Search the Perseus Catalog for:

View: By Section

← Previous Next →

κδ′ τί ἐστιν ἡ λεγομένη τέχνη περὶ βίον.

[188] Πάλιν οἱ Στωικοὶ (Stoic. fr. II 96 Arn.) περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθά φασιν εἶναι τέχνας τινὰς, τὰς ἀρετάς· τέχνην δὲ εἶναί φασι (Stoic. fr. I 73 Arn.) σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων , τὰς δὲ καταλήψεις γίγνεσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. πῶς οὖν ἐν τῷ ² ἡγεμονικῷ, πνεύματι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ὑπάρχοντι,
ἐναπόθεσις γίνεται καταλήψεων καὶ ἀθροισμὸς τοσούτων ὧς γενέσθαι τέχνην , οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐννοῆσαι, τῆς ἐπιγινομένης τυπώσεως ἀεὶ τὴν πρὸ αὐτῆς ἀπαλειφούσης, ἐπεὶ χυτόν τέ ἐστι τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἐξ ὅλου κινεῖσθαι λέγεται
καθ’ ἑκάστην τύπωσιν.

[189] τὸ γὰρ τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνειδωλοποίησιν λέγειν ἐπιδεκτικὴν εἶναι δύνασθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φημὶ δὲ τὴν κρᾶσιν τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως καὶ ταὐτοῦ, ἢ τούς
ἀριθμούς, τέλεον ληρῶδές ἐστιν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ἀγαθόν.

[190] εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, μήτε ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται τὸ δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν, μήτε περὶ σῶμά ἐστι μήτε περὶ ψυχήν, ὧς ἐπελογισάμην, οὐδ’ ὅλως ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθόν

Διὰ δὲ τὰ προειρημένα οὐδὲ κακόν τι ἔστι φύσει. τὰ γὰρ ἑτέροις δοκοῦντα εἶναι κακά, ταῦτα ἕτεροι διώκου- σιν ὡς ἀγαθά, οἷον ἀσέλγειαν ἀδικίαν φιλαργυρίαν ἀκρα- σίαν, τὰ ἐοικότα. ὅθεν εἰ τὰ μὲν φύσει πάντας ὁμοίως πέφυκε κινεῖν, τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα εἶναι κακὰ οὐ πάντας ὁμοίως
κινεῖ, οὐδέν ἐστι φύσει κακόν.

[191] Ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ’ ἀδιάφορόν ἐστί τι φύσει διὰ τὴν περὶ ³ 166 τῶν ἀδιαφόρων διαφωνίαν. οἷον γοῦν οἱ μὲν Στωικοὶ (Stoic. fr. III 122 Arn.) τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ τὰ μὲν προηγμένα μένα εἷναι, τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα, τὰ δὲ οὔτε προηγμένα οὔτε ἀποπροηγμένα, ’π’ προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ⁴ ἱκανὴν ἀξίαν ἔχοντα ὡς Ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον, ἀποπροηγμένα
δὲ τὰ μὴ ἱκανὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν ὡς πενίαν νόσον, μήτε δὲ προηγμένα μήτε ἀποπροηγμένα ὡς τὸ ἐκτεῖναι ἢ συγκάμψαι τὸν δάκτυλον.

[192] τινὲς δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φύσει προηγμένον ἢ ἀποπροηγμένον εἶναι λέγουσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ⁵ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ὁτὲ μὲν
προηγμένον φαίνεσθαι, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένον. εἰ γοῦν, φασίν, οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι ἐπιβουλεύοιντο ὑπὸ τυράννου οἱ δὲ πένητες εἰρηνεύοιντο, πᾶς ἄν ἕλοιτο εἶναι πένης μᾶλλον ἢ πλούσιος, ὡς ἀποπροηγμένον γίνεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον.

[193] ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον
τῶν λεγομένων ἀδιαφόρων οἱ μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φασιν, οἱ δὲ κακόν, ἅπαντες δ’ ἂν ὁμοίως ἀδιάφορον αὐτὸ ἐνόμιζον εἶναι, εἴγε ἀδιάφορον ἦν φύσει, οὐδέν ἐστι φύσει ἀδιάφορον.

Οὕτως καὶ εἴ τις φύσει αἱρετὴν εἶναι λέγοι τὴν ἀνδρείαν
διὰ τὸ τοὺς λέοντας φυσικῶς τολμᾶν καὶ ἀνδρίζεσθαι δοκεῖν καὶ ταύρους, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους τινὰς καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνας , λέγομεν, ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἡ δειλία τῶν φύσει αἱρετῶν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἔλαφοι καὶ λαγῴ καὶ ἄλλα
πλείονα ζῷα φυσικῶς ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ὁρμᾷ. καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δειλοὶ θεωροῦνται· σπανίως μὲν γάρ τις ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἑαυτὸν ἐπέδωκεν εἰς θάνατον βλακευσάμενος ἢ ἄλλως θερμόν τι τυφωθεὶς ἔδοξέ τις διαπράττεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πλεῖστος ὅμιλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκ-
⁶⁷⁸ 167 κλίνει.

[194] ὅθεν καὶ οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι (Epicurea p. 274, 25 Us.) δεικνύναι νομίζουσι φύσει αἱρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· τὰ γὰρ ζῷά φασιν ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι, ἀδιάστροφα ὄντα, ὁρμᾶν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐκκλίνειν ⁹ δὲ ἀλγηδόνας.

[195] καὶ πρὸς τούτους δὲ ἔστι λέγειν,
τι τὸ ποιητικὸν κακοῦ οὐκ ἂν εἴη φύσει ἀγαθόν· ἡ δέ ἡδονὴ κακῶν ἐστι ποιητική· πάσῃ γὰρ ἡδονῇ παραπέπηγεν ἀλγηδών, ἥ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς (Epicurea p. 276, 23 Us.) φύσει κακόν. οἷον γοῦν ἥδεται ὁ μέθυσος ἐμφορούμενος οἴνου καὶ ὁ γαστρίμαργος τροφῆς, καὶ ὁ λάγνος ἀφροδισίοις
ἀμέτρως χρώμενος· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πενίας καὶ νόσων ἐστὶ ποιητικά, ἅπερ ἀλγεινά ἐστι καὶ κακά, ὡς φασίν. οὐκ ἄρα φύσει ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή.

[196] παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ οὔκ ἐστι φύσει κακόν, ἡδονὰς δὲ ἀποτελοῦσιν ἀλγηδόνες· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμας ἀναλαμβάνομεν
μὲν πονοῦντες, καὶ πλούτου καὶ ἐρωμένης οὕτως ἐγκρατὴς γίνεταί τις, καὶ ὑγίειαν περιποιοῦσιν αἱ ἀλγηδόνες. οὐκ ἄρα ὁ πόνος φύσει κακόν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ φύσει ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἦν ἡ ἡδονὴ, φαῦλον δὲ ὁ πόνος, πάντες ἂν ὁμοίως διέκειντο περὶ αὐτῶν, ὧς ἐλέγομεν· ὁρῶμεν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν
φιλοσόφων τὸν μὲν πόνον καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν αἱρουμένους, τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ καταφρονοῦντας.

[197] ὁμοίως δ’ ἂν περιτρίποιντο
καὶ οἱ τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγοντες, ἐκ τοῦ τινὰς τῶν σοφῶν τὸν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς αἱρεῖσθαι βίον, ὡς ἐκ τῆς παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις διαφωνίας τὸ φύσει τι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον εἶναι διατρέπεσθαι.

[198] Οὐκ ἄτοπον δ’ ἂν ’ίσως εἴη πρὸς τούτοις καὶ εἰδικώτερον ἐπιστῆσαι διὰ βραχέων ταῖς ὑπολήψεσι ταῖς περὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρῶν, ἀθέσμων τε καὶ οὐ τοιούτων καὶ νόμων καὶ ἐθῶν καὶ τῆς εἰς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς κατ’ οἰχομένους ὁσιότητος καὶ τῶν ἐοικότων· καὶ γὰρ
οὕτω περὶ τῶν πρακτέων ἢ μὴ πολλὴν εὑρήσομεν ἀνωμα- ¹⁰¹¹ 168 λίαν.

[199] οἷον γοῦν παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρόν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ παράνομον νενόμισται τὸ τῆς ἀρρενομιξίας, παρὰ Γερμανοῖς δέ, ὡς φασίν , οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔν τι τῶν συνήθων. λέγεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ Θηβαίοις τὸ παλαιὸν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο εἶναι δόξαι, καὶ τὸν Μηριόνην τὸν Κρῆτα οὕτω κεκλῆσθαί
φασι δι’ ἔμφασιν τοῦ Κρητῶν ἔθους, καὶ τὴν Ἀχιλλέως πρὸς Πάτροκλον διάπυρον φιλίαν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνάγουσί τινες.

[200] καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, ὅπου γε καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς κυνικῆς φιλο σοφίας καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Κιτιέα Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον (fr. Stoic. I, 256 Arn.) ἀδιάφορον
τοῦτο εἶναί φασιν; καὶ τὸ δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι, καίτοι παρ’ ἡμῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν, παρά τισι τῶν Ἰνδῶν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι νομίζεται· μίγνυνται γοῦν ἀδιαφόρως δημοσίᾳ, καθάπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου Κράτητος ἀκηκόαμεν.

[201] ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τὰς γυναῖκας ἑταιρεῖν παρ’ ἡμῖν
μὲν αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐπονείδιστον, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων εὐκλεές· φασὶ γοῦν, ὅτι αἱ πλείστοις συνιοῦσαι καὶ κόσμον ἔχουσι περισφύριον, σύνθημα τοῦ παρ’ αὐταῖς σεμνολογήματος. παρ’ ἐνίοις δὲ αὐτῶν αἱ κόραι πρὸ τῶν γάμων τὴν προῖκα ἐξ ἑταιρήσεως συνάγουσαι γαμοῦνται.
καὶ τοὺς Στωικοὺς (Stoic. fr. III, 755 Arn.) δὲ ὁρῶμεν οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶναι λέγοντας τὸ ἑταίρᾳ συνοικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἑταίρας ἐργασίας διαζῆν.

[202] ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐστίχθαι παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ, πολλοὶ δὲ
Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Σαρμάτων στίζουσι τὰ γεννώμενα.

[203] τό τε ἐλλόβια ἔχειν τούς ἄρρενας παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρόν ἐστι, παρ’ ἐνίοις δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων , ὥσπερ καὶ Σύροις, εὐγενείας ἐστὶ σύνθημα. τινὲς δὲ ἐπιτείνοντες τὸ σύνθημα τῆς
εὐγενείας, καὶ τὰς ῥῖνας τῶν παίδων τιτρώσκοντες κρίκους ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀργυρέους ἢ χρυσοῦς ἀπαρτῶσιν , ὃ παρ’ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειέ τις,

[204] ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἀνθοβαφῆ καὶ ποδήρη τις ἄρρην ἐνταῦθα <ἂν> ἀμφιέσαιτο ἐσθῆτα, καίτοι Πέρσαις εὐπρεπεστάτου τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν αἰσχροῦ τούτου
¹² 169 δοκοῦντος εἶναι. καὶ παρὰ Διονυσίῳ δὲ τῷ τῆς Σικελίας τυράννῳ τοιαύτης ἐσθῆτος Πλάτωνι καὶ Ἀριστίππῳ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις προσενεχθείσης ὁ μὲν Πλάτων’ ἀπεπέμψατο, εἰπὼν (Eurip. Bacch. 836)

οὖσ’ ἄν δυναίμην θῆλυν ενδῦναι στολήν

ἄρρην πεφυκὼς,

ὁ δὲ Ἀρίστιππος προσήκατο, φήσας (Bacch. 317)

καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν

οὖσ' ἥ γε σώφρωνov οὐ διαφθαρήσεται.

οὕτω καὶ τῶν σοφῶν ᾧ μὲν οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ᾧ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ἐδόκει τοῦτο εἶναι.

[205] ἄθεσμον τέ ἐστι παρ’ ἡμῖν μητέρα ἢ ἀδελφὴν ἰδίαν γαμεῖν· Πέρσαι δέ, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν οἱ σοφίαν ἀσκεῖν δοκοῦντες, οἱ Μάγοι, γαμοῦσι τὰς μητέρας, καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι τὰς ἀδελφὰς ἄγονται πρὸς γάμον, καὶ ὧς
ὁ ποιητής φησιν Σ 356),

Ζεὺς Ἥρην προσέειπε κασιγνήτην ἄλοχόν τε. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων (Stoic. fr. I, 256 Arn.) φησὶ μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μόριον τῆς μητρὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μορίῳ τρῖψαι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι μέρος
τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῇ χειρὶ τρῖψαι φαῦλον
ἂν εἶποι τις εἶναι. καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ (fr. Stoic. III, 745 Arn.) δογματίζει τόν τε πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς παιδοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀδελφῆς. ¹³ Πλάτων’ (Resp. IV 423 E sqq.) δὲ καὶ καθολικώτερον
κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δείν’ ἀπεφήνατο.

[206] τό τε αἰσχρουργεῖν ἐπάρατον ὂν παρ’ ἡμὶν ὁ Ζήνων (Stoic. fr. I, 255 Arn.) οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζει· καὶ ἄλλους δὲ ὧς ἀγαθῷ τινι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι τῷ κακῷ πυνθανόμεθα.

[207] ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρωπείων γεύεσθαι σαρκῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν ¹⁴ ἄθεσμον, παρ’ ὅλοις δὲ βαρβάροις ἔθνεσιν ἀδιάφορόν
ἐστιν. καὶ τί δεῖ τοὺς βαρβάρους λέγειν, ὅπου καὶ ὁ Τυδεὺς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τοῦ πολεμίου λέγεται φαγεῖν φαγεῖν, καὶ ¹⁵ 170 οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς (Stoic. fr. I, 254 III, 748 Arn.) οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶναί φασι τὸ σάρκας τινὰ ἐσθίειν ἄλλων τε ἀν’ θρώπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ;

[208] τό τε ἀνθρωπείῳ μιαίνειν αἵματι βωμὸν θεοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄθεσμον, Λάκωνες δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς Ὀρθωσίας Ἀρτέμιδος μαστίζονται
πικρῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολλὴν αἵματος ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς θεοῦ γενέσθαι ῥύσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ Κρόνῳ θύουσιν ἄνθρωπόν τινες, καθάπερ καὶ Σκύθαι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τοὺς ξένους· ἡμεῖς δὲ χραίνεσθαι τὰ ἱερὰ δοκοῦμεν ἀνθρώπου φόνῳ.

[209] τούς γε μὴν μοιχοὺς κολάζει παρ’ ἡμῖν νόμος, παρὰ δέ
τισιν ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι ταῖς τῶν ἑτέρων γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι· καὶ φιλοσόφων δέ τινές φασιν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ ἀλλοτρίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι.

[210] τοὺς πατέρας τε ὑπὸ τῶν παίδων ἐπιμελείας ἀξιοῦσθαι κελεύει παρ’ ἡμῖν νόμος· οἱ Σκύθαι δὲ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γενομένους
αὐτοὺς ἀποσφάττουσιν. καὶ τί θαυμαστόν , εἴγε ὁ μὲν Κρόνος τῇ ἅρπῃ τὰ αἰδοία ἐξέτεμε τοῦ πατρός, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς τὸν Κρόνον κατεταρτάρωσεν , ἡ δὲ Ἀθηνᾶ μετὰ Ἥρας καὶ Ποσειδῶνος τὸν πατέρα δεσμεύειν ἐπεχείρησεν; ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ὁ Κρόνος ἀναιρεῖν ἔκρινεν,

[211] καὶ
ὁ Σόλων Ἀθηναίοις τὸν περὶ τῶν ἀκρίτων νόμον ἔθετο, καθ’ ὃν φονεύειν ἑκάστῳ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ παῖδα ἐπέτρεψεν· παρ’ ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ τοὺς παῖδας φονεύειν ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ
νόμοι. οἴ τε ωμαίων νομοθέται τούς παῖδας ὑποχειρίους καὶ δούλους τῶν πατέρων κελεύουσιν εἶναι, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν παίδων μὴ κυριεύειν τούς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τοὺς πατέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐλευθερίας οἱ παῖδες τύχωσι κατὰ τούς ἀργυρωνήτους·
παρ’ ἑτέροις δὲ ὡς τυραννικὸν τοῦτο ἐκβέβληται.

[212] νόμος τέ ἐστι τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους κολάζεσθαι· οἱ μονομάχαι δὲ φονεύοντες πολλάκις καὶ τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τύπτειν ἐλευθέρους οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν· οἱ ἀθληταὶ δὲ τύπτοντες ἐλευθέρους ἄνδρας, πολλάκις <δὲ> καὶ
ἀναιροῦντες , τιμῶν καὶ στεφάνων ἀξιοῦνται.

[213] νόμος τε ¹⁶ 171 παρ’ ἡμὶν κελεύει μιᾷ συνοικεῖν ἕκαστον, Θρᾳκῶν δὲ καὶ Γαιτούλων Λιβύων δὲ ἔθνος τοῦτο) πολλαῖς ἕκαστος συνοικεῖ.

[214] τό τε λῃστεύειν παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν παράνομον καὶ
ἄδικόν ἐστι, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων οὐκ ἄτοπον. φασὶ δέ, ὅτι καὶ εὐκλεὲς τοῦτο οἱ Κίλικες ἐνόμιζον εἶναι, ὧς καὶ τοὺς ἐν λῃστείᾳ τελευτήσαντας τιμῆς ἀξίους εἷναι δοκεῖν. καὶ ὁ Νέστωρ δὲ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, μετὰ τὸ φιλοφρονήσασθαι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς

(γ 72) ἦ μαψιδίως ἀλάλησθε

οἶά τε ληιστῆρες;

καίτοι εἰ ἄτοπον ἦν τὸ λῃστεύειν, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως αὐτοὺς φιλοφρονησάμενος διὰ τὸ ὑποπτεύειν, μὴ ἄρα τοιοῦτοί τινες εἶεν.

[215] ἀλλὰ καὶ <τὸ> κλέπτειν παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν ἄδικον
καὶ παράνομόν ἐστιν· οἱ δὲ καὶ κλεπτίστατον εἶναι θεὸν λέγοντες τὸν Ἑρμῆν οὐκ ἄδικον τοῦτο νομίζεσθαι ποιοῦσιν πῶς γὰρ ἂν θεὸς εἴη κακός;). φασὶ δέ τινες, ὅτι καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες τοὺς κλέψαντας ἐκόλαζον οὐ διὰ τὸ κεκλοφέναι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πεφωρᾶσθαι.

[216] ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ δειλὸς καὶ ὁ ῥίψασπις
ἀνὴρ κολάζεται παρὰ πολλοῖς νόμῳ· διὸ καὶ ἡ τὴν ἀσπίδα τῷ παιδὶ ἐπὶ πόλεμον ἐξιόντι διδοῦσα Λάκαινα ‘σὺ
ἔφη, ‘τέκνον, ἢ ταύταν ἢ ἐπὶ ταύταν'. Ἀρχίλοχος δέ, ὥσπερ σεμνυνόμενος ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῷ τὴν ἀσπίδα ῥίψας φυ- γεῖν, ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι περὶ ἑαυτοῦ φησὶν (fr. 58 B.)

ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαΐων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἣν παρὰ θάμνῳ

ἔντος ἀμώμητον κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων,

αὐτὸς δ’ ἐξέφυγον θανάτου τέλος.

[217] αἱ δὲ Ἀμαζόνες καὶ ἐχώλευον τὰ ἄρρενα τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν γεννωμένων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν ἀνδρεῖον αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι δύνασθαι, περὶ πόλεμον δὲ ἔσχον αὐταί, τοῦ ἐναντίου ¹⁷ 172 παρ’ ἡμῖν καλῶς ἔχειν νενομισμένου. καὶ ἡ μήτηρ δὲ τῶν
θεῶν προσίεται τοὺς θηλυδρίας, οὐκ ἂν οὕτω κρίνασα ἡ θεός, εἴγε φύσει φαῦλον ἦν τὸ μὴ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι.

[218] οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καλοῦ πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει. Καὶ τὰ περὶ εὐσεβείας δὲ καὶ θεῶν <θεραπείας> πεπλήρωται
πολλῆς διαφωνίας. θεοὺς γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, τινὲς δὲ οὐκ εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Δ ιαγόραν τὸν Μήλιον καὶ Θεόδωρον καὶ Κριτίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον. καὶ τῶν εἶναι θεοὺς ἀποφηναμένων οἱ μὲν τοὺς πατρίους νομίζουσι θεούς, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς δογματικαῖς αἱρέσεσιν ἀναπλασσομένους, ¹⁸ ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης (cf.fr. 26 Rose) μὲν ἀσώματον
εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ πέρας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, Στωικοὶ (Stoic. fr. I 159 et II 103 Arn.) δὲ πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν, Ἐπίκουρος (p. 355, 7 Us.) δὲ ἀνθρωπόμορφον, Ξενοθάνης (cf. A33 Diels) δὲ σφαῖραν ἀπαθῆ.

[219] καὶ οἱ μὲν προνοεῖν τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς, 24a οἱ δὲ μὴ προνοεῖν· τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ὁ
Ἐπίκουρός (p. 71,3 Us.) φησί μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχειν μήτε ἑτέροις παρέχειν. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον οἱ μὲν ἕνα φασὶν εἶναι θεόν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ διαφόρους ταῖς μορφαῖς, ὡς καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ὑπολήψεις ἐμπίπτειν, κυνοπροσώπους καὶ ἱερακομόρφους καὶ βόας καὶ
κροκοδείλους καὶ τί γὰρ οὐχὶ νομιζόντων τοὺς θεούς.

[220] ὅθεν καὶ τὰ περὶ θυσιῶν καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς θρησκείας ὅλως πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει· ἃ γὰρ ἔν τισιν ἱεροῖς <νομίζεται> ὅσια, ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέροις ἀνόσια. καίτοι εἰ φύσει τὸ ὅσιον
καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο ἐνομίσθη. οἷον γοῦν Σαράπιδι χοῖρον οὐκ ἂν θύσειέ τις, Ἡρακλεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἀσκληπιῷ θύουσιν. πρόβατον Ἴσιδι θύειν ἄθεσμον, τῇ μητρὶ μέντοι λεγομένῃ τῶν θεῶν καὶ θεοῖς ἄλλοις καλλιερεῖται.

[221] ται. <. . . > τῷ Κρόνῳ θύουσιν ἄνθρωπον , ὃ τοῖς πλείστοις
¹⁹ 173 ἀσεβὲς εἶναι νομίζεται. αἴλουρον ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τῷ Ὥρῳ θύουσι, καὶ Θέτιδι σίλφην· ὃ παρ’ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειέ τις. ἵππον τῷ Ποσειδῶνι καλλιεροῦσιν· Ἀπόλλωνι δέ, ἐξαιρέτως τῷ Διδυμαίῳ, τὸ ζῷον ἀπεχθές. αἶγας Ἀρτέμιδι
θύειν εὐσεβές, ἀλλ’ οὐκ Ἀσκληπιῷ.

[222] καὶ ἄλλα δὲ τούτοις ὅμοια παμπληθῆ λέγειν ἔχων ἐῶ, τῆς συντομίας στοχαζόμενος. εἰ μέντοι τι ἦν ὅσιον φύσει θῦμα καὶ ἀνόσιον, παρὰ πᾶσιν ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο.

Παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν εὑρεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ
κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θρησκείᾳ περὶ τοὺς θεούς.

[223] Ἰουδαῖος μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἱερεὺς Αἰγύπτιος θᾶττον ἂν ἀποθάνοι ἤ χοίρειον φάγοι, Λίβυς δὲ προβατείου γεύσασθαι κρέως τῶν ἀθεσμοτάτων εἶναι δοκεῖ, Σύρων δέ τινες περιστερᾶς, ἄλλοι δὲ ἱερείων. ἰχθῦς τε ἐν τισὶ μὲν ἱεροῖς
θέμις ἐσθίειν 5 ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ ἀσεβές. Αἰγυπτίων τε τῶν σοφῶν εἶναι νενομισμένων οἱ μὲν κεφαλὴν ζῴου φαγεῖν ἀνίερον εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ ὠμοπλάτην, οἱ δὲ πόδα, οἱ δὲ κρόμμυον τι.

[224] κρόμμυον δὲ οὐκ ἄν τις προσενέγκαιτο τῶν καθιερουμένων τῷ κατὰ Πηλούσιον Κασίῳ Διί, ὥσπερ
οὐδὲ ἱερεὺς τῆς κατὰ Λιβύην Ἀφροδίτης σκόρδου γεύσαιτο ἄν. ἀπέχονται δὲ ἐν <οἷς> μὲν ἱεροῖς μίνθης, ἐν οἶς
ἡδυόσμου, ἐν οἶς δὲ σελίνου. ἔνιοι δὲ θᾶττον ἂν τἀς κεφαλὰς φαγεῖν φασι τῶν πατέρων ἢ κυάμους. ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἑτέροις ταῦτα ἀδιάφορα.

[225] κυνείων τε γεύσασθαι δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἀνίερον εἶναι, Θρᾳκῶν δὲ ἔνιοι κυνοφαγεῖν
ἱστοροῦνται. ἴσως δὲ καὶ παρ’ Ἕλλησι τοῦτο ἦν σύνηθες· διόπερ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας ὁρμώμενος τισὶ τῶν πασχόντων σκυλάκεια δίδοσθαι κελεύει κρέα. τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων σάρκας, ὧς ἔφην, ἀδιαφόρως ἐσθίουσιν, ὅπερ ἀνίερον παρ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι νενόμι- ²⁰ 174 ’σται.

[226] καίτοι εἴγε ἦν φύσει τὰ τῆς θρησκείας καὶ τῶν
ἀθέσμων, παρὰ πᾶσιν ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο.

Παραπλήσια δὲ ἔστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς εἰς τοὺς κατοιχομένους ὁσιότητος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὁλοκλήρως περιστεί- λαντες τοὺς ἀποθανόντας γῇ καλύπτουσιν, ἀσεβὲς εἶναι νομίζοντες ἡλίῳ δεικνύειν αὐτούς· Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ τὰ ἔντερα
ἐξελόντες ταριχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ σὺν ἑαυτοῖς ὑπὲρ γῆς ἔχουσιν.

[227] Αἰθιόπων δὲ οἱ ἰχθυοφάγοι εἰς τἀς λίμνας ἐμβάλλουσιν αὐτούς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἰχθύων βρωθησομένους· Υρκανοὶ δὲ κυσὶν αὐτοὺς ἐκτίθενται βοράν, Ἰνδῶν δὲ ἔνιοι γυψίν. Τρωγλοδύτας δέ φασιν ἐπί τινα γεώλοφον
ἄγειν τὸν ἀποθανόντα, εἶτα δεσμεύσαντας αὐτοῦ τὴν κε- φαλὴν πρὸς τοὺς πόδας λίθοις βάλλειν μετὰ γέλωτος, εἷθ’ ὅταν χώσωσιν αὐτὸν τοῖς βαλλομένοις ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι.

[228] τινὲς δὲ βάρβαροι τοὺς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας θύσαντες ἐσθίουσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νεότητι ἀποθανόντας γῇ
κρύπτουσιν. ἔνιοι δὲ καίουσι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας· ὣν οἱ μὲν ἀναλαβόντες αὐτῶν τὰ ὀστέα κηδεύουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀφροντίστως κατ’ καταλείπουσιν ἐρριμμένα. Πέρσας δέ φασιν ἀνασκολοπίζειν τοὺς ἀποθανόντας καὶ νίτρῳ ταριχεύειν, εἶθ’ οὕτω τελαμῶσι συνειλεῖν. ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσον πένθος ἐπὶ
τοῖς τελευτήσασιν ὑπομένουσιν ὁρῶμεν.

[229] καὶ τὸν θάνατον δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν δεινὸν καὶ φευκτόν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον. ὁ γοῦν Εὐριπίδης φησὶν (fr. 638Nauck).

τίς δ’ οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,

τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται;

καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος (p. 61, 6. 71, 6 Us.) δέ φησιν ‘ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.’ φασὶ ²¹ δὲ καὶ ὧς εἴπερ συνεστήκαμεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος,
ὁ δὲ θάνατος διάλυσίς ἐστι ψυχῆς καὶ σώμα- τος, ὅτε μὲν ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος οὐ γάρ διαλυόμεθα), ὅτε δὲ ὁ θάνατος ἔστιν, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ἡμεῖς· τῷ γὰρ μηκέτι τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς ²² 175
ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν.

[230] ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτός (cf. B 88 Diels) φησιν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνάναι καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν τεθάφθαι, ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ²³ ἀποθνῂσκοθεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναβιοῦν καὶ ζῆν. ἔνιοι
δὲ καὶ βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν τοῦ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν. ὁ γοῦν Εὐριπίδης φησὶν (fr. 449 Nauck)

ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους

τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν, εἰς ὅσ’ ἔρχεται κακά,

τὸν δ’ αὖ θανόντα καὶ κακῶν πεπαυμένον

χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.

ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπολήψεως καὶ ταῦτα εἴρηται·

[231] (Theogn. 425)

ἀρχὴν μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον,

μηδ’ ἐσιδεῖν αὐγὰς ὀξέος ἠελίου,

φύντα δ’ ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀί·δαο περῆσαι
καὶ κεῖσθαι πολλὴν γαῖαν ἐφεσσάμενον. καὶ τὰ περὶ Κλέοβιν δὲ καὶ Βίτωνα ἴσμεν, ἅ φησιν ὁ Ἡρόδοτος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀργείας ἱερείας λόγῳ (I 31).

[232] ἱστοροῦνται δὲ καὶ Θρᾳκῶν ἔνιοι περικαθεσθέντες τὸν γεννηθέντα θρηνεῖν. οὐδὲ ὁ θάνατος οὖν τῶν φύσει δεινῶν
εἶναι νομίζοιτο ἄν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν τῶν φύσει καλῶν.
οὐδὲ τῶν προειρημένων τι ἐστὶ φύσει τοῖον ἢ τοῖον, νομιστὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ πρός τι.

[233] Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως μεταφέρειν ἔστι καὶ ἐφ’ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ μὴ ἐξεθέμεθα νῦν διὰ
τὴν συντομίαν τοῦ λόγου. εἰ δὲ καὶ περί τινων μὴ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν αὐτόθεν ἀνωμαλίαν, λεκτέον, ὅτι ἔν τισιν ἔθνεσιν ἀγνοουμένοις ἡμῖν ἐνδέχεται καὶ περὶ τούτων εἶναι διαφωνίαν.

[234] ὧς οὖν εἰ μὴ ἐγιγνώσκομεν, εἰ τύχοι, τὸ περὶ τοῦ τἀς ἀδελφὰς γαμεῖν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἔθος, οὐκ ἂν
ὀρθῶς διεβεβαιούμεθα ὁμολογούμενον παρὰ πᾶσιν εἶναι τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἀδελφάς γαμεῖν, οὕτως οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκείνων, ἐν οἶς οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσιν ἡμῖν ἀνωμαλίαι, διαγὰρ ²⁴ 176 βεβαιοῦσθαι προσήκει μὴ εἷναι διαφωνίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐνδεχομένου, καθάπερ ἔφην, τοῦ παρά τισιν ἔθνεσι τῶν ἡμῖν μὴ γινωσκομένων τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι διαφωνίαν.

[235] Ὁ τοίνυν σκεπτικὸς τὴν τοσαύτην ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ὁρῶν ἐπέχει μὲν περὶ τοῦ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον εἶναι, κἀν τούτῳ τῆς δογματικῆς ἀφιστάμενος προπετείας , ἕπεται δὲ ἀδοξάστως τῇ βιωτικῇ τηρήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀπαθὴς
θὴς μένει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπαθεῖ·

[236] ὧς μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος αἰσθητικὸς πάσχει, μὴ προσδοξάζων δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο ὃ πάσχει κακόν ἐστι φύσει, μετριοπαθεῖ. τὸ γὰρ προσδοξάζειν τι τοιοῦτο χεῖρόν ἐστι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάσχειν, ὡς ἐνίοτε τοὺς μὲν τεμνομένους
ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτο πάσχοντας φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ παρεστῶτας διὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦ γινομένου δόξαν ὡς φαύλου λειποψυχεῖν.

[237] ὁ μέντοι γε ὑποθέμενος τὸ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον ἢ μὴ πρακτέον εἶναι ταράσσεται ποικίλως. καὶ γὰρ παρόντων αὐτῷ τούτων ἃ νομίζει φύσει κακὰ
εἶναι ποινηλατεῖσθαι δοκεῖ, καὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ γινόμενος ἐγκρατὴς ὑπό τε τοῦ τύφου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἀποβολὴν αὐτῶν φόβου, καὶ] εὐλαβούμενος μὴ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς νομιζομένοις παρ’ αὐτῷ γένηται,
ταραχαῖς οὐχὶ ταῖς τυχούσαις περιπίπτει·

[238] τοὺς γὰρ ἀνα- πόβλητα εἶναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ λέγοντας ἐφέξομεν ἐκ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν. ὅθεν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι εἰ τὸ κακοῦ ποιητικὸν κακόν ἐστι καὶ φευκτόν, ἡ δὲ πεποίθησις
τοῦ τάδε μὲν εἶναι φύσει ἀγαθά, τάδε δὲ κακὰ ταραχὰς ποιεῖ, κακόν ἐστι καὶ φευκτὸν τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ πεποιθέναι φαῦλόν τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν ὧς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εἶναι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκεῖ λελέχθαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων· ²⁵²⁶²⁷

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. ed. Hermann Mutschmann. Germany. 2014.

Current edition First1KGreek

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Greek) (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.)

Translations (1)

Outlines of Pyrrhonism First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.) — 3.24 focus

Chapter XXIV.—What Is The So-Called Art Of Living?¹

[188] Again, the Stoics declare that goods of the soul are certain arts, namely the virtues. And an art, they say, is ‟a system composed of co-exercised apprehensions,”² and the perceptions arise in the ruling principle. But how there takes place in the ruling principle, which according to them is breath,³ a deposit of perceptions, and such an aggregation of them as to produce art, it is impossible to conceive, when each succeeding impression obliterates the previous one, seeing that breath is fluid and it is said to move as a whole at each impression.

[189] For it is perfect nonsense to say that Plato’s imaginary construction of the soul—I mean the mixture of the indivisible and the divisible essence and of the nature of the Other and of the Same,⁴ or the Numbers—is capable of being receptive of the Good. Hence the good cannot belong to the soul either.

[190] But if the good is not choice itself, and what is choiceworthy in itself neither exists externally nor belongs to either body or soul—as I have argued, —then there does not exist at all any natural good.

For the foregoing reasons also there exists no natural evil. For things which seem to some to be evil are pursued as goods by others—for instance, incontinence, injustice, avarice, intemperance, and the like. Hence, if it is the nature of things naturally existent to move all men alike, whereas the things said to be evil do not move all alike, nothing is naturally evil.

[191] Similarly there is nothing naturally indifferent, because of the divergence of opinion about things indifferent. The Stoics, for example, assert that of the indifferents some are preferred, some rejected, and others neither preferred nor rejected,⁵—the preferred being such as have sufficient value, like health and wealth; the rejected such as have not sufficient value, like poverty and sickness; while extending the finger or bending it in are cases of the neither preferred nor rejected.

[192] Some, however, maintain that none of the indifferents is by nature preferred or rejected; for, owing to the differences in the circumstances, each of the indifferents appears at one time preferred, at another rejected. For certainly, they argue, if the rich were being threatened with attack by a tyrant while the poor were being left in peace, everyone would prefer to be poor rather than rich, so that wealth would be a thing rejected.

[193] Consequently,since of each of the so-called indifferents some say that it is good, others bad, whereas all alike would have counted it indifferent had it been naturally indifferent, there is nothing that is naturally indifferent.

So also, should anyone declare that courage is naturally choiceworthy because lions seem to be naturally bold and courageous, bulls too, it may be, and some men and cocks, we reply that, as for that, cowardice also is one of the things naturally choiceworthy, since deer and hares and many other animals are naturally impelled thereto. The majority of men, too, show themselves to be cowardly; for it is rare for a man to give himself up to death for the sake of his country,⁶ or to seem inspired to do any other daring deed, the great majority of mankind being averse to all such actions.

[194] Hence, also, the Epicureans suppose themselves to have proved that pleasure is naturally choiceworthy; for the animals, they say, as soon as they are born, when still unperverted, seek after pleasure and avoid pains.

[195] But to these we may reply that what is productive of evil cannot be naturally good; but pleasure is productive of evils; for to every pleasure there is linked a pain, and pain, according to them, is a natural evil. Thus, for example, the drunkard feels pleasure when filling himself with wine, and the glutton with food, and the lecher in immoderate sexual intercourse, yet these things are productive of both poverty and sickness, which, as they say, are painful and evil. Pleasure, therefore, is not a natural good.

[196] Similarly, too, what is productive of good is not naturally evil, and pains bring about pleasures; it is, in fact, by toil that we acquire knowledge, and it is thus also that a man becomes possessed both of wealth and of his lady-love, and pains preserve health. Toil, then, is not naturally evil. Indeed if pleasure were naturally good, and toil bad, all men, as we said, would have been similarly disposed towards them, whereas we see many of the philosophers choosing toil and hardship and despising pleasure.

[197] And so, too, those who assert that the virtuous life is naturally good might be refuted by the fact that some of the sages choose the life which includes pleasure,⁷ so that the claim that a thing is by nature of this sort or that is contradicted by the divergence of opinion amongst the Dogmatists themselves.

[198] And perhaps it may not be amiss, in addition to what has been said, to dwell more in detail, though briefly, on the notions concerning things shameful and not shameful, unholy and not so, laws and customs, piety towards the gods, reverence for the departed, and the like. For thus we shall discover a great variety of belief concerning what ought or ought not to be done.

[199] For example,⁸ amongst us sodomy is regarded as shameful or rather illegal, but by the Germani,⁹ they say, it is not looked on as shameful but as a customary thing. It is said, too, that in Thebes long ago this practice was not held to be shameful, and they say that Meriones the Cretan was so called by way of indicating the Cretans’ custom,¹⁰ and some refer to this the burning love of Achilles for Patroclus.¹¹

[200] And what wonder, when both the adherents of the Cynic philosophy and the followers of Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, declare that this practice is indifferent?¹² Having intercourse with a woman, too, in public, although deemed by us to be shameful, is not thought to be shameful by some of the Indians; at any rate they couple publicly with indifference, like the philosopher Crates, as the story goes.

[201] Moreover, prostitution is with us a shameful and disgraceful thing, but with many of the Egyptians it is highly esteemed; at least, they say that those women who have the greatest number of lovers wear an ornamental ankle-ring as a token of their proud position.¹³ And with some of them the girls marry after collecting a dowry before marriage by means of prostitution. We see the Stoics also declaring that it is not amiss to keep company with a prostitute or to live on the profits of prostitution.

[202] Moreover, with us tattooing is held to be shameful and degrading, but many of the Egyptians and Sarmatians tattoo their offspring.

[203] Also, it is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but amongst some of the barbarians, like the Syrians, it is a token of nobility. And some, by way of marking their nobility still further, pierce the nostrils also of their children and suspend from them rings of silver or gold—a thing which nobody with us would do,

[204] just as no man here would dress himself in a flowered robe reaching to the feet, although this dress, which with us is thought shameful, is held to be highly respectable by the Persians. And when, at the Court of Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, a dress of this description was offered to the philosophers Plato and Aristippus,¹⁴ Plato sent it away with the words—

A man am I, and never could I don

A woman’s garb;

but Aristippus accepted it, saying—

For e’en midst revel-routs

She that is chaste will keep her purity.

Thus, even in the case of these sages, while the one of them deemed this practice shameful, the other did not.

[205] And with us it is sinful to marry one’s mother or one’s own sister ; but the Persians, and especially those of them who are reputed to practise wisdom— namely, the Magi,—marry their mothers; and the Egyptians¹⁵ take their sisters in marriage, even as the poet says¹⁶—

Thus spake Zeus unto Hera, his wedded wife and his

sister.

Moreover, Zeno of Citium says that it is not amiss for a man to rub his mother’s private part with his own private part, just as no one would say it was bad for him to rub any other part of her body with his hand. Chrysippus,¹⁷ too, in his book The State approves of a father getting children by his daughter, a mother by her son, and a brother by his sister. And Plato,¹⁸ in more general terms, has declared that wives ought to be held in common.

[206] Masturbation, too, which we count loathsome, is not disapproved by Zeno; and we are informed that others, too, practise this evil as though it were a good thing.

[207] Moreover, the eating of human flesh is sinful with us, but indifferent amongst whole tribes of barbarians.¹⁹ Yet why should one speak of ‟barbarians” when even Tydeus²⁰ is said to have devoured the brains of his enemy, and the Stoic School declare that it is not wrong for a man to eat either other men’s flesh or his own?

[208] And with most of us it is sinful to defile an altar of a god with human blood, but the Laconians lash themselves fiercely over the altar of Artemis Orthosia²¹ in order that a great stream of blood may flow over the altar of the goddess. Moreover, some sacrifice a human victim to Cronos, just as the Scythians²² sacrifice strangers to Artemis; whereas we deem that holy places are defiled by the slaying of a man.

[209] Adulterers are, of course, punished by law with us, but amongst some peoples²³ intercourse with other men’s wives is a thing indifferent; and some philosophers,²⁴ too, declare that intercourse with the wife of another is indifferent.

[210] With us, also, the law enjoins that the fathers should receive due care from their children; but the Scythians cut their throats when they get to be over sixty years old. And what wonder, seeing that Cronos cut off his father’s genitals with a sickle, and Zeus plunged Cronos down to Tartarus, and Athena with the help of Hera and Poseidon attempted to bind her father with fetters?²⁵

[211] Moreover, Cronos decided to destroy his own children, and Solon gave the Athenians the law ‟concerning things immune,” by which he allowed each man to slay his own child; but with us the laws forbid the slaying of children. The Roman lawgivers also ordain that the children are subjects and slaves of their fathers, and that power over the children’s property belongs to the fathers and not the children, until the children have obtained their freedom like bought slaves; but this custom is rejected by others as being despotic.

[212] It is the law, too, that homicides should be punished; but gladiators when they kill often receive actual commendation. Moreover, the laws prevent the striking of free men; yet when athletes strike free men, and often even kill them, they are deemed worthy of rewards and crowns.

[213] With us, too, the law bids each man to have one wife, but amongst the Thracians and Gaetulians (a Libyan tribe)²⁶ each man has many wives.

[214] Piracy, too, is with us illegal and criminal, but with many of the barbarians it is not disapproved. Indeed they say that the Cilicians used to regard it as a noble pursuit, so that they held those who died in the course of piracy to be worthy of honour. So too Nestor—in the poet’s account²⁷—after welcoming Telemachus and his comrades, addresses them thus—

Say, are you roaming

Aimlessly, like sea-rovers?

Yet, if piracy had been an improper thing, he would not have welcomed them in this friendly way, because of his suspicion that they might be people of that kind.

[215] Moreover, thieving is with us illegal and criminal; yet those who declare that Hermes is a most thievish god cause this practice to be accounted not criminal— for how could a god be bad? And some say that the Laconians also punished those who thieved, not because they had thieved, but because they had been found out.

[216] Moreover, the coward and the man who throws away his shield are in many places punished by law; and this is why the Laconian mother, when giving a shield to her son as he set out for the war, said, ‟Either with this, my child, or upon it.” Yet Archilochus,²⁸ as though vaunting to us of his flight after flinging away his shield, speaks thus of himself in his poems—

Over my shield some Saïan warrior gloats,—

The shield I left, though loth, beside the bush—

A flawless piece of armour; I myself

Fled and escaped from death which endeth all.

[217] And the Amazons²⁹ used to maim the males amongst their offspring so as to make them incapable of any manly action, while they themselves attended to warfare; though with us the opposite practice is regarded as right. The Mother of the gods,³⁰ also, approves of effeminates, and the goddess would not have decided thus if unmanliness were naturally a bad thing.

[218] So it is that, in regard to justice and injustice and the excellence of manliness, there is a great variety of opinion.

Around all matters of religion and_ theology also, there rages violent controversy.³¹ For while the majority declare that gods exist, some deny their existence, like Diagoras of Melos, and Theodorus, and Critias the Athenian.³² And of those who maintain the existence of gods, some believe in the ancestral gods, others in such as are constructed in the Dogmatic systems—as Aristotle asserted that God is incorporeal and ‟the limit of heaven,”³³ the Stoics that he is a breath which permeates even through things foul, Epicurus that he is anthropomorphic,³⁴ Xenophanes that he is an impassive sphere.

[219] Some, too, hold that he cares for human affairs, others that he does not so care; for Epicurus declares that ‟what is blessed and incorruptible neither feels trouble itself nor causes it to others.” Hence ordinary people differ also, some saying that there is one god, others that there are many gods and of various shapes; in fact, they even come to share the notions of the Egyptians³⁵ who believe in gods that are dog-faced, or hawk-shaped, or cows or crocodiles or anything else.

[220] Hence, too, sacrificial usages, and the ritual of worship in general, exhibit great diversity. For things which are in some cults accounted holy are in others accounted unholy. But this would not have been so if the holy and the unholy existed by nature. Thus, for example, no one would sacrifice a pig to Sarapis, but they sacrifice it to Heracles and Asclepius. To sacrifice a sheep to Isis is forbidden, but it is offered up in honour of the so-called Mother of the gods and of other deities.

[221] To Cronos³⁶ a human victim is sacrificed at Carthage, although this is regarded by most as an impious act. In Alexandria they offer a cat to Horus and a beetle to Thetis—a thing which no one here would do. To Poseidon they sacrifice a horse; but to Apollo (especially the Didymaean³⁷ Apollo) that animal is an abomination. It is an act of piety to offer goats to Artemis, but not to Asclepius.

[222] And I might add a host of similar instances, but I forbear since my aim is to be brief. Yet surely, if a sacrifice had been holy by nature or unholy, it would have been deemed so by all men alike.

Examples similar to these may also be found in the religious observances with regard to human diet.

[223] For a Jew or an Egyptian priest³⁸ would sooner die than eat swine’s flesh; by a Libyan it is regarded as a most impious thing to taste the meat of a sheep, by some of the Syrians to eat a dove, and by others to eat sacrificial victims. And in certain cults it is lawful, but in others impious, to eat fish. And amongst the Egyptians some of those who are reputed to be sages believe it is sinful to eat an animal’s head,³⁹ others the shoulder, others the foot, others some other part.

[224] And no one would bring an onion⁴⁰ as an offering to Zeus Casius of Pelusium,⁴¹ just as no priest of the Libyan Aphrodite would taste garlic. And in some cults they abstain from mint, in others from catmint, in others from parsley. And some declare that they would sooner eat their fathers’ heads than beans.⁴²

[225] Yet, amongst others, these things are indifferent. Eating dog’s flesh, too, is thought by us to be sinful, but some of the Thracians are reported to be dog-eaters. Possibly this practice was customary also amongst the Greeks; and on this account Diocles, too, starting from the practices of the Asclepiadae,⁴³ prescribes that hounds’ flesh should be given to certain patients. And some, as I have said,⁴⁴ even eat human flesh indifferently, a thing which with us is accounted sinful.

[226] Yet, if the rules of ritual and of unlawful foods had existed by nature, they would have been observed by all men alike.

A similar account may be given of reverence towards the departed.⁴⁵ Some wrap the dead up completely and then cover them with earth, thinking that it is impious to expose them to the sun; but the Egyptians take out their entrails and embalm them and keep them above ground with themselves.

[227] The fish-eating tribes of the Ethiopians cast them into the lakes, there to be devoured by the fish; the Hyrcanians⁴⁶ expose them as a prey to dogs, and some of the Indians to vultures. And they say that some of the Troglodytes⁴⁷ take the corpse to a hill, and then after tying its head to its feet cast stones upon it amidst laughter, and when they have made a heap of stones over it they leave it there.

[228] And some of the barbarians⁴⁸ slay and eat those who are over sixty years old, but bury in the earth those who die young. Some burn the dead; and of these some recover and preserve their bones,⁴⁹ while others show no care but leave them scattered about. And they say that the Persians⁵⁰ impale their dead and embalm them with nitre, after which they wrap them round in bandages. How much grief others endure for the dead we see ourselves.

[229] Some, too, believe death itself to be dreadful and horrible, others do not. Thus Euripides says:⁵¹

Who knows if life be but the state of death,

And death be counted life in realms below?

And Epicurus declares:⁵² ‟Death is nothing to us; for what is dissolved is senseless, and what is senseless is nothing to us.” They also declare that, inasmuch as we are compounded of soul and body, and death is a dissolution of soul and body, when we exist death does not exist (for we are not being dissolved), and when death exists we do not exist, for through the cessation of the compound of soul and body we too cease to exist.

[230] And Heracleitus⁵³ states that both life and death exist both in our state of life and in our state of death; for when we live our souls are dead and buried within us, and when we die our souls revive and live. And some even suppose that dying is better for us than living. Thus Euripides says;⁵⁴

Rather should we assemble to bewail

The babe new-born, such ills has he to face;

Whereas the dead, who has surcease from woe,

With joy and gladness we should bear from home.

[231] These lines, too, spring from the same sentiment:⁵⁵

Not to have been begotten at all were the best thing for

mortals,

Nor to have lookèd upon fiery rays of the sun:

Or, if begotten, to hasten amain to the portals of Hades,

And to lie unmoved robèd in masses of earth.

We know, too, the facts about Cleobis and Biton which Herodotus⁵⁶ relates in his story of the Argive priestess.

[232] It is reported, also, that some of the Thracians sit round the new-born babe and chant dirges.⁵⁷ So, then, death should not be considered a thing naturally dreadful, just as life should not be considered a thing naturally good. Thus none of the things mentioned above is naturally of this character or of that, but all are matters of convention and relative.

[233] The same method of treatment may be applied also to each of the other customs, which we have not now described owing to the summary character of our exposition. And even if, in regard to some of them, we are unable to declare their discrepancy offhand, we ought to observe that disagreement concerning them may possibly exist amongst certain nations that are unknown to us.⁵⁸

[234] For just as, if we had been ignorant, say, of the custom amongst the Egyptians of marrying sisters,⁵⁹ we should have asserted wrongly that it was universally agreed that men ought not to marry sisters,—even so, in regard to those practices wherein we notice no discrepancy, it is not proper for us to affirm that there is no disagreement about them, since, as I said, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us.

[235] Accordingly, the Sceptic, seeing so great a diversity of usages, suspends judgement as to the natural existence of anything good or bad or (in general) fit or unfit to be done, therein abstaining from the rashness of dogmatism;⁶⁰ and he follows undogmatically the ordinary rules of life, and because of this he remains impassive in respect of matters of opinion, while in conditions that are necessitated his emotions are moderate;

[236] for though, as a human being, he suffers emotion through his senses, yet because he does not also opine that what he suffers is evil by nature, the emotion he suffers is moderate. For the added opinion that a thing is of such a kind is worse than the actual suffering itself, just as sometimes the patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while the bystanders swoon away because of their opinion that it is a horrible experience.

[237] But, in fact, he who assumes that there exists by nature something good or bad or, generally, fit or unfit to be done, is disquieted in various ways. For when he experiences what he regards as natural evils he deems himself to be pursued by Furies, and when he becomes possessed of what seems to him good things he falls into no ordinary state of disquiet both through arrogance and through fear of losing them, and through trying to guard against finding himself again amongst what he regards as natural evils;

[238] for those who assert that goods are incapable of being lost⁶¹ we shall put to silence by means of the doubts raised by their dissension. Hence we conclude that if what is productive of evil is evil and to be shunned, and the persuasion that these things are good, those evil, by nature produces disquiet, then the assumption and persuasion that anything is, in its real nature, either bad or good is evil and to be shunned.

For the present, then, this account of things good, evil, and indifferent is sufficient.

Notes on the current edition

Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes

1. 25a

2. 29a

3. 23 ἡδονὴ L 26 τινάς, τὰς ἀρετάς G: αἱρετάς T (artes eligihiles) 1/2 ἀνειδωλοποίησιν G: ymaginum ydeas simulationem Τ 2 ἐπιδεκτικὴν LT (susceptibilem): ἐπιδεικτικὴν MEAB 4 ἢ om. L 8 μηδὲ Bekk. dubit. 16 οὐδ’ ἀδιάφορόν Τ (nec indifferens) : οὐ διάφορόν G || τι E in ras., T (aliquid): τῆ ML: om. AB || περὶ om. T

4. 19a

5. 24

6. §§ 191–192 ~ adv. dogm. V 62—66.

7. § 193–192 dogm. V 99

8. 33 ἐστι om. AB 2 καὶ Τ (quod leones naturaliter auda- ces sunt et videntur fortiter agere) : ἐπὶ τὸ G, unde Gen. ὁρμᾶν pro τολμᾶν coniecerunt 3 δοκεῖν MEAB: δοκεῖ L 5 λαγῴ scr.: λαγὼς MLE pr. : λαγωοὶ AB et E in ras., unde edd.
βλακ. post 10 τῶν ἀνθρώπων transponi iubet Apelt: lasciviens quideni vel Τ 9 τυφωθεὶς MEABT (elatus): τυφλωθεὶς L

9. 14a

10. §§ 194—196 ~ adv. dogm. V 96—98.

11. 14a ἔνεστι Τ (inest) 20 ἀμέτρως Nauck: ἀμέτροις GT (inmoderatis) 23 ἀγαθοῦ MLT (boni): ἀγαθὸν EAB: ἀγαθῶν edd. 28 ἡ AB: om. MLE 8 ἐθῶν GT (consuetuclinibus): θεῶν Kayser 9 κατηχουμένους L

12. 12 Γερμανοῖς GT (apud germanow): Καρμανοῖς Fabricius cf. p. 35, 8 19 Κιτιέα Bekk.: Κιττιέα G: citiensem Τ 23 γοῦν ML: οὖν EAB 28 καὶ om. T 7 ἀπ’ Gen.: om. G: in eis dependent T 9 ἂν add. Bekk. 10 τοῦ vel τούτου secl. Pasquali

13. 4a

14. 9a

15. 11 <οὕτω> καὶ T (sic et) cf. v. 20. 23 ἀσκοῦντες δοκεῖν 27 Κιτιεὺς Bekk : Κιττιεὺς G 28/29 τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μορίῳ MLT (suo memhro confricare): τῶν αὐτοῦ μορίων EAB 2 δοκι- μάζει Kayser 6 ἀπέρατον EAB 7 ἄλλοις EAB 8 τούτῳ om. T

16. 18 σκύθας L 20 et 24 fort. <ὁ> παρ’ ἡμῖν v. 21 ἑταίρων T (amicorum) 22 καὶ — 23 μίγνυσθαι om. EABT 5/6 secundum mancipia T 8 fort. ἀλλήλους pro πολλάκις scrib. cf. p. 35, 32. 36, 2. 10 δὲ add. Τ (autem et)

17. 23 post φιλοφρονησάμενος fort. inser. ὠνείδισε vel simile quid coll. Thuc. I 5, 2 || διὰ τὸ ὑποπτεύειν G: sed propter id quidem suspicdbatur Τ 24 τὸ add. coll. p. 170, 5. 9. 13. 171, 14 || post κλέπτειν Gen. inser. μὲν 25 θεὸν om. M 28 κλέψαντας MEAB: κλέπτας L ὁ ἔντος Brunck: ἐντὸς G: interius Τ || κάλλιπον Τ (dimisi): κάλλιπεν G 7 ὐπ’ αὐτῶν Τ (ab eis): περὶ αὐτὰς G: παρ’ αὐταῖς Bekk. 9 ἔσχον G: hahebant se T: εἶχον vel ἐσχόλαζον Bekk. dub. at cf. p. 177, 13.

18. 19a

19. 15 θεραπείας vel θρησκείας add. e Τ (de creduUtate autem atque pietate deorum) cf. p. 173, 3. 174, 10. 21 τὸν θεὸν εἶναι AB 1 ἐμπίπτειν T (incidere): ἐκπίπτειν G 4 add. Τ (in quibusdam sacris pufantur sancta) 6 τοῦτο om. Τ: τι τοιοῦτον Kayser 10 excidit τινὲς δὲ vel nomen proprium cf. p. 170, 17

20. 11 Ὥρῳ Fabr.: ἥρω G: yro Τ 12 σίλφην GT (silfen) suspectum 16 ἐῶ ΜΤ (dimito): ἐν ὧ LEAB 17 στοχαζόμενος Bekk.: παραστοχαζόμενος G: breyitatem considerans T 24 ancipitres T (legit fors. ἱεράκων interpres) 26 νομιζομένων EAB 28 κρόμυον L 30 σκορόδου edd. et A 31 οἶς add. Bekk.: abstinentiir autem in sacris quidam T 3 τε ML: δὲ EAB: om. Τ

21. 4a

22. 10/11 ea que putantur religiosa et que putantur illicitaT 12 δέ <τούτοις> T (proxima autem hiis) || ἔστι om. EABT || κατοιχουμένους L 20 γυψίοις L

23. 14a

24. 17 om. L 20 gaudentes et henedicentes T 23 μηδ’ ἐσιδεῖν Gen.: nec aspicere T: μὴ δὲ ἰδέειν G || ἠελίου L: ἠελίοιο MEAB 7 τούτων Τ (de hiis): αὐτῶν G

25. 9a

26. §§ 235—237 ~ I 25—27, adv. dogm. V 158—161.

27. 18 post πρακτέον Gen. inser. ἢ μὴ πρακτέον 19 δὲ om. Τ 27 λιποψυχεῖν EB 33 καὶ om. Τ cf. p. 8, 23sqq. 3 desistere compellemus Τ

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.24

ed. Hermann Mutschmann

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

κδ′ τί ἐστιν ἡ λεγομένη τέχνη περὶ βίον.

Current edition First1KGreek

Chapter XXIV.—What Is The So-Called Art Of Living?¹

Notes on the current edition

Stable identifiers

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

κδ′ τί ἐστιν ἡ λεγομένη τέχνη περὶ βίον.

Current edition First1KGreek

Chapter XXIV.—What Is The So-Called Art Of Living? 1

Notes on the current edition

Stable identifiers

Chapter XXIV.—What Is The So-Called Art Of Living?¹