Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, ed. Hermann Mutschmann, 2.14.195

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[195] ‘Η πρότασις τοίνυν αὕτη ‘πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ξῷον’ ἐκ τῶν κατά μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βεβαιοῦται· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ Σωκράτην ἄνθρωπον ὄντα καὶ ζῷον εἶναι, καὶ Πλάτωνα ὁμοίως καὶ Δίωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος, δυνατὸν
εἶναι δοκεῖ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι καὶ ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστιν, ὡς εἰ κἂν ἕν τι τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐναντιούμενον φαίνοιτο τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγιὴς ἡ καθόλου πρότασις, οἶον γοῦν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν πλεῖστα τῶν ζῴων τὴν κάτω γένυν κινεῖ. μόνος δὲ ὁ κροκόδειλος τὴν ἄνω, οὔκ ἐστιν ἀληθὴς
ἡ ‘πᾶν ζῷον τὴν κάτω γένυν κινεῖ’ πρότασις.

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. ed. Hermann Mutschmann. Germany. 2014.

Current edition First1KGreek

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Greek) (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.)

Translations (1)

Outlines of Pyrrhonism First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.) — 2.14.195 focus

[195] Well then, the premiss ‟Every man is an animal” is established by induction from the particular instances; for from the fact that Socrates, who is a man, is also an animal, and Plato likewise, and Dion and each one of the particular instances,¹ they think it possible to assert that every man is an animal; so that if even a single one of the particulars should apparently conflict with the rest the universal premiss is not valid; thus, for example, when most animals move the lower jaw, and only the crocodile the upper, the premiss² ‟Every animal moves the lower jaw” is not true.

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 2.14.195

ed. Hermann Mutschmann

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