Capua and Petelia
THE people of
Capua
, in
Campania
, becoming wealthy
1
through the fertility of their soil, degenerated into luxury and extravagance surpassing even the common report about
Croton
and
Sybaris
. Being then unable to support their burden of prosperity they called in Hannibal; and were accordingly treated with great severity by
Rome
. But the people of Petelia maintained their loyalty to
Rome
and held out so obstinately, when besieged by Hannibal, that after having eaten all the leather in the town, and the bark of all the trees in it, and having stood the siege for eleven months, as no one came to their relief, they surrendered with the entire approval of the Romans. . . . But
Capua
by its influence drew over the other cities to the Carthaginians. . . .
Hieronymus of Syracuse
After the plot against Hieronymus, King of
Syracuse
,
2
Thraso having departed, Zoippus and Andranodorus persuaded Hieronymus to lose no time in sending ambassadors to Hannibal. He accordingly selected Polycleitus of
Cyrene
and Philodemus of
Argos
for the purpose, and sent them into
Italy
, with a commission to discuss the subject of an alliance with the Carthaginians; and at the same time he sent his brothers to
Alexandria
. Hannibal received Polycleitus and Philodemus with warmth; held out great prospects to the young king; and sent the ambassadors back without delay, accompanied by the commander of his triremes, a Carthaginian also named Hannibal, and the Syracusan Hippocrates and his younger brother Epicydes. These men had been for some time serving in Hannibal’s army, being domiciled at
Carthage
, owing to their grandfather having been banished from
Syracuse
because he was believed to have assassinated Agatharchus, one of the sons of Agathocles. On the arrival of these commissioners at
Syracuse
, Polycleitus and his colleague reported the result of their embassy, and the Carthaginian
3
delivered the message given by Hannibal: whereupon the king without hesitation expressed his willingness to make a treaty with the Carthaginians; and, begging the Hannibal who had come to him to go with all speed to
Carthage
, promised that he also would send commissioners from his own court, to settle matters with the Carthaginians.
Hieronymus of Syracuse
Meanwhile intelligence of this transaction had reached
4
the Roman praetor at
Lilybaeum
, who immediately despatched legates to Hieronymus, to renew the treaty which had been made with his ancestors. Being thoroughly annoyed with this embassy, Hieronymus said that
He was sorry for the Romans that they had come to such utter and shameful grief
5
in the battles in
Italy
at the hands of the Carthaginians. The legates were overpowered by the rudeness of the answer: still they proceeded to ask him,
Who said such things about them? Whereupon the king pointed to the Carthaginian envoys who were there, and said,
You had better convict them, if they have really been telling me lies? The Roman legates answered that it was not their habit to take the word of enemies: and advised him to do nothing in violation of the existing treaty; for that would be at once equitable and the best thing for himself. To this the king answered that he would take time to consider of it, and tell them his decision another time; but he proceeded to ask them,
How it came about that before his grandfather’s death a squadron of fifty Roman ships had sailed as far as Pachynus and then gone back again. The fact was that a short time ago the Romans had heard that Hiero was dead; and being much alarmed lest people in
Syracuse
, despising the youth of the grandson whom he left, should stir up a revolution, they had made this cruise with the intention of being ready there to assist his youthful weakness, and to help in maintaining his authority; but being informed that his grandfather was still alive, they sailed back again. When the ambassadors had stated these facts, the young king answered again,
Then please to allow me too now, O Romans, to maintain my authority by
sailing back to see what I can get from
Carthage
. The Roman legates perceiving the warmth with which the king was engaging in his policy, said nothing at the time; but returned and informed the praetor who had sent them of what had been said. From that time forward, therefore, the Romans kept a careful watch upon him as an enemy.
The Treaty with Carthage
Hieronymus on his part selected Agatharchus, Onesimus, and Hipposthenes to send with Hannibal to
Carthage
, with instructions to make an alliance on the following terms:
The Carthaginians to assist him with land and sea forces, in expelling the Romans from
Sicily
, and then divide the island with him; so as to have the river Himera, which divides
Sicily
almost exactly in half, as the boundary between the two provinces. The commissioners arrived in
Carthage
: and finding, on coming to a conference, that the Carthaginians were prepared to meet them in every point, they completed the arrangement. Meanwhile Hippocrates got the young Hieronymus entirely into his hands: and at first fired his imagination by telling him of Hannibal’s marches and pitched battles in
Italy
; and afterwards by repeating to him that no one had a better right to the government of all Siceliots than he; in the first place as the son of Nereis daughter of Pyrrhus, the only man whom all Siceliots alike had accepted deliberately and with full assent as their leader and king; and in the second place in virtue of his grandfather Hiero’s sovereign rights. At last he and his brother so won upon the young man by their conversation, that he would attend to no one else at all: partly from the natural feebleness of his character, but still more from the ambitious feelings which they had excited in him.
6
And therefore, just when Agatharchus and his colleagues were completing the business on which they had been sent in
Carthage
, he sent fresh ambassadors, saying that all
Sicily
belonged to him; and demanding that the Carthaginians should help him to recover
Sicily
: while he promised that he would assist the Carthaginians in their Italian campaign. Though the Carthaginians now saw perfectly well the whole extent of the young man’s fickleness and infatuation: yet thinking it to be in manifold ways to their interests not to let Sicilian affairs out of their hands, they assented to his demands; and having already prepared ships and men, they set about arranging for the transport of their forces into
Sicily
.
Hieronymus Decides For War
When they heard of this, the Romans sent legates to him
7
again, protesting against his violation of the treaty made with his forefathers. Hieronymus thereupon summoned a meeting of his council and consulted them as to what he was to do. The native members of it kept silent, because they feared the folly of their ruler. Aristomachus of
Corinth
, Damippus of
Sparta
, Autonous of
Thessaly
advised that he should abide by the treaty with
Rome
. Andranodorus alone urged that he should not let the opportunity slip; and affirmed that the present was the only chance of establishing his rule over
Sicily
. After the delivery of this speech, the king asked Hippocrates and his brother what they thought, and upon their answering,
The same as Andranodorus, the deliberation was concluded in that sense. Thus, then, war with
Rome
had been decided upon: but while the king was anxious to be thought to have given an adroit answer to the ambassadors, he committed himself to such an utter absurdity as to make it certain that he would not only fail to conciliate the Romans, but would inevitably offend them violently. For he said that he would abide by the treaty, firstly, if the Romans would repay all the gold they had received from his grandfather Hiero; and secondly, if they would return the corn and other presents which they had received from him from the first day of their intercourse with him; and thirdly, if they would acknowledge all
Sicily
east of the Himera to be Syracusan territory.
8
At these propositions of course the ambassadors and council separated; and from that time forth Hieronymus began pushing on his preparations for war with energy: collected and armed his forces, and got ready the other necessary provisions. . . .
Description of Leontini
The city of Leontini taken as a whole faces north,
9
and is divided in half by a valley of level ground, in which are the state buildings, the courthouses, and market-place. Along each side of this valley run hills with steep banks all the way; the flat tops of which, reached after crossing their brows, are covered with houses and temples. The city has two gates, one on the southern extremity of this valley leading to
Syracuse
, the other at the northern leading on to the
Leontine plains, and the arable district. Close under the westernmost of the steep cliffs runs a river called
Lissus
; parallel to which are built continuous rows of houses, in great numbers, close under the cliff, between which and the river runs the road I have mentioned. . . .
Fall of Heronymus
Some of the historians who have described the fall of
10
Hieronymus have written at great length and in terms of mysterious solemnity. They tell us of prodigies preceding his coming to the throne, and of the misfortunes of
Syracuse
. They describe in dramatic language the cruelty of his character and the impiety of his actions; and crown all with the sudden and terrible nature of the circumstances attending his fall. One would think from their description that neither Phalaris, nor Apollodorus, nor any other tyrant was ever fiercer than he. Yet he was a mere boy when he succeeded to power, and only lived thirteen months after. In this space of time it is possible that one or two men may have been put to the rack, or certain of his friends, or other Syracusan citizens, put to death; but it is improbable that his tyranny could have been extravagantly wicked, or his impiety outrageous. It must be confessed that he was reckless and unscrupulous in disposition; still we cannot compare him with either of the tyrants I have named. The fact is that those who write the histories of particular episodes, having undertaken limited and narrow themes, appear to me to be compelled from poverty of matter to exaggerate insignificant incidents, and to speak at inordinate length on subjects that scarcely deserve to be recorded at all. There are some, too, who fall into a similar mistake from mere want of judgment. With how much more reason might the space employed on these descriptions,—which they use merely to fill up and spin out their books,—have been devoted to Hiero and Gelo, without mentioning Hieronymus at all! It would have given greater pleasure to readers and more instruction to students.
Character of Hiero II
For, in the first place, Hiero gained the sovereignty of
11
Syracuse
and her allies by his own unaided abilities without inheriting wealth, or reputation, or any other advantage of fortune. And, in the second place, was established king of
Syracuse
without putting to death, banishing, or harassing any one of the citizens,—which is the most astonishing circumstance of all. And what is quite as surprising as the innocence of his acquisition of power is the fact that it did not change his character. For during a reign of fifty-four years he preserved peace for the country, maintained his own power free from all hostile plots, and entirely escaped the envy which generally follows greatness; for though he tried on several occasions to lay down his power, he was prevented by the common remonstrances of the citizens. And having shown himself most beneficent to the Greeks, and most anxious to earn their good opinion, he left behind him not merely a great personal reputation but also a universal feeling of goodwill towards the Syracusans. Again, though he passed his life in the midst of the greatest wealth, luxury, and abundance, he survived for more than ninety years, in full possession of his senses and with all parts of his body unimpaired; which, to my mind, is a decisive proof of a well-spent life. . . .
Gelo, his son, in a life of more than fifty years
12
regarded it as the most honourable object of ambition to obey his father, and to regard neither wealth, nor sovereign power, nor anything else as of higher value than love and loyalty to his parents. . . .
Treaty Between Hannibal and King Philip V. of Macedon
This is a sworn treaty made between Hannibal, Mago,
13
Barmocarus, and such members of the Carthaginian Gerusia as were present, and all Carthaginians serving in his army, on the one part; and Xenophanes, son of Cleomachus of
Athens
, sent to us by King Philip, as his ambassador, on behalf of himself, the Macedonians, and their allies, on the other part.
The oath is taken in the presence of Zeus,
14
Here, and Apollo: of the god of the Carthaginians, Hercules, and Iolaus: of Ares, Triton, Poseidon: of the gods that accompany the army, and of the sun, moon, and earth: of rivers, harbours, waters: of all the gods who rule
Carthage
: of all the gods who rule
Macedonia
and the rest of
Greece
: of all the gods of war that are witnesses to this oath.
Hannibal, general, and all the Carthaginian senators with
15
him, and all Carthaginians serving in his army, subject to our mutual consent, proposes to make this sworn treaty of friendship and honourable good-will. Let us be friends, close allies, and brethren, on the conditions herein following:—
(1) Let the Carthaginians, as supreme, Hannibal their
16
chief general and those serving with him, all members of the Carthaginian dominion living under the same laws, as well as the people of
Utica
, and the cities and tribes subject to
Carthage
, and their soldiers and allies, and all cities and tribes in
Italy
, Celt-land, and
Liguria
, with whom we have a compact of friendship, and with whomsoever in this country we may hereafter form such compact, be supported by King Philip and the Macedonians, and all other Greeks in alliance with them.
(2) On their parts also King Philip and the Macedonians,
17
and such other Greeks as are his allies, shall be supported and protected by the Carthaginians now in this army, and by the people of
Utica
, and by all cities and tribes subject to
Carthage
, both soldiers and allies, and by all allied cities and tribes in
Italy
, Celt-land, and
Liguria
, and by all others in
Italy
as shall hereafter become allies of the Carthaginians.
18
(3) We will not make plots against, nor lie in ambush for,
19
each other; but in all sincerity and good-will, without reserve or secret design, will be enemies to the enemies of the Carthaginians, saving and excepting those kings, cities, and ports with which we have sworn agreements and friendships.
(4) And we, too, will be enemies to the enemies of
20
King Philip, saving and excepting those kings, cities, and tribes, with which we have sworn agreements and friendships.
(5) Ye shall be friends to us in the war in which we now
21
are engaged against the Romans, till such time as the gods give us and you the victory: and ye shall assist us in all ways that be needful, and in whatsoever way we may mutually determine.
(6) And when the gods have given us victory in our
22
war with the Romans and their allies, if Hannibal shall deem it right to make terms with the Romans, these terms shall include the same friendship with you, made on these conditions: (1) the Romans not to be allowed to make war on you; (2) not to have power over
Corcyra
,
Apollonia
, Epidamnum, Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, nor Atitania; (3) to restore to Demetrius of Pharos all those of his friends now in the dominion of
Rome
.
(7) If the Romans ever make war on you or on us we will
23
aid each other in such war, according to the need of either.
(8) So also if any other nation whatever does so, always
24
excepting kings, cities, and tribes, with whom we have sworn agreements and friendships.
(9) If we decide to take away from, or
25
add to this sworn treaty, we will so take away, or add thereto, only as we both may agree. . . .
Messene and Philip V. in B. C. 215
Democracy being established at
Messene
, and the men
26
of rank having been banished, while those who had received allotments on their lands obtained the chief influence in the government, those of the old citizens who remained found it very hard to put up with the equality which these men had obtained. . . .
Gorgus
of
Messene
, in wealth and extraction, was inferior
27
to no one in the town; and had been a famous athlete in his time, far surpassing all rivals in that pursuit. In fact he was not behind any man of his day in physical beauty, or the general dignity of his manner of life, or the number of prizes he had won. Again, when he gave up athletics and devoted himself to politics and the service of his country, he gained no less reputation in this department than in his former pursuit. For he was removed from the Philistinism that usually characterises athletes, and was looked upon as in the highest degree an able and clear-headed politician. . . .
Philip Dissuaded from Taking Messene
Philip, king of the Macedonians, being desirous of
28
seizing the acropolis of
Messene
, told the leaders of the city that he wished to see it and to sacrifice to Zeus, and accordingly walked up thither with his attendants and joined in the sacrifice. When, according to custom, the entrails of the slaughtered victims were brought to him, he took them in his hands, and, turning round a little to one side, held them out to Aratus and asked him
what he thought the sacrifices indicated? To quit the citadel or hold it? Thereupon Demetrius struck in on the spur of the moment by saying,
If you have the heart of an augur,—to quit it as quick as you can: but if of a gallant and wise king, to keep it, lest if you quit it now you may never have so good an opportunity again: for it is by thus holding the two horns that you can alone keep the ox under your control. By the
two horns he meant
Ithome
and the Acrocorinthus, and by the
ox the
Peloponnese
. Thereupon Philip turned to Aratus and said,
And do you give the same advice? Aratus not making any answer at once, he urged him to speak his real opinion. After some hesitation he said,
If you can get possession of this place without treachery to the Messenians, I advise you to do so; but if, by the act of occupying this citadel with a guard, you shall ruin all the citadels, and the guard wherewith the allies were protected when they came into your hands from Antigonus (meaning by that,
confidence),
consider whether it is not better to take your men away and leave the confidence there, and with it guard the Messenians, and the other allies as well. As far as his own inclination was concerned, Philip was ready enough to commit an act of treachery, as his own subsequent conduct proved: but having been sharply rebuked a little while before by the younger Aratus for his destruction of human life; and seeing that, on the present occasion, the elder spoke with boldness and authority, and begged him not to neglect his advice, he gave in from sheer shame, and taking the latter by his right hand, said,
Then let us go back the same way we came.
Philip’s Loss of Popularity
I wish here to stop in my narrative in order to speak
29
briefly of the character of Philip, because this was the beginning of the change and deterioration in it. For I think that no more telling example can be proposed to practical statesmen who wish to correct their ideas by a study of history. For the splendour of his early career, and the brilliancy of his genius, have caused the dispositions for good and evil displayed by this king to be more conspicuous and widely known throughout
Greece
than is the case with any other man; as well as the contrast between the results accompanying the display of those opposite tendencies.
Now that, upon his accession to the throne,
Thessaly
,
Macedonia
, and in fact all parts of his own kingdom were more thoroughly loyal and well disposed to him, young as he was on his succeeding to the government of
Macedonia
, than they had ever been to any of his predecessors, may be without difficulty inferred from the following fact. Though he was with extreme frequency forced to leave
Macedonia
by the Aetolian and Lacedaemonian wars, not only was there no disturbance in these countries, but not a single one of the neighbouring barbarians ventured to touch
Macedonia
. It would be impossible, again, to speak in strong enough terms of the affection of Alexander, Chrysogonus, and his other friends towards him; or that of the Epirotes, Acarnanians, and all those on whom he had within a short time conferred great benefits. On the whole, if one may use a somewhat hyperbolical phrase, I think it has been said of Philip with very great propriety, that his beneficent policy had made him
The darling of all
Greece
. And it is a conspicuous and striking proof of the advantage of lofty principle and strict integrity, that the Cretans, having at length come to an understanding with each other and made a national alliance, selected Philip to arbitrate between them; and that this settlement was completed without an appeal to arms and without danger,—a thing for which it would be difficult to find a precedent in similar circumstances. From the time of his exploits at
Messene
all this was utterly changed. And it was natural that it should be so. For his purposes being now entirely reversed, it inevitably followed that men’s opinions of him should be reversed also, as well as the success of his various undertakings. This actually was the case, as will become evident to attentive students from what I am now about to relate. . . .
Philip Begins to Become a Tyrant
Aratus seeing that Philip was now openly engaging in war with
Rome
, and entirely changed in his policy toward his allies, with difficulty diverted him from his intention by suggesting numerous difficulties and scruples.
I wish now to remind my readers of what, in my fifth Book, I put forward merely as a promise and unsupported statement, but which has now been confirmed by facts; in order that I may not leave any proposition of mine unproved or open to question.
30
In the course of my history of the Aetolian war, where I had to relate the violent proceedings of Philip in destroying the colonnades and other sacred objects at Thermus; and added that, in consideration of his youth, the blame of these measures ought not to be referred to Philip so much as to his advisers; I then remarked that the life of Aratus sufficiently proved that he would not have committed such an act of wickedness, but that such principles exactly suited Demetrius of Pharos; and I promised to make this clear from what I was next to narrate.
31
I thereby designedly postponed the demonstration of the truth of my assertion, till I had come to the period of which I have just been speaking; that, namely, in which with the presence of Demetrius, and in the absence of Aratus, who arrived a day too late, Philip made the first step in his career of crime; and, as though from the first taste of human blood and murder and treason to his allies, was changed not into a wolf from a man, as in the Arcadian fable mentioned by Plato, but from a king into a savage tyrant.
32
But a still more decisive proof of the sentiments of these two men is furnished by the plot against the citadel of
Messene
, and may help us to make up our minds which of the two were responsible for the proceedings in the Aetolian war; and, when we are satisfied on that point, it will be easy to form a judgment on the differences of their principles.
Aratus a Moderating Influence on Philip
For as in this instance, under the influence of Aratus, Philip refrained from actually breaking faith with the Messenians in regard to the citadel; and thus, to use a common expression, poured a little balm into the wide wound which his slaughters had caused: so in the Aetolian war, when under the influence of Demetrius, he sinned against the gods by destroying the objects consecrated to them, and against man by transgressing the laws of war; and entirely deserted his original principles, by showing himself an implacable and bitter foe to all who opposed him. The same remark applies to the Cretan business.
33
As long as he employed Aratus as his chief director, not only without doing injustice to a single islander, but without even causing them any vexation, he kept the whole Cretan people under control; and led all the Greeks to regard him with favour, owing to the greatness of character which he displayed. So again, when under the guidance of Demetrius, he became the cause of the misfortunes I have described to the Messenians, he at once lost the good-will of the allies and his credit with the rest of
Greece
. Such a decisive influence for good or evil in the security of their government has the choice by youthful sovereigns of the friends who are to surround them; though it is a subject on which by some unaccountable carelessness they take not the smallest care. . . .
The War of Antiochus with Achaeus
(See
5, 107
)
Round
Sardis
ceaseless and protracted skirmishes were
34
taking place and fighting by night and day, both armies inventing every possible kind of plot and counterplot against each other: to describe which in detail would be as useless as it would be in the last degree wearisome. At last, when the siege had already entered upon its second year, Lagoras the Cretan came forward. He had had a considerable experience in war, and had learnt that as a rule cities fall into the hands of their enemies most easily from some neglect on the part of their inhabitants, when, trusting to the natural or artificial strength of their defences, they neglect to keep proper guard and become thoroughly careless. He had observed too, that in such fortified cities captures were effected at the points of greatest strength, which were believed to have been despaired of by the enemy. So in the present instance, when he saw that the prevailing notion of the strength of
Sardis
caused the whole army to despair of taking it by storm, and to believe that the one hope of getting it was by starving it out, he gave all the closer attention to the subject; and eagerly scanned every possible method of making an attempt to capture the town. Having observed therefore that a portion of the wall was unguarded, near a place called the Saw, which unites the citadel and city, he conceived the hope and idea of performing this exploit. He had discovered the carelessness of the men guarding this wall from the following circumstance. The place was extremely precipitous: and there was a deep gully below, into which dead bodies from the city, and the offal of horses and beasts of burden that died, were accustomed to be thrown; and in this place therefore there was always a great number of vultures and other birds collected. Having observed, then, that when these creatures were gorged, they always sat undisturbed upon the cliffs and the wall, he concluded that the wall must necessarily be left unguarded and deserted for the larger part of the day. Accordingly, under cover of night, he went to the spot and carefully examined the possibilities of approaching it and setting ladders; and finding that this was possible at one particular rock, he communicated the facts to the king.
Antiochus Takes Sardis
Antiochus encouraged the attempt and urged Lagoras to carry it out. The latter promised to do his best, and desired the king to join with him Theodotus the Aetolian, and Dionysius the commander of his bodyguard, with orders to devote them to assist him in carrying out the intended interprise. The king at once granted his request, and these officers agreed to undertake it: and having held a consultation on the whole subject, they waited for a night on which there should be no moon just before daybreak. Such a night having arrived, on the day on which they intended to act, an hour before sunset, they selected from the whole army fifteen of the strongest and most courageous men to carry the ladders, and also to mount with them and share in the daring attempt. After these they selected thirty others, to remain in reserve at a certain distance; that, as soon as they had themselves climbed over the walls, and come to the nearest gate, the thirty might come up to it from the outside and try to knock off the hinges and fastenings, while they on the inside cut the cross bar and bolt pins.
35
They also selected two thousand men to follow behind the thirty, who were to rush into the town with them and seize the area of the theatre, which was a favourable position to hold against those on the citadel, as well as those in the town. To prevent suspicion of the truth getting about, owing to the picking out of the men, the king gave out that the Aetolians were about to throw themselves into the town through a certain gully, and that it was necessary, in view of that information, to take energetic measures to prevent them.
The Sack of Sardis
When Lagoras and his party had made all their
36
preparations, as soon as the moon set, they came stealthily to the foot of the cliffs with their scaling ladders, and ensconced themselves under a certain overhanging rock. When day broke, and the picket as usual broke up from that spot; and the king in the ordinary way told off some men to take their usual posts, and led the main body on to the hippodrome and drew them up; at first no one suspected what was going on. But when two ladders were fixed, and Dionysius led the way up one, and Lagoras up the other, there was excitement and a stir throughout the camp. For while the climbing party were not visible to the people in the town, or to Achaeus in the citadel, because of the beetling brow of the rock, their bold and adventurous ascent was in full view of the camp; which accordingly was divided in feeling between astonishment at the strangeness of the spectacle, and a nervous horror of what was going to happen next, all standing dumb with exulting wonder. Observing the excitement in the camp, and wishing to divert the attention both of his own men and of those in the city from what was going on, the king ordered an advance; and delivered an attack upon the gates on the other side of the town, called the Persian gates. Seeing from the citadel the unwonted stir in the camp, Achaeus was for some time at a loss to know what to do, being puzzled to account for it, and quite unable to see what was taking place. However he despatched a force to oppose the enemy at the gate; whose assistance was slow in arriving, because they had to descend from the citadel by a narrow and precipitous path. But Aribazus, the commandant of the town, went unsuspiciously to the gates on which he saw Antiochus advancing; and caused some of his men to mount the wall, and sent others out through the gate, with orders to hinder the approaching enemies, and come to close quarters with them.
Sardis Destroyed
Meanwhile Lagoras, Theodotus, Dionysius, and their men had climbed the rocks and had arrived at the gate nearest them; and some of them were engaged in fighting the troops sent from the citadel to oppose them, while others were cutting through the bars; and at the same time the party outside told off for that service were doing the same. The gates having thus been quickly forced open, the two thousand entered and occupied the area round the theatre. On this all the men from the walls, and from the Persian gate, to which Aribazus had already led a relieving force, rushed in hot haste to pass the word to attack the enemy within the gates. The result was that, the gate having been opened as they retreated, some of the king’s army rushed in along with the retiring garrison; and, when they had thus taken possession of the gate, they were followed by an unbroken stream of their comrades; some of whom poured through the gate, while others employed themselves in bursting open other gates in the vicinity. Aribazus and all the men in the city, after a brief struggle against the enemy who had thus got within the walls, fled with all speed to the citadel. After that, Theodotus and Lagoras and their party remained on the ground near the theatre, determining with great good sense and soldier-like prudence to form a reserve until the whole operation was completed; while the main body rushed in on every side and occupied the town. And now by dint of some putting all they met to the sword, others setting fire to the houses, others devoting themselves to plunder and taking booty, the destruction and sacking of the town was completed. Thus did Antiochus become master of Sardis. . . .
Histories. Polybius. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (Translator). London. 1889.
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