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Lysias: Forensic Speeches in Private Causes; Miscellaneous Writings; Fragments

I. Action for defamation ( δίκη κακηγορίας), Or. X

Of the speeches of Lysias in private causes only four are extant; but each of these four represents a class.

Against Theomnêstos. [Or. X]—The occasion of ¹ this action was as follows. (1) Theomnêstos, a young Athenian, had been indicted by one Lysitheos for throwing away his shield in battle; but had been acquitted. The present speaker had been among the witnesses of Lysitheos; and in the course of the trial had been called a parricide by Theomnêstos. (2) A certain Dionysios, also a witness of Lysitheos, was next prosecuted by Theomnêstos for perjury; and was sentenced to disfranchisement (§ 22). (3) The present speaker then brought his action against Theomnêstos—which was thus the third of a series.

The Athenian law against Defamation ( κακηγο‐² ρίας) punished with a fine of 500 drachmas (about £20) the utterance of certain reproaches classed as ἀπόρρητα (§ 2). To call a citizen a murderer, a striker of father or mother, or to charge him with having thrown away his shield in battle, were among these³. The present case had already been submitted to arbitrators (§ 6); it now came before an ordinary court, under the presidency of the Thesmothetae⁴.⁵

From § 4 the date is certain. The speaker had been thirteen years old in the time of the Tyrants (404—3 B. C.), and was now thirty-three: the speech belongs therefore to 384—3.⁶

Witnesses can scarcely be needed, since many of the judges themselves heard the libel when it was uttered in court. The prosecutor holds it mean and pettifogging ( ἀνελεύθερον—φιλόδικον) to go to law about abusive words; but the taunt of parricide has driven him to it (§§ 1—3). He then proves by witnesses that he was only thirteen years old at the time of his father's death; and that he was directly a sufferer by it, since he became the ward of his father's elder brother, Pantaleon⁷, who has defrauded him (§§ 4, 5).

Theomnêstos owns that he used the taunt; and the taunt has been proved false. But Theomnêstos argues that it is not, in the view of the law, a libel. He said only ‘ slew:’ not ‘murdered.’ Is it lawful, then, the speaker asks, to reproach a man with ‘flinging’ away his shield? The law speaks only of ‘throwing.’ He gives further instances; and then observes that, in the procedure of the Areiopagos, ‘slaying’ is the term always used (§§ 6—14). Not content with this exposure of the quibble, he adds some illustrations from the old laws of Solon. These are full of obsolete words; but their meaning is the same now as ever (§§ 15—20).

If Theomnêstos got satisfaction for having been charged with cowardice, much more should the plaintiff get satisfaction for having been charged with parricide. Theomnêstos has had one favour done him already:—Dionysios, a brave man, has been his victim. For the plaintiff, what could be so shameful a reproach as to be accused of murdering his father —a man who, after serving the democracy all his life, died for it at the hands of the oligarchs? His bravery has to this day its memorials in the temples of Athens; even as the cowardice of Theomnêstos and of his father have their memorials—in the temples of the enemy (§§ 21—29). The plea that the libel was uttered in anger is no defence at law (§ 30). Let the court bear in mind that he, who is now accused of murdering his own father, had in his youth impeached the Tyrants before the Areiopagos. Remembering this, the laws and their oaths, let the judges stand by his father and him (§§ 31, 32).

If not one of the most artistic or the most powerful, ⁸ this is at least one of the most spirited of the speeches of Lysias⁹; and the doubt of its genuineness which seems to have existed in antiquity¹⁰ must be explained—as in the case of the speech For the Invalid—by the slightness of the matter on which the case turned. The verbal quibble of Theomnêstos is, indeed, treated at somewhat excessive length; but the absurdity of the defence was perhaps felt to be among the best supports of the complaint. The conclusion of the speech bears the sure stamp of genuineness. It was a characteristic of Lysias that he loved to end, not with a rhetorical appeal, but with a definite point, put in the fewest and plainest words. Just such an ending we have here. There are besides in the speech several passages quite worthy of Lysias;—for instance, the opening remarks (§§ 1—3); —the reference to the fate of Dionysios (§§ 24, 25);— and the speaker's tribute to his own father (§§ 26—28).¹¹

The reference in § 31 is of some interest. The speaker says that, immediately on reaching the age of eighteen—that is, in 399 or 398 B. C.—he had prosecuted ‘the Thirty’ before the Areiopagos. Now when the Thirty Tyrants left Athens in 403 B. C., Pheidon and Eratosthenes alone of their number are known to have stayed at Athens. If the allusion here is to them, then we see that Eratosthenes escaped at least the penalty of death when impeached by Lysias in 403.¹²

The so-called Second Speech Against Theomnêstos [Or. XI.] is merely an epitome of the First, made by some grammarian later than Harpokration¹³. The epitome preserves for the most part the very words of its original, with which it corresponds as follows:—

Epitome §§ 1— 2 = Speech §§ 1— 5

Epitome §§ 3— 6 = Speech §§ 6—20

Epitome §§ 7—10 = Speech §§ 21—29

Epitome §§ 11—12 = Speech §§ 30—32.

II. Action by a ward against a guardian ( δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς), Or. XXXII

Against Diogeiton. [Or. XXXII.]—After describing ¹⁴ in detail the characteristics of Lysias, Dionysios illustrates his criticism by giving extracts from a Forensic, an Epideictic and a Deliberative Speech. The Olympiakos and the Defence of the Constitution (Or. XXXIV.) supply his examples of the two latter classes. The speech Against Diogeiton is chosen by him to ¹⁵ represent the distinctive excellences of Lysias in the forensic style¹⁶. Photios, too, says expressly that it was among the most admired of all its author's works¹⁷. It belongs to a class of private speeches to which Dionysios gives a special title—the ἐπιτροπικοί, or those made in actions brought by wards against their guardians¹⁸.

Diodotos, an Athenian citizen, went to the coast ¹⁹ of Asia as a hoplite under the command of Thrasyllos in 410 B.C.²⁰,—the year of the battle at Kyzikos. In 408 he was killed at Ephesos, when the troops under Thrasyllos were defeated by the allies of Sparta²¹. Before leaving Athens he had entrusted his two sons and his daughter to the care of Diogeiton, who was at once their uncle and their grandfather, since Diodotos had married his own niece, the daughter of Diogeiton. Eight years (§ 9) after his father's death—that is, in 400 B.C.—the eldest son attained his majority. Thereupon he was informed by Diogeiton that the property left by Diodotos was exhausted, and that he and his brother must shift for themselves.

This action was brought—probably in 400 B. C.— by the eldest son. It is contended that Diodotos had left altogether 15 talents and 26 minae. Diogeiton had at first represented the sum left as only 20 minae 30 staters, i.e. 26 minae altogether. But he had since confessed to 7 talents and 40 minae additional, i.e. 8 talents 6 minae in all. His accounts, however, made him out to have spent 8 talents 10 minae on his wards in eight years; so that, instead of having a balance to hand over to them, he was 4 minae out of pocket.

The speech is directed to showing, first, that the property left by Diodotos was about double of that to which Diogeiton owned; secondly, that his alleged outlay was incredible.

The speaker is husband of the daughter of Diodotos and brother-in-law of the plaintiff. An action of this kind was τιμητή,—that is, the plaintiff named the sum which he claimed; as Demosthenes, for instance, claimed ten talents from his guardians. It does not appear what precise sum was claimed from Diogeiton. The case would come before an ordinary court; and, as a ward was suing his guardian, the president of the court would be the first Archon.

The speaker begins by explaining the necessity which ²² forces him to appear against a relative. His brothers-in-law, cruelly wronged, have besought his aid. Their grandfather Diogeiton had rejected all attempts at mediation; they were therefore driven to seek a legal remedy for his flagrant abuse of his trust (§§ 1—3).

The narrative of facts falls into two parts:—(i) The circumstances under which Diogeiton was appointed guardian, and his assumption of the office on the death of Diodotos: §§ 4—8. (ii) The disclosure made by him to his eldest ward on the latter coming of age, and the interview which followed between the young man's mother and her father Diogeiton: §§ 9—18.

These facts having been proved by witnesses, the speaker turns to the case set up by the defence. The defendant (i) has denied receiving part of the property; and (ii) professes to account for the rest:—§ 20. This account is scrutinised in detail, and shown to be absurd. On the most liberal reckoning, a balance of six talents should have been forthcoming (§§ 19—29).

Here the extract given by Dionysios ends. The statement of the defendant as to the amount which he had originally received must have been the next topic; followed, probably, by the peroration.

This speech—or fragment—is admirable for two ²³ things; the compact marshalling of a mass of intricate details, so that the broad result is made triumphantly clear; and the artistic treatment of character. Nothing could be better fitted to disarm prejudice, or even to create one favourable to the speaker, than the simple opening words. They show no bitterness against Diogeiton,—on the contrary, annoyance at having to appear against him—a necessity for which no one but himself is to blame. But the rhetorical skill is highest in the dramatic passage where the plaintiff's mother is brought in upbraiding her father Diogeiton with his purpose of disinheriting her sons, and the effect of the pleading on those who heard it is described (§§ 12—18).

III. Trial of a claim to property ( διαδικασία), Or. XVII

²⁴

On the Property of Eraton. [Or. XVII.²⁵]—This is the only extant speech of Lysias in a diadikasia,— i.e. in a case of a disputed claim ( διαδίκασμα, § 10) to property either between two private persons or between a private person and the State. Here the dispute lies between a private claimant and the State.

The speaker's grandfather had lent two talents to Eraton, who died without having repaid them. Eraton's three sons, Erasiphon, Eraton, and Erasistratos, failed to pay the interest. The speaker's father therefore brought an action against Erasistratos, the only one of the three brothers who was at Athens; and obtained an order for the payment of the entire debt, principal and interest.

His father having died about this time, the speaker, in right of the verdict, took possession of certain lands of Erasistratos at Sphettos, and claimed at law certain other lands at Kikynna, which the representatives of Erasiphon, the eldest brother, refused to give up to him.

Meanwhile—for what reason is not stated—all the property which had belonged to the elder Eraton²⁶ was confiscated by the State. The speaker was obliged to give up the lands at Sphettos, which he had already for two years been letting to tenants (§ 5,) and to withdraw his claim to the others.

He now brings an action against the Treasury for the partial satisfaction of his claim upon the property of Eraton. The whole of this property was (he says) insufficient to satisfy his claim. Yet he is ready to give up two-thirds of it to the State; and rates the remaining third, which he demands for himself, at 15 minae (§ 7);—i.e. one-eighth of the sum originally lent by his father to Eraton.

The case is heard by an ordinary court, of which the fiscal board of syndici (§ 10) were presidents. Since the action against Erasistratos fell in the archonship of Xenaenetos (§ 3), i.e. in 400 B. C., and ²⁷ three years had elapsed since (§ 5), the date is 397 B.C., of which the winter months had already passed (ib.).

The plaintiff begins by expressing a fear that the judges ²⁸ give him credit for powers of speech which he does not possess—an exordium which suggests that he was at least in some way distinguished (§ 1.) He then gives a narrative, in three parts, of the facts just stated, witnesses being called at the close of each part: (i) § 2: (ii) § 3: (iii) §§ 4—9. He ends by simply asking for a verdict (§ 10).²⁹

In this short speech there is no argument; the proofs are all ‘inartificial,’ ἄτεχνοι πίστεις: i.e. derived directly from witnesses and documents. But there is certainly no reason for suspecting that we have here merely an epitome of a longer oration, like the so-called ‘Second’ speech against Theomnêstos³⁰. Short as it is, the speech is in every respect complete and clear. There is nothing of that crowding which is generally apparent in a summary; the whole is on a small scale, but the symmetry of the parts is perfect. Besides, each section of the narrative is followed by a short recapitulation (§§ 3, 4, 10). An epitomist would have left out epitomes.

IV. Answer to a special plea ( πρὸς παραγραφήν), Or. XXIII

³¹

Against Pankleon. [Or. XXIII.]—The speaker had formerly indicted Pankleon, a fuller living at Athens (§ 2), for some offence not specified; and believing him to be a resident-alien, had summoned him before the Polemarch, who heard cases in which foreigners were concerned. Pankleon thereupon put in a ‘plea to the jurisdiction,’ on the ground that he was a Plataean by birth, and, as such, entitled at Athens to the rights of an Athenian citizen: and that, therefore, the action ought not to have been brought before the Polemarch. This plea ( παραγραφή) gave rise to a previous trial to decide whether the action, in its original form, could be brought into court (§ 5). In such a case the first speech was usually made by the maintainer of the special plea³²: here it is evidently made by the opponent³³. The date is uncertain.

With a promise that he will be brief, the speaker comes ³⁴ to the facts. Pankleon, on being summoned before the Polemarch, stated himself to be a Plataean by birth, son of Hipparmodôros, and enrolled in the Attic deme of Dekeleia. On inquiry³⁵, the speaker learned that Pankleon was in fact a runaway slave of a Plataean named Nikomêdes. A few days afterwards, Nikomêdes actually claimed Pankleon as his slave; but the latter was rescued by a gang of bullies (§§ 5—12). He had once before been brought before the Polemarch by a certain Aristodikos, and had blustered, but had eventually given in. Before doing so, he had withdrawn for a time to Thebes—a signal proof that he was no Plataean (§§ 13—15). If the judges bear in mind these plain facts the speaker is confident of a verdict (§ 16).

As in the last speech, so here all is narrative; there is no argument but the logic of facts. These are not stated with the same conciseness and clearness as in the former case; but there is no better ground here than there for suspecting, with Francken, the work of an epitomist³⁶ .

Miscellaneous Writings.

To his Companions: a Complaint of Slanders. [Or. VIII.]

A friend addresses friends who have wronged him—states his grievances—and formally renounces their acquaintance.³⁷

The opportunity is favourable for approaching this painful but unavoidable subject. He has before him both those whom he wishes to accuse and those whom he wishes to witness the accusation (§§ 1—2). His so-called friends have spoken of him as having thrust his society upon them (§§ 3—8). They have also persuaded him to buy an unsound horse, and have since taken part with the seller (§§ 9—13). Lastly, they have charged him with inciting others to slander them (§§ 14—17). For all these reasons he renounces their friendship. He will be safe now—for they attack only their friends (§§ 18—20).

It is scarcely worth while to inquire how this curiously absurd composition first came among the works of Lysias. As it is too uniformly dreary to be mistaken for a joke, not even a grammarian's conception of his sportive style can explain the imputation. The person who could thus take leave of his friends is certainly hard to imagine; but it is perhaps equally difficult—notwithstanding the amplitude of fatuity conventionally supposed in ‘the late sophist’—to fancy any one taking such a subject for an exercise³⁸.

The Erotikos in the Phaedros.

2. The Erotikos in Plato's Phaedros (pp. 230 E —234 C).—Plato makes Phaedros read to Sokrates a speech of Lysias in which the claims of the nonlover are urged as against those of the lover. Even to ask whether this speech is or is not an actual work of Lysias might seem at first sight to argue a want of sympathy with the broad literary characteristics of the dialogues. This speech of Lysias, it might be assumed, is as much Plato's own creation as the funeral speech by Aspasia which Sokrates repeats in the Menexenos,—or as the discourses put into the mouths of the sophists in the Protagoras,— or as those delivered by Aspasia, Agathon, Aristophanes and others in the Symposium. The gravity of the imitation is, of course, perfect; but only a matter-of-fact reader could be misled by it.

This is probably the light in which the question would appear at first to most readers of Plato. But a nearer examination of the Phaedros brings out two points which seem to distinguish this case in an important way from cases apparently analogous. ³⁹

The first point is the elaborate dramatic preparation made for such a recital of the speech as shall be verbally exact. Phaedros is asked to repeat it from memory—makes excuses—is pressed; and presently it turns out that he has the book with him. Now if the speech was merely Plato's imitation of Lysias, surely this preface would be somewhat heavy —inartistic, indeed, as forcing attention too strongly upon the illusion. It is perfectly fitting, on the other hand, as the dramatist's apology for bringing into his own work of art so large a piece of another's work⁴⁰. There is surely a special emphasis here:—

Phaedr. What do you mean, Sokrates? How can you imagine that I, who am quite unpractised, can remember or do justice to an elaborate work, which the greatest rhetorician of the day spent a long time in composing. Indeed, I cannot; I would give a great deal if I could.

Sokr. I believe that I know Phaedros about as well as I know myself, and I am very sure that he heard the words of Lysias, not once only, but again and again he made him say them, and Lysias was very willing to gratify him; at last, when nothing else would satisfy him, he got hold of the book, and saw what he wanted—this was his morning's occupation—and then when he was tired with sitting, he went out to take a walk, not until, as I believe, he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse, which may not have been very long....Therefore, Phaedros, as he will soon speak in any case, beg him to speak at once.

Phaedr. As you don't seem very likely to let me off until I speak in some way, the best thing that I can do is to speak as I best may.

Sokr. That is a very true observation of yours.

Phaedr. I will do my best, for believe me, Socrates, I did not learn the very words; O no, but I have a general notion of what he said, and will repeat concisely, and in order, the several arguments by which the case of the nonlover was proved to be superior to that of the lover; let me begin at the beginning.

Sokr. Yes, my friend; but you must first of all show what you have got in your left hand under your cloak, for that roll, as I suspect, is the actual discourse. Now, much as I love you, I would not have you suppose that I am going to have your memory exercised upon me, if you have Lysias himself here⁴¹.

The second point to be observed is the closeness ⁴² of the criticism made by Sokrates on the speech— corresponding to the elaborateness of the contrivance for an accurate report of it. General criticism of expression or of moral drift would have been perfectly in place even if the speech had been fictitious. But detailed criticism—recognition, on the one hand, of ‘clearness,’ ‘roundness,’ ‘polish’ in every phrase— on the other hand, ridicule of the chaos of topics, of the repetitions, and especially of the beginning which is no beginning—would this have much meaning or force if the satirist were merely analysing his own handiwork?

Sokr. Well, but are you and I expected to praise the sentiments of the author, or only the clearness, and roundness, and accuracy, and tournure of the language?...I thought, though I speak under correction, that he repeated himself two or three times, either from want of words or from want of pains⁴³....

Again, further on:—

Sokr. Read, that I may have his exact words.

Phaedr. (reading). ‘You know my views of our common interest; and I do not think that I ought to fail in the object of my suit because I am not your lover, for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love is over.’

Sokr. Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood of words to the place of starting....Then as to the other topics—are they not a mass of confusion? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic or any other topic follow in that order? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote freely off just what came into his head⁴⁴....

Then comes the comparison of the speech to the epitaph on Midas, and Phaedros can bear it no longer:—

You are making fun of that oration of ours.

Sokr. Well, I will say no more about your friend, lest I should give offence to you⁴⁵ ....

It is surely clear that the speech of Lysias is both so introduced and so handled by Plato as to stand on a wholly different ground from such dramatic fictions as those in the Protagoras, where the sophists are persons of the drama, imitated in their general method and style of discourse; or from the fiction of Aspasia's authorship in the Menexenos—a fiction, indeed, which Plato has taken so little trouble to keep up that he makes her allude to the Peace of Antalkidas⁴⁶. It would not be much to the purpose to analyse the composition of the Erotikos, or to show that it bears the special marks of the style of Lysias⁴⁷. This could prove nothing. Plato could have imitated Lysias, if he had chosen, without much danger of being found out by us. It is the evidence of the dialogue, not the evidence of the speech itself, which is important.

Lysias is the earliest known writer of Erotic discourses⁴⁸; and he is in a twofold sense the object of Plato's attack in the Phaedros. The primary subject of that dialogue is the antithesis between the false and the true Rhetoric. The true Rhetoric springs from Dialectic, and Dialectic from love of the ideas. Hence the secondary subject of the dialogue is the antithesis between false and true Love. Lysias is by his profession a representative for Plato of the false Rhetoric; by his Erotikos in particular he is the representative of the false Eros. Plato could have imitated well enough for his purpose the general rhetorical characteristics of Lysias; but he embodied the Erotikos in his dialogue, because, further, he wished Lysias to speak for himself upon a special subject⁴⁹ .

Fragments.

Three hundred and thirty-five fragments of every kind, from speeches, letters or unknown works, are arranged and examined by Sauppe, Oratores Attici, vol. II. pp. 170—216. Of this number, 252 represent 127 speeches of known title. Six of the 127 are represented by fragments more considerable than the rest. These six demand a few words of notice.

In a Public Cause.

1. Against Kinesias [LXXIII., LXXIV. Frag. ⁵⁰ 143 in Sauppe].

In Private Causes.

2. Against Tisis [CXIX. 231, 232]. 3. For Pherenikos [CXX. 233, 234]. 4. Against the Sons of Hippokrates [LXII. 124]. 5. Against Archebiades [XIX. 44, 45]. 6. Against Aeschines [I. 1—4].

1. Against Kinesias.

1. Against Kinesias.—Harpokration mentions two speeches of Lysias against Kinesias. One of these was probably identical with that speech of Lysias ‘For Phanios’ from which Athenaeos (XIII. p. 551 D) gives an extract. Phanios had been accused by Kinesias of proposing an unconstitutional measure ( παρανόμων). The short extract in question is a personal attack upon Kinesias, whose impiety, and unfitness, therefore, to be the champion of the laws, are set forth. He is described as having belonged to a club the members of which styled themselves κακοδαιμονισταί—‘the Mephistophelians’ —in ridicule of societies who chose carefully euphemistic names⁵¹. As the latter held their meetings on the first of the month, the seventh, or some such auspicious day, so this society made a point of meeting on one of the black days of the calendar ( ἀποφράδες ἡμέραι). Kinesias is satirised by Aristophanes, partly for his dithyrambs, partly for his atheism⁵²; and enjoyed the distinction of having a whole comedy written about him by Strattis⁵³.

The next four fragments have all been preserved by Dionysios; who quotes the first of them in comparing Lysias with Demosthenes—the other three, in contrasting Lysias with Isaeos.

2. Against Tisis.

2. Against Tisis.—Tisis, a young Athenian, had quarrelled with one Archippos at the palaestra; had treacherously invited him to supper afterwards; and then tied him to a pillar and flogged him. Archippos brought an action for assault and battery ( αἰκίας δίκη); and the present speech was written for him by Lysias. The extract given by Dionysios⁵⁴ contains the narrative of the facts, which he compares with the similar narrative in the speech of Demosthenes against Konon (§§ 3—9). The critic remarks that to other excellences Demosthenes joined those which distinguished the narrative style of Lysias—clearness and naturalness.

3. For Pherenikos.

3. For Pherenikos.—This fragment is concerned with historical names. Plutarch⁵⁵ mentions Pelopidas, Androkleidas, Pherenikos as the principal of the Thebans who fled to Athens when the Kadmea was seized by Phoebidas in 382 B.C. It appears that Androkleidas had died soon after their arrival, and that Pherenikos had taken possession of his property. He was sued for it by a rival claimant, probably also a Theban; and the present speech was made in his defence by an Athenian citizen, who had been hospitably received at Thebes by Kephisodotus, father of Pherenikos, in the exile of 404 B. C. Dionysios expressly says that the speech was made for Pherenikos as for a ξένος—which is against the improbable statement of Aristeides⁵⁶ that the Athenian franchise had been given to the Theban exiles on this occasion. As the exiles were restored to Thebes in 379, this speech must belong to the year 381 or 380, and is therefore the latest known work of Lysias. Quoting a passage of the same kind from a lost oration of Isaeos⁵⁷—in which the advocate explains the motives of gratitude which have prompted him to come forward—Dionysios compares it with this extract. In Isaeos, we hear the rhetorician; here it is the private friend who recounts in the simplest but most telling words the great services which Pherenikos and his father had rendered to the Athenian refugees.

4. Against the Sons of Hippokrates

4. Against the Sons of Hippokrates.—A guardian is here defending himself against a charge of malversation in his trust which had been brought against him by his wards. Dionysios⁵⁸ places an extract from the opening of this speech beside a defence written by Isaeos for a guardian; and remarks upon the difference between the styles in which they respectively resent the imputation. The client of Isaeos uses elaborate phrases; the client of Lysias speaks like a plain man, expressing a natural sense of hardship at the recompense which his wards are giving him.

5. Against Archebiades.

5. Against Archebiades.—A young Athenian citizen who has lately succeeded to a fortune by his father's death is sued by Archebiades for a debt alleged to have been contracted by his father. The point of the contrast which Dionysios⁵⁹ illustrates by an extract from this speech is the same as in the two last cases. Isaeos, too, had once occasion to write for a young client inexperienced in lawsuits. Yet even here he could not prevent his artificialism from showing itself. Lysias, on the contrary, has given to the life the character of a man who was never in a law-court before, who does not deserve to be there now, and who hopes never to be there again.

6. Against Aeschines.

6. Against Aeschines.—The Aeschines in question here is that disciple whom Sokrates once advised ‘to borrow from himself by shortening his commons’⁶⁰. Athenaeos⁶¹ quotes a curious passage from this speech by way of exemplifying the truth that philosophers are not always philosophers. ‘Who would have supposed,’ he says, ‘that Aeschines the Sokratic had been such a character as Lysias makes him in one of his speeches on contracts?’ ( ἐν τοῖς τῶν συμβολαίων λόγοις.) The ‘contract’ to which the speech cited by Athenaeos referred was a debt, due from Aeschines to the speaker. It is not clear, as Blass remarks, how Aeschines came to be plaintiff instead of defendant in the action; that he was so, however, is plain from the opening words. Aeschines had applied for a loan to help him to set up in business as a distiller of perfumes ( τέχνην μυρεψικὴν κατασκευάζεσθαι). The speaker had lent him the money, ‘reflecting that this Aeschines had been a disciple of Sokrates, and was in the habit of discoursing impressively concerning Justice and Virtue.’ Then come some scandalous stories about Aeschines. The genuineness of the speech has been elaborately attacked by Welcker⁶², who takes it to be the work of a later rhetorician, inspired by hatred of philosophers generally. He thinks it too coarsely defamatory for Lysias. This kind of argument is scarcely satisfactory when not supported by particular evidence; and in this case there is none. Sauppe and Blass seem right, then, in holding the fragment to be genuine. The broad comedy of the latter part is remarkable⁶³ .

Letters.

Letters are mentioned among the writings of Lysias by Dionysios, by the pseudo-Plutarch and by Suidas⁶⁴. The last-named speaks of seven; one, ‘a business letter’ ( πραγματικήν), is generally identified with the letter to Polykrates cited by Harpokration. In the other six may probably be included the letter (or address) in the Phaedros; the Erôtikos quoted by Harpokration; and the letters to Asybaros and Metaneira. A few short sentences are all that remain. But two of these are interesting; each belongs, apparently, to a letter written after some coolness or misunderstanding with a friend; and each of them shows in the writer a characteristically eager warmth towards friends.

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. Sir Richard C. Jebb. London. 1876.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos (English) (The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. Jebb, Richard Claverhouse, author. London: Macmillan, 1876.)

Notes on the current edition

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos

1. I. Against Theomnêstos.

2. Law against Defamation.

3. See the speech §§ 6—9: ἀνδροφόνος—πατραλοίας—μητραλοίας —ῥῖψαι τὴν ἀσπίδα. From Dem. in Eubul. § 30 it appears that to reproach a citizen with trading in the marketplace ( τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐργασίαν) came under this law.

4. Meier and Schmann, Att. Proc. p. 67.

5. Date

6. Analysis.

7. The language in § 5 leaves it ambiguous whether Pantaleon was uncle or brother of the speaker; Sauppe assumes the former, which is more likely. The speech of Lysias κατὰ Πανταλέοντος ( Frag. v.) may, he thinks, have had this man for its object. He conjectures that the father of the speaker—who is said in § 27 to have died for the democracy—may have been that Leon of Salamis who was put to death by the Thirty ( Or. Att. II. p. 202).

8. The Speech suspected in antiquity —but probably genuine.

9. ‘Oratio prior in Theomnestum ad optimas Lysiae referenda,’ says Francken: which is true so far, certainly, that ‘indignationis et justi plena doloris est oratio’ ( Comment. Lys. p. 72).

10. Harpokration adds εἰ γνήσιος to his citation of the speech S. VV. ἀπίλλειν, ἀπόρρητα, πεφασμένης, ποδοκακκη: but not S. VV. ἐπιορκήσαντα, οἰκέως.

11. Reference in § 31 to ‘the Tyrants.’

12. The ‘Second’ Speech an Epitome.

13. Who in no one of his six references to the speech Against Theomnêstos (see above) distinguishes it by ά.

14. II. Against Diogeiton.

15. Special prestige of this Speech.

16. Dionys. de Lys cc. 20—27.

17. Phot. Cod. 262 θαυμάζονται μέντοι γε αὐτοῦ ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ λόγοι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ πρὸς Διογείτονα ἐπιτροπῆς. After praising it in detail, he concludes— καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅλος ὁ λόγος ἄξιος θαυμάσαι κατά τε τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ νοήματα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὴν ἐναρμόνιον τούτων συνθήκην, καὶ τὴν εὕρεσίν τε καὶ τάξιν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων.

18. De Lys. c. 20 ἔστι δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτροπικῶν.

19. Occasion and Date.

20. Γλαυκίππου ἄρχοντος, Dionys. Lys. c. 21, in his ὑπόθεσις to the speech.

21. Xenophon distinctly refers the battle at Ephesos, in which the troops of Thrasyllos were engaged, to the archonship of Euktêmon in Ol. 93. 1, i.e. 408 B C.: see Hellen. I. ii. 1 and 7 . Blass ( Att. Ber. p. 620) puts the battle in 410; Grote in 409 (vol. VIII. p. 174). But the statement of Xenophon, at least, is clear. I once thought that in § 7 of the speech we might read Ἐρέσῳ instead of Ἐρέσῳ: since Eresos in Lesbos was in fact attacked by Thrasyllos in 411 B. C. (Thue. VIII. 100). But this, on the other hand, does not agree with the ἐπὶ Γλαυκίππου ἄρχοντος of Dionysios.

22. Analysis.

23. The twofold merit of the Speech.

24. III. On the Property of Eraton.

25. The title in the MSS. is περὶ δημοσίων α·δικημάτων. Reiske ( Or. Att. v. 588) thinks that this title is common to our speech and to the next ( περὶ δημεύσεως τῶν τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφοῦ): and that it may have stood originally thus— ΛΥΣΙΟΥ ΠΕΡΙΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΝ ΑΔΙΚΗΜΛΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΟΙ. Dobree concurs in this view ( Adv. I p 233) Sauppe follows Schott ( O. A. I. p. 110) in changing ἀδικημάτων to χρημάτων and so prints it in his edition; but this is unsatisfactory. Hoelscher (ap. Blass, Att. Ber p. 628) suggests πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον περὶ τῶν Ἐράτωνος χρημάτων (better περὶ τῶν Ἐ. χρ. πρὸς τὸ δ.); and this would be a better title

26. In § 6 Ἐρασιφῶντος must be altered to Ἐράτωνος (meaning the elder Eraton), as appears from §§ 4 f.

27. Date.

28. Analysis.

29. No ground for supposing this to be an epitome.

30. Francken ( Comment. Lys. p. 123) says

‘probabile mihi videtur, esse hanc orationem commentarium, aut potius excerptam esse ex genuina Lysiaca;’

and at p. 238 he describes it as ‘epitome.’

31. IV. Against Pankleon.

32. See e.g. the speeches of Demosthenes For Phormio and Against Pantaenetos, and that of Isokrates Against Kallimachos.

33. Meier and Schömann, Att. Proc. p. 648. The speaker makes a full statement of the facts. He would have assumed a general knowledge of the case on the part of the judges, and would have addressed himself rather to particular points, if Pankleon had spoken before him.

34. Analysis.

35. The particulars of the inquiry are curious. The speaker goes to look for the Dekeleia men at a barber's shop in the Hermae street (leading from the Old to the New Market-place), a regular resort for the men of that deme— τὸ κουρεῖον τὸ παρὰ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς ἵνα οἱ Δεκελεῖς προσφοιτῶσιν (§ 3). He seeks the Plataeans, again, at the cheese-market in the Old Agora—hearing that on the first of every month ἐκεῖσε συλλέγονται οἱ Πλαταιεῖς (§ 6).

36. Comment. Lys. p. 238 ‘ excerpta ex Lysiaca.’ At p. 164 he says only ‘equidem spondere ausim, hanc Lysiacam esse; sed aut non satis ab auctore aut satis superque ab aliis refictam.’ Dobree notices, and appears to endorse, a doubt of its genuineness; but without assigning grounds ( Adv. I. 245).

37. Analysis.

38. Benseler—a very close observer of the style of Lysias—points out that in this Eighth Oration there are hardly any examples of hiatus, and that such as do occur can easily be removed — e.g. in § 7 by reading εὐνοοῦντες for εὖνοι ὄντες. Here, then—in this marked avoidance of hiatus—we have at least one definite mark of a postLysian style (Bens. de hiatu, pp. 182 f.). In § 17, again, one may recognise very distinctly the ring of the scholastic rhetoric— ᾤμην γὰρ ἀπόθετος ὑμῖν εἶναι φίλος, κ.τ.λ. Some phrases in §§ 2, 14 again— ἐναντίον τῆς ἐλπίδος—ὁ δὲ τοσοῦτον ὑπερεῖδε τὸ δἰ ἐμέ—are not like the Attic of Lysias.

39. 1. Preparation for a verbally exact recital.

40. Phaedr. p. 228. It may be noticed that at p. 243 C the speech of Lysias is designated, with the same emphasis which I recognise in the opening scene, as ὁ ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ῥηθείς.

41. pp. 234 E—235 A. (From the Translation by Professor Jowett.)

42. 2. Character of the criticism.

43. p. 235 E.

44. p 263 E.

45. p. 264 D.

46. Menex. p. 245 C.

47. Blass ( Att. Ber. p. 422) points out that, plain as the style of the Erotikos is on the whole, there is rather more rhetorical ornament of the type made popular by Gorgias than Lysias usually employed: see e.g. p. 233 E ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ ἀγαπήσουσι καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἥξουσι | καὶ μάλιστα ἡσθήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην χάριν εἴσονται καὶ πολλα ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς εὔξονται. In such a piece as this—written very likely, as Grote suggests ( Plato I. 254), simply for the amusement of friends — it was natural enough that Lysias should have drawn upon the ληκύθια of the Sicilian school rather more than he would have allowed himself to do in a graver performance.

48. Dr Thompson, Phaedr. p. 151 note 3.

49. In the foregoing discussion I have purposely abstained from attempting to examine several arguments, turning on more or less fine points of style, which have been brought forward on each side. The fact that we have to do with such a literary artist as Plato seems to minimize the value of any argument which might be founded on the internal evidence of the speech. As to external evidence, we know only (1) that Dionysios and the pseudo-Plutarch mention ἐρωτικοί among the works of Lysias; (2) that this particular ἐρωτικός was thought really his by Diogenes Laertius (III. 25), by Hermeias p. 63 (quoted in Spengel's συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν, p. 126); and (as Dr Thompson points out, Phaedr. p. 184, Appendix III.) by Cornelius Fronto—who took it as one of his models in his extant ἐρωτικός to Marcus Aurelius. I would add that the reference of Hermogenes ( περὶ ἰδ. I. 12, Sp. Rh. Gr. II. 331) makes it plain that he thought the ἐρωτικός authentic. The evidence of the dialogue in which the speech is set must decide the question. This is, to my mind, conclusive for the authenticity.Modern critics have been much divided. Among those who believe the Erotikos genuine are Sauppe ( Or. Att. II. p. 209), Spengel ( συν. τεχνῶν, p. 126), Blass ( Att. Ber. p. 416—423 — where L. Schmidt is quoted as agreeing) —and Dr Thompson in his edition of the Phaedros: see esp. Appendix I. Among those who regard the discourse as fictitious are Stallbaum ( Lysiaca ad illustrandas Phaedri Platonis origines, Leipz. 1851); C. F. Hermann ( Gesammelte Abhandlungen, pp. 1 ff.); K. O. Müller ( Hist. Gr. Lit. c. 35, vol. II. p. 140 ed. Donaldson); and Professor Jowett, in his Introduction to the dialogue (Translation, vol. I. p. 553).

50. Speeches.

51. Such as the νουμηνιασταί mentioned in Frag. 143— ἀντὶ νουμηνιαστῶν κακοδαιμονιστὰς σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τοὕνομα θέμενοι.

52. Ar. Ran. 366 : Eccl. 330 : Lys. 838 , 852 .

53. Meineke, Com. Graec. I. pp. 227 f.

54. De Demosth. c. 11.

55. Pelop. c. 5.

56. Panath. p. 300 c.

57. ὑπὲρ Εὐμάθους, εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαίρεσις. Dionys. de Isae. c. 6. On this and the two next Fragments, see vol II pp. 277 f., 365 f.

58. De Isaeo c. 6.

59. De Isaeo c. 10.

60. Diog. Laert. II. 62, φασὶ δ’ αὐτῷ λέγειν Σωκράτην, ἐπειδήπερ ἐπιέζετο ὑπὸ πενίας, παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ δανείζεσθαι τῶν σιτίων ὑφαιροῦντα.

61. XIII. p. 611 D.

62. The substance of his view, as explained in an essay, Unachtheit der Rede des Lysias gegen den Sokratiker Aeschines, is given by Sauppe, O. A. II. p. 170.

63. Besides this fragment — to which Athenaeos (XIII. p. 611 D) gives the title, πρὸς Αἰσχίνην τὸν Σωκρατικὸν χρεώς—two others are cited by the lexicographers; viz. (1) κατ’ Αἰσχίνου περὶ τῆς δημεύσεως τῶν Ἀριστοφάνους χρημάτων: Harpokr. s. v. Χύτροι: and (2) πρὸς Αἰσχίνην βλάβης: Bekker anecd. p. 132, 23. Sauppe thinks that neither of the two latter was against the Sokratic. Aeschines was one of the commonest names. Diogenes Laertius (II. 64) mentions eight bearers of the name who were all more or less distinguished. The speech περὶ συκοφαντίας which Diogenes notices in the same chapter as having been written by Lysias against the Sokratic Aeschines is very likely that from which our fragment comes: see its opening words— νομίζω δ’ οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αὐτὸν ἑτέραν ταύτης ( δίκην) συκοφαντωδεστέραν ἐξευρεῖν.

64. Dionys. De Lys. c. 3, cf. c. 1. [Plut.] Vit. Lys.: Suidas s. v. Αυσίας.

Sir Richard C. Jebb The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos 1.11