James Adam, Commentary on Plato, Republic, ed. James Adam, 6.490B

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[490B] ξυγγενεῖ . νοῦς is akin to Being and the Eternal: cf. Phaed. 79 D , Tim. 90 A —C and infra X 611 E.

ᾧ πλησιάσας κτλ. : ‘whereby having come nigh unto and married with true Being, begetting Reason and Truth, he attained unto knowledge and enjoyed true life and nourishment, and then but not before ceased from travail of the soul.’ The mystic union of the Soul with Being is here described in passionate and glowing language. Cf. Phaedr. 246 E —247 D, Symp. 210 A —212 A, and many parallels in Plotinus, for whom, as for the Neoplatonists generally, the mystic side of Platonism had an extraordinary fascination: see Zeller^{3} III 2, pp. 611—618. The imagery should be compared with Theaet. 156 A ff. where the phenomena of Perception are thus analysed. The Subject unites with the Object, and from this union are born two children, one the αἴσθησις e.g. Sight, the other the αἰσθητόν e.g. τὸ μέλαν. The former belongs more peculiarly to the Subject, the latter to the Object. Similarly with the phenomena of Knowledge. The Subject unites with the Idea, and the children of this union are νοῦς (or rather, strictly speaking, νόησις i.e. the action of νοῦς), on the side of the Subject, and the νοητόν, i.e. Truth, on the side of the Object. We miss an essential point if we take νοῦν as the object of Knowledge; it is the faculty of Reason, no longer dormant, but suddenly called into actuality. Plato means that Reason does not really live until it lays hold on the Idea. γνοίη corresponds to νοῦν; it is by the begetting of νοῦς that we come to know. The aorist denotes the instantaneous act; cf. Symp. 210 E πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν—ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν κτλ. See also on 508 D and cf. VII 517 C. In like manner ἀληθῶς ζῴη balances ἀλήθειαν: there is no true life without knowledge of the Truth. ἀληθῶς goes also with τρέφοιτο: cf. Phaedr. 247 D and 248 B, C. With ὠδῖνος cf. Phaedr. 251 E ( ὠδίνων ἔληξεν) and Symp. 206 E . It is tempting to suppose that in ὠδῖνος Plato is thinking not merely of the lover's pangs, but also of the pangs of birth. The knowledge of the Idea is indeed in Plato's view an intellectual and moral regeneration. But ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος shews that ὠδῖνος means the throes of love; and the further view introduces a confusion of ideas which is alien to the peculiar character of Plato's ‘mysticism.’

μετέσται . With μετέσται cf. X 606 B λογίζεσθαι γὰρ—ὀλίγοις τισὶ μέτ‐ εστιν and Theaet. 186 E . τι is adverbial and does not go with ψεῦδος. There is no occasion for Madvig's conjecture ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται: nor need we write ψεύδους, as I formerly proposed.

Commentary on Plato, Republic. James Adam. ed. James Adam. Cambridge. 1926-1929.

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Commentary on Plato, Republic (English) (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.)

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Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 6.490 focus

[490]
ἀκούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν ἐκεῖθεν ἀναμνησθέντες, ὅθεν διῇμεν τὴν φύσιν οἷον ἀνάγκη φῦναι τὸν καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν 490a ἐσόμενον. ἡγεῖτο δʼ αὐτῷ, εἰ νῷ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ ἀλαζόνι ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς.
ἦν γὰρ οὕτω λεγόμενον.
οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν τοῦτο σφόδρα οὕτω παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
ἆρʼ οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὂν πεφυκὼς εἴη ἁμιλλᾶσθαι ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής, καὶ οὐκ 490b ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἑκάστοις, ἀλλʼ ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδʼ ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου—προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ— ᾧ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δʼ οὔ;
ὡς οἷόν τʼ, ἔφη, μετριώτατα.
τί οὖν; τούτῳ τι μετέσται ψεῦδος ἀγαπᾶν ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον μισεῖν; 490c
μισεῖν, ἔφη.
ἡγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἶμαι φαμὲν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθῆσαι.
πῶς γάρ;
ἀλλʼ ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἕπεσθαι.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν τί δεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν; μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι συνέβη προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη· καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλαβομένου ὅτι πᾶς μὲν ἀναγκασθήσεται 490d ὁμολογεῖν οἷς λέγομεν, ἐάσας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, φαίη ὁρᾶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπισκοποῦντες ἐπὶ τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθʼ οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, καὶ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡρισάμεθα. 490e
ἔστιν, ἔφη, ταῦτα.

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 6.490 focus

[490] Let us begin, then, what we have to say and hear by recalling the starting-point of our description of the nature which he who is to be 490a a scholar and gentleman¹ must have from birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recollect, was truth. That he was to seek always and altogether, on pain of² being an impostor without part or lot in true philosophy. Yes, that was said. Is not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing opinion about him? It is indeed, he said. Will it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over 490b the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with³ the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs⁴ to lay hold on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge and truly live and grow,⁵ and so find surcease from his travail⁶ of soul, but not before? No plea could be fairer. Well, then, will such a man love falsehood, 490c or, quite the contrary, hate it? Hate it, he said. When truth led the way, no choir⁷ of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train. How could it? But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance. Right, he said. What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the choir that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory.⁸ And when you interposed 490d the objection that though everybody will be compelled to admit our statements,⁹ yet, if we abandoned mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom the words referred, everyone would say that he actually saw some of them to be useless and most of them base with all baseness, it was in our search for the cause of this ill-repute that we came to the present question: Why is it that the majority are bad? And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it must necessarily be? 490e That is so, he said.

James Adam Commentary on Plato, Republic 6.490B

ed. James Adam

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