[510B]
ᾗ κτλ.
With
ᾗ cf.
Theaet. 172 D
.
τὸ μέν is
CE.
τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν
: i.e. the objects represented by
CD, which were ‘imitated’ or copied in
AD. They were originals then, but are only images now: this is the force of the collocation
μιμηθεῖσιν—εἰκόσι. Cf. 510 E
ἃ πλάττουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσί, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι, 511 A
εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι, and for the meaning of
μιμηθεῖσιν X 599 A
τό τε μιμηθησόμενον καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον and
Laws 668 B. I have restored the reading of A,
μιμηθεῖσιν, with which Proclus (
in Plat. remp. I p. 291 Kroll) also agrees.
τμηθεῖσιν, which appears to be adopted by all other editors, occurs in all the available MSS except A. But
τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσι would include
AD as well as
DC, and the illustrations employed in the inferior
νοητόν are drawn solely from
DC, as is proved by 510 E (cited above), as well as by the actual facts of the case. The sole objection to
μιμηθεῖσι is that the word is generally used only of “artificiosa imitatio” (Schneider): yet in
Pol. 293 E
, 297 C,
Phil. 40 C
and Arist.
Hist. An. II 8. 502^{b} 9 the ‘imitatio’ can hardly be called ‘artificiosa.’ 511 A seems to me sufficient by itself to prove that A is right. Schneider (
Addit. p. 51) refers to a dissertation by Mommsen published in 1842 as taking the view here advocated.
ἐξ ὑποθέσεων
. ὑπόθεσις is correctly defined in the Platonic
ὅροι (415 B) as
ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος, a starting-point which is not demonstrated, but taken for granted, assumed, postulated. The arithmetician, for example,
ὑποτίθεται the odd, the even, etc., i.e. assumes that his definition of odd, even, etc. is correct, and draws conclusions from his
ὑπόθεσις of the odd, the even, etc. by means of exclusively deductive reasoning: cf. H. Sidgwick in
J. Ph. II p. 100. If we attack his
ὑπόθεσις, as Lucian for example does (
Hermot. 74, quoted by Stallbaum), he must,
quâ arithmetician, throw up the sponge, for the
ὑποθέσεις of the inferior
νοητόν can be demonstrated (or overthrown) only by Dialectic. Cf. generally
Men. 86 E
ff. Schneider may be right in supposing that Aristotle had the present passage in view when he wrote
εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν (
Eth. Nic. I 2. 1095^{a} 32), though it is perhaps better (with Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 587 note 2) to suppose that he is alluding to Plato's oral instruction.
τὸ δ) αὖ ἕτερον κτλ.
τὸ ἕτερον is
EB. The article after
ἕτερον (see cr. n.) stands self-condemned, although its intrusion is difficult to explain.
ὅ, which Schneider proposes, is also difficult, though in harmony with Ficinus (alterum vero, quod excogitat animus), for the verb of the relative clause can hardly be omit ted.
λόγῳ, once proposed by Hermann, has nothing in its favour.
ζητεῖ must be supplied to govern
τὸ ἕτερον.
ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον
. The only
ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος is the Idea of the Good: cf. VII 532 A f. Towards this the Dialectician travels, starting from
ὑποθέσεις. He may begin, for example, by ‘assuming’ the ‘just.’ In such a case he assumes that his definition of ‘just’ is correct, i.e. corresponds exactly to the Idea of ‘Just.’ But whereas the arithmetician treats his
ὑπόθεσις as an ultimate truth, and proceeds deductively to a conclusion, making use of sensible images by way of illustration, the dialectician treats his hypothesis as purely provisional, testing, revising, rejecting (VII 533 C note), and reconstructing, and gradually ascending step by step to the first principle of all (
τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχήν), without employing any sensible objects to illustrate his reasoning. The one gives no account of his
ὑπόθεσις (
οὐδένα λόγον—φανερῶν in C below); the other not only does, but must do so, just because he
is a dialectician: cf. VII 533 C ff. He connects his
ὑποθέσεις with others, subsuming them under higher and yet higher —better and truer—
ὑποθέσεις, until at last he has traversed the whole region of
νοητά. Such of his
ὑποθέσεις as survive will be improved at each stage in the ascent, and finally, as soon as the Idea of Good is reached, all his surviving
ὑποθέσεις will actually have become perfect counterparts of the Ideas which they have hitherto been only
assumed to represent. In the meantime the
ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντός, which Plato himself described dogmatically
δἰ εἰκόνος in 507 A—509 C, will have ceased to be a mere
ὑπόθεσις: it will have become, in the fullest sense of the term, an
ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος: for the highest rung of the ladder is not reached until the entire domain of the knowable has been exhausted, and shewn to be the expression of the Idea of Good. Plato's ideal—it is no more—is a comprehensive and purely intellectual view of the totality of
νοητά, in which every department is seen in its connexion with every other, and all in their dependence on the Good, which is in itself
ἀνυπόθετος and
ὑπερούσιος—ἀνυπόθετος because higher than all
ὑποθέσεις and itself proved by an exhaustive scrutiny of all
νοητά, ὑπερούσιος because higher than, and the cause of, all existence. See also on 511 B and the Appendix to Book VII
On Plato's Dialectic, together with Jackson
J. of Ph. X pp. 145 f., where the distinctive peculiarities of the two methods are very clearly explained.
ὧνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων
: i.q.
ἄνευ τῶν αἷσπερ ἐκεῖνο (
ζητεῖ)
εἰκόνων. I formerly read
τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων (with
q), but now think (with Schneider and others) that A is right. The attraction of a relative in the dative case is rare, but not unexampled. Van Cleef (
de attract. in enunt. rel. usu Plat. p. 45) cites
Gorg. 509 A
,
Prot. 361 E
,
Theaet. 144 A
,
Rep. VII 531 E (all examples of
ἐντυγχάνω, whose proper construction in the sense of ‘fall in with’ is the dative, not the genitive), and
Ep. VII 327 A (with
προσέτυχον); for examples in other authors see Kühner
Gr. Gr. II p. 914. If
ἄνευ and
ἐκεῖνο are pronounced with emphasis, the meaning, I think, is easily caught. Stallbaum reads
ὧν περὶ κτλ. with one Vienna MS, understanding, I suppose,
χρῆται .
αὐτοῖς ‐‐ δἰ αὐτῶν
. αὐτοῖς (
ipsis= solis) is further accentuated by
δἰ αὐτῶν (‘through themselves alone’): cf. 511 C. The
εἴδη of the dialectician do not employ the adventitious aid of
εἰκόνες: see on 511 B. The use of
εἴδεσι here must not be held to imply that even the dialectician's conceptions of the Ideas are correct
before he has reached the Idea of the Good. Till then, they are only
ὑποθέσεις, though the false
ὑποθέσεις are weeded out (VII 533 C note), and the hypothetical character of the survivors is gradually eliminated in the course of the ascent. See on
ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον above, and contrast 511 C.
ἀλλ’ αὖθις κτλ.
‘Then have it over again, said I.’ The ellipse has a colloquial effect. Ast's
εὐθύς for
αὖθις is unlikely: nor does Cobet's <
ἐρῶ> after
ἐγώ sound right. If Plato had written
ἐρῶ, he would, I think, have placed it after
αὖθις. μάνθανε, or the like, supplied from
ἔμαθον, suits the con text (
ῥᾷον γὰρ—μαθήσει) best. Similarly in D below,
οἶσθα is understood out of Glauco's reply. Cf. also
ἀλλ’ ὧδε in I 352 E.
Commentary on Plato, Republic. James Adam. ed. James Adam. Cambridge. 1926-1929.
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