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Death of Hasdrubal

MY reason for prefixing a table of contents to each book, rather than a preface, is not because I do not recognise the usefulness of a preface in arresting attention and rousing interest, and also giving facilities for finding any passage that is wanted, but because I find prefaces viewed, though from many inadequate reasons, with contempt and neglect. I therefore had recourse to a table of contents throughout my history, except the first six books, arranged according to Olympiads, as being as effective, or even more so, than a preface, and at the same time as less subject to the objection of being out of place, for it is closely connected with the subject-matter. In the first six books I wrote prefaces, because I thought a mere table of contents less suitable. . . .

Much easier and shorter was Hasdrubal’s journey into Italy . . . .²

Never at any other time had Rome been in a greater state of excitement and terrified expectation of the result. . . .³

None of these arrangements satisfied Hasdrubal. But⁴ circumstances no longer admitted of delay. He saw the enemy drawn out in battle array and advancing; and he was obliged to get the Iberians and the Gauls who were serving with him into line. He therefore stationed his ten elephants on the front, increased the depth of his lines, and so had his whole army covering a somewhat small ground. He took up a position himself in the centre of the line, immediately behind the elephants, and commenced an advance upon the Roman left, with a full resolution that in this battle he must either conquer or die. Livius advanced to meet the enemy with proud confidence, and having come to close quarters with him was fighting with great gallantry, Meanwhile Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing, found himself unable to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the rough ground in front of him, relying on which Hasdrubal had directed his advance upon the Roman left: and being embarrassed by his inability to strike a blow, he promptly decided what the circumstances pointed out as the tactics to pursue. He withdrew his men from the right wing, and marched them on the rear of the field of battle; and, after passing the left of the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the Carthaginians who were fighting near the elephants. Up to this point the victory had been doubtful; for both sides fought with desperation, the Romans believing that all would be over with them if they failed, and the Iberians and Carthaginians holding exactly the same conviction for themselves. Moreover the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike; for finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a crossfire of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and Roman lines into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell upon the rear of the enemy the battle ceased to be equal: for the Iberians found themselves attacked on front and rear at once, which resulted in the greater part of them being cut down on the ground. Six of the elephants were killed with the men on them, four forced their way through the lines and were afterwards captured, having been abandoned by their Indian drivers.

Hasdrubal’s Conduct in His Last Battle

Hasdrubal had behaved on this occasion, as throughout ⁵ his whole life, like a brave man, and died fighting: and he deserves not to be passed over without remark. I have already stated that Hannibal was his brother, and on his departure to Italy entrusted the command in Iberia to him. I have also described his many contests with the Romans, and the many embarrassing difficulties with which he had to struggle, caused by the generals sent from Carthage to Iberia ; and how in all these matters he had supported these vicissitudes and reverses in a noble spirit worthy of a son of Barcas. But I will now speak of his last contest, and explain why he seems to me pre-eminently to deserve respectful attention and imitation. Most generals and kings, when entering upon decisive battles, place before their eyes the glory and advantages to be obtained from victory, and frequently consider and contrive what use they will make of every success; but they do not go on to review the chances of failure, nor contemplate the plan to be adopted, or the action to be taken, in the case of reverse. Yet the former is obvious, the latter requires foresight. Therefore it is that most of them, though in many instances their soldiers have fought nobly, by their own folly and imprudence in this respect have added dishonour to defeat: have disgraced their previous achievements, and rendered themselves, during the remainder of their lives, objects of reproach and contempt. It is easy to see that many leaders make this fatal mistake, and that the difference between one man and another in these points is most signal; for history is full of such instances. Hasdrubal, on the contrary, as long as there was reasonable hope of being able to accomplish anything worthy of his former achievements, regarded his personal safety in battle as of the highest consequence; but when Fortune deprived him of all hopes for the future, and reduced him to the last extremities, though neglecting nothing either in his preparations or on the field that might secure him the victory, nevertheless considered how, in case of total overthrow, he might face his fate and suffer nothing unworthy of his past career.

These remarks are meant for those engaged in active operations, that they may neither dash the hopes of those who rely upon them by a heedless seeking of danger, nor by an unworthy clinging to life add disgrace and shame to the catastrophies which befall them.

The Romans Celebrate a Victory

Having won the victory, the Romans began pillaging the enemy’s camp; and killed a number of the Celts, as they lay stupefied with drunkenness in their beds, like unresisting victims. Then they collected the rest of the booty, from which more than three hundred talents were paid into the treasury. Taking Carthaginians and Celts together, not less than ten thousand were killed, and about two thousand Romans. Some of the principal Carthaginians were taken prisoners, but the rest were put to the sword. When the report reached Rome , people at first could not believe it, from the intensity of their wish that it might be true; but when still more men arrived, not only stating the fact, but giving full details, then indeed the city was filled with overpowering joy; every temple-court was decked, and every shrine full of sacrificial cakes and victims: and, in a word, they were raised to such a pitch of hopefulness and confidence, that every one felt sure that Hannibal, formerly the object of their chief terror, could not after that stay even in Italy . . . .

A Plea For Union In Greece

⁶

Facts I imagine, Aetolians, have made it clear to you that neither King Ptolemy nor the community of Rhodes , Byzantium , Chios , or Mitylene , regard a composition with you as unimportant. For this is not the first or the second time that we have introduced the subject of peace to your assembly; but ever since you entered upon the war we have beset you with entreaties, and have never desisted from warning you on this subject; because we saw that its immediate result would be the destruction of yourselves and of Macedonia , and because we foresaw in the future danger to our own countries and to that of all other Greeks. For as, when a man has once set a fire alight, the result is no longer dependent upon his choice, but it spreads in whatever direction chance may direct, guided for the most part by the wind and the combustible nature of the material, and frequently attacks the first author of the conflagration himself: so too, war, when once it has been kindled by a nation, sometimes devours the first those who kindled it; and soon rushes along destroying everything that falls in its way, continually gathering fresh strength, and blown into greater heat by the folly of the people in its neighbourhood, as though by the wind. Wherefore, men of Aetolia , considering that we, as representatives of the whole body of the islanders and of the Greek inhabitants of Asia , are here to beseech you to put an end to war and to choose peace, because the matter affects us as well as you, show your wisdom by listening to us and yielding to our entreaties. For if you were carrying on a war which, though profitless (and most wars are that), was yet glorious from the motive which prompted it, and the reputation likely to accrue from it, you might be pardoned perhaps for a fixed determination to continue it; but if it is a war of the most signal infamy, which can bring you nothing but discredit and obloquy,—does not such an undertaking claim considerable hesitation on your part? We will speak our opinion frankly; and you, if you are wise, will give us a quiet hearing. For it is much better to hear a disagreeable truth now and thereby be preserved, than to listen to smooth things now, and soon afterwards to be ruined yourselves, and to ruin the rest of the Greeks with you.

Dangers of the Treaty With Rome

Put then before your eyes your own folly. You profess to be at war against Philip on behalf of the Greeks, that they may escape from servitude to him; but your war is really for the enslavement and ruin of Greece . That is the tale told by your treaty with Rome , which formerly existed only in written words, but is now seen in full operation. Heretofore, though mere written words, it was a disgrace to you: but now your execution of it has made that disgrace palpable to the eyes of all the world. Moreover, Philip merely lends his name and serves as a pretext for the war: he is not exposed to any attack: it is against his allies,—the majority of the Peloponnesian states, Boeotia , Euboea , Phocis , Locris , Thessaly , Epirus ,—that you have made this treaty, bargaining that their bodies and their goods shall belong to the Romans, their cities and their territory to the Aetolians. ⁸ And though personally, if you took a city, you would not stoop to violate the freeborn, or to burn the buildings, because you look upon such conduct as cruel and barbarous; yet you have made a treaty by which you have handed over all other Greeks to the barbarians, to be exposed to the most shameful violence and lawlessness. And all this was hitherto kept a secret. But now the fate of the people of Oreus, and of the miserable Aeginetans, has betrayed you to every one,—Fortune having, as though of set purpose, suddenly brought your infatuation before the scenes.

So much for the origin of the war and its events up to now. But as to its result,—supposing everything to go to your wish,—what do you expect that to be? Will it not be the beginning of great miseries to all Greece ?

Philip In Aetolia Again

For I presume no one can fail to see that, if once the Romans get rid of the war in Italy ,—and this is all but done, now that Hannibal has been confined to a narrow district in Bruttii,—they will direct their whole power upon Greece : professedly, indeed, in aid of the Boeotians against Philip, but really with the view of reducing it entirely under their own power. And if they design to treat it well when they have conquered it, theirs will be the honour and glory; and if badly, theirs too will be the plunder from the states they destroy, and the power over those which they allow to survive: while you will be calling upon the gods to witness your wrongs, when no god will be any longer willing, nor any man be able to help you. Now, perhaps, you ought to have foreseen all this from the first, for that would have been your best course. But since the future often escapes human foresight, now, at any rate, that you have seen by actual experience what has happened, it must be your duty to take better measures for the future. In any case we have omitted nothing which it becomes sincere friends to say or do. We have spoken our opinion about the future with absolute frankness; and you we urge and entreat not to stand in the way of the freedom and safety of yourselves or of the rest of Greece .

This speaker having, as it seemed, made a considerable impression, he was followed by the ambassadors of Philip, who, without making a long speech, merely said that they were commissioned to do one of two things,—if the Aetolians chose peace, to accept it readily: if not, to call the gods and the ambassadors from Greece to witness that the Aetolians, and not Philip, ought to be held responsible for what happened thereafter, and so to depart. . . .

Philip Vandalizes Thermus

Philip loudly lamented his ill-fortune in having so ⁹ narrowly missed getting Attalus into his hands. . . .

On his way to the lake Trichonis Philip arrived¹⁰ at Thermus, where there was a temple of Apollo; and there he once more defaced all the sacred buildings which he had spared on his former occupation of the town. In both instances it was an ill-advised indulgence of temper: for it is a mark of utter unreasonableness to commit an act of impiety against heaven in order to gratify one’s wrath against man. . . .

Faults of the Achaean Officers

There are three methods followed by those who wish to ¹¹ arrive at an intelligent knowledge of tactics. The first is by the study of history, the second by the use of scientific treatises composed by specialists, the third by actual experience on the field. But of all three of these methods the Achaean commanders were equally ignorant. . . .

A very general fault in the men was an unfortunate rivalry, engendered by the ostentation and bad taste of the others. They were very particular about their attendants and their dress; and there was a show of splendour in this, kept up by the majority beyond their means. But to their arms they paid no attention whatever. . . .

Most people, indeed, do not so much as attempt to imitate the real achievements of those who obtain success, but, while trying to reproduce their unimportant peculiarities, succeed only in displaying their own frivolity. . . .

Philopoemen in the Peloponnese , B. C. 207

Brightness in the armour, he said, contributes much ¹² to inspire dismay in the enemy; and care bestowed on having it made to fit properly is of great service in actual use. This will best be secured if you give to your arms the attention which you now bestow on your dress, and transfer to your dress the neglect which you now show of your arms. By thus acting, you will at once save your money, and be undoubtedly able to maintain the interests of your country. Therefore the man who is going to take part in manœuvres or a campaign ought, when putting on his greaves, to see that they are bright and well-fitting, much more than that his shoes and boots are; and when he takes up his shield and helmet, to take care that they are cleaner and more costly than his cloak and shirt: for when men take greater care of what is for show, than of what is for use, there can be no doubt of what will happen to them on the field. I beg you to consider that elaboration in dress is a woman’s weakness, and a woman of no very high character either; but costliness and splendour in armour are the characteristics of brave men who are resolved on saving themselves and their country with glory.

The whole audience were so convinced by this speech and so much struck with the wisdom of the advice, that, immediately after leaving the council-chamber, they began pointing with scorn at the over-dressed dandies, and forced some of them to quit the market-place; and what is more, in future manœuvres and campaigns they kept a stricter watch on each other in these points.

Philopoemen and Machanidas

So true it is that a single word spoken by a man of ¹³ credit is often sufficient not only to turn men from the worst courses, but even to incite them to the noblest. But when such a speaker can appeal to his own life as in harmony with his words, then indeed his exhortation carries a weight which nothing can exceed. And this was above all others the case with Philopoemen. For in his dress and eating, as well as in all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple; in his manners to others without ceremony or pretence; and throughout his life he made it his chief aim to be absolutely sincere. Consequently a few unstudied words from him were sufficient to raise a firm conviction in the minds of his hearers; for as he could point to his own life as an example, they wanted little more to convince them. Thus it happened on several occasions, that the confidence he inspired, and the consciousness of his achievements, enabled him in a few words to overthrow long and, as his opponents thought, skilfully argued speeches.

So on this occasion, as soon as the council of the league separated, all returned to their cities deeply impressed both by the words and the man himself, and convinced that no harm could happen to them with him at their head. Immediately afterwards Philopoemen set out on a visitation of the cities, which he performed with great energy and speed. He then summoned a levy of citizens and began forming them into companies and drilling them; and at last, after eight months of this preparation and training, he mustered his forces at Mantinea , prepared to fight the tyrant Machanidas in behalf of the freedom of all the Peloponnesians. ¹⁴

Arrangement of Forces at Mantinea

Machanidas had now acquired great confidence, and ¹⁵ looked upon the determination of the Achaeans as extremely favourable to his plans. As soon as he heard of their being in force at Mantinea , he duly harangued his Lacedaemonians at Tegea , and the very next morning at daybreak advanced upon Mantinea . He led the right wing of the phalanx himself; his mercenaries marched in two parallel columns on each side of his front; and behind them were carts carrying quantities of field artillery and bolts for the catapults. ¹⁶ Meanwhile Philopoemen too had arranged his army in three divisions, and was leading them out of Mantinea , the Illyrians and the men with body armour by the gate leading to the temple of Poseidon, and with them all the rest of the foreign contingent and lightarmed troops; by the next gate, toward the west, the phalanx; and by the next the Achaean cavalry. He sent his light-armed men forward to occupy the hill, which rises to a considerable height above the road called Xenis and the above-mentioned temple: he stationed the men with body armour next, resting on this hill to the south; next them the Illyrians; next them, in the same straight line, the phalanx, drawn up in companies, with an interval between each, along the ditch which runs towards the temple of Poseidon, right through the middle of the plain of Mantinea , until it touches the range of mountains that forms the boundary of the territory of the Elisphasii. Next to them, on the right wing, he stationed the Achaean cavalry, under the command of Aristaenetus of Dyme ; while on the left wing he led the whole of the foreign contingent, drawn up in lines one behind the other.

Battle of Mantinea

As soon as the enemy were well in sight, Philopoemen went down the ranks of the phalanx, and addressed to them an exhortation which, though short, clearly pointed out to them the nature of the battle in which they were engaged. But most of what he said was rendered inaudible by the answering shouts of the troops. The affection and confidence of the men rose to such a pitch of enthusiasm and zeal that they seemed to be almost acting under a divine inspiration, as they cried out to him to lead them on and fear nothing. However he tried, when he could get the opportunity, to make this much clear to them, that the battle on the one side was to establish a shameful and ignominious servitude, on the other to vindicate an ever-memorable and glorious liberty.

Machanidas at first looked as though he meant to attack the¹⁷ enemy’s right wing in column; but when he got within moderate distance he deployed into line by the right, and by this extension movement made his right wing cover the same amount of ground as the left wing of the Achaeans, and fixed his catapults in front of the whole force at intervals. Philopoemen understood that the enemy’s plan was, by pouring volleys from the catapults into his phalanx, to throw the ranks into confusion: he therefore gave him no time or interval of repose, but opened the engagement by a vigorous charge of his Tarentines¹⁸ close to the temple of Poseidon, where the ground was flat and suitable for cavalry. ¹⁹ Whereupon Machanidas was constrained to follow suit by sending his Tarentines forward also.

Efficiency of Mercenaries

At first the struggle was confined to these two forces, ²⁰ and was maintained with spirit. But the light-armed troops coming gradually to the support of such of them as were wavering, in a very short time the whole of the mercenaries on either side were engaged. They fought sometimes in close order, sometimes in pairs: and for a long time so entirely without decisive result, that the rest of the two armies, who were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined, could come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained for a long while exactly their original ground. But after a time the mercenaries of the tyrant began to get the better of the struggle, from their numbers, and the superiority in skill obtained by long practice. And this is the natural and usual result. The citizens of a democracy no doubt bring more enthusiasm to their battles than the subjects of a tyrant; but in the same proportion the mercenaries of sovereigns are naturally superior and more efficient than those of a democracy. For in the former case one side is fighting for liberty, the other for a condition of servitude; but in the case of mercenaries, those of the tyrant are encouraged by the certain prospect of reward, those of a democracy know that they must lose by victory: for as soon as a democracy has crushed its assailants, it no longer employs mercenaries to protect its liberties; while a tyranny requires more mercenaries in proportion as its field of ambition is extended: for as the persons injured by it are more numerous, those who plot against it are more numerous also; and the security of despots rests entirely on the loyalty and power of mercenaries.

Machanidas Changes his Plan

Thus it came about that the mercenaries in the army of Machanidas fought with such fury and violence, that even the Illyrians and men with body armour, who formed the reserve supporting the mercenaries of the Achaean army, were unable to withstand their assault; but were all driven from their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of Mantinea , which was about seven stades distant.

And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what some doubt, namely, that the issues in war are for the most part decided by the skill or want of skill of the commanders. For though perhaps it is a great thing to be able to follow up a first success properly, it is a greater thing still that, when the first step has proved a failure, a man should retain his presence of mind, keep a good look-out for any error of judgment on the part of the victors, and avail himself of their mistakes. At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines itself to have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day; while those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves by presence of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory. Both happened on this occasion to the respective leaders.

The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven²¹ from their ground, and their leftwing having been thoroughly broken up, Machanidas abandoned his original plan of winning the day by outflanking the enemy with some of his forces and charging their front with others, and did neither; but, quite losing his head, rushed forward heedlessly with all his mercenaries in pursuit of the fugitives, as though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive those who had once given way up to the town gates.

Defeat of the Lacedaemonians

Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could to rally the mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and urging them to stand; but when he saw that they were hopelessly beaten, he did not run away in a panic nor give up the battle in despair, but, withdrawing under cover of his phalanx, waited until the enemy had passed him in their pursuit, and left the ground on which the fighting had taken place empty, and then immediately gave the word to the front companies of the phalanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground abandoned by his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers from returning, and got on higher ground than the enemy’s right wing. He exhorted the men to keep up their courage, and remain where they were, until he gave the word for a general advance; and he ordered Polybius of Megalopolis ²² to collect such of the Illyrians and body armour men and mercenaries as remained behind and had not taken part in the flight, and form a reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to keep a look-out against the return of the pursuers. ²³ Thereupon the Lacedaemonians, excited by the victory gained by the light-armed contingent, without waiting for the word of command, brought their sarissae to the charge and rushed upon the enemy. But when in the course of their advance they reached the edge of the dyke, being unable at that point to change their purpose and retreat when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly because they did not consider the dyke a serious obstacle, as the slope down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water or underwood growing in it, they continued their advance through it without stopping to think.

Philopoemen Seizes an Opportunity

The opportunity for attack which Philopoemen had long foreseen had now arrived. He at once ordered the phalanx to bring their sarissae to the charge and advance. The men obeyed with enthusiasm, and accompanied their charge with a ringing cheer. The ranks of the Lacedaemonians had been disorganised by the passage of the dyke, and as they ascended the opposite bank they found the enemy above them They lost courage and tried to fly; but the greater number of them were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans, and partly by trampling on each other. Now this result was not unpremeditated or accidental, but strictly owing to the acuteness of the general. For Philopoemen originally took ground behind the dyke, not to avoid fighting, as some supposed, but from a very accurate and scientific calculation of strategical advantages. He reckoned either that Machanidas when he arrived would advance without thinking of the dyke, and that then his phalanx would get entangled, just as I have described their actually doing; or that if he advanced with a full apprehension of the difficulty presented by the dyke, and then changing his mind and deciding to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose order and a long straggling column,²⁴ the victory would be his, without a general engagement, and the defeat his adversary’s. For this has happened to many commanders, who having drawn up their men for battle, and then concluded that they were not strong enough to meet their opponents, either from the nature of the ground, the disparity of their numbers, or for other reasons, have drawn off in too long a line of march, and hoped in the course of the retreat to win a victory, or at least get safe away from the enemy, by means of their rear guard alone.

Army of Machanidas Put to Flight

However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prognostication of what would happen; for the Lacedaemonians ²⁵ were thoroughly routed. Seeing therefore that his phalanx was victorious and that he had gained a complete and brilliant success, he set himself vigorously to secure the only thing wanting to complete it, that is, to prevent the escape of Machanidas. Seeing therefore that, in the course of the pursuit, he was caught between the dyke and the town with his mercenaries, he waited for him to attempt a return. But when Machanidas saw that his army was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he knew that he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory: he therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and tried to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy, while they were still scattered and engaged in the pursuit. Some of his men, understanding his plan and seeing no other hope of safety, kept by him at first; but when they came upon the ground, and saw the Achaeans guarding the bridge over the dyke, they lost heart; and the whole company began falling away from him, each doing the best he could to preserve his own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of making his way over the bridge; and rode along the edge of the dyke, trying with all his might to find a place which he could cross.

Fall of Machanidas

Philopoemen recognised Machanidas by his purple ²⁶ cloak and the trappings of his horse. He at once left Anaxidamus, with orders to guard the bridge with vigilance, and give no quarter to any of the mercenaries; because they were the men on whom the despots of Sparta always depended for supporting their power. Then taking Polyaenus of Cyprus and Simias, who were attending on him at the time, he rode along the edge of the ditch opposite to that in which the tyrant and his attendants were; for Machanidas had still two men with him, Arexidamus and one of the mercenaries. As soon as Machanidas had found a spot in the dyke which could be crossed, he put spurs to his horse, and tried to force it to go on and get over. Then Philopoemen turned suddenly round upon him and dealt him a mortal wound with his spear, and a second with a stab from the spike at the butt end of it, and thus killed the tyrant in a hand-to-hand encounter. Those who were riding with him did the same to Arexidamus; but the third man seeing their fall gave up the idea of crossing the dyke and escaped. Simias immediately stripped the bodies of the two who had fallen, and with their armour carried off also the tyrant’s head, and then hurried off to overtake the pursuing party; being eager to give the soldiers ocular evidence of the fall of the enemy’s commander, that they might continue the pursuit of their opponents with all the more confidence and spirit right up to Tegea . And this in fact added so greatly to the spirit of the men that it contributed more than anything else to their carrying Tegea by assault, and pitching their camp next day on the Eurotas, undisputed masters of all the open country. ²⁷ For many years past they had been vainly trying to drive the enemy from their own borders, but now they were themselves devastating Laconia without resistance, without having lost any great number of their own men in the battle; while they had killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken even more prisoners, and possessed themselves of all their baggage and arms.

The Hannibalian War Continued

What profit is it to our readers to describe wars and battles, the storming of cities and the enslavement of their inhabitants, if they are to know nothing of the causes which conduce to success and failure? The results of such operations merely touch the fancy: it is the tracing of the designs of the actors in such scenes that is really instructive; and above all it is the following in detail of each step that can educate the ideas of the student.

²⁸

Who could refrain from speaking in terms of admiration of²⁹ this great man’s strategic skill, courage, and ability, when one looks to the length of time during which he displayed those qualities; and realises to one’s self the pitched battles, the skirmishes and sieges, the revolutions and counter-revolutions of states, the vicissitudes of fortune, and in fact the course of his design and its execution in its entirety? For sixteen continuous years Hannibal maintained the war with Rome in Italy , without once releasing his army from service in the field, but keeping those vast numbers under control, like a good pilot, without any sign of disaffection towards himself or towards each other, though he had troops in his service who, so far from being of the same tribe, were not even of the same race. He had Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, Greeks, who had naturally nothing in common with each other, neither laws, nor customs, nor language. Yet the skill of the commander was such, that these differences, so manifold and so wide, did not disturb the obedience to one word of command and to a single will. And yet circumstances were not by any means unvarying: for though the breeze of fortune often set strongly in his favour, it as often also blew in exactly the opposite direction. There is therefore good ground for admiring Hannibal’s display of ability in campaign; and there can be no fear in saying that, if he had reserved his attack upon the Romans until he had first subdued other parts of the world, there is not one of his projects which would have eluded his grasp. As it was, he began with those whom he should have attacked last, and accordingly began and ended his career with them. . . .

Scipio in Spain , After the Battle of the Metaurus

Hasdrubal having collected his forces from the various ³⁰ towns in which they had wintered, advanced to within a short distance of Ilipa and there encamped; forming his entrenchment at the foot of the mountains, with a plain in front of him well suited for a contest and battle. His infantry amounted to seventy thousand, his cavalry to four thousand, and his elephants to thirty-two. On his part, Scipio sent M. Junius Silanus to visit Colichas and take over from him the forces that had been prepared by him. ³¹ These amounted to three thousand infantry and five hundred horse. The other allies he received personally in the course of his march up the country to his destination. When he approached Castalo and Baecula, and had there been joined by Marcus Junius and the troops from Colichas, he found himself in a position of great perplexity. For without their allies the Roman forces were not strong enough to risk a battle; yet to do so, in dependence upon the allies for his hopes of ultimate success, appeared to him to be dangerous and too venturesome. In spite however of his perplexity, he was obliged to yield to the force of circumstances so far as to employ the Iberians; but he resolved to do so only to make a show of numbers to the enemy, while he really fought the action with his own legions. ³² With this purpose in his mind he got his whole army on the march, forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and when he had come within the view of the Carthaginians, he pitched his camp on some low hills exactly opposite the enemy.

Futile Attack by Mago

Mago thought that it would be an excellent moment to attack the Romans while actually engaged in making their camp; he therefore rode up to the entrenchment with the greater part of his own cavalry and Massanissa with the Numidians, persuaded that he should catch Scipio off his guard. Scipio had however all along foreseen this, and had placed some cavalry equal in number to those of the Carthaginians under cover of some hills. Upon these making an unexpected charge, many of the enemy’s horsemen at once took to flight at the startling appearance, and began to make off; while the rest closed with their opponents and fought with great gallantry. But the Carthaginians were disconcerted by the agility of some of the Roman horsemen in dismounting, and after a short resistance they retreated with considerable loss. The retreat was at first conducted in good order: but as the Romans pressed them hard, they broke up their squadrons, and fled for safety to their own camp. This affair gave the Romans better spirits for engaging in a pitched battle, and had the contrary effect on the Carthaginians. However, during the next few days they both drew out on the intervening plain; skirmished with their cavalry and light-armed troops; and, after thus trying each other’s mettle, were resolved to bring the matter to the test of a general engagement.

Defeat of Hasdrubal Son of Gesco

On this occasion Scipio appears to have employed a ³³ two-fold stratagem. Hasdrubal had been accustomed to make his demonstrations in force somewhat late in the day, with the Libyans in his centre, and the elephants on either wing; while his own practice had been to make his counter-movements somewhat later still, with the Roman soldiers on his centre opposite the Libyans, and the Iberians on his two wings; but the day on which he resolved upon a general engagement, by reversing this arrangement, he greatly contributed to secure the victory for his own men, and succeeded in putting the enemy at a considerable disadvantage. For directly it was light he sent his aides with orders to the tribunes and men to arm, as soon as they had got their breakfasts, and parade outside the camp. The order was obeyed with alacrity because the men suspected what was going to take place. He then sent the cavalry and light-armed forward, with orders to advance close to the enemy’s camp, and skirmish boldly up to it; while he himself marched out with the infantry, just as the sun was appearing above the horizon; and on reaching the middle of the plain, made his dispositions in the reverse order to his usual arrangement, placing the Iberians in the centre and the Roman legionaries on the two wings.

The sudden approach of the cavalry to their camp, and the simultaneous appearance of the rest of the army getting into order, left the Carthaginians barely time to get under arms. Hasdrubal was therefore obliged, without waiting for the men to get breakfast, or making any preparations, to despatch his cavalry and light-armed troops at once against the enemy’s cavalry on the plain, and to get his infantry into order on some level ground not far from the skirts of the mountains, as was their custom. For a time the Romans remained quiet; but when the morning was getting on, and the engagement between the light-armed troops still continued undecided, because such of them as were forced from their ground retired on their own heavy infantry and then formed again for attack, Scipio at length thought that the time was come. He withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the maniples, and then distributed them equally between the two wings on rear of his line, first the velites and behind them the cavalry. He then advanced, at first in line direct; but when he was about a stade³⁴ from the enemy, he ordered the Iberians to continue the advance in the same order, while he commanded the maniples and squadrons on the right wing to turn outwards to the right, and those on the left wing to the left.

Scipio Outflanks the Enemy

Scipio with the three leading squadrons of cavalry from the right wing, preceded by the usual number of velites and three maniples (a combination of troops which the Romans call a cohort), and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius with a similar force from the left wing, turned the one to the left the other to the right, and advanced at a great speed in column upon the enemy, the troops in succession forming up and following in column as they wheeled. When these troops were within a short distance of the enemy,—the Iberians in the line direct being still a considerable distance behind, because they were advancing at a deliberate pace,—they came into contact with the two wings of the enemy simultaneously, the Roman forces being in column, according to Scipio’s original plan. The movements subsequent to this, which resulted in the troops on the rear finding themselves in the same line as the troops in front, and engaged like them with the enemy, were exactly the converse of each other—taking the right and left wings in general, and the cavalry and infantry in particular. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing came into line on the right and tried to outflank the enemy, while the heavy infantry came into line on the left; but on the left wing the heavy infantry came into line by the right, the cavalry and velites by the left. The result of this movement was that, as far as the cavalry and light infantry were concerned, their right became their left. Scipio cared little for this, but was intent on something more important, namely, the outflanking of the enemy. For while a general ought to be quite alive to what is taking place, and rightly so, he ought to use whatever movements suit the circumstances.

Carthaginians Driven From Spain

When these troops were at close quarters the elephants ³⁵ were severely handled, being wounded and harassed on every side by the velites and cavalry, and did as much harm to their friends as to their foes; for they rushed about promiscuously and killed every one that fell in their way on either side alike. As to the infantry,— the Carthaginian wings began to be broken, but the centre occupied by the Libyans, and which was the best part of the army, was never engaged at all. It could not quit its ground to go to the support of the wings for fear of the attack of the Iberians, nor could it by maintaining its position do any actual fighting, because the enemy in front of it did not come to close quarters. However, for a certain time the two wings fought gallantly, because it was for them, as for the enemy, a struggle for life and death. But now the midday heat was become intense, and the Carthaginians began to feel faint, because the unusual time at which they had been forced to come on the field had prevented them from fortifying themselves with the proper food; while the Romans had the advantage in physical vigour as well as in cheerfulness, which was especially promoted by the fact that the prudence of their general had secured his best men being pitted against the weakest troops of the enemy. Thus hard pressed Hasdrubal’s centre began to retreat; at first step by step; but soon the ranks were broken, and the men rushed in confusion to the skirts of the mountain; and on the Romans pressing in pursuit with still greater violence, they began a headlong flight into their entrenchments. Had not Providence interfered to save them, they would promptly have been driven from their camp too; but a sudden storm gathered in the air, and a violent and prolonged torrent of rain descended, under which the Romans with difficulty effected a return to their own camp. . . .

Many Romans lost their lives by the fire in³⁶ trying to get the silver and gold which had been melted and fused. . . .

Scipio on the Expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain in Consequence of the Above Victory

When every one complimented Scipio after he had³⁷ driven the Carthaginians from Iberia , and advised him straightway to take some rest and ease, as having put a period to the war, he answered that he congratulated them on their sanguine hopes; for himself he was now more than ever revolving in his mind how to begin the war with Carthage . Up to that time the Carthaginians had waged war upon the Romans; but that now fortune put it in the power of the Romans to make war upon them. . . .

Scipio’s Visit to Syphax, King of Masaesylians

³⁸

In his conversation with Syphax, Scipio, who was eminently³⁹ endowed by nature in this respect, conducted himself with so much kindness and tact, that Hasdrubal afterwards remarked to Syphax that Scipio appeared more formidable to him in such an interview than in the field. . . .

Scipio Suppresses A Mutiny in Spain

When a mutiny broke out among part of the troops ⁴⁰ in the Roman camp, Scipio, though he had now had a very adequate experience of the difficulties of administration, never felt himself more at a loss how to act or in greater embarrassment. And naturally so. For as in the case of the body, causes of mischief, such as cold, heat, fatigue, or wounds, may be avoided by precautions, or easily relieved when they occur; while those which arise from within the body itself, such as tumours or diseases, are difficult to foresee and difficult to relieve when they do exist, so it is, we must believe, with political and military administration. Against plots from without, and the attacks of enemies, the precautions to be taken and the measures for relief may readily be learned by those who pay the requisite attention; but to decide on the right method of resisting intestine factions, revolutions, and disturbances is difficult, and requires great tact and extreme acuteness; and, moreover, the observation of one maxim suitable in my opinion to all armies, states, and bodies alike, which is this: never in such cases to allow any lengthened idleness or repose, and least of all at a time of success and when provisions are abundant.

Being, then, as I have all along said, a man eminently careful, acute, and prompt, Scipio summoned a meeting of the military tribunes and proposed a solution of the existing troubles as follows. He said that he must promise the soldiers the settlement of their pay; and, in order to create a belief in his promise, he must now take public steps to exact with all speed the contributions which had been already imposed upon the cities for the support of the whole army, with the distinct understanding that the object of that measure was the settlement of the pay: and these same tribunes should return to the army and urge and entreat the men to abandon their rebellious spirit, and come to him to receive their pay, either singly or, if they preferred it, in a body. And when this was done he would consider, as circumstances arose, what measures it was necessary to take.

Scipio’s Plan to Punish the Rebels

With this suggestion in their minds these officers deliberated on the means of raising money; and having communicated their decisions to Scipio, he said that he would now consult them on the next necessary step. They accordingly resolved that they would name a day on which all were to appear; and that then they would pardon the general body of the men, but severely punish the instigators of the mutiny, who were as many as thirty-five. The day having arrived, and the mutineers having appeared to make terms and receive their pay, Scipio gave secret instructions to the tribunes, who had been sent on the mission to them, to meet them; and, each of them selecting five of the ringleaders, to greet them with politeness and invite them, if possible, to their own tent, or, if they could not do that, to dinner or some such entertainment. But to the troops with him he sent round orders to have provisions for a considerable period ready in three days’ time, because they were to march against the deserter Andobales under Marcus Silanus. When they heard this the mutineers were much emboldened, because they imagined that they would have everything in their own hands, as the other troops would be gone by the time they joined the general.

Suppression of the Mutiny

Upon the approach of the mutineers, Scipio gave orders ⁴¹ to his army to march out the next morning at daybreak with their baggage. But he instructed the tribunes and praefects that, as soon as they met the mutineers, they should order their men to put down their baggage, and keep them under arms at the city gate; and then, placing a detachment at each of the gates, take good care that none of the mutineers should leave the city. The officers who had been sent to meet the men fell in with them on their arrival, and took the ringleaders with every appearance of civility to their own tents, in accordance with the arrangement that had been made. At the same time orders had been given to them to arrest the thirty-five immediately after dinner, and to keep them in fetters: without allowing any one in the tent to go out, except the messenger who was to inform the general from each of them that this had been accomplished.

The tribunes having done as they were ordered, at daybreak next morning, seeing that the new arrivals were collected⁴² in the market-place, the general gave the signal for the assembly of the army. The signal was as usual promptly obeyed by all, for they were curious to see how the general would demean himself in their presence, and what he would say to them about the business in hand. As soon as they were come together, Scipio sent word to the tribunes to bring their soldiers under arms, and station them round the assembled men. He then came forward himself. His first appearance caused an immediate change of feeling. The soldiers supposed that he was still unwell, and when they suddenly saw him, contrary to all expectations, with all the appearance of full health and strength, they were struck with terror.

Scipio Harangues the Mutinous Troops

He began his speech by saying that he wondered what their grievances were, or what they looked for forward that induced them to mutiny. For that there were three motives only on which men usually venture to rebel against their country and their commanders,—discontent and anger with their officers; dissatisfaction with their present position; or, lastly, hopes of something better and more glorious. Now, I ask you, he continued, which of these can you allege? It is with me, I presume, that you are dissatisfied, because I did not pay you your wages. But this cannot be laid to my charge; for while I was in office your pay was never short. The fault then may lie with Rome that the accumulated arrears have not been settled. Which was your proper course then in that case? To have brought forward your complaint thus, as rebels and enemies to the country that nurtured you, or to have come personally to me and stated your case, and to have begged your friends to support and help you? The latter would have been the better plan in my opinion. In those who serve others for pay it is sometimes pardonable to revolt against their paymasters; but in the case of those who are fighting for themselves, for their own wives and children, it can in no circumstances be conceded. It is just as though, on the plea of being wronged in money matters by his own father, a man were to come in arms to slay him from whom he received his own life. Or perhaps you may allege that I imposed greater hardships and dangers on you than on the others, and gave the rest more than their share of profits and booty. But you can neither venture to say this, nor, if you did venture, could you prove it. What then is your grievance against me at this moment, I should like to ask, that you have mutinied? I believe that not one of you will be able to express or even conceive it.

Scipio’s Speech Continued

Nor again can it have been any dissatisfaction with the position of affairs. For when was any prosperity greater? When has Rome won more victories, when have her arms had brighter prospects than now? But perhaps some faint-heart will say that our enemies have more numerous advantages, fairer and more certain prospects than ourselves. Which, pray, of these enemies? Is it Andobales and Mandonius? But which of you is ignorant of the fact that these men first betrayed the Carthaginians and joined us, and now once more, in defiance of their oaths and pledges, have come forward as our opponents? It is a fine thing surely to become the enemies of your country in reliance on such men as these! Nor again had you any prospect of becoming masters of Iberia by your own prowess: for you would not have been strong enough, even in conjunction with Andobales, to meet us in the field, to say nothing of doing so without such aid. I should like then to ask,—what was it in which you trusted? Surely not in the skill and valour of the leaders whom you have now elected, or in the fasces and axes which were borne in front of them,—men of whom I will not deign to say even another word. All this, my men, is absolutely futile; nor will you be able to allege even the smallest just complaint against me or your country. Wherefore I will undertake your defence to Rome and myself, by putting forward a plea which all the world will acknowledge to hold good. And it is that, a crowd is ever easily misled and easily induced to any error. Therefore it is that crowds are like the sea, which in its own nature is safe and quiet; but, when winds fall violently upon it, assumes the character of the blasts which lash it into fury: thus a multitude also is ever found to be what its leaders and counsellors are. Acting on this consideration, I and all my fellow-officers hereby offer you pardon and amnesty for the past: but to the guilty authors of the mutiny we are resolved to show no mercy, but to punish them as their misconduct to their country and to ourselves deserves.

Execution of the Ringleaders

Just as he said these words, the soldiers, who were posted under arms round the assembly, clashed their swords against their shields; and at the same instant the ringleaders of the mutiny were brought in, stripped and in chains. But such terror was inspired in the men by the threatening aspect of the surrounding troops, and by the dreadful spectacle before them, that, while the ringleaders were being scourged and beheaded, they neither changed countenance nor uttered a sound, but remained all staring open-mouthed and terrified at what was going on. So the ringleaders of the mischief were scourged and dragged off through the crowd dead; but the rest of the men accepted with one consent the offer of an amnesty from the general and officers; and then voluntarily came forward, one by one, to take an oath to the tribunes that they would obey the orders of their commanders and remain loyal to Rome .

Having thus crushed what might have been the beginning of serious danger, Scipio restored his troops to their former good disposition. . . .

⁴³

Scipio Proposes to Fight Andobales

Scipio at once summoned a meeting of the soldiers in ⁴⁴ New Carthage, and addressed them on the subject of the audacious proceedings of Andobales, and his treachery to them; and by dwelling at great length on these topics he inspired the men with a very great eagerness to attack these princes. He then proceeded to enumerate the battles they had already fought against the Iberians and Carthaginians combined, the Carthaginians acting as leaders in the campaigns. Seeing, he added, that you always beat them, it does not now become you to fear defeat in a war against Iberians by themselves, and led by Andobales. I will not therefore even accept any Iberian of them all as a partner in the struggle, but I will undertake the campaign by the unassisted services of my Roman soldiers: in order to make it plain to all that it was not, as some assert, by the aid of Iberians that we defeated the Carthaginians and drove them from Iberia ; but that it was by Roman valour and your own gallantry that we have conquered Carthaginian and Celtiberian combined. Let nothing therefore disturb your confidence in each other: but, if you have ever done it before, approach this undertaking with courage undismayed. For securing the victory I will with God’s help make every necessary provision. This speech filled the troops with such zeal and confidence, that they presented all the appearance of men whose enemies are in full view, and who are on the very point of closing with them.

Scipio Defeats Andobales

Scipio then dismissed the assembly, but on the next ⁴⁵ day got his troops on the march, and having reached the Ebro in ten days and crossed it, on the fourth day after that pitched his camp near that of the enemy, with a valley between his own and the enemy’s lines. Next day he turned some cattle that had accompanied his army into this valley, after giving Caius Laelius instructions to have the cavalry ready, and some of the tribunes to prepare the velites. The Iberians having at once made an onslaught upon the cattle, he despatched some of the velites against them. ⁴⁶ These two forces became engaged, and reinforcements being sent to either party from time to time, a severe infantry skirmishing took place in the valley. The proper moment for attack being now come, Caius Laelius, having the cavalry prepared as directed, charged the skirmishers of the enemy, getting between them and the high ground, so that the greater number of them were scattered about the valley and killed by the cavalry. This event roused the barbarians to a furious desire to engage, that they might not appear to be entirely reduced to despair by their previous defeat; and accordingly by daybreak next day they drew out their whole army for battle. Scipio was quite ready to give them battle; but when he saw that the Iberians had come down into the valley in an imprudent manner, and were stationing, not only their cavalry, but their infantry also on the level ground, he waited for a time, because he wished as many of the enemy as possible to take up a position like that. He felt confidence in his cavalry, and still more in his infantry; because, in such deliberate and hand-tohand battles as this, his men were vastly superior to the Iberians both in themselves and in their arms.

Scipio’s Return To Rome

When he thought the right time had come he drew ⁴⁷ out [the velites]⁴⁸ to oppose those of the enemy who occupied the foot of the hills; while against those who had descended into the valley he led his main force from the camp in four cohorts, and attacked the infantry. Caius Laelius at the same time made a detour with the cavalry by the hills, which stretched from the camp to the valley, and charged the enemy’s horse on the rear; and so kept them occupied with fighting him. The enemy’s infantry therefore, being thus deprived of the support of the cavalry, on which they had relied in descending into the valley, were distressed and overmatched in the battle; while their cavalry was in much the same plight: for, being surprised on ground of insufficient extent, they fell into confusion, and lost more men by hurting each other than by the hands of the enemy; for their own infantry was pressing upon their flank, and the enemy’s infantry on their front, while his cavalry were attacking on their rear. The battle having taken this course, the result was that nearly all those who had descended into the valley lost their lives; while those who had been stationed on the foot of the hills managed to escape. These last were the light-armed troops, and formed about a third of the whole army: with whom Andobales himself contrived to make good his escape to a certain stronghold of great security. . . .

⁴⁹

Having thus put a finishing stroke to his campaigns in⁵⁰ Iberia , Scipio arrived at Tarraco in high spirits, bringing with him the materials of a brilliant triumph for himself, and a glorious victory for his country. But being anxious to arrive in Rome before the consular elections, he arranged for the government of Iberia ,⁵¹ and, having put the army into the hands of Junius Silanus and L. Marcius, embarked with Caius Laelius and his other friends for Rome . . . .

Antiochus Moves from Bactria Through Interior Asia

⁵²

Euthydemus was himself a Magnesian, and he answered the envoy by saying that Antiochus ⁵³ was acting unjustly in trying to expel him from his kingdom. He was not himself a revolted subject, but had destroyed the descendant of some who had been such, and so had obtained the kingdom of Bactria. After adding more arguments to the same effect, he urged Teleas to act as a sincere mediator of peace, by urging Antiochus not to grudge him the royal title and dignity, for if he did not yield to this demand, neither of them would be safe: seeing that great hords of Nomads were close at hand, who were a danger to both; and that if they admitted them into the country, it would certainly be utterly barbarised. With these words he sent Teleas back to Antiochus. The king had long been looking about for some means of ending the controversy; and when he was informed by Teleas of what Euthydemus had said, he readily admitted these pleas for a pacification. And after several journeys of Teleas to and fro between the two, Euthydemus at last sent his son Demetrius to confirm the terms of the treaty. Antiochus received the young prince; and judging from his appearance, conversation, and the dignity of his manners that he was worthy of royal power, he first promised to give him one of his own daughters, and secondly conceded the royal title to his father. And having on the other points caused a written treaty to be drawn up, and the terms of the treaty to be confirmed on oath, he marched away; after liberally provisioning his troops, and accepting the elephants belonging to Euthydemus. ⁵⁴ He crossed the Caucasus ⁵⁵ and descended into India; renewed his friendship with Sophagasenus the king of the Indians; received more elephants, until he had a hundred and fifty altogether; and having once more provisioned his troops, set out again personally with his army: leaving Androsthenes of Cyzicus the duty of taking home the treasure which this king had agreed to hand over to him. Having traversed Arachosia and crossed the river Enymanthus, he came through Drangene to Carmania; and, as it was now winter, he put his men into winter quarters there. ⁵⁶ This was the extreme limit of the march of Antiochus into the interior: in which he not only reduced the up-country Satraps to obedience to his authority, but also the coast cities, and the princes on this side Taurus; and, in a word, consolidated his kingdom by overawing all his subjects with the exhibition of his boldness and energy. For this campaign convinced the Europeans as well as the Asiatics that he was worthy of royal power. . . .

Histories. Polybius. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (Translator). London. 1889.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by Robert B. Strassler.

Current edition Perseus

The Histories (English) (Polybius. Vols. 1-2. Shuckburgh, Evelyn S., translator. London, New York, NY: Macmillan and Co., 1889.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Polybius. Vols. 1-4. Büttner-Wobst, Theodor, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1893.) — 11.1a focus

ι. εχ προοεμιο

[1] ἴσως δέ τινες ἐπιζητοῦσι πῶς ἡμεῖς οὐ προγραφὰς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ βίβλῳ, καθάπερ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προεκθέσεις καθʼ ἑκάστην ὀλυμπιάδα πεποιήκαμεν τῶν πράξεων.

[2] ἐγὼ δὲ κρίνω χρήσιμον μὲν εἶναι καὶ τὸ τῶν προγραφῶν γένος· καὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐπίστασιν ἄγει τοὺς ἀναγινώσκειν θέλοντας καὶ συνεκκαλεῖται καὶ παρορμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον ἑτοίμως ἔνεστιν εὑρεῖν διὰ τούτου·

[3] θεωρῶν δὲ διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας καὶ τὰς τυχούσας ὀλιγωρούμενον καὶ φθειρόμενον τὸ τῶν προγραφῶν γένος, οὕτως καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος κατηνέχθην·

[4] τῆς γὰρ προεκθέσεως οὐ μόνον ἰσοδυναμούσης πρὸς τὴν προγραφήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεῖόν τι δυναμένης, ἅμα δὲ καὶ χώραν ἐχούσης ἀσφαλεστέραν διὰ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι τῇ πραγματείᾳ,

[5] τούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐδοκιμάσαμεν χρῆσθαι τῷ μέρει παρʼ ὅλην τὴν σύνταξιν πλὴν ἓξ τῶν πρώτων βυβλίων· ἐν ἐκείνοις δὲ προγραφὰς ἐποιησάμεθα διὰ τὸ μὴ λίαν ἐναρμόζειν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῶν προεκθέσεων γένος.

ιι. ρες ιταλιαε

[1] ἀλλὰ πολὺ ῥᾳδιεστέραν καὶ συντομωτέραν συνέβη γενέσθαι τὴν Ἀσδρούβου παρουσίαν εἰς Ἰταλίαν. —

διόπερ ὡς οὐδέποτε μᾶλλον ὀρθὴ καὶ περίφοβος ἡ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πόλις ἐγεγόνει, καραδοκοῦσα τὸ συμβησόμενον. —

Ἀσδρούβᾳ δὲ τούτων μὲν ἤρεσκεν οὐδέν,

[2] τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων οὐκέτι διδόντων ἀναστροφὴν διὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους ἐκτεταγμένους καὶ προσάγοντας, ἠναγκάζετο παρατάττειν τοὺς Ἴβηρας καὶ τοὺς μετʼ αὐτοῦ γεγονότας Γαλάτας.

[3] προθέμενος δὲ τὰ θηρία τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα δέκα, καὶ τὸ βάθος αὐξήσας τῶν τάξεων, καὶ ποιήσας ἐν βραχεῖ χώρῳ τὴν ὅλην δύναμιν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις μέσον αὑτὸν θεὶς τῆς παρατάξεως κατὰ τὴν τῶν θηρίων προστασίαν, ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τὰ λαιὰ τῶν πολεμίων, προδιειληφὼς ὅτι δεῖ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα κίνδυνον νικᾶν ἢ θνήσκειν.

[4] ὁ μὲν οὖν Λίβιος ἀντεπῄει τοῖς πολεμίοις σοβαρῶς καὶ συμβαλὼν ταῖς αὑτοῦ δυνάμεσιν ἐμάχετο γενναίως·

[5] ὁ δὲ Κλαύδιος ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος τεταγμένος προάγειν μὲν εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν καὶ περικερᾶν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους οὐκ ἐδύνατο διὰ τὰς προκειμένας δυσχωρίας, αἷς πεπιστευκὼς Ἀσδρούβας ἐποιήσατο τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ λαιὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἔφοδον.

[6] ἀπόρως δὲ διακείμενος ἐπὶ τῷ μηδὲν πράττειν, ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος ἔμαθεν ὃ δέον ἦν πράττειν.

[7] διὸ καὶ παραδεξάμενος ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν τοὺς αὑτοῦ στρατιώτας κατὰ τὸν ὄπισθεν τόπον τῆς μάχης, καὶ τὸ λαιὸν ὑπεράρας τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς, προσέβαλε κατὰ κέρας τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἐπὶ τὰ θηρία.

[8] καὶ μέχρι μὲν [οὖν] τούτων ἀμφίδοξος ἦν ἡ νίκη. οἵ τε γὰρ ἄνδρες ἐφαμίλλως ἐκινδύνευον ἀμφότεροι διὰ τὸ μήτε τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐλπίδα καταλείπεσθαι σωτηρίας, εἰ σφαλεῖεν, μήτε τοῖς Ἴβηρσι καὶ Καρχηδονίοις· τά τε θηρία κοινὴν ἀμφοῖν παρείχοντο τὴν χρείαν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ·

[9] μέσα γὰρ ἀπειλημμένα καὶ συνακοντιζόμενα διετάραττε καὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ τὰς τῶν Ἰβήρων τάξεις.

[10] ἅμα δὲ τῷ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Κλαύδιον προσπεσεῖν κατʼ οὐρὰν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἄνισος ἦν ἡ μάχη, τῶν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νώτου τοῖς Ἴβηρσι προσκειμένων.

[11] ἐξ οὗ καὶ συνέβη τοὺς πλείστους τῶν Ἰβήρων ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς μάχης καιρῷ κατακοπῆναι.

[12] τῶν δὲ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἓξ ἅμα τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἔπεσε, τὰ δὲ τέτταρα διωσάμενα τὰς τάξεις ὕστερον ἑάλω μεμονωμένα καὶ ψιλὰ τῶν Ἰνδῶν.

[1] Ἀσδρούβας δὲ καὶ τὸν πρὸ τούτου χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἔσχατον καιρὸν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος, ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον· ὃν οὐκ ἄξιον ἀνεπισήμαντον παραλιπεῖν.

[2] ὅτι μὲν ἀδελφὸς ἦν Ἀννίβου κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ διότι χωριζόμενος εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν τούτῳ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράξεις ἐνεχείρισε, ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἡμῖν δεδήλωται

[3] . παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ διότι πολλοῖς μὲν χρησάμενος ἀγῶσι πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, πολλαῖς δὲ καὶ ποικίλαις περιστάσεσι παλαίσας διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐπαποστελλομένους ἐκ Καρχηδόνος εἰς Ἰβηρίαν στρατηγούς, ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς εἰρημένοις καιροῖς ἀξίως μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς Βάρκα, καλῶς δὲ καὶ γενναίως τὰς περιπετείας καὶ τὰς ἐλαττώσεις διετέλει φέρων, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ συντάξεων δεδηλώκαμεν. περὶ δὲ τῶν τελευταίων ἀγώνων νῦν ἐροῦμεν,

[4] καθὸ μάλιστα πέφηνεν ἡμῖν ἄξιος ἐπιστάσεως εἶναι καὶ ζήλου.

[5] τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τῶν βασιλέων, ἐπειδὰν συνιστῶνται τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων ἀγῶνας, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων ἔνδοξα καὶ λυσιτελῆ συνεχῶς λαμβάνοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, καὶ πολλάκις ἐφιστάνοντας καὶ διαλογιζομένους πῶς ἑκάστοις χρήσονται, κατὰ λόγον σφίσι χωρησάντων τῶν πραγμάτων,

[6] τὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἀποπτωμάτων οὐκέτι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθεμένους, οὐδʼ ἐν νῷ λαμβάνοντας πῇ καὶ τί πρακτέον ἑκάστοις ἐστὶ κατὰ τὰς περιπετείας. καίτοι τὸ μὲν ἕτοιμόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ πολλῆς δεῖται προνοίας.

[7] τοιγαροῦν οἱ πλεῖστοι διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀγεννίαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἀβουλίαν αἰσχρὰς μὲν ἐποίησαν τὰς ἥττας, εὐγενῶς πολλάκις ἠγωνισμένων τῶν στρατιωτῶν, κατῄσχυναν δὲ τὰς πρὸ τούτου πράξεις, ἐπονείδιστον δὲ σφίσι τὸν καταλειπόμενον ἐποίησαν βίον.

[8] διότι δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος σφάλλονται, καὶ διότι μεγίστην ἐν τούτοις ἔχει διαφορὰν ἀνὴρ ἀνδρός, εὐχερὲς τῷ βουλομένῳ καταμαθεῖν· πολλὰ γὰρ ὑποδείγματα τῶν τοιούτων πεποίηκεν ὁ προγεγονὼς χρόνος.

[9] Ἀσδρούβας δʼ, ἕως μὲν ἦν ἐλπὶς ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον τοῦ δύνασθαι πράττειν ἄξιόν τι τῶν προβεβιωμένων, οὐδενὸς μᾶλλον προενοεῖτο κατὰ τοὺς κινδύνους ὡς τῆς αὑτοῦ σωτηρίας·

[10] ἐπεὶ δὲ πάσας ἀφελομένη τὰς εἰς τὸ μέλλον ἐλπίδας ἡ τύχη συνέκλεισε πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον καιρόν, οὐδὲν παραλιπὼν οὔτε περὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν οὔτε κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν, οὐχ ἧττον πρόνοιαν εἶχε καὶ τοῦ σφαλεὶς τοῖς ὅλοις ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομεῖναι τῶν προβεβιωμένων ἀνάξιον.

[11] ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ τῶν ἐν πράγμασιν ἀναστρεφομένων, ἵνα μήτε προπετῶς κινδυνεύοντες σφάλλωσι τὰς τῶν πιστευσάντων ἐλπίδας μήτε φιλοζωοῦντες παρὰ τὸ δέον αἰσχρὰς καὶ

[1] ἐπονειδίστους ποιῶσι τὰς αὑτῶν περιπετείας· Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τῇ μάχῃ κατορθώσαντες παραυτίκα μὲν τὸν χάρακα διήρπαζον τῶν ὑπεναντίων, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν Κελτῶν ἐν ταῖς στιβάσι κοιμωμένους διὰ τὴν μέθην κατέκοπτον ἱερείων τρόπον·

[2] συνῆγον δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων λείαν, ἀφʼ ἧς εἰς τὸ δημόσιον ἀνήχθη πλείω τῶν τριακοσίων ταλάντων.

[3] ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν μὲν Καρχηδονίων κατὰ τὴν μάχην σὺν τοῖς Κελτοῖς οὐκ ἐλάττους μυρίων, τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων περὶ δισχιλίους. ἑάλωσαν δὲ καὶ ζωγρίᾳ τινὲς τῶν ἐνδόξων Καρχηδονίων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ κατεφθάρησαν.

[4] τῆς δὲ φήμης ἀφικομένης εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἠπίστουν τῷ λίαν βούλεσθαι τοῦτο γενόμενον ἰδεῖν·

[5] ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ πλείους ἧκον, οὐ μόνον τὸ γεγονός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κατὰ μέρος διασαφοῦντες, τότε δὴ χαρᾶς ὑπερβαλλούσης ἦν ἡ πόλις πλήρης, καὶ πᾶν μὲν τέμενος ἐκοσμεῖτο, πᾶς δὲ ναὸς ἔγεμε πελάνων καὶ θυμάτων,

[6] καθόλου δʼ εἰς τοιαύτην εὐελπιστίαν παρεγένοντο καὶ θάρσος ὥστε πάντας τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ὃν μάλιστα πρότερον ἐφοβήθησαν, τότε μηδʼ ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ νομίζειν παρεῖναι.

[7] ὁ δὲ φαντασίαν μὲν ἔχειν ἔφη τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους, τὴν δʼ ἀλήθειαν οὐ τοιαύτην εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ἐναντίον. —

ιιι. ρες γραεξιαε

[1] "ὅτι μὲν οὔτε Πτολεμαῖος ὁ βασιλεὺς οὔθʼ ἡ τῶν Ῥοδίων πόλις οὔθʼ ἡ τῶν Βυζαντίων καὶ Χίων καὶ Μυτιληναίων ἐν παρέργῳ τίθενται τὰς ὑμετέρας, ὦ ἄνδρες Αἰτωλοί, διαλύσεις, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπολαμβάνω τοῦτʼ εἶναι συμφανές.

[2] οὐ γὰρ νῦν πρῶτον οὐδὲ δεύτερον ποιούμεθα πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰρήνης λόγους, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὅτου τὸν πόλεμον ἐνεστήσασθε, προσεδρεύοντες καὶ πάντα καιρὸν θεραπεύοντες οὐ διαλείπομεν ὑπὲρ τούτων ποιούμενοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μνήμην,

[3] κατὰ μὲν τὸ παρὸν τῆς ὑμετέρας καὶ Μακεδόνων στοχαζόμενοι καταφθορᾶς, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον καὶ περὶ τῶν σφετέρων πατρίδων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων προνοούμενοι.

[4] καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρός, ὅταν ὑφάψῃ τις ἅπαξ τὴν ὕλην, οὐκέτι τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τῇ τούτου προαιρέσει γίνεται τὸ συμβαῖνον, ἀλλʼ ᾗ ποτʼ ἂν τύχῃ λαμβάνει τὴν νομήν, τὸ πλεῖον τοῖς ἀνέμοις κυβερνώμενον καὶ τῇ τῆς ὑποκειμένης ὕλης διαφθορᾷ, καὶ πολλάκις ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τὸν ἐμπρήσαντα πρῶτον ὥρμησε παραλόγως,

[5] τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον [καὶ] ὁ πόλεμος ὑπό τινων ὅταν ἅπαξ ἐκκαυθῇ, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτοὺς τούτους πρώτους ἀπόλλυσι, ποτὲ δὲ φέρεται φθείρων ἀδίκως πᾶν τὸ παραπεσόν, αἰεὶ καινοποιούμενος καὶ προσφυσώμενος, ὥσπερ ὑπʼ ἀνέμων, ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν πλησιαζόντων ἀγνοίας.

[6] διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες Αἰτωλοί, νομίσαντες καὶ τοὺς νησιώτας πανδημεὶ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας Ἕλληνας παρόντας ὑμῶν δεῖσθαι τὸν μὲν πόλεμον ἆραι, τὴν δʼ εἰρήνην ἑλέσθαι, διὰ τὸ καὶ πρὸς σφᾶς ἀνήκειν τὰ γινόμενα, σωφρονήσαντες ἐντράπητε καὶ πείσθητε τοῖς παρακαλουμένοις.

[7] καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατά τινα τύχην ἐπολεμεῖτε πόλεμον ἀλυσιτελῆ μέν, ἐπειδὴ παντὶ πολέμῳ τοῦτο παρέπεται κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον, ἔνδοξον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐπιγραφήν, ἴσως ἄν τις ὑμῖν ἔσχε συγγνώμην, φιλοτίμως διακειμένοις.

[8] εἰ δὲ πάντων αἴσχιστον καὶ πολλῆς ἀδοξίας πλήρη καὶ βλασφημίας, ἆρʼ οὐ μεγάλης προσδεῖται τὰ πράγματʼ ἐπιστάσεως;

[9] ῥηθήσεται γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν μετὰ παρρησίας· ὑμεῖς δʼ, ἂν εὖ φρονῆτε, μεθʼ ἡσυχίας ἀνέξεσθε.

[10] πολλῷ γάρ ἐστιν ἄμεινον ὀνειδισθέντας ἐν καιρῷ σωθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς χάριν ἀκούσαντας μετʼ ὀλίγον ἀπολέσθαι μὲν αὐτούς, ἀπολέσαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς Ἕλληνας.

[1] λάβετε τοίνυν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὴν αὑτῶν ἄγνοιαν. φατὲ μὲν γὰρ πολεμεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Φίλιππον, ἵνα σῳζόμενοι μὴ ποιῶσι τούτῳ τὸ προσταττόμενον, πολεμεῖτε δʼ ἐπʼ ἐξανδραποδισμῷ καὶ καταφθορᾷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

[2] ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ συνθῆκαι λέγουσιν ὑμῶν αἱ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, αἳ πρότερον μὲν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ὑπῆρχον, νῦν δʼ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι θεωροῦνται γινόμεναι.

[3] καὶ τότε μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γράμματα τὴν αἰσχύνην ὑμῖν ἐπέφερε, νῦν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τοῦτο γίνεται πᾶσι καταφανές.

[4] λοιπὸν ὁ μὲν Φίλιππος ὄνομα γίνεται καὶ πρόσχημα τοῦ πολέμου· πάσχει γὰρ οὐδὲν δεινόν· τούτῳ δὲ συμμάχων ὑπαρχόντων Πελοποννησίων τῶν πλείστων, Βοιωτῶν, Εὐβοέων, Φωκέων, Λοκρῶν, Θετταλῶν, Ἠπειρωτῶν, κατὰ τούτων πεποίησθε

[5] τὰς συνθήκας ἐφʼ ᾧ τὰ μὲν σώματα καὶ τἄπιπλα Ῥωμαίων ὑπάρχειν, τὰς δὲ πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν Αἰτωλῶν.

[6] καὶ κυριεύσαντες μὲν αὐτοὶ πόλεως οὔτʼ ἂν ὑβρίζειν ὑπομείναιτε τοὺς ἐλευθέρους οὔτʼ ἐμπιπράναι τὰς πόλεις, νομίζοντες ὠμὸν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο καὶ βαρβαρικόν·

[7] συνθήκας δὲ πεποίησθε τοιαύτας, διʼ ὧν ἅπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ἐκδότους δεδώκατε τοῖς βαρβάροις εἰς τὰς αἰσχίστας ὕβρεις καὶ παρανομίας.

[8] καὶ ταῦτα πρότερον μὲν ἠγνοεῖτο· νυνὶ δὲ διὰ τῆς Ὠρειτῶν καὶ τῶν ταλαιπώρων Αἰγινητῶν ἅπασι γεγόνατε καταφανεῖς, τῆς τύχης ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξώστραν ἀναβιβαζούσης τὴν ὑμετέραν ἄγνοιαν.

[9] ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τὰ νῦν ἤδη συμβαίνοντα τοιαῦτʼ ἐστί· τὸ δὲ τέλος, ἂν ὅλως πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ὑμῖν χωρήσῃ, ποῖόν τι δεῖ προσδοκᾶν; ἆρʼ οὐ κακῶν ἀρχὴν μεγά

[1] λων ἅπασι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν; ὅτι γάρ, ἂν Ῥωμαῖοι τὸν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ πόλεμον ἀποτρίψωνται — τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ, συγκεκλειμένου τῆς Βρεττίας εἰς πάνυ βραχεῖς τόπους Ἀννίβου —

[2] λοιπὸν ὅτι πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόπους ποιήσονται, λόγῳ μὲν Αἰτωλοῖς βοηθήσοντες κατὰ Φιλίππου, τῇ δʼ ἀληθείᾳ πᾶσαν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοὺς ποιησόμενοι, καὶ λίαν ὑπολαμβάνω τοῦτʼ εἶναι καταφανές.

[3] ἐάν τε καλῶς προθῶνται ποιεῖν Ῥωμαῖοι κυριεύσαντες, ἐκείνων ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὴν χάριν καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφήν, ἐάν τε κακῶς, τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπάρξειν καὶ τὰς ὠφελείας ἐκ τῶν ἀπολλυμένων καὶ τὴν ἐξουσίαν

[4] τῶν σῳζομένων. ὑμεῖς δὲ τότε τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπικαλέσεσθε μάρτυρας, ὅταν μήτε τῶν θεῶν βούληται μήτε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔτι δύνηται βοηθεῖν ὑμῖν μηδείς.

ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔδει πάντα προορᾶσθαι·

[5] τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὑμῖν πρέπον·

[6] ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολλὰ διαφεύγει τῶν μελλόντων τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην πρόνοιαν, νῦν γε δέον ἂν εἴη, διὰ τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων συνεωρακότας τὸ συμβαῖνον, βέλτιον βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος.

[7] οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἡμεῖς γε κατὰ τὸ παρὸν οὐδὲν ἀπολελοίπαμεν τῶν ἁρμοζόντων ἢ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς φίλοις, καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος τὸ δοκοῦν μετὰ παρρησίας εἰρήκαμεν·

[8] ὑμᾶς δʼ ἀξιοῦμεν καὶ παρακαλοῦμεν μήθʼ αὑτοῖς φθονῆσαι μήτε τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας."

[9] τούτου δὲ ποιήσαντος διατροπήν τινα τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐδόκει, μετὰ τοῦτον εἰσῆλθον οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου πρέσβεις, οἳ τοὺς μὲν κατὰ μέρος λόγους ὑπερέθεντο, δύο δʼ ἔφασαν ἥκειν ἔχοντες ἐντολάς,

[10] αἱρουμένων μὲν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὴν εἰρήνην ἑτοίμως δέχεσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς τοὺς παρόντας ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπιμαρτυραμένους χωρίζεσθαι διότι τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα συμβησομένων τοῖς Ἕλλησιν Αἰτωλούς, ἀλλʼ οὐ Φίλιππον αἴτιον δεήσει νομίζειν. —

[1] καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὑτὸν κατοιμώξας ὅτι παρὰ μικρὸν ἔλθοι τοῦ λαβεῖν τὸν Ἄτταλον ὑποχείριον. —

[2] ὅτι Φίλιππος πορευθεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν Τριχωνίδα λίμνην καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς τὸν Θέρμον, ἔνθʼ ἦν ἱερὸν Ἀπόλλωνος, ὅσα πρότερον ἀπέλιπε τῶν ἀναθημάτων, τότε πάλιν ἅπαντα διελωβήσατο, κακῶς μὲν πρὸ τοῦ, κακῶς δὲ τότε χρώμενος τῷ θυμῷ·

[3] τὸ γὰρ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀργιζόμενον εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβεῖν τῆς πάσης ἀλογιστίας ἐστὶ σημεῖον. —

Ἐλλόπιον, πόλις Αἰτωλίας.

[4] Πολύβιος ια#.

Φύταιον, πόλις Αἰτωλίας.

[5] Πολύβιος ἑνδεκάτῳ.

[1] ὅτι τριῶν ὄντων τρόπων, καθʼ οὓς ἐφίενται πάντες στρατηγίας οἱ κατὰ λόγον αὐτῇ προσιόντες, πρώτου. μὲν διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτων κατασκευῆς,

[2] ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ μεθοδικοῦ καὶ τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἐμπείρων ἀνδρῶν παραδόσεως, τρίτου δὲ τοῦ διὰ τῆς ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἕξεως καὶ τριβῆς,

[3] πάντων ἦσαν τούτων ἀνεννόητοι οἱ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγοὶ ἁπλῶς. —

[4] τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις ὑπεγεγόνει τις ζῆλος οὐκ εὐτυχὴς ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀλαζονείας καὶ τῆς ἀκαιρίας·

[5] ἐσπούδαζον γὰρ τὰς ἀκολουθίας καὶ τὰς ἐσθῆτας διαφερόντως, καί τις ἦν περὶ τοὺς πλείστους καλλωπισμός, ὑπερέχων τὴν ἐκ τοῦ βίου χορηγίαν. ὅπλων δʼ οὐδὲ τὸν ἐλάχιστον ἐποιοῦντο λόγον.

[6] —

[7] οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ τὰ μὲν ἔργα τῶν εὐτυχούντων οὐδὲ πειρῶνται μιμεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ πάρεργα ζηλοῦντες μετὰ βλάβης ἐκθεατρίζουσι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀκρισίαν. —

[1] μεγάλα μὲν γὰρ ἔφη τὴν λαμπρότητα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ἔκπληξιν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, πολλὰ δὲ συνεργεῖν τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἐπισκευῆς ἁρμογὴν τῶν ὅπλων εἰς τὴν χρείαν.

[2] γίνεσθαι δʼ ἂν μάλιστα τὸ δέον, εἰ τὴν μὲν ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν νῦν ποιοῦνται περὶ τὸν ἱματισμόν, ταύτην ποιήσαιντο περὶ τῶν ὅπλων, τὴν δὲ πρότερον ὀλιγωρίαν περὶ τῶν ὅπλων παρʼ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχουσαν, ταύτην μετενέγκαιεν ἐπὶ τὰς ἐσθῆτας·

[3] οὕτως γὰρ ἅμα τούς τε κατʼ ἰδίαν βίους ὠφελήσεσθαι καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράγμαθʼ ὁμολογουμένως αὐτοὺς δυνήσεσθαι σῴζειν.

[4] διόπερ ἔφη δεῖν τὸν εἰς ἐξοπλισίαν ἢ στρατείαν ἐκπορευόμενον, ὅτε μὲν τὰς κνημῖδας περιτίθεται, σκοπεῖν ὅπως ἀραρυῖαί τε καὶ στίλβουσαι τῶν ὑποδεσμῶν καὶ κρηπίδων ὑπάρχωσιν αὗται μᾶλλον,

[5] ὅταν δὲ τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ τὸν θώρακα καὶ τὸ κράνος διαλαμβάνῃ, περιβλέπειν ἵνα τῆς χλαμύδος καὶ τοῦ χιτῶνος καθαρειότερα ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πολυτελέστερα·

[6] παρʼ οἷς γὰρ τὰ πρὸς ἐπιφάνειαν αἱρετώτερά [ἐστι] τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, παρὰ τούτοις αὐτόθεν εὐθέως προφανὲς εἶναι τὸ συμβησόμενον ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις.

[7] καθόλου δʼ ἠξίου διαλαμβάνειν ὡς ὁ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἱματίοις καλλωπισμὸς γυναικός ἐστι, καὶ ταύτης οὐ λίαν σώφρονος, ἡ δʼ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις πολυτέλεια καὶ σεμνότης ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, προαιρουμένων ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς πατρίδας ἐνδόξως σῴζειν.

[8] πάντες δʼ οἱ παρόντες οὕτως ἀπεδέξαντο τὰ ῥηθέντα καὶ τὸν νοῦν τῆς παρακλήσεως ἐθαύμασαν, ὡς καὶ παραχρῆμα μὲν ἐκπορευόμενοι τὸ βουλευτήριον εὐθέως ἐνεδείκνυντο τοὺς κεκαλλωπισμένους καὶ διακλίνειν ἐνίους ἠνάγκαζον τῆς ἀγορᾶς,

[9] ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἐξοπλισίαις καὶ στρατείαις παρετήρουν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις.

[1] οὕτως εἷς λόγος εὐκαίρως ῥηθεὶς ὑπʼ ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου πολλάκις οὐ μόνον ἀποτρέπει τῶν χειρίστων, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρορμᾷ πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

[2] ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἴδιον βίον ἀκόλουθον εἰσφέρηται τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὁ παρακαλῶν, ἀνάγκη λαμβάνειν τὴν πρώτην πίστιν τὴν παραίνεσιν. ὃ δὴ περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἄνδρα μάλιστʼ ἄν τις ἴδοι γινόμενον.

[3] κατά τε γὰρ τὴν ἐσθῆτα καὶ τὴν σίτησιν ἀφελὴς καὶ λιτὸς ἦν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, εὐπερίκοπτος καὶ ἀνεπίφθονος·

[4] περί γε μὴν τοῦ παρʼ ὅλον τὸν βίον ἀληθεύειν μεγίστην ἐποιήσατο σπουδήν. τοιγάρτοι βραχέα καὶ τὰ τυχόντʼ ἀποφαινόμενος μεγάλην ἐγκατέλειπε πίστιν τοῖς ἀκούουσι·

[5] παράδειγμα γὰρ ἐν πᾶσι τὸν ἴδιον βίον εἰσφερόμενος οὐ πολλῶν ἐποίει προσδεῖσθαι λόγων τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

[6] διὸ καὶ πολλάκις λόγους μακροὺς καὶ δοκοῦντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων δεόντως εἰρῆσθαι διʼ ὀλίγων ῥημάτων τῇ πίστει καὶ ταῖς ἐννοίαις τῶν πραγμάτων ὁλοσχερῶς ἐξέβαλε.

[7] πλὴν τότε συντελεσθέντος τοῦ διαβουλίου πάντες ἐπανῆγον ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις, τά τε ῥηθέντα καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα διαφερόντως ἀποδεδεγμένοι, καὶ νομίζοντες οὐδʼ ἂν παθεῖν οὐδὲν δεινὸν ἐκείνου προεστῶτος.

[8] ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην εὐθέως ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς πόλεις, ἐνεργῶς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ποιούμενος τὴν ἔφοδον.

[9] κἄπειτα συναγαγὼν τοὺς ὄχλους ἅμα μὲν ἐγύμναζεν ἅμα δὲ συνέταττε καὶ τέλος οὐδʼ ὅλους ὀκτὼ μῆνας χρησάμενος τῇ τοιαύτῃ παρασκευῇ καὶ μελέτῃ συνῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς Μαντίνειαν, διαγωνιούμενος πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁπάντων Πελοποννησίων ἐλευθερίας.

[1] ὁ δὲ Μαχανίδας κατατεθαρρηκώς, καὶ νομίζων ὡς ἂν εἰ κατʼ εὐχὴν αὐτῷ γίνεσθαι τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὁρμήν, ἅμα τῷ γνῶναι διότι συνηθροισμένοι τυγχάνουσιν εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν,

[2] παρακαλέσας ἐν Τεγέᾳ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς καιροῖς, εὐθέως εἰς τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν, ἄρτι τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιφαινούσης, προῆγεν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Μαντίνειαν, τῆς μὲν φάλαγγος καθηγούμενος τῷ δεξιῷ κέρατι,

[3] τοὺς δὲ μισθοφόρους ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους τῆς πρωτοπορείας παραλλήλους ἄγων, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ζεύγη πλῆθος ὀργάνων καὶ βελῶν κομίζοντα καταπελτικῶν.

[4] κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν Φιλοποίμην εἰς τρία μέρη διῃρηκὼς τὴν δύναμιν ἐξῆγεν ἐκ τῆς Μαντινείας, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἱεροῦ φέρουσαν τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ θωρακίτας, ἅμα δὲ τὸ ξενικὸν ἅπαν καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἑξῆς ὡς πρὸς τὰς δύσεις τοὺς φαλαγγίτας, ἔτι δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐχομένην τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἱππεῖς.

[5] τοῖς μὲν οὖν εὐζώνοις κατελάβετο πρώτοις τὸν λόφον τὸν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἀνατείνων ἱκανὸν ὑπὲρ τὴν ὁδὸν κεῖται τὴν Ξενίδα καὶ τὸ προειρημένον ἱερόν· τοὺς δὲ θωρακίτας συνάπτων ἐπὶ τὴν μεσημβρίαν κατέστησε. τούτοις δὲ συνεχεῖς τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς παρενέβαλε.

[6] μετὰ δὲ τούτους ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθεῖαν τὴν φάλαγγα κατὰ τέλη σπειρηδὸν ἐν διαστήμασιν ἐπέστησε παρὰ τὴν τάφρον τὴν φέρουσαν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ποσειδίου διὰ μέσου τοῦ τῶν Μαντινέων πεδίου καὶ συνάπτουσαν τοῖς ὄρεσι τοῖς συντερμονοῦσι τῇ τῶν Ἐλισφασίων χώρᾳ.

[7] πρὸς μὲν τούτοις ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἐπέστησε τοὺς Ἀχαϊκοὺς ἱππεῖς, ὧν Ἀρισταίνετος ἡγεῖτο Δυμαῖος· κατὰ δὲ τὸ λαιὸν αὐτὸς εἶχε τὸ ξενικὸν ἅπαν ἐν ἐπαλλήλοις τάξεσιν.

[1] ἅμα δὲ τῷ σύνοπτον ἤδη καλῶς εἶναι παραγενομένην τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων δύναμιν ἐπιπορευόμενος τὰ συστήματα τῶν φαλαγγιτῶν παρεκάλει βραχέως μέν, ἐμφαντικῶς δὲ τοῦ παρόντος κινδύνου.

[2] τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα τῶν λεγομένων ἀσαφῆ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν εὔνοιαν καὶ πίστιν τῶν ὄχλων εἰς τοιαύτην ὁρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν παρέστη τὸ πλῆθος ὥστε παραπλησίαν ἐνθουσιασμῷ. τὴν ἀντιπαράκλησιν γίνεσθαι τῶν δυνάμεων, ἄγειν καὶ θαρρεῖν αὐτὸν παρακελευομένων·

[3] τοῦτο μέντοι παράπαν ἐπιμελῶς ἐπειρᾶτο διασαφεῖν, ὅτε λάβοι καιρόν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ὑπὲρ αἰσχρᾶς καὶ ἐπονειδίστου δουλείας, τοῖς δʼ ὑπὲρ ἀειμνήστου καὶ λαμπρᾶς ἐλευθερίας συνέστηκεν ὁ παρὼν κίνδυνος.

[4] ὁ δὲ Μαχανίδας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπέδειξεν ὡς ὀρθίᾳ τῇ φάλαγγι προσμίξων πρὸς τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν πολεμίων· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐπλησίασε, λαβὼν σύμμετρον ἀπόστημα περιέκλα τὴν δύναμιν ἐπὶ δόρυ, καὶ παρεκτείνας ἴσον ἐποίησε τὸ παρʼ αὑτοῦ δεξιὸν τῷ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εὐωνύμῳ, τοὺς δὲ καταπέλτας πρὸ πάσης ἐπέστησε τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν διαστήμασιν.

[5] ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην θεασάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ὅτι τοῖς καταπέλταις ἐπενόει βαλὼν εἰς τὰς σπείρας τῶν φαλαγγιτῶν τραυματίζειν τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ θόρυβον ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ὅλοις,

[6] οὐκέτι χρόνον ἔδωκεν οὐδʼ ἀναστροφήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν Ταραντίνων ἐνεργῶς ἐχρῆτο τῇ καταρχῇ τοῦ κινδύνου κατὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸ Ποσείδιον τόπους, ὄντας ἐπιπέδους καὶ πρὸς ἱππικὴν εὐφυεῖς χρείαν.

[7] ὁ δὲ Μαχανίδας ὁρῶν τὸ γινόμενον ἠναγκάζετο ποιεῖν τὸ παραπλήσιον καὶ συναφεῖναι τοὺς παρʼ αὑτοῦ Ταραντίνους.

[1] τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνδρώδης ἦν ἡ σύμπτωσις· κατὰ βραχὺ δὲ προσγινομένων τοῖς πιεζομένοις τῶν εὐζώνων, ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ συνέβη τὸ παρʼ ἑκατέρων ξενικὸν ἀναμὶξ γενέσθαι,

[2] πάντῃ δὲ τούτων συμπλοκῆς ἁθρόως καὶ κατʼ ἄνδρα γινομένης ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον πάρισος ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος οὕτως ὥστε τὰς λοιπὰς δυνάμεις, καραδοκούσας καθʼ ὁποτέρων ὁ κονιορτὸς τραπήσεται, μὴ δύνασθαι συμβαλεῖν διὰ τὸ μένειν ἀμφοτέρους ἐπὶ πολὺ διακατέχοντας ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τόπον.

[3] χρόνου δὲ γινομένου κατίσχυον καὶ τῷ πλήθει καὶ ταῖς εὐχειρίαις διὰ τὴν ἕξιν οἱ παρὰ τοῦ τυράννου μισθοφόροι.

[4] τοῦτο δʼ εἰκότως καὶ τὸ παράπαν εἴωθε γίνεσθαι.

[5] ὅσῳ γὰρ συμβαίνει τοὺς ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ὄχλους προθυμοτέρους ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀγῶσι τῶν τοῖς τυράννοις πολιτικῶν ὑποταττομένων, τοσούτῳ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις ξενικὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μισθοφορούντων εἰκὸς ὑπεράγειν καὶ διαφέρειν.

[6] ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπʼ ἐκείνων οἷς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας ἐστίν, οἷς δʼ ὑπὲρ δουλείας ὁ κίνδυνος, οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων οἷς μὲν ὑπὲρ ὁμολογουμένης ἐπανορθώσεως, οἷς δʼ ὑπὲρ προδήλου βλάβης γίνεται φιλοτιμία.

[7] δημοκρατία μὲν γάρ, ἐπανελομένη τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύσαντας, οὐκέτι μισθοφόροις τηρεῖ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐλευθερίαν· τυραννὶς δʼ ὅσῳ μειζόνων ἐφίεται, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων προσδεῖται μισθοφόρων.

[8] πλείονας γὰρ ἀδικοῦσα πλείονας ἔχει καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας. ἡ δὲ τῶν μονάρχων ἀσφάλεια τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῇ τῶν ξένων εὐνοίᾳ κεῖται καὶ δυνάμει.

[1] διὸ δὴ καὶ τότε συνέβαινε τὸ παρὰ τῷ Μαχανίδᾳ ξενικὸν οὕτως ἐκθύμως ἀγωνίζεσθαι καὶ βιαίως ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς ἐφεδρεύοντας τοῖς ξένοις Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ θωρακίτας δύνασθαι τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν ὑπομεῖναι, πάντας δʼ ἐκπιεσθέντας φεύγειν προτροπάδην ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς Μαντινείας, ἀπεχούσης τῆς πόλεως ἑπτὰ σταδίους.

[2] ἐν ᾧ δὴ καιρῷ τὸ παρʼ ἐνίοις ἀπορούμενον τότε παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογούμενον ἐγένετο καὶ συμφανές, ὅτι πλεῖστα τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον συντελουμένων παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων ἐμπειρίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀπειρίαν ἐπιτελεῖται.

[3] μέγα μὲν γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τὸ προτερήματος ἀρχὴν λαβόντα προσθεῖναι τἀκόλουθον, πολὺ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ σφαλέντα ταῖς πρώταις ἐπιβολαῖς μεῖναι παρʼ αὑτὸν καὶ συνιδεῖν τὴν τῶν εὐτυχούντων ἀκρισίαν καὶ συνεπιθέσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἁμαρτήμασιν.

[4] ἰδεῖν γοῦν ἔστι πολλάκις τοὺς μὲν ἤδη δοκοῦντας πεπροτερηκέναι μετʼ ὀλίγον τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσφαλμένους, τοὺς δʼ ἐν ἀρχαῖς δόξαντας ἐπταικέναι πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀγχίνοιαν τὰ ὅλα παραδόξως κατωρθωκότας.

[5] ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε προφανῶς ἐδόκει περὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἀμφοτέρους γεγονέναι.

[6] τοῦ γὰρ ξενικοῦ παντὸς ἐγκεκλικότος τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ παραλελυμένου τοῦ λαιοῦ κέρως, ὁ μὲν Μαχανίδας ἀφέμενος τοῦ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατὰ κέρας ὑπεραίρειν τοῖς δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἀπαντᾶν καὶ πειρᾶσθαι τῶν ὅλων,

[7] τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἔπραξεν, ἀκρατῶς δὲ καὶ μειρακιωδῶς συνεκχυθεὶς τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μισθοφόροις ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσιν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτὸν τὸν φόβον ἱκανὸν ὄντα τοὺς ἅπαξ ἐγκλίναντας ἄχρι τῶν πυλῶν συνδιώκειν.

[1] ὁ δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγὸς ἕως μὲν τοῦ δυνατοῦ διακατεῖχε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐπʼ ὀνόματος καλῶν καὶ παροξύνων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας·

[2] ἐπεὶ δʼ ἑώρα τούτους ἐκβιαζομένους, οὐ πτοηθεὶς ἔφευγεν οὐδʼ ἀθυμήσας ἀπέστη , ἀλλʼ ὑποστείλας αὑτὸν ὑπὸ τὸ τῆς φάλαγγος κέρας, ἅμα τῷ παραπεσεῖν τοὺς διώκοντας καὶ γενέσθαι τὸν τόπον ἔρημον, καθʼ ὃν ὁ κίνδυνος ἦν, εὐθέως τοῖς πρώτοις τέλεσι τῶν φαλαγγιτῶν ἐπʼ ἀσπίδα κλίνων, προῆγε μετὰ δρόμου, τηρῶν τὰς τάξεις.

[3] καταλαβόμενος δὲ τὸν ἐκλειφθέντα τόπον ὀξέως, ἅμα μὲν ἀπετέτμητο τοὺς διώκοντας, ἅμα δʼ ὑπερδέξιος ἐγεγόνει τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων κέρατος.

[4] καὶ τοὺς μὲν φαλαγγίτας αὐτοῦ παρεκάλει θαρρεῖν καὶ μένειν, ἕως ἂν παραγγείλῃ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν ἀναμίξ·

[5] Πολυαίνῳ δʼ ἐπέταξε τῷ Μεγαλοπολίτῃ τοὺς περιλειπομένους καὶ τοὺς διακεκλικότας τὴν φυγὴν Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ θωρακίτας καὶ μισθοφόρους συναθροίσαντι μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐφεδρεύειν τῷ κέρατι τῆς φάλαγγος καὶ τηρεῖν τὴν ἐπάνοδον τῶν ἐκ διώγματος ἀναχωρούντων.

[6] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι χωρὶς παραγγέλματος, ἐπαρθέντες ταῖς διανοίαις ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν εὐζώνων προτερήματι, καταβαλόντες τὰς σαρίσας ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους.

[7] ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν προάγοντες ἧκον ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς τάφρου χεῖλος, τὰ μὲν οὐκέτι διδόντος τοῦ καιροῦ μεταμέλειαν ὥστʼ ἐν χερσὶν ὄντας τῶν πολεμίων ἀναστρέφειν, τὰ δὲ καὶ τῆς τάφρου καταφρονήσαντες διὰ τὸ τὴν κατάβασιν ἔχειν ἐκ πολλοῦ καὶ μήθʼ ὕδωρ κατὰ τὸ τέλος ἐν αὐτῇ μήτε τινʼ ἀγρίαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν, ὥρμησαν ἀνεπιστάτως διὰ ταύτης.

[1] ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην ἅμα τῷ παραπεσεῖν κατὰ τῶν ὑπεναντίων τὸν ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων ἑωραμένον ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ καιρόν, τότε πᾶσιν ἐπάγειν τοῖς φαλαγγίταις καταβαλοῦσι τὰς σαρίσας παρήγγειλε.

[2] τῶν δʼ Ἀχαιῶν ὁμοθυμαδὸν καὶ μετὰ καταπληκτικῆς κραυγῆς ποιησαμένων τὴν ἔφοδον, οἱ μὲν προδιαλελυκότες τὰς τάξεις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῇ τῆς τάφρου καταβάσει πάλιν ἀναβαίνοντες πρὸς ὑπερδεξίους τοὺς πολεμίους ἀποδειλιάσαντες ἐτρέποντο·

[3] τὸ δὲ πολὺ πλῆθος ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τάφρῳ διεφθείρετο, τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, τὸ δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων.

[4] συνέβαινε δὲ τὸ προειρημένον οὐκ αὐτομάτως οὐδʼ ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀγχίνοιαν τοῦ προεστῶτος, ὃς εὐθέως προεβάλετο τὴν τάφρον.

[5] ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην οὐ φυγομαχῶν, ὥς τινες ὑπελάμβανον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν ἀκριβῶς καὶ στρατηγικῶς ἕκαστα συλλογισάμενος, ὅτι παραγενόμενος ὁ Μαχανίδας, εἰ μὲν προσάξει τὴν δύναμιν οὐ προϊδόμενος τὴν τάφρον, οὕτω συμβήσεται παθεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν φάλαγγα τὸ προειρημένον νῦν, γινόμενον δὲ τότʼ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας·

[6] εἰ δὲ συλλογισάμενος τὴν δυσχρηστίαν τῆς τάφρου, κἄπειτα μεταμεληθεὶς καὶ δόξας ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἐκ παρατεταγμένων ἀπολύσει καὶ μακρὰν αὑτὸν ἐν πορείᾳ διδόναι μέλλει, διότι χωρὶς ὁλοσχεροῦς ἀγῶνος αὐτῷ μὲν τὸ νικᾶν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ τἀναντία περιέσται. πολλοῖς γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν,

[7] οἵτινες παραταξάμενοι μέν, οὐκ ἀξιόχρεως δὲ νομίσαντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τινὲς μὲν διὰ τόπους,

[8] οἱ δὲ διὰ πλῆθος, οἱ δὲ διʼ ἄλλας αἰτίας, μακρὰν ἑαυτοὺς δόντες ἐν πορείᾳ, κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν διʼ αὐτῶν τῶν οὐραγούντων ἤλπισαν οἱ μὲν προτερήσειν, οἱ δʼ ἀσφαλῶς ἀπολυθήσεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων.

[9] ἐν οἷς δὴ καὶ μέγιστα συμβαίνει τοὺς ἡγουμένους

[1] πλὴν ὅ γε Φιλοποίμην οὐ διεψεύσθη τῇ προνοίᾳ τοῦ συντελεσθησομένου· τροπὴν γὰρ ἰσχυρὰν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

[2] συνορῶν δὲ τὴν φάλαγγα νικῶσαν καὶ τὰ ὅλα καλῶς αὑτῷ προχωροῦντα καὶ λαμπρῶς, ἐπὶ τὸ καταλειπόμενον ὥρμησε τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς· τοῦτο δʼ ἦν τὸ μὴ διαφυγεῖν τὸν Μαχανίδαν.

[3] εἰδὼς οὖν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ διώγματος παράπτωσιν ἀποτετμημένον ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν μέρεσι τῆς τάφρου μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων μισθοφόρων, ἐκαραδόκει τὴν τούτου παρουσίαν.

[4] ὁ δὲ Μαχανίδας, συνθεωρήσας κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ διώγματος φεύγουσαν τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν, καὶ συλλογισάμενος διότι προπέπτωκε καὶ διέψευσται τῆς ὅλης ἐλπίδος, εὐθέως ἐπειρᾶτο συστραφεὶς μεθʼ ὧν εἶχε περὶ αὑτὸν ξένων, ἅθρους διαπεσεῖν διὰ τῶν ἐσκεδασμένων καὶ διωκόντων.

[5] εἰς ἃ καὶ συνορῶντες ἔνιοι συνέμενον αὐτῷ τὰς ἀρχάς, ταύτην ἔχοντες τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας.

[6] ὡς δὲ παραγενόμενοι συνεῖδον τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τηροῦντας τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς τάφρου γέφυραν, τότε δὴ πάντες ἐξαθυμήσαντες ἀπέρρεον ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ, καὶ καθʼ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος ἐπορίζετο τὴν σωτηρίαν.

[7] καθʼ ὃν δὴ καιρὸν ὁ τύραννος ἀπογνοὺς τὴν διὰ τῆς γεφύρας ὁδὸν παρήλαυνε παρὰ τὴν τάφρον, ἐνεργῶς διάβασιν ζητῶν.

[1] ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην, ἐπιγνοὺς τὸν Μαχανίδαν ἀπό τε τῆς πορφυρίδος καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἵππον κόσμου, τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἀναξίδαμον ἀπολείπει, παρακαλέσας τηρεῖν ἐπιμελῶς τὴν δίοδον καὶ μηδενὸς φείδεσθαι τῶν μισθοφόρων διὰ τὸ τούτους εἶναι τοὺς συναύξοντας αἰεὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ τυραννίδας·

[2] αὐτὸς δὲ παραλαβὼν Πολύαινον τὸν Κυπαρισσέα καὶ Σιμίαν, οἷς ἐχρῆτο τότε παρασπισταῖς, ἐκ τοῦ πέραν τῆς τάφρου τὴν ἀντιπαραγωγὴν ἐποιεῖτο τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ τοῖς μετʼ αὐτοῦ·

[3] δύο γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ τότε τῷ Μαχανίδᾳ συμμίξαντες, Ἀρηξίδαμος καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων εἷς.

[4] ἅμα δὲ τῷ τὸν Μαχανίδαν κατά τινα τόπον εὔβατον τῆς τάφρου, προσθέντα τοὺς μύωπας, βίᾳ τὸν ἵππον ἐπάγειν καὶ διαπερᾶν, συναγαγὼν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ὁ Φιλοποίμην αὐτῷ καὶ πατάξας τῷ δόρατι καιρίως, καὶ προσενεγκὼν τῷ σαυρωτῆρι πληγὴν ἄλλην ἐκ διαλήψεως, ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ διέφθειρε τὸν τύραννον.

[5] τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον ἐγίνετο καὶ περὶ τὸν Ἀρηξίδαμον ὑπὸ τῶν παρίππων. ὁ δὲ τρίτος ἀπογνοὺς τὴν διάβασιν διέφυγε τὸν κίνδυνον κατὰ τὸν τῶν προειρημένων φόνον.

[6] πεσόντων δʼ ἀμφοτέρων, εὐθέως οἱ περὶ τὸν Σιμίαν, σκυλεύσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ συναφελόντες ἅμα τοῖς ὅπλοις τὴν τοῦ τυράννου κεφαλήν, ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τοὺς διώκοντας,

[7] σπεύδοντες ἐπιδεῖξαι τοῖς ὄχλοις τὴν ἀπώλειαν τοῦ τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἡγεμόνος χάριν τοῦ πιστεύσαντας ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀνυπόπτως καὶ τεθαρρηκότως ποιήσασθαι τὸν ἐπιδιωγμὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἕως τῆς Τεγεατῶν πόλεως.

[8] ὃ καὶ μεγάλα συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὴν ὁρμὴν τῶν ὄχλων· οὐ γὰρ ἥκιστα διὰ τούτων τῆς μὲν Τεγέας ἐξ ἐφόδου κύριοι κατέστησαν, ταῖς δʼ ἐχομέναις παρὰ τὸν Εὐρώταν ἐστρατοπέδευον, κρατοῦντες ἤδη τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀναμφισβητήτως.

[9] καὶ πολλῶν χρόνων οὐ δυνάμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας ἀπώσασθαι, τότε πᾶσαν ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθουν αὐτοὶ τὴν Λακωνικήν,

[10] τῶν μὲν ἰδίων οὐ πολλοὺς ἀπολωλεκότες ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπεκτακότες μὲν οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν τετρακισχιλίων, ζωγρίᾳ δʼ εἰληφότες ἔτι πλείους τούτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς κεκυριευκότες ἁπάσης καὶ τῶν ὅπλων.

ιϝ. ρες ιταλιαε

[1] ὅτι φησὶν ὁ Πολύβιος, τί γὰρ ὄφελός ἐστι τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσι διεξιέναι πολέμους καὶ μάχας καὶ πόλεων ἐξανδραποδισμοὺς καὶ πολιορκίας, εἰ μὴ τὰς αἰτίας ἐπιγνώσονται, παρʼ ἃς ἐν ἑκάστοις οἱ μὲν κατώρθωσαν, οἱ δʼ ἐσφάλησαν;

[2] τὰ γὰρ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ψυγαγωγεῖ μόνον τοὺς ἀκούοντας, αἱ δὲ πρόσθεν διαλήψεις τῶν ἐπιβαλλομένων ἐξεταζόμεναι δεόντως ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας.

[3] μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ὁ κατὰ μέρος χειρισμὸς ἑκάστων ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἐπανορθοῖ τοὺς συνεφιστάνοντας. —

[1] τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπισημήναιτο τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις τἀνδρός, βλέψας εἰς τὸ μῆκος τούτου τοῦ χρόνου,

[2] καὶ συνεπιστήσας αὑτὸν ἐπί τε τὰς καθόλου καὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μάχας καὶ πολιορκίας καὶ πόλεων μεταβολὰς καὶ περιστάσεις καιρῶν, ἐπί τε τὴν περιοχὴν τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς καὶ πράξεως,

[3] ἐν ᾗ συνεχῶς Ἀννίβας ἑκκαίδεκα πολεμήσας ἔτη Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν οὐδέποτε διέλυσε τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τῶν ὑπαίθρων, ἀλλὰ συνέχων ὑφʼ αὑτόν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς κυβερνήτης, ἀστασίαστα διετήρησε τοσαῦτα πλήθη καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καίπερ οὐχ οἷον ὁμοεθνέσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὁμοφύλοις χρησάμενος στρατοπέδοις. εἶχε γὰρ Λίβυας,

[4] Ἴβηρας, Λιγυστίνους, Κελτούς, Φοίνικας, Ἰταλούς, Ἕλληνας, οἷς οὐ νόμος, οὐκ ἔθος, οὐ λόγος, οὐχ ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἦν κοινὸν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

[5] ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἡ τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀγχίνοια τὰς τηλικαύτας καὶ τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ἑνὸς ἐποίει προστάγματος ἀκούειν καὶ μιᾷ πείθεσθαι γνώμῃ, καίπερ οὐχ ἁπλῆς οὔσης τῆς περιστάσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποικίλης, καὶ πολλάκις μὲν αὐτοῖς λαμπρᾶς ἐπιπνεούσης τῆς τύχης, ποτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον.

[6] ἐξ ὧν εἰκότως ἄν τις θαυμάσειε τὴν τοῦ προεστῶτος δύναμιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει, καὶ θαρρῶν εἴπειεν ὡς εἴπερ ποιησάμενος τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπʼ ἄλλα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐπὶ τελευταίους ἦλθε Ῥωμαίους, οὐδὲν ἂν τῶν προτεθέντων αὐτὸν διέφυγε.

[7] νῦν δʼ, ἐφʼ οὓς ἔδει τελευταίους ἐλθεῖν, ἀπὸ τούτων ἀρξάμενος, ἐν τούτοις ἐποιήσατο καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸ τέλος.

ϝ. ρες ηισπανιαε

[1] οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, ἁθροίσαντες τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐν αἷς ἐποιοῦντο τὴν παραχειμασίαν, προῆλθον, καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως τῆς προσαγορευομένης Ἰλίπας, βαλόμενοι τὸν χάρακα πρὸς ταῖς ὑπωρείαις, καὶ προθέμενοι πεδία πρὸς ἀγῶνα καὶ μάχην εὐφυῆ. πλῆθος δὲ πεζῶν μὲν εἶχον εἰς ἑπτὰ μυριάδας,

[2] ἱππεῖς δὲ τετρακισχιλίους, θηρία δὲ δυσὶ πλείω τῶν τριάκοντα.

[3] Πόπλιος δὲ Μάρκον μὲν Ἰούνιον ἐξαπέστειλε πρὸς Κολίχαντα, παραληψόμενον τὰς ἑτοιμασθείσας αὐτῷ παρὰ τούτου δυνάμεις· αὗται δʼ ἦσαν πεζοὶ μὲν τρισχίλιοι, ἱππεῖς δὲ πεντακόσιοι· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς συμμάχους αὐτὸς παρελάμβανε,

[4] προάγων καὶ ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον.

[5] ἐγγίσας δὲ τῷ Κασταλῶνι καὶ τοῖς περὶ Βαίκυλα τόποις, καὶ συμμίξας ἐνθάδε τῷ Μάρκῳ καὶ ταῖς παρὰ τοῦ Κολίχαντος δυνάμεσιν, εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν ἐνέπιπτε περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων.

[6] χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν συμμάχων οὐκ ἀξιόχρεοι παρῆσαν αἱ Ῥωμαϊκαὶ δυνάμεις αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ διακινδυνεύειν· τὸ δʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ἔχοντας τὰς ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων κινδυνεύειν ἐπισφαλὲς ἐδόκει καὶ λίαν εἶναι παράβολον.

[7] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διαπορήσας, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων συγκλειόμενος, ἐπὶ τὸ συγχρῆσθαι κατηνέχθη τοῖς Ἴβηρσιν οὕτως ὥστε φαντασίαν μὲν παρασκευάζειν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις,

[8] τὸν δʼ ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τῶν ἰδίων στρατοπέδων. ταῦτα δὲ προθέμενος ἀνέζευξε μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως, ἔχων πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς τετρακισμυρίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ τρισχιλίους.

[9] ἐγγίσας δὲ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις καὶ γενόμενος σύνοπτος ἐστρατοπέδευσε περί τινας γεωλόφους καταντικρὺ τῶν πολεμίων.

[1] Μάγων δὲ νομίσας εὐφυῆ καιρὸν ἐπιθέσθαι καταστρατοπεδεύουσι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἀναλαβὼν τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων καὶ Μασαννάσαν μετὰ τῶν Νομάδων, ἤλαυνε πρὸς τὴν παρεμβολήν, πεπεισμένος ἀφυλακτοῦντα λήψεσθαι τὸν Πόπλιον. ὁ δὲ πάλαι προορώμενος τὸ μέλλον,

[2] ὑπό τινα βουνὸν ὑπεστάλκει τοὺς ἱππεῖς, ἴσους τοῖς τῶν Καρχηδονίων·

[3] ὧν ἀνυπονοήτως ἐμπεσόντων πολλοὶ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀναστρέφοντες διὰ τὸ παράδοξον τῆς ἐπιφανείας τῆς ἄφνω τῶν ἱππέων ἀπέπεσον, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ συμβάλλοντες τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐμάχοντο γενναίως.

[4] τῇ δὲ παρὰ τῶν καταβαινόντων ἐν τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς ἱππεῦσιν εὐχειρίᾳ δυσχρηστούμενοι καὶ πολλοὺς ἀπολλύντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, βραχὺ προσαντισχόντες ἐνέκλιναν.

[5] καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν τάξει τὴν ἀναχώρησιν ἐποιοῦντο, τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἐγκειμένων αὐτοῖς λύσαντες τὰς ἴλας κατέφυγον ὑπὸ τὴν αὑτῶν παρεμβολήν.

[6] οἱ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαῖοι τούτου γενομένου θαρραλεώτερον διέκειντο πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τοὐναντίον.

[7] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἑξῆς ἐπί τινας ἡμέρας τάς τε δυνάμεις ἐκτάξαντες ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ πεδίῳ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ διὰ τῶν εὐζώνων ἀκροβολισμοὺς ποιησάμενοι καὶ καταπειράσαντες ἀλλήλων, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν τὰ ὅλα.

[1] κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον δυσὶ δοκεῖ κεχρῆσθαι στρατηγήμασιν ὁ Πόπλιος.

[2] θεωρῶν γὰρ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ὀψὲ ποιούμενον τὰς ἐξαγωγάς, καὶ μέσους Λίβυας, τὰ δὲ θηρία προτιθέμενον ἑκατέρων τῶν κεράτων, αὐτὸς εἰωθὼς τῇ μὲν ὥρᾳ προσανατείνειν,

[3] τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους μέσους ἀντιτάττειν τοῖς Λίβυσι, τοὺς δʼ Ἴβηρας ἐπὶ τῶν κεράτων παρεμβάλλειν, ᾗ προέθετο κρίνειν ἡμέρᾳ, τἀναντία τοῖς προειρημένοις ποιήσας μεγάλα συνήργησε ταῖς σφετέραις δυνάμεσι πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν, οὐκ ὀλίγα δʼ ἠλάττωσε τοὺς πολεμίους.

[4] ἅμα γὰρ τῷ φωτὶ διαπεμψάμενος τοὺς ὑπηρέτας παρήγγειλε πᾶσι τοῖς χιλιάρχοις καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἀριστοποιησαμένους καὶ καθοπλισαμένους ἐξάγειν πρὸ τοῦ χάρακος.

[5] γενομένου δὲ τούτου καὶ προθύμως πειθαρχησάντων διὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν τοῦ μέλλοντος, τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους προαπέστειλε, συντάξας ἐγγίζειν τῇ παρεμβολῇ τῶν ὑπεναντίων καὶ προσακροβολίζεσθαι θρασέως,

[6] αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἔχων ἄρτι τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατολῆς ἐπιφαινομένης προῆγε, καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς μέσον τὸ πεδίον παρενέβαλε, τάττων ἐναντίως ἢ πρόσθεν· μέσους μὲν γὰρ ἐτίθει τοὺς Ἴβηρας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κεράτων τὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων.

[7] τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις, ἄφνω συνεγγιζόντων πρὸς τὸν χάρακα τῶν ἱππέων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης δυνάμεως ἐκταττομένης ἐν ὄψει, μόλις ἐδόθη καιρὸς εἰς τὸ καθοπλίσασθαι.

[8] διόπερ ἠναγκάσθησαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ἔτι νήστεις ἔχοντες τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀπαρασκεύως ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους ἐπαφιέναι τοῖς ἱππεῦσι τῶν ὑπεναντίων εἰς τὰ πεδία, τὰς δὲ πεζικὰς δυνάμεις παρατάττειν, οὐ πολὺ τῆς παρωρείας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις ποιούμενοι τὴν ἔκταξιν, καθάπερ ἦν ἔθος αὐτοῖς.

[9] ἕως μὲν οὖν τινος ἔμενον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔχοντες· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἡμέρας προύβαινε, τῶν δʼ εὐζώνων ἄκριτος ἦν καὶ πάρισος ἡ συμπλοκὴ διὰ τὸ τοὺς πιεζομένους καταφεύγοντας ὑπὸ τὰς ἰδίας φάλαγγας ἐκ μεταβολῆς κινδυνεύειν,

[10] τὸ τηνικαῦτα δὲ διαδεξάμενος ὁ Πόπλιος διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων ἐν ταῖς σημαίαις εἴσω τοὺς ἀκροβολιζομένους, καὶ μερίσας ἐφʼ ἑκάτερον κέρας ὀπίσω τῶν παρατεταγμένων, πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς γροσφομάχους, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐπιβάλλει τοὺς ἱππεῖς, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς μετωπηδὸν ποιούμενος τὴν ἔφοδον·

[11] ἀποσχὼν δὲ περὶ τετραστάδιον τῶν ὑπεναντίων, τοὺς μὲν Ἴβηρας τηροῦντας τὰς τάξεις τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν παρήγγειλε, τῷ μὲν δεξιῷ τὰς σημαίας καὶ τὰς ἴλας ἐπι

[1] στρέφειν ἐπὶ δόρυ, τῷ δʼ εὐωνύμῳ τἀναντία. καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ, Λεύκιος δὲ Μάρκιος καὶ Μάρκος Ἰούνιος ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων τρεῖς ἴλας ἱππέων τὰς ἡγουμένας, καὶ πρὸ τούτων γροσφομάχους τοὺς εἰθισμένους καὶ τρεῖς σπείρας — τοῦτο δὲ καλεῖται τὸ σύνταγμα τῶν πεζῶν παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις κοόρτις —

[2] πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἐπʼ ἀσπίδα περικλάσαντες τούτους, οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ δόρυ, προῆγον ὀρθίους ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐνεργῆ ποιούμενοι τὴν ἔφοδον, ἀεὶ τῶν ἑξῆς ἐπιβαλλόντων καὶ κατὰ περίκλασιν ἑπομένων.

[3] ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτους μὲν οὐ πολὺ συνέβαινε τῶν πολεμίων ἀπέχειν, τοὺς δʼ Ἴβηρας ἐν τῇ κατὰ πρόσωπον πλευρᾷ τόπον ἱκανὸν ἔτι διεστάναι τῷ βάδην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγήν, προσέβαλλον τοῖς κέρασιν ἀμφοτέροις ἅμα τοῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὀρθίαις ταῖς Ῥωμαϊκαῖς δυνάμεσι κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν.

[4] αἱ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα κινήσεις, διʼ ὧν συνέβαινε τοὺς ἑπομένους, ἐπιπαρεμβάλλοντας ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθεῖαν τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, συγκαθίστασθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς τὴν μάχην, τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶχον διάθεσιν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ καθόλου τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῷ λαιῷ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οἱ πεζοὶ τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν.

[5] οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως ἱππεῖς μετὰ τῶν εὐζώνων, ἐκ δόρατος ἐπιπαρεμβάλλοντες, ὑπερκερᾶν ἐπειρῶντο τοὺς πολεμίους, οἱ δὲ πεζοὶ τοὐναντίον ἐξ ἀσπίδος παρενέβαλλον·

[6] τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς σπείραις ἐκ δόρατος, οἱ δʼ ἱππεῖς μετὰ τῶν γροσφομάχων ἐξ ἡνίας.

[7] ἐγεγόνει μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν εὐζώνων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν κεράτων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως τὸ δεξιὸν εὐώνυμον.

[8] οὗ μικρὸν λόγον θέμενος ὁ στρατηγὸς τοῦ μείζονος ἐποιήσατο πρόνοιαν, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπερκέρασιν, ὀρθῶς λογιζόμενος·

[9] εἰδέναι μὲν γὰρ δεῖ τὸ γινόμενον, χρῆσθαι δὲ ταῖς πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ἁρμοζούσαις κινήσεσιν.

[1] ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων συμπλοκῆς τὰ μὲν θηρία διὰ τῶν γροσφομάχων καὶ τῶν ἱππέων ἀκοντιζόμενα καὶ διαταραττόμενα πανταχόθεν ἔπασχε μὲν κακῶς, ἔβλαπτε δʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον τοὺς φίλους ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους· φερόμενα γὰρ εἰκῇ τοὺς ὑποπεσόντας ἐξ ἀμφοῖν αἰεὶ διέφθειρε.

[2] τῆς δὲ πεζικῆς δυνάμεως τὰ μὲν κέρατα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐθραύετο, τὸ δὲ μέσον τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Λίβυας, ὅπερ ἦν χρησιμώτατον, εἰς τέλος ἄπρακτον ἦν·

[3] οὔτε γὰρ παραβοηθεῖν ἠδύναντο τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν κεράτων, λιπόντες τὸν ἴδιον τόπον διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἰβήρων ἔφοδον, οὔτε μένοντες ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐνεργεῖν τι τῶν δεόντων οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν διὰ τὸ μὴ συνιέναι τοὺς κατὰ πρόσωπον πολεμίους αὐτοῖς εἰς τὰς χεῖρας.

[4] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ χρόνον μέν τινα διηγωνίζοντο τὰ κέρατα γενναίως διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὅλων ἑκατέροις συνεστάναι τὸν κίνδυνον.

[5] ἤδη δὲ τοῦ καύματος ἐφεστῶτος κατὰ τὴν ἀκμήν, οἱ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι παρελύοντο διὰ τὸ μὴ πεποιῆσθαι τὴν ἔξοδον κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν, κεκωλῦσθαι δὲ τῆς ἁρμοζούσης παρασκευῆς,

[6] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ ταῖς εὐψυχίαις καθυπερεῖχον, καὶ μάλιστα τῷ τοῖς χρησιμωτάτοις πρὸς τοὺς ἀχρειοτάτους τῶν πολεμίων συμβεβληκέναι διὰ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πρόνοιαν.

[7] τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν κατὰ πόδα πιεζούμενοι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν ἐποιοῦντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κλίναντες ἁθρόοι πρὸς τὴν παρώρειαν ἀπεχώρουν· ἐγκειμένων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων βιαιότερον ἔφευγον εἰς τὸν χάρακα προτροπάδην.

[8] εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ θεὸς αὐτοῖς τις συνεπελάβετο τῆς σωτηρίας, παραχρῆμʼ ἂν ἐξέπεσον ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς.

[9] ἐπιγενομένης δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα συστροφῆς ἐξαισίου,

[10] καὶ καταρραγέντος ὄμβρου λάβρου καὶ συνεχοῦς, μόλις εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν στρατοπεδείαν ἀνεκομίσθησαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι. —

[11] Ἰλούργεια, πόλις Ἰβηρίας, Πολύβιος ἑνδεκάτῃ.

τὸ δὲ τετηκὸς καὶ συνερρυηκὸς ἀργύριον καὶ χρυσίον ἀναζητοῦντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς πλεῖστοι Ῥωμαίων διεφθάρησαν. —

[1] ὅτι πάντων εὐδαιμονιζόντων τὸν Πόπλιον μετὰ τὸ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐξελάσαι τῆς Ἰβηρίας, καὶ παρακαλούντων ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἐπεὶ πέρας ἐπιτέθεικε τῷ πολέμῳ, μακαρίζειν αὐτοὺς ἔφη διότι τοιαύτας ἔχουσι τὰς ἐλπίδας,

[2] αὐτὸς δὲ νῦν καὶ μάλιστα βουλεύεσθαι τίνα τρόπον ἄρξηται τοῦ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους πολέμου·

[3] τὸν μὲν γὰρ πρὸ τούτου χρόνον Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις πεπολεμηκέναι, νυνὶ δὲ τὴν τύχην παραδεδωκέναι καιρὸν εἰς τὸ Ῥωμαίους Καρχηδονίοις ἐξενεγκεῖν πόλεμον. —

ὅτι ὁ Πόπλιος διαλεχθεὶς τῷ Σόφακι,

[4] ἅτε δὴ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εὐφυὴς ὑπάρχων, οὕτω φιλανθρώπως ὡμίλησε καὶ ἐπιδεξίως ὥστε τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν εἰπεῖν ταῖς ὕστερον ἡμέραις πρὸς τὸν Σόφακα διότι φοβερώτερος αὐτῷ Πόπλιος πέφηνε κατὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν ἤπερ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις. —

[1] ὅτι στάσεως γενομένης τινῶν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῷ Ῥωμαϊκῷ, ὁ Πόπλιος, καίπερ ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐφʼ ἱκανόν, ὅμως οὐδέποτε μᾶλλον εἰς ἀπορίαν ἧκε καὶ δυσχρηστίαν. καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔπασχε κατὰ λόγον·

[2] καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰς μὲν ἐκτὸς αἰτίας τοῦ βλάπτειν, λέγω δʼ οἷον ψύχους, καύματος, κόπου, τραυμάτων, καὶ πρὶν γίνεσθαι φυλάξασθαι δυνατὸν καὶ γενομέναις εὐμαρὲς βοηθῆσαι, τὰ δʼ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων γινόμενα φύματα καὶ νόσους δυσχερὲς μὲν προϊδέσθαι, δυσχερὲς δὲ γενομένοις βοηθεῖν,

[3] τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ περὶ πολιτείας καὶ περὶ στρατοπέδων διαληπτέον.

[4] πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἔξωθεν ἐπιβουλὰς καὶ πολέμους πρόχειρος ὁ τρόπος τῆς παρασκευῆς καὶ βοηθείας τοῖς ἐφιστάνουσι,

[5] πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς γενομένας ἀντιπολιτείας καὶ στάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς δύσχρηστος ἡ βοήθεια καὶ μεγάλης ἐπιδεξιότητος καὶ διαφερούσης ἀγχινοίας δεομένη·

[6] πλὴν ἑνὸς παραγγέλματος, ὃ πᾶσιν ἁρμόσει, δεῖ καὶ στρατοπέδοις καὶ πόλεσι καὶ σώμασιν, ὡς ἐμὴ δόξα.

[7] τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ μηδέποτʼ ἐᾶν ἐπὶ πολὺ ῥᾳθυμεῖν καὶ σχολάζειν περὶ μηδὲν τῶν προειρημένων, ἥκιστα δʼ ἐν ταῖς εὐροίαις τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἐν ταῖς δαψιλείαις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.

[8] πλὴν ὅ γε Πόπλιος, ἅτε διαφερόντως ἐπιμελὴς ὤν, καθάπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶπον, ἔτι δʼ ἀγχίνους καὶ πρακτικός, συναθροίσας τοὺς χιλιάρχους τοιάνδε τινὰ τῶν ἐνεστώτων εἰσηγεῖτο λύσιν.

[9] ἔφη γὰρ δεῖν ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς στρατιώταις τὴν τῶν ὀψωνίων ἀπόδοσιν· χάριν δὲ τοῦ πιστεύεσθαι τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν, τὰς ἐπιτεταγμένας εἰσφορὰς ταῖς πόλεσι πρότερον εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς στρατοπέδου χορηγίαν ταύτας νῦν ἁθροίζειν ἐπιφανῶς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ὡς πρὸς τὴν διόρθωσιν τῶν ὀψωνίων γινομένης τῆς παρασκευῆς·

[10] τοὺς δὲ χιλιάρχους τοὺς αὐτοὺς πάλιν πορευθέντας ἀξιοῦν καὶ παρακαλεῖν μετατίθεσθαι τὴν ἄγνοιαν καὶ κομίζεσθαι τὰς σιταρχίας, παραγινομένους ὡς αὐτόν, ἄν τε κατὰ μέρη βούλωνται τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἄν θʼ ὁμοῦ πάντες.

[11] γενομένου δὲ τούτου τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη παρʼ αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ἔφη δεῖν βουλεύεσθαι τί δέον ἐστὶ πράττειν.

[1] οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διανοηθέντες ἐγίνοντο περὶ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐπιμέλειαν· .

[2] τῶν δὲ χιλιάρχων διασαφούντων τὰ δεδογμένα, γνοὺς ὁ Πόπλιος ἀνεκοινοῦτο τῷ συνεδρίῳ τί δέον ἐστὶ ποιεῖν.

[3] ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἡμέραν διασαφήσαντας εἰς ἣν δεήσει παρεῖναι, πρὸς μὲν τὸ πλῆθος διαλύεσθαι, τοὺς δʼ αἰτίους κολάζειν πικρῶς· οὗτοι δʼ ἦσαν εἰς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν.

[4] τῆς δʼ ἡμέρας ἐπελθούσης, καὶ παραγενομένων τῶν ἀποστατῶν ἐπί τε τὰς διαλύσεις καὶ τὴν κομιδὴν τῶν ὀψωνίων,

[5] τοῖς μὲν χιλιάρχοις τοῖς πρεσβεύσασι συνέταξε διʼ ἀπορρήτων ὁ Πόπλιος ἀπαντᾶν τοῖς ἀποστάταις καὶ διελομένους ἕκαστον πέντε τῶν ἀρχηγῶν τῆς στάσεως εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντησιν φιλανθρωπεῖν καὶ καλεῖν ὡς αὑτούς, μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς κατασκήνωσιν· οἳ δʼ ἂν μὴ δύνωνται τοῦτο, πρός γε δεῖπνον καὶ τοιαύτην συνουσίαν.

[6] τῷ δὲ μεθʼ αὑτοῦ στρατοπέδῳ παρήγγειλε πρὸ ἡμερῶν τριῶν ἐφόδια παρεσκευάσθαι κατὰ πλείω χρόνον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην αὐτῶν μετὰ Μάρκου πορευομένων.

[7] ὃ καὶ θαρραλεωτέρους αὐτοὺς ἀκούσαντας ἐποίησε τοὺς ἀποστάτας· ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ὑπέλαβον ἔσεσθαι τὴν πλείστην ἐξουσίαν, ἐπειδὰν συμμίξωσι τῷ στρατηγῷ τῶν ἄλλων στρατοπέδων κεχωρισμένων.

[1] συνεγγιζόντων δʼ αὐτῶν τῇ πόλει, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις στρατιώταις εἰς τὴν ἐπαύριον ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ παρηγγέλλετο μετὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐξάγειν,

[2] τοῖς δὲ χιλιάρχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐπάρχοις, ὅταν ἐκπορευομένοις μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον τὰς μὲν ἀποσκευὰς ἀποτιθέναι, τοὺς δὲ στρατιώτας κατέχειν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐπὶ τῆς πύλης, κἄπειτα διελεῖν σφᾶς ἐφʼ ἑκάστην τῶν πυλῶν καὶ φροντίζειν ἵνα μηδεὶς ἐκπορεύηται τῶν ἀποστατῶν.

[3] οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀπάντησιν ἀποτεταγμένοι, συμμίξαντες τοῖς παραγινομένοις πρὸς αὐτούς, ἀπῆγον μετὰ φιλανθρωπίας τοὺς ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις κατὰ τὸ συντεταγμένον.

[4] τούτοις μὲν οὖν ὑπʼ αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ἐρρήθη συλλαβεῖν τοὺς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντʼ ἄνδρας, ἐπειδὰν δειπνήσωσι, δήσαντάς τε τηρεῖν, μηδενὸς ἔτι τῶν ἔνδον ἐκπορευομένου πλὴν τοῦ διασαφήσοντος τῷ στρατηγῷ παρʼ ἑκάστου τὸ γεγονός.

[5] πραξάντων δὲ τῶν χιλιάρχων τὸ συνταχθέν, εἰς τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ θεωρῶν τοὺς παραγινομένους ἡθροισμένους εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν, συνεκάλει τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.

[6] πάντων δὲ συντρεχόντων κατὰ τὸν ἐθισμὸν ἅμα τῷ σημῆναι, καὶ μετεώρων ὄντων ταῖς διανοίαις οἷόν ποτʼ ὄψονται τὸν στρατηγὸν καὶ τί ποτʼ ἀκούσονται περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων,

[7] πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πυλῶν χιλιάρχους ὁ Πόπλιος διεπέμψατο, κελεύων αὐτοὺς ἄγειν τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ περιστῆναι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, αὐτὸς δὲ προπορευθεὶς ἐξέστησε ταῖς διανοίαις πάντας εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν πρώτην φαντασίαν·

[8] ἔτι γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὐτὸν ἀσθενῶς ἔχειν οἱ πολλοί, κἄπειτα παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν αἰφνιδίως ἐρρωμένον θεασάμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἐπίφασιν κατεπλάγησαν.

[1] οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οὕτω πως ἤρξατο τῶν λόγων. ἔφη γὰρ θαυμάζειν τίνι δυσαρεστήσαντες ἢ ποίαις ἐλπίσιν ἐπαρθέντες ἐπεβάλοντο ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπόστασιν.

[2] τρεῖς γὰρ αἰτίας εἶναι, διʼ ἃς τολμῶσι στασιάζειν ἄνθρωποι πρὸς πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς ἡγουμένους, ὅταν τοῖς προεστῶσι μέμφωνταί τι καὶ δυσχεραίνωσιν, ἢ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασι δυσαρεστῶσιν, ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία μειζόνων ὀρεχθῶσι καὶ καλλιόνων ἐλπίδων.

[3] "ἐρωτῶ δὲ τί τούτων ὑμῖν ὑπῆρξεν; ἐμοὶ δῆλον ὅτι δυσηρεστήσασθε, διότι τὰς σιταρχίας ὑμῖν οὐκ ἀπεδίδουν·

[4] ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἐμὸν μὲν οὐκ ἦν ἔγκλημα· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν ὑμῖν ἐνέλειπε τῶν ὀψωνίων·

[5] εἰ δʼ ἄρʼ ἦν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης, διότι τὰ πάλαι προσοφειλόμενα νῦν οὐ διωρθοῦτο —

[6] πότερον οὖν ἐχρῆν ἀποστάτας γενομένους τῆς πατρίδος καὶ πολεμίους τῆς θρεψάσης οὕτως ἐγκαλεῖν ἢ παρόντας λέγειν μὲν περὶ τούτων πρὸς ἐμέ, παρακαλεῖν δὲ τοὺς φίλους συνεπιλαβέσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν ὑμῖν;

[7] δοκῶ γάρ, ἦν τοῦτο βέλτιον. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μισθοῦ παρά τισι στρατευομένοις ἔστιν ὅτε συγγνώμην δοτέον ἀφισταμένοις τῶν μισθοδοτῶν, τοῖς δʼ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν πολεμοῦσι καὶ γυναικῶν ἰδίων καὶ τέκνων οὐδαμῶς συγχωρητέον·

[8] ἔστι γὰρ παραπλήσιον ὡς ἂν εἴ τις ὑπὸ γονέως ἰδίου φάσκων εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον ἀδικεῖσθαι παρείη μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων, ἀποκτενῶν τοῦτον παρʼ οὗ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸς ἔλαβε.

[9] νὴ Δίʼ ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ τὰς μὲν κακοπαθείας ὑμῖν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους πλείους ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπέταττον, τὰ δὲ λυσιτελῆ καὶ τὰς ὠφελείας ἑτέροις μᾶλλον ἐμέριζον·

[10] ἀλλʼ οὔτε τολμᾶτε τοῦτο λέγειν οὔτε τολμήσαντες δύναισθʼ ἂν ἀποδεῖξαι.

[11] τί οὖν ἐστιν, ἐφʼ ᾧ δυσαρεστούμενοι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἡμῖν τὰς ἀποστάσεις ἐποιήσασθε; τοῦτʼ ἤδη βούλομαι πυθέσθαι· δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν οὔτʼ ἐρεῖν οὔτʼ ἐπινοήσειν ὑμῶν

[1] οὐδένα. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἀσχάλλοντες· πότε γὰρ εὔροια πραγμάτων μείζων; πότε δὲ πλείω προτερήματα γέγονε τῇ Ῥώμῃ; πότε δὲ τοῖς στρατευομένοις μείζους ἐλπίδες ἢ νῦν;

[2] ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἐρεῖ τις τῶν ἀπηλπικότων ὅτι πλείω τὰ λυσιτελῆ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς προυφαίνετο καὶ μείζους ἐλπίδες καὶ βεβαιότεραι· παρὰ τίσι δὴ τούτοις;

[3] ἢ παρʼ Ἀνδοβάλῃ καὶ Μανδονίῳ; καὶ τίς ὑμῶν οὐκ οἶδε διότι πρότερον μὲν οὗτοι παρασπονδήσαντες Καρχηδονίους πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπέστησαν, νῦν δὲ πάλιν ἀθετήσαντες τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐχθροὺς ἡμῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναδεδείχασι;

[4] καλόν γε τούτοις πιστεύσαντας πολεμίους γενέσθαι τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος.

[5] οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐν αὑτοῖς εἴχετε τὰς ἐλπίδας ὡς κρατήσοντες τῆς Ἰβηρίας· οὐδὲ γὰρ μετʼ Ἀνδοβάλου ταχθέντες ἱκανοὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἦτε διακινδυνεύειν, μή τι καὶ καθʼ ἑαυτοὺς ταττόμενοι.

[6] τί οὖν ἦν ᾧ προσείχετε; πυθέσθαι γὰρ ἂν βουλοίμην ὑμῶν. εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις τῶν νῦν προχειρισθέντων ἡγεμόνων καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς πιστεύοντες ἢ καὶ ταῖς ῥάβδοις καὶ τοῖς πελέκεσι τοῖς προηγουμένοις αὐτῶν· ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδὲ λέγειν πλείω καλόν.

[7] ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστι τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδέν· οὐδʼ ἂν ἔχοιθʼ ὑμεῖς δίκαιον οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον εἰπεῖν οὔτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὔτε πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα.

[8] διόπερ ἐγὼ περὶ ὑμῶν πρός τε τὴν Ῥώμην καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἀπολογήσομαι, τὰ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁμολογούμενα δίκαια προθέμενος.

[9] ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶ διότι πᾶς ὄχλος εὐπαραλόγιστος ὑπάρχει καὶ πρὸς πᾶν εὐάγωγος. ὅθεν αἰεὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάθος συμβαίνει περί τε τοὺς ὄχλους καὶ τὴν θάλατταν.

[10] καθάπερ γὰρ κἀκείνης ἡ μὲν ἰδία φύσις ἐστὶν ἀβλαβὴς τοῖς χρωμένοις καὶ στάσιμος, ὅταν δʼ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμπέσῃ τὰ πνεύματα βίᾳ, τοιαύτη φαίνεται τοῖς χρωμένοις οἷοί τινες ἂν ὦσιν οἱ κυκλοῦντες αὐτὴν ἄνεμοι,

[11] τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀεὶ καὶ φαίνεται καὶ γίνεται πρὸς τοὺς χρωμένους οἵους ἂν ἔχῃ προστάτας καὶ συμβούλους.

[12] διὸ κἀγὼ νῦν καὶ πάντες οἱ προεστῶτες τοῦ στρατοπέδου πρὸς μὲν ὑμᾶς διαλυόμεθα καὶ πίστιν δίδομεν ἐφʼ ᾧ μὴ μνησικακήσειν.

[13] πρὸς δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους ἀκαταλλάκτως διακείμεθα, κολάζειν αὐτοὺς ἀξίως καὶ τῶν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τῶν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἡμαρτημένων."

[1] ἀκμὴν δὲ ταῦτʼ ἔλεγε καὶ κύκλῳ μὲν οἱ στρατιῶται περιεστῶτες ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀπὸ παραγγέλματος συνεψόφησαν ταῖς μαχαίραις τοὺς θυρεούς, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις δεδεμένοι γυμνοὶ οἱ τῆς στάσεως αἴτιοι γεγονότες εἰσήγοντο.

[2] τῷ δὲ πλήθει τοιοῦτον παρέστη δέος ὑπό τε τοῦ πέριξ φόβου καὶ τῶν κατὰ πρόσωπον δεινῶν, ὥστε τῶν μὲν μαστιγουμένων, τῶν δὲ πελεκιζομένων μήτε τὴν ὄψιν ἀλλοιῶσαι μήτε φωνὴν προέσθαι μηδένα, μένειν δὲ πάντας ἀχανεῖς, ἐκπεπληγμένους πρὸς τὸ συμβαῖνον.

[3] οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχηγοὶ τῶν κακῶν αἰκισθέντες εἵλκοντο διὰ μέσων, ἀπηλλαγμένοι τοῦ ζῆν· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχόντων

[4] κατὰ κοινὸν ἔλαβον τὰς πίστεις ἐφʼ ᾧ μηδένα μηδενὶ μνησικακήσειν, αὐτοὶ δὲ καθʼ ἕνα προϊόντες ὤμνυον τοῖς χιλιάρχοις ἦ μὴν πειθαρχήσειν τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ μηδὲν ὑπεναντίον φρονήσειν τῇ Ῥώμῃ.

Πόπλιος μὲν οὖν,

[5] μεγάλων κινδύνων ἀρχὴν φυομένων καλῶς διορθωσάμενος, πάλιν ἀποκατέστησε τὰς οἰκείας δυνάμεις εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διάθεσιν. —

[1] ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος συναθροίσας εὐθέως ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ Καρχηδόνι τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἔλεγε περί τε τῆς Ἀνδοβάλου τόλμης καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀθεσίας,

[2] καὶ πολλὰ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐνεγκάμενος παρώξυνε τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν προειρημένων δυναστῶν ὁρμήν.

[3] ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐξηριθμήσατο τοὺς προγεγενημένους αὐτοῖς ἀγῶνας πρὸς Ἴβηρας ὁμοῦ καὶ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους, στρατηγούντων Καρχηδονίων,

[4] ἐν οἷς ἀεὶ νικῶντας οὐ καθήκειν ἔφη νυνὶ διαπορεῖν, μήποτε πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἴβηρας Ἀνδοβάλου στρατηγοῦντος μαχόμενοι λειφθῶσι.

[5] διόπερ οὐδὲ προσδέξασθαι συναγωνιστὴν Ἰβήρων οὐδένα καθάπαξ ἔφη, διʼ αὐτῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων συστήσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον,

[6] ἵνα φανερὸν γένηται πᾶσιν ὡς οὐκ Ἴβηρσι Καρχηδονίους καταπολεμησάμενοι, καθάπερ ἔνιοί φασιν, ἐξεβάλομεν ἐξ Ἰβηρίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Κελτίβηρας ταῖς Ῥωμαίων ἀρεταῖς καὶ τῇ σφετέρᾳ γενναιότητι νενικήκαμεν. ταῦτα δʼ εἰπὼν ὁμονοεῖν παρῄνει καὶ θαρροῦντας,

[7] εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον τινά, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἰέναι τὸν κίνδυνον. περὶ δὲ τοῦ νικᾶν αὐτὸς ἔφη μετὰ τῶν θεῶν ποιήσασθαι τὴν καθήκουσαν πρόνοιαν.

[8] τῷ δὲ πλήθει τοιαύτη παρέστη προθυμία καὶ θάρσος ὥστε παραπλησίους εἶναι πάντας ἐκ τῆς ἀπόψεως τοῖς ὁρῶσι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μέλλουσιν ὅσον οὔπω πρὸς αὐτοὺς διακινδυνεύειν.

[1] τότε μὲν οὖν ταῦτʼ εἰπὼν διαφῆκε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον ἀναζεύξας προῆγε, καὶ παραγενηθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν δεκαταῖος καὶ περαιωθεὶς τῇ τετάρτῃ μετὰ ταύτην προσεστρατοπέδευσε τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, λαβὼν αὐλῶνά τινα μεταξὺ τῆς αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν πολεμίων στρατοπεδείας.

[2] τῇ δʼ ἑξῆς εἰς τὸν προειρημένον αὐλῶνα προσέβαλέ τινα θρέμματα τῶν παρεπομένων τῷ στρατοπέδῳ, συντάξας ἑτοίμους ἔχειν τοὺς ἱππεῖς τῷ Γαΐῳ, τοὺς δὲ γροσφομάχους ἐπέταξε τῶν χιλιάρχων τισὶ παρασκευάζειν.

[3] ταχὺ δὲ τῶν Ἰβήρων ἐπιπεσόντων ἐπὶ τὰ θρέμματʼ ἐξαφῆκε τῶν γροσφομάχων τινάς. γινομένης δὲ διὰ τούτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ προσβοηθούντων ἑκατέροις πλειόνων, συνέστη μέγας ἀκροβολισμὸς τῶν πεζῶν περὶ τὸν αὐλῶνα.

[4] τοῦ δὲ καιροῦ παραδιδόντος εὐλόγους ἀφορμὰς πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν, ἔχων ὁ Γάιος ἑτοίμους τοὺς ἱππεῖς κατὰ τὸ συνταχθὲν ἐπεβάλετο τοῖς ἀκροβολιζομένοις, ἀποτεμόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς παρωρείας, ὥστε τοὺς πλείους αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸν αὐλῶνα σκεδασθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων διαφθαρῆναι. γενομένου δὲ τούτου,

[5] παροξυνθέντες οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ διαγωνιάσαντες μὴ διὰ τὸ προηττῆσθαι δόξωσι καταπεπλῆχθαι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἐξῆγον ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ καὶ παρέταττον εἰς μάχην ἅπασαν τὴν δύναμιν.

[6] ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἕτοιμος μὲν ἦν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς Ἴβηρας ἀλογίστως συγκαταβαίνοντας εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα καὶ τάττοντας οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἱππεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις, ἐπέμενε, βουλόμενος ὡς πλείστους ταύτῃ χρήσασθαι τῇ παρεμβολῇ,

[7] πιστεύων μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι τοῖς ἰδίοις, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς πεζοῖς, διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἐξ ὁμολόγου καὶ συστάδην μάχας τόν τε καθοπλισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς παρʼ αὑτοῦ πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν Ἰβήρων.

[1] ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔδοξε τὸ δέον αὐτῷ γίνεσθαι, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν τῇ παρωρείᾳ τεταγμένους τῶν πολεμίων ἀντέταττε πρὸς δὲ τοὺς εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα καταβεβηκότας ἅθρους ἄγων ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἐπὶ τέτταρας κοόρτις προσέβαλε τοῖς πεζοῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων.

[2] κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον καὶ Γάιος Λαίλιος, ἔχων τοὺς ἱππεῖς, προῆγε διὰ τῶν λόφων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἐπὶ τὸν αὐλῶνα κατατεινόντων, καὶ προσέβαλλε τοῖς τῶν Ἰβήρων ἱππεῦσι κατὰ νώτου, καὶ συνεῖχε τούτους ἐν τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν μάχῃ. λοιπὸν οἱ μὲν πεζοὶ τῶν ὑπεναντίων,

[3] ἐρημωθέντες τῆς τῶν ἱππέων χρείας, οἷς πιστεύσαντες εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα κατέβησαν, ἐπιεζοῦντο καὶ κατεβαροῦντο τῇ μάχῃ, οἱ δʼ ἱππεῖς τὸ παραπλήσιον ἔπασχον·

[4] ἀπειλημμένοι γὰρ ἐν στενῷ καὶ δυσχρηστούμενοι πλείους ὑφʼ αὑτῶν ἢ τῶν πολεμίων διεφθείροντο, τῶν μὲν ἰδίων πεζῶν ἐκ πλαγίου προσκειμένων αὐτοῖς, τῶν δὲ πολεμίων τῶν πεζῶν κατὰ πρόσωπον, τῶν δʼ ἱππέων κατὰ νώτου περιεστώτων.

[5] τοιαύτης δὲ γενομένης τῆς μάχης οἱ μὲν εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα καταβάντες σχεδὸν ἅπαντες διεφθάρησαν, οἱ δʼ ἐν τῇ παρωρείᾳ διέφυγον.

[6] οὗτοι δʼ ἦσαν εὔζωνοι, τρίτον δὲ μέρος τῆς ἁπάσης δυνάμεως, μεθʼ ὧν καὶ τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην συνέβη διασωθέντα φυγεῖν εἴς τι χωρίον ὀχυρόν. —

Πόπλιος δέ,

[7] συντέλειαν ἐπιτεθεικὼς τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἔργοις, παρῆν εἰς τὸν Ταρράκωνα μετὰ μεγίστης χαρᾶς, κάλλιστον θρίαμβον καὶ καλλίστην νίκην τῇ πατρίδι κατάγων.

[8] σπεύδων δὲ μὴ καθυστερεῖν τῆς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ καταστάσεως τῶν ὑπάτων, πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν διατάξας καὶ παραδοὺς τὸ στρατόπεδον τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἰούνιον καὶ Μάρκιον, αὐτὸς ἀπέπλευσε μετὰ Γαΐου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φίλων εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην.

ϝι. ρες ασιαε

[1] καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ Εὐθύδημος Μάγνης, πρὸς ὃν ἀπελογίζετο φάσκων ὡς οὐ δικαίως αὐτὸν Ἀντίοχος ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας ἐκβαλεῖν σπουδάζει·

[2] γεγονέναι γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀποστάτης τοῦ βασιλέως, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρων ἀποστάντων ἐπανελόμενος τοὺς ἐκείνων ἐκγόνους, οὕτως κρατῆσαι τῆς Βακτριανῶν ἀρχῆς.

[3] καὶ πλείω δὲ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν διαλεχθεὶς ἠξίου τὸν Τηλέαν μεσιτεῦσαι τὴν διάλυσιν εὐνοϊκῶς, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν Ἀντίοχον μὴ φθονῆσαι τῆς ὀνομασίας αὑτῷ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ προστασίας,

[4] ὥς γʼ ἐὰν μὴ συγχωρῇ τοῖς ἀξιουμένοις, οὐδετέρῳ τῆς ἀσφαλείας ὑπαρχούσης·

[5] πλήθη γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγα παρεῖναι τῶν Νομάδων, διʼ ὧν κινδυνεύειν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, ἐκβαρβαρωθήσεσθαι δὲ τὴν χώραν ὁμολογουμένως, ἐὰν ἐκείνους προσδέχωνται.

[6] ταῦτα δʼ εἰπὼν ἐξαπέστειλε τὸν Τηλέαν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον.

[7] ὁ δὲ βασιλεύς, πάλαι περιβλεπόμενος λύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, πυθόμενος ταῦτα παρὰ τοῦ Τηλέου, προθύμως ὑπήκουσε πρὸς τὰς διαλύσεις διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας.

[8] τοῦ δὲ Τηλέου προσανακάμψαντος καὶ πολλάκις πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους, τέλος Εὐθύδημος ἐξέπεμψε Δημήτριον τὸν υἱὸν βεβαιώσοντα τὰς ὁμολογίας· ὃν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀποδεξάμενος,

[9] καὶ νομίσας ἄξιον εἶναι τὸν νεανίσκον βασιλείας καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔντευξιν καὶ προστασίαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπηγγείλατο δώσειν αὐτῷ μίαν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρων· δεύτερον δὲ συνεχώρησε τῷ πατρὶ τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ὄνομα.

[10] περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐγγράπτους ποιησάμενος ὁμολογίας καὶ συμμαχίαν ἔνορκον, ἀνέζευξε σιτομετρήσας δαψιλῶς τὴν δύναμιν, προσλαβὼν καὶ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας ἐλέφαντας τοῖς περὶ τὸν Εὐθύδημον.

[11] ὑπερβαλὼν δὲ τὸν Καύκασον καὶ κατάρας εἰς τὴν Ἰνδικήν, τήν τε φιλίαν ἀνενεώσατο τὴν πρὸς τὸν Σοφαγασῆνον τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Ἰνδῶν,

[12] καὶ λαβὼν ἐλέφαντας, ὥστε γενέσθαι τοὺς ἅπαντας εἰς ἑκατὸν καὶ πεντήκοντʼ, ἔτι δὲ σιτομετρήσας πάλιν ἐνταῦθα τὴν δύναμιν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀνέζευξε μετὰ τῆς στρατιᾶς, Ἀνδροσθένην δὲ τὸν Κυζικηνὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνακομιδῆς ἀπέλιπε τῆς γάζης τῆς ὁμολογηθείσης αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως.

[13] διελθὼν δὲ τὴν Ἀραχωσίαν καὶ περαιωθεὶς τὸν Ἐρύμανθον ποταμόν, ἧκε διὰ τῆς Δραγγηνῆς εἰς τὴν Καρμανίαν, οὗ καὶ συνάπτοντος ἤδη τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐποιήσατο τὴν παραχειμασίαν.

[14] τὸ μὲν οὖν πέρας τῆς εἰς τοὺς ἄνω τόπους στρατείας Ἀντιόχου τοιαύτην ἔλαβε τὴν συντέλειαν, διʼ ἧς οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἄνω σατράπας ὑπηκόους ἐποιήσατο τῆς ἰδίας ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπιθαλαττίους πόλεις καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου δυνάστας,

[15] καὶ συλλήβδην ἠσφαλίσατο τὴν βασιλείαν, καταπληξάμενος τῇ τόλμῃ καὶ φιλοπονίᾳ πάντας τοὺς ὑποταττομένους·

[16] διὰ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς στρατείας ἄξιος ἐφάνη τῆς βασιλείας οὐ μόνον τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην.

Notes on the current edition

Histories

1. After the battle at Baecula, Hasdrubal made good his passage over the Western Pyrenees, and thence through the Cevennes , B.C. 208. In the spring of B.C. 207 he crossed the Alps and descended into Italy , crossed the Po, and besieged Placentia . Thence he sent a letter to his brother Hannibal announcing that he would march southward by Ariminum and meet him in Umbria . The letter fell into the hands of the Consul Nero, who was at Venusia , and who immediately made a forced march northward, joined his colleague at Sena , and the next day attacked Hasdrubal. See above, ; Livy, 27, 39-49 .

2. See Livy, 27, 39 .

3. Livy, 27, 44 .

4. Battle of the Metaurus. B. C. 207. Coss, C. Claudius Nero, M. Livius Salinator II.

5. Hasdrubal falls in the battle.

6. There is nothing to show positively that a Rhodian is the speaker: but Livy mentions envoys from Rhodes and Ptolemy this year. For the special attempts of the Rhodians to bring about a peace between Philip and the Aetolians, see , .

6. A speech of the legate from Rhodes ⁶ before an assembly of Aetolians at Heraclea in the autumn of B.C. 207 (see Livy, 28, 7 ), at the end of the summer campaign.

8. Cp. .

9. Attalus eludes Philip. Livy, 28, 7, 8 , B. C. 207.

10. Philip at Thermus See .

11. Defects of the Achaean officers.

12. Speech of Philopoemen urging reform.

13. Philopoemen’s own example.

14. War against Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta . B. C. 208- 207.

15. Battle of Mantinea , B. C. 207.

16. The road to Tegea . See Paus, 8, 10 sq.

17. The attack of Machanidas.

18. The Tarentines were horsemen armed with light skirmishing javelins. See ; ; and cp. Arrian, Tact. 4, § 5 ; 18, § 2 . Livy, 35, 28 ; 37, 40 .

19. The battle begun by light-cavalry charges.

20. Defeat of the Achaean right wing.

21. Machanidas pursues the fugitives, and thus allows the Achaean hoplites to get between him and his quarters.

22. See on .

23. The fight at the dyke.

24. The text is certainly corrupt here, and it is not clear what the general sense of the passage is beyond this,—that Philopoemen calculated on defeating the enemy, as he did, while struggling through the dyke: or on their exposing themselves to attack if they retreated from the dyke without crossing it.

25. Machanidas, returning from the pursuit, is killed while trying to recross the dyke.

26. Death of Machanidas and capture of Tegea .

27. Achaeans in Laconia .

28. Ability of Hannibal. See Livy, 28, 12

29. B.C. 218-202.

30. Hasdrubal son of Gesco encamps near Ilipa (or Silpia) in Baetica , B.C. 206. Livy 28, 13-6 .

31. Scipio advances into Baetica ,

32. and encamps close to the Carthaginian forces.

33. Scipio resolves on a general engagement, and alters his disposition so as to make the battle depend upon the Italians rather than the Spaniards.

34. Or, according to another reading five stades. Livy, 28, 14 , says

quingentos passus.

35. The elephants.

36. The Romans in the mining district of Spain .

37. Scipio’s idea of transferring the war to Africa .

38. See Livy, 28, 17, 18 .

39. Scipio’s influence over Syphax.

40. Scipio appeases a mutiny in the Roman camp, at Sucro. Livy, 28, 24 . In the autumn of B. C. 206.

41. The mutiny suppressed and the ringleaders executed at New Carthage.

42. Scipio’s speech to the mutineers.

43. Scipio at New Carthage has heard of hostile movements on the part of Andobales north of the Ebro , B. C. 206. See Livy, 28, 31-34 .

44. Scipio’s address to his soldiers.

45. Scipio marches to the Ebro , crosses it, and in fourteen days is in the presence of the enemy.

46. A skirmish,

47. Decisive victory of Scipio.

48. The text is imperfect.

49. By further operations in this year, B. C. 206, Scipio had compelled Mago to abandon Spain : and towards the winter the Roman army went into winter-quarters at Tarraco .

50. Scipio returns to Rome in the autumn of B. C. 206.

51. Handing it over to L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, Livy, 28, 38 .

52. Antiochus in Bactria . See ,

53. The answer of Euthydemus (a Magnesian), king of Bactria , to Teleas, the envoy of Antiochus.

54. Antiochus continues his march into the interior of Asia .

55. That is the Caucasus Indicus or Paropamisus: mod. Hindú Kúsh.

56. B. C. 212-205

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Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Death of Hasdrubal

Hasdrubal’s Conduct in His Last Battle

The Romans Celebrate a Victory

A Plea For Union In Greece

Dangers of the Treaty With Rome

Philip In Aetolia Again

Philip Vandalizes Thermus

Faults of the Achaean Officers

Philopoemen in the Peloponnese , B. C. 207

Philopoemen and Machanidas

Arrangement of Forces at Mantinea

Battle of Mantinea

Efficiency of Mercenaries

Machanidas Changes his Plan

Defeat of the Lacedaemonians

Philopoemen Seizes an Opportunity

Army of Machanidas Put to Flight

Fall of Machanidas

The Hannibalian War Continued

Scipio in Spain , After the Battle of the Metaurus

Futile Attack by Mago

Defeat of Hasdrubal Son of Gesco

Scipio Outflanks the Enemy

Carthaginians Driven From Spain

Scipio on the Expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain in Consequence of the Above Victory

Scipio’s Visit to Syphax, King of Masaesylians

Scipio Suppresses A Mutiny in Spain

Scipio’s Plan to Punish the Rebels

Suppression of the Mutiny

Scipio Harangues the Mutinous Troops

Scipio’s Speech Continued

Execution of the Ringleaders

Scipio Proposes to Fight Andobales

Scipio Defeats Andobales

Scipio’s Return To Rome

Antiochus Moves from Bactria Through Interior Asia

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