τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν
: i.q.
τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει (J. and C.).
οὐ γὰρ δήπου κτλ.
is said in view of the question in 506 B. There is certainly no allusion to the
Philebus: see 505 C note
τὸν ἥλιον κτλ.
The Good has been shewn to be the cause of Knowledge: Socrates now proceeds to shew that it is also the cause of Being. In the philosophy of Plato, Knowledge is the epistemological counterpart of Being, Being the ontological counterpart of Knowledge: see V 476 E ff. notes The final unity in which both Knowledge and Being meet is the Idea of the Good, which is therefore the supreme and ultimate cause of the Universe. See also on
οὐκ οὐσίας κτλ. below and the Appendix to Book VII
On Plato's Dialectic.
οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα
. See on
οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ below.
φάναι
. V 473 A note
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι κτλ.
Cf. Arist.
Met. A 6. 988^{a} 10
τὰ γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ τί ἔστιν αἰτία τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ’ εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν. Plato identified
τἀγαθόν and
τὸ ἕν: see the anecdote in Aristox.
Harm. § 30 Marquard.
οὐκ οὐσίας κτλ.
has occasioned a vast amount of discussion. Krohn boldly declares that ‘Die
ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ist keine Idee, denn sie hat keine
οὐσία, sondern es ist eine Macht, die mit unserer Denkweise nur als die Gottheit begriffen werden kann’ (
Pl. St. p. 146). Fouillée
La Philosophie de Platon II p. 109 draws an over-subtle distinction between
εἶναι and
οὐσία, holding that although the Good is not
οὐσία, it nevertheless is
ὄν (cf. VII 518 C). Others have suspected the text, O. Schneider, for example, proposing
οὐ <μόνον> οὐσίας κτλ. (
Versuch einer genet. Entw. d. Plat.
ἀγαθόν p. 16). That the text is right, the balance with
οὐ γένεσιν—ὄντα conclusively shews. The Sun, said Socrates, is the cause of
γένεσις, though not himself
γένεσις. Just so the Good is the cause of
οὐσία, though not itself
οὐσία, but (to use a Neoplatonic expression)
ὑπερούσιος. Plato's meaning is as follows. The Sun is not
γένεσις in the sense in which the objects which he produces are
γιγνόμενα. Yet in a certain sense he too is
γένεσις, for he is
ὁρατός: see VII 529 C ff. and
Tim. 28 B
. (Bosanquet cannot be right in denying that Plato regards the Sun as a
γιγνόμενον). As the cause of
γένεσις, we may, in fact, regard the Sun as the only true
γένεσις, for all
γιγνόμενα are derived from him. Similarly the Good is not
οὐσία in the sense in which the Ideas are
οὐσίαι; but in a higher sense it is the only true
οὐσία, for all
οὐσίαι are only specific determinations of the Good. The
ὑπερουσιότης of the Good is merely Plato's way of saying that the first Principle of all existence must itself be underived. See on
ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον 510 B and cf. Biehl l.c. p. 62 and Fouillée l.c. II pp. 105—111, where the matter is very clearly explained. The doctrine of the
ὑπερουσιότης of the Highest afterwards became a cardinal point with the Neoplatonists: see Plotinus ap. RP.^{7} p. 528, and for other references Hermann
Vind. disp. de id. boni pp. 40 note 84, 41 note 87, Zeller^{3} III 2. pp. 490 ff., Fouillée
La Philosophie de Platon III pp. 289, 291 notes, and Shorey
Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. I p. 188 note 1. It is highly characteristic of Plato's whole attitude that he finds the true keystone of the Universe—the ultimate fountain from which both Knowledge and Existence flow—in no cold and colourless ontological abstraction, like Being, but in that for which
πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις συστενάζει καὶ συνωδίνει (
Rom. 8. 22)—viz.
τὸ ἀγαθόν. Cf.
Phaed. 97 C
ff. and see also on 508 D. The conception is poetical and religious no less than philosophical, and may be compared with Dante's ‘L’ Amor che muove il Sole e l' altre Stelle' and Tennyson's ‘For so the whole round world is every way Bound by gold chains about the feet of God,’ as well as with Aristotle's
πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον
Met.
Λ 7 et al.
καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων κτλ.
“Glauco exclaimed, very comically, ‘Save us all, what an amazing transcendence!’” It is Glauco's
προθυμία which is
γελοῖον: see 506 D.
ὑπερβολῆς is not ‘exaggeration’ (Jowett), but refers to
ὑπερέχοντος: cf.
ἀμήχανον κάλλος λέγεις 509 A. A
ὑπερβολή which transcends existence may well be called
δαιμονία (‘supernatural,’ ‘miraculous’).
εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ κτλ.
Stephanus proposed
ἄλλο for
ἀλλά (as in 501 E), but cf.
Men. 86 E
εἰ μή τι οὖν, ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον.
αὐτώ
: the Sun and the Idea of the Good.
ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ κτλ.
“I do not say ‘of heaven,’ lest you should imagine that I am etymologising on the name.” The Sun might well be called
βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ. Socrates pretends to avoid the word
οὐρανός, lest by thus equating it with
ὁρατόν (for the contrast with
νοητοῦ would suggest that
οὐρανοῦ=
ὁρατοῦ) he should be accused of deriving
οὐρανός from
ὁρᾶν, as certain clever people did in Plato's time (
Crat. 396 B
. The same derivation is given by Philo Jud.
de mund. opif. 10). For
σοφίζεσθαι in this sense cf.
σοφία in
Crat. 396 C
, D. E. S. Thompson (
Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc. 1888 p. 14) takes
σοφίζεσθαι simply as ‘pun’ and thinks that the pun is between
νοῦ (suggested in
νοητοῦ above) and
οὐρα‐νοῦ, quoting
ἀπ’ ὄνου πεσεῖν, and the anecdote in D. L. II 118, VI 3: cf. also Isocrates
Apophth. Fr. 8 ed. Blass. But such a pun is both far-fetched and pointless, and in view of the passage from the
Cratylus there should be no doubt that Plato
more suo is merely scoffing at a well-known contemporary etymology. The reading
οὐρανόν—see cr. n.—would be fatal to Thompson's theory, but
οὐρανοῦ (which most MSS read) is more pointed and idiomatic, and perhaps right, though the accusative is not indefensible.
ἄνισα
. It appears from the Scholiast that even ancient critics debated whether
ἄνισα or
ἴσα (
εἰς ἴσα
v) should be read. Proclus (
in Plat. remp. I p. 288 Kroll) and the author of the third
Quaest. Plat. in Plutarch (1001 C ff.) read
ἄνισα:
ἴσα appears in a grammarian cited by Stallbaum from Villoison
Anecd. Gr. II p. 199. The dispute still reigns, Stallbaum and some others preferring
ἴσα, others, such as Richter (
Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 145) and Dümmler (
Antisth. p. 80)
ἀν’ ἴσα, others even
ἂν ἴσα (which is certainly not Greek, though found in a few inferior MSS); but there should be no question that Plato wrote
ἄνισα. If the line is bisected, all four segments are equal, and the elaborate proportions drawn in 510 A, 511 E, VII 534 A represent no corresponding relations between the different segments of the line. The inequality, as Schneider and Steinhart point out, is intended to represent the difference in
σαφήνεια or
ἀλήθεια between the
δοξαστόν (or
ὁρατόν) and the
γνωστόν (or
νοητόν): cf.
σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ below and 510 A. (So also Benson in Nettleship's
Lect. and Rem. II p. 239 note). For this reason the
νοητόν should be represented by a longer segment. Others assign the larger part to the
ὁρατόν, as being the region of
τὰ πολλά (Plutarch l.c. and Espinas in his edition of Book VI), but the length of the two main segments should follow the primary and fundamental principle of Plato's classification. The relevant consideration is not at present multiplicity
versus unity, but different degrees of clearness and truth. Beckman's excision of
ἄνισα τμήματα (
num Plato artefactorum ideas statuerit p. 38) needs no refutation. See also next note.
πάλιν τέμνε κτλ.
See Figure 1 on p. 65.
καί σοι ἔσται κτλ.
: ‘and when classified according to their relative clearness and obscurity, the different segments will represent—in the visible sphere, segment 1, Images’ etc. The datives, like
ἀληθείᾳ in 510 A, are causal, and state the principle on which the entire classification (of
νοητά as well as
ὁρατά) rests. With
ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ Socrates begins to describe the contents of the particular segments. This is interrupted by the definition of
εἰκόνες, and resumed, in a different form, at
τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον in 510 A.
μέν before
τῷ ὁρωμένῳ contrasts with
σκόπει δὴ αὖ in B, much as
τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον balances the second
μέν. On
σαφηνείᾳ see below 511 C note
