Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, ed. Hermann Mutschmann, 2.5.32

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[32] ταύτην οὖν τὴν διαφωνίαν εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον εἶναι λέξουσιν οἱ δογματικοί, δώσουσιν αὐτόθεν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκαταληψίαν, εἰ δὲ έπικριτήν, τίνι ἐπικρινοῦσιν
αὐτὴν εἰπάτωσαν. αἰσθήσει μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύνανται διὰ τὸ νοητὴν ὐπ’ αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγεσθαι· εἰ δὲ λέξουσιν ὅτι διανοίᾳ, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἀδηλότατόν ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια, ὧς δεικνύουσιν οἱ περὶ μὲν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ψυχῆς ὁμοφωνοῦντες, περὶ δὲ τῆς διανοίας διαφερόμενοι,
εἰ τῇ

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. ed. Hermann Mutschmann. Germany. 2014.

Current edition First1KGreek

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Greek) (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.)

Translations (1)

Outlines of Pyrrhonism First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.) — 2.5.32 focus

[32] If, then, the Dogmatists shall maintain that this dispute is incapable of decision, they will be admitting thereby the non-apprehensibility of the soul, while if they say it is capable of decision, let them tell us by what means they will decide it. For they cannot say ‟by sense-perception,” since the soul is said by them to be an object of intelligence; and if they shall say ‟by the intellect,” we will say that inasmuch as the intellect is the least evident part of the soul—as is shown by those who agree about the real existence of the soul, though differing about the intellect,

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 2.5.32

ed. Hermann Mutschmann

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