νῷ ἔχεις
: ‘you remember.’
ἐν νῷ ἔχεις (as in some inferior MSS) would mean ‘you intend.’ Compare
Euthyph. 2 B
with
Ap. 20 B
. The reference is to 485 B—487 A.
ἤ
=‘alioquin.’ Cf. V 463 D note
οὕτω κτλ.
οὕτω “ex Adimanti verbis repetitum et praecise dictum est pro
οὕτω λεγόμενον ἦν.” If the word is genuine, it must be taken in this way. J. and C. translate “to say no more,” comparing
ῥᾳδίως οὕτω and the like (see on II 377 B). But there appears to be no other instance of this idiomatic
οὔτω with the adverb
σφόδρα. οὑτωσὶ σφόδρα in
Ar.
Frogs 88
is quite different, in spite of Blaydes on
Ar.
Wasps 461
. It is just possible that
οὕτω is an interpolation from
οὕτω just before.
παρὰ δόξαν
. By selecting this form of expression Plato “opinionibus opinionem tribuit” (Schneider), loosely enough, but the words are practically equivalent to
ἐναντίον. παράδοξον would be somewhat easier, but the text is probably sound. For a similar pleonasm see my note on
Crito 44 C.
δοκουμένοις
. With the passive cf. X 612 D.
αὐτοῦ
is masculine, and means Plato's
καλὸς κἀγαθός, i.e. the philosopher, whom popular opinion regards as an
ἀλαζών, if not as a liar.
ἆρ’ οὖν δὴ κτλ.
‘Shall we not then fairly plead that the true lover of learning was disposed by nature to strive towards Being and tarried not at the many particulars which are opined to be’ etc.? Socrates has just said that Truth is the leading attribute of the Philosopher. This proposition is challenged by public opinion (
παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις), and in support of it Socrates urges, what he had asserted before (485 A—C) that the philosopher is a lover of
τὸ ὄν. εἴη (‘was,’ i.e. ‘is, as we saw’) would be the ‘philosophic imperfect’ in direct speech. For the rare change from
ἦν to
εἴη after a primary tense cf.
Xen.
Mem. I 2. 34
δῆλον (sc.
ἐστὶν)
ὅτι ἀφεκτέον εἴη τοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγειν, where
εἴη stands for
ἦν (the usual ‘erat’ for ‘esset’ with words denoting obligation or necessity) of the direct, and Plato
Charm. 156 B
λέγουσί που ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν. (Madvig's insertion of
ἄν after
ἀναγκαῖον in this passage is without authority.) Cf. also II 361 C note The sequence is all the more easy with the philosophic imperfect because its very nature involves a reference to the past. Ast's conjecture
ἀπελογησάμεθα is incorrect; for the philosopher's zeal for Being has not yet been urged in
defence of the statement—now for the first time formally challenged— that Truth is his leading characteristic. Madvig conjectures
ἀπελογισάμεθα, which Baiter adopts, although the word is wholly inappropriate here. Cf. X 607 B note
ξυγγενεῖ
. νοῦς is akin to Being and the Eternal: cf.
Phaed. 79 D
,
Tim. 90 A
—C and infra X 611 E.
ᾧ πλησιάσας κτλ.
: ‘whereby having come nigh unto and married with true Being, begetting Reason and Truth, he attained unto knowledge and enjoyed true life and nourishment, and then but not before ceased from travail of the soul.’ The mystic union of the Soul with Being is here described in passionate and glowing language. Cf.
Phaedr. 246 E
—247 D,
Symp. 210 A
—212 A, and many parallels in Plotinus, for whom, as for the Neoplatonists generally, the mystic side of Platonism had an extraordinary fascination: see Zeller^{3} III 2, pp. 611—618. The imagery should be compared with
Theaet. 156 A
ff. where the phenomena of Perception are thus analysed. The Subject unites with the Object, and from this union are born two children, one the
αἴσθησις e.g. Sight, the other the
αἰσθητόν e.g.
τὸ μέλαν. The former belongs more peculiarly to the Subject, the latter to the Object. Similarly with the phenomena of Knowledge. The Subject unites with the Idea, and the children of this union are
νοῦς (or rather, strictly speaking,
νόησις i.e. the
action of
νοῦς), on the side of the Subject, and the
νοητόν, i.e. Truth, on the side of the Object. We miss an essential point if we take
νοῦν as the
object of Knowledge; it is the faculty of Reason, no longer dormant, but suddenly called into actuality. Plato means that Reason does not really live until it lays hold on the Idea.
γνοίη corresponds to
νοῦν; it is by the begetting of
νοῦς that we come to know. The aorist denotes the instantaneous act; cf.
Symp. 210 E
πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν—ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν κτλ. See also on 508 D and cf. VII 517 C. In like manner
ἀληθῶς ζῴη balances
ἀλήθειαν: there is no true life without knowledge of the Truth.
ἀληθῶς goes also with
τρέφοιτο: cf.
Phaedr. 247 D
and 248 B, C. With
ὠδῖνος cf.
Phaedr. 251 E
(
ὠδίνων ἔληξεν) and
Symp. 206 E
. It is tempting to suppose that in
ὠδῖνος Plato is thinking not merely of the lover's pangs, but also of the pangs of birth. The knowledge of the Idea is indeed in Plato's view an intellectual and moral regeneration. But
ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος shews that
ὠδῖνος means the throes of love; and the further view introduces a confusion of ideas which is alien to the peculiar character of Plato's ‘mysticism.’
μετέσται
. With
μετέσται cf. X 606 B
λογίζεσθαι γὰρ—ὀλίγοις τισὶ μέτ‐
εστιν and
Theaet. 186 E
.
τι is adverbial and does not go with
ψεῦδος. There is no occasion for Madvig's conjecture
ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται: nor need we write
ψεύδους, as I formerly proposed.
ἡγουμένης κτλ.
‘Now where Truth was leader’ (as we saw it was with the
φιλόσοφος) ‘we shall never, I think, allow that a quire of evils joined her train.’
ἡγουμένης is not the present, but the imperfect participle (cf.
ἡγεῖτο δ’ αὐτῷ—ἀλήθεια 490 A): the ‘philosophic’ past is carried on from the earlier sentence. The tense is strictly to the point, for our
ἀπολογία is not yet finished: see 490 A note We ought not to regard
ἀκολουθῆσαι (with Goodwin
MT. p. 55) as a gnomic aorist: still less should we read
ἀκολουθήσειν with
q, or
φαμεν for
θαῖμεν (Stobaeus
Flor. 11. 18 and Vind. F), taking
ἄν with
ἀκολουθῆσαι (as I formerly suggested). The past tense is the only one appropriate to the situation both in Greek and in English. See also on line 17.
ἦθος
: sc.
ἀκολουθῆσαι. These ‘joined the train’ of virtue at 486 B.
καὶ δὴ κτλ.
καί is ‘also’ and goes with
τὸν ἄλλον: cf.
καὶ—δή in 494 A.
ἀναγκάζοντα
has been doubted. It is read by all the MSS except
Ξ, which has
ἀναλαμβάνοντα (cf. 490 D). Stallbaum accepts
ἀναλαμβάνοντα, while Baiter adopts Madvig's picturesque conjecture
ἀναβιβάζοντα. The text is perfectly sound.
ἀναγκάζοντα is
ἀναγκάζοντα τῷ λόγῳ, i.e.
λέγων ἀναγκαῖα εἶναι, ‘insisting on their necessity’: see on II 363 D (
ἀποτίνουσιν) and cf. X 611 B and
Theaet. 153 C
(where Cobet wrongly brackets
ἀναγκάζω). Much the same view is taken by Jackson (
J. of Ph. XIII p. 218), who compares 486 E
μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι. J. and C.'s translation “compelling your assent” is scarcely accurate here.
φαίη
. In 487 C we have
φαίη ἄν τις, and Richards would add
ἄν here. But the hypothetical critic (with whom Socrates himself agrees 487 E) is now treated as what he really is—the exponent of opinions held by all. We should translate ‘after you objected that all men would be compelled to agree with what we say, but when they set words aside, and looked at the actual people of whom the argument spoke, they declared that’ etc. For
φαίη after
ἀναγκασθήσεται (rather than
ἀναγκασθήσοιτο) see Kühner
Gr. Gr. II p. 1061.
τῆς διαβολῆς
. Π and the majority of MSS have
τῆς ἤδη διαβολῆς. If
ἤδη is right, it must, I think, be taken with
τῆς διαβολῆς in the sense of ‘ea
διαβολή quae iam apparebat et in conspectum venerat, cum antea animadversa non fuisset’ (so Bernhardy and Schneider
Addit. p. 46). Even so, it is harsh, but not so harsh as if we take it with
ἐπισκοποῦντες, as Stallbaum—and formerly Schneider—did. So extreme a hyperbaton would be more difficult than that in
Soph.
O. T. 1245
, and scarcely admissible in prose. Perhaps Plato wrote
τῆς διαβολῆς ἤδη. Otherwise we must suppose that A and other MSS are right in omitting the word.
τὰς μιμουμένας κτλ.
Plato distinguishes between two kinds of
πονηρία, that which results from the corruption of the truly philosophic nature, and the
πονηρία of pretenders to philosophy. It is the latter—so we are told—which is responsible for the prejudice under which Philosophy labours (cf. 489 D): but the former is by far the more serious evil (491 E, 495 B), though engendered, not by Philosophy, but by the seductive influence of public opinion.
