Plato Republic 6.491

ἀνάξιον =‘too good for’: cf. Prot. 355 D and Soph. Phil. 1009 . ἀντάξιον (Benedictus) and ἀνοίκειον (Herwerden) are unhappy conjectures.

ἐπὶ πάντας : ‘all the world over.’ Cf. ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπους in Tim. 23 B .

ἐ ‐‐ γενέσθαι . Cobet, who formerly proposed γενήσεσθαι, afterwards rejected the whole clause. The aorist infinitive with μέλλω is rare, but thoroughly established in Plato, if any reliance is placed on the best MSS: see the examples collected by Schanz Vol. V p. vii.

ὀλιγάκις ‐‐ ὀλίγας . ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὀλίγας is half-proverbial. For καὶ ὀλίγας Stephanus conjectured καὶ ὀλίγοις or καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις, Richards κἀν ὀλίγοις, comparing Arist. Eth. Nic. VII 11. 1151^{b} 30 διὰ το τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν. But ἐν ὀλίγοις would be inelegant after ἐν ἀνθρώποις, and Plato could not have written ὀλίγην. A similar but easier change from the generic singular to the plural occurs III 408 B and infra 500 C. Translate, keeping the anacoluthon; ‘that such a nature—one possessed of all the qualities’ etc.—‘such natures are few and far between among mankind.’

ὃ ‐‐ ὅτι . Cf. I 330 B note

ἀπόλλυσι κτλ. Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 114) asks how courage and temperance can tend to corrupt the character. The answer is given by Plato in 494 B ff. They bring their possessor to the front, and therefore expose him to the solicitations of selfish and unscrupulous men. It should be carefully borne in mind that ἀνδρεία and the other virtues are here regarded, not as the result of education, but as natural qualities, derived from the philosopher's native love of truth. We are in fact dealing with the potentiality of the τελέως φιλόσοφος (491 A). It is this which suffers corruption, not the actualized philosopher. Cf. Krohn l.c. p. 115 and Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 26.

ἔχεις γὰρ ‐‐ λέγω : not “now I have given you an outline of my meaning” (D. and V.), but ‘you understand the general type of the things I mean,’ that is, the general character of things which φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾷ, though in themselves advantages or even virtues. Adimantus assents, but would like to have them specified more precisely. In reply, Socrates bids him grasp the notion of them correctly as a whole ( αὐτοῦ is neuter and ὅλου αὐτοῦ is practically equivalent to τύπου), and it will become clear to him, and τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν (viz. that they ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀποσπᾷ —φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾷ B, C) will not appear ἄτοπα as before ( ἄτοπον—ἀκοῦσαι in B). The passage is somewhat loosely written; but αὐτῶν is certainly neuter and not ‘the philosophic natures,’ as J. and C. suppose.

ἐγγείων ‐‐ ζῴων . These are possessive genitives. Richards says that “ τῶν should probably be omitted before ζῴων or added before ἐγγείων.” Cf. however IV 438 C note In this instance I think Plato wrote τῶν ζῴων in order to call special attention to ζῷα as opposed to ἔγγεια. They are not on the same level of importance, as far as the argument is concerned, for it is the degeneration of ζῷα, not of ἔγγεια, which Plato has to explain.

πλειόνων is much more elegant than Madvig's conjecture πλεῖον. Plato's position on this matter, in the way in which he states it, is open to objection. It might be argued that the naturally strong nature is the best fitted to resist the corrupting influences of its environment. But the philosophic nature is remarkable for sensibility as well as strength, and the sensitive plant needs careful fostering. The general sentiment of this passage is Socratic, as Hermann ( Gesch. u. System p. 330 note 33) and Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 365) have pointed out: cf. Mem. IV 1. 3, 4 τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους ἐρρωμενεστάτους τε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντας—παιδευθέντας μὲν καὶ μαθόντας ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἀρίστους τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτους γίγνεσθαι —ἀπαιδεύτους δὲ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς γενομένους κακίστους τε καὶ βλαβερωτᾴτους γίγνεσθαι.

τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν κτλ. The contrast is between the ἀρίστη φύσις and the φαύλη, where both are subjected to ( οὖσαν ἐν cf. 495 A) bad τροφή. The former ‘comes off worse,’ ‘suffers more’ ( κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν), because the τροφή is more alien to its nature than to that of the others: cf. τοσούτῳ πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων. So Schneider correctly explains the passage. Cf. generally Dante Inferno VI 106—108 “Ritorna a tua scienza, Che vuol, quanto la cosa è più perfetta, Più senta 'l bene, e così la doglienza.” Van Heusde's ἐν ἀλλοτρίῳ τραφεῖσαν misses the point. Even more unhappy is Boeckh's κακίον’ ἀπαλλάττειν, which Stallbaum adopts. κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν is simply the comparative of κακῶς ἀπαλλάττειν: see Cobet in Mnem. XI p. 168, where Stallbaum is severely rebuked.

ἐκ νεανικῆς κτλ. : “out of a fulness of nature ruined by education” Jowett. Plato's attitude on this subject is highly characteristic. The educator's whole efforts are to be directed towards saving and improving strong and gifted natures: cf. VII 519 A, B. Weak natures may be almost neglected, without serious injury to the State. They will never do anything great—whether good or evil: see 495 B. For this and other reasons Plato does not trouble to lay down rules for the education of the lower classes in his city.