Against Pankleon. [Or. XXIII.]—The speaker had formerly indicted Pankleon, a fuller living at Athens (§ 2), for some offence not specified; and believing him to be a resident-alien, had summoned him before the Polemarch, who heard cases in which foreigners were concerned. Pankleon thereupon put in a ‘plea to the jurisdiction,’ on the ground that he was a Plataean by birth, and, as such, entitled at Athens to the rights of an Athenian citizen: and that, therefore, the action ought not to have been brought before the Polemarch. This plea ( παραγραφή) gave rise to a previous trial to decide whether the action, in its original form, could be brought into court (§ 5). In such a case the first speech was usually made by the maintainer of the special plea ² : here it is evidently made by the opponent ³ . The date is uncertain.

With a promise that he will be brief, the speaker comes ⁴ to the facts. Pankleon, on being summoned before the Polemarch, stated himself to be a Plataean by birth, son of Hipparmodôros, and enrolled in the Attic deme of Dekeleia. On inquiry ⁵ , the speaker learned that Pankleon was in fact a runaway slave of a Plataean named Nikomêdes. A few days afterwards, Nikomêdes actually claimed Pankleon as his slave; but the latter was rescued by a gang of bullies (§§ 5—12). He had once before been brought before the Polemarch by a certain Aristodikos, and had blustered, but had eventually given in. Before doing so, he had withdrawn for a time to Thebes—a signal proof that he was no Plataean (§§ 13—15). If the judges bear in mind these plain facts the speaker is confident of a verdict (§ 16).

As in the last speech, so here all is narrative; there is no argument but the logic of facts. These are not stated with the same conciseness and clearness as in the former case; but there is no better ground here than there for suspecting, with Francken, the work of an epitomist ⁶ .