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κβ′ περὶ σοφισμάτων.

[229] Οὐκ ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως καὶ τῷ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων ἐπιστῆσαι λόγῳ διὰ βραχέων, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰς τὴν τούτων διάλυσιν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν οἱ σεμνύνοντες ¹ αὐτήν. εἰ γὰρ τῶν τε ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν λόγων,
φασίν, ἐστὶν αὕτη διαγνωστική, ψευδεῖς δὲ λόγοι καὶ τὰ σοφίσματα, καὶ τούτων ἂν εἴη διακριτικὴ λυμαινομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν φαινομέναις πιθανότησιν. ὅθεν ὧς βοηθοῦντες οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ σαλεύοντι τῷ βίῳ καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις δὴ
τῶν σοφισμάτων μετὰ σπουδῆς ἡμᾶς πειρῶνται διδάσκειν, λέγοντες σόφισμα εἶναι λόγον πιθανὸν καὶ δεδολιευμένον ὥστε προσδέξασθαι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἤτοι ψευδῆ ἢ ὡμοιωμένην ψευδεῖ ἢ ἄδηλον ἢ ἄλλως ἀπρόσοὐδὲ ² 111 δεκτὸν,

[230] οἷον ψευδῆ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ <τούτου> τοῦ ἔχει ‘οὐδεὶς δίδωσι κατηγόρημα πιεῖν· καιηγόρημα ³ δέ ἐστι τὸ ἀψίνθιον πιεῖν· οὐδεὶς ἄρα δίδωσιν
ἀψίνθιον πιεῖν’, ἔτι δὲ ὅμοιον ψευδεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου ‘ὃ μήτε ἐνεδέχετο μήτε ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον· οὔτε δὲ ἐνεδέχετο οὔτε ἐνδέχεται
τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεύει· <οὐκ ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεύει>’.

[231] ἔτι δὲ ⁴ ἄδηλον οὕτως ‘οὐχὶ καὶ ἠρώτηκά τί σε πρῶτον, καὶ οὐχὶ οἱ ἀστέρες ἄρτιοί εἰσιν· ἠρώτηκα δέ τί σε πρῶτον· οἱ ἄρα ἀστέρες ἄρτιοί εἰσιν’. ἔτι δὲ ἀπρόσδεκτον
ἄλλως, ὡς οἱ λεγόμενοι σολοικίζοντες λὀγοι, οἷον ‘ὃ βλέπεις, ἔστιν· βλέπεις δὲ φρενιτικόν· ἔστιν ἂρα φρενιτικόν’. ‘ὃ ὁρᾷς, ἒστιν· ὁρᾷς δὲ φλεγμαίνοντα τόπον· ἔστιν ἄρα φλεγμαίνοντα τόπον’.

[232] εἶτα μέντοι καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις αὐτῶν [ὁρᾶν ἤτοι] πριστᾶν ⁵ ἐπιχειροῦσι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου σοφίσματος,
ὅτι ἄλλο διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συγκεχώρηται καὶ ἄλλο ἐπενήνεκται. συγκεχώρηται γὰρ τὸ μὴ πίνεσθαι κατηγόρημα, καὶ εἶναι κατηγόρημα τὸ ἀψίνθιον πίνειν, οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀψίνθιον. διὸ δέον ἐπιφέρειν ‘οὐδεὶς ἄρα πίνει τὸ ἀψίνθιον πίνειν’,
ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἐπενήνεκται ‘οὐδεὶς ἄρα ἀψίνθιον πίνει’ ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, οὐ συναγόμενον ἐκ τῶν συγκεχωρημένων λημμάτων.

[233] ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὅτι δοκεῖ μὲν ἐπὶ ψεῦδος ἀπάγειν ὧς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνεπιστάτους ὀκνεῖν αὐτῷ συγκατατίθεσθαι, ⁶ συνάγει δὲ ἀληθές, τὸ ‘οὐκ ἄρα ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ ὁ
ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεύει’. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἄτοπόν ἐστιν, ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστι τὸ ‘ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστι, φοωεύει’. διὸ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον. ⁷ 112 ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἀπαγωγή, φασίν,

[234] ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ γἐνους ⁸ τῶν μεταπιπτόντων ἐστίν. μηδενὸς γὰρ προηρωτημένου
κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀληθὲς γίνεται, ψευδοῦς τῆς συμπλοκῆς οὔσης παρὰ τὸ ἐμπεπλέχθαι ψεῦδος τὸ ῾ἡρώτηκά τί σε πρῶτον’ ἐν αὐτῇ. μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτηθῆναι τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, τῆς προσλήψεως ⁹ ἀληθοῦς γενομένης ῾ἠρώτηκα δέ τί σε πρῶτον᾿, διὰ
τὸ ἠρωτῆσθαι πρὸ τῆς προσλήψεως τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἡ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς
πρότασις γίνεται ψευδὴς τοῦ ἐν τῷ συμπεπλεγμένῳ ψεύδους γενομένου ἀληθοῦς· ὡς μηδέποτε δύνασθαι συναχθῆναι τὸ συμπέρασμα μὴ συνυπάρχοντος τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῇ προσλήψει.

[235]
τοὺς δὲ τελευταίους, φασὶν ἔνιοι, τούς σολοικίζοωτας ¹⁰ λόγους, ἀτόπως ἐπάγεσθαι παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν.

Τοιαῦτα μὲν οὖν τινες διαλεκτικοί φασι περὶ σοφισμάτων (καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι ἄλλα λέγουσιν)· ταῦτα δὲ τὰς μὲν τῶν εἰκαιοτέρων ἀκοὰς ἴσως δύναται γαργαλίζειν, περιττὰ δέ
ἐστι καὶ μάτην αὐτοῖς πεπονημένα. καὶ τοῦτο δυνατὸν μὲν ἴσως καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἤδη λελεγμένων ἡμῖν ὁρᾶν· ὑπεμνήσαμεν γάρ, ὅτι μὴ δύναται τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος κατὰ τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ποικίλως τε ἄλλως καὶ τῷ τὰ μαρτύρια τῆς συλλογιστικῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν,
τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους διατρέπεσθαι λόγους.

[236] εἰς δὲ τὸν προκείμενον τόπον ἰδίως καὶ ἄλλα μὲν πολλὰ λέγειν ἔνεστιν, ὧς δὲ ἐν συντόμῳ νῦν τόδε λεκτέον. ὅσα μὲν σοφίσματα ἰδίως ἡ διαλεκτικὴ δύνασθαι δοκεῖ διελέγχειν, τούτων ἡ διάλυσις ἄχρηστός ἐστιν· ὅσων δὲ ἡ διάλυσις
χρησιμεύει, ταῦτα ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς οὐκ ἂν δοαύἐπαγωγὴ ¹¹ σειεν, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τέχνῃ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων παρακολούθησιν ἐσχηκότες.

[237] εὐθέως γοῦν, ἔνα ἑνὸς ἢ δευτέρου μνησθῶμεν παραδείγματος, ἐρωτηθέντος [ἰατρῷ] τοιούτου σοφίσματος ‘κατὰ τὰς νόσους ἐν ταῖς παρακμαῖς τήν τε ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον δοκιμαστέον· ἐπὶ
πάσης δὲ τυπώσεως νόσου πρὸ τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου πάντως γίνεται παρακμή· ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πρὸ τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου τήν τε ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον ὡς τὸ πολὺ παραλαμβάνειν’ ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι πρὸς διάλυσιν τοῦ λόγου, καίτοι χρησίμην οὖσαν,

[238] ὁ
δὲ ἰατρὸς διαλύσεται τὸ σόφισμα, εἰδὼς ὅτι παρακμὴ λέγεται διχῶς, ἥ τε τοῦ ὅλου νοσήματος καὶ ἡ ἑκάστης ἐπιτάσεως μερικῆς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκμῆς ῥοπὴ πρὸς τὸ κρείσσον’, καὶ πρὸ μὲν τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου ὧς τὸ πολὺ γίνεται
παρακμὴ ἡ τῆς ἐπιτάσεως τῆς μερικῆς, τὴν δὲ ποικίλην δίαιταν οὐκ ἐν ταύτῃ δοκιμάζομεν ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ παρακμῇ τοῦ ὅλου νοσήματος. ὅθεν καὶ διηρτῆσθαι λέξει τὰ λήμματα τοῦ λόγου, ἑτέρας μὲν παρακμῆς ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ
λήμματι λαμβανομνης, τουτέστι τῆς τοῦ ὅλου πάθους, ἑτέρας δὲ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ, τουτέστι τῆς μερικῆς.

[239] πάλιν τε ἐπί τινος πυρέσσοντος κατὰ πύκνωσιν ἐπιτεταμένην ἐρωτηθέντος τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου ‘τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάματά ἐστιν· ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ὑποκειμένῃ πυρώσει
τὸ ψυχρόν· κατάλληλον ἄρα τῇ ὑποκειμένῃ πυρώσει τὸ ψυχρόν’ ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς ἡσυχάσει, ὁ δὲ ἰατρός,

[240] εἰδὼς τίνα μέν ἐστιν προηγουμένως προσεχῆ πάθη, τίνα δὲ συμπτώματα τούτων, ἐρεῖ μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν συμπτωμάτων προκόπτειν τὸν λόγον (ἀμέλει γοῦν πρὸς τὴν ἐπίχυσιν τοῦ
ψυχροῦ πλείονα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνειν τὴν πύρωσιν) ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν προσεχῶν παθῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν στέγνωσιν εἶναι προσεχῆ, ἥτις οὐ τὴν πύκνωσιν ἀλλά τὸν χαλαστικὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἀπαιτεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐπακολουθούσης ¹² 14
θερμασίας οὐ προηγουμένως προσεχές, ὅθεν μηδὲ τὸ κατάλληλον εἶναι δοκοῦν αὐτῇ.

[241] καὶ οὕτως μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς σοφίσμασι τοῖς χρησίμως ἀπαιτοῦσι τὴν διάλυσιν οὐδὲν ἕξει λέγειν ὁ διαλεκτικός, ἐρωτήσας δὲ ἡμᾶς τοιούτους λόγους ‘εἰ οὐχὶ καὶ καλὰ κέρατα ἔχεις καὶ κέρατα
ἔχεις, κέρατα ἔχεις· οὐχὶ δὲ καλὰ κέρατα ἔχεις καὶ κέρατα ἔχεις·

[242] κέρατα ἄρα ἔχεις.’ ‘εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι ἐν ὧί ἐστι τόπῳ κινεῖται, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ὐκ ἒστι· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν (μένει γάρ), οὔτε [δὲ] ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν (πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐνεργοίη τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἐν ᾧ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ¹³ ἒστιν;)

[243] οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖταί τι.’ ‘ἢτοι τὸ ὂν γίνεται ἢ
τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὂν οὐ γίνεται (ἔστι γάρ)· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν· (τὸ μὲν γὰρ γινόμενον πάσχει τι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν οὐ πάσχει) οὐδὲν ἄρα γίνεται.

[244] ἡ χιὼν ὕδωρ ἐστὶ πεπηγός· μέλαν δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστίν. μέλαινα ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ χιών.’ καὶ τοιούτους ἀθροίσας
ὕθλους συνάγει τὰς ὀφρῦς, καὶ προχειρίζεται τὴν διαλεκτικήν, καὶ πάνυ σεμνῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ κατ’ κατασκευάζειν ἡμῖν δι’ ἀποδείξεων συλλογιστικῶν, ὅτι γίνεταί τι, καὶ ὅτι κινεῖταί τι, καὶ ὅτι ἡ χιών ἐστι λευκή, καὶ ὅτι κέρατα οὐκ ἔχομεν,
καίτοι γε ἀρκοῦντος ἴσως τοῦ τὴν ἐνάργειαν αὐτοῖς ἀντιτιθέναι τιθέναι πρὸς τὸ θραύεσθαι τὴν διαβεβαιωτικὴν θέσιν διὰ τῆς ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἰσοσθενοῦς αὐτῶν ἀντιμαρτυρήσεως. ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς φιλόσοφος <τις> κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον σιωπῶν περιπάτησεν, καὶ οἱ
κατὰ τὸν βίον ἄνθρωποι πεζάς τε καὶ διαποντίους στέλλονται πορείας κατασκευάζουσί τε ναῦς καὶ οἰκίας καὶ παισοποιοῦνται τῶν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ἀμελοῦντες ¹⁴ 115 λόγων.

[245] φέρεται δὲ καὶ Ἡροφίλου τοῦ ἰατροῦ χαρίεν <τι> ἀπομνημόνευμα· συνεχρόνισε γὰρ οὗτος Διοδώρῳ, ἐναπειροκαλῶν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ λόγους διεξῄει σοφιστικοὺς
κατά τε ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τῆς κινήσεως. ὡς οὖν ἐκβαλών ποτε ὦμον ὁ Διόδωρος ἧκε θεραπευθησόμενος ὧς τὸν Ἡρόφιλον, ἐχαριεντίσατο ἐκεῖνος πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγων ‘ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἦν τόπω ὁ ὦμος ὢν ἐκπέκτωκεν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἦν οὔτε ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐκπέπτωκεν’,
ὧς τὸν σοφιστὴν λιπαρεῖν ἐᾶν μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους, τὴν δὲ ἐξ ἰατρικῆς ἁρμόζουσαν αὐτῷ προσάγειν θεραπείαν.

[246] ἀρκεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, τὸ ἐμπείρως τε καὶ ἀδοξάστως κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς τηρήσεις τε καὶ προλήψεις βιοῦν, περὶ τῶν ἐκ δογματικῆς περιεργίας καὶ μάλιστα ἔξω τῆς βιωτικῆς
χρείας λεγομένων ἐπέχοντας. εἰ οὖν ὅσα μὲν εὐχρήστως ἂν ἐπιλυθείη, ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν διαλύσαιτο ἡ διαλεκτική, ὅσα δὲ ἐπιλύεσθαι δοίη τις ἂν ἴσως ὐπ’ αὐτῆς σοφίσματα,. τούτων ἡ διάλυσις ἄχρηστός ἐστιν, ἄχρηστός ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἐπίλυσιν τῶν σοφισμάτων ἡ διαλεκτική.

[247] Καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς λεγομένων ὁρμώμενός τις οὕτως ἂν συντόμως ὑπομνήσειε περιττὰ εἶναι τὰ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων παρ’ αὐτοῖς δὴ τεχνολογούμενα.
ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην τὴν διαλεκτικήν φασιν ὡρμηκέναι οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γνῶναι τί ἐκ τίνος συνάγεται, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δι’ ἀποδεικτικῶν λόγων τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ
κρίνειν ἐπίστασθαι· λέγουσι γοῦν εἷναι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ ούδετέρων.

[248] ἐπεὶ τοίνυν αὐτοί φασιν ἀληθῆ λόγον εἶναι τὸν δι’ ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἀληθὲς συνάγοντα δυμπέρασμα, ἅμα τῷ ἐρωτηθῆναι λόγον ψεῦδος ἔχοντα τὸ συμπέρασμα
εἰσόμεθα ὅτι ψευδής ἐστιν καὶ οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα ¹⁵ 116 αὐτῷ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἤτοι μὴ εἷναι συνακτικὸν ἢ μηδὲ τὰ λήμματα ἔχειν ἀληθῆ.

[249] καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. ἤτοι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ψευδὲς συμπέρασμα
τῇ διὰ· τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ἢ οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ. ἀλλ’ ¹⁶ μὲν οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἔσται· λέγουσι γὰρ (Stoic. fr. II 239 A.) συνακτικὸν γίνεσθαι λόγον, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ συμπέρασμα. εἰ δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκὴν εἶναί ψευδῆ κατὰ τἀς
αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τεχνολογίας· φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ψεῦδος ψεὐδει μὲν ἀκολουθεῖ, ἀληθεῖ δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

[250] ὅτι δὲ ὁ μὴ συνακτικὸς ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς λόγος κατὰ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικός έστιν, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων. εἰ τοίνυν ἐρωτηθέντος λόγου, ἐν ᾧ ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ συμπέρασμα,
αὐτόθεν γινώσκομεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τοῦ συμπέρασμα ἔχειν ψευδές, οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα αὐτῷ, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν παρὰ τί τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἔχει. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ’ ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐστι τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ψηφοπαικτῶν γινόμενα συγκατατιθέμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἴσμεν ὅτι
ἀπατῶσιν, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν ὅπως ἀπατῶσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῖς ψευδέσι μέν, πιθανοῖς δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσι λόγοις πειθόμεθα, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν ὅπως παραλογίζονται.

[251] ἢ ἐπεὶ ἴ’ οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ ψεῦδος ἀπάγειν τὸ σόφισμά φασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλας ἀτοπίας, κοινότερον οὕτω συνερωτητέον. ὁ ἐρωτώμενος λόγος ἤτοι ἐπί τι ἀπρόσδεκτον ἡμᾶς ἄγει ἢ ἐπί τι τοιοῦτον ὧς χρῆναι αὐτὸ προσδέχεσθαι. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν
τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἀτόπως αὐτῷ συγκαταθησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ ἐπί τι ἀπρόσδεκτον, οὐχ ἡμᾶς τῇ ἀτοπίᾳ δεήσει συγκατατίθεσθαι προπετῶς διὰ τὴν πιθανότητα, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνους ἀφίστασθαι τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τοῖς ἀτόποις ἀναγκάζοντος συγκατατίθεσθαι, εἲγε μὴ ληρεῖν παιδαριωδῶς, ἀλλὰ τἀληθῆ
ζητεῖν, ὡς ὑπισχνοῦνται, προῄρηνται.

[252] ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ὁδὸς ¹⁷ 117 εἴη ἐπί τινα κρημνὸν φέρουσα, οὐκ ὠθοῦμεν αὑτοὺς εἰς τὸν κρημνὸν διὰ τὸ ὁδόν τινα εἷναι φέρουσαν ἐπ’ αὐτόν, ἀλλ’ ἀφιστάμεθα τῆς ὁδοῦ διὰ τὸν κρημνόν, οὕτω καὶ εἰ λόγος εἴη ἐπί τι ὁμολογουμένως ἄτοπον ἡμᾶς ἀπάγων, οὐχὶ τῷ ἀτόπῳ συγκαταθησόμεθα διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’
ἀποστησόμεθα τοῦ λόγου διὰ τὴν ἀτοπίαν.

[253] ὅταν οὖν οὕτως ἡμῖν συνερωτᾶται λόγος, καθ’ ἑκάστην πρότασιν ἐφέξομεν, εἶτα τοῦ ὅλου συνερωτηθέντος λόγου τὰ <ἡμῖν> δοκοῦντα ἐπάξομεν. καὶ εἴγε οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον δογματικοὶ (fr. II 275 A.) ἐν τῇ συνερωτήσει τοῦ
σμρίτου προἰόντος τοῦ λόγου φασὶ δεῖν ἴστ’ ἳστασθαι καὶ ἐπέχειν, ἴνα μὴ ἐκπέσωσιν εἰς ἀτοπίαν, πολὺ δήπου μᾶλλον ἂν ἡμῖν ἁρμόζον εἴη σκεπτικοῖς οὖσιν, ὑποπτεύουσιν ἀτοπίαν, μὴ προπίπτειν κατὰ τὰς συνερωτήσεις τῶν λημμάτων, ἀλλ’ ἐπέχειν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἕως τῆς ὃλης ¹⁸ συνερωτήσεως τοῦ λόγου.

[254] καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀδοξάστως ἀπὸ τῆς
βιωτικῆς τηρήσεως ὁρμώμενοι τοὺς ἀπατηλοὺς οὕτος ἐκκλίνομεν λόγους, οἱ δογματικοὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτως ἕξουσι διακρῖναι τὸ σόφισμα ἀπὸ τοῦ δεόντως δοκοῦντος ἐρωτᾶσθαι λόγου, εἲγε χρὴ δογματικῶς αὐτούς ἐπικρῖναι, καὶ ὅτι συνακτικόν ἐστι τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὅτι τὰ λήμματά
ἐστιν ἀληθῆ ἤ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει·

[255] ὑπεμνήσαμεν γὰρ ἒμπροσθεν, ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς συνακτικούς λόγους δύνανται καταλαμβάνειν οὔτε ἀληθὲς εἶναί τι κρίνειν οἶοί τέ εἰσι, μήτε κριτήριον μήτε ἀπόδειξιν ὁμολογουμένως ἔχοντες, ὧς
ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὐπ’ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὑπεμνήσαμεν. παρέλκει οὖν ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἡ θρυλουμένη παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων τεχνολογία.

[256] Παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαστολῆς τῶν ἀμφιβολιῶν
λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀμφιβολία λέξις ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω σημαίνουσα καὶ αἱ λέξεις σημαίνουσι θέσει, ὅσας μὲν χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἀμφιβολίας διαλύεσθαι, τουτέστι τὰς ἔν τινι ¹⁹ 118 τῶν ἐμπειριῶν, ταύτας οἱ καθ’ ἑκάστην τέχνην ἐγγεγυμνασμένοι
διαλύσονται, τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντες αὐτοὶ τῆς ὐπ’ αὐτῶν πεποιημένης θετικῆς χρήσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων κατὰ τῶν σημαινομένων, ὁ δὲ διαλεκτικὸς οὐδαμῶς,

[257] οἷον ὧς ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφιβολίας ‘ἐν ταῖς παρακμαῖς τὴν ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον δοκιμαστέον’. ἤδη δὲ καὶ
κατὰ τὸν βίον ἄχρι καὶ τούς παῖδας ὁρῶμεν διαστελλομένους ἀμφιβολίας, ὧν ἡ διαστολὴ χρησιμεύειν αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ. εἰ γοῦν τις ὁμωνύμους οἰκέτας ἔχων κελεύοι παιδίον κληθῆναι αὐτῷ τὸν Μάνην, εἰ τύχοι (τοῦτο γὰρ τοὔνομα τοῖς οἰκέταις ἔστω κοινόν), πεύσεται ὁ παῖς ποῖον. καὶ εἰ
πλείονας καὶ διαφόρους τις οἴνους ἔχων λέγοι τῷ παιδίῳ ‘ἒγχεόν μοι τοῦ οἴνου πιεῖν’, ὁμοίως ὁ παῖς πεύσεται ποίου.

[258] οὕτως ἡ ἐν ἑκάστοις ἐμπειρία τοῦ χρησίμου τὴν διαστολὴν εἰσάγει. ὅσαι μέντοι μὴ ἔν τινι τῶν βιωτικῶν ἐμπειριῶν εἰσιν ἀμφιβολίαι, ἀλλ’ ἐν δογματικαῖς οἰήσεσι
κεῖνται καὶ εἰσὶν ἴσως ἄχρηστοι πρὸς τὸ ἀδοξάστως βιοῦν, περὶ ταὐτ’ ἃς ἰδίως ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἔχων ἀναγκασθήσεται καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ὁμοίως ἐπέχειν κατὰ τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἐφόδους, καθὸ πράγμασιν ἀδήλοις καὶ ἀκαταλήπτοις ἢ καὶ ἀνυποστάτοις ἴσως εἰσὶ συνεζευγμέναι.

[259] ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων
καὶ εἰσαῦθις διαλεξόμεθα (cf. p. ’ εἰ δέ τις δογματικὸς πρός τι τούτων ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειροίη, κρατυνεῖ τὸν σκεπτικὸν λόγον, ἐκ τῆς ἑκατέρωθεν ἐπιχειρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀνεπικρίτου διαφωνίας τὴν περὶ τῶν ζητουμένων ἐποχὴν καὶ αὐτὸς βεβαιῶν.

Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν εἰπόντες αὐτοῦ που περιγράφομεν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων σύνταγμα.

²⁰

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. ed. Hermann Mutschmann. Germany. 2014.

Current edition First1KGreek

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Greek) (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.)

Translations (1)

Outlines of Pyrrhonism First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.) — 2.22 focus

Chapter XXII.—Concerning Sophisms

[229] It will not, perhaps, be amiss to give our attention for a moment to the subject of Sophisms, seeing that those who glorify Dialectic¹ declare that it is indispensable for exposing sophisms. For, they say, if Dialectic is capable of distinguishing true and false arguments, and sophisms are false arguments, it will also be capable of discerning these, which distort the truth by apparent plausibilities. Hence the dialecticians, by way of assisting life² when it totters, strive earnestly to teach us the conception of sophisms, their differences and their solutions. They declare that a sophism is ‟a plausible argument cunningly framed to induce acceptance of the inference, it being either false or resembling what is false or non-evident or otherwise unacceptable.”

[230] It is false, for example, in the case of the sophism ‟Nobody offers one a predicate to drink; but ‟to drink absinth” is a predicate; nobody therefore offers one absinth to drink.” Or again, it may resemble the false, as in this case—‟What neither was nor is possible is not absurd;³ but it neither was nor is possible for a doctor, qua doctor, to murder; therefore it is not absurd that a doctor, qua doctor, should murder.”

[231] Or again, it may be non-evident, as thus—‟It is not true both that I have asked you a question first and that the stars are not even in number; but I have asked you a question first; therefore the stars are even.” Or again, it may be otherwise unacceptable, like the so-called solecistic⁴ arguments, such as—‟That at which you look exists; but you have a frenzied look; therefore 'frenzied' exists;” or ‟What you gaze at exists; but you gaze at an inflamed spot; therefore 'at an inflamed spot' exists.”

[232] Moreover, they attempt also to set forth solutions of the sophisms, saying in the case of the first sophism that one thing is established by the premisses and another inferred in the conclusion. For it is established that a predicate is not drunk and that ‟to drink absinth” is a predicate, but not ‟absinth” by itself. Hence, whereas one ought to infer ‟Nobody therefore drinks the ‘to drink absinth,’” which is true, the inference drawn is ‟Nobody therefore drinks absinth,” which is false, as not deduced from the established premisses.

[233] And as regards the second sophism, they explain that while it seems to lead in a false direction, so that it makes the inattentive hesitate in assenting to it, its conclusion is true, namely ‟It is not therefore absurd that the doctor, qua doctor, should murder.” For no judgement is absurd,⁵ and ‟the doctor, qua doctor, murders” is a judgement, so that neither is it absurd.

[234] And the method of leading up to the non-evident⁶ deals, they say, with the class of things that are variable.⁷ For when, according to the assumption, no previous question has been asked, the negation of the conjunctive premiss is true, the conjunctive or major premiss being false because of its inclusion of the false clause ‟I have asked you a question first.” But after the negation of the major has been asked, as the minor premiss ‟I have asked you a question first” has become true, owing to the fact that the negation of the major has been asked before the minor premiss, the first clause in the negation of the major becomes false while the false clause in the major has become true; so that it is never possible for the conclusion to be deduced if the negation of the major premiss does not co-exist with the minor premiss.

[235] And as to the last class—the solecistic arguments—some declare that they are introduced absurdly, contrary to linguistic usage.

Such are the statements made by some of the Dialecticians concerning sophisms—though others indeed make other statements; and what they say may be able, perhaps, to tickle the ears of the casual hearer, superfluous though it is and the result of vain labour on their part. Probably this can be seen from what we have said already;⁸ for we have shown that truth and falsehood, according to the Dialecticians, cannot be apprehended, and that by a variety of arguments as well as by the refutation of their evidences for the validity of the syllogism, namely proof and axiomatic arguments.⁹

[236] And there are many other special objections bearing on the topic before us which we might mention, but now, for brevity’s sake, we mention only this one.

As regards all the sophisms which dialectic seems peculiarly able to expose, their exposure is useless; whereas in all cases where the exposure is useful, it is not the dialectician who will expose them but the experts in each particular art who grasp the connexion of the facts.

[237] Thus, for instance, to mention one or two examples, if a sophism such as this were propounded—‟In diseases, at the stages of abatement, a varied diet and wine are to be approved; but in every type of disease an abatement inevitably occurs before the first third day;¹⁰ it is necessary, therefore, to take for the most part a varied diet and wine before the first third day,”—in this case the dialectician would be unable to assist in exposing the argument, useful though the exposure would be,

[238] but the doctor will expose the sophism, since he knows that the term ‟abatement” is used in two senses, of the general ‟abatement” in the disease and of the tendency to betterment after the crisis in the strained local conditions, and this improvement in the local strain generally occurs before the first third day, but it is not for this but for the general abatement in the disease that we recommend the varied diet. Consequently he will say that the premisses are discordant, since one kind of ‟abatement” is adopted in the first premiss, namely that of the general condition, and another—that of the local condition—in the second premiss.

[239] Again, in the case of one who suffers from fever due to aggravated ‟contraction” or obstruction, if an argument is propounded in the form—‟Opposites are cures of opposites;¹¹ cold is the opposite of the present feverish condition; therefore cold is the treatment which corresponds to the present feverish condition,”—here again the dialectician will keep silence,

[240] but the doctor, since he knows what morbid states are fundamentally persistent and what are symptoms of such states, will declare that the argument does not apply to the symptoms (not to mention the fact that the result of the application of cold is to aggravate the feverish condition) but to the persistent morbid states, and that the constipation is persistent but requires an expansive method of treatment rather than contraction, whereas the resultant symptom of inflammation is not fundamentally persistent, nor (consequently) is the state of cold which seems to correspond thereto.

[241] Thus, as regards sophisms the exposure of which is useful, the dialectician will not have a word to say, but he will propound for us arguments such as these¹² —‟If it is not so that you both have fair horns and have horns, you have horns; but it is not so that you have fair horns and have horns; therefore you have horns.”

[242] ‟If a thing moves, it moves either in the spot where it is or where it is not; but it moves neither in the spot where it is (for it is at rest) nor in that where it is not (for how could a thing be active in a spot where it does not so much as exist?); therefore nothing moves.”¹³

[243] ‟Either the existent becomes or the non-existent; now the existent does not become (for it exists); nor yet does the non-existent (for the becoming is passive but the non-existent is not passive); therefore nothing becomes.”¹⁴

[244] ‟Snow is frozen water; but water is black; therefore snow is black.”¹⁵

And when he has made a collection of such trash he draws his eyebrows together, and expounds Dialectic and endeavours very solemnly to establish for us by syllogistic proofs that a thing becomes, a thing moves, snow is white, and we do not have horns, although it is probably sufficient to confront the trash with the plain fact in order to smash up their positive affirmation by means of the equipollent contradictory evidence derived from appearances. Thus, in fact, a certain philosopher,¹⁶ when the argument against motion was put to him, without a word started to walk about; and people who follow the usual way of life proceed on journeys by land and sea and build ships and houses and beget children without paying any attention to the arguments against motion and becoming.

[245] And we are told of an amusing retort made by the physician Herophilus:¹⁷ he was a contemporary of Diodorus who, being given to juggling with dialectic, used to promulgate sophistical arguments against motion as well as many other things. So when Diodorus had dislocated his shoulder he came to Herophilus to get treated, and the latter jestingly said to him—‟Your shoulder has been put out either in the place where it was or where it was not; but it was put out neither where it was nor where it was not; therefore it has not been put out;” so that the Sophist begged him to leave such arguments alone and apply the treatment prescribed by medical art as suitable to his case.

[246] For¹⁸ it is, I think, sufficient to conduct one’s life empirically and undogmatically in accordance with the rules and beliefs that are commonly accepted, suspending judgement regarding the statements derived from dogmatic subtlety and furthest removed from the usage of life.¹⁹ If, then, dialectic would fail to expose any of the sophisms which might usefully be exposed, while the exposure of all the sophisms which we might perhaps grant it capable of exposing is useless, then in respect of the exposure of sophisms dialectic is useless.

[247] Starting even from the actual statements made by the dialecticians one might show concisely in this wise that their technical arguments about sophisms are superfluous. The dialecticians assert that they have resorted to the art of dialectic not simply for the sake of ascertaining what is deduced from what but chiefly for the sake of knowing how to discern the true and the false by means of probative arguments. Thus they declare that dialectic is ‟the science of what is true and false and neither.”

[248] Since, then, they assert that a true argument is one which draws a true conclusion by means of true premisses,²⁰ when an argument is propounded which has a false conclusion we shall at once know that it is false and shall not yield it assent. For the argument itself must either be illogical or contain premisses that are not true.

[249] The following considerations show this clearly: The false conclusion in the argument either follows from the combination formed by its premisses, or it does not so follow. But if it does not so follow, neither will the argument be logically sound; for an argument, they say, is logically sound when its conclusion follows from the combination formed by its premisses. If, again, it does so follow, then—according to their own technical treatises—the combination formed by its premisses must necessarily be false; for they say that the false follows from the false and nohow from the true.²¹

[250] And from what we have already said²² it is plain that according to them the argument which is not logically sound or not true is not probative either.

If, then, when an argument is propounded with a false conclusion we know at once that the argument is neither true nor logically sound, because of its false conclusion, we shall not assent to it, even if we fail to see wherein the fallacy lies. For just as we refuse our assent to the truth of the tricks performed by jugglers and know that they are deluding us, even if we do not know how they do it, so likewise we refuse to believe arguments which, though seemingly plausible, are false, even when we do not know how they are fallacious.

[251] Further, since the sophism leads, they say, not only to falsehood but also to other absurdities, we must discuss it more at large. The argument propounded leads us either to an inadmissible conclusion or to one of such a sort that we must needs admit it. In the latter case we shall assent to it without absurdity; but if it leads to what is inadmissible, it is not we that ought to yield hasty assent to the absurdity because of its plausibility, but it is they that ought to abstain from the argument which constrains them to assent to absurdities, if they really choose to seek truth, as they profess, rather than drivel like children.

[252] Thus, suppose there were a road leading up to a chasm, we do not push ourselves into the chasm just because there is a road leading to it but we avoid the road because of the chasm; so, in the same way, if there should be an argument which leads us to a confessedly absurd conclusion, we shall not assent to the absurdity just because of the argument but avoid the argument because of the absurdity.

[253] So whenever such an argument is propounded to us we shall suspend judgement regarding each premiss, and when finally the whole argument is propounded we shall draw what conclusions we approve.

And if the Dogmatists of the School of Chrysippus declare that when the ‟Sorites”²³ is being propounded they ought to halt while the argument is still proceeding and suspend judgement, to avoid falling into absurdity, much more, surely, would it be fitting for us, who are Sceptics, when we suspect absurdity, to give no hasty approval of the premisses propounded but rather to suspend judgement about each until the completion of the whole series which forms the argument.

[254] And whereas we, by starting undogmatically from the observation of practical life, thus avoid these fallacious arguments, the Dogmatists will not be in a position to distinguish the Sophism from the argument which seems to be correctly propounded, seeing that they have to pronounce dogmatically that the form of the argument is, or is not, logically sound and also that the premisses are, or are not, true.

[255] For we have shown above that they are neither able to apprehend the logically valid arguments nor yet capable of deciding that a thing is true, since—as we have shown from their own statements—they possess neither a Criterion nor a Demonstration that commands general agreement. Thus far, then, the technical treatment of Sophisms so much talked of amongst the Dialecticians is otiose.

[256] And we say much the same regarding the distinguishing of ambiguities. For if the Ambiguity is a word or phrase having two or more meanings, and it is by convention²⁴ that words have meaning, then all such ambiguities as can be usefully cleared up—such, that is, as occur in the course of some practical affair— will be cleared up, not certainly by the dialectician, but by the craftsmen trained in each several art, as they have personal experience of the conventional way adopted by themselves of using the terms to denote the objects signified

[257] —as, for example, in the case of the ambiguity ‟In periods of abatement one should sanction a varied diet and wine.”²⁵ And in the ordinary affairs of life we see already how people —ay, and even the slave-boys—distinguish ambiguities when they think such distinction is of use. Certainly, if a master who had servants named alike were to bid a boy called, say, ‟Manes” (supposing this to be common name for a servant) to be summoned, the slave-boy will ask ‟Which one?” And if a man who had several different wines were to say to his boy ‟Pour me out a draught of wine,” then too the boy will ask ‟Which one?”

[258] Thus it is the experience of what is useful in each affair that brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities.

All such ambiguities, however, as are not involved in the practical experiences of life but in dogmatic opinions, and are no doubt useless for a life void of dogmatism,—concerning these the Dialectician, in his own peculiar position,²⁶ will be similarly forced, in view of the Sceptic attacks, to suspend judgement, in so far as they are probably linked up with matters that are non-evident and non-apprehensible, or even non-substantial.

[259] This subject, however, we shall discuss later on; ²⁷ and if any Dogmatist should attempt to refute any of our statements he will be strengthening the Sceptic argument by adding support to their suspension of judgement about the matters in question as a result of our mutual antagonism and interminable dissension.

Having said thus much concerning ambiguities we now conclude therewith our Second Book of Outlines.

Notes on the current edition

Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes

1. 19a

2. 1 οὐδὲ Τ (nec) : καὶ G 7 ἢ add. T 12 τὴν <μὲν> Θέωνι : Bekk. dubit. || δὲ MLT (autem) : καὶ EAB 17 τῷ EAB : τὸ L: om. M(T?) 18 λόγον T (instare rationem) ΙΙ τὴν om. L
φασίν om. EAB 23/24 rw βίῳ Gen.: τὸν βίον G: adiuvantes concussam vitam Τ 24 δὴ om. Τ 28 ψευδεῖ EABT (false) : ψευδῆ ML

3. 29a

4. 2a

5. 9a

6. 19a

7. 29 τούτου add. T (sicut in hoc sophismate) 29 a ποιεῖν EAB 31 ἔτι δὲ Gen.: ἐπὶ δὲ G: om. T (similis autem false) 1 δὲ om. L 2 ὁ EAB: om. ML 2—2a suppl. Bekk. coll. 20/1 2 a ἔτι δὲ ut p. 111,31 4 ἠρώτηκα — 5 εἰσιν om. Μ 5 οἱ LT: εἰ EAB || ἔτι δὲ ut p. 111,31 (aliter autem inacceptabiles T) 9 a ὁρᾶν ἤτοι om. T

8. 24a

9. 29a

10. 5a

11. 24 ἐπαγωγὴ Gen. 28 δὲ om. L 29 τῆς προσλήψεως om. EAB 29a γενομένης ML γινομένης EAB 30 προσλήψεως Bekk.: προλ. G: assumptionem T ut v. 29 5 τοὺς — 6 συνήθ. corrupta esse putat Pappeng., qui αὐτοὺς vel aliud desiderat
ἔνιοι MEABT (quidam) : ἔνθα L 5a ἐπάγεσθαι T (induci) : ἐπάγειν G 7 τινες om. T 9 οἰκειοτέρων L 14 δυωάμεως om. L

12. 21 ἐπὶ om. T 23 ἰατρῷ secL, fort. leg. τοῦ τοιούτου σοφίσματος coll. p. 114,9 aut ἰατρικοῦ σοφίσματος 26 ante primum terWane T 27/28 ante primam paroxisim tertiane T
ante primam quidem tertiane T 4 καὶ om. T 9 τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου ML: τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τοιούτου EAB: huiusmodi ratione T

13. 29a

14. 20 προσεχές Τ 20/21 τὸ ψυχρὸν <ψυχρὸν τὸ> κατ. εἷναι δοκεῖν αὐτὴ Pappenheim 23 ἐρωτήσεις EAB || ἡμᾶς T (interrogans autem nos) : ἡμῖν G 24/25 et 25/26 καὶ κέρατα ἔχεις del. E. Weber 28 μενεῖ Kayser || μένει γὰρ <ἐν εἴπερ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν> E. Weber coll. p. 137,26 || δὲ om. ὁ ἐνάργειαν Fabr.: ἐνέργειαν G: ad manifestam T 7 αὐτῶν alt. EAB: αὐτοῦ L: αὐ(??) Μ: eis Τ 8 τις add. T (quidam phil.) cf. p. 136, 25. || ad φίλ’. rubr. in L add. in mrg. ὁ ἀντισθένης
κατὰ om. T (rationem motus) 12 κατὰ G: de T

15. 14 τι add. T (gratum quid) 15 ἐναπειροκαλῶν Bekk.: ἐν ἀπειροκάλῳ Gr: in dyalectica inexpertus T 16 κατὰ G: de T 18 ad ἐχαρ. L habet in mrg. εὐτραπελίσατο, ἒσκοψεν ΙΙ λέγων Τ (dicens): λέγω Gr 19 ὢν om. Τ 24 βιοῦν T (vivere) βίου G 26 λεγομένων om. T 29 κατὰ GT (secundum): fort. πρὸς 31 δὲ MEAB: om LT 6 λέγουσι γοῦν Bekk.: λέγουσιν οὖν G: dicunt enim T S τὸν L: τῶν MEAB

16. 15a

17. 15 αὐτοῦ om. T 22 ἢ μὴ μήτε T (nec) 27 περὶ T (circa) 31 μὲν MLT (quidem) : μὴ EAB 32 φασιν Gr: quod autem T ἐπειδὴ δὲ?) 1 ἀπάγειν τὸ σόφισμά φασιν ἀλλὰ καἰ scripsi sec. T (in falsum deducit sophisma dicunt quidem etiam) : ἀπάγειν τοῖς σοφίσμασιν ἀλλὰ καὶ G

18. 24a

19. 17 οὕτως GT (sic): οὗτός τις Rustow: Οὗτος? 18 ἡμῖν add. T (que videntur hobis) 22 καὶ ἐπέχειν om. Τ 24 προπίπτειν Bekk. : προσπίπτειν G: concedere Τ 6 ἢ Τ (duo aut plura): καὶ G: ἢ καὶ coniecerat Pappenheim coll. Diog. Laert. VII 62.

20. 10 ἔχοντες — 14 δὲ om. T 17 παιδίων M 18 εἰ τύχοι om. T 20 οἴνους τις EAB ΙΙ λἐγοι λέγει G 31 λρατθνεῖ τυνεῖ Bekk.: κρατύνει GT (confirmat) 1 αὐτοῦ που suspecta Pappenheimio

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 2.22

ed. Hermann Mutschmann

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Chapter XXII.—Concerning Sophisms

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