James Adam, Commentary on Plato, Protagoras, ed. James Adam, ed. Adela Marion Adam, XXXVI.353C

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[353C] 3. ἐλέγομεν is more humble than λέγομεν —the idea is ‘used to call’ till you said it was wrong.

4. ἀκούετε δή : Socrates bespeaks ‘Attention!’ like a herald. ἀκούετε λεῴ (e.g. Ar. Peace, 551 ) was the usual way of beginning a proclamation at Athens. Cf. Apol. 20D , 32A, Theaet. 201D .

5. ἄλλο τι . This, the shorter form of this particle of interrogation, is probably not a deliberate abbreviation for ἄλλο τι ἤ. Thus ἄλλο τι τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστιν = ‘this is true—anything else?’ i.e. isn't it?, the words being thrown in parenthetically like nicht wahr and n'est ce pas.

6. ἐν τοῖσδε—οί=ον· τοῖσδεwould lead us to expect an enumeration of the cases: as it is, only examples are given. The effect of the Greek may be brought out by ‘in the following cases—that often for example, etc.’ With this punctuation it is needless to write (as Kroschel does) τοιοῖσδε for τοῖσδε .

8. γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν : cf. Meno, 77C ἦ γὰρ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐριθυμεῖν αὐτῶν; μάλιστα.

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras. James Adam. ed. James Adam, ed. Adela Marion Adam. Cambridge. 1921.

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Current edition Perseus

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras (English) (Plato. Platonis Protagoras. Adam, James; Adam, Adela Marion, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.)

Editions (1)

Πρωταγόρας Perseus (Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.) — 353 focus

[353]

ΣΩ.

ἴθι δὴ μετʼ ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὅ φασιν ὑπὸ 353 353a τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεσθε, ἔροιντʼ ἂν ἡμᾶς· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτʼ ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατον ἡμῖν.
τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; 353b
οἶμαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἶναί τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τἆλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτʼ ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἡγήσασθαι ᾗ οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερὸν γενέσθαι, ἕπου· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον, ἐῶ χαίρειν.
ἀλλʼ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε ὥσπερ ἤρξω. 353c
πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο ἡμᾶς· τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; εἴποιμʼ ἂν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡδί· Ἀκούετε δή· πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαι. ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσδε, οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν;—φαῖεν ἄν.—οὐκοῦν ἐροίμεθʼ ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν· Πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πῇ φατε εἶναι; 353d πότερον ὅτι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρασκευάζει; ἢ κἂν εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δʼ ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅτι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὁπῃοῦν; ἆρʼ οἰόμεθʼ ἂν αὐτούς, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἄλλο τι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἢ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν κακά ἐστιν, 353e ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ὕστερον γιγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ τἆλλα.— ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.—οὐκοῦν νόσους ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι.—συνέφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.—

Translations (1)

Protagoras Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Lamb, W.R.M., translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1924 (printing).) — 353 focus

Soc.

Come then, and join me in the endeavor to persuade the world and explain what is this experience of theirs, which they call being overcome by pleasure, and which they give as the reason why they fail to do what is best though they have knowledge of it. For perhaps if we said to them: What you assert, good people, is not correct, but quite untrue—they might ask us: Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not being overcome by pleasure 353a what on earth is it, and what do you call it? Tell us that.
Why, Socrates, must we consider the opinion of the mass of mankind, 353b who say just what occurs to them?
I fancy, I replied, that this will be a step towards discovering how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. So if you think fit to abide by the arrangement we made a while ago—that I should lead in the direction which seems best for elucidating the matter—you must now follow; but if you would rather not, to suit your wishes I will let it pass.
No, he said, your plan is quite right: go on to the end as you began. 353c
Once more then, I proceeded, suppose they should ask us: Then what do you call this thing which we described as being overcome by pleasures? The answer I should give them would be this: Please attend; Protagoras and I will try to explain it to you. Do you not say that this thing occurs, good people, in the common case of a man being overpowered by the pleasantness of food or drink or sexual acts, and doing what he does though he knows it to be wicked? They would admit it. Then you and I would ask them again: In what sense do you call such deeds wicked? 353d Is it that they produce those pleasures and are themselves pleasant at the moment, or that later on they cause diseases and poverty, and have many more such ills in store for us? Or, even though they have none of these things in store for a later day, and cause us only enjoyment, would they still be evil just because, forsooth, they cause enjoyment in some way or other? Can we suppose, Protagoras, that they will make any other answer than that these things are evil, not according to the operation of the actual pleasure 353e of the moment, but owing to the later results in disease and those other ills?
I think, said Protagoras, that most people would answer thus.
Then in causing diseases they cause pains? And in causing poverty they cause pains? They would admit this, I imagine. 354a
Protagoras agreed.

James Adam Commentary on Plato, Protagoras XXXVI.353C

ed. James Adam, ed. Adela Marion Adam

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ΣΩ.

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