Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, ed. Hermann Mutschmann, 2.22.250

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[250] ὅτι δὲ ὁ μὴ συνακτικὸς ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς λόγος κατὰ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικός έστιν, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων. εἰ τοίνυν ἐρωτηθέντος λόγου, ἐν ᾧ ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ συμπέρασμα,
αὐτόθεν γινώσκομεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τοῦ συμπέρασμα ἔχειν ψευδές, οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα αὐτῷ, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν παρὰ τί τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἔχει. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ’ ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐστι τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ψηφοπαικτῶν γινόμενα συγκατατιθέμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἴσμεν ὅτι
ἀπατῶσιν, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν ὅπως ἀπατῶσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῖς ψευδέσι μέν, πιθανοῖς δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσι λόγοις πειθόμεθα, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν ὅπως παραλογίζονται.

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. ed. Hermann Mutschmann. Germany. 2014.

Current edition First1KGreek

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Greek) (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.)

Translations (1)

Outlines of Pyrrhonism First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.) — 2.22.250 focus

[250] And from what we have already said¹ it is plain that according to them the argument which is not logically sound or not true is not probative either.

If, then, when an argument is propounded with a false conclusion we know at once that the argument is neither true nor logically sound, because of its false conclusion, we shall not assent to it, even if we fail to see wherein the fallacy lies. For just as we refuse our assent to the truth of the tricks performed by jugglers and know that they are deluding us, even if we do not know how they do it, so likewise we refuse to believe arguments which, though seemingly plausible, are false, even when we do not know how they are fallacious.

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 2.22.250

ed. Hermann Mutschmann

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Current edition First1KGreek

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