[228] Similar arguments apply also to the ‟common properties.” For if vision is one and the same property in Dion and in Theon, then, suppose that Dion should perish and Theon survive and retain his sight, either they will assert that the vision of the perished Dion remains unperished, which is incredible, or they will declare that the same vision has both perished and not perished, which is absurd; therefore the vision of Theon is not identical with Dion’s but, if anything, the vision of each is peculiar to himself. And if breathing is an identical property in Dion and Theon, it is impossible that breathing should exist in Theon and not exist in Dion; but this is possible when the one has perished and the other survives; therefore it is not identical.

However, as regards this subject, this concise statement will be sufficient for the present.