THE materials, then, from which we must exhort ¹ and dissuade, praise and blame, accuse and defend, the notions also and propositions, useful in order to render these points credible, are those [which we have discussed] : for respecting these questions, and out of these sources, are enthymems deduced, so that an orator, thus provided, may speak on each separate department of questions. But as rhetoric has in ² view the coming to a decision (tor in deliberative oratory, the assembly arrive at decisions, and the sentence of a court of justice is ipso facto a decision) ; it is necessary to look not only to your speech, in what way that will be of a character to convince and persuade, but also to invest yourself with a certain kind of character, and the judge with a certain kind of feeling. For it is a point of great consequence, ³ particularly in deliberative! cases ; and, next to these, in judicial; as well that the speaker seem to be a man of a certain character, as that his audience conceive him to be of a certain disposition toward themselves; moreover it is of consequence if your audience chance to be themselves also disposed in a certain way. ^{4 5} Now, as to a speaker's appearing to be himself of a certain character, this point is more available in deliberations : but the disposing the auditor in a certain way, in judicial cases ; for things do not show themselves in the same light to persons affected by love and by hatred, nor to those under emotions of anger, as to those who are disposed to placability; but they appear either utterly different in character, or at least different in degree. For to a judge who is affected by love toward the party respecting whom he pronounces his decision, that party appears either not at all to be unjust, or to be so in a very trivial degree. To a judge, however, who is affected by hatred, the case has a contrary appearance. So also to a person who is eager and sanguine, the proposed object, if pleasant, takes the appearance, as well of being likely to accrue, as of being likely to prove really a good ; while by one who is indifferent and reluctant, the opposite view is taken.

⁶ Now, there are three causes of a speaker's deserving belief; for so many in number are the qualities on account of which we lend our credit, independently of proof adduced; and these are prudence, moral excellence, and the having our interests at heart2; (for men are fallacious in what they allege or advise by reason, either of all, or some, of these causes; for either, from want of ability, they do not rightly apprehend the question; or, rightly apprehending it, from their depravity, they do not tell you what they think; or, being men both of ability and moral excellence, they have not your interests at heart, on which account it is possible they should not give you the best advice, though fully known what is best;) and besides these there is no other : it follows therefore, of course, that the speaker who appears to possess all these qualities, is considered by his audience ⁷ as deserving credit 3. Now the means by which men ^{8 9} may appear virtuous and prudent, are to be derived ¹⁰ from what has been laid down on the subject of the virtues ; for it is by help of the very same things, that an orator may invest himself, and any one else, in a certain character. The subject of feeling an in- ¹¹ terest, and of friendliness, must be discussed in ray treatise of the passions, commencing henceforth. Passions however are, all emotions whatsoever, on which pain and pleasure are consequent, by whose operation, undergoing a change, men differ in respect to their decisions : for instance, anger, pity, fear, and whatever other emotions are of such a nature, and those opposed to them. But it will be fitting to ¹² divide what I have to say, respecting each, into three considerations; to consider, respecting anger, for example, how those who are susceptible of anger are affected; with whom they usually are angry; and on what occasions. For, granted that we be in possession of one, or even two of these points, and not of them all, it will be impossible for us to kindle anger in the breast; and in the case of the rest of the passions in a similar way. In the same way, then, as on the subjects treated of above I have separately drawn up the several propositions, so let me do in respect of these also, and make my distinctions according to the manner specified.

LET anger be defined to be " a desire accompanied ¹³ by pain of a revenge which presents itself, on ^{14 15 16} count of an apparent slight from persons acting toward one's self, or some of one's friends, unbecom- ¹⁷ ingly." Now, if anger be this, it must be that he who is affected by anger, is so affected invariably towards some individual (for instance, towards Cleon), but not towards mankind2, generally: and this, because the individual has already wrought some indignity, either on himself or some of his friends, or in- ¹⁸ tends doing so. It must be also that there is a sort of pleasure consequent on all anger, arising out of the hope of avenging one's self3; for the idea of attaining what one desires is pleasant; and no one is desirous of objects which appear impracticable to him; and he who is under the affection of anger is desirous of objects which appear practicable to him. Wherefore it has been happily remarked of anger, that it is, " Far, far too dear to every mortal breast, Sweet to the soul, as honey to the taste4.” Because a sort of pleasure is consequent on it, as well on this account, as because men linger in thought on compassing revenge. Now the phantasy which then arises excites a pleasure within us, as do the phanta- ¹⁹ sies of dreams. But as a slight is the operation of an opinion conceived of an object which appears not worth consideration (for we esteem things absolutely bad, and those which are good, and what conduces to them, to be worth some consideration ; that however which is mere nothing, or absolutely trivial, we con- ²⁰ ceive worth none). There are three species of slight, contempt, vexatiousness, and contumely: for he who manifests contempt is guilty of a slight, since men contemn whatever they think worth nothing, and what is worth nothing, they slight. Again, he who is vexatious appears to contemn, for vexatiousness is a thwarting another's wishes, not that any thing may accrue to the person himself who so impedes, but in ^{21 22 23} order that something may not accrue to that other. Since, then, he slights not with a view to any advantage to himself, it is plain that he conceives you can neither hurt him, (for, if he did, he would be afraid, and would not be guilty of slight,) nor can benefit him in any respect worth mentioning, since he would otherwise hold you in consideration, in order to become your friend. He, too, who acts contume- ²⁴ liously manifests slight; for contumely is the doing and saying those things about which the person who is the subject of this treatment, has feelings of delicacy, not with a view that any thing should accrue to himself, other than what arises to him in the act, but in order that he may be gratified; for they who requite an injury, do not act contumeliously, but take revenge. Now the cause of the pleasure felt by those ²⁵ who act contumeliously, is that, by injuring, they conceive themselves to be more decidedly superior: on which account young men and the rich are given to contumely, for in manifesting the contumely, they conceive themselves superior. To contumely belongs the withholding of respect; but he who withholds respect, manifests slight; for that which is of no value, is held in no consideration, either good or bad. On which principle Achilles, in his anger, says, " He hath withheld from me respect, for he hath seized and possesses my prize himself, having taken it from me." And again, " Like some unregarded vagabond ;" as though he were, on this account, affected by anger. Now people think it becoming that they ²⁶ should De looKea up to oy their interiors, whether in birth, power, or moral excellence, or generally speaking, in whatever respect one may happen to be ²⁷ much superior: thus the rich man thinks to be looked up to by the poor, in regard to money; also the man who has a faculty of speaking, by him who is destitute of it, in the case of speaking ; and he who thinks himself worthy to bear office, by him who deserves to be subject to rule. Whence it has been said, " Beware ! for dreadful is the wrath of kings:” and in another place, " 'Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last:” for they feel indignant by reason of their superiority. ²⁸ Moreover [men think it becoming that they should be looked up to] by those at whose hands they think they ought to receive good; and these are such as they have benefited, or continue to benefit, whether in their own persons, or as instruments of any one, and whom any of their relatives have benefited, or wish, or did wish to benefit.

²⁹ 1. From hence it is by this time manifest both under what affections as regards themselves, and with what objects, and for what reasons, men feel anger. For as regards themselves, it is when they happen to be aggrieved, since he who is aggrieved is anxious for something. Now a man [will feel thus aggrieved], as well on any person's clashing with him in regard to any object, directly; when he is thirsty, for example, in regard to drinking: as also should they not directly clash, yet will he appear to do the same thing; and if a person thwarts, or does not co-operate with one, and if a person annoys one in any respect, when thus circumstanced, one feels anger against all these. ³⁰ On which account people who are ill, in poverty, love, thirst, in a word, who are under desire, and fail of success, these all are fretful and irritable, and particularly with those who slight their present condition: the sick man, for example, is annoyed by those who slight him in regard to his disease: the poor man too, with those who do so in regard to his poverty; and the warrior, in regard to war; the lover, in regard to love; and in other cases similarly, for each one has the way paved to the feeling anger in each case, by the passion which exists in his mind. Again, a man ³¹ is nettled should he happen to be expecting the very opposite of what results; for that pains one more deeply which falls out very unexpectedly; just in the same ratio as that which is very unexpected delights, should it be what one wishes for. On which account seasons, times, dispositions, and ages, which class of them are readily excited to anger, and when, and how, will be plain from this which I have said ; also it will be plain that they are then excited with greater readiness, when more immediately influenced by these circumstances. As then regards the persons themselves, under these dispositions it is that they are readily excited to anger.

2. But people feel anger towards those who laugh ³² at them excessively, and gibe, and scoff at them, for these treat them with contumely ; with such also as hurt them in all particulars, of such a nature as are tokens of contumely: these of course must be such as neither are in requital for any thing, or beneficial to those who are the agents 6; for this is enough to make it appear to be an act solely of contumely: towards ³³ those also who underrate and despise what themselves take a warm interest in; thus all those who are fond of philosophy, are angry if any one undervalues philosophy ; so, too, they who embrace the notion of an universal idea7, are nettled if a person despises the doctrine; and as regards other things in a similar manner. But all this will be felt much more keenly, ³⁴ it these persons suspect that the qualities so underrated do not really belong to them, or not completely, or not firmly, or that they do not appear to belong to them ; since, if they conceive themselves to be very strong in the points on which they happen to be rallied, they do not regard its, and anger is felt to- ^{35 36 37} wards friends, in a greater degree than towards such ³⁸ as are not friends; because people conceive it to be more fitting to receive good at their hands than not: ³⁹ also towards those who have been in the habit of honouring or bestowing consideration on them, if, on the contrary, they do not keep on the same terms with them; because people conceive themselves despised bv them. for otherwise they would do as be- ⁴⁰ fore. Towards those also who do not requite a kindness, or who do not return an equivalent, towards those also who thwart them, if they be inferiors; for these all appear to despise them, the latter as though they were their inferiors, the former as though the ⁴¹ kindness had been received] from inferiors. Men feel it also in a greater degree towards persons of no account, should they slight them; for anger is supposed to arise from a slight, and to exist towards persons whose conduct misbecame them ; now it becomes inferiors to make no manifestation of slight. ⁴² Towards friends, anger is felt if they do not or speak not well; and still more so if they do the contrary; also if they should not perceive us to be in want, just as the Plexippus of Antipho was angry with Meleager; for not to perceive this is a token of slight, since in regard to those for whom we feel ⁴³ deference, this does not escape our notice: towards those also it is felt who exult in their misfortunes; and, in a word, towards such as are in good spirits amid their misfortunes ; for this marks either a foe, or one who manifests slight: towards those also who do not care if they give us pain; wherefore, men feel anger towards those who announce evil tidings10. ⁴⁴ Against those also is anger felt who either readily listen to, or scrutinize our failings; for they resemble persons who slight us, or who are our enemies ; since a friend sympathizes with one, and all men, as their ⁴⁵ peculiar failings are scrutinized, feel pain. More- ^{46 47} over men feel anger towards those who slight them ⁴⁸ in the presence of five descriptions of persons, viz. in the presence of those whom they emulate, whom they admire, by whom they are desirous of being admired, in whose presence they are alive to delicacy of feeling, and before those who have a delicacy of feeling towards them; if before these any one should slight them, they feel anger more sensibly: with those also do men feel angry who slight them in such respects, as it is disgraceful for them not to stand up in defence of; in regard to parents, for instance, or children, wives, or persons in subjection: with those, too, who make no return of favours; for the slight then is contrary to what is becoming : and with those who play off sarcasms upon them when seriously engaged ; for sarcasm has an air of contempt: also with those who benefit others, if they do not also benefit them; since this also carries an air of contempt, the not thinking them worthy what all are worthy of. Also the letting a man escape our memory is a thing very apt to provoke anger; for example, the nearly forgetting even his name, since forgetfulness seems to be an indication of slight; because forgetfulness arises from disregard, and disregard is a kind of slight. Now, it has been told you against whom men feel anger, and under what dispositions, and why11. It evidently will be needful for an orator to work up his audience by his speech, into such a frame of mind as that under which men are prone to anger, and his adversary, too, as being obnoxious to that on account of which men feel anger, and as being such an one as people feel anger against. ⁴⁹

⁵¹ As the feeling anger is the opposite of being appeased, and anger itself of placability, we must ascertain with what dispositions men are placable, towards whom they are thus affected, and by what ^{52 53 54} means they are appeased. Let placability, then, be defined to be " a subsiding and appeasement of anger1.” Now, if men feel anger towards those who slight them, and if slight be voluntary, it is plain that they are placable in regard to those who do no such thing, or who either do so, or appear to do so, involuntarily : towards those also who wish the contrary of what they do; and those who behave in the same way toward themselves also, for no one seems likely him- ⁵⁵ self to be guilty of slight towards himself. Men are thus disposed also towards such as acknowledge and repent of their guilt; for taking their feeling of pain for what they have done as a punishment, they are appeased :-there is proof of this in the case of chastising servants; for we chastise more violently those who contradict us, and deny their guilt; but towards such as acknowledge themselves to be justly punished, we cease from our wrath2; the reason of which is, that the denial of what is evident is a sort of impudence, and impudence is slight and contempt: therefore we are not alive to sense of shame, in regard to those whom we despise very ⁵⁶ much. Men are thus disposed also towards those who humble themselves before them3, and do not ^{57 58 59} contradict their imputations; for they appear to acknowledge themselves inferior ; but inferiors fear us, and no one who fears is guilty of slight. But the fact that anger ceases towards such as humble themselves, even dogs evince by their not biting those who sit as suppliants. Placability is also felt ⁶⁰ towards such as are earnestly attentive, where they are themselves attentive; for they think themselves regarded with attention, and not despised: towards such as [subsequently to their manifesting slight] ⁶¹ have gratified us in more important points, and with those who implore us, and deprecate our anger; for these are more humble: towards those also, who ⁶² are not given to contumely, nor to jeering one; and who do not manifest slight towards any one, or towards those alone who are not good men, and not towards such as we ourselves are. In a word, we ⁶³ should consider the subject of placability, from the opposite of the doctrine of anger. Once more, it is ⁶⁴ felt towards those whom men fear, or have a delicacy toward ; for so long as they are thus affected, they are not influenced by anger; since it is impossible to feel anger and fear at the same time. Again, ⁶⁵ people either do not feel anger at all, or feel it in a less degree, towards those who have themselves acted under the influences of anger ; for these appear to have acted, not from any motive of slight; for no one who is angry with you slights you ; since slight ⁶⁶ is unattended by pain, anger, however, is so attended. Thus are they also disposed towards such as regard them with respect.

It is evident, also, that men are placable, when in a ⁶⁷ frame of mind contrary to the feeling of anger; thus in amusements, in mirth, in festivity, amid rejoicings, or a course of success and of gratification, or, in a word, when in a state of freedom from pain, and amid chastened pleasure and virtuous hope. Those, too, who have suffered some time to elapse, and are not fresh from the influence of anger; for time makes anger cease4. Also vengeance previously taken on ^{68 69 70} one object allays the anger felt against another, even if he be more violent. For which reason, Philocrates, when some one asked him " how it was, as the populace were enraged with him, that he did not make his defence," very justly said, " I will not do it yet.”— " But when will you ?"—" I will do it, when I see some one else criminated." For people, after they have exhausted their anger on some other object, become placable ; which happened in the case of Ergophilus; for the populace, though more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, yet acquitted him, because, on the day before, they had condemned Cal- ⁷¹ listhenes to death. Men are thus disposed if they have convicted the object, and if he have suffered a greater ill than they, with all their anger, would have themselves inflicted; for they think they have gotten, as it were, their revenge. Again, if they are aware that they are themselves unjust, and suffer de- ⁷² servingly5; because anger is not felt at what is just; for in that case men no longer conceive themselves sufferers contrary to what is becoming; but anger was defined to be such a feeling. On which account we should preface punishment with a sort of lecture; for thus even slaves feel less indignant at being pun- ⁷³ ished. Moreover they are thus disposed, if they conceive that the sufferer will not perceive that he is punished by them, and in return for what they have have suffered; for anger is felt against individuals: ⁷⁴ Thucyd. iii. 38. ^{75 76} and this is plain from the definition. Hence is it said in the poem with great propriety, " Go, say 'twas Ulysses, subverter of cities," etc.; as though the hero had not been revenged, unless Polyphemus perceived both by whom6, and in return for what7, he suffered. So that men are not angry with any who are no longer sensible; neither any longer with those who are dead8, as being persons who have endured the extremity of suffering; nor with those who will not be susceptible of pain, nor feel the punishment inflicted, a point of which those affected by anger are desirous. On which account the poet, wishing to restrain Achilles from his anger against Hector now that he is dead, aptly says, " In his madness he is vexing a senseless clod." It is evident that arguments must be deduced ⁷⁷ from the topics here furnished, by those who would appease their audience; by working up the hearers themselves into feelings such as I have described; and those with whom they are enraged, either as objects of fear, or as deserving reverence, or as persons who have benefited them, or as having been involuntary agents, or as now exceedingly pained at what they have done. ^{78 79 80 81}

⁸³ LET us discuss the characters towards whom men bear friendly feelings, and hatred, and the reasons why they do so; setting out with a definition of friendliness and the act of cherishing this feeling. ⁸⁴ Let the bearing friendly feeling, then, be defined to be "the wishing a person what we think good, for his sake and not for our own, and, as far as is in our power, the exerting ourselves to procure it." And a friend is he who entertains and meets a return of this feeling. And those people consider themselves friends who consider themselves to stand thus affected towards each other.

⁸⁵ These considerations being laid down, of necessity it must be, that one who participates in another's joy at good fortune, and in his sorrow at what aggrieves him, not from any other motive, but simply for his sake, is his friend. For every one, when that happens which he wishes, rejoices; but when the contrary happens, all are grieved. So that the pain and pleasure men feel are an indication of their wishes. ⁸⁶ Those, too, are friends, to whom the same things are become by this time good, and the same evil; those, too, who are friends and foes to the same persons, for these must necessarily desire similar objects. So that he who wishes for another what he does for ⁸⁷ himself, appears to be a friend to that other. Men love also those who have benefited either themselves, or those for whom they have a regard; whether in important particulars, or with readiness2, and for their own sakes, or those whom they deem willing to ⁸⁸ benefit them. Again, people love the friends of their friends, and such as cherish friendly feelings towards ^{89 90} those for whom they do themselves; likewise those who are loved by such as are beloved by themselves; those also who are enemies to the same people, and ⁹¹ who hate those whom they hate themselves, and those who are hated by those who also are hated by themselves; for to all these the same objects seem good as to themselves; so that they wish for things which are good to them, both which were laid down to be characteristic of a friend. Moreover men love ⁹² those who benefit them in regard to money matters, and the security of life; on which account people ⁹³ honour the liberal and brave. They love also the just, of which character they esteem those who do not live at the cost of others, such are all who are supported by their bodily labour, and of these are husbandmen, and among the rest handicraftsmen ^{94 95} in particular. They love also the temperate, for they are not unjust; and those who are disengaged from business, for the same reason. We love also ⁹⁶ those of whom we wish to become the friends, should they appear to desire it also. Of this sort are those who are good in respect to moral excellence, and men of approved character, either among all men, or among the best men, or those who are held in admiration by ourselves, or who themselves admire us. Again, we love those who are pleasant companions ⁹⁷ for passing time, or spending a day with; of this description are the good-tempered, and such as are not fond of chiding those who err, and are not quarrelsome or contentious3. For all people of this sort are fond of dispute ; but such as are fond of dispute give us the idea of desiring the opposite of ^{98 99} what we do. Also those who have a happy turn in passing and taking a joke ; for both seem bent on the same things as their neighbours, being able both to endure being rallied and neatly rallying others 4. ¹⁰⁰ Men love also those who praise their good qualities, and particularly such as they apprehend not to belong ¹⁰¹ to them: also those who are neat in their appearance, their dress, and their whole manner of living. Also ¹⁰² those who do not reproach them with errors, nor their own benefits; for both these descriptions of ¹⁰³ people have an air of reproving them. People admire also those who forget old grievances ; and who do not treasure up grounds of quarrel, but are easily reconciled ; because of whatever disposition they show themselves towards others, people naturally think they ¹⁰⁴ will prove to be of towards themselves also: as also those who do not talk scandal, nor inform themselves of the ills either of their neighbours or themselves, but of their good points only; for this is the con- ¹⁰⁵ duct of a good man. We are friendly disposed also towards those who are not at cross purposes with us when angry, or seriously engaged; for all such people are fond of dispute: towards those also who comport themselves seriously towards us; thus, for instance, those who admire us, or consider us worthy ¹⁰⁶ men, and take a pleasure in our society, and who are thus affected in regard particularly to points about which ourselves are desirous to be admired, or to ap- ¹⁰⁷ pear excellent or agreeable : as also towards our equals, and those who have the same objects in view, supposing they do not clash with us5, and that their livelihood arise not from the same profession, for thus ^{108 109} arises an instance of the proverb, “ Potter hates potter6.” We stand thus affected towards those also ¹¹⁰ who are desirous of the same objects with ourselves, and which it is possible for us to participate in as well as them; otherwise the same collision takes place in this case: towards those also, in regard to ¹¹¹ whom men have themselves in such a way as, while they do not hold them cheap, not to feel shame on mere matters of opinion. With this feeling do peo- ¹¹² ple regard those also in respect to whom they feel shame about matters really shameful: and those before whom they are studious to stand approved, and by whom they wish to be emulated, yet without being envied, all these men either love as friends, or wish to become their friends; also those with whom ¹¹³ they would co-operate toward some good, were it not that greater ills are likely thereby to befall themselves: and such as regard with friendly feeling, the ¹¹⁴ absent equally with the present; on which account all love those who manifest this disposition in regard to the dead. Also men entirely love those who are particularly zealous for their friends and never abandon them ; for eminently beyond all the good, people love those who are good as friends. They also love ¹¹⁵ those who do not dissemble towards them; of this class are such as mention their own failings; for it has been said already, that before friends we feel no shame about mere matters of opinion; if, then, he who is so ashamed has not the feelings of a friend, the man who is without such shame bears a resemblance to one who has friendly feelings. Also we love those who do not inspire us with fear, and before whom we feel confidence; for no one loves a person whom he fears7. But the species of friend- ^{116 117} ship are companionship, intimacy, relationship, and the like. And the efficient causes of friendship are gratuitous benefits, the rendering a service unsolicited, and the not disclosing it after it has been ren- ^{118 119} dered ; for thus done the favour appears to be solely for the sake of your friend himself, and from no other motive.

¹²⁰ The subject of hatred, however, and of bearing it, may, it is plain, be considered by taking the contraries. But the efficient causes of hatred are anger, vexatiousness, calumny.

¹²¹ 1. Now anger arises out of something which has reference to ourselves; hatred, however, even independently of any thing having reference to ourselves, since if we conceive a person to be of a certain description, we bear hatred towards him. 2. And our anger invariably has reference to individual objects, as to Callias or Socrates ; but hatred may be borne even to whole classes; for every one hates the character of a thief and an informer. 3. Again, the one feeling is to be remedied by time; the other is incurable. 4. Also the first is a desire of inflicting pain on its object, the last of doing him deadly harm; for the angry man wishes to be felt9, to him who bears hatred this matters not; and all things which give pain may be felt; but what does harm in the highest degree, is least capable of being felt, for instance, injustice and folly, for the presence of vice does not at all pain [him to whom it is present]. 5. And anger is attended by pain, hatred is not; for he who is affected by anger is pained, but he who is affected by ^{122 123} hatred is not. 6. The former, too, had many ills befallen the object of his anger, might be inclined to pity him; the latter would not, in any case; for the former wishes the object of his anger to suffer in his turn, the latter desires the extinction of the object of his hate10. Out of these heads, then, it is plain that ¹²⁴ the orator may both prove those to be friends and enemies who really are such, and render such those who are not, and may do away the assertions of people on the subject, and may draw over those who hesitate whether an act was done from motives of anger or hatred, to whatsoever side he may fix on.

THE sort of things which men fear, and the persons ¹²⁵ whom, and under what affections as regards themselves, will thus become plain. Now, let fear be defined to be " A sort of pain or agitation, arising out of an idea that an evil, capable either of destroying or giving pain, is impending on us." People do not fear every evil1; for example, a man does not fear lest he shall become unjust or stupid; but people fear all those evils whose effect is either a considerable degree of pain, or destruction, and these, provided they be not far removed, but give one the idea of being close at hand, so as to be on the eve of happening2; for they do not fear that which is very far ^{126 127 128} off: for all know that they shall die; but since the event is not near, they pay no attention to it.

¹²⁹ If then fear be this, it must follow that all those things are to be feared which appear to possess great power either of destroying, or of hurting, in points whose tendency is toward considerable pain. On which account even the symptoms of such things are alarming, for the evil appears to be at hand; since this in fact is danger, viz. “ the approach of what ¹³⁰ excites fear." Of this description, however, are both the hatred and the anger of those who have it in their power to do us any harm3; for it is evident that they have both the will and the power, so that they are ¹³¹ not far from doing it. Also injustice, possessed of power; for [it is evident that it does not want inclination to do harm] since it is from settled inclination ¹³² that the unjust man is unjust. Also insulted virtue, invested with power; for it is evident that, invariably, when it is insulted, it determines on a requital, ¹³³ and now it has the power of exacting one. The fear also of those who have the power of doing us any harm, is itself an object to be dreaded; for any one, in such circumstances, will of course be prepared against us.

¹³⁴ But as men in general are depraved, and may be prevailed on by gain, and are timid amid dangers; it is, generally speaking, a fearful thing to be at the ¹³⁵ disposal of another. So that accomplices in any deed of guilt are to be feared, lest either they should ¹³⁶ denounce you, or abandon you to trial. Also those who have the power to act unjustly, are always objects of fear to such as may be attacked by injustice ; for, in nine cases out of ten, a man when he has the power, perpetrates the injustice. Also those who ¹³⁷ have been wronged4, or who conceive themselves to ¹³⁸ have been wronged; for they are ever on the watch for an opportunity [of retaliating]. Also those who have wronged others5, if possessed of power, are to be feared, from their apprehension of being retaliated on ; for cases of this kind were laid down to be such as to excite alarm. Those, too, who are rivals for ¹³⁹ the same objects, and which it is not possible should accrue to both, for people are ever at variance with those towards whom they stand on this footing. Those who are objects of fear to our superiors, are also objects of fear to ourselves; for much more will they be able to injure us, than our superiors: and for ¹⁴⁰ the same reason [we needs must tear thosej whom our superiors fear6. Men dread those also who have already annihilated persons superior to themselves; and those who have attacked their inferiors; for, either they are already deserving fear, or they will become so by being aggrandized in power. And ¹⁴¹ among those who have been wronged, or are enemies, or opponents, it is not the passionate, and those who speak their minds freely, who are to be dreaded ; but ¹⁴² the mild, the dissembling, and the insidious ; for they give us to doubt, whether they be not close upon us, so that they are never clearly known to be too far off to reach us. ^{143 144 145}

^{146 147} But all those circumstances which excite fear, have a still greater tendency to do so, in respect of which should a man have committed a mistake, it is not possible for him to recover himself, but which either are impracticable altogether, or which cannot be corrected by himself, but by his enemies only : as have those also which we have no means, or no easy means, of ¹⁴⁸ averting. So that, to speak generally, all those things are to be feared, which, happening or being likely to happen in the case of others, excite compassion. The circumstances then of fear, and which men are alarmed at, those at least of greatest importance, are, as I may say, nearly those which I have enumerated: and now let me state under what dispositions, as regards themselves, men are susceptible of fear.

¹⁴⁹ Now, if fear be attended by an apprehension of suffering some destructive evil, it is plain that none of those who consider that they shall not suffer any thing, is subject to fear; and that no one is subject to it, in regard to those things which he does not consider that he shall suffer; nor in regard to those persons at whose hands he does not apprehend any thing; nor at a time when he is without apprehensions. It must follow, therefore, that those are subject to fear, who apprehend they shall suffer something, and this in regard to the persons at whose hands, and the things which, and at the times when. ¹⁵⁰ they so apprehend. But neither are those who are, and who think themselves to be, in the midst of great good fortune, at all apprehensive of suffering any thing, (on which account they are contumelious, contemptuous, and rash; but it is wealth, strength, number of friends, power, which renders men of this temper,) nor those who think that already they have suffered the sum of all that is horrible7, and whose feelings have been chilled with respect to what awaits them, just as those who have been already beaten on the rack; but [in order to the existence of fear] there must needs arise some hope of safety, about ¹⁵¹ which men feel the painful anxiety8; and this is a proof of it, that fear makes men deliberate; and yet no one deliberates about that which is utterly hopeless. So that, when it shall better serve our cause ¹⁵² that the audience be affected by fear, we must set them off as persons liable to suffer, inasmuch as others of greater power have suffered, and also to show that their equals are or have been exposed to sufferings; and this, at the hands of persons from whom they would not have apprehended it, and such things, and at times when they would not have apprehended it.

But since on the subject of fear, it is plain what it ¹⁵³ is ; and on the subject of things exciting fear, and also with what dispositions men experience it; from this it will be plain both what confidence is, and on what points men are confident, and with what dispositions ; for both confidence itself is the opposite of fear, and what inspires it is the opposite of what excites fear; so that it is the hope of things conducive to safety, accompanied by an idea that they are near; and of things to be feared, that they either do not exist, or are at a distance.

But these are circumstances inspiring confidence; ¹⁵⁴ to have danger afar off, and that in which we may confide, near: also means of recovering from, or of averting loss, whether these be numerous, or valua- ¹⁵⁵ ble, or both: again, should we never have been injured, nor have ourselves injured others ; also, if we have no rival at all; or should those we have, be devoid of power; or, supposing they have power, should they be our friends ; or should they have benefited us, or have been themselves benefited by us; or should those, to whom the same things are an object as to ourselves, be more numerous than those to whom they are not, or more powerful, or both at once.

¹⁵⁶ But, as regards themselves, people feel confidence when-thus affected : should they conceive themselves to have been often successful, and this without having suffered ; or should they often have fallen into danger, and have escaped9: for there are two ways in which men become dead to apprehension, either from never having experienced, or from being possessed of resources against calamity; just as, in the case of danger by sea, both those who never experienced a storm feel confidence as to the result, and those who from their experience possess resources ¹⁵⁷ against it. Men feel it also, when the case does not alarm their equals, nor their inferiors, nor those to whom they conceive themselves superior ; but they conceive thus of those whom, either absolutely in their own persons, or virtually in the persons of their su- ¹⁵⁸ periors or of their equals, they have overcome. And again, if they conceive there belong to themselves, in greater number and degree, those things in which, when they have the advantage, men are objects of fear; and these are, store of wealth, and strength in respect to retainers, and friends, and territory, and warlike preparation, either all together, or the most ¹⁵⁹ important of them. Also, if they have not wronged ¹⁶⁰ any one, or not many, or not any of such a character as men are apprehensive of. And, in a word, if their ¹⁶¹ account stands well with heaven, as well in other respects, as in what regards omens and oracles10: because anger is a thing which inspires confidence; and the being free from the commission of injustice, while you are wronged yourself, is productive of anger ; and the deity is supposed to aid such as have been wronged. [Once more, people feel confidence] ¹⁶² when, being the first aggressors, they think they can suffer nothing, or shall not, or shall succeed at last. And of the subject of what inspires confidence and fear, we have spoken.

THE points about which men feel delicate, or are in- ¹⁶³ sensible to such feelings, and towards whom, and with what dispositions, will be manifest from what follows. Now, let sense of shame be defined to be ¹⁶⁴ " a kind of pain and agitation about evils present, past, or to come, which appear to tend to loss of character." And impudence to be, “ a sort of neglect and callousness about these points."

Now, if the sensibility defined be actually sensi- ¹⁶⁵ bility to shame, it must follow that a man is affected by it, on the occurrence of evils of a kind which appear to be disgraceful, either to himself, or those for ¹⁶⁶ whom he has a regard: and such are all results of depravity whatsoever; for example, the casting away one's shield, or the turning to flight, for this pro- ^{167 168} ceeds from cowardice; and the withholding a deposit from a person, for it is the result of injustice. And that cohabitation with those with whom we ought not, or where, or when we ought not, [is a source of ^{169 170 171} shame;] for it is the result of intemperance: as is also the deriving gain from paltry, mean, or impracticable sources, as from the poor, for instance, or from the dead; whence also the proverb, " to pillage even from the dead:" for it is the result of a sordid ¹⁷² hankering after lucre, and of meanness. It is also a source of shame for a person, who has the means, not to contribute his aid in money matters, or to do so in a minor degree; and for one to be assisted by ¹⁷³ those in less easy circumstances than himself; and for one to borrow himself, when his friend appears to be asking a loan ; and to ask a further loan, when he would recall a former; and the recalling a former loan when he asks another ; and the praising a thing to such a degree as to seem to ask for it; and the persisting no less, though often foiled; for these are ¹⁷⁴ all indications or meanness. And the praising a person in his presence is a token of adulation; and the praising a man's good points, while you slur over his failings ; or, when one is grieved, the exhibiting grief in an inordinate degree, and whatever other conduct is of a similar kind, [is a source of shame,] ¹⁷⁵ because it manifests adulation. [It is also shameful] not to sustain toils which those who are advanced in years, or who live delicately, or who are of higher rank, or, in a word, which they sustain whose strength is inferior to your own; because all these ¹⁷⁶ are indications of effeminacy: and so it is to be benefited by another, and that frequently; or, to re- ^{177 178} proach a person with his obligations to you; for they are all indications of a mean and abject spirit. Again, to talk about one's self, and to be one's own ¹⁷⁹ trumpeter ; and to assert that to be one s own which belongs to another; for these are indications of arrogance. In the same way, too, in the several other instances of moral depravity, both their results, their indications, and the like attendant circumstances, are all subjects of shame; for they are disgraceful, and make one ashamed. And to the afore-mentioned we ¹⁸⁰ may add, the non-participation in those creditable qualities which either every body, or all our equals, or the greatest part of them, partake of. By equals I mean, fellow countrymen, citizens, those of the same age, relations; in a word, those with whom we are on an equality ; for [when a thing is so general] the non-participation in it begins to be disgraceful; for instance, the not having been educated2, at least in a certain degree, and so in the case of other deficiencies; but the disgrace of all these things becomes much greater, should they appear to be wanting by our own fault; for thus, they are more properly the result of depravity should one be himself the cause of what has attached to him. or does now. or is likely so to attach. Again, men are sensible to ¹⁸¹ feelings of shame, when they are suffering, have suffered, or are about to suffer any thing of such a nature, as tends to loss of respect, and disgrace: and these are all services consisting in the lending one's self either personally, or in any shameful action where there is an idea of suffering insult: and whatever administers to intemperance, whether it be voluntary, or not: and submission to violence, if invo- ¹⁸² luntary; for such submission, without defending one's self, proceeds from an unmanly character, and from cowardice. These then, and the like to these, are the things about which men are sensible of shame.

^{183 184} But as the sense of shame is an idea entertained of loss of character; and of this loss, in itself alone, without reference to its consequences ; and as no one regards the opinion, except for the sake of those who hold it; it must follow that a man is thus sensible in regard to those for whom he has an esteem. But he will have an esteem for those who admire him, and whom he does himself admire, and by whom he wishes to be admired, and in regard to whom he feels emulation, and whose opinion he does not hold cheap. ¹⁸⁵ Now, people wish to be admired by, and do themselves admire, all those who possess any of those goods which are valued; or from whom they happen to be very much in want of getting something of which they have the disposal; for instance, those who ¹⁸⁶ are in love. But people have their emulation excited, in reference to their equals; and they hold in consideration the prudent, as being men who adhere to truth; of this description are men of education, and ¹⁸⁷ such as are advanced in years. Also actions done in the eyes of the world and in public [excite our shame], and hence the proverb, that " Shame dwells in the eyes." On this account, people are more sensible of shame before those with whom they are always likely to be present, and those who fix their attention on them, for both these are instances of being before the ¹⁸⁸ eyes of persons :-again, they are sensible of it before those who are not open to charges on the same points ; for their sentiments, it is evident, are the opposite of their own: before those also who do not make allowances for such as appear to be faulty; for errors which a man commits himself ,these he is said ¹⁸⁹ not to take amiss in his neighbours; so that he evidently will take amiss such as he does not commit himself: and before those who are fond of divulging ¹⁹⁰ what they know to the world; for whether a man does not think one's conduct faulty, or does not divulge it, makes no difference. But persons likely to divulge [what they know to one's discredit] are such as have been injured, from their being anxiously on the watch to retaliate ; and those who are slanderers generally; for if they speak ill even of those who are not culpable, much more will they of those who are: as are also those who are on the look-out for the errors of their neighbours, for instance, jesters, and the poets of the old comedy ; for these are in some sense slanderers, and fond of divulging. Again, [men are sensible of shame] before those with whom they never met with a repulse; for they are disposed towards them as admirers. On which account men have a sense of shame, even towards those who ask any thing for the first time, as having never yet forfeited their good opinion in any points. And of this description are both those who have lately sought to be our friends, for they have observed our excellent qualities; and hence, the reply of Euripides to the Syracusans is a good one4; and, of our old acquaintances, those who know no ill of us. And men are ¹⁹¹ sensible of shame not only about the things themselves which have been mentioned as delicate points, but even about the indications of them; for instance, not only about licentious conduct, but also about all indications of it; not only in doing what is disgraceful, but even in mentioning it5. And in the same ¹⁹² way they are sensible ot shame, not only before those who have been mentioned, but before those also who ^{193 194 195 196} will be likely to disclose their conduct to them, as for instance, their servants or their friends. In brief, however, people are not at all sensible of shame before those whose opinions, in regard to their justness, they hold cheap; for no one feels shame before children and brutes: nor do men feel it about the same points when before acquaintances, as before strangers; but when before acquaintances they feel it on points really shameful6; but before strangers on matters merely sanctioned by custom.

¹⁹⁷ As regards themselves, men would be likely to be sensible of shame under these dispositions; first, if there should really exist any so affected towards themselves, as I described those to be, in regard to whom they feel shame. And these were either those whom they hold in admiration, or by whom themselves are held in admiration, or by whom they are desirous of being admired, or of whom they are petitioning something which they will not be likely to get, if not men ¹⁹⁸ of character. And if these be either actual spectators (just as, on the question of the allotment of Samos to colonists, Cydias introduced in his harangue to the ecclesia; for he put it to the Athenians to imagine that the Greeks were standing round as actual spectators, and not as mere future hearers, of the decree which they might pass); or should persons of this description be near, or be likely soon to be aware of their conduct: and on this account persons in misfortune, do not wish even to be seen by those who once deemed them happy; for they who thus deem of us ¹⁹⁹ are admirers. And when they have attached to them what throws discredit on the conduct and the actions, either of themselves, or of their ancestors, or any others with whom in any way they are closely connected ; and, in one word, all in whose behalf they are sensible of shame ; and these are the above-mentioned, and those who stand in any relation to them, ²⁰⁰ whose tutors or advisers they have been 7. And if ²⁰¹ there be others, their equals, with whom they are at rivalry; for, from a feeling of shame, on account of persons of this description, men both do and leave undone very many things. Again, when people are ²⁰² likely to be seen, and openly to be engaged before those who are privy [to their disgrace], they become in a higher degree susceptible of shame. And hence the poet Antiphon, just as he was going to be beaten on the rack by Dionysius, observing those who were about to be executed with him muffling themselves up as they went through the gate, said, "Why do you muffle yourselves up;—is it lest any of these present should see you to-morrow ? "

Thus much then on the subject of the sense of shame; but of insensibility to it, we shall evidently know enough from the contraries.

THE persons towards whom men feel gratitude, and ²⁰³ the occasions on which, and with what dispositions on their own part, will be plain to us, after we have defined gratuitous benevolence. Now, let gratuitous ^{204 205 206 207} benevolence be “ that conformably to which, he who has the power is said to confer a benefit on one who needs it, not in return for any thing, nor in order that any thing may accrue to him who so confers it, but that some benefit may arise to the object." But it becomes great should it be conferred on one who is in extreme want2, or if the boon be great and difficult of attainment, or at a crisis of a certain description, or if the giver has bestowed it alone, or first, or in a ²⁰⁸ greater degree than any other. Wants are however our desires of these ; such particularly as are attended by pain on failing of their objects; and of this description are our lusts, as for instance, love. Again, such as arise in the suffering of the body, and in danger ; for both the man who is exposed to danger, and who suffers pain, is anxious for something. On which account, those who stand by us in poverty and banishment, should they confer even trifling benefits, will yet have gratified us by reason of the greatness of our need, and the circumstances of the time ; take the instance of him who gave but a mat [to a beggar] ²⁰⁹ in the Lycaeum. It is necessary, then, that our obligation have reference, if possible, by all means to some case of this sort, but if not, to some one of equal or greater need. So that, as it is evident both when, and in what cases, an act of free benevolence takes place, and how the parties are affected, it is plain that out of these principles we must get up our speech, showing that, as regards the one party, they were or are exposed to pain, or want of this description, and as regards the other, that in such their want they assisted them by administering some boon of this description.

²¹⁰ And it is also evident, by recurring to what topics we may do away the obligation, and make our audi- ^{211 212} ence insensible of grateful feelings3; for either we ²¹³ may urge that they are or were assisting them for their own sakes, and this was supposed not to be free benevolence; or are doing so just because it fell out by chance, or because they were compelled to do so; or that they paid back a debt, but did not bestow a gift, and this as well if the party was conscious of his having been so indebted, as if he was not; because there is in both cases the idea of a quid pro quo; so that neither on this view of the case will any gratitude be felt. We should also examine the ²¹⁴ point under all the predicaments; for free benevolence stands in this, either that that particular thing was given, or in such quantity, or of such a quality, or as to the time when, or the place where, it was given. And we may adduce it as a sign to suit this purpose, if the parties in question have refused a less favour; and if they have conferred on an enemy either the same favour, or an equal one, or a greater; for then it will be evident that they did it not for our sakes. Or, if he wittingly has given something paltry4; for no one acknowledges that he stands in need of what is paltry.

And now have my sentiments respecting benevolence, and the want of it, been explained. ^{215 216 217}

²¹⁹ LET us explain the circumstances which excite pity; and the persons whom men pity; and, as regards ²²⁰ themselves, with what dispositions. Now let pity be defined tb be1, "a sort of pain occasioned by an evil capable of hurting or destroying2, appearing to befall one who does not deserve it, which one may himself expect to endure3, or that some one connected with him will; and this when it appears near: for it evidently is necessary that a person likely to feel pity should be actually such as to deem that, either in his own person, or of some one connected with him, he may suffer some evil, and that an evil of such a description as has been stated in the definition, or one similar to it, or nearly equivalent to it. ²²¹ On which account neither do those who are abso- ^{222 223 224 225} lutely lost, feel pity f for these think they shall no ²²⁶ longer be exposed to suffering, for their sufferings are past; nor -those who esteem themselves excessively happy, but these wax insolent; for evidently, if they esteem every good to be realized to them, they also esteem their lot to be incapable of suffering any evil; since this also enters into the number of goods. But ²²⁷ of this description, viz. such as think they may yet suffer evil, are both who already have suffered and escaped5; and those advanced in years, as well by reason of their prudence, as of their experience : and the weak ; and those who are rather timid; and men of education, for these calculate life's contingencies aright; and those to whom belong parents6, or ²²⁸ children, or wives, for these attach to one's self, and are liable to suffer the above-mentioned evils. Those ²²⁹ do not feel pity who are under the excitements of courage, for instance, under anger or confidence ; for these feelings little calculate the future : nor do those feel pity who are under insolent dispositions7; for these persons also calculate little of suffering any thing: but those who are of the mean temperament between these are susceptible of pity : and those again are not susceptible of it who are vehemently affected by fear; for such as are horror-struck do not feel pity8, by reason of its being akin to an evil which comes home to themselves. Also people are suscep- ²³⁰ tible of pity, should they esteem some persons to be good; for he who esteems no one to be such9, will ^{231 232 233 234 235} think every one deserving of evil. And in a word, every one, when he is so affected as to call to his recollection the fact, that evils of such a character have befallen either him or his, or to apprehend that they may befall either him or his. And now it has been stated with what dispositions men feel pity.

²³⁶ The circumstances which excite their pity will be evident from the definition : for whatever things, of the number of those which cause pain and anguish, have a tendency to destroy, are all such as to cause pity: again, every thing whose tendency is utter abolition; also all those evils which involve the quality of greatness, and of which chance is the ²³⁷ cause . But the evils whose characteristic is great anguish and destruction, are as follows: death, assaults, personal injuries, and age, and sickness, and ²³⁸ want of food. And the evils of which chance is the cause, are, absolute want, or fewness of friends, (on which account even the being torn from friends and familiars is a circumstance to be pitied,) ugliness, infirmity, deformity, and the circumstance that some evil befalls one from a source whence it were becoming for some good to have arisen; and the frequent occurrence of a similar thing: and the accession of some good, when one has already passed his sufferings ; as for example, the gifts of the king were sent ²³⁹ down to Diopithes after he was dead11; and the fact either that no good has accrued, or of there being no enjoyment of it when it has arrived. These, then, and the like, are the circumstances on account of which men feel pity.

²⁴⁰ But people are sensible of pity toward their acquaintances, if they be not of extremely close connexion, but about such they feel just as they do about themselves when on the eve of suffering: and on this ^{241 242 243} account Amasis, as they say, did not shed a tear over his son when he was being led to execution, but he did over his friend who was asking an alms; for this was a circumstance to call for pity; the other, to excite horror. For horror is distinct from pity, ^{244 245} and has a tendency to expel pity from the breast, and is frequently available to produce a contrary effect13. Still men feel pity while the evil is yet approaching. And they feel it towards their equals, whether in age, in temper, in habits, in rank, or in family; for in all these relations, the evil is seen with greater clearness as possible to befall also one's self. For we must here also assume generally, that whatever people fear in their own case, that they pity as happening in the case of others. But as the disasters ²⁴⁶ which excite pity always appear to be close at hand, while, as to those removed at the distance of ten thousand years, men neither in the expectation of them, if future, nor in the remembrance of them, if past, are sensible of pity at all, or at least not in an equal degree ; this being the case, it must follow that those characters which are got up with the aid of gesture, and voice, and dress, and of acting, generally have the greater effect in producing pity14. For thus, by setting the evil before our eyes, as either ^{247 248 249} being on the eve of taking place, or as having happened, men make it appear to be close at hand. ²⁵⁰ Likewise things which have just taken place, or quickly about to do so, have on this very account a ²⁵¹ greater tendency to excite pity. Also the indications and actions of persons ; for instance, the garments15 of those who have suffered, and other things of that sort. And the expressions of those under suffering, for instance, of those already in act of dying. And especially is it a circumstance to move pity, that while in these crises the persons have borne themselves virtuously 16. For all these circumstances produce pity in a higher degree from its appearing near; also, the fact of the person's being unworthy, and his disaster appearing in view before our eyes.

²⁵² To pity is opposed, most directly, that feeling which men call indignation; for, to the feeling pain at undeserved misfortune, is opposed in a certain way the feeling pain at undeserved good fortune, and it originates in the same disposition; and these feelings ²⁵³ are both those of a virtuous disposition. For we ought to sympathize with, and to pity those who are undeservedly unfortunate; and to feel indignant at those who are undeservedly fortunate ; for whatever happens contrary to desert is unjust; and on this account we make indignation an attribute even of ^{254 255 256} the gods1. It should seem, too, that envy stands ²⁵⁷ opposed to pity in the same way, as appearing to be akin to, and in fact the same thing as, indignation; and yet it really is distinct. For envy is also a pain ²⁵⁸ causing agitation, it also is felt at good fortune, not, however, at the good fortune of the undeserving [only], but of equals and fellows2. The feeling, however, in all cases equally [of envy and of indignation], must exist [in the breasts of those affected by it], not because any difference will be likely to accrue to themselves, but on account of their neighbour, solely as regards himself. For no longer will the one feeling be envy, and the other indignation, but fear, should the pain and agitation exist on this account, viz. because some evil will probably result to themselves from the good fortune of the other.

But it is plain that opposite feelings will be conse- ²⁵⁹ quent on these passions: for he who feels pain at those who are undeservedly unfortunate, will feel pleasure, or at least be unaffected by pain, at those who are unfortunate under different circumstances3: for instance, no good man would feel pain about parricides and murderers when they meet with punishment ; since we ought to feel joy at such occurrences ; and so in the case of those who are deservedly fortunate ; for both are instances of justice, and cause the good man to rejoice, since it must be that he has a hope that what has been realized to his equal, will ²⁶⁰ be realized also to himself, and these are all feelings ^{261 262 263 264} of the same disposition; and their opposites, of the opposite dispositions. Since the same man who exults in misfortune is also envious ; for any who feels pain at the accession and acquisition of any good, that person necessarily must rejoice when that good is in act of being withdrawn and lost. On which account these feelings are all of them obstacles to pity; but, among themselves, they differ for the foregoing reasons, so that all are alike available with a view to render a thins not an object of pity.

²⁶⁵ On the subject of indignation, then, let us first state who the persons are with whom men feel indignant, the occasions on which, and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions; then, after these, ²⁶⁶ of other points. But the subject will be plain from what has already been said ; for if indignation be a feeling pain on a man's appearing to be undeservedly fortunate, it will be evident in the first place that it is not possible to feel indignation in the case of every ²⁶⁷ good. For there is no one who, it another be just, or brave, or shall make acquisitions of virtue, will feel indignation at that other ; for neither is pity felt at the contraries of these qualities5: but it is about ^{268 269} wealth and power and the like possessions [that ²⁷⁰ people feel indignant], and in a word, about all those things of which the good are deserving, and such as are naturally possessed of advantages; as, for example, of high birth, of beauty, and advantages of that description. But as what is ancient seems, in a ²⁷¹ certain sense, akin to what is natural, it must follow, that men are indignant, in a greater degree, at those who possess the very same good, if they be recently possessed of it, and are by its means in good circumstances, [than with those who have long possessed it.] For those who have recently become rich give ²⁷² greater pain than those who have long been rich, and by right of birth. And, in the same way, persons in office, and men of power, and possessed of numerous friends, and of good children, and any good of this description ; and likewise if, through the instrumentality of these, there should accrue to them any further good: here, too, those of recent wealth, who by means of their wealth get into office, give greater pain than those who have been wealthy of old. And in a similar manner in the case of the others. But ²⁷³ the reason of this is, that while the one sort appear to possess what is their own, the others do not; for that which appears ever to have held this rank, seems to involve an idea of truth ; insomuch that the others seem to possess what does not belong to them. And as, of the goods, each does not become any one ²⁷⁴ who may accidentally present himself, but there is a certain proportion and idea of adaptation; for example, splendour in respect of armour, is not adapted to a man whose virtue is justice, but to him who possesses courage; and splendid marriage feasts are not adapted to those of recent wealth, but to those of high birth: therefore if any one, though he may be a good man, meet with a possession which is not adapted to him, we should feel indignant; as also with an inferior who disputes with his superior; and particularly if he does so on the very points in which he is inferior. Whence also this was remarked by Homer: " He missed engaging with Ajax the son of Telamon; for Jupiter was indignant because he was ²⁷⁵ fain to engage a hero his superior6." But, if it be not on the same grounds, we feel indignant if an inferior challenge a superior, even on any grounds; for instance, if a musician were to dispute with a just man, for justice is superior to music. The persons then with whom, and the reasons why men feel indignant will be evident from this; for they are these or others of the same description.

²⁷⁶ As regards themselves, men have a tendency to indignation, if they deserve and have acquired the highest goods; for the circumstance of those not their equals being thought worthy of equal advan- ²⁷⁷ tages, is not just. Next, they feel it, if they chance to be good and excellent persons; for they both ²⁷⁸ judge aright, and hate what is unjust. Again, if they be ambitious and desirous of certain objects, and especially should they be ambitious about those things ²⁷⁹ which others who are undeserving obtain. And those, in a word, who think themselves worthy those things, of which they do not esteem others worthy, are apt to feel indignant at those others, and about those very objects. On which account slaves, sorry fellows, and men devoid of ambition, are not liable to feelings of indignation, since there is nothing of ²⁸⁰ which they think themselves worthy. And from this it is evident on what occasions of misfortunes, or ill luck, or failure of success, persons ought to rejoice, or at least to be unaffected by pain; for, from what has been stated, the contraries will be evident. So that should the speech have wrought up the judges into this disposition, and should it have shown that those who claim to be pitied, and that the circumstances under which they claim it, are undeserving pity, and really deserving not to gain it, it will be impossible for the judges to feel pity. ²⁸¹

IT is plain also on what occasions, with whom, and ²⁸³ with what dispositions men feel envy, if in truth envy be " a sort of pain at apparent good fortune, ²⁸⁴ touching the above-mentioned goods 1, in the case of equals, not in order that any thing may happen to one's self, and simply on account of their [being thus fortunately for those who have, or seem to have equals, will be the people to be envious. I mean by ²⁸⁵ equals, those who are like in circumstances of birth, connexions, age, habits, character, and property. They, too, will be envious who fall but little short of ^{286 287 288} possessing all : hence those who are carrying on mighty projects, and those who are prosperous, are envious; for they think that every one is carrying off what belongs to them. Again, those who are remarkably esteemed on any account, and particularly on account of their wisdom or happiness. And those who are ambitious are more given to envy than those who are devoid of ambition. And those who make a show of wisdom, for they are ambitious on the score of wisdom. And, in a word, those who in any respect are ambitious of glory are given to envy in that respect. And the narrow-minded; for, to them, ^{289 290} every thing appears of consequence.

The goods respecting which men feel envy have been told you ; for all those things whatsoever, about which men are eager for praise, and ambitious, whe- ^{291 292} ther they be productions or acquisitions, and respecting which they are desirous of renown, and all cases of good luck; about all these nearly is envy felt; and particularly about such of them as the individuals are themselves desirous of, or think they ought themselves to possess, or those things in the possession of which they are themselves superior, or deficient in a trifling degree.

²⁹³ Again, it is evident with whom men are envious ; for this has been already stated in connexion [with what has gone before; since men envy those who ²⁹⁴ come near them in time, and place, and age, and character ; whence the saying, " kindred too is conscious ²⁹⁵ of envy 3." Men also envy those with whom they are at rivalry; for they are rivals of those above- mentioned ; but of those who existed ten thousand years back, or who may live ten thousand years hence, or who are already dead, of these no one is the rival; nor again of those who live at the Pillars of Hercules 4; nor of those of whom, in the opinions either of themselves or of others, they are greatly the inferiors ; nor again of those to whom they conceive themselves to be in a great degree superior; with the like indifference do they regard those fat all en- ²⁹⁶ gaged] in pursuits of this description. And as men are affected by ambition in regard to rivals, and competitors, and all, in a word, who are eager after the same objects, it must follow that they envy these in an especial manner; whence the saying, " potter ^{297 298} envies potter." And those who either succeed with difficulty, or do not succeed at all, envy those who succeed quickly. Again, they envy those whose acquisitions and success are a reproach to themselves, and these are those who are near them, or their equals; for it becomes evident that they do themselves fail of success through their own fault, so that ^{299 300} this, galling them, produces envy. And those who ³⁰¹ either possess or have acquired that which it would become themselves to possess, or which themselves had at one time acquired; at least the old, on this account, envy the young. And those who have been ³⁰² at considerable expense on an object, envy those who have expended little on the same object. But it is ³⁰³ evident both with whom, and on what occasions, and with what dispositions people of this sort feel pleasure ; for they will be delighted, having in the contrary circumstances that very temper, the which being without, they are pained. So that if the ³⁰⁴ judges themselves shall have been wrought up into this disposition, while those who lay claim to our pity or to the acquisition of some good, are such as have been described, it is evident that they will not obtain pity at the hands of those on whom they depend for it.

HENCE likewise it will be evident both with what ³⁰⁵ dispositions, and in regard to what objects, and of whom, persons are emulous. Because if emulation ³⁰⁶ be “a sort of pain at the apparent presence of goods which are held in honour, and which admit of one's gaining them himself, in the case of those naturally our equals; felt, not because they are present to another, but because they are not likewise present to one Is self," (on which very account emulation is a vir- ³⁰⁷ tuous feeling, and belongs to virtuous people, whereas envy is a depraved feeling, and belongs to persons who are depraved: for the one, by motion of his emu- ³⁰⁸ lation, sets himself to acquire the good; while the other, by motion of his envy, sets himself to cause ³⁰⁹ the dispossession of his neighbour). It must be, then, that persons who deem themselves worthy of goods which they do not possess, are apt to feel emulation; since no one arrogates to himself that which appears ³¹⁰ impossible: and hence the young and the high-spirited are thus affected; and also those to whom belong goods of such a description as to be worth the attention of men in repute; these are wealth, number of friends, office, and whatever other goods are of this kind ; for men feel emulous of such goods ; as though, because they properly belong to such as are men of virtuous dispositions, it were matter of absolute right ³¹¹ that themselves should be virtuous. Again, those are emulous whom others esteem worthy of such goods: and those again whose ancestors, or relations, or in- ³¹² timate friends, or whose tribe or city is held in esteem about any point, such persons are apt to feel emulation on that point; for they think they belong properly to them, and that themselves are worthy of them.

³¹³ But if those goods are matter of emulation which are held in esteem, it must of course follow that the virtues are of this description ; and whatever things have a tendency to aid and benefit others; since people honour virtuous people, and those who benefit them: likewise that all goods whatsoever, the enjoyment of which accrues to one's neighbours, are of this sort; for instance, wealth, and beauty, rather than health.

³¹⁴ And it will also be evident who the persons are who are objects of emulation; since they who possess these, and the like goods, become objects of emulation ; these goods are such as have been mentioned, for example, courage, wisdom, sovereignty; for those who are sovereigns have a power of benefiting many. Generals, orators, all, in fact, who have abilities this ³¹⁵ way [are objects of emulation]. And those whom many wish to resemble, or who have many acquaintances, or many friends. Or those whom many admire, or whom they do themselves admire. And those on ³¹⁶ whom are pronounced the praises and encomia of poets and panegyrists2. Persons, however, of a con- ³¹⁷ trary description, men despise; for contempt is the contrary of emulation ; and the despising of the being emulous. And it must be that persons so affected as to emulate certain persons, or to be themselves objects of emulation, are apt to feel contempt for those things and persons who possess evils the contraries of those goods which are the objects of emulation. On which account men frequently despise the fortunate, when their good fortune is unconnected with those goods which are held in esteem.

Of the means, then, by which the passions are excited in the breast, and are allayed, one of the sources out of which means of persuasion arise, of these we now have treated.

LET us next go over in detail the dispositions of ³¹⁸ men; considering of what kind of a turn they are, in reference to their passions, habits, ages, and fortunes. ^{319 320 321 322 323} I call anger, lust, and the like, by the name passions; a subject of which we have treated above. By the name habits, I designate virtues and vices : and of these we have treated above, both as to the points on which men form deliberate choice, and that to which ³²⁴ they give birth in action. And the ages are youth, prime, and old age. By fortune I mean, high birth, and wealth, and abilities, and their opposites; and, in one word, good and bad fortune.

³²⁵ Now the young are in their dispositions prone to desire, and of a character to effect what they desire. And they are in the highest degree apt to pursue the pleasures of love above all desires about which the body is concerned, and in these they are incontinent. ^{326 327} But they are prone to change, and fastidious in the objects of their desires. And they desire with earnestness, but speedily cease to desire; for their wishes are keen, without being durable; just like the hunger ³²⁸ and thirst of the sick. And they are passionate and irritable, and of a temperament to follow the impulse. ³²⁹ And they cannot overcome their anger; for by reason of their ambition they do not endure a slight, but ³³⁰ become indignant, and fancy themselves injured: and they are ambitious indeed of honour, but more so of ³³¹ victory; for youth is desirous of superiority, and victory is a sort of superiority. And of both these are they desirous in a higher degree than of gain; but least of all are they desirous of gain3, by reason of their having never yet experienced want; just according to the proverbial saying of Pittacus to Am- ³³² phiaraus 4. And they do not view things in a bad When some one peculiar quality Doth so possess a man, that it doth draw All his affects, his spirits, and his powers, In their confluctions, all to run one way, This may be truly said to be a humour. Every Man out of his Humour : where see Whalley's note. ^{333 334} light, but in a good, by reason of their never having yet been witnesses of much depravity. And they ³³⁵ are credulous, from their never having yet been much imposed on. And they are sanguine in their ³³⁶ expectations ; for like those who are affected by wine, so the young are warmed by their nature ; and at the same time from their having never yet met with many repulses. Their life, too, for the most ³³⁷ part, is one of hope; for hope is of that which is yet to be, while memory is of that which is passed: but to the young that which is yet to be, is long; but that which has passed, is short; for in the early days of life they think they remember nothing, while they hope for every thing; and they are easily imposed on, for the reason which has been stated; because they soon cherish expectation. And they are brave ³³⁸ rather to an excess; tor they are irritable and sanguine, qualities, the one whereof cancels fear, and the other inspires courage; for while no one who is affected by anger ever is afraid, the being in hope of some good is a thing to give courage. And they are ³³⁹ bashful; for they do not as yet conceive the honourable to be any thing distinct, but they have been educated only under the established usage of the state. And they are high-minded ; for they have not ³⁴⁰ as yet been humbled by the course of life, but are unexperienced in peremptory circumstances: again, high-mindedness is the deeming one's self worthy of much; and this belongs to persons of sanguine expectations. And they prefer succeeding in an hon- ³⁴¹ curable sense than in points of expediency; for they live more in conformity to moral feeling than to mere calculations5; and calculation is of the expedient, moral excellence, however, of that which is honourable. Again, they are fond of friends and companions ³⁴² rather than ot their other compeers in age, by reason of their delighting in social intercourse, and of their not yet deciding on any thing in reference to what is ³⁴³ expedient; so that they do not decide on their friends ³⁴⁴ [upon that principle]. And all their errors are on the side of excess and too great earnestness, in contravention of Chilo's rule; for the young carry every thing to an excess; for their friendships are in excess, their hatreds are in excess, and they do every thing else with the same degree of earnestness ; they think also that they know every thing, and firmly asseverate that they do; for this is the cause of their ³⁴⁵ pushing every thing to an excess. And, in their trespasses, they trespass on the side of wantonness, and not of malice. They are likewise prone to pity, from their conceiving every one to be good, and more worthy than in fact he is6; for they measure others by the standard of their own guiltlessness ; so that they conceive them to be suffering what they do ³⁴⁶ not deserve. And they are fond of mirth, on which account they are also of a facetious turn7; for facetiousness is chastened forwardness of manner.

Such, then, is the disposition of the young.

³⁴⁷ BUT those who are advanced in life, and who have passed their prime, are of dispositions in most points ^{348 349} the very opposite of these. Since by reason of their having lived many years, and having been deceived in a greater number of instances, and having mistaken, by reason, too, that the majority of human affairs are but worthless, they neither positively as- ^{350 351} severate any thing, and they err in every thing more on the side of defect than they ought. And they always " suppose," but never " know" certainly; and, questioning every thing, they always subjoin a “perhaps," or a "possibly." And they talk of every ³⁵² thing in this undecisive tone, asserting nothing decisively. And they are apt to view things in an ³⁵³ unfavourable light ; for a disposition thus to view things, is the judging of every thing on the worse side. Moreover they are apt to be suspicious from distrust, and they are distrustful from their experience. And on this account they neither love nor ³⁵⁴ hate with great earnestness; but, conformably to the remark of Bias, they both love as though about to hate, and hate as though about to love. And they ³⁵⁵ are pusillanimous, from their having been humbled by the course of life ; for they raise their desires to nothing great or vast, but to things only which conduce to support of life. And they are illiberal; for ³⁵⁶ property is one of the necessaries; and they are at the same time aware, from their experience, of the difficulty of its acquisition, and of the ease with which it is lost. And they are timid and apprehen- ³⁵⁷ sive of every thing ; for their disposition is the reverse of that of the young; for they have been chilled by years, but the young are warm in their temperament; so that their age has paved the way to timidity; for fear is a certain kind of chill. And ³⁵⁸ they are attached to life, and particularly at its last closing day, from the circumstance that desire is of some object which is absent, and that men more especially desire that of which they stand in need. And ³⁵⁹ they have self-love more than is fitting ; for this too is a kind of littleness of spirit. And they live in a greater degree than they ought by the standard of expediency, and not of what is honourable, by reason of their self-love: for what is expedient is good relatively, to one's self; but what is honourable is good ³⁶⁰ absolutely. And they are insensible to shame, rather than liable to be affected by it; for on account of their not holding equally in esteem the honourable ³⁶¹ and the expedient, they despise appearances. Again, they are not easily inspired with hope, on account of their experience ; for the majority of things are but paltry; wherefore the generality turn out inferior to the expectation; and once more on account of their ³⁶² timidity they are apt to despond]. And they live more in memory than in hope; for the remnant of life is brief, but what has passed is considerable; and hope indeed is of what is to come; whereas memory is of things gone by: the very reason this, of their garrulity; for they never cease talking of that which has taken place, since they are delighted in awaken - ³⁶³ ing the recollections of things. And their anger is keen, but faint. And their desires have, some, abandoned them, the others are faint; so that neither are they liable to the influence of desire, nor apt to act in conformity to it, but with a view to gain; on which account men of this age appear to be naturally temperate, for both their desires have relaxed, and ^{364 365 366} they are enslaved to gain. And they live more by calculation than by moral feeling; for calculation is of expediency, but moral feeling is of virtue. And, in their trespasses, they trespass on the side of malice, not of wanton insolence. The old have moreover a tendency to pity, but not on the same principle with the young; for the latter are thus disposed from their love of human nature, the former from their ³⁶⁷ imbecility ; since they consider the endurance of every calamity at hand to them, and this was laid ³⁶⁸ down as a principle of pity . Whence they are que- ^{369 370} rulous, and neither facetious, nor fond of mirth ; for querulousness is the very reverse of fondness for mirth.

Such, then, are the dispositions of the young, and ³⁷¹ of those in advanced life3. So that, as all welcome an address worded to their own disposition, and a speaker who resembles themselves, it is clear by employing his oration in what way the orator will appear of this description, as regards himself and what he says.

THOSE who are in their prime will, it is evident, be ³⁷² in a mean in point of disposition between these, subtracting the excesses of each: being neither rash in too great a degree, (for rashness is of this description, 1. e. in excess, nor too much given to fear, but keep- ^{373 374} ing themselves right in respect to both. Neither placing confidence in all, nor distrusting all, but judging rather in conformity to the truth. Neither living with a view solely to what is honourable, nor with a view only to expediency, but with a respect to both. And conformed neither to penurious parsimony, nor to extravagance, but to what is fitting. With the ³⁷⁵ same equality do they carry themselves also in respect to anger and to desire. And they are of a tempering ³⁷⁶ coolness joined with spirit, and are spirited not ^{377 378} out temperate coolness : for in the young and in elderly persons these qualities are separated; since the young are spirited, and of an intemperate rashness, while elderly persons are of a chastened spirit, and timid. And thus, in a word, whatever advantages youth and age have divided between them, the middle age possesses both ; and in whatever respects they are either in excess or defect, in all these it holds a mean and what is fitting.

³⁷⁹ But the body is in its prime from the age of thirty to five and thirty; and the mind about the age of forty-nine. Let thus much, then, have been said re- ' specting youth, and old and mature age, and the dispositions which they severally are of.

³⁸⁰ BUT let us treat of the goods of fortune next in order, so many of them at least as influence the dispositions of men in any particular way.

³⁸¹ Now it is the disposition of high birth, that its possessor is more ambitious than others; for all, when any possession is realized to them, are wont to ac- ³⁸² cumulate upon it. But high birth is nobility of ancestry ; and it is apt to indulge in contempt even of those who are as good as its own ancestors ; because distinctions, in proportion as they are more remote, rather than recent, are held in greater esteem, and afford a ready plea for arrogance.

³⁸³ But, noble, is an appellation referring to excellence of birth; whereas, generous refers to one's not degenerating from the nature [of his ancestry] ; which, generally speaking, is not the case with the noble, but the majority of them are ordinary persons. For there is a kind of richness of produce in the genera- tions of man, just as there is in that which arises from the land ; and at times, should the stock be good, ³⁸⁴ there arise in a family at intervals extraordinary persons ; and afterwards it again relaxes. And a family of brilliant talent run wild into dispositions bordering on madness1; as in the instances of the descendants of Alcibiades, and Dionysius the elder: and one of sedate wisdom, into stupidity and dulness; as in the instances of the descendants of Cimon, and Pericles, and Socrates.

ANY one, without any great penetration, may distin- ³⁸⁵ guish the dispositions consequent on wealth; for [its possessors] are insolent and overbearing, from being tainted in a certain way by the getting of their wealth. For they are affected as though they possessed every good; since wealth is a sort of standard of the worth of other things ; whence every thing seems to be purchaseable by it. And they ³⁸⁶ are affectedly delicate and purse-proud; they are thus delicate on account of their luxurious lives, and the display they make of their prosperity. They are purse-proud, and violate the rules of good breeding2, ^{387 388 389} from the circumstance that every one is wont to dwell upon that which is beloved and admired by him, and because they think that others are emulous of that, of which they are themselves. But at the same time they are thus affected reasonably enough ; for many are they who need the aid of men of property. Whence, too, that remark of Simonides addressed to the wife of Hiero respecting the wealthy and the wise ; for when she asked him, " whether it were better to have been born wealthy or wise," he replied, " wealthy; for," he said, " he used to see the wise hanging on at the doors of the wealthy." ³⁹⁰ And [it is a characteristic of the rich] that they esteem themselves worthy of being in office; for they consider themselves possessed of that on account of which they are entitled to be in office. And, in a word, the disposition of the rich is that of a fool amid prosperity.

³⁹¹ However, the dispositions of those who are but lately rich, and of those who have been so from of old, are different; inasmuch as those who have recently become rich have all these faults in a greater and a worse degree; for the having recently become rich is as it were an inexpertness in wealth. And they are guilty of offences, not of a malicious nature, but such as are either offences of contumely or intemperance ; for instance, in the case of assault or adultery. ^{392 393 394}

AND in the same way on the subject of power, the ^{396 397 398} most striking almost of its dispositions are evident; for of these power has some in common with wealth, and others which are better. For men in power are more ambitious and more manly in their dispositions than the wealthy; from their aiming at all duties whatsoever, which from their power they have the means of discharging. And they are less given to trifling, because, from a necessity of looking carefully to their power, they are constrained to a diligent attention. And they comport themselves with a dignity which is conciliatory rather than repulsive; for their claims for dignity render them more conspicuous ; on which account, they bear themselves moderately : but conciliatory dignity is a softened and graceful sedateness. And, if they do transgress the bounds of right, it is not in small points, but in those which are of importance, that they are guilty.

But good fortune, according to its constituents, is ³⁹⁹ of the disposition of the states which have been described ; since those which appear to be the greatest instances of good fortune resolve themselves ultimately into these states: and, besides these, to the excellence of one's progeny, and to personal advantages. But men are usually more overbearing and ⁴⁰⁰ inconsiderate in consequence of prosperity. But one disposition, and that most excellent, is a concomitant of good fortune, viz. that the fortunate are lovers of the gods, and are disposed toward the deity with a ⁴⁰¹ sort of confidence, in consequence of the goods which have accrued to them from fortune.

The subject, then, of the dispositions as they conform to age and to fortune has been discussed; for from the opposites of my remarks the opposite subjects will be evident; the subject, for example, of the disposition of a poor, or unfortunate person, or of one out of power.

⁴⁰³ BUT since the use of persuasive orations has a reference to the forming a decision (since on questions which we are acquainted with, and have decided on, there is no further need of an oration) ; and as this is their use, whether addressing his speech to a single individual, the speaker endeavours to exhort or dissuade (which they do who admonish or persuade; since that individual is in no less degree a judge; because the person [be he who he may], whomsoever we want to persuade is, once for all, a judge); and also if one be speaking against an adversary, or on any supposed question, it has equally [a reference to decision] ; (for one needs must employ a speech, and sweep away objections against which, as against an adversary, he directs his address); this is just as much the case in demonstrative oratory (since the speech commends itself to the listener just as though to a judge). But he alone is strictly a judge, who decides on the questions at issue in civil controversies : since both forensic questions, and those on which men deliberate, are agitated as to how they stand. But of dispositions, as they are affected by the constitutions of states, we have spoken above. So that the means will now have been distinctly unfolded, both how, and by the use of what things, we may render our addresses ethical.

⁴⁰⁴ But as there was, in each species of orations, a certain distinct end proposed; and as respecting all of them some ideas and propositions have been ascertained, out of which the deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial orators deduce their means of persuading ; and as, in addition to these, the means by which it is possible for us to render our speeches ethical, have been developed; it merely remains, that we go over ⁴⁰⁵ in detail the topics which are common to the three ⁴⁰⁶ species of oratory : for it is necessary that every orator should connect with his speech the topics of possibility or impossibility; and for some it will be necessary to attempt to show that certain things will take place, and for others that they have taken place. And again, the topic of greatness is common to all oratory ; for every orator, whether he exhort or dissuade, praise or blame, accuse or defend, avails himself of amplification and diminution.

But of these common topics, amplification is most congenial to demonstrative oratory, as has been remarked ; possibility, as relating to the past, to judicial3; since on what has been its decision is made; but possibility, as relating to the future, is most congenial to deliberative.

FIRST, then, let us speak of things possible and those ⁴⁰⁷ which are impossible.

If then it be possible that one contrary should exist, or be called into existence, the other contrary will also appear to be possible; for instance, if it be possible for a man to be convalescent, it also is possible for him to be sick; for the effective power of contraries, inasmuch as they are contraries, is the ^{408 409 410} same. If, of two similar things, the one be possible, the other which is similar will be possible also. If the more difficult be possible, so will also that which is easier. And if it be possible for a thing to be produced in a state of excellence or beauty, it also is possible for it to be produced under general circumstances ; for it is more difficult for a building to be ⁴¹¹ made beautiful, than simply a building. And in whatever case the commencement is possible, the fulfilment also is possible1: for of things which are impossible, none either take place or begin to do so; for instance, it neither is the case, that the diameter of a square is commensurable with the side, neither ⁴¹² will it ever begin to be so. Also, wherever the fulfilment is possible, so is the commencement; since ⁴¹³ every thing proceeds from a beginning. And if the subsequent in being or production be possible, so also is the antecedent: if, for example, it be possible that a man should be produced, so also is it that a child should, since it is antecedent in its production : again, if it be possible for a child, so is it also for a man to be produced; on the principle that the former is a ⁴¹⁴ commencement. Things likewise are possible, of which there is a natural love or desire; for no one loves what is impossible, neither desires it, for the ^{415 416} most part at least. Also, any thing which is the subject of an art or science, is possible both to exist and to be produced. Likewise any thing whatsoever, the principle of whose production resides in those whom we can compel or persuade ; such are those whose superiors, or lords, or friends we are. ⁴¹⁷ And wherever the parts are possible, so also is the whole. Wherever again the whole is possible, so also are the parts, generally speaking : for if the latchet, the forepart, and the upperleather of the shoe admit of being brought into being, so also do the shoes themselves: and if the shoes, then also the latchet, ⁴¹⁸ the forepart, and upperleauther2; also, if the genus be ^{419 420} of the number of things possible, so also will be the species; and if the species, so also the genus: for example, if a vessel can be produced, so can a trireme; and if a trireme, so can a vessel. And if, of things which have a natural relation to each other, the one be possible, so is also the other; as if the double be possible, so also is the half; and if the half, so also is the double. And if a thing admits of ⁴²¹ being brought into being without art or preparation, a fortiori it will admit of it by the help of art and attention. On which principle too it has been remarked by Agatho, " Yes, truly, in some things you must fare just as fortune goes ; other things there are which attach to us by necessity and art.” Also, if ⁴²² any thing be possible to persons who are worse, or our inferiors, or less prudent, much more will it also be possible to their opposites ; just as Isocrates said, that " it would be strange if Euthynus learnt it, and he were not able to find it out."

With regard, however, to things impossible, it is ⁴²³ plain that they result from the contraries of the above-mentioned principles.

Questions as to the actual occurrence of any thing, ⁴²⁴ are to be viewed under the following considerations. For, in the first place, if that which had a less natural tendency to occur, has occurred ; then may that have occurred which had a greater tendency. And if that ⁴²⁵ which is wont to take place subsequently, has taken place, that also has taken place which usually does primarily: if, for instance, a man has forgotten, then also must he at some time have learnt that [of which he is now forgetful]. Also, if a man was able and ⁴²⁶ willing, he achieved the deed; for all men when, being willing, they have power, proceed to act; for there is nothing in their way. If, moreover, a man was willing and had no external impediment. If, again, the act ^{427 428 429} was possible, and he was under the influence of anger3. And if it was possible, and he [the person in question] was influenced by lust; for, generally speaking, men, if they have the power, execute that of which they are desirous; the bad from weakness of principle ; and the virtuous because they desire ob- ^{430 431} jects compatible with virtue. Also, if a man was on the point of bringing the thing into action and of doing it; since the probability is, that he who was on the eve of acting, did moreover really act. Also, if all those things have taken place which naturally occur, either as preparatory to, or on account of the occurrence in question; as for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if he attempted it, he has also achieved it. And if all those things which naturally occur subsequently, and that on account of which the deed is done, have taken place, then has also the prior to them and that which is the cause taken place: if, for instance, it has thundered, it has also lightened; and if he acted, he also attempted. Of all this number there are some thus subsequent of necessity; others however merely generally.

⁴³² With regard, however, to the non-occurrence of things, the considerations applicable will be plain from the contraries of those above stated,

Also with regard to what will happen, matters will become evident from the same considerations; for that which is within the power and the wishes of any one will take place. Also things which are subjects of lust, anger, and reasonings, accompanied by power 4. ⁴³³ On this account, too, if persons be on the onset or on the eve of doing any thing, it will be done: for, generally speaking, things which are on the point of taking place occur, rather than those which are not. ^{434 435} Also, if all those things have preceded which naturally occur before; for instance, if it lowers, there is a probability that it will rain. Also, if that has happened which is on account of the thing in question, ^{436 437} it is probable that that will also happen ; for instance, if there be a foundation, it is probable that there will also be a house.

The subject of greatness and smallness in regard ⁴³⁸ to affairs, also of the degrees of greater and less, and of things great and small in general, is clear to us from what has been said. For, in the discussion of deliberative oratory, the doctrine of the greatness of goods has been stated, and respecting the greater and less in the abstract. So that as with respect to each class of speeches the proposed end is a good ; (for instance, the expedient,-the honourable,-and the just;) it is evident that by every orator, his means of amplification are to be arrived at through the medium of these. But to institute, besides this, a further inquiry into ⁴³⁹ the subject of greatness and of excess in the abstract, is to talk idly; since particular cases are more completely applicable to use than mere generalities.

On the subject, then, of what is possible and impossible,-and whether the fact has or has not occurred,-will or will not occur, and moreover on the subject of greatness and smallness in regard to affairs, let thus much have been said.

IT remains that I treat of the means of effecting ⁴⁴⁰ persuasion which are common to every class of subjects, since I have already treated of such as are peculiar. And these common means of persuasion are two in species, example and enthymem: for the sentiment is part of an enthymem. Let us then first ⁴⁴¹ treat of example; for the example is correspondent to induction; and induction is a principle.

But of examples there are two species; for one Two sorts. ⁴⁴² species of example is the quoting real matters of fact which have actually taken place; another is the fabricating them yourself: and of this method, one species is illustration, the other fable; like those of Aesop and the African legends. Again1, example is somewhat of this description, as if one were to assert that the state ought to set itself in order against the king, and not to allow him to make himself master of Egypt; and this, because aforetime Darius passed not into Greece, before that he had seized that country; but when he had seized it, he passed across; so that the present king, should he seize Egypt, will pass over; on which account he is not to be permitted.

⁴⁴³ Illustration is of the nature of Socrates's discourses : for instance, were one to say that it is not fitting that magistrates chosen by lot should be in office; for it is just the same thing as though one were to pick out wrestlers by lot; not taking such as are able to contend, but those on whom the lot may fall: or as though men were to draw lots for that person of the crew whom it might befit to take the helm; as if it became the person on whom the lot fell, and not him who understood the art.

⁴⁴⁴ But fable is such as that of Stesichorus in opposition to Phalaris, and that of Aesop in behalf of the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the citizens of Himera had chosen Phalaris general with absolute powers, and were on the eve of assigning him a body guard, after other things which he said, related to them a fable: " That a horse was sole master of a meadow; but that on a stages coming in and spoiling the pasture, in his wish to be avenged of the stag, he asked some man whether he should be able, in ^{445 446} conjunction with him, to chastise the stag. The man said [that he would be able] if he would take the bit, and himself were to mount him with his darts. When, however, he had agreed to this, and the man was mounted, the horse, instead of being revenged, was himself already the slave of the man. And in the same way do you also (says he) look to it, lest, in your wish to avenge yourselves on your enemies, you suffer in the same way as the horse ; for already, through your choice of a commander with independent power, you have the bit in your mouths: but if you assign him a body guard, and permit him to mount into the saddle, you will become, from that moment forth, the slaves of Phalaris."

And Aesop, when pleading at Samoa in behalf of ⁴⁴⁷ a demagogue who was tried for his life, said, " That a fox in crossing a river was thrust out of her course into a drain, and that, being unable to get out, she was harassed for a long time, many horse leeches having got hold of her; but a hedgehog wandering by, when he saw her, taking compassion on her, asked whether he should pick off the horse leeches from her; that the fox however would not permit him; but on his asking why, she replied, ‘ Because these are indeed already filled from me, and now suck but a little blood; if, however, you should pick them off, others, who are hungry, coming up will drain off the little blood which remains. But (said he), Oh Samians, thus also does this man no longer injure you; for he is wealthy: should you, however, put him to death, others who are poor will come, who will exhaust you while they filch the public monev."

But fables are adapted to deliberative oratory, and ⁴⁴⁸ possess this advantage; that to hit upon facts which have occurred in point is difficult; but with regard to fables it is comparatively easy. For an orator ought to construct them just as he does his illustrations, if he be able to discover the point of similitude, a thing which will be easy if he be of a philosophical ⁴⁴⁹ turn of mind3. Cases, then, in the shape of fables, are the easier to bring forward; but those are more availing with a view to deliberation, which are put upon the ground of facts; because, generally speaking, the future resembles the past4.

⁴⁵⁰ It will, moreover, be right for one who has not enthymems to employ his examples like positive proofs ; since the persuasive efficacy of your speech will be produced by them: but one who possesses [enthymems] should employ them like evidence, putting them forward after his enthymems, in way of a conclusion. Because, if they be put first, they bear resemblance to induction; and induction, except in few instances, is not proper to rhetoric; whereas when put in at the end, they resemble evidence; and a witness in every case influences belief. On which account, there is moreover a necessity imposed on him who puts them first of citing many; for him, however, who states them in conclusion even one is sufficient; for a credible witness, though but single, is serviceable.

The number, then, of the species of examples, how many they are, and how and when they are to be used, has been stated. ^{451 452}

ON the subject of the use of maxims, after it has ⁴⁵⁴ been stated what a maxim is, it will most easily become clear both in what cases, on what occasions, and what persons it befits to avail themselves of the enunciation of maxims in their speeches.

Now the maxim is an assertion, and yet not re- ⁴⁵⁵ specting particulars, as what kind of person Iphicrates was, but on some general subject; neither is it on every general subject 1, as, that what is straight is opposed to what is curved; but it is respecting as many subjects as moral conduct is concerned about, and as are objects of choice or avoidance in acting. So that, as the enthymem is a form of reasoning ⁴⁵⁶ nearly [confined] to this description of subjects, both the conclusions of enthymems and their premises, after the syllogistic form has been done away, become maxims 2. Take an instance: “ A man who is ^{457 458} in his sound mind never ought to educate his children so as to be too highly skilled 3." Now this is a maxim: but if the reason, and the cause why he should not do so, be added, the whole [conjointly] will become an enthymem; thus, " for besides the indolence which they contract, they will attach to themselves the bitter jealousy of the citizens." Again, this : " There is not a man who in every respect is happy4:" and the following: "There is not one of all mankind who is free5," are maxims: and the last becomes an enthymem, if added to the following proposition, " for either he is the slave of money or of fortune."

⁴⁵⁹ If, then, the maxim be what it has been described, there will necessarily be four kinds of maxims: for either they will be with the annexed reason, or with- ⁴⁶⁰ out it. Now the maxims which need proof are all such as assert any thing which contravenes received opinion, or is doubtful; but those which state nothing contrary to peopled notions do well enough] with- ⁴⁶¹ out the addition of proof. And of these last it cannot but be that some will need no proof, from their having been previously known ; as, " The best thing for a man, as it seems to me at least, is health -because to nine-tenths of mankind this seems to be the case: and that others simultaneously with their being uttered become evident to such as turn their attention to them ; as, " There is no lover who does not always ⁴⁶² love. And again, of those which have proof subjoined, some are a part of an enthymem, just as, " A man who is in his sound mind never ought," etc. Others are essentially enthymems, and not part of an enthymem ; the which obtain more than any other species. And these are all those in which the reason for what is asserted appears wrought in, as ^{463 464 465 466} in this maxim: " Being yourself a mortal, do not ⁴⁶⁷ cherish immortal wrath :” "-or the assertion that, " one ought not always to cherish wrath," is a maxim; that, however, which is added, viz. "because you are a mortal," states the reason why. Similar to which is the following: “ It is fitting that a mortal conceive mortal notions, not that a being destined to death should think of what is immortal 7."

From what has been said it has then become evi- ⁴⁶⁸ dent, as well how many the species of maxims are, as also to what kind of subjects they are severally adapted. For on subjects which may be questioned, or contravene received opinions, the orator must not use those without the reason annexed; but let him either, prefixing the reason, use the conclusion as a maxim, thus—“ For my part, as then it neither is good to be exposed to envy, nor to be indolent, I assert that it is not good to be educated ;" or, stating this [which here is the conclusion] first, subjoin that which was prefixed 8. Observing that on subjects which do not contravene received opinions, but are doubtful, that he annex the reason why as concisely as possible. And on subjects such as these the ⁴⁶⁹ apophthegms of the Lacedaemonians are very suitable, and sayings which have an air of mystery; as if one were to apply that which Stesichorus said before the Locrians, " that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cigalas should sing upon the ground 9." The employment of maxims becomes him who is ^{470 471 472 473 474} rather advanced in life; and particularly as respects subjects about which each happens to be well informed 10. Since for one not so advanced in age to sport maxims is bad taste, just as it is for him to have recourse to fables: and the use of them on subjects about which one is ignorant is silly, and argues a want of education. There is a sufficient sign of the truth of this; for the boors of the country are of all other people most fond of hammering out maxims, ⁴⁷⁵ and set them forth with great volubility. Also the stating generally a maxim which is, in fact, not general, is most especially befitting in appeals to the feelings, and in the act of exciting indignation; and then either at the beginning, or after the proof. ⁴⁷⁶ Again, it is proper to avail ones self of maxims which are current and common, if they be of any service ; for from their being common they appear to be correct, as though every one acknowledged their truth11: this one, for instance, (if the orator be exhorting persons to face the hazard, though they have not sacrificed,) " One omen there is which is best, to defend one's country or to face it, though they be few in number,-" Mars is common;" and to cut off the children of their foes, what though they have done no injury,-" He is a fool who, after slaying the father, still spares the child12."

⁴⁷⁷ Some old sayings too are maxims; for example, the expression, " Next neighbour to an Athenian." ⁴⁷⁸ It is also proper to quote maxims which even contravene the current sayings, (I mean by current sayings such as this, " Know thyself or this, " Too much of one thing is good for nothing;") whenever your moral character may be likely to show itself to greater advantage, or the thing spoken is said in an impas- ^{479 480 481} sioned manner. The speaking in an impassioned manner is, as if one in a passion were to assert, " that it was a falsehood that one ought to know himself; at least, this man, had he known himself, would never have claimed to be your general 13." The moral character appears better [when we contradict a maxim] thus, "it does not become men, as some assert, to love as though they were about to hate, but to hate as though they were about to love." And we ought ⁴⁸² to give a manifestation of our moral principle by means of the diction we employ, otherwise to subjoin the reason; for instance, either stating the sentence thus, " we ought to love, not as they tell us, but as though always about to love, for the other is the part of an insidious manor thus, “ the common maxim does not please me; for it is the duty of the true friend at least to love as though he were always about to love." " Nor again [does this please me], that we ought to carry nothing to excess; since 'tis our duty to hate the wicked at least to the very extreme."

They contribute, too, a considerable aid to our ⁴⁸³ orations : first owing to the vanity of the audience ; for they feel a pleasure if one, speaking generally, happens to hit upon ideas which they hold on any particular point. My meaning, however, will be plain in this way, as also the manner in which we ought to catch at them; for the maxim, as has been stated, is an assertion universally, and men feel delighted when that is asserted universally, which they happen previously to have taken up as their opinion upon particulars. If, for instance, a man chanced to have bad neighbours or children, he would hail the man who should say, "nothing is more annoying than dwelling near people," or, " nothing is more silly than to beget children." ⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸⁵ So that we should form a guess, some how or other, as to the opinions which our audience happen to have taken up with; then to speak on these subjects ge- ⁴⁸⁶ nerally conformably to them. This one advantage the application of maxims must needs possess, and another superior to it; for it gives our orations an air of character. But those orations bear an impress of character in which the principle is manifest. And all maxims produce this effect by reason of the speaker's asserting universally on things which are the objects of deliberate choice: so that should the maxims be good, they make the speaker also to appear a man of worthy character.

Such, then, be our discussion on the subject of the maxim, of its nature, its species, the manner in which it is to be employed, and the advantages which it possesses.

⁴⁸⁷ LET us speak generally of enthymems, in what way we ought to seek for them, and afterwards of the topics, ( τόποι,) for the nature of the two is respectively different1. ⁴⁸⁸ It has been stated before, that the enthymem is a kind of syllogism, also in what way it is a syllogism, and in what respect it differs from the syllogism of ⁴⁸⁹ logic; tor we should make our conclusions without taking up our assumptions either many stages back, or all of them together: the one process from its length is obscure ; the other, from its stating what is plain, is waste of words.

And this is the reason why men of no education have more persuasive influence over the mob than ⁴⁹⁰ men of high acquirements, as the poet says, " that the unlearned speak more in unison with the feelings of the mob;" for the latter address them in common and general points, the former, from the store of their information, in a manner which comes home to them. So that we are not to found our address on any thing ⁴⁹¹ which may seem to the purpose, but on certain definite points; such, for example, as seem right to the judges, or those whose opinions they acknowledge; and the reason for this is, that it will appear to be the case either to all or most of them : moreover we ⁴⁹² should draw our conclusions not only from necessary, but also from contingent premises 3.

First, then, you ought to be aware that it is necessary, respecting every subject on which you have to speak and to draw conclusions, whether it be through the medium of the rhetorical SyllogiSM , or of any ⁴⁹³ other whatsoever, to be masters either of all or some of the facts inherent in it: for having none of them, you will not be able to draw your inferences from any thing5. My meaning is this : how shall we be able to give advice to the Athenians, whether they ought to go to war, without being informed what their forces are, whether naval or military, or both; and these in how great numbers; also what are their resources ; or their allies and enemies; and yet further, what former wars they have waged, and in what manner, and other points of this description: or how to eulo- ⁴⁹⁴ gize them, unless we be informed of the sea-fight at Salamis, or the battle at Marathon, or the exploits achieved by them in behalf of the Heraclidae, or some other such points; for it is on the real or apparent honourable traits attaching to each object that all orators found their panegyrics. And in the same ^{495 496 497 498 499} way it is -on their opppsites that they ground their reprehension, always looking out for any thing of that nature which either attaches, or appears to attach, to the subject; suppose [the case of a censure passed on the Athenians] because they subjected the Greeks to themselves, and reduced to a state of servitude the people of Aegina and Potidaea, who were their allies against the barbarian, and bore off the prize of highest worthy and every other transaction of this nature, and whatever other such error may attach to them.

⁵⁰⁰ And in the same way those orators who accuse and defend, construct their accusations and defences on a ⁵⁰¹ view of existing circumstances7: there is no difference in your pursuing this process, whether it be respecting Athenians or Lacedaemonians, men or gods. For in advising Achilles, or in praising or blaming him, in accusing and defending him, we must assume the traits which attach, or appear to attach, to his character; in order that from among their number we may, in so praising or blaming him, allege whatever things honourable or base attach to him; and in accusing or defending him, whatever things just or unjust; and in advising him, whatever is beneficial ⁵⁰² or injurious. And in a similar manner respecting any business whatsoever; as, respecting justice, the question whether it be expedient [must be discussed] on the ground of what appertains to justice or ex- ⁵⁰³ pediency. So that as all men appear thus to construct their proofs, whether they draw their inferences with greater accuracy or remissness, (for they do not make their assumptions out of every subject, but from those circumstances which are inherent in each question,) and by reason that it is manifestly impossible otherwise to prove; it is evident, then, that it is necessary, as I said in the Topics, to be in pos- ^{504 505} session of certain select propositions on points which may occur, and are most convenient: and [it is ⁵⁰⁶ evident] that the orator should conduct his inquiry respecting questions which arise on the sudden in the same manner, not turning his view aside to indefinite points, but to the actual points of the case which the oration is concerning; and embracing in his sketch the greatest number he is able, and those coming the nearest to the point; for in proportion as he is master of the greater number of the things inherent in the case, by so much the easier will it be to effect proof; and in proportion as these are the nearer to the point, in the very same proportion will they be more peculiar, and less vague. By vague I mean, the praising ⁵⁰⁷ Achilles because he is a man, and one of the deified heroes, and made war against Troy ; for these are points attaching to a thousand others beside: so that such an orator no more praises Achilles than he does Diomed. But by peculiar I mean, those which befall no one else than to Achilles, for instance, the slaying Hector, the bravest of the Trojans ; and Cycnus, who, being himself invulnerable, prevented all the forces from landing ; and that he joined the expedition the youngest, and without being bound by an oath; and whatever other topics are of this description. One element of enthymems, then, is that ⁵⁰⁸ of selection ; and this is the first which partakes of the nature of topics.

And now let us state the elements of enthymems; ⁵⁰⁹ (but by pace and element of an enthymem I mean the same thing). First, however, let us treat of those ⁵¹⁰ points concerning which it is necessary first to speak. For of enthymems there are two species; the one species are confirmative, that such is or is not the fact; and the other refutative: and they differ just as, in logic, the syllogism and the elenchus differ. And the confirmative enthymem is the deducing a ⁵¹¹ conclusion from acknowledged premises; the refuta- ⁵¹² tive, however, is the deducing an inference which is ⁵¹³ not admitted. Now the general arguments nearly on each class of subjects necessary and useful to be known are in our possession; for propositions have been selected on each [branch of rhetoric] ; so that the topics out of which one must allege his enthymems, whether on questions of good or evil, just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, select points moreover respecting the dispositions, the passions, and the habits, having been collected above, are likewise actually before us.

⁵¹⁴ But let us, in a different manner, further make assumptions respecting all the classes of rhetoric, and putting a mark on them severally as we proceed, state both the refutative and confirmative elements, as well as those of apparent enthymems, which, however, are not really enthymems, for neither in truth are they [the elements of actual] syllogisms. When these points have been elucidated, we shall discuss the subject of starting objections to enthymems, and the means of their solution, from what sources we ought to adduce them.

⁵¹⁵ THERE is one element of confirmative enthymems, derivable from contraries; for we should consider, whether the contrary quality be inherent in the contrary subject; doing away the argument [grounded thereon] if it be not inherent; and if it be inherent, founding one thereon ourselves: for example, the argument that " Temperance is good, because intemperance is injurious:" or, as it is in the Messeniac oration, "If war be the cause of our present trou- ⁵¹⁶ bles, of course we shall put ourselves right again with the return of peace." And, " If in truth it be not just to be angry with those who unwillingly do us harm; neither, if one on compulsion shall do good to any one, is it his duty to be grateful to him." And, " If to speak falsely is among men available to persuade; there is no anomaly in supposing, on the contrary, that many things which are true fail of being believed."

Another is derivable from conjugate inflections2; ⁵¹⁷ for the qualities must either be inherent consistently, or not at all; for example, the argument, that " the just is not in every case a good, for then also would that which is justly be well; now it is not, however, desirable to die justly3.

Another from relatives; for if to one party attach ⁵¹⁸ the idea of his having acted honourably or justly, to the other also will attach that of having suffered [honourably, etc.]. Also, if to command be just, so also is the having executed [the command] ; for example, just as that farmer of the revenue, Diomedon 4, said of the revenues, " If it be not base for you to put them up for sale, neither is it for us to purchase them." And if the idea that he has suffered justly or honourably be on the side of the patient, so will it also be on that of the agent; and if on that of the agent, then also on that of the patient. There is, however, in this way of arguing, room for passing off some false reasoning 5: for if the person has justly suffered any thing, he indeed has justly been a sufferer, but perhaps not so at your hands. On which ^{519 520 521 522} account we should view the question separately,­ whether the patient deserve to suffer, and whether the agent have a right to inflict the suffering; that done, to employ the facts in whatever way may suit our purpose: for at times, considerations of this kind do not harmonize; just as in the Alcmaeon of Theodectus, " Did no man hate thy mother ?" In his reply he tells her, that it is fitting to consider the points taken separately ; and when Alphesiboea asks how, taking her up, he says, " That she indeed deserved death, they did decree; but at the same time that I ought not to be the slayer." And just so the trial respecting Demosthenes, and of the persons who slew Nicanor. For when they had been adjudged to have slain him justly, it appeared that he had also been justly put to death. Again, respecting the person who met his death at Thebes, respecting whom some one bade the question be decided, whether he were deserving death; as though it were not unjust to slay one who deserved to die.

⁵²³ Another element is derivable from the relations of greater and less6; for instance: " If not even the gods know every thing, hardly I should suppose do men for it is-to say, that if the quality be not inherent in that which would more naturally possess it; then it is evident, that in that which would less naturally possess it, it is not inherent.

⁵²⁴ And the argument, that " he assaults his neighbours, who even does so to his father;" is derived from the element, if the less probability exist, so also does the greater; [which is available] in reference to whether of the two points it may be needful to prove, ' whether that it is or is not the fact.

⁵²⁵ And again, by parity of reasoning, when it is said, " And is thy father to be pitied in that he has lost his children, and is not in truth CEneus who has lost his noble offspring ? " and the argument, " If indeed Theseus committed no wrong, neither did Paris;" and, " If Tyndarus' sons did not act unjustly, neither did ⁵²⁶ Paris and this, ‟ Suppose Hector did slay Patroclus, Paris slew Achilles;" and this, " If other artists are not to be held cheap, neither are philosophers and, "If generals are not held cheap because they are frequently vanquished, neither are sophists;" and that, " If it behoves an individual to have a care for your glory, it also behoves you to regard that of Greece."

Another element arises from the consideration of ⁵²⁷ time, as Iphicrates urged in his oration against Harmodius, " that if before my doing it, I had claimed to have the honour of a statue, ye would have granted it; will ye not then grant it me now that I have achieved it ?-Do not, therefore, engage yourselves under promises, when about to receive; and, when you have experienced the benefit, withdraw them." And, on another occasion, in reference to the Thebans permitting Philip to pass through into Attica, the argument that, " if, before his aiding them against the Phocians, he had claimed a passage, they would have promised; it were then an absurd thing, if, because he threw himself on them, and had confidence in them, they should not let him march through8."

Another element is deduced from assertions made ⁵²⁸ respecting yourself retorted upon your adversary; and the term is of exceeding service, as is exemplified ^{529 530 531 532} in the Teucer; one too it is of which Iphicrates availed himself against Aristophon, when he put the question home to him, whether he would betray the fleet for a bribe; and on his denying that he would, then said he, " Would you, who are Aristophon, not betray them, and shall I, who am Iphicrates ?" You ought, however, to be dealing with an opposite party, who appears in a greater degree to have been guilty of injustice; otherwise it would appear ridiculous, were any one laying an accusation against an Aristides, to allege this ; but it ought always to tend directly to the discredit of him who lays the impeachment ; for, generally speaking, the plaintiff presumes himself better than the defendant; this notion, then, it behoves us to refute. And generally it is absurd when one chides in another what he does himself, or would feel inclined to do ; or exhorts him to do what he does not himself, neither would be induced to do.

⁵³³ Another place is from definitions9; as, " that the genius is nothing else than either the deity, or his production. And yet whoever conceives the existence of the production of a deity, must necessarily think at the same time that gods are in existence 10." And, as Iphicrates said, "that that man was most noble who was the best; for that there did not attach any nobility to Harmodius and Aristogiton before they had achieved some noble exploit." And his proof that himself was more nearly akin to them, by saying, " At any rate my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, than yours are11." And, as was said in that speech about Paris, ^{534 535 536} " All will be free to acknowledge that the intemperate do not acquiesce in the enjoyment of a single person." And the reason on account of which Socrates refused to go to Archelaus, " because," said he, " it is a disgrace for one who has been treated well to be unable to make a retort on terms of equality, just as it would be for one who has been treated ill." For all these deduce their inferences about the points respecting which they speak, after having defined and ascertained the question.

Another element is deducible from the number of ⁵³⁷ senses in which a word may be taken, as in the Topics respecting the acceptations of the word rightly. Another from taking the different bearings of the case; as, " If all act unjustly for three objects, for the sake either of this, or this, or this, and from two of these motives it is impossible that he should have acted; but that he acted on the third, not even the accusers themselves allege."

Another from induction, as may be illustrated from ⁵³⁸ the oration respecting Peparethus, to establish that women every where discern truly respecting their children; because first at Athens the mother made the matter clear to Mantias, the orator, when undertaking a suit against his son; and again at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were at issue on the point, the Dodonian woman proved the child to be the son of Ismenias; and on this account they considered Thessaliscus to be the son of Ismenias. And again, from the law of Theodectes, " If people do not give their own horses in charge to those who manage those of others amiss, nor [their ships] to those who overturn the ships of others; neither ought we, if in every case it happens in the same way, to employ those who but ill protect the safety of others, for our own protection." And, as Alcidamas asserted, that " all pay honour to the wise, at least the Parians. honoured Archilochus, what though he was a calumniator of them; and the Chians, Homer, who was not their citizen; the Mitylenaeans, Sappho, though she was a woman; and the Lacedaemonians, who of all people are the least attached to learning, made Chilon one of their senators; the Greeks of Italy also honoured Pythagoras, and the people of Lampsacus buried Anaxagoras, though a foreigner, and honour him even to this day; the Athenians again were prosperous while they abode by the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians, while by those of Lycurgus ; also at Thebes, at the time that the magistrates were men of learning, the state enjoyed prosperity."

⁵³⁹ Another element of enthymems is derivable from a former decision of the same, a similar, or opposite question; more especially indeed if all men so decide, and that uniformly ; and otherwise, [if not all,] but the majority ; or the wise, either all, or most of them ; or the good; or if the very judges themselves, or those whom they approve, or those in opposition to whom they cannot decide (as for instance those on whom they depend) ; or those contrary to whom it is not becoming to decide; for instance, a god, or a father, or teacher, [happen so to have decided]. Just on the principle of the appeal of Autocles to Mixidemides, " whether it beseemed the awful goddesses to render an account to the Areopagus, and not Mixidemides ?" Or, as Sappho insisted, "that to die was an evil, the gods having so decided; since [had it not been so] they would themselves have died;" or as Aristippus told Plato when he asserted something, as he thought, rather dogmatically, " Yet," said he, " our companion at least held no such thing," meaning Socrates. And Hegesippus, having first consulted the oracle at Olympia, put the question secondly at Delphi,-whether he [Apollo] was of the same opinion as his father; as though it were disgraceful to contradict a father. And of Helen, as Isocrates wrote12, that " she was worthy, since indeed Theseus judged her so." And of Paris, " whom the goddesses ⁵⁴⁰ preferred 13;" and of Evagoras, as lacerates says, that must needs be virtuous, It since Conon, when unfortunately passing by every one else, came to Evagoras."

Another element arises from an enumeration of ⁵⁴¹ parts; as in the Topica, " what kind of motion the soul is; it is either of this, or that description." And an instance occurs in the Socrates of Theodectes: "Toward what temple bath he been guilty of impiety? whom of the gods which the ritual of our state acknowledges, hath he not honoured ? "

Another consists in, Since, in the generality of in- ⁵⁴² stances, it happens that on the same circumstances somewhat is consequent whether good or evil, the exhortation or dissuasion by means of these consequences, the accusation or defence, the praising or blaming; for instance, on education is consequent envy, which is an evil; and the being wise, which is a good: [on the one hand then you may assert that] men should not seek to be educated, because it is not good to be envied; [on the other that] it is fitting to be educated, for it is good to be wise. In this topic 14, with the addition of that on possibility, and the other [universal means of proof], as they have been stated, consists the system of CaliDDus.

Another occurs, when we want to exhort or: dis- ⁵⁴³ suade respecting two propositions, and those opposed to each other; and to avail ourselves of the forementioned argument in the case of both. The difference [between this and the element last mentioned] is, that in it the opposition is merely between any propositions which may happen, it here holds between contraries : for instance, a priestess was endeavouring to prevent her son from becoming a public speaker ; ^{544 545 546} because, said she, " If on the one hand you speak what is just, men will hate you ; if what is unjust, the gods." [Here then it might be retorted], therefore you ought to become a public speaker; for, " if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; if what is unjust, men 15." And this is equivalent to the proverb " of buying dirt as well as salt." And the retortion is this, when on each of two contraries good and evil is consequent, they being respectively opposed.

⁵⁴⁷ Another arises from the circumstance, that men do not approve the same things privately as before the world; but when in public, they praise beyond all things what is just and honourable ; but within themselves they prefer what is expedient: the orator should endeavour to infer whichever suits his purpose, for this element is of sovereign use in exposing anomalies of opinion.

⁵⁴⁸ Another element is deducible from the analogy of results; as Iphicrates urged when they compelled his son to serve who was under the standard age, because he was tall, that " if they esteem great children as men, they assuredly will vote small men to be children." And Theodectes, in the oration respecting the law, asked, "Do ye make the mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, citizens on account of their virtue, and will ye not make exiles of those among the mercenaries who have committed these intolerable acts?"

⁵⁴⁹ Another arises out of the argument, that if the result be the same, the principle from which it arises will be the same; just as Xenophanes used to argue, that " they are equally guilty of impiety who assert that the gods were produced, as those who assert that they die; for in both cases it happens that in some period or other the gods do not exist." And generally ⁵⁵⁰ assuming that the result of each act is in every case identified with it. [Take this argument as an illustration] : "Ye are about to pronounce, not respecting Socrates, but respecting the pursuit in general, whether it be right to addict one's self to philosophy." And this, "that the giving earth and water is the being slaves." And "that the participating in the common peace is the performing of what is enjoined." Now we are to take whichever side may suit our purpose.

Another may be deduced from the circumstance, ⁵⁵¹ that the same persons do not choose the same things subsequently as before, but contrariwise; as, for instance, this appeal :-" If, when in banishment, we fought that we might return ; shall we, now that we have returned, take to flight, in order that we may not fight16?" For one while they chose abiding in their country at the expense of fighting ; at another, the possibility of avoiding fighting at the expense of non-continuance in their native land.

Another element which may be resorted to is, the ⁵⁵² assertion that a thing either exists or was produced, for the sake of that for which it might have existed or been produced; as if some one were to give a person any thing, in order that by taking it from him he may annoy him. Whence also it has been said, " To many, fortune, not bearing them good will, gives great good luck; but it is in order that they may receive the more conspicuous calamities 17." And this from the Meleager of Antiphon: " Not in order that they might slay the beast, but that they may become witnesses, before Greece, of Meleager's valour." And that insinuation in the Ajax of Theodectes, "that Diomede chose Ulysses, not as any compliment, but in order that his attendant might at the same time be his inferior." For it is very possible that he did so on this account.

Another, common both to the judicial and de- ⁵⁵³ liberative orators, is the consideration of the motives ^{554 555 556} which stimulate or retard men, and the objects with a view to which they both act and avoid; for these are such as, if they be actually in existence, we needs must proceed to action; for instance, if the undertaking be possible, and easy, and beneficial, either to the person in question himself, or to his friends, or pernicious to his enemies, and entailing loss on them ; or if the loss be less than the object proposed 18. And it is upon these considerations that orators exhort, and on their opposites that they dissuade ; moreover they both defend and accuse upon the ground of these considerations; they rest their defences on those which are used to dissuade, and their accusations on those used to exhort 19. The whole system of Calippus, as well as that of Pamphilus, is nothing more than this element.

⁵⁵⁷ Another is deducible from circumstances which appear to have taken place, but which are improbable, on the ground that they would not seem to be facts, had they not well nigh occurred or actually done so; and that they have a yet stronger claim to belief; for men apprehend as truths either facts or probabilities; if then it be passing belief, and not probable, it will be true 20; for at all events, it is not on account of its likelihood and plausibility that it has this appearance of being the case. Just as Androcles of the burgh Pithos, said in his impeachment ^{558 559 560} of the law, when the multitude were tumultuous as he spoke, " The laws require some law to set them right, for the very fishes require salt;" and yet it is neither likely nor plausible that creatures bred in the brine of the sea should require salt. " Nay, the olive lees require oil," and yet it is a fact not to be credited, that the very things from which oil is produced should require oil."

Another element, REFUTATIVE, is the consideration ⁵⁶¹ of contradictions; if there occur any contradiction under all the circumstances of time, conduct 21, sayings, and the like. And this independently, respecting your adversary, as " He tells you that he loves you, yet did he conspire with the thirty [tyrants] ;" or independently respecting yourself, " He tells you that I am litigious, but is not able to prove that I have brought any action into court;" or respecting both yourself and the adversary distinctly, " This man never lent any thing, but I have ransomed many of vou."

Another, applicable to those who have been calum- ⁵⁶² mated, or who appear so, whether men or actions, is the explaining the cause of the mistaken notion; for there is some circumstance, on account of which it appears to be the case; for example, when a certain woman had come in contact with her son, she seemed from her embracing him to have had connexion with the youth; when, however, the circumstance which caused it had been stated, the charge was quashed. And as in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses tells Ajax why, though he is braver than Ajax, he does not seem so.

Another is derived from the cause, if that be in ⁵⁶³ existence, arguing that the effect is also; and should it not exist, that neither does the effect. For cause, ^{564 565} and that of which it is the cause, exist conjointly, and nothing exists without a cause. Just as Leodamas in his defence, when Thrasybulus accused him, because he had been inscribed with infamy on a pillar in the Acropolis, but erased it in the time of the thirty tyrants, urged, " that it was not possible, because the thirty tyrants would put greater confidence in him, while his hatred toward the democracy remained inscribed in public."

⁵⁶⁶ Another is, the observing whether the thing respecting which the party is deliberating, or acting, or has acted, did or does admit of being on another and better footing; since it will become evident that, if this be the case, he has not acted; since no one voluntarily, and of his own knowledge, deliberately chooses what is bad. This, however, involves a fallacy ; for in many cases it becomes clear [only] when too late, how it might have been managed better, whereas it was. before unknown.

⁵⁶⁷ Another, which occurs when any thing anomalous to former acts is about to be done, is the considering the both in connexion; just as Xenophanes advised the people of Elea, when they asked him whether they should sacrifice and sing a dirge to Leucothea22 or not, " if they conceived her to be a deity, not to sing a dirge; but if a human being, not to sacrifice."

⁵⁶⁸ Another element is, the accusing or defending on the ground of errors committed; for instance, in the Medea of Carcinus, some persons accuse her because she slew her children, [alleging] that at all events they were not forthcoming ; for, respecting the sending away her children, Medea was in fault: she, however, defends herself [alleging that, if any one], she would have murdered Jason, not her children; which in truth had she done, she would have erred in not doing the other. And this element and species of enthymem constitutes the whole of that system of Theodorus, which is first.

⁵⁶⁹ Another is deducible from the name; as Sophocles ⁵⁷⁰ says, " Steel in truth you are, and bear the name." ⁵⁷¹ And as they are wont to say in their praises of the gods23; and as Conon used to call Thrasybulus, " rash in counsel," ( θρασύβουλος) ; and Herodicus told Thrasymachus, " You are always rash in fight, ( θρασύμαχος) ; and Polus, "You always are a colt," ( Πω̃λος) ; and Draco the legislator, that " his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon24; for they were harsh." And as the Hecuba of Euripides says of Venus, " The very name of the goddess rightly begins with folly25." And as Charemon says, "Pentheus, rightly named from the calamities20 awaiting him."

Refutative enthymems, however, are more in re- ⁵⁷² pute than the confirmative ; by reason of the refutative enthymem being a setting contraries briefly together ; and because things when put in contrast are more palpable to the auditor. Of all forms of reasoning, however, as well confirmative as refutative, those produce the greatest effect 27, which are of such a description that, on the commencement of their enunciation, men anticipate the conclusion, yet without their being superficial; for the hearers on their own parts, feel a pleasure 28, in having of themselves anti- ^{573 574 575 576 577 578} cipated it; and [next to these may we class] all those, by which the hearers are left behind, just so much as that they apprehend them simultaneously with their having been enunciated.

⁵⁷⁹ JUST as it is possible that [one form of reasoning] may be a syllogism, and that another, without really being such, may appear to be so ; even so it must needs be with respect to the enthymem also, that one description should really be enthymems, and another not, however they may appear to be; for the enthymem is a species of syllogism.

⁵⁸⁰ But the elements of these apparent enthymems are, one derivable from the diction: and of this, the first kind is, as in logic, the asserting your last proposition with all the air of a conclusion, although you have deduced no [legitimate] inference at all: thus, " So and so is assuredly not the case, necessarily, therefore, so and so is." And the expressing yourself in the course of your reasonings concisely and pointedly; for this kind of style is the very province of the enthymem, and this kind of fallacy is, it is probable, that which is [demonstrated] " the result of the style of the diction ;" but the stringing together the heads of many syllogisms, is a good expedient with a view to expressing yourself with all the air of syllogism in your style; thus, " that he preserved some, avenged others, emancipated the Greek people." For each of these propositions has been demonstrated from others ; and when they are put in conjunction, it appears that ⁵⁸¹ something results ever from them. Another kind arises from similarity of names, as the assertion, that ⁵⁸² " the mouse is an excellent animal, being that from which the most esteemed of all rites have derived their name;" for of all rites, the mysteries are held in most esteem. Or, if any one in praising a dog, were to embrace in his panegyric the dog in the heavens, or Pan; because Pindar thus addresses him, " blessed being, whom the inhabitants of Olympus call the all-various dog of the mighty goddess." Or the arguing, that "it is a most disgraceful thing, that there should be not even a dog in the house; and therefore it is evident that a dog is honourable." And the assertion, that Mercury is "communicative" above all the gods, because Mercury alone is called " common." And the stating that λόγος, speech, is most excellent; because the good are worthy of λόγος, esteem, not of wealth: for the words ( λόγου ἄξιον) are not used in a single sense.

Another [element of fallacy] is the asserting con- ⁵⁸³ jointly what is true separately; or separately, what is true conjointly; for as it appears to be the same thing, what though in many instances it be not the same, the orator should practise whatever method is more available to his purpose. The saying of Euthydemus is neither more nor less than an instance of this; the declaration, for instance, that "he knew there was a galley in the Piraeus 1," for he knew each [separate fact of his assertion]. And to declare of one who knows the constituent letters, " that he knows the verse 2;" for the verse is the same thing. Again, the saying that " as twice so much is prejudicial, he denied that the one was wholesome; for it is absurd that two good things should constitute one that is noxious." Thus enunciated, it is adapted to refutation; but thus it is confirmative; "for two evils do not constitute one good," etc. But the whole topic ^{584 585} is replete wih fallacy. Such again is the saying of Polycrates respecting Thrasybulus, that he had deposed thirty tyrants3;" for he takes them conjointly. Or, as in the Orestes of Theodectes, from distinct cases, "It is just that she who has slain her husband should die; as also that a son at least should avenge his father. Now, are not these the very things that have been done ?" for, taking the cases conjointly, perhaps it is no longer just. This may also come under the fallacy of omission, for it is not explained " by whom [she should be put to death]."

⁵⁸⁶ Another element is the doing away or establishing a point by exaggeration4: and this occurs when, without having shown that [the prisoner] has really committed the crime, [the accuser] proceeds to exaggerate it; for this fallacy causes it to appear (when the accused employs the exaggeration) that he has not done the deed; or, (supposing it be the accuser who gets into a passion,) that he has done it. Thus then there is no enthymem ; for the hearer is sophistically brought over to a belief either that [the accused] has or has not done it, without any proof having been adduced.

⁵⁸⁷ Another is the argument drawn from a sign5, for this also is illogical; as if one were to say, " Lovers are an advantage to states; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton deposed the tyrant Hipparchus." And if one were to say, " Dionysius is a robber, for he is a wicked man;" for this also is illogical, because not every wicked man is a thief, although every thief is a wicked man. ^{588 589 590}

⁵⁹¹ Another is the arguing from an accidental cir- ⁵⁹² cumstance; exemplified in that which Polycrates said about mice, that " they lent their aid by gnawing through the [enemy's] bowstrings." Or supposing one to declare, "that the being bidden to supper is the most honourable; for Achilles was wroth, on account of his not being invited by the Greeks at Tenedos:" he however was enraged, as though he was treated with disrespect, and this occurred upon his not being invited.

Another arises from establishing the consequent; ⁵⁹³ as in the oration respecting Paris, [it is contended] that " he is of a noble spirit; because, despising the society of many, he abode on Ida by himself for, because the noble-spirited are thus disposed, he, too, it should seem, is noble-spirited. Again, " Since he is both foppish in his dress, and strolls about by night, he is an adulterer;" because adulterers are persons of such habits7. Similar to this is also the argument, that the poor, because they dance and sing in the temples ; and that exiles, because it is permitted them to dwell where they list, [are happy.]" For as these advantages belong to those who appear to be happy; they too would appear to be happy, to whom they belong. Moreover, the case varies with the circumstances of the transaction; on which account, the argument falls under the charge of omission.

Another arises from stating as a cause that which ⁵⁹⁴ in fact is not; [arguing], for instance, on its having happened "simultaneously," or "after;" for men do assume that what occurs "subsequently," [occurs] " by means of" [that which preceded], and more especially those engaged in state affairs; just as Demades [insinuated] "that the administration of ^{595 596} Demosthenes was the cause of all their misfortunes; because a war happened after it."

⁵⁹⁷ Another, from the omission of the "when" and " manner how;" for instance, the argument " that Paris carried off Helen justly; because free choice had been given her by her father8;" for very possibly it was not [granted] for a continuance, but at first merely; because so far only was she at her father's disposal. Or if any one were to say, " that the striking free men was an insult because under all circumstances this is not the case, but when one begins the violence.

⁵⁹⁸ Again, as in the disputations of the Sophists, there arises an apparent syllogism from stating things absolutely or not absolutely, but conditionally ; as [it is contended] in logic, that " what is a nonentity, does exist; because a nonentity exists as a nonentity;" and that " what is unknown is known, for it is known to be unknown9;" just so in rhetoric also, we have an apparent enthymem from what is not absolutely probable, but conditionally probable. This, however, is not universally the case; as in truth Agatho remarks, " Perhaps some one will be inclined to assert this to be probable, that many improbabilities will befall men:" for that which is contrary to probability does occur; so that even what is contrary to probability is probable 10; this, however, is not the case absolutely; but just as in sophistical disputations, it is the omission of the circumstances of extent, relation, and place, which produces the imposition; so also here [in rhetoric], it results from the things being probable not absolutely, but conditionally pro- ⁵⁹⁹ bable. The system of Corax is constructed upon this topic: for supposing your client, without being open to the charge, as for instance, being infirm, ^{600 601 602} should be under a charge for an assault, [you have grounds for your defence,] because the case is not probable: and if he be open to the charge, from his being, for example, a powerful man, [still you may defend him] on the ground that it is not likely, because it was sure to seem to be likely11. And so also respecting all other cases, for he needs must be either open to the imputation or not. Both cases then appear to be likely; but the one is likely [absolutely], the other not absolutely, but so as has been explained. And this is [the secret] "of making the worse, the better side 12." And hence mankind were justly in- ⁶⁰³ dignant at the annunciation of Protagoras 13; for it is an imposition, and not the real, but an apparent probability, and has a place in no art except rhetoric, and the art of disputation. And now the subject of enthymems, as well real as apparent, has been discussed.

\ IT follows that I speak of the modes of disengaging ⁶⁰⁴ one's self from arguments. They are either the meeting them with contradictory arguments, or starting an obj ection1. Now as to the meeting them with counter ^{605 606 607 608 609} arguments, it is evident that we may do it on the ground of the same topics [as were given for refutation]: for the arguments arise out of probabilities, ⁶¹⁰ and many things which appear likely are opposed to each other.

⁶¹¹ Objections, however, (as was stated in the Topics,) are started in four ways : 1. for either it may be from the same subject: 2. from a similar: 3. or an opposite [to that from which the adversary argues]: 4. ⁶¹² or from points already decided. By deriving your objection from the same source, I mean that, supposing the enthymem were respecting love, " that it was a good feeling;" there would be a twofold ⁶¹³ jection ; tor it [might be started] asserting generally that " every want is bad:" or particularly, that " the proverbial expression Caunian loves2, would not have ⁶¹⁴ arisen had there not been some wicked loves. Again, an objection is alleged on the ground of a contrary fact; as, if the enthymem was this, " The good man benefits all his friends,, rand the obiection.l " But ⁶¹⁵ the bad man does not hurt all his." And on the ground of similar cases3; if the argument be, " Those who have been treated ill always hate;" [the objection,] that " those who have been treated well do not ⁶¹⁶ always love4." And again, the decisions of men of celebrity: thus, suppose one brought forward the argument, that "we ought to have some feeling for those who are intoxicated, because they err ignorantly5:" this objection [may be started], that "Pittacus ^{617 618 619 620 621} is not therefore entitled to praise, otherwise he would not in his enactments have imposed higher fines, in case the party committed the error while intoxicated."

But as all reasonings [of the orator] are derived ⁶²² from four sources, and these four are probability, example, proof positive ( τεκμήριον), and signs; and as the reasonings drawn from what is usual, or appears to be so, are drawn from probabilities, while those drawn by inference from similarity of circumstances, whether in one or more instances, (when the speaker embracing what is general, then infers particulars,) exist by virtue of example; while those again which are inferred from what is necessary and fact, are founded on proof positive; and lastly, as those drawn from what does or does not hold good, whether universally or particularly, result from signs, [it being remembered] that probability is not what always, but what usually occurs;it is plain that it is, in, every case, possible to get rid of reasonings such as these by starting an objection. The solution is, how- ⁶²³ ever, [sometimes] apparent, and not always real; for the objector does not do it away on the ground of its not being probable, but on that of its not being necessary6. Wherefore it always happens, that the defendant has the advantage of the accuser, by means of this piece of sophistry. For as the accuser constructs his proof by means of probabilities (the task of getting rid of the positive certainty being by no means the same [in point of difficulty], as that of getting rid of the probability of the charge); and as that which is merely probable, is invariably open to an objection ; (for it otherwise would not be a probability, but invariable and necessary;) and if this method of solution have been adopted, the judge supposes either that it does not amount to a probability, or at least that he ought not to decide, having been imposed upon in the way mentioned above; ⁶²⁴ because [in fact] he is not bound to pronounce on positive proofs alone, but also on probabilities, which is the spirit of the oath, " that he will decide to the best of his judgment; " wherefore that will not be a satisfactory objection which rests merely on the absence of proof positive, but it is further incumbent on the objector to get rid of the probability; this, however, will be the case, if the objection be proba- ⁶²⁵ ble in a higher degree; (and it may be so in two ways, either on the score of time, or of the nature of the case; and pre-eminently so, if in both these particulars ;) for if in the majority of instances it be as you state, then it is a greater probability.

⁶²⁶ Signs also, and the reasonings deduced from them, may be got rid of, even if they be facts, as was stated in the first Book; for it is clear to us from the Analytics that every sign is illogical.

⁶²⁷ The same method of solution applies to reasonings grounded on example as to those on probabilities; for if we have a single instance in contravention, it has been answered7, [sufficiently to show] that it is not necessary; or that in the majority of instances, and those of more frequent occurrence, the case is otherwise. If, however, it be the case more frequently, and in the majority of instances, we must contend that the present is not the case in point, or that its application is not in point, or that it has some difference at all events.

⁶²⁸ But proofs positive ( τεκμήρια), and the reasonings grounded on them, we shall not be able to get rid of, at least not on the plea of inconclusiveness; this is clear to us from the Analytics : it remains for us to show that what is asserted is not the case8; if, however, it be clear both that it is true as a matter of fact, and that it is a proof positive of the point, from that moment it becomes irrefragable; for thenceforth it is plain from demonstration. ^{629 630}

AMPLIFICATION and extenuation are not elements of ⁶³² enthymems, (by topic and element I mean the same thing,) since the element and the topic is that under which many enthymems fall; whereas amplification and extenuation are [themselves] enthymems for showing that a thing is great or little, like those for showing that it is good or bad. lost or unjust. or falls under either of the other denominations. And ⁶³³ these are all the questions about which syllogisms and enthymems are conversant; so that unless each of these be a topic of an enthymem, amplification and extenuation are not.

Neither, again, are the topics which are available ⁶³⁴ to solution of enthymems, at all different in species from those employed in their construction: for it is evident that he effects solution who either proves [something contrary], or states an objection, and they establish a counter proof of the contrary ; thus, " If one has argued that a fact has taken place, the other argues that it has not or " if one argues that it has not, the other insists that it has." So that this will not amount to a difference ; for both employ the same vehicles of proof, inasmuch as they each allege enthymems to show that it is, or is not the case.

But the objection is not an enthymem, but is, as ⁶³⁵ was stated in the Topics, the stating some opinion from which it will appear that no legitimate inference has been arrived at, or that [the opponent] has assumed some false proposition.

Thus much, then, on the subject of examples, and ⁶³⁶ maxims, and enthymems1, and, in a word, all the ⁶³⁷ means of persuasion which address themselves to the understanding, both the sources whence we may furnish ourselves plentifully with them, and the means by which we may effect their solution2. It remains for us to go over the subject of style and arrangement3. ^{638 639 640}