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Chapter XXV.—Does There Exist An Art Of Living?
[239] It is plain from what has been said above that there can be no art of living.
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For if such an art exists, it has to do with the consideration of things good, evil, and indifferent, so that these being non-existent the art of living also is non-existent. Further, since the Dogmatists do not all with one accord lay down one single art of living, but some propound one art, some another, they are guilty of discrepancy and open to the argument from discrepancy which I stated in our discussion of the Good.
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[240] Yet, even if they were all to agree in assuming that the art of living is one —such as, for example, the celebrated ‟prudence” whereof the Stoics dream, and which seems to be more convincing than all the rest,—even so equally absurd results will follow. For since ‟prudence” is a virtue, and the Sage alone was in possession of virtue, the Stoics, not being sages,
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will not be in possession of the art of living.
[241] And in general, since, according to them, no art
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can have real existence, an art of living cannot exist, so far as their statements go.
Thus, for example, they declare that art is ‟a composite of apprehensions,” and apprehension is ‟assent to an apprehensive impression.”
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But the apprehensive impression is indiscoverable; for every impression is not apprehensive, nor is it possible to decide which one of the impressions is the apprehensive impression, since we cannot simply decide by means of every impression which one is apprehensive and which not, while if we require an apprehensive impression in order to determine which is the apprehensive impression we are wrecked on the ad infinitum fallacy, since we are asking for another apprehensive impression so as to determine the impression taken to be apprehensive.
[242] And herein, too, the procedure of the Stoics, in presenting the notion of the apprehensive impression, is logically unsound; for in stating, on the one hand, that an apprehensive impression is that which is derived from a real object,
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and, on the other hand, that a real object is that which is capable of giving rise to an apprehensive impression, they fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning. If, then, in order that an art of living may exist, there must first exist art, and in order that art may subsist apprehension must pre-exist, and in order that apprehension may subsist assent to an apprehensive impression must be apprehended, but the apprehensive impression is indiscoverable, —then the art of living is indiscoverable.
[243] Another argument is this. Every art appears to be apprehended by means of its own special products, but there is no special product of the art of living; for anything you might mention as its product—such as honouring parents, paying back deposits, and all the rest—is found to be common to ordinary folk as well. Therefore no art of living exists. For we shall not ascertain (as some assert) from the apparent derivation of some speech or operation of the prudent man from a state of prudence that it is a product of prudence.
[244] For the state of prudence itself is inapprehensible, not being directly apparent either of itself or from its products, these being common to ordinary folk as well. And to say that we apprehend the possessor of the art of living by the unvarying quality of his actions
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is the assertion of those who over-estimate human nature and are visionaries rather than truth- tellers:
[245] There remains the assertion that the art of living is apprehended by means of those effects which they describe in their books; and these being numerous and much alike, I will extract a few of them by way of examples. Thus, for instance, Zeno, the Master of their sect, in his treatises, amongst many other statements regarding the rearing of children, says this: ‟Have carnal knowledge no less and no more of a favourite than of a non-favourite child, nor of a female than of a male; favourite or non-favourite, males or females, no different conduct, but the same, befits and is befitting to all alike.”
[246] And as concerns piety towards parents, the same man states,
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in reference to the story of Jocasta and Oedipus, that there was nothing dreadful in his rubbing his mother: ‟If she had been ailing in one part of her body and he had done her good by rubbing it with his hands, it had not been shameful; was it, then, shameful for him to stop her grief and give her joy by rubbing other parts, and to beget noble children by his mother?” And with this opinion Chrysippus also agrees. At least he says in his State: ‟I approve of carrying out those practices—which, quite rightly, are customary even nowadays amongst many peoples —according to which a mother has children by her son,
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the father by his daughter, the brother by his full sister.”
[247] And he proceeds, in the same treatises, to introduce amongst us cannibalism,
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saying: ‟And if from a living body a part be cut off that is good for food, we should not bury it nor otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from our parts a new part may arise.”
[248] And in his book On Duty he says expressly, regarding the burial of parents: ‟When our parents decease we should use the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like the nails or teeth or hair—were nothing to us, and we need bestow no care or attention on a thing like it. Hence, also, men should make use of the flesh, when it is good, for food, just as also when one of their own parts, such as the foot, is cut off, it would be proper that it and the like parts should be so used; but when the flesh is not good, they should either bury it and leave it, or burn it up and let the ashes lie, or cast it far away and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”
[249] Of such a kind are most of the philosophers’ theories; but they would not dare to put them into practice unless they lived under the laws of the Cyclopes or Laestrygones.
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But if they are totally incapable of acting thus, and their actual conduct is common to ordinary folk as well, there is no action peculiar to those who are suspected of possessing the art of living. So then, if the arts must certainly be apprehended by means of their peculiar effects, and no effect is observed that is peculiar to the so-called art of living, this art is not apprehended. Consequently, no one can positively affirm regarding it that it is really existent.
Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. Robert Gregg Bury (Translator). London. 1933.
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