Plato Republic 6.510

ὅσα πυκνὰ κτλ. Cf. Tim. 46 A ff. πυκνά ) ( μανά is ‘of close texture,’ ‘close grained’ (D. and V.), not exactly ‘solid’ (as Jowett).

πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον . Although the productions of imitative art and the like must be held to belong to this category (see App. I to Book VII), there is nothing to shew that Plato was thinking of them when he wrote this sentence.

ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν : ‘whereof this is an image.’ ἔοικεν corresponds to εἰκόνας above.

αὐτό : viz. τὸ ὁρώμενον, with reference to ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ above.

ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν κτλ. i.e.

ᾗ κτλ. With ᾗ cf. Theaet. 172 D . τὸ μέν is CE.

τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν : i.e. the objects represented by CD, which were ‘imitated’ or copied in AD. They were originals then, but are only images now: this is the force of the collocation μιμηθεῖσιν—εἰκόσι. Cf. 510 E ἃ πλάττουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσί, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι, 511 A εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι, and for the meaning of μιμηθεῖσιν X 599 A τό τε μιμηθησόμενον καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον and Laws 668 B. I have restored the reading of A, μιμηθεῖσιν, with which Proclus ( in Plat. remp. I p. 291 Kroll) also agrees. τμηθεῖσιν, which appears to be adopted by all other editors, occurs in all the available MSS except A. But τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσι would include AD as well as DC, and the illustrations employed in the inferior νοητόν are drawn solely from DC, as is proved by 510 E (cited above), as well as by the actual facts of the case. The sole objection to μιμηθεῖσι is that the word is generally used only of “artificiosa imitatio” (Schneider): yet in Pol. 293 E , 297 C, Phil. 40 C and Arist. Hist. An. II 8. 502^{b} 9 the ‘imitatio’ can hardly be called ‘artificiosa.’ 511 A seems to me sufficient by itself to prove that A is right. Schneider ( Addit. p. 51) refers to a dissertation by Mommsen published in 1842 as taking the view here advocated.

ἐξ ὑποθέσεων . ὑπόθεσις is correctly defined in the Platonic ὅροι (415 B) as ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος, a starting-point which is not demonstrated, but taken for granted, assumed, postulated. The arithmetician, for example, ὑποτίθεται the odd, the even, etc., i.e. assumes that his definition of odd, even, etc. is correct, and draws conclusions from his ὑπόθεσις of the odd, the even, etc. by means of exclusively deductive reasoning: cf. H. Sidgwick in J. Ph. II p. 100. If we attack his ὑπόθεσις, as Lucian for example does ( Hermot. 74, quoted by Stallbaum), he must, quâ arithmetician, throw up the sponge, for the ὑποθέσεις of the inferior νοητόν can be demonstrated (or overthrown) only by Dialectic. Cf. generally Men. 86 E ff. Schneider may be right in supposing that Aristotle had the present passage in view when he wrote εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ( Eth. Nic. I 2. 1095^{a} 32), though it is perhaps better (with Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 587 note 2) to suppose that he is alluding to Plato's oral instruction.

τὸ δ) αὖ ἕτερον κτλ. τὸ ἕτερον is EB. The article after ἕτερον (see cr. n.) stands self-condemned, although its intrusion is difficult to explain. ὅ, which Schneider proposes, is also difficult, though in harmony with Ficinus (alterum vero, quod excogitat animus), for the verb of the relative clause can hardly be omit ted. λόγῳ, once proposed by Hermann, has nothing in its favour. ζητεῖ must be supplied to govern τὸ ἕτερον.

ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον . The only ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος is the Idea of the Good: cf. VII 532 A f. Towards this the Dialectician travels, starting from ὑποθέσεις. He may begin, for example, by ‘assuming’ the ‘just.’ In such a case he assumes that his definition of ‘just’ is correct, i.e. corresponds exactly to the Idea of ‘Just.’ But whereas the arithmetician treats his ὑπόθεσις as an ultimate truth, and proceeds deductively to a conclusion, making use of sensible images by way of illustration, the dialectician treats his hypothesis as purely provisional, testing, revising, rejecting (VII 533 C note), and reconstructing, and gradually ascending step by step to the first principle of all ( τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχήν), without employing any sensible objects to illustrate his reasoning. The one gives no account of his ὑπόθεσις ( οὐδένα λόγον—φανερῶν in C below); the other not only does, but must do so, just because he is a dialectician: cf. VII 533 C ff. He connects his ὑποθέσεις with others, subsuming them under higher and yet higher —better and truer— ὑποθέσεις, until at last he has traversed the whole region of νοητά. Such of his ὑποθέσεις as survive will be improved at each stage in the ascent, and finally, as soon as the Idea of Good is reached, all his surviving ὑποθέσεις will actually have become perfect counterparts of the Ideas which they have hitherto been only assumed to represent. In the meantime the ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντός, which Plato himself described dogmatically δἰ εἰκόνος in 507 A—509 C, will have ceased to be a mere ὑπόθεσις: it will have become, in the fullest sense of the term, an ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος: for the highest rung of the ladder is not reached until the entire domain of the knowable has been exhausted, and shewn to be the expression of the Idea of Good. Plato's ideal—it is no more—is a comprehensive and purely intellectual view of the totality of νοητά, in which every department is seen in its connexion with every other, and all in their dependence on the Good, which is in itself ἀνυπόθετος and ὑπερούσιος—ἀνυπόθετος because higher than all ὑποθέσεις and itself proved by an exhaustive scrutiny of all νοητά, ὑπερούσιος because higher than, and the cause of, all existence. See also on 511 B and the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic, together with Jackson J. of Ph. X pp. 145 f., where the distinctive peculiarities of the two methods are very clearly explained.

ὧνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων : i.q. ἄνευ τῶν αἷσπερ ἐκεῖνο ( ζητεῖ) εἰκόνων. I formerly read τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων (with q), but now think (with Schneider and others) that A is right. The attraction of a relative in the dative case is rare, but not unexampled. Van Cleef ( de attract. in enunt. rel. usu Plat. p. 45) cites Gorg. 509 A , Prot. 361 E , Theaet. 144 A , Rep. VII 531 E (all examples of ἐντυγχάνω, whose proper construction in the sense of ‘fall in with’ is the dative, not the genitive), and Ep. VII 327 A (with προσέτυχον); for examples in other authors see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 914. If ἄνευ and ἐκεῖνο are pronounced with emphasis, the meaning, I think, is easily caught. Stallbaum reads ὧν περὶ κτλ. with one Vienna MS, understanding, I suppose, χρῆται .

αὐτοῖς ‐‐ δἰ αὐτῶν . αὐτοῖς ( ipsis= solis) is further accentuated by δἰ αὐτῶν (‘through themselves alone’): cf. 511 C. The εἴδη of the dialectician do not employ the adventitious aid of εἰκόνες: see on 511 B. The use of εἴδεσι here must not be held to imply that even the dialectician's conceptions of the Ideas are correct before he has reached the Idea of the Good. Till then, they are only ὑποθέσεις, though the false ὑποθέσεις are weeded out (VII 533 C note), and the hypothetical character of the survivors is gradually eliminated in the course of the ascent. See on ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον above, and contrast 511 C.

ἀλλ’ αὖθις κτλ. ‘Then have it over again, said I.’ The ellipse has a colloquial effect. Ast's εὐθύς for αὖθις is unlikely: nor does Cobet's < ἐρῶ> after ἐγώ sound right. If Plato had written ἐρῶ, he would, I think, have placed it after αὖθις. μάνθανε, or the like, supplied from ἔμαθον, suits the con text ( ῥᾷον γὰρ—μαθήσει) best. Similarly in D below, οἶσθα is understood out of Glauco's reply. Cf. also ἀλλ’ ὧδε in I 352 E.

οἱ περὶ κτλ. In CE, as will afterwards appear, are included five sciences, which form the προοίμιον (VII 531 D) or προπαιδεία (ib. 536 D) to Dialectic, represented by EB. They are the Science of Number, Plane Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy, and Harmonics: VII 522 C—531 C. In each of these the method, according to Plato, is the same. Certain ὑποθέσεις are taken for granted, and inferences drawn from them by purely deductive reasoning, aided by the use of sensible likenesses or illustrations. See also App. I to Book VII.

ὡς εἰδότες . They have no knowledge of their ὑποθέσεις, otherwise they would be able to give an account of them: see VII 533 C and 531 E μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες δοῦναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἴσεσθαί ποτέ τι ὧν φαμὲν δεῖν εἰδέναι; Οὐδ) αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

ὁμολογουμένως =“folgerechterweise” (Cohen Pl. Ideenl. u. d. Math. p. 29) refers to the agreement between premises, intermediate steps, and conclusion: cf. VII 533 C, where ὁμολογία is used in the same way. “With perfect unanimity” (D. and V.) is incorrect and pointless.

τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι κτλ. They use the ‘visible kinds,’ i.e. visible squares, visible diagonals, etc., but they are thinking about mathematical squares and diagonals etc. Cf. generally Euthyd. 290 B οἱ δ’ αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοί· θηρευτικοὶ γάρ εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι· οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα ἕκαστοι τούτων ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ἀνευρίσκουσιν, and VII 527 A.

ἔοικε . Visible σχήματα are imperfect copies of ‘mathematical’ σχήματα: cf. VII 526 A and App. I to Book VII.

τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ κτλ. : ‘for that with a view to which they are discoursing is the square itself and a diagonal itself, not this which they draw’ etc. αὐτοῦ (‘by itself,’ i.e. apart from its embodiment in perceivable squares) is ambiguous, and might (so far as language is concerned) refer either to the Idea of Square (cf. v 476 A ff.) or to the Mathematical Square (cf. VII 525 D, E notes), which—see App. I to Book VII—Plato holds to be distinct from the Idea. But the ambiguity is resolved as soon as we are shewn (in 511 C ff.) how to interpret διανοούμενοι and διανοίᾳ (511 A), and we then see that Plato is here speaking of the mathematical square. The singular τοῦ τετραγώνου is generic (cf. ὁ σοφιστής for the whole class of Sophists), for there are many ‘mathematical’ squares, diagonals etc. (VII 526 A note and App. I to Book VII). It is conceivably for this reason that Plato drops the article with διαμέτρου (‘a diagonal itself’), thereby also getting a more precise antithesis to ἀλλ’ οὐ ταύτης, or else (if this suggestion is hypercritical) διαμέτρου is also generic. Sidgwick is, I think, mistaken when he says ( J. Ph. II p. 103) that the language of this passage “in no way supports the interpolation of intermediates (Aristotle's τὰ μεταξύ) between particulars and Ideas”: for διανοούμενοι involves διάνοια, and since διάνοια is intermediate between νοῦς and δόξα (511 D), we may reasonably suppose that its objects are likewise intermediate between the higher νοητά and δοξαστά. See App. I to Book VII.

πλάττουσιν : with reference to models of geometrical figures, orreries etc., all of which belong to CD, and may themselves have shadows and likenesses in AD.

ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι . See 510 B note The anacoluthon in αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα—τούτοις μὲν χρώμενοι is illustrated by Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 8: cf. also VII 520 D.

ζητοῦντές τε . Instead of τε, I formerly read δέ (on slight MS authority), with Ast and Stallbaum; but the corruption of δέ to τε is exceedingly improbable here. The antithetical force of the clause ζητοῦντες—ἰδεῖν is weakened by the occurrence of the words ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ in the μέν clause. If the objects in question are used as images, the further statement that the real object of investigation is their originals ( αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα) loses its antithetical force, and becomes a sort of adjunct. Hence τε following ζητοῦντες is more appropriate than αὐτὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνα ζητοῦντες ἰδεῖν, which would be the natural way of expressing an antithesis. Cf. Laws 927 B ὀξὺ μὲν ἀκούουσι βλέπουσί τε ὀξύ (where the order is the same as here), Phaedr. 266 C and other examples cited by Hoefer de part. Pl. pp. 17 f.

τῇ διανοίᾳ . See on τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ 510 D.

ἔλεγον . 510 B.

ἀναγκαζομένην . For the participle we might expect ἀναγκάζεσθαι. But ἀναγκαζομένην gives a better balance with νοητόν, and the meaning is ‘Accordingly I described this class as intelligible indeed, but the soul as compelled’ etc.

τῶν ὑποθέσεων ‐‐ ἐκβαίνειν : ‘to step out of and above assumptions,’ viz. by reaching the ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος: cf. 510 B note

αὐτοῖς τοῖς κτλ. αὐτοῖς is ‘the actual things,’ ‘the originals,’ as in αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα 510 E: ‘employing as images the originals from which images were made’ (lit. ‘the imaged-from’ “abgebildet” Schneider) ‘by the objects below,’ i.e. employing as images the originals in CD, which were copied by the shadows etc. in AD. For ἀπεικασθεῖσι in this sense cf. ἀπεικασθῆναι in Tim. 48 C and (with J. and C.) εἰκασθέντος in Phaedr. 250 B . Other views of this passage are discussed in App. X.

καὶ ἐκείνοις κτλ. : ‘those also, in comparison with those remoter objects, being esteemed and honoured as palpable and clear.’ καί is ‘also’ and not ‘and,’ as some have supposed. ἐκείνοις is DC, and ἐκεῖνα AD. Plato uses the pronoun ἐκείνοις to indicate that the objects in CD are less near to the mind of the mathematician than those in CE, which are the immediate object of his study (cf. Sidgwick in J. Ph. II p. 98). He could not, even if he had wished to, have written καὶ αὐτοῖς (et ipsis) without sacrificing αὐτοῖς just before. ἐκεῖνα is said because AD is remoter still. See also App. X.

δεδοξασμένοις means, I believe, ‘esteemed,’ ‘valued’ as in Polyb. VI 53. 9 τῶν ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ δεδοξασμένων ἀνδρῶν: cf. the regular use of δοξάζειν for ‘glorify’ in the N. T. No other certain instance of this usage appears to occur in Plato, or even in classical Greek: at all events neither Thuc. III 45. 6 nor Dionys. Thesm. 1. 24 Meineke, cited by L. and S., is a case in point. But the collocation with τετιμημένοις makes it probable that the usage, though rare, is Platonic; and every other interpretation of the word is beset with serious difficulties, as is shewn in App. X.

τετιμημένοις . τετμημένοις is read by Schneider, with several MSS (see cr. n.), and understood as ‘cut off’ (abgeschnitten); but, as J. and C. observe, this does not suit δεδοξασμένοις, and it is doubtful if the objects can be said to be ‘cut,’ although the line is: see on τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν 510 B.

ταύτης in spite of γεωμετρίαις because Geometry is itself one art: cf. VII 533 C γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ ἑπομένας. The plural γεωμετρίαις does not mean the ‘various branches of geometry’ (as D. and V. suppose), but geometrical investigations: cf. λογισμούς for ‘Arithmetic’ in 510 C.

αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος κτλ. : ‘the argument grasps by itself, through the power of dialectic.’ λόγος is not the faculty of reason (“Vernunft” Schleiermacher), which is νοῦς, or even ‘thought’ (“Gedanke” Schneider), but rather “the impersonal reason, or drift of the argument” (Bosanquet), the instrument by which νοῦς works (Krohn Pl. St. p. 140). ὁ λόγος is of course personified, as it constantly is in this sense.

δυνάμει should not be translated ‘faculty,’ but simply ‘power’ (cf. 508 E note): the argument, unaided by εἰκόνες ( αὐτός ‘by itself,’ cf. αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι 510 B note), grasps its object by the inherent power of dialectical argumentation ( διαλέγεσθαι), and nothing else. In spite of Grimmelt ( de reip. unit. etc. p. 52) it is certainly an error to identify ὁ λόγος with νοῦς. Why does Dialectic dispense with all sensible images or illustrations? Plato (it should be remembered) holds that the intrusion of any element of sense-perception, however small, impedes the exercise of thought: see Phaed. 79 C ff. The ὑποθέσεις of the dialectician may be and often are generalisations from αἰσθητά, but a generalisation, regarded in itself, is wholly νοητόν. These ὑποθέσεις it is the province of Dialectic to test in every possible way, to demolish where necessary (VII 533 C note), to correct by one another, to classify according to their mutual coherence and interdependence, until by an exhaustive scrutiny of all νοητά we grasp the unifying principle of all existence—the Idea of the Good. Cf. VII 517 C note and see on τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου below and the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.

τῷ ὄντι indicates that we are to take the word in its literal etymological signification, ‘literally hypotheses or underpositions, stepping-stones as it were and starting-points.’ For this use of τῷ ὄντι and kindred expressions see I 343 C, V 474 A notes and W. G. Headlam On editing Aeschylus pp. 138 ff. With ἐπιβάσεις cf. Symp. 211 C ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον.

τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου . See on ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον 510 B. Plato makes no attempt in the Republic to classify Ideas in such an ascending scale as he here suggests, though it is probable from 509 A that Knowledge and Truth would rank near to the Good. Nor is there any dialogue in which an exhaustive classification is even attempted. Such hints as Plato gives us throughout his writings are enumerated in Stumpf das Verhältniss etc. pp. 50, 56, 76, and in Zeller^{4} II 1, pp. 704—707: cf. also Fouillée La Philosophie de Platon II pp. 99—104. We must suppose that each higher Idea will excel all the lower both in range and in excellence. These two characteristics are, from Plato's point of view, the same. The wider an Idea is in range and extension, the greater will be the sum of existences of which it is the cause. But the Idea of Good is the cause of all existence, so that each higher Idea will be better than all below it, because it contains more of Good. Beyond this it is perhaps safer not to go. A systematic attempt to correlate all intelligibles among themselves and in their connexion with the Good would have been premature in Plato's day, and is premature still. The permanent value of Plato's conception lies in the ideal which it sets before every succeeding generation of investigators.

πάλιν αὖ κτλ. The dialectician's progress involves both an ascent and a descent—an ascent ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, and a descent ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὴν τελευτήν (cf. Aristotle quoted on 510 B). By the time that he reaches the Idea of the Good, all his surviving ὑποθέσεις have become exact counterparts of the Ideas which are their objective correlates; the others have all of them been demolished (VII 533 C note). The conclusions ( τελευταί) of dialectic are therefore impregnable; ψευδὴς ἐπιστήμη is a contradiction in terms (V 477 E note). For more on this subject see the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.

εἴδεσιν ‐‐ εἴδη . On αὐτοῖς δἰ αὐτῶν see 510 B note εἴδεσιν may now be taken in its full force; for after the Idea of Good has been reached, the dialectician's conception of each εἶδος is accurate and complete: see last note. I formerly read αὐτοῖς δἰ αὑτῶν, rejecting εἰς αὐτά as superfluous on account of καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη. But αὑτῶν is certainly wrong (cf. 510 B), and εἰς αὐτά, which may well be taken loosely with καταβαίνῃ or a participle supplied from it, merely states that the conclusions of dialectic are likewise εἴδη: whereas καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη seems to lay emphasis on the fact that dialectic never descends below εἴδη to particulars (“und bei Begriffen endigt” Schneider). We may translate ‘and with Ideas end.’ Plato means to emphasize the fact that the Dialectician quâ Dialectician does not draw conclusions as to particulars: if he did, he could scarcely be said αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρῆσθαι. See the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.

ὅτι μέντοι κτλ. There is no anacoluthon as Engelhardt ( Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 9) supposes, but ὅτι depends on μανθάνω. With σαφέστερον cf. V 478 C and 509 D above. σαφής, originally ‘clear,’ often=‘true’ in Greek. Plato's comparison between Light and Truth in 507 C ff. gave a new and profound significance to the equation. The present passage should be compared with Phil. 57 B ff., where Dialectic is said to excel mathematical and all other sciences in respect of ‘the clearness’ ( τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τἀληθέστατον) of its object. In general, the higher a science is, the greater (according to Plato) is the amount of truth or knowability which its subjectmatter contains. Plato's theory on this subject is the source of Aristotle's doctrine of ἁπλῶς γνώριμα or γνωριμώτερα φύσει, for which see Stewart on Eth. Nic. I 4. 1095^{b} 2.

τὸ ‐‐ καλουμένων . καλουμένων implies that τέχναι (‘Arts’) sometimes bore the specific meaning of ‘mathematical sciences’ as early as the time of Plato. This use of the word may have been introduced by some of the Sophists, perhaps Hippias: cf. Prot. 318 E , where Protagoras says οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν (the medieval quadrivium) διδάσκοντες— καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἱππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν. If we can understand μουσικήν as ‘theory of Music,’ Hippias' quadrivium is identical with Plato's, except that Plato would like to add Stereometry. Cf. also Theaet. 145 A, B and see Tannery L'Éducation Platonicienne in Rev. Philos. X p. 523, the Appendix to Book VII On the propaedeutic studies of the Republic and my article in Cl. Rev. XV p. 220, where I have tried to shew that our use of the word ‘Arts’ in ‘Bachelor of Arts’ etc. is an inheritance from the Platonic Academy.

καὶ ‐‐ θεώμενοι . The relative sentence passes into a main clause, as in II 357 B, where see note.

αὐτά : viz. the subject-matter of the so-called ‘Arts’: cf. VII 518 B.

καίτοι ‐‐ ἀρχῆς : ‘although they are intelligibles with a first principle.’ The mathematician does not ascend to an ἀρχή, and therefore does not exercise— for ἴσχειν in its original half-inchoative sense cf. IX 585 B and Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. I 2, p. 434 note— νοῦς on his subject, but nevertheless his subject is νοητόν (as we have been told before 510 B, 511 A, C) and has an ἀρχή, viz. his ὑποθέσεις ( αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί above). καίτοι is not found elsewhere in Plato for καίπερ with a participle (Hoefer de part. Pl. p. 28) but occurs in Simonides ap. Prot. 339 C , in Axioch. 364 B and Lysias 31. 34. To write καίπερ (with Kugler de part. τοι etc. p. 18) would be rash. For other views on this difficult clause see App. XI.

καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς . See 510 D note

ὡς ‐‐ οὖσαν . διάνοια is the most general word for a state ( ἕξις) of mind or mode of thought in Greek; and the limitation here introduced is entirely Plato's own. Plato apparently attempts to fortify his innovation by etymology, hinting that the word διάνοια is by derivation that which is between ( διὰ μέσου) νοῦς and δόξα. So also J. and C. Cf. εἰκασία (with allusion to εἰκόνες) in E. On δόξης see 510 A note

νόησιν is used in its strict sense of νοῦς in actual exercise, not merely the faculty of νοῦς: cf. 508 E note The exercise of νοῦς is correctly spoken of as a πάθημα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον, but the faculty itself could hardly be thus described.

πίστιν κτλ. If we strictly limit DC to ὁρατά, πίστις must be understood as the state of mind which believes only in visible, palpable ( ἐναργῆ) things ( τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος 510 A): ‘seeing,’ as we still say, ‘is believing.’ But Plato has already spoken of AC as δοξαστόν (510 A note); so that πίστις should not be confined to the objects of sight. It is in fact a subdivision of δόξα, superior in point of ‘clearness’ ( σαφήνεια) to εἰκασία. We may regard it as the normal condition of the average uneducated mind. εἰκασία is the state of mind in which εἰκόνες are held to be true. Here again, if εἰκόνες are strictly limited to images of ὁρατά (cf. 509 E, 510 A), εἰκασία must be similarly confined in its scope, and loses all metaphysical interest and importance: see VII 517 A note But since the εἰκόνες are a lower grade of δοξαστά (510 A note), εἰκασία should be understood as a lower variety of δόξα (as in VII 534 A), viz. the state of mind which accepts as true that which is a copy of a copy ( τρίτον πρὸς ἀλήθειαν). In this sense εἰκασία (with a play on εἰκόνες) is a new coinage of Plato's. The translation ‘conjecture’ is misleading, for conjecture implies conscious doubt or hesitation, and doubt is foreign to εἰκασία in Plato's sense. Plato may however have intended to suggest that such a state of mind is in reality no better than conjecture. See also X 598 A note and Bosanquet Companion pp. 261 f. with Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II pp. 242—246.

ὥσπερ ἐφ’ οἷς κτλ. : “attributing to them such a degree of clearness as their objects have of truth” J. and C. Liebhold's ἐφ’ ὅσον for ἐφ’ οἷς is an unhappy suggestion: cf. VII 534 A. A corrector in q changed the first μετέχειν to μετέχει, which, in deference to Schneider's arguments, I formerly printed. But the text is quite sound. Stated categorically, the clause would run ὥσπερ ἐφ’ οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας μετέχει. Under the government of ἡγησάμενος, the first as well as the second μετέχει becomes μετέχειν; for the accusative with infinitive may be employed even in the subordinate clauses of Indirect. See on 492 C. The jingle μετέχειν— μετέχειν is inoffensive: cf. X 614 A, 621 B.