[236] Since some allege that the Sceptic philosophy is identical with the Empiricism of the Medical sect, ¹ it must be recognized that inasmuch as that Empiricism positively affirms the inapprehensibility of what is non-evident it is not identical with Scepticism nor would it be consistent in a Sceptic to embrace that doctrine. He could more easily, in my opinion, adopt the so-called ‟Method;”

[237] for it alone of the Medical systems appears to avoid rash treatment of things non-evident by arbitrary assertions as to their apprehensibility or non-apprehensibility, and following appearances derives from them what seems beneficial, in accordance with the practice of the Sceptics. For we stated above ² that the common life, in which the Sceptic also shares, is four-fold, one part depending on the directing force of Nature, another on the compulsion of the affections, another on the tradition of laws and customs, and another on the training of the arts.

[238] So then, just as the Sceptic, in virtue of the compulsion of the affections, is guided by thirst to drink and by hunger to food, and in like manner to other such objects, in the same way the Methodical physician is guided by the pathological affections to the corresponding remedies—by contraction to dilatation, as when one seeks refuge in heat from the contraction due to the application of cold, or by fluxion to the stoppage of it, as when persons in a hot bath, dripping with perspiration and in a relaxed condition, seek to put a stop to it and for this reason rush off into the cool air. It is plain, too, that conditions which are naturally alien compel us to take measures for their removal, seeing that even the dog when it is pricked by a thorn proceeds to remove it.

[239] And in short—to avoid exceeding the limits proper to an outline of this kind by a detailed enumeration—I suppose that all the facts described by the Methodic School can be classed as instances of the compulsion of the affections, whether natural or against nature.

Besides, the use of terms in an undogmatic and indeterminate sense is common to both systems.

[240] For just as the Sceptic uses the expressions ‟I determine nothing” and ‟I apprehend nothing,” as we have said, in an undogmatic sense, even so the Methodic speaks of ‟generality” ³ and ‟pervade” and the like in a non-committal way. So also he employs the term ‟indication” in an undogmatic sense to denote the guidance derived from the apparent affections, or symptoms, both natural and contra-natural, for the discovery of the seemingly appropriate remedies— as, in fact, I mentioned in regard to hunger and thirst and the other affections.

[241] Consequently, judging from these and similar indications, we should say that the Methodic School of Medicine has some affinity with Scepticism; and, when viewed not simply by itself, but in comparison with the other Medical Schools, it has more affinity than they.

And now that we have said thus much concerning the Schools which seem to stand nearest to that of the Sceptics, we here bring to a conclusion both our general account of Scepticism and the First Book of our ‟Outlines.”