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ι′ περὶ τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως.

[64] Φᾶσί τοίνυν οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐντελέστερον περὶ κινήσεως διειληφέναι (Aristot. Cat. p. 15 a 13) ἐξ εἴδη ταύτης ὑπάρχειν, τοπικὴν μετάβασιν, φυσικὴν ¹ μεταβολήν, αὔξησιν, μείωσιν, γένεσιν, φθοράν.
ἡμεῖς οὖν ἑκάστῳ τῶν προειρημένων εἰδῶν τῆς κινήσεως κατ’ ἰδίαν ἐπιστήσομεν, ἀπὸ τῆς τοπικῆς μεταβάσεως ἀρξάμενοι. ἔστιν οὖν αὕτη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς καθ’ ἣν τόπον ἐκ τόπου μετέρχεται τὸ κινούμενον ητοι
καθ’ ὁλότητα ἢ κατὰ μέρος, <καθ’> ὅλον μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν περιπατούντων, κατὰ μέρος δὲ ὧς ἐπὶ τῆς περὶ κέντρῳ κινουμένης σφαίρας· ὅλης γὰρ αὐτῆς μενούσης ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ τὰ μέρη τούς τόπους ² ἀμείβει.

[65] τρεῖς δέ, οἶμαι, γεγόνασιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω περὶ κινήσεως
στάσεις. ὁ μὲν γὰρ βίος καί τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, μὴ εἶναι δὲ Παρμενίδης τε καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, μὴ μᾶλλον δὲ εἷναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἔφασαν οἱ σκεπτικοί· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ
λόγῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐκθέμενοι τὴν ἀντίρρησιν τῶν τε εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβανόντων καὶ τῶν μηδὲν εἷναι κίνησιν ἀποφαινομένων, ἐὰν τὴν διαφωνίαν εὑρίσκωμεν ἰσοσθενῆ, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν λέγειν ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις.

[66] ἀρξώμεθα δὲ
ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν λεγόντων.

³⁴⁵⁶ 136

Οὗτοι δὴ τῇ ἐναργείᾳ μάλιστα ἐπερείδονται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι, φασί, κίνησις, πῶς μὲν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμὰς ὁ ἥλιος φέρεται, πῶς δὲ τἀς τοῦ ἔτους ὥρας
ποιεῖ, παρὰ τοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς συνεγγισμοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἀφ᾿ ἡμῶν ἀποστάσεις γιγνομένας; ἢ πῶς νῆες ἀπὸ λιμένων ἀναχθεῖσαι καταίρουσιν ἐπὶ λιμένας ἄλλους πάμπολυ τῶν προτέρων ἀφεστῶτας; τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὁ τὴν κίνησιν ἀναιρῶν πρόεισι τῆς ⁷ οἰκίας καὶ αὖθις ἀναστρέφει; ταῦτα δὴ τελέως
ἀναντίρρητα εἶναι. διὸ καὶ τῶν κυνικῶν τις ἐρωτηθεὶς <τὸν> κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀνέστη δὲ καὶ ἐβάδισεν, ἔργῳ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐναργείας παριστάς, ὅτι ὑπαρκτή ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις.

Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὕτω δυσωπεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσι τούς τῆς
ἐναντίας αὐτοῖς στάσεως ὄντας·

[67] οἱ δὲ τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιροῦντες λόγοις ἐπιχειροῦσι τοιούτοις. εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖται ἢ ὑφ’ ἑτέρου. ἀλλ᾿
εἰ μὲν ὑφ’ ἑτέρου, <. . . . . . . . . >. τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον ὑφ’ ἑτέρου κινεῖσθαι ἤτοι ἀναιτίως κινηθήσεται ἢ κατά τινα αἰτίαν. ἀναιτίως μὲν οὐδέν φασι γίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ κατά τινα αἰτίαν κινεῖται, ἡ αἰτία, καθ᾿ ἣν κινεῖται, κινητικὴ αὐτοῦ γενήσεται,
ὅθεν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει κατὰ τὴν μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἰρημένην ἐπιβολήν.

[68] ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ τὸ κινοῦν ἐνεργεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργοῦν κινεῖται, κἀκεῖνο δεήσεται κινοῦντος ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τρίτου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὡς ἄναρχον γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν τὸ
κινούμενον ὑφ᾿ ἑτέρου κινεῖται. ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ ὑφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ <γὰρ> πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ἤτοι προωθοῦν κινεῖ ἢ ἐπισπώμενον ⁸⁹¹⁰ 137 ἢ ἀνωθοῦν ἢ ἐνθλῖβον, δεήσει τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν κατά τινα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν.

[69] ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μὶν προωστικῶς ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ, ἔσται ἐξόπισθεν ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ δὲ ἐπισπαστικῶς, ἒμπροσθεν, εἰ δὲ ἀνωστικῶς, ὑποκάτω, εἰ
δὲ ἐνθλιπτικῶς, ἐπάνω. ἀδύνατον δὲ αὐτό τι ἑαυτοῦ ἐπάνω εἶναι ἢ ἔμπροσθεν ἢ ὑποκάτω ἢ ὀπίσω· ἀδύνατον ἄρα ὑφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὑφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖται μήτε ὑφ᾿ ἑτέρου, οὐδὲ κινεῖταί τι.

[70] εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν καταφεύγοι, ὑπομνηστέον
αὐτὸν τῆς περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν διαφωνίας, καὶ ὅτι ἀνεπίκριτος αὕτη καθέστηκεν, κριτήριον ἡμῶν τῆς ἀληθείας ἄχρι νυν οὐχ εὑρηκότων.

[71] Ἒτι κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἑν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν·
μένει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν· οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· ὅπου γάρ τι μὴ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ δρᾶσαί τι οὐδὲ παθεῖν δύναται. οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖταί τι. οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔστι μὴν Διοδώρου τοῦ Κρόνου, πολλῶν δὲ ἀντιρρήσεων τετύχηκεν, ὧν τὰς πληκτικωτέρας πληκτικωτέρας ¹¹ διὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς ἐκθησόμεθα μετὰ
τῆς φαινομένης ἡμῖν ἐπικρίσεως.

[72] φασὶν οὖν τινες, ὅτι δύναταί τι ἐν ᾡ ἔστι τόπω κινεῖσθαι· τἀς γοῦν περὶ τοῖς κέντροις περιδινουμένας σφαίρας ἐν
τῷ αὐτῶ μενούσας τόπω κινεῖσθαι. πρὸς οὓς μεταφέρειν χρὴ τὸν λόγον ἐφ’ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν τῆς σφαίρας, καὶ ὑπομιμνῄσκοντας, ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ κατὰ μέρη κινεῖται, συνάγειν ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖταί τι.

[73] τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ
ποιήσομεν καὶ πρὸς τούς λέγοντας, ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον δυεῖν ἔχεται τόπων, τοῦ τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃν φέρεται. πευσόμεθα γάρ αὐτῶν, πότε φέρεται τὸ κινού- ¹²¹³¹⁴¹⁵ 138 μένον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου εἰς τὸν ἕτερον, ἆρα ὅτε
ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν ἢ ὅτε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ. ἀλλ’ ὅτε μὲν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἒστιν, οὐ μετέρχεται εἰς τὸν δεύτερον· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἐστιν· ὅτε δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ, οὐ μετέρχεται ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ.

[74] πρὸς τῷ καὶ συναρπάζεσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον· ἐν ᾦ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἐνεργεῖν
ἐν αὐτῷ δύναται· οὐ γὰρ δήπου φέρεσθαι εἴς τινα τόπον συγχωρήσει τις ἐκεῖνο ἁπλῶς ὃ μὴ δίδωσι κινεῖσθαι.

[75] τινὲς μέντοι κἀκεῖνο φασίν· τόπος λέγεται διχῶς, ὁ μὲν ἐν πλάτει, οἷον ὡς ἐμοῦ ἡ οἰκία, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν, ὧς λόγου χάριν ὁ περιτετυπωκώς μου τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν
τοῦ σώματος ἀήρ. λέγεται οὖν ἐν τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον οὐκ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος. πρὸς οὓς ἔνεστιν ὑποδιαιροῦντας τὸν ἐν πλάτει τόπον λέγειν, ὅτι τούτου ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἔστι κυρίως τὸ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον σῶμα, ὧς ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν αὐτοῦ
τόπῳ, ἐν ᾧ δὲ οὐκ ἒστιν, ὧς ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς μέρεσι τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος τόπου· εἶτα συνάγοντας, ὅτι μήτε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖσθαί τι δύναται μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεσθαι, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος καταχρηστικῶς λεγομένῳ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαί τι δύναται· συστατικὰ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τό τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι
πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὧν ἐν οὐθετέρῳ κινεῖσθαί τι δύνασθαι δέδεικται.

[76] Ερωτητέον δὲ κἀκεῖνον τὸν λόγον. εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι κατὰ τὸ πρότερον <πρότερον> κινεῖται ἢ κατὰ
μεριστὸν διάστημα· οὔτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον δύναταί τι κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐδὲ κινεῖταί τι ἄρα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον οὐκ ἐνδέχεταί τι κινεῖσθαι,
αὐτόθεν δῆλον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνονται τά σώματα καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι οἷς κινεῖσθαι λέγεται ¹⁶¹⁷¹⁸ τὰ σώματα, οὐ γενήσεται κίνησις, ἀδυνάτου ὄντος τοῦ πρῶτόν τι ἐν ἀπείροις εὑρεθῆναι, ἀφ’ οὗ πρώτου κινήσεται τὸ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον.

[77] εἰ δὲ εἰς ἀμερὲς καταλήγει τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κινουμένων ὁμοίως τὸ
πρῶτον ἀμερὲς τοῦ τόπου τῷ πρώτῳ ἑαυτοῦ ἀμερεῖ μετέρχεται χρόνῳ, πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἔστιν ἰσοταχῆ, οἷον ὁ ταχύτατος ἵππος καὶ ἡ χελώνη· ὅπερ τοῦ προτέρου ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον γίνεται ἡ κίνησις. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα.

[78] εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥς φασιν, μαρτυρεῖσθαι τὰ ἄδηλα χρή, ἐπεί, ἴνα τις ἀνύσῃ σταδιαῖον διάστημα, δεῖ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀνύσαι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ σταδίου μέρος καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δεύτερον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, οὕτω καὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον
κινεῖσθαι προσήκει, ἐπεί τοί γε εἰ ἀθρόως διιέναι τὸ κινούμενον λέγοιτο πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ κινεῖσθαι λέγεται, ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ἔσται τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ψυχρὸν εἴη μέρος, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τοῦ δι’ οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κίνησιν, ἢ τὸ μέν, εἰ τύχοι, μέλαν, τὸ δὲ
λευκὸν ὥστε καὶ χρώζειν τὰ ἐντυγχάνοντα δύνασθαι, τὸ κινούμενον ἔσται θερμόν τε ἅμα καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ λευκόν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον.

[79] εἶτα καὶ πόσον ἀθρόως διέξεισι τόπον τὸ κινούμενον, εἰπάτωσαν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀόριστον τοῦτον εἶναι φήσουσιν, προσδέξονταί τι κινεῖσθαι διά πάσης
τῆς γῆς ἀθρόως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φεύγουσιν, ὁρισάτωσαν ἡμῖν τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ τόπου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἐπιχειρεῖν ὁρίζειν τὸν τόπον, οὗ πλέον διάστημα οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀκαριαῖον δυνήσεται διελθεῖν τὸ κινούμενον ἀθρόως,
πρὸς τῷ ἀποκληρωτικὸν καὶ προπετὲς ἢ καὶ γελοῖον ἴσως εἶναι, εἰς τὴν ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτει· πάντα γὰρ ¹⁹²⁰²¹ 140 ἔσται ἰσοταχῆ, εἴγε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὁμοίως κατὰ περιωρισμένοηυς
τόπους τὰς μεταβάσεις τῶν κινήσεων ποιεῖται.

[80] εἰ δὲ φήσουσιν, ὅτι μικρὸν μέν, οὐ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν δὲ περιωρισμένον τόπον ἀθρόως κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον, ἐνέσται ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν σωριτικὴν ἀπορίαν ἀεὶ τῷ ὑποτεθέντι μεγέθει ἀκαριαῖον προστιθέναι μέγεθος τόπου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
στήσονταί που τοιαύτην ποιουμένων ἡμῶν συνερώτησιν, πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἀκριβῆ περιορισμὸν καὶ τὴν τερατείαν ἐκείνην ἐμπεσοῦνται· ἐμπεσοῦνται· εἰ δὲ προσήσονται τὴν παραύξησιν, ἀναγκάσομεν αὐτοὺς συγχωρεῖν ἀθρόως τι δύνασθαι κινη- θῆναι διὰ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς γῆς ἀπάσης. ὥστε οὐδὲ <κατὰ>
ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα κινεῖται τὰ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενα.

[81] εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν τόπον μήτε κατὰ τὸ πρότερον <πρότερον> κινεῖταί τι, οὐδὲ κινεῖταί τι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω τούτων φασὶν οἱ τὴν μεταβατικὴν κίνησιν ἀναιροῦντες. ἡμεῖς δὲ μήτε τοὺς
λόγους τούτους μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον, ᾧ κατακολουθοῦντες εἰσάγουσι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς κινήσεως, δυνάμενοι διατρέπειν, πειν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀντιθέσει τῶν τε φαινομένων καὶ τῶν λόγων, ἐπέχομεν περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστι κίνησις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. ed. Hermann Mutschmann. Germany. 2014.

Current edition First1KGreek

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Greek) (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.)

Translations (1)

Outlines of Pyrrhonism First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.) — 3.10 focus

Chapter X.—Concerning Transient Motion

[64] Now those who are reputed to have given the most complete classification of Motion assert that six kinds of it exist—local transition, physical change, increase, decrease, becoming, perishing.¹ We, then, shall deal with each of the aforesaid kinds of motion separately beginning with local transition. According, then, to the Dogmatists, this is the motion by which the moving object passes on from place to place, either wholly or partially—wholly as in the case of men walking, partially as when a globe is moving round a central axis, for while as a whole it remains in the same place, its parts change their places.

[65] The main views held about motion are, I imagine, three. It is assumed by ordinary people² and by some philosophers that motion exists, but by Parmenides, Melissus and certain others³ that it does not exist; while the Sceptics have declared that it is ‟no more” existent than non-existent; for so far as the evidence of phenomena goes it seems that motion exists, whereas to judge by the philosophic argument it would seem not to exist. So when we have exposed the contradiction which lies between those who believe in the existence of motion and those who maintain that motion is naught, if we shall find the counter-arguments of equal weight,⁴ we shall be compelled to declare that, so far as these arguments go, motion is ‟no more” existent than non-existent.

[66] We shall begin with those who affirm its real existence.

These base their view mainly on ‟evidence.”⁵ If, say they, motion does not exist, how does the sun move from east to west, and how does it produce the seasons of the year, which are brought about by its approximations to us and its recessions from us? Or how do ships put out from harbours and cast anchor in other harbours very far distant from the first?, And in what fashion does the denier of motion proceed from his house and return to it again? These facts are perfectly incontestable. Consequently, when one of the Cynics⁶ had an argument against motion put to him, he made no reply but stood up and began to walk, thus demonstrating by his action and by ‟evidence” that motion is capable of real existence.

So these men attempt in this way to put to shame those who hold the contrary opinion;

[67] but those who deny the existence of motion allege such arguments as these: If a thing is moved, it is moved either by itself or by another thing. But if it is moved by another, it will be moved either causelessly or owing to some cause. Nothing, they assert, is moved causelessly; but if it is moved owing to some cause, the cause owing to which it moves will be what makes it move, and thus we are involved in an infinite regress, according to the criticism stated a little while ago.

[68] Moreover, if the movent thing is active, and what is active is moved, that movent thing will need another movent thing, and the second a third, and so on ad infinitum, so that the motion comes to have no beginning; which is absurd. Therefore the thing that moves is not always moved by another. Nor yet by itself. Since every movent causes motion either by pushing forward or by drawing after or by pushing up or by thrusting down, what is self-movent must move itself in one of the aforesaid ways.

[69] But if it moves itself propulsively, it will be behind itself; and if by pulling after, it will be in front of itself; and if by pushing up, it will be below itself; and if by thrusting down, it will be above itself. But it is impossible for anything to be above or before or beneath or behind its own self; therefore it is impossible for anything to be moved by itself. But if nothing is moved either by itself or by another, then nothing is moved at all.

[70] And if anyone should seek refuge in the notions of ‟impulse” and ‟purpose” we must remind him of the controversy about ‟what is in our power,”⁷ and how it is still unsettled, since hitherto we have failed to find a criterion of truth.⁸

[71] Further, there is this also to be said. If a thing moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not. But it does not move in the place where it is, for if it is in it, it remains in it; nor yet does it move in the place where it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither effect nor suffer anything. Therefore nothing moves. This argument is, in fact, that of Diodorus Cronos,⁹ but it has been the subject of many attacks, of which we shall describe, owing to the character of our treatise, only the more formidable, together with a judgement of their value, as it seems to us.

[72] Some, then, assert that a thing can move in the place where it is; at any rate the globes which revolve round their axes move while remaining in the same place.¹⁰ Against these men we should transfer the argument which applies to each of the parts of the globe, and, reminding them that, to judge by this argument, it does not move even in respect of its parts, draw the conclusion that nothing moves in the place where it is.

[73] And we shall take the same course in replying to those who declare that the moving thing occupies two places, that wherein it is and that whereto it shifts. For we shall ask them when the moving object shifts from the place wherein it is to the other place—whether while it is in the first place or while it is in the second. But when it is in the first place it does not pass over into the second, for it is still in the first; and when it is not in this, it is not passing from it.

[74] And besides, the question is being begged; for where it is not, there it cannot be active.For surely no one will allow that any object to which he does not grant motion at all can shift to any place.

[75] Some, however, make this statement: Place is used in two senses, the broad sense, as for example ‟my house,” and the exact sense,¹¹ as for instance ‟the air which enfolds the surface of my body.” So the moving object is said to move in place, ‟place” being used not in the exact sense but in the broad sense. To these we can reply by dividing up ‟place” in the broad sense, and saying that in one part of it the body said to be moved properly exists, this being its own ‟place” in the exact sense, and in the other part it does not exist, this being the remaining portions of ‟place” in the extended sense; next we shall argue that an object can move neither in the place where it is nor in that where it is not, and so conclude that nothing can move even in what is perversely termed ‟place” in the broad sense; for this is composed of the place wherein it is in the exact sense and the place wherein it is not, and it has been proved that a thing cannot move in either of these.

[76] We should also propound the following argument.¹² If a thing moves it moves either by way of orderly, or gradual, progression or by occupying the divisible interval all at once; but in neither of these ways can a thing move, as we shall prove; so that it does not move at all.

Now that a thing can not move in orderly progression is plain on the face of it. For if bodies, and also the places and the times in which the bodies are said to move, are divided to infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to discover amongst the infinite any first thing wherefrom the object said to move will derive its initial movement.

[77] And if the aforesaid objects are reducible to atomic parts, and each of the moving things passes equally in an atomic period of time with its own first atom into the first atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity —the speediest horse, for instance, and the tortoise;¹³ which is a result even more absurd than the former. Therefore motion does not take place by way of orderly progression.

Nor yet by way of immediate occupation of the divisible interval.

[78] For if one ought, as they declare, to take the apparent as evidence for the non-apparent, since, in order to complete the distance of a stade a man must first complete the first portion of the stade, and secondly the second portion, and so on with the rest, so likewise everything that moves ought to move by way of orderly progression; for surely if we should assert that the moving thing passes all at once through all the portions of the place wherein it is said to move, it will be in all the portions thereof at once, and if one portion of the place through which it has its motion should be cold, another hot, or, mayhap, one black, another white, so as to be able also to colour things in contact,—then the moving thing will be at once hot and cold and black and white, which is absurd.

[79] Next let them tell us how much space the moving thing passes through all at once. For if they shall assert that it is limitless, they will be granting that a thing moves through the whole of the earth all at once; while if they shirk this conclusion, let them define for us the extent of the space. But, on the one hand, the attempt to define precisely the space or interval beyond which the thing moving all at once will be unable to advance so much as a hair’s-breadth is probably not merely presumptuous and rash or even ridiculous, but plunges us again into the original difficulty;¹⁴ for all things will be of equal velocity, if each of them alike has its transitional movements over definite intervals of space.

[80] And if, on the other go hand, they shall assert that the moving thing moves all at once through a space that is small but not precisely determined, it will be open to us to adopt the sorites argument¹⁵ and keep constantly adding a hair’s-breadth of space to the breadth assumed. And if, then, they shall make a halt anywhere while we are pursuing this argument, they will be reverting to the monstrous theory of precise definition as before; while if they shall assent to the process of addition, we shall force them to grant that a thing can move all at once through the whole of the earth. Consequently, objects said to be in motion do not move by occupying a divisible interval all at once.

[81] But if a thing moves neither thus instantaneously nor by way of gradual progression, it does not move at all.

These, and yet more than these, are the arguments used by those who reject transient motion. But we, being unable to refute either these arguments or the apparent facts on which the view of the reality of motion is based, suspend our judgement—in view of the contradiction between appearances and arguments—regarding the question as to the existence or non-existence of motion.

Notes on the current edition

Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes

1. 29a

2. 4a

3. § 64 ~ adv. dogm. IV 37—41.

4. § 65 ~ adv. dogm. IV 45—49.

5. § 66 ~ adv. dogm. IV 67—68.

6. 1 μετέρχεται scripsi coll. p. 139, 11. 484,24: περιέρχεται G: transit Τ 2 add. Τ (secundum totum) 6 βίος Τ (vita): Βίας G cf. p. 485,19 9 εἶναι T (esse): κίνησιν G 15 ὅσον — λεγομένοις om. T || ἀρξώμεθα T (inciiamus): ἀρξόμεθα G

7. 20a

8. § 67 ~ adv. dogm. IV 70—76.

9. § 68 ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ–69 ~ adv. dogm. IV 83—84.

10. 17 δὴ MEAB: δὲ LT (autem) 21 <αὐτοῦ> γιγνομένας T (eius factas) 24 secundum quem autem modum Τ 25 ἐστι Τ (sunt) || ὁ ἀντισθένης in mrg. G 26 addidi coll. p. 115, 8. 490, 3. 1 lacunam quam statui sic fere expleverim <οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις>, sed plura excidisse monet forsitan v. 6 ἐπιβολὴν : 6 ἄλλως—9 κίνησιν hunc in locum transferri iubet Pasquali || ἑτέρου alt. T (ab alio): ἑαυτοῦ G 3 μὲν <οὖν> Bekk. 11 γὰρ add. Gen.

11. 29a

12. § 71 ~ adv. dogm. IV 87.

13. § 72 ~ adv. dogm. IV 93. 103—107.

14. § 73 ~ adv. dogm. IV 94. 105—107.

15. 12 κινοῦν Τ (quod se monet): ἀγνωθοῦν ML: ὠθοῦν EAB
τρόπων Τ (modorum) : τρόπον Gt 26 οὔτε Τ (neque) : οὔτε δὲ G 2 <καὶ> μεταφέρειν Τ (et circumferre) 7 duo tenet loca T

16. § 75 ~ adv. dogm. IV 95. 108—110

17. § 76 ~ adv. dogm. IV 139—141.

18. 14 ἐν ᾦ — 15 δύναται secl. Kayser 23 τὸ κυρίως ικν. Kayser 33 προτ. add. T (jprius primo) 3 ὡς δείξομεν om. Τ

19. § 77 ~ adv. dogm. IV 154.

20. § 78 ~ adv. dogm. lV 124—126.

21. 10 καθ’ ἕκαστον EAB 11 ἀμερεῖ <ἀμερεῖ> coni. malim <μέρει> ἀμερεῖ 19 σταδίου LT (stadii): σταδιαίου 25 τύχοι AB Par. suppl. 133: τύχη MLE: si contingit T
κατὰ om. EAB 2 τῶ MEABT (cum eo quod): τὸ L

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.10

ed. Hermann Mutschmann

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Chapter X.—Concerning Transient Motion

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