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Book 2

The necessity of investing the Judge with a favourable feeling.

THE materials, then, from which we must exhort ¹ and dissuade, praise and blame, accuse and defend, the notions also and propositions, useful in order to render these points credible, are those [which we have discussed] : for respecting these questions, and out of these sources, are enthymems deduced, so that an orator, thus provided, may speak on each separate department of questions. But as rhetoric has in ² view the coming to a decision (tor in deliberative oratory, the assembly arrive at decisions, and the sentence of a court of justice is ipso facto a decision) ; it is necessary to look not only to your speech, in what way that will be of a character to convince and persuade, but also to invest yourself with a certain kind of character, and the judge with a certain kind of feeling. For it is a point of great consequence, ³ particularly in deliberative! cases ; and, next to these, in judicial; as well that the speaker seem to be a man of a certain character, as that his audience conceive him to be of a certain disposition toward themselves; moreover it is of consequence if your audience chance to be themselves also disposed in a certain way. ⁴⁵ Now, as to a speaker's appearing to be himself of a certain character, this point is more available in deliberations : but the disposing the auditor in a certain way, in judicial cases ; for things do not show themselves in the same light to persons affected by love and by hatred, nor to those under emotions of anger, as to those who are disposed to placability; but they appear either utterly different in character, or at least different in degree. For to a judge who is affected by love toward the party respecting whom he pronounces his decision, that party appears either not at all to be unjust, or to be so in a very trivial degree. To a judge, however, who is affected by hatred, the case has a contrary appearance. So also to a person who is eager and sanguine, the proposed object, if pleasant, takes the appearance, as well of being likely to accrue, as of being likely to prove really a good ; while by one who is indifferent and reluctant, the opposite view is taken.

⁶ Now, there are three causes of a speaker's deserving belief; for so many in number are the qualities on account of which we lend our credit, independently of proof adduced; and these are prudence, moral excellence, and the having our interests at heart2; (for men are fallacious in what they allege or advise by reason, either of all, or some, of these causes; for either, from want of ability, they do not rightly apprehend the question; or, rightly apprehending it, from their depravity, they do not tell you what they think; or, being men both of ability and moral excellence, they have not your interests at heart, on which account it is possible they should not give you the best advice, though fully known what is best;) and besides these there is no other : it follows therefore, of course, that the speaker who appears to possess all these qualities, is considered by his audience ⁷ as deserving credit 3. Now the means by which men ⁸⁹ may appear virtuous and prudent, are to be derived ¹⁰ from what has been laid down on the subject of the virtues ; for it is by help of the very same things, that an orator may invest himself, and any one else, in a certain character. The subject of feeling an in- ¹¹ terest, and of friendliness, must be discussed in ray treatise of the passions, commencing henceforth. Passions however are, all emotions whatsoever, on which pain and pleasure are consequent, by whose operation, undergoing a change, men differ in respect to their decisions : for instance, anger, pity, fear, and whatever other emotions are of such a nature, and those opposed to them. But it will be fitting to ¹² divide what I have to say, respecting each, into three considerations; to consider, respecting anger, for example, how those who are susceptible of anger are affected; with whom they usually are angry; and on what occasions. For, granted that we be in possession of one, or even two of these points, and not of them all, it will be impossible for us to kindle anger in the breast; and in the case of the rest of the passions in a similar way. In the same way, then, as on the subjects treated of above I have separately drawn up the several propositions, so let me do in respect of these also, and make my distinctions according to the manner specified.

Persons against whom Anger is felt, and by whom, and why.

LET anger be defined to be " a desire accompanied ¹³ by pain of a revenge which presents itself, on ¹⁴¹⁵¹⁶ count of an apparent slight from persons acting toward one's self, or some of one's friends, unbecom- ¹⁷ ingly." Now, if anger be this, it must be that he who is affected by anger, is so affected invariably towards some individual (for instance, towards Cleon), but not towards mankind2, generally: and this, because the individual has already wrought some indignity, either on himself or some of his friends, or in- ¹⁸ tends doing so. It must be also that there is a sort of pleasure consequent on all anger, arising out of the hope of avenging one's self3; for the idea of attaining what one desires is pleasant; and no one is desirous of objects which appear impracticable to him; and he who is under the affection of anger is desirous of objects which appear practicable to him. Wherefore it has been happily remarked of anger, that it is, " Far, far too dear to every mortal breast, Sweet to the soul, as honey to the taste4.” Because a sort of pleasure is consequent on it, as well on this account, as because men linger in thought on compassing revenge. Now the phantasy which then arises excites a pleasure within us, as do the phanta- ¹⁹ sies of dreams. But as a slight is the operation of an opinion conceived of an object which appears not worth consideration (for we esteem things absolutely bad, and those which are good, and what conduces to them, to be worth some consideration ; that however which is mere nothing, or absolutely trivial, we con- ²⁰ ceive worth none). There are three species of slight, contempt, vexatiousness, and contumely: for he who manifests contempt is guilty of a slight, since men contemn whatever they think worth nothing, and what is worth nothing, they slight. Again, he who is vexatious appears to contemn, for vexatiousness is a thwarting another's wishes, not that any thing may accrue to the person himself who so impedes, but in ²¹²²²³ order that something may not accrue to that other. Since, then, he slights not with a view to any advantage to himself, it is plain that he conceives you can neither hurt him, (for, if he did, he would be afraid, and would not be guilty of slight,) nor can benefit him in any respect worth mentioning, since he would otherwise hold you in consideration, in order to become your friend. He, too, who acts contume- ²⁴ liously manifests slight; for contumely is the doing and saying those things about which the person who is the subject of this treatment, has feelings of delicacy, not with a view that any thing should accrue to himself, other than what arises to him in the act, but in order that he may be gratified; for they who requite an injury, do not act contumeliously, but take revenge. Now the cause of the pleasure felt by those ²⁵ who act contumeliously, is that, by injuring, they conceive themselves to be more decidedly superior: on which account young men and the rich are given to contumely, for in manifesting the contumely, they conceive themselves superior. To contumely belongs the withholding of respect; but he who withholds respect, manifests slight; for that which is of no value, is held in no consideration, either good or bad. On which principle Achilles, in his anger, says, " He hath withheld from me respect, for he hath seized and possesses my prize himself, having taken it from me." And again, " Like some unregarded vagabond ;" as though he were, on this account, affected by anger. Now people think it becoming that they ²⁶ should De looKea up to oy their interiors, whether in birth, power, or moral excellence, or generally speaking, in whatever respect one may happen to be ²⁷ much superior: thus the rich man thinks to be looked up to by the poor, in regard to money; also the man who has a faculty of speaking, by him who is destitute of it, in the case of speaking ; and he who thinks himself worthy to bear office, by him who deserves to be subject to rule. Whence it has been said, " Beware ! for dreadful is the wrath of kings:” and in another place, " 'Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last:” for they feel indignant by reason of their superiority. ²⁸ Moreover [men think it becoming that they should be looked up to] by those at whose hands they think they ought to receive good; and these are such as they have benefited, or continue to benefit, whether in their own persons, or as instruments of any one, and whom any of their relatives have benefited, or wish, or did wish to benefit.

²⁹ 1. From hence it is by this time manifest both under what affections as regards themselves, and with what objects, and for what reasons, men feel anger. For as regards themselves, it is when they happen to be aggrieved, since he who is aggrieved is anxious for something. Now a man [will feel thus aggrieved], as well on any person's clashing with him in regard to any object, directly; when he is thirsty, for example, in regard to drinking: as also should they not directly clash, yet will he appear to do the same thing; and if a person thwarts, or does not co-operate with one, and if a person annoys one in any respect, when thus circumstanced, one feels anger against all these. ³⁰ On which account people who are ill, in poverty, love, thirst, in a word, who are under desire, and fail of success, these all are fretful and irritable, and particularly with those who slight their present condition: the sick man, for example, is annoyed by those who slight him in regard to his disease: the poor man too, with those who do so in regard to his poverty; and the warrior, in regard to war; the lover, in regard to love; and in other cases similarly, for each one has the way paved to the feeling anger in each case, by the passion which exists in his mind. Again, a man ³¹ is nettled should he happen to be expecting the very opposite of what results; for that pains one more deeply which falls out very unexpectedly; just in the same ratio as that which is very unexpected delights, should it be what one wishes for. On which account seasons, times, dispositions, and ages, which class of them are readily excited to anger, and when, and how, will be plain from this which I have said ; also it will be plain that they are then excited with greater readiness, when more immediately influenced by these circumstances. As then regards the persons themselves, under these dispositions it is that they are readily excited to anger.

2. But people feel anger towards those who laugh ³² at them excessively, and gibe, and scoff at them, for these treat them with contumely ; with such also as hurt them in all particulars, of such a nature as are tokens of contumely: these of course must be such as neither are in requital for any thing, or beneficial to those who are the agents 6; for this is enough to make it appear to be an act solely of contumely: towards ³³ those also who underrate and despise what themselves take a warm interest in; thus all those who are fond of philosophy, are angry if any one undervalues philosophy ; so, too, they who embrace the notion of an universal idea7, are nettled if a person despises the doctrine; and as regards other things in a similar manner. But all this will be felt much more keenly, ³⁴ it these persons suspect that the qualities so underrated do not really belong to them, or not completely, or not firmly, or that they do not appear to belong to them ; since, if they conceive themselves to be very strong in the points on which they happen to be rallied, they do not regard its, and anger is felt to- ³⁵³⁶³⁷ wards friends, in a greater degree than towards such ³⁸ as are not friends; because people conceive it to be more fitting to receive good at their hands than not: ³⁹ also towards those who have been in the habit of honouring or bestowing consideration on them, if, on the contrary, they do not keep on the same terms with them; because people conceive themselves despised bv them. for otherwise they would do as be- ⁴⁰ fore. Towards those also who do not requite a kindness, or who do not return an equivalent, towards those also who thwart them, if they be inferiors; for these all appear to despise them, the latter as though they were their inferiors, the former as though the ⁴¹ kindness had been received] from inferiors. Men feel it also in a greater degree towards persons of no account, should they slight them; for anger is supposed to arise from a slight, and to exist towards persons whose conduct misbecame them ; now it becomes inferiors to make no manifestation of slight. ⁴² Towards friends, anger is felt if they do not or speak not well; and still more so if they do the contrary; also if they should not perceive us to be in want, just as the Plexippus of Antipho was angry with Meleager; for not to perceive this is a token of slight, since in regard to those for whom we feel ⁴³ deference, this does not escape our notice: towards those also it is felt who exult in their misfortunes; and, in a word, towards such as are in good spirits amid their misfortunes ; for this marks either a foe, or one who manifests slight: towards those also who do not care if they give us pain; wherefore, men feel anger towards those who announce evil tidings10. ⁴⁴ Against those also is anger felt who either readily listen to, or scrutinize our failings; for they resemble persons who slight us, or who are our enemies ; since a friend sympathizes with one, and all men, as their ⁴⁵peculiar failings are scrutinized, feel pain. More- ⁴⁶⁴⁷ over men feel anger towards those who slight them ⁴⁸ in the presence of five descriptions of persons, viz. in the presence of those whom they emulate, whom they admire, by whom they are desirous of being admired, in whose presence they are alive to delicacy of feeling, and before those who have a delicacy of feeling towards them; if before these any one should slight them, they feel anger more sensibly: with those also do men feel angry who slight them in such respects, as it is disgraceful for them not to stand up in defence of; in regard to parents, for instance, or children, wives, or persons in subjection: with those, too, who make no return of favours; for the slight then is contrary to what is becoming : and with those who play off sarcasms upon them when seriously engaged ; for sarcasm has an air of contempt: also with those who benefit others, if they do not also benefit them; since this also carries an air of contempt, the not thinking them worthy what all are worthy of. Also the letting a man escape our memory is a thing very apt to provoke anger; for example, the nearly forgetting even his name, since forgetfulness seems to be an indication of slight; because forgetfulness arises from disregard, and disregard is a kind of slight. Now, it has been told you against whom men feel anger, and under what dispositions, and why11. It evidently will be needful for an orator to work up his audience by his speech, into such a frame of mind as that under which men are prone to anger, and his adversary, too, as being obnoxious to that on account of which men feel anger, and as being such an one as people feel anger against. ⁴⁹

⁵⁰

The Persons susceptible of Placability, also those towards whom, and the occasions on which it is felt.

⁵¹ As the feeling anger is the opposite of being appeased, and anger itself of placability, we must ascertain with what dispositions men are placable, towards whom they are thus affected, and by what ⁵²⁵³⁵⁴ means they are appeased. Let placability, then, be defined to be " a subsiding and appeasement of anger1.” Now, if men feel anger towards those who slight them, and if slight be voluntary, it is plain that they are placable in regard to those who do no such thing, or who either do so, or appear to do so, involuntarily : towards those also who wish the contrary of what they do; and those who behave in the same way toward themselves also, for no one seems likely him- ⁵⁵ self to be guilty of slight towards himself. Men are thus disposed also towards such as acknowledge and repent of their guilt; for taking their feeling of pain for what they have done as a punishment, they are appeased :-there is proof of this in the case of chastising servants; for we chastise more violently those who contradict us, and deny their guilt; but towards such as acknowledge themselves to be justly punished, we cease from our wrath2; the reason of which is, that the denial of what is evident is a sort of impudence, and impudence is slight and contempt: therefore we are not alive to sense of shame, in regard to those whom we despise very ⁵⁶ much. Men are thus disposed also towards those who humble themselves before them3, and do not ⁵⁷⁵⁸⁵⁹ contradict their imputations; for they appear to acknowledge themselves inferior ; but inferiors fear us, and no one who fears is guilty of slight. But the fact that anger ceases towards such as humble themselves, even dogs evince by their not biting those who sit as suppliants. Placability is also felt ⁶⁰ towards such as are earnestly attentive, where they are themselves attentive; for they think themselves regarded with attention, and not despised: towards such as [subsequently to their manifesting slight] ⁶¹ have gratified us in more important points, and with those who implore us, and deprecate our anger; for these are more humble: towards those also, who ⁶² are not given to contumely, nor to jeering one; and who do not manifest slight towards any one, or towards those alone who are not good men, and not towards such as we ourselves are. In a word, we ⁶³ should consider the subject of placability, from the opposite of the doctrine of anger. Once more, it is ⁶⁴ felt towards those whom men fear, or have a delicacy toward ; for so long as they are thus affected, they are not influenced by anger; since it is impossible to feel anger and fear at the same time. Again, ⁶⁵ people either do not feel anger at all, or feel it in a less degree, towards those who have themselves acted under the influences of anger ; for these appear to have acted, not from any motive of slight; for no one who is angry with you slights you ; since slight ⁶⁶ is unattended by pain, anger, however, is so attended. Thus are they also disposed towards such as regard them with respect.

It is evident, also, that men are placable, when in a ⁶⁷ frame of mind contrary to the feeling of anger; thus in amusements, in mirth, in festivity, amid rejoicings, or a course of success and of gratification, or, in a word, when in a state of freedom from pain, and amid chastened pleasure and virtuous hope. Those, too, who have suffered some time to elapse, and are not fresh from the influence of anger; for time makes anger cease4. Also vengeance previously taken on ⁶⁸⁶⁹⁷⁰ one object allays the anger felt against another, even if he be more violent. For which reason, Philocrates, when some one asked him " how it was, as the populace were enraged with him, that he did not make his defence," very justly said, " I will not do it yet.”— " But when will you ?"—" I will do it, when I see some one else criminated." For people, after they have exhausted their anger on some other object, become placable ; which happened in the case of Ergophilus; for the populace, though more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, yet acquitted him, because, on the day before, they had condemned Cal- ⁷¹ listhenes to death. Men are thus disposed if they have convicted the object, and if he have suffered a greater ill than they, with all their anger, would have themselves inflicted; for they think they have gotten, as it were, their revenge. Again, if they are aware that they are themselves unjust, and suffer de- ⁷² servingly5; because anger is not felt at what is just; for in that case men no longer conceive themselves sufferers contrary to what is becoming; but anger was defined to be such a feeling. On which account we should preface punishment with a sort of lecture; for thus even slaves feel less indignant at being pun- ⁷³ ished. Moreover they are thus disposed, if they conceive that the sufferer will not perceive that he is punished by them, and in return for what they have have suffered; for anger is felt against individuals: ⁷⁴ Thucyd. iii. 38. ⁷⁵⁷⁶ and this is plain from the definition. Hence is it said in the poem with great propriety, " Go, say 'twas Ulysses, subverter of cities," etc.; as though the hero had not been revenged, unless Polyphemus perceived both by whom6, and in return for what7, he suffered. So that men are not angry with any who are no longer sensible; neither any longer with those who are dead8, as being persons who have endured the extremity of suffering; nor with those who will not be susceptible of pain, nor feel the punishment inflicted, a point of which those affected by anger are desirous. On which account the poet, wishing to restrain Achilles from his anger against Hector now that he is dead, aptly says, " In his madness he is vexing a senseless clod." It is evident that arguments must be deduced ⁷⁷ from the topics here furnished, by those who would appease their audience; by working up the hearers themselves into feelings such as I have described; and those with whom they are enraged, either as objects of fear, or as deserving reverence, or as persons who have benefited them, or as having been involuntary agents, or as now exceedingly pained at what they have done. ⁷⁸⁷⁹⁸⁰⁸¹

⁸²

The Characters towards whom men entertain friendly feelings, or hatred; and the reasons why.

⁸³ LET us discuss the characters towards whom men bear friendly feelings, and hatred, and the reasons why they do so; setting out with a definition of friendliness and the act of cherishing this feeling. ⁸⁴ Let the bearing friendly feeling, then, be defined to be "the wishing a person what we think good, for his sake and not for our own, and, as far as is in our power, the exerting ourselves to procure it." And a friend is he who entertains and meets a return of this feeling. And those people consider themselves friends who consider themselves to stand thus affected towards each other.

⁸⁵ These considerations being laid down, of necessity it must be, that one who participates in another's joy at good fortune, and in his sorrow at what aggrieves him, not from any other motive, but simply for his sake, is his friend. For every one, when that happens which he wishes, rejoices; but when the contrary happens, all are grieved. So that the pain and pleasure men feel are an indication of their wishes. ⁸⁶ Those, too, are friends, to whom the same things are become by this time good, and the same evil; those, too, who are friends and foes to the same persons, for these must necessarily desire similar objects. So that he who wishes for another what he does for ⁸⁷ himself, appears to be a friend to that other. Men love also those who have benefited either themselves, or those for whom they have a regard; whether in important particulars, or with readiness2, and for their own sakes, or those whom they deem willing to ⁸⁸ benefit them. Again, people love the friends of their friends, and such as cherish friendly feelings towards ⁸⁹⁹⁰ those for whom they do themselves; likewise those who are loved by such as are beloved by themselves; those also who are enemies to the same people, and ⁹¹ who hate those whom they hate themselves, and those who are hated by those who also are hated by themselves; for to all these the same objects seem good as to themselves; so that they wish for things which are good to them, both which were laid down to be characteristic of a friend. Moreover men love ⁹² those who benefit them in regard to money matters, and the security of life; on which account people ⁹³ honour the liberal and brave. They love also the just, of which character they esteem those who do not live at the cost of others, such are all who are supported by their bodily labour, and of these are husbandmen, and among the rest handicraftsmen ⁹⁴⁹⁵ in particular. They love also the temperate, for they are not unjust; and those who are disengaged from business, for the same reason. We love also ⁹⁶ those of whom we wish to become the friends, should they appear to desire it also. Of this sort are those who are good in respect to moral excellence, and men of approved character, either among all men, or among the best men, or those who are held in admiration by ourselves, or who themselves admire us. Again, we love those who are pleasant companions ⁹⁷ for passing time, or spending a day with; of this description are the good-tempered, and such as are not fond of chiding those who err, and are not quarrelsome or contentious3. For all people of this sort are fond of dispute ; but such as are fond of dispute give us the idea of desiring the opposite of ⁹⁸⁹⁹ what we do. Also those who have a happy turn in passing and taking a joke ; for both seem bent on the same things as their neighbours, being able both to endure being rallied and neatly rallying others 4. ¹⁰⁰ Men love also those who praise their good qualities, and particularly such as they apprehend not to belong ¹⁰¹ to them: also those who are neat in their appearance, their dress, and their whole manner of living. Also ¹⁰² those who do not reproach them with errors, nor their own benefits; for both these descriptions of ¹⁰³ people have an air of reproving them. People admire also those who forget old grievances ; and who do not treasure up grounds of quarrel, but are easily reconciled ; because of whatever disposition they show themselves towards others, people naturally think they ¹⁰⁴ will prove to be of towards themselves also: as also those who do not talk scandal, nor inform themselves of the ills either of their neighbours or themselves, but of their good points only; for this is the con- ¹⁰⁵ duct of a good man. We are friendly disposed also towards those who are not at cross purposes with us when angry, or seriously engaged; for all such people are fond of dispute: towards those also who comport themselves seriously towards us; thus, for instance, those who admire us, or consider us worthy ¹⁰⁶ men, and take a pleasure in our society, and who are thus affected in regard particularly to points about which ourselves are desirous to be admired, or to ap- ¹⁰⁷ pear excellent or agreeable : as also towards our equals, and those who have the same objects in view, supposing they do not clash with us5, and that their livelihood arise not from the same profession, for thus ¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁹ arises an instance of the proverb, “ Potter hates potter6.” We stand thus affected towards those also ¹¹⁰ who are desirous of the same objects with ourselves, and which it is possible for us to participate in as well as them; otherwise the same collision takes place in this case: towards those also, in regard to ¹¹¹ whom men have themselves in such a way as, while they do not hold them cheap, not to feel shame on mere matters of opinion. With this feeling do peo- ¹¹² ple regard those also in respect to whom they feel shame about matters really shameful: and those before whom they are studious to stand approved, and by whom they wish to be emulated, yet without being envied, all these men either love as friends, or wish to become their friends; also those with whom ¹¹³ they would co-operate toward some good, were it not that greater ills are likely thereby to befall themselves: and such as regard with friendly feeling, the ¹¹⁴ absent equally with the present; on which account all love those who manifest this disposition in regard to the dead. Also men entirely love those who are particularly zealous for their friends and never abandon them ; for eminently beyond all the good, people love those who are good as friends. They also love ¹¹⁵ those who do not dissemble towards them; of this class are such as mention their own failings; for it has been said already, that before friends we feel no shame about mere matters of opinion; if, then, he who is so ashamed has not the feelings of a friend, the man who is without such shame bears a resemblance to one who has friendly feelings. Also we love those who do not inspire us with fear, and before whom we feel confidence; for no one loves a person whom he fears7. But the species of friend- ¹¹⁶¹¹⁷ ship are companionship, intimacy, relationship, and the like. And the efficient causes of friendship are gratuitous benefits, the rendering a service unsolicited, and the not disclosing it after it has been ren- ¹¹⁸¹¹⁹ dered ; for thus done the favour appears to be solely for the sake of your friend himself, and from no other motive.

¹²⁰ The subject of hatred, however, and of bearing it, may, it is plain, be considered by taking the contraries. But the efficient causes of hatred are anger, vexatiousness, calumny.

¹²¹ 1. Now anger arises out of something which has reference to ourselves; hatred, however, even independently of any thing having reference to ourselves, since if we conceive a person to be of a certain description, we bear hatred towards him. 2. And our anger invariably has reference to individual objects, as to Callias or Socrates ; but hatred may be borne even to whole classes; for every one hates the character of a thief and an informer. 3. Again, the one feeling is to be remedied by time; the other is incurable. 4. Also the first is a desire of inflicting pain on its object, the last of doing him deadly harm; for the angry man wishes to be felt9, to him who bears hatred this matters not; and all things which give pain may be felt; but what does harm in the highest degree, is least capable of being felt, for instance, injustice and folly, for the presence of vice does not at all pain [him to whom it is present]. 5. And anger is attended by pain, hatred is not; for he who is affected by anger is pained, but he who is affected by ¹²²¹²³ hatred is not. 6. The former, too, had many ills befallen the object of his anger, might be inclined to pity him; the latter would not, in any case; for the former wishes the object of his anger to suffer in his turn, the latter desires the extinction of the object of his hate10. Out of these heads, then, it is plain that ¹²⁴ the orator may both prove those to be friends and enemies who really are such, and render such those who are not, and may do away the assertions of people on the subject, and may draw over those who hesitate whether an act was done from motives of anger or hatred, to whatsoever side he may fix on.

The nature of Fear, and the objects which excite it, and the dispositions under which men are afraid.

THE sort of things which men fear, and the persons ¹²⁵ whom, and under what affections as regards themselves, will thus become plain. Now, let fear be defined to be " A sort of pain or agitation, arising out of an idea that an evil, capable either of destroying or giving pain, is impending on us." People do not fear every evil1; for example, a man does not fear lest he shall become unjust or stupid; but people fear all those evils whose effect is either a considerable degree of pain, or destruction, and these, provided they be not far removed, but give one the idea of being close at hand, so as to be on the eve of happening2; for they do not fear that which is very far ¹²⁶¹²⁷¹²⁸ off: for all know that they shall die; but since the event is not near, they pay no attention to it.

¹²⁹ If then fear be this, it must follow that all those things are to be feared which appear to possess great power either of destroying, or of hurting, in points whose tendency is toward considerable pain. On which account even the symptoms of such things are alarming, for the evil appears to be at hand; since this in fact is danger, viz. “ the approach of what ¹³⁰ excites fear." Of this description, however, are both the hatred and the anger of those who have it in their power to do us any harm3; for it is evident that they have both the will and the power, so that they are ¹³¹ not far from doing it. Also injustice, possessed of power; for [it is evident that it does not want inclination to do harm] since it is from settled inclination ¹³² that the unjust man is unjust. Also insulted virtue, invested with power; for it is evident that, invariably, when it is insulted, it determines on a requital, ¹³³ and now it has the power of exacting one. The fear also of those who have the power of doing us any harm, is itself an object to be dreaded; for any one, in such circumstances, will of course be prepared against us.

¹³⁴ But as men in general are depraved, and may be prevailed on by gain, and are timid amid dangers; it is, generally speaking, a fearful thing to be at the ¹³⁵ disposal of another. So that accomplices in any deed of guilt are to be feared, lest either they should ¹³⁶ denounce you, or abandon you to trial. Also those who have the power to act unjustly, are always objects of fear to such as may be attacked by injustice ; for, in nine cases out of ten, a man when he has the power, perpetrates the injustice. Also those who ¹³⁷ have been wronged4, or who conceive themselves to ¹³⁸ have been wronged; for they are ever on the watch for an opportunity [of retaliating]. Also those who have wronged others5, if possessed of power, are to be feared, from their apprehension of being retaliated on ; for cases of this kind were laid down to be such as to excite alarm. Those, too, who are rivals for ¹³⁹ the same objects, and which it is not possible should accrue to both, for people are ever at variance with those towards whom they stand on this footing. Those who are objects of fear to our superiors, are also objects of fear to ourselves; for much more will they be able to injure us, than our superiors: and for ¹⁴⁰ the same reason [we needs must tear thosej whom our superiors fear6. Men dread those also who have already annihilated persons superior to themselves; and those who have attacked their inferiors; for, either they are already deserving fear, or they will become so by being aggrandized in power. And ¹⁴¹ among those who have been wronged, or are enemies, or opponents, it is not the passionate, and those who speak their minds freely, who are to be dreaded ; but ¹⁴² the mild, the dissembling, and the insidious ; for they give us to doubt, whether they be not close upon us, so that they are never clearly known to be too far off to reach us. ¹⁴³¹⁴⁴¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁷ But all those circumstances which excite fear, have a still greater tendency to do so, in respect of which should a man have committed a mistake, it is not possible for him to recover himself, but which either are impracticable altogether, or which cannot be corrected by himself, but by his enemies only : as have those also which we have no means, or no easy means, of ¹⁴⁸ averting. So that, to speak generally, all those things are to be feared, which, happening or being likely to happen in the case of others, excite compassion. The circumstances then of fear, and which men are alarmed at, those at least of greatest importance, are, as I may say, nearly those which I have enumerated: and now let me state under what dispositions, as regards themselves, men are susceptible of fear.

¹⁴⁹ Now, if fear be attended by an apprehension of suffering some destructive evil, it is plain that none of those who consider that they shall not suffer any thing, is subject to fear; and that no one is subject to it, in regard to those things which he does not consider that he shall suffer; nor in regard to those persons at whose hands he does not apprehend any thing; nor at a time when he is without apprehensions. It must follow, therefore, that those are subject to fear, who apprehend they shall suffer something, and this in regard to the persons at whose hands, and the things which, and at the times when. ¹⁵⁰ they so apprehend. But neither are those who are, and who think themselves to be, in the midst of great good fortune, at all apprehensive of suffering any thing, (on which account they are contumelious, contemptuous, and rash; but it is wealth, strength, number of friends, power, which renders men of this temper,) nor those who think that already they have suffered the sum of all that is horrible7, and whose feelings have been chilled with respect to what awaits them, just as those who have been already beaten on the rack; but [in order to the existence of fear] there must needs arise some hope of safety, about ¹⁵¹ which men feel the painful anxiety8; and this is a proof of it, that fear makes men deliberate; and yet no one deliberates about that which is utterly hopeless. So that, when it shall better serve our cause ¹⁵² that the audience be affected by fear, we must set them off as persons liable to suffer, inasmuch as others of greater power have suffered, and also to show that their equals are or have been exposed to sufferings; and this, at the hands of persons from whom they would not have apprehended it, and such things, and at times when they would not have apprehended it.

But since on the subject of fear, it is plain what it ¹⁵³ is ; and on the subject of things exciting fear, and also with what dispositions men experience it; from this it will be plain both what confidence is, and on what points men are confident, and with what dispositions ; for both confidence itself is the opposite of fear, and what inspires it is the opposite of what excites fear; so that it is the hope of things conducive to safety, accompanied by an idea that they are near; and of things to be feared, that they either do not exist, or are at a distance.

But these are circumstances inspiring confidence; ¹⁵⁴ to have danger afar off, and that in which we may confide, near: also means of recovering from, or of averting loss, whether these be numerous, or valua- ¹⁵⁵ ble, or both: again, should we never have been injured, nor have ourselves injured others ; also, if we have no rival at all; or should those we have, be devoid of power; or, supposing they have power, should they be our friends ; or should they have benefited us, or have been themselves benefited by us; or should those, to whom the same things are an object as to ourselves, be more numerous than those to whom they are not, or more powerful, or both at once.

¹⁵⁶ But, as regards themselves, people feel confidence when-thus affected : should they conceive themselves to have been often successful, and this without having suffered ; or should they often have fallen into danger, and have escaped9: for there are two ways in which men become dead to apprehension, either from never having experienced, or from being possessed of resources against calamity; just as, in the case of danger by sea, both those who never experienced a storm feel confidence as to the result, and those who from their experience possess resources ¹⁵⁷ against it. Men feel it also, when the case does not alarm their equals, nor their inferiors, nor those to whom they conceive themselves superior ; but they conceive thus of those whom, either absolutely in their own persons, or virtually in the persons of their su- ¹⁵⁸ periors or of their equals, they have overcome. And again, if they conceive there belong to themselves, in greater number and degree, those things in which, when they have the advantage, men are objects of fear; and these are, store of wealth, and strength in respect to retainers, and friends, and territory, and warlike preparation, either all together, or the most ¹⁵⁹ important of them. Also, if they have not wronged ¹⁶⁰ any one, or not many, or not any of such a character as men are apprehensive of. And, in a word, if their ¹⁶¹ account stands well with heaven, as well in other respects, as in what regards omens and oracles10: because anger is a thing which inspires confidence; and the being free from the commission of injustice, while you are wronged yourself, is productive of anger ; and the deity is supposed to aid such as have been wronged. [Once more, people feel confidence] ¹⁶² when, being the first aggressors, they think they can suffer nothing, or shall not, or shall succeed at last. And of the subject of what inspires confidence and fear, we have spoken.

Touching what points men are alive to, or insensible to, Delicacy of Feeling; towards whom ; and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions.

THE points about which men feel delicate, or are in- ¹⁶³ sensible to such feelings, and towards whom, and with what dispositions, will be manifest from what follows. Now, let sense of shame be defined to be ¹⁶⁴ " a kind of pain and agitation about evils present, past, or to come, which appear to tend to loss of character." And impudence to be, “ a sort of neglect and callousness about these points."

Now, if the sensibility defined be actually sensi- ¹⁶⁵ bility to shame, it must follow that a man is affected by it, on the occurrence of evils of a kind which appear to be disgraceful, either to himself, or those for ¹⁶⁶ whom he has a regard: and such are all results of depravity whatsoever; for example, the casting away one's shield, or the turning to flight, for this pro- ¹⁶⁷¹⁶⁸ ceeds from cowardice; and the withholding a deposit from a person, for it is the result of injustice. And that cohabitation with those with whom we ought not, or where, or when we ought not, [is a source of ¹⁶⁹¹⁷⁰¹⁷¹ shame;] for it is the result of intemperance: as is also the deriving gain from paltry, mean, or impracticable sources, as from the poor, for instance, or from the dead; whence also the proverb, " to pillage even from the dead:" for it is the result of a sordid ¹⁷² hankering after lucre, and of meanness. It is also a source of shame for a person, who has the means, not to contribute his aid in money matters, or to do so in a minor degree; and for one to be assisted by ¹⁷³ those in less easy circumstances than himself; and for one to borrow himself, when his friend appears to be asking a loan ; and to ask a further loan, when he would recall a former; and the recalling a former loan when he asks another ; and the praising a thing to such a degree as to seem to ask for it; and the persisting no less, though often foiled; for these are ¹⁷⁴ all indications or meanness. And the praising a person in his presence is a token of adulation; and the praising a man's good points, while you slur over his failings ; or, when one is grieved, the exhibiting grief in an inordinate degree, and whatever other conduct is of a similar kind, [is a source of shame,] ¹⁷⁵ because it manifests adulation. [It is also shameful] not to sustain toils which those who are advanced in years, or who live delicately, or who are of higher rank, or, in a word, which they sustain whose strength is inferior to your own; because all these ¹⁷⁶ are indications of effeminacy: and so it is to be benefited by another, and that frequently; or, to re- ¹⁷⁷¹⁷⁸ proach a person with his obligations to you; for they are all indications of a mean and abject spirit. Again, to talk about one's self, and to be one's own ¹⁷⁹ trumpeter ; and to assert that to be one s own which belongs to another; for these are indications of arrogance. In the same way, too, in the several other instances of moral depravity, both their results, their indications, and the like attendant circumstances, are all subjects of shame; for they are disgraceful, and make one ashamed. And to the afore-mentioned we ¹⁸⁰ may add, the non-participation in those creditable qualities which either every body, or all our equals, or the greatest part of them, partake of. By equals I mean, fellow countrymen, citizens, those of the same age, relations; in a word, those with whom we are on an equality ; for [when a thing is so general] the non-participation in it begins to be disgraceful; for instance, the not having been educated2, at least in a certain degree, and so in the case of other deficiencies; but the disgrace of all these things becomes much greater, should they appear to be wanting by our own fault; for thus, they are more properly the result of depravity should one be himself the cause of what has attached to him. or does now. or is likely so to attach. Again, men are sensible to ¹⁸¹ feelings of shame, when they are suffering, have suffered, or are about to suffer any thing of such a nature, as tends to loss of respect, and disgrace: and these are all services consisting in the lending one's self either personally, or in any shameful action where there is an idea of suffering insult: and whatever administers to intemperance, whether it be voluntary, or not: and submission to violence, if invo- ¹⁸² luntary; for such submission, without defending one's self, proceeds from an unmanly character, and from cowardice. These then, and the like to these, are the things about which men are sensible of shame.

¹⁸³¹⁸⁴ But as the sense of shame is an idea entertained of loss of character; and of this loss, in itself alone, without reference to its consequences ; and as no one regards the opinion, except for the sake of those who hold it; it must follow that a man is thus sensible in regard to those for whom he has an esteem. But he will have an esteem for those who admire him, and whom he does himself admire, and by whom he wishes to be admired, and in regard to whom he feels emulation, and whose opinion he does not hold cheap. ¹⁸⁵ Now, people wish to be admired by, and do themselves admire, all those who possess any of those goods which are valued; or from whom they happen to be very much in want of getting something of which they have the disposal; for instance, those who ¹⁸⁶ are in love. But people have their emulation excited, in reference to their equals; and they hold in consideration the prudent, as being men who adhere to truth; of this description are men of education, and ¹⁸⁷ such as are advanced in years. Also actions done in the eyes of the world and in public [excite our shame], and hence the proverb, that " Shame dwells in the eyes." On this account, people are more sensible of shame before those with whom they are always likely to be present, and those who fix their attention on them, for both these are instances of being before the ¹⁸⁸ eyes of persons :-again, they are sensible of it before those who are not open to charges on the same points ; for their sentiments, it is evident, are the opposite of their own: before those also who do not make allowances for such as appear to be faulty; for errors which a man commits himself ,these he is said ¹⁸⁹ not to take amiss in his neighbours; so that he evidently will take amiss such as he does not commit himself: and before those who are fond of divulging ¹⁹⁰ what they know to the world; for whether a man does not think one's conduct faulty, or does not divulge it, makes no difference. But persons likely to divulge [what they know to one's discredit] are such as have been injured, from their being anxiously on the watch to retaliate ; and those who are slanderers generally; for if they speak ill even of those who are not culpable, much more will they of those who are: as are also those who are on the look-out for the errors of their neighbours, for instance, jesters, and the poets of the old comedy ; for these are in some sense slanderers, and fond of divulging. Again, [men are sensible of shame] before those with whom they never met with a repulse; for they are disposed towards them as admirers. On which account men have a sense of shame, even towards those who ask any thing for the first time, as having never yet forfeited their good opinion in any points. And of this description are both those who have lately sought to be our friends, for they have observed our excellent qualities; and hence, the reply of Euripides to the Syracusans is a good one4; and, of our old acquaintances, those who know no ill of us. And men are ¹⁹¹ sensible of shame not only about the things themselves which have been mentioned as delicate points, but even about the indications of them; for instance, not only about licentious conduct, but also about all indications of it; not only in doing what is disgraceful, but even in mentioning it5. And in the same ¹⁹² way they are sensible ot shame, not only before those who have been mentioned, but before those also who ¹⁹³¹⁹⁴¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁶ will be likely to disclose their conduct to them, as for instance, their servants or their friends. In brief, however, people are not at all sensible of shame before those whose opinions, in regard to their justness, they hold cheap; for no one feels shame before children and brutes: nor do men feel it about the same points when before acquaintances, as before strangers; but when before acquaintances they feel it on points really shameful6; but before strangers on matters merely sanctioned by custom.

¹⁹⁷ As regards themselves, men would be likely to be sensible of shame under these dispositions; first, if there should really exist any so affected towards themselves, as I described those to be, in regard to whom they feel shame. And these were either those whom they hold in admiration, or by whom themselves are held in admiration, or by whom they are desirous of being admired, or of whom they are petitioning something which they will not be likely to get, if not men ¹⁹⁸ of character. And if these be either actual spectators (just as, on the question of the allotment of Samos to colonists, Cydias introduced in his harangue to the ecclesia; for he put it to the Athenians to imagine that the Greeks were standing round as actual spectators, and not as mere future hearers, of the decree which they might pass); or should persons of this description be near, or be likely soon to be aware of their conduct: and on this account persons in misfortune, do not wish even to be seen by those who once deemed them happy; for they who thus deem of us ¹⁹⁹ are admirers. And when they have attached to them what throws discredit on the conduct and the actions, either of themselves, or of their ancestors, or any others with whom in any way they are closely connected ; and, in one word, all in whose behalf they are sensible of shame ; and these are the above-mentioned, and those who stand in any relation to them, ²⁰⁰ whose tutors or advisers they have been 7. And if ²⁰¹ there be others, their equals, with whom they are at rivalry; for, from a feeling of shame, on account of persons of this description, men both do and leave undone very many things. Again, when people are ²⁰² likely to be seen, and openly to be engaged before those who are privy [to their disgrace], they become in a higher degree susceptible of shame. And hence the poet Antiphon, just as he was going to be beaten on the rack by Dionysius, observing those who were about to be executed with him muffling themselves up as they went through the gate, said, "Why do you muffle yourselves up;—is it lest any of these present should see you to-morrow ? "

Thus much then on the subject of the sense of shame; but of insensibility to it, we shall evidently know enough from the contraries.

Those towards whom people feel Gratitude; on what occasions ; and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions.

THE persons towards whom men feel gratitude, and ²⁰³ the occasions on which, and with what dispositions on their own part, will be plain to us, after we have defined gratuitous benevolence. Now, let gratuitous ²⁰⁴²⁰⁵ ²⁰⁶²⁰⁷ benevolence be “ that conformably to which, he who has the power is said to confer a benefit on one who needs it, not in return for any thing, nor in order that any thing may accrue to him who so confers it, but that some benefit may arise to the object." But it becomes great should it be conferred on one who is in extreme want2, or if the boon be great and difficult of attainment, or at a crisis of a certain description, or if the giver has bestowed it alone, or first, or in a ²⁰⁸ greater degree than any other. Wants are however our desires of these ; such particularly as are attended by pain on failing of their objects; and of this description are our lusts, as for instance, love. Again, such as arise in the suffering of the body, and in danger ; for both the man who is exposed to danger, and who suffers pain, is anxious for something. On which account, those who stand by us in poverty and banishment, should they confer even trifling benefits, will yet have gratified us by reason of the greatness of our need, and the circumstances of the time ; take the instance of him who gave but a mat [to a beggar] ²⁰⁹ in the Lycaeum. It is necessary, then, that our obligation have reference, if possible, by all means to some case of this sort, but if not, to some one of equal or greater need. So that, as it is evident both when, and in what cases, an act of free benevolence takes place, and how the parties are affected, it is plain that out of these principles we must get up our speech, showing that, as regards the one party, they were or are exposed to pain, or want of this description, and as regards the other, that in such their want they assisted them by administering some boon of this description.

²¹⁰ And it is also evident, by recurring to what topics we may do away the obligation, and make our audi- ²¹¹²¹² ence insensible of grateful feelings3; for either we ²¹³ may urge that they are or were assisting them for their own sakes, and this was supposed not to be free benevolence; or are doing so just because it fell out by chance, or because they were compelled to do so; or that they paid back a debt, but did not bestow a gift, and this as well if the party was conscious of his having been so indebted, as if he was not; because there is in both cases the idea of a quid pro quo; so that neither on this view of the case will any gratitude be felt. We should also examine the ²¹⁴ point under all the predicaments; for free benevolence stands in this, either that that particular thing was given, or in such quantity, or of such a quality, or as to the time when, or the place where, it was given. And we may adduce it as a sign to suit this purpose, if the parties in question have refused a less favour; and if they have conferred on an enemy either the same favour, or an equal one, or a greater; for then it will be evident that they did it not for our sakes. Or, if he wittingly has given something paltry4; for no one acknowledges that he stands in need of what is paltry.

And now have my sentiments respecting benevolence, and the want of it, been explained. ²¹⁵²¹⁶²¹⁷

²¹⁸

Of Pity.

²¹⁹ LET us explain the circumstances which excite pity; and the persons whom men pity; and, as regards ²²⁰ themselves, with what dispositions. Now let pity be defined tb be1, "a sort of pain occasioned by an evil capable of hurting or destroying2, appearing to befall one who does not deserve it, which one may himself expect to endure3, or that some one connected with him will; and this when it appears near: for it evidently is necessary that a person likely to feel pity should be actually such as to deem that, either in his own person, or of some one connected with him, he may suffer some evil, and that an evil of such a description as has been stated in the definition, or one similar to it, or nearly equivalent to it. ²²¹ On which account neither do those who are abso- ²²²²²³²²⁴ ²²⁵ lutely lost, feel pity f for these think they shall no ²²⁶ longer be exposed to suffering, for their sufferings are past; nor -those who esteem themselves excessively happy, but these wax insolent; for evidently, if they esteem every good to be realized to them, they also esteem their lot to be incapable of suffering any evil; since this also enters into the number of goods. But ²²⁷ of this description, viz. such as think they may yet suffer evil, are both who already have suffered and escaped5; and those advanced in years, as well by reason of their prudence, as of their experience : and the weak ; and those who are rather timid; and men of education, for these calculate life's contingencies aright; and those to whom belong parents6, or ²²⁸ children, or wives, for these attach to one's self, and are liable to suffer the above-mentioned evils. Those ²²⁹ do not feel pity who are under the excitements of courage, for instance, under anger or confidence ; for these feelings little calculate the future : nor do those feel pity who are under insolent dispositions7; for these persons also calculate little of suffering any thing: but those who are of the mean temperament between these are susceptible of pity : and those again are not susceptible of it who are vehemently affected by fear; for such as are horror-struck do not feel pity8, by reason of its being akin to an evil which comes home to themselves. Also people are suscep- ²³⁰ tible of pity, should they esteem some persons to be good; for he who esteems no one to be such9, will ²³¹²³² ²³³ ²³⁴²³⁵ think every one deserving of evil. And in a word, every one, when he is so affected as to call to his recollection the fact, that evils of such a character have befallen either him or his, or to apprehend that they may befall either him or his. And now it has been stated with what dispositions men feel pity.

²³⁶ The circumstances which excite their pity will be evident from the definition : for whatever things, of the number of those which cause pain and anguish, have a tendency to destroy, are all such as to cause pity: again, every thing whose tendency is utter abolition; also all those evils which involve the quality of greatness, and of which chance is the ²³⁷ cause . But the evils whose characteristic is great anguish and destruction, are as follows: death, assaults, personal injuries, and age, and sickness, and ²³⁸ want of food. And the evils of which chance is the cause, are, absolute want, or fewness of friends, (on which account even the being torn from friends and familiars is a circumstance to be pitied,) ugliness, infirmity, deformity, and the circumstance that some evil befalls one from a source whence it were becoming for some good to have arisen; and the frequent occurrence of a similar thing: and the accession of some good, when one has already passed his sufferings ; as for example, the gifts of the king were sent ²³⁹ down to Diopithes after he was dead11; and the fact either that no good has accrued, or of there being no enjoyment of it when it has arrived. These, then, and the like, are the circumstances on account of which men feel pity.

²⁴⁰ But people are sensible of pity toward their acquaintances, if they be not of extremely close connexion, but about such they feel just as they do about themselves when on the eve of suffering: and on this ²⁴¹²⁴²²⁴³ account Amasis, as they say, did not shed a tear over his son when he was being led to execution, but he did over his friend who was asking an alms; for this was a circumstance to call for pity; the other, to excite horror. For horror is distinct from pity, ²⁴⁴²⁴⁵ and has a tendency to expel pity from the breast, and is frequently available to produce a contrary effect13. Still men feel pity while the evil is yet approaching. And they feel it towards their equals, whether in age, in temper, in habits, in rank, or in family; for in all these relations, the evil is seen with greater clearness as possible to befall also one's self. For we must here also assume generally, that whatever people fear in their own case, that they pity as happening in the case of others. But as the disasters ²⁴⁶ which excite pity always appear to be close at hand, while, as to those removed at the distance of ten thousand years, men neither in the expectation of them, if future, nor in the remembrance of them, if past, are sensible of pity at all, or at least not in an equal degree ; this being the case, it must follow that those characters which are got up with the aid of gesture, and voice, and dress, and of acting, generally have the greater effect in producing pity14. For thus, by setting the evil before our eyes, as either ²⁴⁷²⁴⁸ ²⁴⁹ being on the eve of taking place, or as having happened, men make it appear to be close at hand. ²⁵⁰ Likewise things which have just taken place, or quickly about to do so, have on this very account a ²⁵¹ greater tendency to excite pity. Also the indications and actions of persons ; for instance, the garments15 of those who have suffered, and other things of that sort. And the expressions of those under suffering, for instance, of those already in act of dying. And especially is it a circumstance to move pity, that while in these crises the persons have borne themselves virtuously 16. For all these circumstances produce pity in a higher degree from its appearing near; also, the fact of the person's being unworthy, and his disaster appearing in view before our eyes.

Of Indignation.

²⁵² To pity is opposed, most directly, that feeling which men call indignation; for, to the feeling pain at undeserved misfortune, is opposed in a certain way the feeling pain at undeserved good fortune, and it originates in the same disposition; and these feelings ²⁵³ are both those of a virtuous disposition. For we ought to sympathize with, and to pity those who are undeservedly unfortunate; and to feel indignant at those who are undeservedly fortunate ; for whatever happens contrary to desert is unjust; and on this account we make indignation an attribute even of ²⁵⁴²⁵⁵ ²⁵⁶ the gods1. It should seem, too, that envy stands ²⁵⁷ opposed to pity in the same way, as appearing to be akin to, and in fact the same thing as, indignation; and yet it really is distinct. For envy is also a pain ²⁵⁸ causing agitation, it also is felt at good fortune, not, however, at the good fortune of the undeserving [only], but of equals and fellows2. The feeling, however, in all cases equally [of envy and of indignation], must exist [in the breasts of those affected by it], not because any difference will be likely to accrue to themselves, but on account of their neighbour, solely as regards himself. For no longer will the one feeling be envy, and the other indignation, but fear, should the pain and agitation exist on this account, viz. because some evil will probably result to themselves from the good fortune of the other.

But it is plain that opposite feelings will be conse- ²⁵⁹ quent on these passions: for he who feels pain at those who are undeservedly unfortunate, will feel pleasure, or at least be unaffected by pain, at those who are unfortunate under different circumstances3: for instance, no good man would feel pain about parricides and murderers when they meet with punishment ; since we ought to feel joy at such occurrences ; and so in the case of those who are deservedly fortunate ; for both are instances of justice, and cause the good man to rejoice, since it must be that he has a hope that what has been realized to his equal, will ²⁶⁰be realized also to himself, and these are all feelings ²⁶¹ ²⁶²²⁶³²⁶⁴ of the same disposition; and their opposites, of the opposite dispositions. Since the same man who exults in misfortune is also envious ; for any who feels pain at the accession and acquisition of any good, that person necessarily must rejoice when that good is in act of being withdrawn and lost. On which account these feelings are all of them obstacles to pity; but, among themselves, they differ for the foregoing reasons, so that all are alike available with a view to render a thins not an object of pity.

²⁶⁵ On the subject of indignation, then, let us first state who the persons are with whom men feel indignant, the occasions on which, and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions; then, after these, ²⁶⁶ of other points. But the subject will be plain from what has already been said ; for if indignation be a feeling pain on a man's appearing to be undeservedly fortunate, it will be evident in the first place that it is not possible to feel indignation in the case of every ²⁶⁷ good. For there is no one who, it another be just, or brave, or shall make acquisitions of virtue, will feel indignation at that other ; for neither is pity felt at the contraries of these qualities5: but it is about ²⁶⁸²⁶⁹ wealth and power and the like possessions [that ²⁷⁰ people feel indignant], and in a word, about all those things of which the good are deserving, and such as are naturally possessed of advantages; as, for example, of high birth, of beauty, and advantages of that description. But as what is ancient seems, in a ²⁷¹ certain sense, akin to what is natural, it must follow, that men are indignant, in a greater degree, at those who possess the very same good, if they be recently possessed of it, and are by its means in good circumstances, [than with those who have long possessed it.] For those who have recently become rich give ²⁷² greater pain than those who have long been rich, and by right of birth. And, in the same way, persons in office, and men of power, and possessed of numerous friends, and of good children, and any good of this description ; and likewise if, through the instrumentality of these, there should accrue to them any further good: here, too, those of recent wealth, who by means of their wealth get into office, give greater pain than those who have been wealthy of old. And in a similar manner in the case of the others. But ²⁷³ the reason of this is, that while the one sort appear to possess what is their own, the others do not; for that which appears ever to have held this rank, seems to involve an idea of truth ; insomuch that the others seem to possess what does not belong to them. And as, of the goods, each does not become any one ²⁷⁴ who may accidentally present himself, but there is a certain proportion and idea of adaptation; for example, splendour in respect of armour, is not adapted to a man whose virtue is justice, but to him who possesses courage; and splendid marriage feasts are not adapted to those of recent wealth, but to those of high birth: therefore if any one, though he may be a good man, meet with a possession which is not adapted to him, we should feel indignant; as also with an inferior who disputes with his superior; and particularly if he does so on the very points in which he is inferior. Whence also this was remarked by Homer: " He missed engaging with Ajax the son of Telamon; for Jupiter was indignant because he was ²⁷⁵ fain to engage a hero his superior6." But, if it be not on the same grounds, we feel indignant if an inferior challenge a superior, even on any grounds; for instance, if a musician were to dispute with a just man, for justice is superior to music. The persons then with whom, and the reasons why men feel indignant will be evident from this; for they are these or others of the same description.

²⁷⁶ As regards themselves, men have a tendency to indignation, if they deserve and have acquired the highest goods; for the circumstance of those not their equals being thought worthy of equal advan- ²⁷⁷ tages, is not just. Next, they feel it, if they chance to be good and excellent persons; for they both ²⁷⁸ judge aright, and hate what is unjust. Again, if they be ambitious and desirous of certain objects, and especially should they be ambitious about those things ²⁷⁹ which others who are undeserving obtain. And those, in a word, who think themselves worthy those things, of which they do not esteem others worthy, are apt to feel indignant at those others, and about those very objects. On which account slaves, sorry fellows, and men devoid of ambition, are not liable to feelings of indignation, since there is nothing of ²⁸⁰ which they think themselves worthy. And from this it is evident on what occasions of misfortunes, or ill luck, or failure of success, persons ought to rejoice, or at least to be unaffected by pain; for, from what has been stated, the contraries will be evident. So that should the speech have wrought up the judges into this disposition, and should it have shown that those who claim to be pitied, and that the circumstances under which they claim it, are undeserving pity, and really deserving not to gain it, it will be impossible for the judges to feel pity. ²⁸¹

²⁸²

Of Envy.

IT is plain also on what occasions, with whom, and ²⁸³ with what dispositions men feel envy, if in truth envy be " a sort of pain at apparent good fortune, ²⁸⁴ touching the above-mentioned goods 1, in the case of equals, not in order that any thing may happen to one's self, and simply on account of their [being thus fortunately for those who have, or seem to have equals, will be the people to be envious. I mean by ²⁸⁵ equals, those who are like in circumstances of birth, connexions, age, habits, character, and property. They, too, will be envious who fall but little short of ²⁸⁶²⁸⁷²⁸⁸ possessing all : hence those who are carrying on mighty projects, and those who are prosperous, are envious; for they think that every one is carrying off what belongs to them. Again, those who are remarkably esteemed on any account, and particularly on account of their wisdom or happiness. And those who are ambitious are more given to envy than those who are devoid of ambition. And those who make a show of wisdom, for they are ambitious on the score of wisdom. And, in a word, those who in any respect are ambitious of glory are given to envy in that respect. And the narrow-minded; for, to them, ²⁸⁹²⁹⁰ every thing appears of consequence.

The goods respecting which men feel envy have been told you ; for all those things whatsoever, about which men are eager for praise, and ambitious, whe- ²⁹¹²⁹² ther they be productions or acquisitions, and respecting which they are desirous of renown, and all cases of good luck; about all these nearly is envy felt; and particularly about such of them as the individuals are themselves desirous of, or think they ought themselves to possess, or those things in the possession of which they are themselves superior, or deficient in a trifling degree.

²⁹³ Again, it is evident with whom men are envious ; for this has been already stated in connexion [with what has gone before; since men envy those who ²⁹⁴ come near them in time, and place, and age, and character ; whence the saying, " kindred too is conscious ²⁹⁵ of envy 3." Men also envy those with whom they are at rivalry; for they are rivals of those above- mentioned ; but of those who existed ten thousand years back, or who may live ten thousand years hence, or who are already dead, of these no one is the rival; nor again of those who live at the Pillars of Hercules 4; nor of those of whom, in the opinions either of themselves or of others, they are greatly the inferiors ; nor again of those to whom they conceive themselves to be in a great degree superior; with the like indifference do they regard those fat all en- ²⁹⁶ gaged] in pursuits of this description. And as men are affected by ambition in regard to rivals, and competitors, and all, in a word, who are eager after the same objects, it must follow that they envy these in an especial manner; whence the saying, " potter ²⁹⁷²⁹⁸ envies potter." And those who either succeed with difficulty, or do not succeed at all, envy those who succeed quickly. Again, they envy those whose acquisitions and success are a reproach to themselves, and these are those who are near them, or their equals; for it becomes evident that they do themselves fail of success through their own fault, so that ²⁹⁹ ³⁰⁰ this, galling them, produces envy. And those who ³⁰¹ either possess or have acquired that which it would become themselves to possess, or which themselves had at one time acquired; at least the old, on this account, envy the young. And those who have been ³⁰² at considerable expense on an object, envy those who have expended little on the same object. But it is ³⁰³ evident both with whom, and on what occasions, and with what dispositions people of this sort feel pleasure ; for they will be delighted, having in the contrary circumstances that very temper, the which being without, they are pained. So that if the ³⁰⁴ judges themselves shall have been wrought up into this disposition, while those who lay claim to our pity or to the acquisition of some good, are such as have been described, it is evident that they will not obtain pity at the hands of those on whom they depend for it.

Of Emulation.

HENCE likewise it will be evident both with what ³⁰⁵ dispositions, and in regard to what objects, and of whom, persons are emulous. Because if emulation ³⁰⁶ be “a sort of pain at the apparent presence of goods which are held in honour, and which admit of one's gaining them himself, in the case of those naturally our equals; felt, not because they are present to another, but because they are not likewise present to one Is self," (on which very account emulation is a vir- ³⁰⁷ tuous feeling, and belongs to virtuous people, whereas envy is a depraved feeling, and belongs to persons who are depraved: for the one, by motion of his emu- ³⁰⁸ lation, sets himself to acquire the good; while the other, by motion of his envy, sets himself to cause ³⁰⁹ the dispossession of his neighbour). It must be, then, that persons who deem themselves worthy of goods which they do not possess, are apt to feel emulation; since no one arrogates to himself that which appears ³¹⁰ impossible: and hence the young and the high-spirited are thus affected; and also those to whom belong goods of such a description as to be worth the attention of men in repute; these are wealth, number of friends, office, and whatever other goods are of this kind ; for men feel emulous of such goods ; as though, because they properly belong to such as are men of virtuous dispositions, it were matter of absolute right ³¹¹ that themselves should be virtuous. Again, those are emulous whom others esteem worthy of such goods: and those again whose ancestors, or relations, or in- ³¹² timate friends, or whose tribe or city is held in esteem about any point, such persons are apt to feel emulation on that point; for they think they belong properly to them, and that themselves are worthy of them.

³¹³ But if those goods are matter of emulation which are held in esteem, it must of course follow that the virtues are of this description ; and whatever things have a tendency to aid and benefit others; since people honour virtuous people, and those who benefit them: likewise that all goods whatsoever, the enjoyment of which accrues to one's neighbours, are of this sort; for instance, wealth, and beauty, rather than health.

³¹⁴ And it will also be evident who the persons are who are objects of emulation; since they who possess these, and the like goods, become objects of emulation ; these goods are such as have been mentioned, for example, courage, wisdom, sovereignty; for those who are sovereigns have a power of benefiting many. Generals, orators, all, in fact, who have abilities this ³¹⁵way [are objects of emulation]. And those whom many wish to resemble, or who have many acquaintances, or many friends. Or those whom many admire, or whom they do themselves admire. And those on ³¹⁶ whom are pronounced the praises and encomia of poets and panegyrists2. Persons, however, of a con- ³¹⁷ trary description, men despise; for contempt is the contrary of emulation ; and the despising of the being emulous. And it must be that persons so affected as to emulate certain persons, or to be themselves objects of emulation, are apt to feel contempt for those things and persons who possess evils the contraries of those goods which are the objects of emulation. On which account men frequently despise the fortunate, when their good fortune is unconnected with those goods which are held in esteem.

Of the means, then, by which the passions are excited in the breast, and are allayed, one of the sources out of which means of persuasion arise, of these we now have treated.

Of the Passions and Habits of the Young1.

LET us next go over in detail the dispositions of ³¹⁸ men; considering of what kind of a turn they are, in reference to their passions, habits, ages, and fortunes. ³¹⁹³²⁰³²¹³²²³²³ I call anger, lust, and the like, by the name passions; a subject of which we have treated above. By the name habits, I designate virtues and vices : and of these we have treated above, both as to the points on which men form deliberate choice, and that to which ³²⁴ they give birth in action. And the ages are youth, prime, and old age. By fortune I mean, high birth, and wealth, and abilities, and their opposites; and, in one word, good and bad fortune.

³²⁵ Now the young are in their dispositions prone to desire, and of a character to effect what they desire. And they are in the highest degree apt to pursue the pleasures of love above all desires about which the body is concerned, and in these they are incontinent. ³²⁶³²⁷ But they are prone to change, and fastidious in the objects of their desires. And they desire with earnestness, but speedily cease to desire; for their wishes are keen, without being durable; just like the hunger ³²⁸ and thirst of the sick. And they are passionate and irritable, and of a temperament to follow the impulse. ³²⁹ And they cannot overcome their anger; for by reason of their ambition they do not endure a slight, but ³³⁰ become indignant, and fancy themselves injured: and they are ambitious indeed of honour, but more so of ³³¹ victory; for youth is desirous of superiority, and victory is a sort of superiority. And of both these are they desirous in a higher degree than of gain; but least of all are they desirous of gain3, by reason of their having never yet experienced want; just according to the proverbial saying of Pittacus to Am- ³³² phiaraus 4. And they do not view things in a bad When some one peculiar quality Doth so possess a man, that it doth draw All his affects, his spirits, and his powers, In their confluctions, all to run one way, This may be truly said to be a humour. Every Man out of his Humour : where see Whalley's note. ³³³³³⁴ light, but in a good, by reason of their never having yet been witnesses of much depravity. And they ³³⁵ are credulous, from their never having yet been much imposed on. And they are sanguine in their ³³⁶ expectations ; for like those who are affected by wine, so the young are warmed by their nature ; and at the same time from their having never yet met with many repulses. Their life, too, for the most ³³⁷ part, is one of hope; for hope is of that which is yet to be, while memory is of that which is passed: but to the young that which is yet to be, is long; but that which has passed, is short; for in the early days of life they think they remember nothing, while they hope for every thing; and they are easily imposed on, for the reason which has been stated; because they soon cherish expectation. And they are brave ³³⁸ rather to an excess; tor they are irritable and sanguine, qualities, the one whereof cancels fear, and the other inspires courage; for while no one who is affected by anger ever is afraid, the being in hope of some good is a thing to give courage. And they are ³³⁹ bashful; for they do not as yet conceive the honourable to be any thing distinct, but they have been educated only under the established usage of the state. And they are high-minded ; for they have not ³⁴⁰ as yet been humbled by the course of life, but are unexperienced in peremptory circumstances: again, high-mindedness is the deeming one's self worthy of much; and this belongs to persons of sanguine expectations. And they prefer succeeding in an hon- ³⁴¹ curable sense than in points of expediency; for they live more in conformity to moral feeling than to mere calculations5; and calculation is of the expedient, moral excellence, however, of that which is honourable. Again, they are fond of friends and companions ³⁴² rather than ot their other compeers in age, by reason of their delighting in social intercourse, and of their not yet deciding on any thing in reference to what is ³⁴³ expedient; so that they do not decide on their friends ³⁴⁴ [upon that principle]. And all their errors are on the side of excess and too great earnestness, in contravention of Chilo's rule; for the young carry every thing to an excess; for their friendships are in excess, their hatreds are in excess, and they do every thing else with the same degree of earnestness ; they think also that they know every thing, and firmly asseverate that they do; for this is the cause of their ³⁴⁵ pushing every thing to an excess. And, in their trespasses, they trespass on the side of wantonness, and not of malice. They are likewise prone to pity, from their conceiving every one to be good, and more worthy than in fact he is6; for they measure others by the standard of their own guiltlessness ; so that they conceive them to be suffering what they do ³⁴⁶ not deserve. And they are fond of mirth, on which account they are also of a facetious turn7; for facetiousness is chastened forwardness of manner.

Such, then, is the disposition of the young.

Of the Passions and Habits of those advanced in Life.

³⁴⁷ BUT those who are advanced in life, and who have passed their prime, are of dispositions in most points ³⁴⁸³⁴⁹ the very opposite of these. Since by reason of their having lived many years, and having been deceived in a greater number of instances, and having mistaken, by reason, too, that the majority of human affairs are but worthless, they neither positively as- ³⁵⁰³⁵¹ severate any thing, and they err in every thing more on the side of defect than they ought. And they always " suppose," but never " know" certainly; and, questioning every thing, they always subjoin a “perhaps," or a "possibly." And they talk of every ³⁵² thing in this undecisive tone, asserting nothing decisively. And they are apt to view things in an ³⁵³ unfavourable light ; for a disposition thus to view things, is the judging of every thing on the worse side. Moreover they are apt to be suspicious from distrust, and they are distrustful from their experience. And on this account they neither love nor ³⁵⁴ hate with great earnestness; but, conformably to the remark of Bias, they both love as though about to hate, and hate as though about to love. And they ³⁵⁵ are pusillanimous, from their having been humbled by the course of life ; for they raise their desires to nothing great or vast, but to things only which conduce to support of life. And they are illiberal; for ³⁵⁶ property is one of the necessaries; and they are at the same time aware, from their experience, of the difficulty of its acquisition, and of the ease with which it is lost. And they are timid and apprehen- ³⁵⁷ sive of every thing ; for their disposition is the reverse of that of the young; for they have been chilled by years, but the young are warm in their temperament; so that their age has paved the way to timidity; for fear is a certain kind of chill. And ³⁵⁸ they are attached to life, and particularly at its last closing day, from the circumstance that desire is of some object which is absent, and that men more especially desire that of which they stand in need. And ³⁵⁹ they have self-love more than is fitting ; for this too is a kind of littleness of spirit. And they live in a greater degree than they ought by the standard of expediency, and not of what is honourable, by reason of their self-love: for what is expedient is good relatively, to one's self; but what is honourable is good ³⁶⁰ absolutely. And they are insensible to shame, rather than liable to be affected by it; for on account of their not holding equally in esteem the honourable ³⁶¹ and the expedient, they despise appearances. Again, they are not easily inspired with hope, on account of their experience ; for the majority of things are but paltry; wherefore the generality turn out inferior to the expectation; and once more on account of their ³⁶² timidity they are apt to despond]. And they live more in memory than in hope; for the remnant of life is brief, but what has passed is considerable; and hope indeed is of what is to come; whereas memory is of things gone by: the very reason this, of their garrulity; for they never cease talking of that which has taken place, since they are delighted in awaken - ³⁶³ ing the recollections of things. And their anger is keen, but faint. And their desires have, some, abandoned them, the others are faint; so that neither are they liable to the influence of desire, nor apt to act in conformity to it, but with a view to gain; on which account men of this age appear to be naturally temperate, for both their desires have relaxed, and ³⁶⁴³⁶⁵³⁶⁶they are enslaved to gain. And they live more by calculation than by moral feeling; for calculation is of expediency, but moral feeling is of virtue. And, in their trespasses, they trespass on the side of malice, not of wanton insolence. The old have moreover a tendency to pity, but not on the same principle with the young; for the latter are thus disposed from their love of human nature, the former from their ³⁶⁷ imbecility ; since they consider the endurance of every calamity at hand to them, and this was laid ³⁶⁸ down as a principle of pity . Whence they are que- ³⁶⁹³⁷⁰ rulous, and neither facetious, nor fond of mirth ; for querulousness is the very reverse of fondness for mirth.

Such, then, are the dispositions of the young, and ³⁷¹ of those in advanced life3. So that, as all welcome an address worded to their own disposition, and a speaker who resembles themselves, it is clear by employing his oration in what way the orator will appear of this description, as regards himself and what he says.

Of the Dispositions of Persons in their mature Age.

THOSE who are in their prime will, it is evident, be ³⁷² in a mean in point of disposition between these, subtracting the excesses of each: being neither rash in too great a degree, (for rashness is of this description, 1. e. in excess, nor too much given to fear, but keep- ³⁷³³⁷⁴ ing themselves right in respect to both. Neither placing confidence in all, nor distrusting all, but judging rather in conformity to the truth. Neither living with a view solely to what is honourable, nor with a view only to expediency, but with a respect to both. And conformed neither to penurious parsimony, nor to extravagance, but to what is fitting. With the ³⁷⁵ same equality do they carry themselves also in respect to anger and to desire. And they are of a tempering ³⁷⁶ coolness joined with spirit, and are spirited not ³⁷⁷³⁷⁸ out temperate coolness : for in the young and in elderly persons these qualities are separated; since the young are spirited, and of an intemperate rashness, while elderly persons are of a chastened spirit, and timid. And thus, in a word, whatever advantages youth and age have divided between them, the middle age possesses both ; and in whatever respects they are either in excess or defect, in all these it holds a mean and what is fitting.

³⁷⁹ But the body is in its prime from the age of thirty to five and thirty; and the mind about the age of forty-nine. Let thus much, then, have been said re- ' specting youth, and old and mature age, and the dispositions which they severally are of.

The characteristic Dispositions of Persons of high birth.

³⁸⁰ BUT let us treat of the goods of fortune next in order, so many of them at least as influence the dispositions of men in any particular way.

³⁸¹ Now it is the disposition of high birth, that its possessor is more ambitious than others; for all, when any possession is realized to them, are wont to ac- ³⁸² cumulate upon it. But high birth is nobility of ancestry ; and it is apt to indulge in contempt even of those who are as good as its own ancestors ; because distinctions, in proportion as they are more remote, rather than recent, are held in greater esteem, and afford a ready plea for arrogance.

³⁸³ But, noble, is an appellation referring to excellence of birth; whereas, generous refers to one's not degenerating from the nature [of his ancestry] ; which, generally speaking, is not the case with the noble, but the majority of them are ordinary persons. For there is a kind of richness of produce in the genera- tions of man, just as there is in that which arises from the land ; and at times, should the stock be good, ³⁸⁴ there arise in a family at intervals extraordinary persons ; and afterwards it again relaxes. And a family of brilliant talent run wild into dispositions bordering on madness1; as in the instances of the descendants of Alcibiades, and Dionysius the elder: and one of sedate wisdom, into stupidity and dulness; as in the instances of the descendants of Cimon, and Pericles, and Socrates.

The Dispositions consequent on Wealth.

ANY one, without any great penetration, may distin- ³⁸⁵ guish the dispositions consequent on wealth; for [its possessors] are insolent and overbearing, from being tainted in a certain way by the getting of their wealth. For they are affected as though they possessed every good; since wealth is a sort of standard of the worth of other things ; whence every thing seems to be purchaseable by it. And they ³⁸⁶ are affectedly delicate and purse-proud; they are thus delicate on account of their luxurious lives, and the display they make of their prosperity. They are purse-proud, and violate the rules of good breeding2, ³⁸⁷³⁸⁸³⁸⁹ from the circumstance that every one is wont to dwell upon that which is beloved and admired by him, and because they think that others are emulous of that, of which they are themselves. But at the same time they are thus affected reasonably enough ; for many are they who need the aid of men of property. Whence, too, that remark of Simonides addressed to the wife of Hiero respecting the wealthy and the wise ; for when she asked him, " whether it were better to have been born wealthy or wise," he replied, " wealthy; for," he said, " he used to see the wise hanging on at the doors of the wealthy." ³⁹⁰ And [it is a characteristic of the rich] that they esteem themselves worthy of being in office; for they consider themselves possessed of that on account of which they are entitled to be in office. And, in a word, the disposition of the rich is that of a fool amid prosperity.

³⁹¹ However, the dispositions of those who are but lately rich, and of those who have been so from of old, are different; inasmuch as those who have recently become rich have all these faults in a greater and a worse degree; for the having recently become rich is as it were an inexpertness in wealth. And they are guilty of offences, not of a malicious nature, but such as are either offences of contumely or intemperance ; for instance, in the case of assault or adultery. ³⁹² ³⁹³³⁹⁴

³⁹⁵

Of the Dispositions of Men in Power, and of the Fortunate.

AND in the same way on the subject of power, the ³⁹⁶³⁹⁷³⁹⁸ most striking almost of its dispositions are evident; for of these power has some in common with wealth, and others which are better. For men in power are more ambitious and more manly in their dispositions than the wealthy; from their aiming at all duties whatsoever, which from their power they have the means of discharging. And they are less given to trifling, because, from a necessity of looking carefully to their power, they are constrained to a diligent attention. And they comport themselves with a dignity which is conciliatory rather than repulsive; for their claims for dignity render them more conspicuous ; on which account, they bear themselves moderately : but conciliatory dignity is a softened and graceful sedateness. And, if they do transgress the bounds of right, it is not in small points, but in those which are of importance, that they are guilty.

But good fortune, according to its constituents, is ³⁹⁹ of the disposition of the states which have been described ; since those which appear to be the greatest instances of good fortune resolve themselves ultimately into these states: and, besides these, to the excellence of one's progeny, and to personal advantages. But men are usually more overbearing and ⁴⁰⁰ inconsiderate in consequence of prosperity. But one disposition, and that most excellent, is a concomitant of good fortune, viz. that the fortunate are lovers of the gods, and are disposed toward the deity with a ⁴⁰¹ sort of confidence, in consequence of the goods which have accrued to them from fortune.

The subject, then, of the dispositions as they conform to age and to fortune has been discussed; for from the opposites of my remarks the opposite subjects will be evident; the subject, for example, of the disposition of a poor, or unfortunate person, or of one out of power.

⁴⁰²

That there are some Topics common to all the species of Oratory.

⁴⁰³ BUT since the use of persuasive orations has a reference to the forming a decision (since on questions which we are acquainted with, and have decided on, there is no further need of an oration) ; and as this is their use, whether addressing his speech to a single individual, the speaker endeavours to exhort or dissuade (which they do who admonish or persuade; since that individual is in no less degree a judge; because the person [be he who he may], whomsoever we want to persuade is, once for all, a judge); and also if one be speaking against an adversary, or on any supposed question, it has equally [a reference to decision] ; (for one needs must employ a speech, and sweep away objections against which, as against an adversary, he directs his address); this is just as much the case in demonstrative oratory (since the speech commends itself to the listener just as though to a judge). But he alone is strictly a judge, who decides on the questions at issue in civil controversies : since both forensic questions, and those on which men deliberate, are agitated as to how they stand. But of dispositions, as they are affected by the constitutions of states, we have spoken above. So that the means will now have been distinctly unfolded, both how, and by the use of what things, we may render our addresses ethical.

⁴⁰⁴ But as there was, in each species of orations, a certain distinct end proposed; and as respecting all of them some ideas and propositions have been ascertained, out of which the deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial orators deduce their means of persuading ; and as, in addition to these, the means by which it is possible for us to render our speeches ethical, have been developed; it merely remains, that we go over ⁴⁰⁵ in detail the topics which are common to the three ⁴⁰⁶ species of oratory : for it is necessary that every orator should connect with his speech the topics of possibility or impossibility; and for some it will be necessary to attempt to show that certain things will take place, and for others that they have taken place. And again, the topic of greatness is common to all oratory ; for every orator, whether he exhort or dissuade, praise or blame, accuse or defend, avails himself of amplification and diminution.

Let us also, after these points have been explained, attempt to treat of enthymems in general (if we are in possession of any thing on the subject) and of examples ; in order that by subjoining what remains we may make good our original proposal.

But of these common topics, amplification is most congenial to demonstrative oratory, as has been remarked ; possibility, as relating to the past, to judicial3; since on what has been its decision is made; but possibility, as relating to the future, is most congenial to deliberative.

Of Things Possible and Impossible.

FIRST, then, let us speak of things possible and those ⁴⁰⁷ which are impossible.

If then it be possible that one contrary should exist, or be called into existence, the other contrary will also appear to be possible; for instance, if it be possible for a man to be convalescent, it also is possible for him to be sick; for the effective power of contraries, inasmuch as they are contraries, is the ⁴⁰⁸⁴⁰⁹⁴¹⁰ same. If, of two similar things, the one be possible, the other which is similar will be possible also. If the more difficult be possible, so will also that which is easier. And if it be possible for a thing to be produced in a state of excellence or beauty, it also is possible for it to be produced under general circumstances ; for it is more difficult for a building to be ⁴¹¹ made beautiful, than simply a building. And in whatever case the commencement is possible, the fulfilment also is possible1: for of things which are impossible, none either take place or begin to do so; for instance, it neither is the case, that the diameter of a square is commensurable with the side, neither ⁴¹² will it ever begin to be so. Also, wherever the fulfilment is possible, so is the commencement; since ⁴¹³ every thing proceeds from a beginning. And if the subsequent in being or production be possible, so also is the antecedent: if, for example, it be possible that a man should be produced, so also is it that a child should, since it is antecedent in its production : again, if it be possible for a child, so is it also for a man to be produced; on the principle that the former is a ⁴¹⁴ commencement. Things likewise are possible, of which there is a natural love or desire; for no one loves what is impossible, neither desires it, for the ⁴¹⁵⁴¹⁶ most part at least. Also, any thing which is the subject of an art or science, is possible both to exist and to be produced. Likewise any thing whatsoever, the principle of whose production resides in those whom we can compel or persuade ; such are those whose superiors, or lords, or friends we are. ⁴¹⁷ And wherever the parts are possible, so also is the whole. Wherever again the whole is possible, so also are the parts, generally speaking : for if the latchet, the forepart, and the upperleather of the shoe admit of being brought into being, so also do the shoes themselves: and if the shoes, then also the latchet, ⁴¹⁸ the forepart, and upperleauther2; also, if the genus be ⁴¹⁹⁴²⁰ of the number of things possible, so also will be the species; and if the species, so also the genus: for example, if a vessel can be produced, so can a trireme; and if a trireme, so can a vessel. And if, of things which have a natural relation to each other, the one be possible, so is also the other; as if the double be possible, so also is the half; and if the half, so also is the double. And if a thing admits of ⁴²¹ being brought into being without art or preparation, a fortiori it will admit of it by the help of art and attention. On which principle too it has been remarked by Agatho, " Yes, truly, in some things you must fare just as fortune goes ; other things there are which attach to us by necessity and art.” Also, if ⁴²² any thing be possible to persons who are worse, or our inferiors, or less prudent, much more will it also be possible to their opposites ; just as Isocrates said, that " it would be strange if Euthynus learnt it, and he were not able to find it out."

With regard, however, to things impossible, it is ⁴²³plain that they result from the contraries of the above-mentioned principles.

Questions as to the actual occurrence of any thing, ⁴²⁴ are to be viewed under the following considerations. For, in the first place, if that which had a less natural tendency to occur, has occurred ; then may that have occurred which had a greater tendency. And if that ⁴²⁵ which is wont to take place subsequently, has taken place, that also has taken place which usually does primarily: if, for instance, a man has forgotten, then also must he at some time have learnt that [of which he is now forgetful]. Also, if a man was able and ⁴²⁶ willing, he achieved the deed; for all men when, being willing, they have power, proceed to act; for there is nothing in their way. If, moreover, a man was willing and had no external impediment. If, again, the act ⁴²⁷⁴²⁸⁴²⁹ was possible, and he was under the influence of anger3. And if it was possible, and he [the person in question] was influenced by lust; for, generally speaking, men, if they have the power, execute that of which they are desirous; the bad from weakness of principle ; and the virtuous because they desire ob- ⁴³⁰⁴³¹ jects compatible with virtue. Also, if a man was on the point of bringing the thing into action and of doing it; since the probability is, that he who was on the eve of acting, did moreover really act. Also, if all those things have taken place which naturally occur, either as preparatory to, or on account of the occurrence in question; as for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if he attempted it, he has also achieved it. And if all those things which naturally occur subsequently, and that on account of which the deed is done, have taken place, then has also the prior to them and that which is the cause taken place: if, for instance, it has thundered, it has also lightened; and if he acted, he also attempted. Of all this number there are some thus subsequent of necessity; others however merely generally.

⁴³² With regard, however, to the non-occurrence of things, the considerations applicable will be plain from the contraries of those above stated,

Also with regard to what will happen, matters will become evident from the same considerations; for that which is within the power and the wishes of any one will take place. Also things which are subjects of lust, anger, and reasonings, accompanied by power 4. ⁴³³ On this account, too, if persons be on the onset or on the eve of doing any thing, it will be done: for, generally speaking, things which are on the point of taking place occur, rather than those which are not. ⁴³⁴⁴³⁵ Also, if all those things have preceded which naturally occur before; for instance, if it lowers, there is a probability that it will rain. Also, if that has happened which is on account of the thing in question, ⁴³⁶⁴³⁷ it is probable that that will also happen ; for instance, if there be a foundation, it is probable that there will also be a house.

The subject of greatness and smallness in regard ⁴³⁸ to affairs, also of the degrees of greater and less, and of things great and small in general, is clear to us from what has been said. For, in the discussion of deliberative oratory, the doctrine of the greatness of goods has been stated, and respecting the greater and less in the abstract. So that as with respect to each class of speeches the proposed end is a good ; (for instance, the expedient,-the honourable,-and the just;) it is evident that by every orator, his means of amplification are to be arrived at through the medium of these. But to institute, besides this, a further inquiry into ⁴³⁹ the subject of greatness and of excess in the abstract, is to talk idly; since particular cases are more completely applicable to use than mere generalities.

On the subject, then, of what is possible and impossible,-and whether the fact has or has not occurred,-will or will not occur, and moreover on the subject of greatness and smallness in regard to affairs, let thus much have been said.

Of Examples;-how many species there are of them, in what manner, and when we are to employ them.

IT remains that I treat of the means of effecting ⁴⁴⁰ persuasion which are common to every class of subjects, since I have already treated of such as are peculiar. And these common means of persuasion are two in species, example and enthymem: for the sentiment is part of an enthymem. Let us then first ⁴⁴¹ treat of example; for the example is correspondent to induction; and induction is a principle.

But of examples there are two species; for one Two sorts. ⁴⁴² species of example is the quoting real matters of fact which have actually taken place; another is the fabricating them yourself: and of this method, one species is illustration, the other fable; like those of Aesop and the African legends. Again1, example is somewhat of this description, as if one were to assert that the state ought to set itself in order against the king, and not to allow him to make himself master of Egypt; and this, because aforetime Darius passed not into Greece, before that he had seized that country; but when he had seized it, he passed across; so that the present king, should he seize Egypt, will pass over; on which account he is not to be permitted.

⁴⁴³ Illustration is of the nature of Socrates's discourses : for instance, were one to say that it is not fitting that magistrates chosen by lot should be in office; for it is just the same thing as though one were to pick out wrestlers by lot; not taking such as are able to contend, but those on whom the lot may fall: or as though men were to draw lots for that person of the crew whom it might befit to take the helm; as if it became the person on whom the lot fell, and not him who understood the art.

⁴⁴⁴ But fable is such as that of Stesichorus in opposition to Phalaris, and that of Aesop in behalf of the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the citizens of Himera had chosen Phalaris general with absolute powers, and were on the eve of assigning him a body guard, after other things which he said, related to them a fable: " That a horse was sole master of a meadow; but that on a stages coming in and spoiling the pasture, in his wish to be avenged of the stag, he asked some man whether he should be able, in ⁴⁴⁵⁴⁴⁶ conjunction with him, to chastise the stag. The man said [that he would be able] if he would take the bit, and himself were to mount him with his darts. When, however, he had agreed to this, and the man was mounted, the horse, instead of being revenged, was himself already the slave of the man. And in the same way do you also (says he) look to it, lest, in your wish to avenge yourselves on your enemies, you suffer in the same way as the horse ; for already, through your choice of a commander with independent power, you have the bit in your mouths: but if you assign him a body guard, and permit him to mount into the saddle, you will become, from that moment forth, the slaves of Phalaris."

And Aesop, when pleading at Samoa in behalf of ⁴⁴⁷ a demagogue who was tried for his life, said, " That a fox in crossing a river was thrust out of her course into a drain, and that, being unable to get out, she was harassed for a long time, many horse leeches having got hold of her; but a hedgehog wandering by, when he saw her, taking compassion on her, asked whether he should pick off the horse leeches from her; that the fox however would not permit him; but on his asking why, she replied, ‘ Because these are indeed already filled from me, and now suck but a little blood; if, however, you should pick them off, others, who are hungry, coming up will drain off the little blood which remains. But (said he), Oh Samians, thus also does this man no longer injure you; for he is wealthy: should you, however, put him to death, others who are poor will come, who will exhaust you while they filch the public monev."

But fables are adapted to deliberative oratory, and ⁴⁴⁸ possess this advantage; that to hit upon facts which have occurred in point is difficult; but with regard to fables it is comparatively easy. For an orator ought to construct them just as he does his illustrations, if he be able to discover the point of similitude, a thing which will be easy if he be of a philosophical ⁴⁴⁹ turn of mind3. Cases, then, in the shape of fables, are the easier to bring forward; but those are more availing with a view to deliberation, which are put upon the ground of facts; because, generally speaking, the future resembles the past4.

⁴⁵⁰ It will, moreover, be right for one who has not enthymems to employ his examples like positive proofs ; since the persuasive efficacy of your speech will be produced by them: but one who possesses [enthymems] should employ them like evidence, putting them forward after his enthymems, in way of a conclusion. Because, if they be put first, they bear resemblance to induction; and induction, except in few instances, is not proper to rhetoric; whereas when put in at the end, they resemble evidence; and a witness in every case influences belief. On which account, there is moreover a necessity imposed on him who puts them first of citing many; for him, however, who states them in conclusion even one is sufficient; for a credible witness, though but single, is serviceable.

The number, then, of the species of examples, how many they are, and how and when they are to be used, has been stated. ⁴⁵¹⁴⁵²

⁴⁵³

Of Moral Sentiments,—what they are, and of how many species,—how they are to be employed,-and what advantages they possess.

ON the subject of the use of maxims, after it has ⁴⁵⁴ been stated what a maxim is, it will most easily become clear both in what cases, on what occasions, and what persons it befits to avail themselves of the enunciation of maxims in their speeches.

Now the maxim is an assertion, and yet not re- ⁴⁵⁵ specting particulars, as what kind of person Iphicrates was, but on some general subject; neither is it on every general subject 1, as, that what is straight is opposed to what is curved; but it is respecting as many subjects as moral conduct is concerned about, and as are objects of choice or avoidance in acting. So that, as the enthymem is a form of reasoning ⁴⁵⁶ nearly [confined] to this description of subjects, both the conclusions of enthymems and their premises, after the syllogistic form has been done away, become maxims 2. Take an instance: “ A man who is ⁴⁵⁷⁴⁵⁸ in his sound mind never ought to educate his children so as to be too highly skilled 3." Now this is a maxim: but if the reason, and the cause why he should not do so, be added, the whole [conjointly] will become an enthymem; thus, " for besides the indolence which they contract, they will attach to themselves the bitter jealousy of the citizens." Again, this : " There is not a man who in every respect is happy4:" and the following: "There is not one of all mankind who is free5," are maxims: and the last becomes an enthymem, if added to the following proposition, " for either he is the slave of money or of fortune."

⁴⁵⁹ If, then, the maxim be what it has been described, there will necessarily be four kinds of maxims: for either they will be with the annexed reason, or with- ⁴⁶⁰ out it. Now the maxims which need proof are all such as assert any thing which contravenes received opinion, or is doubtful; but those which state nothing contrary to peopled notions do well enough] with- ⁴⁶¹ out the addition of proof. And of these last it cannot but be that some will need no proof, from their having been previously known ; as, " The best thing for a man, as it seems to me at least, is health -because to nine-tenths of mankind this seems to be the case: and that others simultaneously with their being uttered become evident to such as turn their attention to them ; as, " There is no lover who does not always ⁴⁶² love. And again, of those which have proof subjoined, some are a part of an enthymem, just as, " A man who is in his sound mind never ought," etc. Others are essentially enthymems, and not part of an enthymem ; the which obtain more than any other species. And these are all those in which the reason for what is asserted appears wrought in, as ⁴⁶³⁴⁶⁴⁴⁶⁵⁴⁶⁶ in this maxim: " Being yourself a mortal, do not ⁴⁶⁷ cherish immortal wrath :” "-or the assertion that, " one ought not always to cherish wrath," is a maxim; that, however, which is added, viz. "because you are a mortal," states the reason why. Similar to which is the following: “ It is fitting that a mortal conceive mortal notions, not that a being destined to death should think of what is immortal 7."

From what has been said it has then become evi- ⁴⁶⁸ dent, as well how many the species of maxims are, as also to what kind of subjects they are severally adapted. For on subjects which may be questioned, or contravene received opinions, the orator must not use those without the reason annexed; but let him either, prefixing the reason, use the conclusion as a maxim, thus—“ For my part, as then it neither is good to be exposed to envy, nor to be indolent, I assert that it is not good to be educated ;" or, stating this [which here is the conclusion] first, subjoin that which was prefixed 8. Observing that on subjects which do not contravene received opinions, but are doubtful, that he annex the reason why as concisely as possible. And on subjects such as these the ⁴⁶⁹ apophthegms of the Lacedaemonians are very suitable, and sayings which have an air of mystery; as if one were to apply that which Stesichorus said before the Locrians, " that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cigalas should sing upon the ground 9." The employment of maxims becomes him who is ⁴⁷⁰⁴⁷¹⁴⁷²⁴⁷³⁴⁷⁴ rather advanced in life; and particularly as respects subjects about which each happens to be well informed 10. Since for one not so advanced in age to sport maxims is bad taste, just as it is for him to have recourse to fables: and the use of them on subjects about which one is ignorant is silly, and argues a want of education. There is a sufficient sign of the truth of this; for the boors of the country are of all other people most fond of hammering out maxims, ⁴⁷⁵ and set them forth with great volubility. Also the stating generally a maxim which is, in fact, not general, is most especially befitting in appeals to the feelings, and in the act of exciting indignation; and then either at the beginning, or after the proof. ⁴⁷⁶ Again, it is proper to avail ones self of maxims which are current and common, if they be of any service ; for from their being common they appear to be correct, as though every one acknowledged their truth11: this one, for instance, (if the orator be exhorting persons to face the hazard, though they have not sacrificed,) " One omen there is which is best, to defend one's country or to face it, though they be few in number,-" Mars is common;" and to cut off the children of their foes, what though they have done no injury,-" He is a fool who, after slaying the father, still spares the child12."

⁴⁷⁷ Some old sayings too are maxims; for example, the expression, " Next neighbour to an Athenian." ⁴⁷⁸ It is also proper to quote maxims which even contravene the current sayings, (I mean by current sayings such as this, " Know thyself or this, " Too much of one thing is good for nothing;") whenever your moral character may be likely to show itself to greater advantage, or the thing spoken is said in an impas- ⁴⁷⁹⁴⁸⁰⁴⁸¹ sioned manner. The speaking in an impassioned manner is, as if one in a passion were to assert, " that it was a falsehood that one ought to know himself; at least, this man, had he known himself, would never have claimed to be your general 13." The moral character appears better [when we contradict a maxim] thus, "it does not become men, as some assert, to love as though they were about to hate, but to hate as though they were about to love." And we ought ⁴⁸² to give a manifestation of our moral principle by means of the diction we employ, otherwise to subjoin the reason; for instance, either stating the sentence thus, " we ought to love, not as they tell us, but as though always about to love, for the other is the part of an insidious manor thus, “ the common maxim does not please me; for it is the duty of the true friend at least to love as though he were always about to love." " Nor again [does this please me], that we ought to carry nothing to excess; since 'tis our duty to hate the wicked at least to the very extreme."

They contribute, too, a considerable aid to our ⁴⁸³ orations : first owing to the vanity of the audience ; for they feel a pleasure if one, speaking generally, happens to hit upon ideas which they hold on any particular point. My meaning, however, will be plain in this way, as also the manner in which we ought to catch at them; for the maxim, as has been stated, is an assertion universally, and men feel delighted when that is asserted universally, which they happen previously to have taken up as their opinion upon particulars. If, for instance, a man chanced to have bad neighbours or children, he would hail the man who should say, "nothing is more annoying than dwelling near people," or, " nothing is more silly than to beget children." ⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸⁵ So that we should form a guess, some how or other, as to the opinions which our audience happen to have taken up with; then to speak on these subjects ge- ⁴⁸⁶ nerally conformably to them. This one advantage the application of maxims must needs possess, and another superior to it; for it gives our orations an air of character. But those orations bear an impress of character in which the principle is manifest. And all maxims produce this effect by reason of the speaker's asserting universally on things which are the objects of deliberate choice: so that should the maxims be good, they make the speaker also to appear a man of worthy character.

Such, then, be our discussion on the subject of the maxim, of its nature, its species, the manner in which it is to be employed, and the advantages which it possesses.

Of Enthymems.

⁴⁸⁷ LET us speak generally of enthymems, in what way we ought to seek for them, and afterwards of the topics, ( τόποι,) for the nature of the two is respectively different1. ⁴⁸⁸ It has been stated before, that the enthymem is a kind of syllogism, also in what way it is a syllogism, and in what respect it differs from the syllogism of ⁴⁸⁹ logic; tor we should make our conclusions without taking up our assumptions either many stages back, or all of them together: the one process from its length is obscure ; the other, from its stating what is plain, is waste of words.

And this is the reason why men of no education have more persuasive influence over the mob than ⁴⁹⁰ men of high acquirements, as the poet says, " that the unlearned speak more in unison with the feelings of the mob;" for the latter address them in common and general points, the former, from the store of their information, in a manner which comes home to them. So that we are not to found our address on any thing ⁴⁹¹ which may seem to the purpose, but on certain definite points; such, for example, as seem right to the judges, or those whose opinions they acknowledge; and the reason for this is, that it will appear to be the case either to all or most of them : moreover we ⁴⁹² should draw our conclusions not only from necessary, but also from contingent premises 3.

First, then, you ought to be aware that it is necessary, respecting every subject on which you have to speak and to draw conclusions, whether it be through the medium of the rhetorical SyllogiSM , or of any ⁴⁹³ other whatsoever, to be masters either of all or some of the facts inherent in it: for having none of them, you will not be able to draw your inferences from any thing5. My meaning is this : how shall we be able to give advice to the Athenians, whether they ought to go to war, without being informed what their forces are, whether naval or military, or both; and these in how great numbers; also what are their resources ; or their allies and enemies; and yet further, what former wars they have waged, and in what manner, and other points of this description: or how to eulo- ⁴⁹⁴ gize them, unless we be informed of the sea-fight at Salamis, or the battle at Marathon, or the exploits achieved by them in behalf of the Heraclidae, or some other such points; for it is on the real or apparent honourable traits attaching to each object that all orators found their panegyrics. And in the same ⁴⁹⁵⁴⁹⁶⁴⁹⁷⁴⁹⁸⁴⁹⁹ way it is -on their opppsites that they ground their reprehension, always looking out for any thing of that nature which either attaches, or appears to attach, to the subject; suppose [the case of a censure passed on the Athenians] because they subjected the Greeks to themselves, and reduced to a state of servitude the people of Aegina and Potidaea, who were their allies against the barbarian, and bore off the prize of highest worthy and every other transaction of this nature, and whatever other such error may attach to them.

⁵⁰⁰ And in the same way those orators who accuse and defend, construct their accusations and defences on a ⁵⁰¹ view of existing circumstances7: there is no difference in your pursuing this process, whether it be respecting Athenians or Lacedaemonians, men or gods. For in advising Achilles, or in praising or blaming him, in accusing and defending him, we must assume the traits which attach, or appear to attach, to his character; in order that from among their number we may, in so praising or blaming him, allege whatever things honourable or base attach to him; and in accusing or defending him, whatever things just or unjust; and in advising him, whatever is beneficial ⁵⁰² or injurious. And in a similar manner respecting any business whatsoever; as, respecting justice, the question whether it be expedient [must be discussed] on the ground of what appertains to justice or ex- ⁵⁰³ pediency. So that as all men appear thus to construct their proofs, whether they draw their inferences with greater accuracy or remissness, (for they do not make their assumptions out of every subject, but from those circumstances which are inherent in each question,) and by reason that it is manifestly impossible otherwise to prove; it is evident, then, that it is necessary, as I said in the Topics, to be in pos- ⁵⁰⁴⁵⁰⁵ session of certain select propositions on points which may occur, and are most convenient: and [it is ⁵⁰⁶ evident] that the orator should conduct his inquiry respecting questions which arise on the sudden in the same manner, not turning his view aside to indefinite points, but to the actual points of the case which the oration is concerning; and embracing in his sketch the greatest number he is able, and those coming the nearest to the point; for in proportion as he is master of the greater number of the things inherent in the case, by so much the easier will it be to effect proof; and in proportion as these are the nearer to the point, in the very same proportion will they be more peculiar, and less vague. By vague I mean, the praising ⁵⁰⁷ Achilles because he is a man, and one of the deified heroes, and made war against Troy ; for these are points attaching to a thousand others beside: so that such an orator no more praises Achilles than he does Diomed. But by peculiar I mean, those which befall no one else than to Achilles, for instance, the slaying Hector, the bravest of the Trojans ; and Cycnus, who, being himself invulnerable, prevented all the forces from landing ; and that he joined the expedition the youngest, and without being bound by an oath; and whatever other topics are of this description. One element of enthymems, then, is that ⁵⁰⁸ of selection ; and this is the first which partakes of the nature of topics.

And now let us state the elements of enthymems; ⁵⁰⁹ (but by pace and element of an enthymem I mean the same thing). First, however, let us treat of those ⁵¹⁰ points concerning which it is necessary first to speak. For of enthymems there are two species; the one species are confirmative, that such is or is not the fact; and the other refutative: and they differ just as, in logic, the syllogism and the elenchus differ. And the confirmative enthymem is the deducing a ⁵¹¹ conclusion from acknowledged premises; the refuta- ⁵¹² tive, however, is the deducing an inference which is ⁵¹³ not admitted. Now the general arguments nearly on each class of subjects necessary and useful to be known are in our possession; for propositions have been selected on each [branch of rhetoric] ; so that the topics out of which one must allege his enthymems, whether on questions of good or evil, just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, select points moreover respecting the dispositions, the passions, and the habits, having been collected above, are likewise actually before us.

⁵¹⁴ But let us, in a different manner, further make assumptions respecting all the classes of rhetoric, and putting a mark on them severally as we proceed, state both the refutative and confirmative elements, as well as those of apparent enthymems, which, however, are not really enthymems, for neither in truth are they [the elements of actual] syllogisms. When these points have been elucidated, we shall discuss the subject of starting objections to enthymems, and the means of their solution, from what sources we ought to adduce them.

Elements of Enthymems.

⁵¹⁵ THERE is one element of confirmative enthymems, derivable from contraries; for we should consider, whether the contrary quality be inherent in the contrary subject; doing away the argument [grounded thereon] if it be not inherent; and if it be inherent, founding one thereon ourselves: for example, the argument that " Temperance is good, because intemperance is injurious:" or, as it is in the Messeniac oration, "If war be the cause of our present trou- ⁵¹⁶ bles, of course we shall put ourselves right again with the return of peace." And, " If in truth it be not just to be angry with those who unwillingly do us harm; neither, if one on compulsion shall do good to any one, is it his duty to be grateful to him." And, " If to speak falsely is among men available to persuade; there is no anomaly in supposing, on the contrary, that many things which are true fail of being believed."

Another is derivable from conjugate inflections2; ⁵¹⁷ for the qualities must either be inherent consistently, or not at all; for example, the argument, that " the just is not in every case a good, for then also would that which is justly be well; now it is not, however, desirable to die justly3.

Another from relatives; for if to one party attach ⁵¹⁸ the idea of his having acted honourably or justly, to the other also will attach that of having suffered [honourably, etc.]. Also, if to command be just, so also is the having executed [the command] ; for example, just as that farmer of the revenue, Diomedon 4, said of the revenues, " If it be not base for you to put them up for sale, neither is it for us to purchase them." And if the idea that he has suffered justly or honourably be on the side of the patient, so will it also be on that of the agent; and if on that of the agent, then also on that of the patient. There is, however, in this way of arguing, room for passing off some false reasoning 5: for if the person has justly suffered any thing, he indeed has justly been a sufferer, but perhaps not so at your hands. On which ⁵¹⁹⁵²⁰⁵²¹⁵²² account we should view the question separately, whether the patient deserve to suffer, and whether the agent have a right to inflict the suffering; that done, to employ the facts in whatever way may suit our purpose: for at times, considerations of this kind do not harmonize; just as in the Alcmaeon of Theodectus, " Did no man hate thy mother ?" In his reply he tells her, that it is fitting to consider the points taken separately ; and when Alphesiboea asks how, taking her up, he says, " That she indeed deserved death, they did decree; but at the same time that I ought not to be the slayer." And just so the trial respecting Demosthenes, and of the persons who slew Nicanor. For when they had been adjudged to have slain him justly, it appeared that he had also been justly put to death. Again, respecting the person who met his death at Thebes, respecting whom some one bade the question be decided, whether he were deserving death; as though it were not unjust to slay one who deserved to die.

⁵²³ Another element is derivable from the relations of greater and less6; for instance: " If not even the gods know every thing, hardly I should suppose do men for it is-to say, that if the quality be not inherent in that which would more naturally possess it; then it is evident, that in that which would less naturally possess it, it is not inherent.

⁵²⁴ And the argument, that " he assaults his neighbours, who even does so to his father;" is derived from the element, if the less probability exist, so also does the greater; [which is available] in reference to whether of the two points it may be needful to prove, ' whether that it is or is not the fact.

⁵²⁵ And again, by parity of reasoning, when it is said, " And is thy father to be pitied in that he has lost his children, and is not in truth CEneus who has lost his noble offspring ? " and the argument, " If indeed Theseus committed no wrong, neither did Paris;" and, " If Tyndarus' sons did not act unjustly, neither did ⁵²⁶ Paris and this, ‟ Suppose Hector did slay Patroclus, Paris slew Achilles;" and this, " If other artists are not to be held cheap, neither are philosophers and, "If generals are not held cheap because they are frequently vanquished, neither are sophists;" and that, " If it behoves an individual to have a care for your glory, it also behoves you to regard that of Greece."

Another element arises from the consideration of ⁵²⁷ time, as Iphicrates urged in his oration against Harmodius, " that if before my doing it, I had claimed to have the honour of a statue, ye would have granted it; will ye not then grant it me now that I have achieved it ?-Do not, therefore, engage yourselves under promises, when about to receive; and, when you have experienced the benefit, withdraw them." And, on another occasion, in reference to the Thebans permitting Philip to pass through into Attica, the argument that, " if, before his aiding them against the Phocians, he had claimed a passage, they would have promised; it were then an absurd thing, if, because he threw himself on them, and had confidence in them, they should not let him march through8."

Another element is deduced from assertions made ⁵²⁸ respecting yourself retorted upon your adversary; and the term is of exceeding service, as is exemplified ⁵²⁹⁵³⁰⁵³¹⁵³² in the Teucer; one too it is of which Iphicrates availed himself against Aristophon, when he put the question home to him, whether he would betray the fleet for a bribe; and on his denying that he would, then said he, " Would you, who are Aristophon, not betray them, and shall I, who am Iphicrates ?" You ought, however, to be dealing with an opposite party, who appears in a greater degree to have been guilty of injustice; otherwise it would appear ridiculous, were any one laying an accusation against an Aristides, to allege this ; but it ought always to tend directly to the discredit of him who lays the impeachment ; for, generally speaking, the plaintiff presumes himself better than the defendant; this notion, then, it behoves us to refute. And generally it is absurd when one chides in another what he does himself, or would feel inclined to do ; or exhorts him to do what he does not himself, neither would be induced to do.

⁵³³ Another place is from definitions9; as, " that the genius is nothing else than either the deity, or his production. And yet whoever conceives the existence of the production of a deity, must necessarily think at the same time that gods are in existence 10." And, as Iphicrates said, "that that man was most noble who was the best; for that there did not attach any nobility to Harmodius and Aristogiton before they had achieved some noble exploit." And his proof that himself was more nearly akin to them, by saying, " At any rate my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, than yours are11." And, as was said in that speech about Paris, ⁵³⁴⁵³⁵⁵³⁶ " All will be free to acknowledge that the intemperate do not acquiesce in the enjoyment of a single person." And the reason on account of which Socrates refused to go to Archelaus, " because," said he, " it is a disgrace for one who has been treated well to be unable to make a retort on terms of equality, just as it would be for one who has been treated ill." For all these deduce their inferences about the points respecting which they speak, after having defined and ascertained the question.

Another element is deducible from the number of ⁵³⁷ senses in which a word may be taken, as in the Topics respecting the acceptations of the word rightly. Another from taking the different bearings of the case; as, " If all act unjustly for three objects, for the sake either of this, or this, or this, and from two of these motives it is impossible that he should have acted; but that he acted on the third, not even the accusers themselves allege."

Another from induction, as may be illustrated from ⁵³⁸ the oration respecting Peparethus, to establish that women every where discern truly respecting their children; because first at Athens the mother made the matter clear to Mantias, the orator, when undertaking a suit against his son; and again at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were at issue on the point, the Dodonian woman proved the child to be the son of Ismenias; and on this account they considered Thessaliscus to be the son of Ismenias. And again, from the law of Theodectes, " If people do not give their own horses in charge to those who manage those of others amiss, nor [their ships] to those who overturn the ships of others; neither ought we, if in every case it happens in the same way, to employ those who but ill protect the safety of others, for our own protection." And, as Alcidamas asserted, that " all pay honour to the wise, at least the Parians. honoured Archilochus, what though he was a calumniator of them; and the Chians, Homer, who was not their citizen; the Mitylenaeans, Sappho, though she was a woman; and the Lacedaemonians, who of all people are the least attached to learning, made Chilon one of their senators; the Greeks of Italy also honoured Pythagoras, and the people of Lampsacus buried Anaxagoras, though a foreigner, and honour him even to this day; the Athenians again were prosperous while they abode by the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians, while by those of Lycurgus ; also at Thebes, at the time that the magistrates were men of learning, the state enjoyed prosperity."

⁵³⁹ Another element of enthymems is derivable from a former decision of the same, a similar, or opposite question; more especially indeed if all men so decide, and that uniformly ; and otherwise, [if not all,] but the majority ; or the wise, either all, or most of them ; or the good; or if the very judges themselves, or those whom they approve, or those in opposition to whom they cannot decide (as for instance those on whom they depend) ; or those contrary to whom it is not becoming to decide; for instance, a god, or a father, or teacher, [happen so to have decided]. Just on the principle of the appeal of Autocles to Mixidemides, " whether it beseemed the awful goddesses to render an account to the Areopagus, and not Mixidemides ?" Or, as Sappho insisted, "that to die was an evil, the gods having so decided; since [had it not been so] they would themselves have died;" or as Aristippus told Plato when he asserted something, as he thought, rather dogmatically, " Yet," said he, " our companion at least held no such thing," meaning Socrates. And Hegesippus, having first consulted the oracle at Olympia, put the question secondly at Delphi,-whether he [Apollo] was of the same opinion as his father; as though it were disgraceful to contradict a father. And of Helen, as Isocrates wrote12, that " she was worthy, since indeed Theseus judged her so." And of Paris, " whom the goddesses ⁵⁴⁰ preferred 13;" and of Evagoras, as lacerates says, that must needs be virtuous, It since Conon, when unfortunately passing by every one else, came to Evagoras."

Another element arises from an enumeration of ⁵⁴¹ parts; as in the Topica, " what kind of motion the soul is; it is either of this, or that description." And an instance occurs in the Socrates of Theodectes: "Toward what temple bath he been guilty of impiety? whom of the gods which the ritual of our state acknowledges, hath he not honoured ? "

Another consists in, Since, in the generality of in- ⁵⁴² stances, it happens that on the same circumstances somewhat is consequent whether good or evil, the exhortation or dissuasion by means of these consequences, the accusation or defence, the praising or blaming; for instance, on education is consequent envy, which is an evil; and the being wise, which is a good: [on the one hand then you may assert that] men should not seek to be educated, because it is not good to be envied; [on the other that] it is fitting to be educated, for it is good to be wise. In this topic 14, with the addition of that on possibility, and the other [universal means of proof], as they have been stated, consists the system of CaliDDus.

Another occurs, when we want to exhort or: dis- ⁵⁴³ suade respecting two propositions, and those opposed to each other; and to avail ourselves of the forementioned argument in the case of both. The difference [between this and the element last mentioned] is, that in it the opposition is merely between any propositions which may happen, it here holds between contraries : for instance, a priestess was endeavouring to prevent her son from becoming a public speaker ; ⁵⁴⁴⁵⁴⁵⁵⁴⁶ because, said she, " If on the one hand you speak what is just, men will hate you ; if what is unjust, the gods." [Here then it might be retorted], therefore you ought to become a public speaker; for, " if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; if what is unjust, men 15." And this is equivalent to the proverb " of buying dirt as well as salt." And the retortion is this, when on each of two contraries good and evil is consequent, they being respectively opposed.

⁵⁴⁷ Another arises from the circumstance, that men do not approve the same things privately as before the world; but when in public, they praise beyond all things what is just and honourable ; but within themselves they prefer what is expedient: the orator should endeavour to infer whichever suits his purpose, for this element is of sovereign use in exposing anomalies of opinion.

⁵⁴⁸ Another element is deducible from the analogy of results; as Iphicrates urged when they compelled his son to serve who was under the standard age, because he was tall, that " if they esteem great children as men, they assuredly will vote small men to be children." And Theodectes, in the oration respecting the law, asked, "Do ye make the mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, citizens on account of their virtue, and will ye not make exiles of those among the mercenaries who have committed these intolerable acts?"

⁵⁴⁹ Another arises out of the argument, that if the result be the same, the principle from which it arises will be the same; just as Xenophanes used to argue, that " they are equally guilty of impiety who assert that the gods were produced, as those who assert that they die; for in both cases it happens that in some period or other the gods do not exist." And generally ⁵⁵⁰ assuming that the result of each act is in every case identified with it. [Take this argument as an illustration] : "Ye are about to pronounce, not respecting Socrates, but respecting the pursuit in general, whether it be right to addict one's self to philosophy." And this, "that the giving earth and water is the being slaves." And "that the participating in the common peace is the performing of what is enjoined." Now we are to take whichever side may suit our purpose.

Another may be deduced from the circumstance, ⁵⁵¹ that the same persons do not choose the same things subsequently as before, but contrariwise; as, for instance, this appeal :-" If, when in banishment, we fought that we might return ; shall we, now that we have returned, take to flight, in order that we may not fight16?" For one while they chose abiding in their country at the expense of fighting ; at another, the possibility of avoiding fighting at the expense of non-continuance in their native land.

Another element which may be resorted to is, the ⁵⁵² assertion that a thing either exists or was produced, for the sake of that for which it might have existed or been produced; as if some one were to give a person any thing, in order that by taking it from him he may annoy him. Whence also it has been said, " To many, fortune, not bearing them good will, gives great good luck; but it is in order that they may receive the more conspicuous calamities 17." And this from the Meleager of Antiphon: " Not in order that they might slay the beast, but that they may become witnesses, before Greece, of Meleager's valour." And that insinuation in the Ajax of Theodectes, "that Diomede chose Ulysses, not as any compliment, but in order that his attendant might at the same time be his inferior." For it is very possible that he did so on this account.

Another, common both to the judicial and de- ⁵⁵³ liberative orators, is the consideration of the motives ⁵⁵⁴⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵⁶ which stimulate or retard men, and the objects with a view to which they both act and avoid; for these are such as, if they be actually in existence, we needs must proceed to action; for instance, if the undertaking be possible, and easy, and beneficial, either to the person in question himself, or to his friends, or pernicious to his enemies, and entailing loss on them ; or if the loss be less than the object proposed 18. And it is upon these considerations that orators exhort, and on their opposites that they dissuade ; moreover they both defend and accuse upon the ground of these considerations; they rest their defences on those which are used to dissuade, and their accusations on those used to exhort 19. The whole system of Calippus, as well as that of Pamphilus, is nothing more than this element.

⁵⁵⁷ Another is deducible from circumstances which appear to have taken place, but which are improbable, on the ground that they would not seem to be facts, had they not well nigh occurred or actually done so; and that they have a yet stronger claim to belief; for men apprehend as truths either facts or probabilities; if then it be passing belief, and not probable, it will be true 20; for at all events, it is not on account of its likelihood and plausibility that it has this appearance of being the case. Just as Androcles of the burgh Pithos, said in his impeachment ⁵⁵⁸⁵⁵⁹⁵⁶⁰ of the law, when the multitude were tumultuous as he spoke, " The laws require some law to set them right, for the very fishes require salt;" and yet it is neither likely nor plausible that creatures bred in the brine of the sea should require salt. " Nay, the olive lees require oil," and yet it is a fact not to be credited, that the very things from which oil is produced should require oil."

Another element, REFUTATIVE, is the consideration ⁵⁶¹ of contradictions; if there occur any contradiction under all the circumstances of time, conduct 21, sayings, and the like. And this independently, respecting your adversary, as " He tells you that he loves you, yet did he conspire with the thirty [tyrants] ;" or independently respecting yourself, " He tells you that I am litigious, but is not able to prove that I have brought any action into court;" or respecting both yourself and the adversary distinctly, " This man never lent any thing, but I have ransomed many of vou."

Another, applicable to those who have been calum- ⁵⁶² mated, or who appear so, whether men or actions, is the explaining the cause of the mistaken notion; for there is some circumstance, on account of which it appears to be the case; for example, when a certain woman had come in contact with her son, she seemed from her embracing him to have had connexion with the youth; when, however, the circumstance which caused it had been stated, the charge was quashed. And as in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses tells Ajax why, though he is braver than Ajax, he does not seem so.

Another is derived from the cause, if that be in ⁵⁶³ existence, arguing that the effect is also; and should it not exist, that neither does the effect. For cause, ⁵⁶⁴⁵⁶⁵ and that of which it is the cause, exist conjointly, and nothing exists without a cause. Just as Leodamas in his defence, when Thrasybulus accused him, because he had been inscribed with infamy on a pillar in the Acropolis, but erased it in the time of the thirty tyrants, urged, " that it was not possible, because the thirty tyrants would put greater confidence in him, while his hatred toward the democracy remained inscribed in public."

⁵⁶⁶ Another is, the observing whether the thing respecting which the party is deliberating, or acting, or has acted, did or does admit of being on another and better footing; since it will become evident that, if this be the case, he has not acted; since no one voluntarily, and of his own knowledge, deliberately chooses what is bad. This, however, involves a fallacy ; for in many cases it becomes clear [only] when too late, how it might have been managed better, whereas it was. before unknown.

⁵⁶⁷ Another, which occurs when any thing anomalous to former acts is about to be done, is the considering the both in connexion; just as Xenophanes advised the people of Elea, when they asked him whether they should sacrifice and sing a dirge to Leucothea22 or not, " if they conceived her to be a deity, not to sing a dirge; but if a human being, not to sacrifice."

⁵⁶⁸Another element is, the accusing or defending on the ground of errors committed; for instance, in the Medea of Carcinus, some persons accuse her because she slew her children, [alleging] that at all events they were not forthcoming ; for, respecting the sending away her children, Medea was in fault: she, however, defends herself [alleging that, if any one], she would have murdered Jason, not her children; which in truth had she done, she would have erred in not doing the other. And this element and species of enthymem constitutes the whole of that system of Theodorus, which is first.

⁵⁶⁹ Another is deducible from the name; as Sophocles ⁵⁷⁰ says, " Steel in truth you are, and bear the name." ⁵⁷¹ And as they are wont to say in their praises of the gods23; and as Conon used to call Thrasybulus, " rash in counsel," ( θρασύβουλος) ; and Herodicus told Thrasymachus, " You are always rash in fight, ( θρασύμαχος) ; and Polus, "You always are a colt," ( Πω̃λος) ; and Draco the legislator, that " his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon24; for they were harsh." And as the Hecuba of Euripides says of Venus, " The very name of the goddess rightly begins with folly25." And as Charemon says, "Pentheus, rightly named from the calamities20 awaiting him."

Refutative enthymems, however, are more in re- ⁵⁷² pute than the confirmative ; by reason of the refutative enthymem being a setting contraries briefly together ; and because things when put in contrast are more palpable to the auditor. Of all forms of reasoning, however, as well confirmative as refutative, those produce the greatest effect 27, which are of such a description that, on the commencement of their enunciation, men anticipate the conclusion, yet without their being superficial; for the hearers on their own parts, feel a pleasure 28, in having of themselves anti- ⁵⁷³⁵⁷⁴⁵⁷⁵⁵⁷⁶⁵⁷⁷⁵⁷⁸ cipated it; and [next to these may we class] all those, by which the hearers are left behind, just so much as that they apprehend them simultaneously with their having been enunciated.

Elements of Apparent Enthymems.

⁵⁷⁹ JUST as it is possible that [one form of reasoning] may be a syllogism, and that another, without really being such, may appear to be so ; even so it must needs be with respect to the enthymem also, that one description should really be enthymems, and another not, however they may appear to be; for the enthymem is a species of syllogism.

⁵⁸⁰ But the elements of these apparent enthymems are, one derivable from the diction: and of this, the first kind is, as in logic, the asserting your last proposition with all the air of a conclusion, although you have deduced no [legitimate] inference at all: thus, " So and so is assuredly not the case, necessarily, therefore, so and so is." And the expressing yourself in the course of your reasonings concisely and pointedly; for this kind of style is the very province of the enthymem, and this kind of fallacy is, it is probable, that which is [demonstrated] " the result of the style of the diction ;" but the stringing together the heads of many syllogisms, is a good expedient with a view to expressing yourself with all the air of syllogism in your style; thus, " that he preserved some, avenged others, emancipated the Greek people." For each of these propositions has been demonstrated from others ; and when they are put in conjunction, it appears that ⁵⁸¹ something results ever from them. Another kind arises from similarity of names, as the assertion, that ⁵⁸² " the mouse is an excellent animal, being that from which the most esteemed of all rites have derived their name;" for of all rites, the mysteries are held in most esteem. Or, if any one in praising a dog, were to embrace in his panegyric the dog in the heavens, or Pan; because Pindar thus addresses him, " blessed being, whom the inhabitants of Olympus call the all-various dog of the mighty goddess." Or the arguing, that "it is a most disgraceful thing, that there should be not even a dog in the house; and therefore it is evident that a dog is honourable." And the assertion, that Mercury is "communicative" above all the gods, because Mercury alone is called " common." And the stating that λόγος, speech, is most excellent; because the good are worthy of λόγος, esteem, not of wealth: for the words ( λόγου ἄξιον) are not used in a single sense.

Another [element of fallacy] is the asserting con- ⁵⁸³ jointly what is true separately; or separately, what is true conjointly; for as it appears to be the same thing, what though in many instances it be not the same, the orator should practise whatever method is more available to his purpose. The saying of Euthydemus is neither more nor less than an instance of this; the declaration, for instance, that "he knew there was a galley in the Piraeus 1," for he knew each [separate fact of his assertion]. And to declare of one who knows the constituent letters, " that he knows the verse 2;" for the verse is the same thing. Again, the saying that " as twice so much is prejudicial, he denied that the one was wholesome; for it is absurd that two good things should constitute one that is noxious." Thus enunciated, it is adapted to refutation; but thus it is confirmative; "for two evils do not constitute one good," etc. But the whole topic ⁵⁸⁴⁵⁸⁵ is replete wih fallacy. Such again is the saying of Polycrates respecting Thrasybulus, that he had deposed thirty tyrants3;" for he takes them conjointly. Or, as in the Orestes of Theodectes, from distinct cases, "It is just that she who has slain her husband should die; as also that a son at least should avenge his father. Now, are not these the very things that have been done ?" for, taking the cases conjointly, perhaps it is no longer just. This may also come under the fallacy of omission, for it is not explained " by whom [she should be put to death]."

⁵⁸⁶ Another element is the doing away or establishing a point by exaggeration4: and this occurs when, without having shown that [the prisoner] has really committed the crime, [the accuser] proceeds to exaggerate it; for this fallacy causes it to appear (when the accused employs the exaggeration) that he has not done the deed; or, (supposing it be the accuser who gets into a passion,) that he has done it. Thus then there is no enthymem ; for the hearer is sophistically brought over to a belief either that [the accused] has or has not done it, without any proof having been adduced.

⁵⁸⁷ Another is the argument drawn from a sign5, for this also is illogical; as if one were to say, " Lovers are an advantage to states; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton deposed the tyrant Hipparchus." And if one were to say, " Dionysius is a robber, for he is a wicked man;" for this also is illogical, because not every wicked man is a thief, although every thief is a wicked man. ⁵⁸⁸⁵⁸⁹⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁹¹ Another is the arguing from an accidental cir- ⁵⁹² cumstance; exemplified in that which Polycrates said about mice, that " they lent their aid by gnawing through the [enemy's] bowstrings." Or supposing one to declare, "that the being bidden to supper is the most honourable; for Achilles was wroth, on account of his not being invited by the Greeks at Tenedos:" he however was enraged, as though he was treated with disrespect, and this occurred upon his not being invited.

Another arises from establishing the consequent; ⁵⁹³ as in the oration respecting Paris, [it is contended] that " he is of a noble spirit; because, despising the society of many, he abode on Ida by himself for, because the noble-spirited are thus disposed, he, too, it should seem, is noble-spirited. Again, " Since he is both foppish in his dress, and strolls about by night, he is an adulterer;" because adulterers are persons of such habits7. Similar to this is also the argument, that the poor, because they dance and sing in the temples ; and that exiles, because it is permitted them to dwell where they list, [are happy.]" For as these advantages belong to those who appear to be happy; they too would appear to be happy, to whom they belong. Moreover, the case varies with the circumstances of the transaction; on which account, the argument falls under the charge of omission.

Another arises from stating as a cause that which ⁵⁹⁴ in fact is not; [arguing], for instance, on its having happened "simultaneously," or "after;" for men do assume that what occurs "subsequently," [occurs] " by means of" [that which preceded], and more especially those engaged in state affairs; just as Demades [insinuated] "that the administration of ⁵⁹⁵⁵⁹⁶ Demosthenes was the cause of all their misfortunes; because a war happened after it."

⁵⁹⁷ Another, from the omission of the "when" and " manner how;" for instance, the argument " that Paris carried off Helen justly; because free choice had been given her by her father8;" for very possibly it was not [granted] for a continuance, but at first merely; because so far only was she at her father's disposal. Or if any one were to say, " that the striking free men was an insult because under all circumstances this is not the case, but when one begins the violence.

⁵⁹⁸ Again, as in the disputations of the Sophists, there arises an apparent syllogism from stating things absolutely or not absolutely, but conditionally ; as [it is contended] in logic, that " what is a nonentity, does exist; because a nonentity exists as a nonentity;" and that " what is unknown is known, for it is known to be unknown9;" just so in rhetoric also, we have an apparent enthymem from what is not absolutely probable, but conditionally probable. This, however, is not universally the case; as in truth Agatho remarks, " Perhaps some one will be inclined to assert this to be probable, that many improbabilities will befall men:" for that which is contrary to probability does occur; so that even what is contrary to probability is probable 10; this, however, is not the case absolutely; but just as in sophistical disputations, it is the omission of the circumstances of extent, relation, and place, which produces the imposition; so also here [in rhetoric], it results from the things being probable not absolutely, but conditionally pro- ⁵⁹⁹ bable. The system of Corax is constructed upon this topic: for supposing your client, without being open to the charge, as for instance, being infirm, ⁶⁰⁰⁶⁰¹⁶⁰² should be under a charge for an assault, [you have grounds for your defence,] because the case is not probable: and if he be open to the charge, from his being, for example, a powerful man, [still you may defend him] on the ground that it is not likely, because it was sure to seem to be likely11. And so also respecting all other cases, for he needs must be either open to the imputation or not. Both cases then appear to be likely; but the one is likely [absolutely], the other not absolutely, but so as has been explained. And this is [the secret] "of making the worse, the better side 12." And hence mankind were justly in- ⁶⁰³ dignant at the annunciation of Protagoras 13; for it is an imposition, and not the real, but an apparent probability, and has a place in no art except rhetoric, and the art of disputation. And now the subject of enthymems, as well real as apparent, has been discussed.

The Solution of Arguments.

\ IT follows that I speak of the modes of disengaging ⁶⁰⁴ one's self from arguments. They are either the meeting them with contradictory arguments, or starting an obj ection1. Now as to the meeting them with counter ⁶⁰⁵⁶⁰⁶⁶⁰⁷⁶⁰⁸⁶⁰⁹ arguments, it is evident that we may do it on the ground of the same topics [as were given for refutation]: for the arguments arise out of probabilities, ⁶¹⁰ and many things which appear likely are opposed to each other.

⁶¹¹ Objections, however, (as was stated in the Topics,) are started in four ways : 1. for either it may be from the same subject: 2. from a similar: 3. or an opposite [to that from which the adversary argues]: 4. ⁶¹² or from points already decided. By deriving your objection from the same source, I mean that, supposing the enthymem were respecting love, " that it was a good feeling;" there would be a twofold ⁶¹³ jection ; tor it [might be started] asserting generally that " every want is bad:" or particularly, that " the proverbial expression Caunian loves2, would not have ⁶¹⁴ arisen had there not been some wicked loves. Again, an objection is alleged on the ground of a contrary fact; as, if the enthymem was this, " The good man benefits all his friends,, rand the obiection.l " But ⁶¹⁵ the bad man does not hurt all his." And on the ground of similar cases3; if the argument be, " Those who have been treated ill always hate;" [the objection,] that " those who have been treated well do not ⁶¹⁶ always love4." And again, the decisions of men of celebrity: thus, suppose one brought forward the argument, that "we ought to have some feeling for those who are intoxicated, because they err ignorantly5:" this objection [may be started], that "Pittacus ⁶¹⁷⁶¹⁸⁶¹⁹⁶²⁰⁶²¹ is not therefore entitled to praise, otherwise he would not in his enactments have imposed higher fines, in case the party committed the error while intoxicated."

But as all reasonings [of the orator] are derived ⁶²² from four sources, and these four are probability, example, proof positive ( τεκμήριον), and signs; and as the reasonings drawn from what is usual, or appears to be so, are drawn from probabilities, while those drawn by inference from similarity of circumstances, whether in one or more instances, (when the speaker embracing what is general, then infers particulars,) exist by virtue of example; while those again which are inferred from what is necessary and fact, are founded on proof positive; and lastly, as those drawn from what does or does not hold good, whether universally or particularly, result from signs, [it being remembered] that probability is not what always, but what usually occurs;it is plain that it is, in, every case, possible to get rid of reasonings such as these by starting an objection. The solution is, how- ⁶²³ ever, [sometimes] apparent, and not always real; for the objector does not do it away on the ground of its not being probable, but on that of its not being necessary6. Wherefore it always happens, that the defendant has the advantage of the accuser, by means of this piece of sophistry. For as the accuser constructs his proof by means of probabilities (the task of getting rid of the positive certainty being by no means the same [in point of difficulty], as that of getting rid of the probability of the charge); and as that which is merely probable, is invariably open to an objection ; (for it otherwise would not be a probability, but invariable and necessary;) and if this method of solution have been adopted, the judge supposes either that it does not amount to a probability, or at least that he ought not to decide, having been imposed upon in the way mentioned above; ⁶²⁴ because [in fact] he is not bound to pronounce on positive proofs alone, but also on probabilities, which is the spirit of the oath, " that he will decide to the best of his judgment; " wherefore that will not be a satisfactory objection which rests merely on the absence of proof positive, but it is further incumbent on the objector to get rid of the probability; this, however, will be the case, if the objection be proba- ⁶²⁵ ble in a higher degree; (and it may be so in two ways, either on the score of time, or of the nature of the case; and pre-eminently so, if in both these particulars ;) for if in the majority of instances it be as you state, then it is a greater probability.

⁶²⁶ Signs also, and the reasonings deduced from them, may be got rid of, even if they be facts, as was stated in the first Book; for it is clear to us from the Analytics that every sign is illogical.

⁶²⁷ The same method of solution applies to reasonings grounded on example as to those on probabilities; for if we have a single instance in contravention, it has been answered7, [sufficiently to show] that it is not necessary; or that in the majority of instances, and those of more frequent occurrence, the case is otherwise. If, however, it be the case more frequently, and in the majority of instances, we must contend that the present is not the case in point, or that its application is not in point, or that it has some difference at all events.

⁶²⁸ But proofs positive ( τεκμήρια), and the reasonings grounded on them, we shall not be able to get rid of, at least not on the plea of inconclusiveness; this is clear to us from the Analytics : it remains for us to show that what is asserted is not the case8; if, however, it be clear both that it is true as a matter of fact, and that it is a proof positive of the point, from that moment it becomes irrefragable; for thenceforth it is plain from demonstration. ⁶²⁹⁶³⁰

⁶³¹

Of Amplification and Extenuation.

AMPLIFICATION and extenuation are not elements of ⁶³² enthymems, (by topic and element I mean the same thing,) since the element and the topic is that under which many enthymems fall; whereas amplification and extenuation are [themselves] enthymems for showing that a thing is great or little, like those for showing that it is good or bad. lost or unjust. or falls under either of the other denominations. And ⁶³³ these are all the questions about which syllogisms and enthymems are conversant; so that unless each of these be a topic of an enthymem, amplification and extenuation are not.

Neither, again, are the topics which are available ⁶³⁴ to solution of enthymems, at all different in species from those employed in their construction: for it is evident that he effects solution who either proves [something contrary], or states an objection, and they establish a counter proof of the contrary ; thus, " If one has argued that a fact has taken place, the other argues that it has not or " if one argues that it has not, the other insists that it has." So that this will not amount to a difference ; for both employ the same vehicles of proof, inasmuch as they each allege enthymems to show that it is, or is not the case.

But the objection is not an enthymem, but is, as ⁶³⁵ was stated in the Topics, the stating some opinion from which it will appear that no legitimate inference has been arrived at, or that [the opponent] has assumed some false proposition.

Thus much, then, on the subject of examples, and ⁶³⁶ maxims, and enthymems1, and, in a word, all the ⁶³⁷ means of persuasion which address themselves to the understanding, both the sources whence we may furnish ourselves plentifully with them, and the means by which we may effect their solution2. It remains for us to go over the subject of style and arrangement3. ⁶³⁸⁶³⁹⁶⁴⁰

Rhetoric. Aristotle. Theodore Alois Buckley (Translator). London. 1857.

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Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric (Theodore Alois Buckley) (OCR draft) (English) (Theodore Alois Buckley's English translation, first published in 1850 and represented from the Henry G. Bohn 1857 printing; corrected against a second OCR of the same printing.)

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Editions (1)

Ῥητορική Perseus (Aristotle. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1959 (printing).) — 2.1 focus

[1] 16 ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, ταῦτʼ ἐστίν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, 20 ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων.

[2] ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕνεκα κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλὰς κρίνουσι καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὑτὸν ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν·

[3] πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει 25 πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἶτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαις, τό τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὑτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν πως διακεῖσθαι αὐτόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως τυγχάνωσιν.

[4] τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς 30 συμβουλάς ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαί πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὐδʼ ὀργιζομένοις καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν, 1378a 1 ἀλλʼ ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἕτερα· τῷ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦντι περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν ἢ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι τοὐναντίον· καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, ἐὰν ᾖ τὸ ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται, τῷ 5 δʼ ἀπαθεῖ ἢ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τοὐναντίον.

[5] τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αἴτια· τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι διʼ ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια· διαψεύδονται γὰρ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἢ συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ διʼ 10 ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἢ διὰ τούτων τι·

[6] ἢ γὰρ διʼ ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσιν, ἢ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν, ἢ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν ἀλλʼ οὐκ εὖνοι, διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα 15 ταῦτʼ ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις πιστόν.

[7] ὅθεν μὲν οὖν φρόνιμοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανεῖεν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διῃρημένων ληπτέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κἂν ἕτερόν τις κἂν ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον· περὶ δʼ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον.

[8] 20 ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη διʼ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία.

[9] δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία, λέγω δʼ οἷον περὶ ὀργῆς πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἓν ἢ τὰ 25 δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἅπαντα δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη τὴν ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τούτων ποιήσωμεν καὶ διέλωμεν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον.

[1] 30 ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ τι τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος.

[2] εἰ δὴ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι ἀεὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστόν τινι, οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, 1378b 1 καὶ ὅτι αὑτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τί πεποίηκεν ἢ ἤμελλεν, καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονήν, τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὑτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὑτῷ. διὸ 5 καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ·

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο

ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται·

Hom. Il. 18.109-110 ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἡδονή τις διά τε τοῦτο καὶ διότι διατρίβουσιν ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ· ἡ οὖν τότε γινομένη 10 φαντασία ἡδονὴν ἐμποιεῖ, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἐνυπνίων.

[3] ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τἀγαθὰ ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα πρὸς αὐτά· ὅσα δὲ μηδέν τι ἢ μικρόν, οὐδενὸς ἄξια ὑπολαμβάνομεν), τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη ὀλιγωρίας, 15 καταφρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπηρεασμὸς καὶ ὕβρις·

[4] ὅ τε γὰρ καταφρονῶν ὀλιγωρεῖ (ὅσα γὰρ οἴονται μηδενὸς ἄξια, τούτων καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ μηδενὸς ἀξίων ὀλιγωροῦσιν), καὶ ὁ ἐπηρεάζων φαίνεται ὀλιγωρεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμὸς ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς βουλήσεσιν μὴ ἵνα τι αὑτῷ ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὴ ἐκείνῳ· ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἵνα αὑτῷ τι, ὀλιγωρεῖ· 20 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε βλάψειν ὑπολαμβάνει, ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ οὐκ ὠλιγώρει, οὔτʼ ὠφελῆσαι ἂν οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου, ἐφρόντιζε γὰρ ἂν ὥστε φίλος εἶναι·

[5] καὶ ὁ ὑβρίζων δὲ ὀλιγωρεῖ· ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφʼ οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ 25 ἵνα τι γίγνηται αὑτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅ τι ἐγένετο, ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἡσθῇ· οἱ γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται.

[6] αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῖς ὑβρίζουσιν, ὅτι οἴονται κακῶς δρῶντες αὐτοὶ ὑπερέχειν μᾶλλον (διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι ὑβρισταί· ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὑβρίζοντες)· ὕβρεως δὲ ἀτιμία, ὁ δʼ 30 ἀτιμάζων ὀλιγωρεῖ· τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμήν, οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ· διὸ λέγει ὀργιζόμενος ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς

ἠτίμησεν· ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς

Hom. Il. 1.356 καὶ

ὡς εἴ τινʼ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην,

Hom. Il. 9.648

[7] 35 ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ὀργιζόμενος. προσήκειν δὲ οἴονται πολυωρεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡττόνων κατὰ γένος, κατὰ δύναμιν, κατʼ ἀρετήν, 1379a 1 καὶ ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς ὑπερέχῃ πολύ, οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ πλούσιος πένητος καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ῥητορικὸς ἀδυνάτου εἰπεῖν καὶ ἄρχων ἀρχομένου καὶ ἄρχειν ἄξιος οἰόμενος τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι ἀξίου· διὸ εἴρηται 5

θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλήων

Hom. Il. 2.196 καὶ

ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον·

Hom. Il. 1.82 ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν.

[8] ἔτι ὑφʼ ὧν τις οἴεται εὖ πάσχειν δεῖν· οὗτοι δʼ εἰσὶν οὓς εὖ πεποίηκεν ἢ ποιεῖ, αὐτὸς ἢ διʼ αὐτόν τις ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τις, ἢ βούλεται ἢ ἐβουλήθη.

[9] 10 φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἤδη πῶς τε ἔχοντες ὀργίζονται αὐτοὶ καὶ τίσιν καὶ διὰ ποῖα. αὐτοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὅταν λυπῶνται· ἐφίεται γάρ τινος ὁ λυπούμενος· ἐάν τε οὖν κατʼ εὐθυωρίαν ὁτιοῦν ἀντικρούσῃ τις, οἷον τῷ διψῶντι πρὸς τὸ πιεῖν, ἐάν τε μή, ὁμοίως ταὐτὸ φαίνεται ποιεῖν· καὶ ἐάν τε ἀντιπράττῃ 15 τις ἐάν τε μὴ συμπράττῃ ἐάν τε ἄλλο τι ἐνοχλῇ οὕτως ἔχοντα, πᾶσιν ὀργίζεται·

[10] διὸ κάμνοντες, πενόμενοι, πολεμοῦντες, ἐρῶντες, διψῶντες, ὅλως ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ μὴ κατορθοῦντες ὀργίλοι εἰσὶ καὶ εὐπαρόρμητοι, μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς τοὺς τοῦ παρόντος ὀλιγωροῦντας, οἷον κάμνων μὲν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν νόσον, πενόμενος δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πενίαν, πολεμῶν δὲ τοῖς 20 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἐρῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο ὀλιγωρῇ τις· προοδοποιεῖται γὰρ ἕκαστος πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου ὀργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος πάθους· ἔτι δʼ ἐὰν τἀναντία τύχῃ προσδεχόμενος·

[11] 25 λυπεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τέρπει τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ἐὰν γένηται ὃ βούλεται· διὸ καὶ ὧραι καὶ χρόνοι καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ ἡλικίαι ἐκ τούτων φανεραί, ποῖαι εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε, καὶ ὅτε μᾶλλον ἐν τούτοις εἰσί, μᾶλλον καὶ εὐκίνητοι.

[12] 30 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργήν, ὀργίζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ χλευάζουσιν καὶ σκώπτουσιν (ὑβρίζουσι γάρ), καὶ τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα βλάπτουσιν ὅσα ὕβρεως σημεῖα· ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἃ μήτε ἀντί τινος μήτʼ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ποιοῦσιν· ἤδη γὰρ δοκεῖ διʼ ὕβριν.

[13] καὶ 35 τοῖς κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ καταφρονοῦσι περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ μάλιστα σπουδάζουσιν, οἷον οἱ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐάν τις εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐάν τις εἰς τὴν ἰδέαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων·

[14] ταῦτα δὲ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν ὑποπτεύσωσι μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὑτοῖς, ἢ ὅλως ἢ μὴ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ μὴ δοκεῖν· 1379b 1 ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴωνται ὑπερέχειν ἐν τούτοις ἐν οἷς σκώπτονται, οὐ φροντίζουσιν.

[15] καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις· οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἢ μή.

[16] καὶ τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τιμᾶν ἢ 5 φροντίζειν, ἐὰν πάλιν μὴ οὕτως ὁμιλῶσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τούτων οἴονται καταφρονεῖσθαι· ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιεῖν.

[17] καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀντιποιοῦσιν εὖ μηδὲ τὴν ἴσην ἀνταποδιδοῦσιν. καὶ τοῖς τἀναντία ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν ἥττους ὦσιν. καταφρονεῖν γὰρ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι φαίνονται, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἡττόνων οἱ 10 δʼ ὡς παρὰ ἡττόνων.

[18] καὶ τοῖς ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ οὖσιν, ἄν τι ὀλιγωρῶσι, μᾶλλον· ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ τῆς ὀλιγωρίας πρὸς τοὺς μὴ προσήκοντας, προσήκει δὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι μὴ ὀλιγωρεῖν·

[19] τοῖς δὲ φίλοις, ἐάν τε μὴ εὖ λέγωσιν ἢ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐὰν τἀναντία, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθάνωνται δεομένων, 15 ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀντιφῶντος Πλήξιππος τῷ Μελεάγρῳ· ὀλιγωρίας γὰρ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι σημεῖον· ὧν γὰρ φροντίζομεν οὐ λανθάνει.

[20] καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχαίρουσι ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καὶ ὅλως εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀτυχίαις· ἢ γὰρ ἐχθροῦ ἢ ὀλιγωροῦντος σημεῖον. καὶ τοῖς μὴ φροντίζουσιν ἐὰν λυπήσωσιν· 20 διὸ καὶ τοῖς κακὰ ἀγγέλλουσιν ὀργίζονται.

[21] καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἀκούουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ἢ θεωμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν φαῦλα· ὅμοιοι γάρ εἰσιν ἢ ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἢ ἐχθροῖς·

[22] οἱ γὰρ φίλοι συναλγοῦσιν, θεώμενοι δὲ τὰ οἰκεῖα φαῦλα πάντες ἀλγοῦσιν. ἔτι τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσι πρὸς πέντε, πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, πρὸς οὓς θαυμάζουσιν, ὑφʼ 25 ὧν βούλονται θαυμάζεσθαι, ἢ οὓς αἰσχύνονται, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς· ἄν τις ἐν τούτοις ὀλιγωρῇ, ὀργίζονται μᾶλλον.

[23] καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀλιγωροῦσιν ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτοῖς αἰσχρὸν μὴ βοηθεῖν, οἷον γονεῖς, τέκνα, γυναῖκας, ἀρχομένους. καὶ τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδοῦσιν· παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον γὰρ ἡ 30 ὀλιγωρία.

[24] καὶ τοῖς εἰρωνευομένοις πρὸς σπουδάζοντας·

[25] καταφρονητικὸν γὰρ ἡ εἰρωνεία. καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων εὐποιητικοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο καταφρονητικόν, τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν, ὧν πάντας, καὶ αὐτόν.

[26] ποιητικὸν δʼ ὀργῆς καὶ ἡ λήθη, οἷον καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων, οὕτως οὖσα περὶ μικρόν· 35 ὀλιγωρίας γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ λήθη σημεῖον εἶναι· διʼ ἀμέλειαν μὲν γὰρ ἡ λήθη γίγνεται, ἡ δʼ ἀμέλεια ὀλιγωρία τίς ἐστιν.

[27] 1380a 1 οἷς μὲν οὖν ὀργίζονται καὶ ὡς ἔχοντες καὶ διὰ ποῖα, ἅμα εἴρηται· δῆλον δʼ ὅτι δέοι ἂν κατασκευάζειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιούτους οἷοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τούτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφʼ οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἵοις 5 ὀργίζονται.

[1] ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαιἐναντίον τῷ πραΰνεσθαι καὶ ὀργὴ πραότητι, ληπτέον πῶς ἔχοντες πρᾶοί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς τίνας πράως ἔχουσι καὶ διὰ τίνων πραΰνονται.

[2] ἔστω δὴ πράϋνσις κατάστασις καὶ ἠρέμησις ὀργῆς.

[3] εἰ οὖν ὀργίζονται 10 τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσιν, ὀλιγωρία δʼ ἑκούσιον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν τούτων ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀκουσίως ποιοῦσιν ἢ φαινομένοις τοιούτοις πρᾶοί εἰσιν.

[4] καὶ τοῖς τἀναντία ὧν ἐποίησαν βουλομένοις. καὶ ὅσοι καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς αὑτοὺς τοιοῦτοι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ δοκεῖ ὀλιγωρεῖν.

[5] καὶ τοῖς ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ μεταμελομένοις· 15 ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες δίκην τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πεποιημένοις παύονται τῆς ὀργῆς· σημεῖον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν κολάσεως· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας καὶ ἀρνουμένους μᾶλλον κολάζομεν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας δικαίως κολάζεσθαι παυόμεθα θυμούμενοι· αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ἀναισχυντία τὸ τὰ φανερὰ ἀρνεῖσθαι, ἡ δʼ ἀναισχυντία 20 ὀλιγωρία καὶ καταφρόνησις·

[6] ὧν γοῦν πολὺ καταφρονοῦμεν, οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα. καὶ τοῖς ταπεινουμένοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ἀντιλέγουσιν· φαίνονται γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν ἥττους εἶναι, οἱ δʼ ἥττους φοβοῦνται, φοβούμενος δὲ οὐδεὶς ὀλιγωρεῖ· ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ταπεινουμένους 25 παύεται ἡ ὀργή, καὶ οἱ κύνες δηλοῦσιν οὐ δάκνοντες τοὺς καθίζοντας.

[7] καὶ τοῖς σπουδάζουσι πρὸς τοὺς σπουδάζοντας· δοκεῖ γὰρ σπουδάζεσθαι ἀλλʼ οὐ καταφρονεῖσθαι.

[8] καὶ τοῖς μείζω κεχαρισμένοις. καὶ τοῖς δεομένοις καὶ παραιτουμένοις· ταπεινότεροι γάρ.

[9] καὶ τοῖς μὴ ὑβρισταῖς μηδὲ χλευασταῖς 30 μηδʼ ὀλιγώροις εἰς μηδένα ἢ μὴ εἰς χρηστοὺς μηδʼ εἰς τοιούτους οἷοί περ αὐτοί·

[10] ὅλως δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ πραΰνοντα. καὶ οὓς φοβοῦνται ἢ αἰσχύνονται, ἕως ἂν οὕτως ἔχωσιν, οὐκ ὀργίζονται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἅμα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι.

[11] καὶ τοῖς διʼ ὀργὴν ποιήσασιν ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται 35 ἢ ἧττον ὀργίζονται· οὐ γὰρ διʼ ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πρᾶξαι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος ὀλιγωρεῖ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀλιγωρία ἄλυπον, 1380b 1 ἡ δʼ ὀργὴ μετὰ λύπης.

[12] καὶ τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς.

καὶ ἔχοντες δὲ ἐναντίως τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι πρᾶοί εἰσιν, οἷον ἐν παιδιᾷ, ἐν γέλωτι, ἐν ἑορτῇ, ἐν εὐημερίᾳ, ἐν κατορθώσει, ἐν πληρώσει, ὅλως ἐν ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ ἡδονῇ μὴ 5 ὑβριστικῇ καὶ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικεῖ. ἔτι κεχρονικότες καὶ μὴ ὑπόγυιοι τῇ ὀργῇ ὄντες· παύει γὰρ ὀργὴν ὁ χρόνος·

[13] παύει δὲ καὶ ἑτέρου ὀργὴν μείζω ἡ παρʼ ἄλλου ληφθεῖσα τιμωρία πρότερον· διὸ εὖ Φιλοκράτης, εἰπόντος τινός, ὀργιζομένου τοῦ δήμου, τί οὐκ ἀπολογεῖ;, οὔπω γε, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ πότε; 10 ὅταν ἴδω ἄλλον διαβεβλημένον· πρᾶοι γὰρ γίγνονται ὅταν εἰς ἄλλον τὴν ὀργὴν ἀναλώσωσιν, ὃ συνέβη ἐπὶ Ἐργοφίλου· μᾶλλον γὰρ χαλεπαίνοντες ἢ Καλλισθένει ἀφεῖσαν διὰ τὸ Καλλισθένους τῇ προτεραίᾳ καταγνῶναι θάνατον.

[14] καὶ ἐὰν ἕλωσιν. καὶ ἐὰν μεῖζον κακὸν πεπονθότες ὦσιν ἢ ὃ ὀργιζόμενοι 15 ἂν ἔδρασαν· ὥσπερ εἰληφέναι γὰρ οἴονται τιμωρίαν.

[15] καὶ ἐὰν ἀδικεῖν οἴωνται αὐτοὶ καὶ δικαίως πάσχειν, οὐ γίγνεται ἡ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον νομίζουσι πάσχειν, ἡ δʼ ὀργὴ τοῦτο ἦν· διὸ δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ προκολάζειν· ἀγανακτοῦσιν γὰρ ἧττον κολαζόμενοι καὶ 20 οἱ δοῦλοι.

[16] καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθήσεσθαι οἴωνται ὅτι διʼ αὑτοὺς καὶ ἀνθʼ ὧν ἔπαθον· ἡ γὰρ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸν καθʼ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν· δῆλον δʼ ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ· διὸ ὀρθῶς πεποίηται

φάσθαι Ὀδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον,

Hom. Od. 9.504 ὡς οὐ τετιμωρημένος εἰ μὴ ᾔσθετο καὶ ὑφʼ ὅτου καὶ ἀνθʼ 25 ὅτου· ὥστε οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι μὴ αἰσθάνονται ὀργίζονται, οὔτε τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ἔτι, ὡς πεπονθόσι τε τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ οὐκ ἀλγήσουσιν οὐδʼ αἰσθησομένοις, οὗ οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφίενται· διὸ εὖ περὶ τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὁ ποιητής, παῦσαι βουλόμενος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τῆς ὀργῆς τεθνεῶτος, 30

κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων.

Hom. Il. 24.54

[17] δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τοῖς καταπραΰνειν βουλομένοις ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων λεκτέον, αὑτοὺς μὲν παρασκευάζουσι τοιούτους, οἷς δʼ ὀργίζονται ἢ φοβεροὺς ἢ αἰσχύνης ἀξίους ἢ κεχαρισμένους ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ ὑπεραλγοῦντας τοῖς πεποιημένοις.

[1] 35 τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τί, τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ὁρισάμενοι λέγωμεν.

[2] ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ, 1381a 1 καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. φίλος δέ ἐστιν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος· οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

[3] τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φίλον εἶναι τὸν συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα τοῖς 5 λυπηροῖς μὴ διά τι ἕτερον ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐκεῖνον· γιγνομένων γὰρ ὧν βούλονται χαίρουσιν πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως σημεῖον αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί.

[4] καὶ οἷς δὴ ταὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς φίλοι καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροί· ταὐτὰ γὰρ τούτοις βούλεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ὥστε 10 ἅπερ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βουλόμενος τούτῳ φαίνεται φίλος εἶναι.

[5] καὶ τοὺς πεποιηκότας εὖ φιλοῦσιν, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κήδονται, ἢ εἰ μεγάλα, ἢ εἰ προθύμως, ἢ εἰ ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ἢ οὓς ἂν οἴωνται βούλεσθαι ποιεῖν εὖ.

[6] καὶ τοὺς τῶν φίλων φίλους καὶ φιλοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ φιλοῦσιν. καὶ τοὺς 15 φιλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν φιλουμένων αὐτοῖς.

[7] καὶ τοὺς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροὺς καὶ μισοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ μισοῦσιν, καὶ τοὺς μισουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῖς μισουμένων· πᾶσιν γὰρ τούτοις τὰ αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεται εἶναι καὶ αὐτοῖς, ὥστε βούλεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά, ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ φίλου.

[8] ἔτι τοὺς εὐποιητικοὺς εἰς 20 χρήματα καὶ εἰς σωτηρίαν· διὸ τοὺς ἐλευθερίους καὶ ἀνδρείους τιμῶσι καὶ τοὺς δικαίους·

[9] τοιούτους δʼ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοὺς μὴ ἀφʼ ἑτέρων ζῶντας· τοιοῦτοι δʼ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα.

[10] καὶ τοὺς σώφρονας, ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοι.

[11] καὶ τοὺς ἀπράγμονας 25 διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ οἷς βουλόμεθα φίλοι εἶναι, ἂν φαίνωνται βουλόμενοι· εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἵ τʼ ἀγαθοὶ κατʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱ εὐδόκιμοι ἢ ἐν ἅπασιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς βελτίστοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυμαζομένοις ὑφʼ αὑτῶν ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυμάζουσιν αὐτούς.

[12] ἔτι τοὺς ἡδεῖς συνδιαγαγεῖν καὶ συνδιημερεῦσαι· τοιοῦτοι δʼ 30 οἱ εὔκολοι καὶ μὴ ἐλεγκτικοὶ τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων καὶ μὴ φιλόνικοι μηδὲ δυσέριδες (πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μαχητικοί, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι τἀναντία φαίνονται βούλεσθαι),

[13] καὶ οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ τῷ τωθάσαι καὶ τῷ ὑπομεῖναι· ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως σπεύδουσι τῷ πλησίον, δυνάμενοί τε σκώπτεσθαι 35 καὶ ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες.

[14] καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἀγαθά, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἃ φοβοῦνται μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς.

[15] 1381b 1 καὶ τοὺς καθαρείους περὶ ὄψιν, περὶ ἀμπεχόνην, περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.

[16] καὶ τοὺς μὴ ὀνειδιστὰς μήτε τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων μήτε τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐλεγκτικοί.

[17] καὶ τοὺς μὴ μνησικακοῦντας, μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν 5 ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλʼ εὐκαταλλάκτους· οἵους γὰρ ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς αὑτοὺς οἴονται.

[18] καὶ τοὺς μὴ κακολόγους μηδὲ εἰδότας μήτε τὰ τῶν πλησίον κακὰ μήτε τὰ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀγαθά·

[19] ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ταῦτα δρᾷ. καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀντιτείνοντας τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις ἢ σπουδάζουσιν· 10 μαχητικοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς σπουδαίως πως ἔχοντας, οἷον θαυμάζοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ σπουδαίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς,

[20] καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα πεπονθότας περὶ ἃ μάλιστα βούλονται αὐτοὶ ἢ θαυμάζεσθαι ἢ σπουδαῖοι δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ἡδεῖς.

[21] καὶ τοὺς 15 ὁμοίους καὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντας, ἐὰν μὴ παρενοχλῶσι μηδʼ ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ ᾖ ὁ βίος· γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ

κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ.

Hes. WD 25

[22] καὶ τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντας, ὧν ἐνδέχεται ἅμα μετέχειν αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὸ καὶ οὕτω συμβαίνει.

[23] καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὥστε μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὰ πρὸς 20 δόξαν, μὴ καταφρονοῦντες.

[24] καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνονται τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἢ ὑφʼ ὧν ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἢ φιλοῦσιν ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι.

[25] καὶ οἷς ἂν τἀγαθὰ συμπράττωσιν, ἐὰν μὴ μέλλῃ αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι μείζω κακά.

[26] καὶ οἳ ὁμοίως 25 καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας καὶ τοὺς παρόντας φιλοῦσιν· διὸ καὶ τοὺς περὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας τοιούτους πάντες φιλοῦσιν. καὶ ὅλως τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοῦσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοὺς φιλεῖν ἀγαθούς.

[27] καὶ τοὺς μὴ πλαττομένους πρὸς αὐτούς· τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα τὰ 30 ἑαυτῶν λέγοντες· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τὰ πρὸς δόξαν οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα· εἰ οὖν ὁ αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, ὁ μὴ αἰσχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι ἔοικεν. καὶ τοὺς μὴ φοβερούς, καὶ οὓς θαρροῦμεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ.

[28] εἴδη δὲ φιλίας ἑταιρεία οἰκειότης συγγένεια καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. 35 ποιητικὰ δὲ φιλίας χάρις

[29] καὶ τὸ μὴ δεηθέντος ποιῆσαι καὶ τὸ ποιήσαντα μὴ δηλῶσαι· αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὕτως ἕνεκα φαίνεται καὶ οὐ διά τι ἕτερον.

[30] 1382a 1 περὶ δʼ ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ μισεῖν φανερὸν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔστι θεωρεῖν. ποιητικὰ δὲ ἔχθρας ὀργή, ἐπηρεασμός, διαβολή.

[31] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν· ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, 5 μισοῦμεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰατὸν χρόνῳ, τὸ δʼ ἀνίατον. καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ· αἴσθεσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, τῷ δʼ οὐδὲν διαφέρει. 10 ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ παρουσία τῆς κακίας. καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δʼ οὐ μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὔ. καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἂν γενομένων ἐλεήσειεν, ὁ δʼ οὐδενός· ὁ μὲν 15 γὰρ ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται ᾧ ὀργίζεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἶναι.

[32] φανερὸν οὖν ἐν τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας διαλύειν, καὶ διʼ ὀργὴν ἢ διʼ ἔχθραν ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἐφʼ ὁποτέραν ἂν προαιρῆταί τις ἄγειν.

[1] 20 ποῖα δὲ φοβοῦνται καὶ τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ὧδʼ ἔσται φανερόν. ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλʼ ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτα ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω 25 ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

[2] εἰ δὴ ὁ φόβος τοῦτʼ ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φθείρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην 30 συντεινούσας· διὸ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν τοιούτων φοβερά· ἐγγὺς γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ φοβερόν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ πλησιασμός.

[3] τοιαῦτα δὲ ἔχθρα τε καὶ ὀργὴ δυναμένων ποιεῖν τι (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι βούλονται τε καὶ δύνανται, ὥστε ἐγγύς εἰσιν 35 τοῦ ποιεῖν),

[4] καὶ ἀδικία δύναμιν ἔχουσα· τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι γὰρ ὁ ἄδικος ἄδικος.

[5] 1382b 1 καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑβριζομένη δύναμιν ἔχουσα (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι προαιρεῖται μὲν ὅταν ὑβρίζηται, ἀεί, δύναται δὲ νῦν),

[6] καὶ φόβος τῶν δυναμένων τι ποιῆσαι· ἐν παρασκευῇ γὰρ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον·

[7] ἐπεὶ δʼ οἱ πολλοὶ χείρους καὶ ἥττους τοῦ 5 κερδαίνειν καὶ δειλοὶ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, φοβερὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥστε οἱ συνειδότες πεποιηκότι τι δεινὸν φοβεροὶ ἢ κατειπεῖν ἢ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν.

[8] καὶ οἱ δυνάμενοι ἀδικεῖν τοῖς δυναμένοις ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὅταν δύνωνται. καὶ οἱ ἠδικημένοι ἢ 10 νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἀεὶ γὰρ τηροῦσι καιρόν. καὶ οἱ ἠδικηκότες, ἂν δύναμιν ἔχωσι, φοβεροί, δεδιότες τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν·

[9] ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο φοβερόν. καὶ οἱ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνταγωνισταί, ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ὑπάρχειν ἀμφοῖν· ἀεὶ γὰρ πολεμοῦσι πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους.

[10] καὶ οἱ τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν 15 φοβεροί· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δύναιντο βλάπτειν αὐτούς, εἰ καὶ τοὺς κρείττους. καὶ οὓς φοβοῦνται οἱ κρείττους αὐτῶν, διὰ ταὐτό.

[11] καὶ οἱ τοὺς κρείττους αὐτῶν ἀνῃρηκότες, καὶ οἱ τοῖς ἥττοσιν αὐτῶν ἐπιτιθέμενοι· ἢ γὰρ ἤδη φοβεροὶ ἢ αὐξηθέντες. καὶ τῶν ἠδικημένων καὶ ἐχθρῶν ἢ ἀντιπάλων οὐχ οἱ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ 20 παρρησιαστικοί, ἀλλὰ οἱ πρᾶοι καὶ εἴρωνες καὶ πανοῦργοι· ἄδηλοι γὰρ εἰ ἐγγύς, ὥστε οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω.

[12] πάντα δὲ τὰ φοβερὰ φοβερώτερα ὅσα ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἐπανορθώσασθαι μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλʼ ἢ ὅλως ἀδύνατα, ἢ μὴ ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. καὶ ὧν βοήθειαι μή εἰσιν ἢ μὴ ῥᾴδιαι. ὡς δʼ 25 ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐφʼ ἑτέρων γιγνόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ καὶ ἃ φοβοῦνται σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ μέγιστα ταῦτʼ ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ διακείμενοι αὐτοὶ φοβοῦνται, νῦν λέγωμεν.

[13] εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ φόβος μετὰ προσδοκίας τινὸς τοῦ πείσεσθαί 30 τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται τῶν οἰομένων μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἃ μὴ οἴονται ἂν παθεῖν οὐδὲ τούτους ὑφʼ ὧν μὴ οἴονται, οὐδὲ τότε ὅτε μὴ οἴονται. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἄν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε.

[14] οὐκ οἴονται δὲ παθεῖν ἂν οὔτε οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μεγάλαις ὄντες καὶ δοκοῦντες 1383a 1 (διὸ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ὀλίγωροι καὶ θρασεῖς, ποιεῖ δὲ τοιούτους πλοῦτος ἰσχὺς πολυφιλία δύναμις), οὔτε οἱ ἤδη πεπονθέναι πάντα νομίζοντες τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀπεψυγμένοι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ὥσπερ 5 οἱ ἀποτυμπανιζόμενοι ἤδη· ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινα ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγωνιῶσιν. σημεῖον δέ· ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ, καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων·

[15] ὥστε δεῖ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν ᾖ βέλτιον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἷον παθεῖν (καὶ γὰρ 10 ἄλλοι μείζους ἔπαθον), καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους δεικνύναι πάσχοντας ἢ πεπονθότας, καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφʼ ὧν οὐκ ᾤοντο, καὶ ταῦτα ἃ καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ ᾤοντο.

[16] ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φόβου φανερὸν τί ἐστιν, καὶ τῶν φοβερῶν, καὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔχοντες δεδίασι, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων καὶ τὸ 15 θαρρεῖν τί ἐστι, καὶ περὶ ποῖα θαρραλέοι εἰσὶ καὶ πῶς διακείμενοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν· τό τε γὰρ θάρσος τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ φόβῳ, καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον τῷ φοβερῷ, ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἡ ἐλπὶς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων, τῶν δὲ φοβερῶν ὡς ἢ μὴ ὄντων ἢ πόρρω ὄντων.

[17] ἔστι δὲ θαρραλέα τά τε δεινὰ πόρρω 20 ὄντα καὶ τὰ σωτήρια ἐγγύς, καὶ ἐπανορθώσεις ἂν ὦσι καὶ βοήθειαι πολλαὶ ἢ μεγάλαι ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ μήτε ἠδικημένοι μήτε ἠδικηκότες ὦσιν, ἀνταγωνισταί τε ἢ μὴ ὦσιν ὅλως, ἢ μὴ ἔχωσιν δύναμιν, ἢ δύναμιν ἔχοντες ὦσι φίλοι ἢ πεποιηκότες εὖ ἢ πεπονθότες, ἢ ἂν πλείους ὦσιν οἷς ταὐτὰ συμφέρει, 25 ἢ κρείττους, ἢ ἄμφω.

[18] αὐτοὶ δʼ οὕτως ἔχοντες θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ἂν πολλὰ κατωρθωκέναι οἴωνται καὶ μὴ πεπονθέναι, ἢ ἐὰν πολλάκις ἐληλυθότες εἰς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ διαπεφευγότες ὦσι· διχῶς γὰρ ἀπαθεῖς γίγνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἢ τῷ μὴ πεπειρᾶσθαι ἢ τῷ βοηθείας ἔχειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ 30 θάλατταν κινδύνοις οἵ τε ἄπειροι χειμῶνος θαρροῦσι τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ οἱ βοηθείας ἔχοντες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

[19] καὶ ὅταν τοῖς ὁμοίοις φοβερὸν μὴ ᾖ, μηδὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι καὶ ὧν κρείττους οἴονται εἶναι·

[20] οἴονται δὲ ὧν κεκρατήκασιν ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν κρειττόνων ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων. καὶ ἂν ὑπάρχειν αὑτοῖς 35 οἴωνται πλείω καὶ μείζω, οἷς ὑπερέχοντες φοβεροί εἰσιν· 1383b 1 ταῦτα δέ ἐστι πλῆθος χρημάτων καὶ ἰσχὺς σωμάτων καὶ φίλων καὶ χώρας καὶ τῶν πρὸς πόλεμον παρασκευῶν, ἢ πασῶν ἢ τῶν μεγίστων. καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἠδικηκότες ὦσιν μηδένα ἢ μὴ πολλοὺς ἢ μὴ τούτους παρʼ ὧν φοβοῦνται,

[21] καὶ ὅλως ἂν τὰ πρὸς 5 τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτοῖς καλῶς ἔχῃ, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ σημείων καὶ λογίων· θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὀργή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἀλλʼ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὀργῆς ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπολαμβάνεται βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις.

[22] καὶ ὅταν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἢ μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν μηδὲ πείσεσθαι ἢ κατορθώσειν οἴωνται. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν 10 φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται.

[1] ποῖα δʼ αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, καὶ πρὸς τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.

[2] ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, ἡ δʼ ἀναισχυντία 15 ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

[3] εἰ δή ἐστιν αἰσχύνη ἡ ὁρισθεῖσα, ἀνάγκη αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ὧν φροντίζει· τοιαῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὅσα ἀπὸ κακίας ἔργα ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν ἀσπίδα ἢ φυγεῖν· ἀπὸ δειλίας γάρ. καὶ τὸ 20 ἀποστερῆσαι παρακαταθήκην ἢ ἀδικῆσαι· ἀπὸ ἀδικίας γάρ.

[4] καὶ τὸ συγγενέσθαι αἷς οὐ δεῖ ἢ οὗ οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ· ἀπὸ ἀκολασίας γάρ.

[5] καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἢ αἰσχρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ ἀδυνάτων, οἷον πενήτων ἢ τεθνεώτων, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία τὸ ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φέρειν· ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας γὰρ καὶ 25 ἀνελευθερίας.

[6] καὶ τὸ μὴ βοηθεῖν, δυνάμενον, εἰς χρήματα, ἢ ἧττον βοηθεῖν. καὶ τὸ βοηθεῖσθαι παρὰ τῶν ἧττον εὐπόρων,

[7] καὶ δανείζεσθαι ὅτε δόξει αἰτεῖν, καὶ αἰτεῖν ὅτε ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν ὅτε αἰτεῖν, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἃ δόξει αἰτεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἀποτετυχηκότα μηδὲν ἧττον· πάντα γὰρ ἀνελευθερίας ταῦτα 30 σημεῖα,

[8] τὸ δʼ ἐπαινεῖν παρόντας κολακείας, καὶ τὸ τἀγαθὰ μὲν ὑπερεπαινεῖν τὰ δὲ φαῦλα συναλείφειν, καὶ τὸ ὑπεραλγεῖν ἀλγοῦντι παρόντα, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα τοιαῦτα· κολακείας γὰρ σημεῖα.

[9] καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπομένειν πόνους οὓς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι 1384a 1 ἢ τρυφῶντες ἢ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντες ἢ ὅλως οἱ ἀδυνατώτεροι· πάντα γὰρ μαλακίας σημεῖα.

[10] καὶ τὸ ὑφʼ ἑτέρου εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις, καὶ ὃ εὖ ἐποίησεν ὀνειδίζειν· μικροψυχίας γὰρ πάντα καὶ ταπεινότητος σημεῖα.

[11] καὶ τὸ 5 περὶ αὑτοῦ πάντα λέγειν καὶ ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τἀλλότρια αὑτοῦ φάσκειν· ἀλαζονείας γάρ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστης τῶν τοῦ ἤθους κακιῶν τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· αἰσχρὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀναίσχυντα.

[12] καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ τῶν καλῶν ὧν πάντες μετέχουσιν, ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, 10 μὴ μετέχειν—ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω ὁμοεθνεῖς, πολίτας, ἡλικιώτας, συγγενεῖς, ὅλως τοὺς ἐξ ἴσου—αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἤδη τὸ μὴ μετέχειν οἷον παιδεύσεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μᾶλλον, ἂν διʼ ἑαυτὸν φαίνηται· οὕτω γὰρ ἤδη ἀπὸ κακίας μᾶλλον, ἂν αὐτὸς ᾖ αἴτιος τῶν ὑπαρξάντων 15 ἢ ὑπαρχόντων ἢ μελλόντων.

[13] πάσχοντες δὲ ἢ πεπονθότες ἢ πεισόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσχύνονται ὅσα εἰς ἀτιμίαν φέρει καὶ ὀνείδη· ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ εἰς ὑπηρετήσεις ἢ σώματος ἢ ἔργων αἰσχρῶν, ὧν ἐστιν τὸ ὑβρίζεσθαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰς ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα, τὰ δʼ εἰς βίαν ἄκοντα· ἀπὸ 20 ἀνανδρίας γὰρ ἢ δειλίας ἡ ὑπομονὴ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι.

ἃ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνονται, ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα·

[14] ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης φροντίζει ἀλλʼ ἢ διὰ τοὺς δοξάζοντας, ἀνάγκη τούτους 25 αἰσχύνεσθαι ὧν λόγον ἔχει·

[15] λόγον δὲ ἔχει τῶν θαυμαζόντων, καὶ οὓς θαυμάζει, καὶ ὑφʼ ὧν βούλεται θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμεῖται, καὶ ὧν μὴ καταφρονεῖ τῆς δόξης·

[16] θαυμάζεσθαι μὲν οὖν βούλονται ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ θαυμάζουσι τούτους ὅσοι τι ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῶν τιμίων, ἢ παρʼ ὧν τυγχάνουσιν 30 δεόμενοι σφόδρα τινὸς ὧν ἐκεῖνοι κύριοι, οἷον οἱ ἐρῶντες·

[17] φιλοτιμοῦνται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους· φροντίζουσι δʼ ὡς ἀληθευόντων τῶν φρονίμων, τοιοῦτοι δʼ οἵ τε πρεσβύτεροι καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι.

[18] καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ μᾶλλον (ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ)· διὰ 35 τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, 1384b 1 διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα.

[19] καὶ τοὺς μὴ περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐνόχους· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τἀναντία δοκεῖ τούτοις. καὶ τοὺς μὴ συγγνωμονικοὺς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἁμαρτάνειν· ἃ γάρ τις αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα λέγεται τοῖς πέλας οὐ νεμεσᾶν, 5 ὥστε ἃ μὴ ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι νεμεσᾷ.

[20] καὶ τοὺς ἐξαγγελτικοὺς πολλοῖς· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει μὴ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐξαγγέλλειν· ἐξαγγελτικοὶ δὲ οἵ τε ἠδικημένοι, διὰ τὸ παρατηρεῖν, καὶ οἱ κακολόγοι· εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτάνοντας, ἔτι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας. καὶ οἷς ἡ διατριβὴ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πέλας 10 ἁμαρτίαις, οἷον χλευασταῖς καὶ κωμῳδοποιοῖς· κακολόγοι γάρ πως οὗτοι καὶ ἐξαγγελτικοί. καὶ ἐν οἷς μηδὲν ἀποτετυχήκασιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θαυμαζόμενοι διάκεινται· διὸ καὶ τοὺς πρῶτον δεηθέντας τι αἰσχύνονται ὡς οὐδέν πω ἠδοξηκότες ἐν αὐτοῖς· τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἄρτι βουλόμενοι φίλοι εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ 15 βέλτιστα τεθέανται· διὸ εὖ ἔχει ἡ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους), καὶ τῶν πάλαι γνωρίμων οἱ μηδὲν συνειδότες.

[21] αἰσχύνονται δὲ οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ τὰ ῥηθέντα αἰσχυντηλὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, οἷον οὐ μόνον ἀφροδισιάζοντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντες

[22] 20 τὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγοντες. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐ τοὺς εἰρημένους μόνον αἰσχύνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς δηλώσοντας αὐτοῖς, οἷον θεράποντας καὶ φίλους τούτων.

[23] ὅλως δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται οὔθʼ ὧν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἀληθεύειν (οὐδεὶς γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία αἰσχύνεται), οὔτε ταὐτὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους 25 καὶ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν δοκοῦντα τοὺς δʼ ἄπωθεν τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον.

[24] αὐτοὶ δὲ ὧδε διακείμενοι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἄν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ὑπάρχοιεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντες οὕτως τινὲς οἵους ἔφαμεν εἶναι οὓς αἰσχύνονται. ἦσαν δʼ οὗτοι ἢ οἱ θαυμαζόμενοι ἢ 30 θαυμάζοντες ἢ ὑφʼ ὧν βούλονται θαυμάζεσθαι, ἢ ὧν δέονταί τινα χρείαν ἧς μὴ τεύξονται ἄδοξοι ὄντες, καὶ οὗτοι ἢ ὁρῶντες (ὥσπερ Κυδίας περὶ τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας ἐδημηγόρησεν· ἠξίου γὰρ ὑπολαβεῖντοὺς Ἀθηναίους περιεστάναι κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὡς ὁρῶντας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους 35 ἃ ἂν ψηφίσωνται), ἢ ἂν πλησίον ὦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἢ μέλλωσιν αἰσθήσεσθαι· διὸ καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι ἀτυχοῦντες ὑπὸ τῶν ζηλούντων ποτὲ οὐ βούλονται· 1385a 1 θαυμασταὶ γὰρ οἱ ζηλωταί.

[25] καὶ ὅταν ἔχωσιν ἃ καταισχύνουσιν ἔργα καὶ πράγματα ἢ αὑτῶν ἢ προγόνων ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν πρὸς οὓς ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς ἀγχιστεία τις. καὶ ὅλως ὑπὲρ ὧν αἰσχύνονται αὐτοί· εἰσὶ δʼ οὗτοι οἱ εἰρημένοι 5 καὶ οἱ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀναφερόμενοι, ἢ ὧν διδάσκαλοι ἢ σύμβουλοι γεγόνασιν, ἢ ἐὰν ὦσιν ἕτεροι ὅμοιοι πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται·

[26] πολλὰ γὰρ αἰσχυνόμενοι διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν.

[27] καὶ μέλλοντες ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν φανερῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι τοῖς συνειδόσιν αἰσχυντηλοὶ 10 μᾶλλον εἰσίν· ὅθεν καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητής, μέλλων ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι ὑπὸ Διονυσίου, εἶπεν, ἰδὼν τοὺς συναποθνῄσκειν μέλλοντας ἐγκαλυπτομένους ὡς ᾔεσαν διὰ τῶν πυλῶν, τί ἐγκαλύπτεσθε; ἔφη· ἦ μὴ αὔριόν τις ὑμᾶς ἴδῃ τούτων;

περὶ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνης ταῦτα· περὶ δὲ ἀναισχυντίας δῆλον 15 ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐπορήσομεν.

[1] τίσιν δὲ χάριν ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, ὁρισαμένοις τὴν χάριν δῆλον ἔσται.

[2] ἔστω δὴ χάρις, καθʼ ἣν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ἔχειν, ὑπουργία τῷ δεομένῳ μὴ ἀντί τινος, μηδʼ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι ἀλλʼ ἵνα τι ἐκείνῳ· μεγάλη δὲ 20 ἂν ᾖ σφόδρα δεόμενος, ἢ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἢ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις, ἢ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα.

[3] δεήσεις δέ εἰσιν αἱ ὀρέξεις, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα αἱ μετὰ λύπης τοῦ μὴ γιγνομένου. τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, οἷον ἔρως, καὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κακώσεσιν καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ κινδυνεύων 25 ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ὁ λυπούμενος· διὸ οἱ ἐν πενίᾳ παριστάμενοι καὶ φυγαῖς, κἂν μικρὰ ὑπηρετήσωσιν, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δεήσεως καὶ τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένοι, οἷον ὁ ἐν Λυκείῳ τὸν φορμὸν δούς.

[4] ἀνάγκη οὖν μάλιστα μὲν εἰς ταὐτὰ ἔχειν τὴν ὑπουργίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς ἴσα ἢ μείζω·

[5] ὥστε ἐπεὶ φανερὸν καὶ οἷς 30 καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς γίγνεται χάρις καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τούτων παρασκευαστέον, τοὺς μὲν δεικνύντας ἢ ὄντας ἢ γεγενημένους ἐν τοιαύτῃ λύπῃ καὶ δεήσει, τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρετηκότας ἐν τοιαύτῃ χρείᾳ τοιοῦτόν τι ἢ ὑπηρετοῦντας. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἐνδέχεται τὴν χάριν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀχαρίστους· 1385b 1 ἢγὰρ ὅτι αὑτῶν ἕνεκα ὑπηρετοῦσιν ἢ ὑπηρέτησαν (τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἦν χάρις), ἢ ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης συνέπεσεν ἢ συνηναγκάσθησαν, ἢ ὅτι ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔδωκαν, εἴτε εἰδότες εἴτε μή· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ τὸ ἀντί τινος, ὥστε οὐδʼ 5 οὕτως ἂν εἴη χάρις.

[6] καὶ περὶ ἁπάσας τὰς κατηγορίας σκεπτέον· ἡ γὰρ χάρις ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ ἢ τοσόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ἢ πότε ἢ ποῦ. σημεῖον δὲ εἰ ἔλαττον μὴ ὑπηρέτησαν, καὶ εἰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἢ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἴσα ἢ μείζω· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἡμῶν ἕνεκα. ἢ εἰ φαῦλα εἰδώς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ 10 δεῖσθαι φαύλων.

[1] καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀχαριστεῖν εἴρηται· ποῖα δʼ ἐλεεινὰ καὶ τίνας ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, λέγωμεν.

[2] ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν 15 ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσειν ὑπάρχειν τοιοῦτον οἷον οἴεσθαι παθεῖν ἄν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἷον εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ ἢ ὅμοιον ἢ παραπλήσιον·

[3] διὸ οὔτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες 20 ἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔτι παθεῖν οἴονται· πεπόνθασι γάρ), οὔτε οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι, ἀλλʼ ὑβρίζουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἅπαντα οἴονται ὑπάρχειν τἀγαθά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παθεῖν μηδὲν κακόν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

[4] εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἷοι νομίζειν παθεῖν ἄν, οἵ τε πεπονθότες ἤδη 25 καὶ διαπεφευγότες, καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ διʼ ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον, καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι· εὐλόγιστοι γάρ.

[5] καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχουσι γονεῖς ἢ τέκνα ἢ γυναῖκες· αὐτοῦ τε γὰρ ταῦτα, καὶ οἷα παθεῖν τὰ εἰρημένα.

[6] καὶ οἱ μήτε ἐν ἀνδρείας πάθει ὄντες, οἷον ἐν ὀργῇ 30 ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα), μήτε ἐν ὑβριστικῇ διαθέσει (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἀλόγιστοι τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι), ἀλλʼ οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων, μήτʼ αὖ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι, διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει.

[7] κἂν οἴωνταί τινας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν· ὁ γὰρ μηδένα οἰόμενοςπάντας οἰήσεται ἀξίους εἶναι κακοῦ. 1386a 1 καὶ ὅλως δὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ οὕτως ὥστʼ ἀναμνησθῆναι τοιαῦτα συμβεβηκότα ἢ αὑτῷ ἤ τῳ τῶν αὑτοῦ, ἢ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι αὑτῷ ἤ τῳ τῶν αὑτοῦ.

[8] ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἐλεοῦσιν εἴρηται, ἃ δʼ ἐλεοῦσιν ἐκ 5 τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ δῆλον· ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλεεινά, καὶ ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὅσων ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων.

[9] ἔστι δὲ ὀδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ φθαρτικὰ θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γῆρας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια,

[10] ὧν δʼ ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν 10 ἀφιλία, ὀλιγοφιλία (διὸ καὶ τὸ διασπᾶσθαι ἀπὸ φίλων καὶ συνήθων ἐλεεινόν), αἶσχος, ἀσθένεια, ἀναπηρία, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν προσῆκεν ἀγαθόν τι ὑπάρξαι κακόν τι συμβῆναι,

[11] καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πεπονθότος γενέσθαι τι ἀγαθόν, οἷον Διοπείθει τὰ παρὰ βασιλέως τεθνεῶτι κατεπέμφθη, 15 καὶ τὸ ἢ μηδὲν γεγενῆσθαι ἀγαθὸν ἢ γενομένων μὴ εἶναι ἀπόλαυσιν.

ἐφʼ οἷς μὲν οὖν ἐλεοῦσι, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν·

[12] ἐλεοῦσι δὲ τούς τε γνωρίμους, ἂν μὴ σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὦσιν οἰκειότητι (περὶ δὲ τούτους ὥσπερ περὶ αὑτοὺς μέλλοντας 20 ἔχουσιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ Ἀμάσιος ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ υἱεῖ ἀγομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ἐδάκρυσεν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ φίλῳ προσαιτοῦντι· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ δεινόν· τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἕτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις τῷ ἐναντίῳ χρήσιμον·

[13] οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐλεοῦσιν ἐγγὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ 25 δεινοῦ ὄντος), καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσιν κατὰ ἡλικίαν, κατὰ ἤθη, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις μᾶλλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτῷ ἂν ὑπάρξαι· ὅλως γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ὅσα ἐφʼ αὑτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπʼ ἄλλων γιγνόμενα ἐλεοῦσιν.

[14] ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐγγὺς φαινόμενα τὰ πάθη 30 ἐλεεινά ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γενόμενα ἢ ἐσόμενα οὔτε ἐλπίζοντες οὔτε μεμνημένοι ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ φωναῖς καὶ ἐσθῆσι καὶ ὅλως ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι (ἐγγὺς γὰρ ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι τὸκακόν, πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιοῦντες ἢ 35 ὡς μέλλοντα ἢ ὡς γεγονότα·

[15] 1386b 1 καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα),

[16] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, οἷον ἐσθῆτάς τε τῶν πεπονθότων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ λόγους καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἐν τῷ πάθει ὄντων, οἷον ἤδη τελευτώντων. καὶ μάλιστα τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἐν 5 τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς ὄντας ἐλεεινόν· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς φαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔλεον, καὶ ὡς ἀναξίου ὄντος καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινομένου τοῦ πάθους.

[1] ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὃ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν· τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικείμενόν 10 ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις. καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἤθους χρηστοῦ·

[2] δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξίως πράττουσι κακῶς συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὖ νεμεσᾶν· ἄδικον γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γιγνόμενον· διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ 15 νεμεσᾶν.

[3] δόξειε δʼ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον, ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νεμεσᾶν, ἔστι δʼ ἕτερον· λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ 20 ὁμοίου. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ διʼ αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ μὲν φθόνος, τὸ δὲ νέμεσις, ἀλλὰ φόβος, ἐὰν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαῦλον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου εὐπραξίας.

φανερὸν δʼ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν, οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαιφόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός· 30 δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δʼ αὔτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι κατʼ ἀξίαν· ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν ἅπερ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ αὑτῷ.

[5] καὶ ἔστιν τοῦαὐτοῦ ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· 1387a 1 ἐφʼ ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν· διὸ κωλυτικὰ μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτʼ ἐστί, διαφέρει δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν 5 ἅπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα.

[6] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν λέγωμεν, τίσιν τε νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες αὐτοί, εἶτα μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

[7] φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν, 10 πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς νεμεσᾶν·

[8] οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, νεμεσήσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων εἰσίν), ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅσων ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄξιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ φύσει ἔχοντες 15 ἀγαθά, οἷον εὐγένειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.

[9] ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐγγύς τι φαίνεται τοῦ φύσει, ἀνάγκη τοῖς ταὐτὸ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθόν, ἐὰν νεωστὶ ἔχοντες τυγχάνωσι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὐπραγῶσι, μᾶλλον νεμεσᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ λυποῦσιν οἱ νεωστὶ πλουτοῦντες τῶν πάλαι καὶ διὰ γένος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντες 20 καὶ δυνάμενοι καὶ πολύφιλοι καὶ εὔτεκνοι καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. καὶ ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν γίγνηται αὐτοῖς, ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μᾶλλον λυποῦσιν οἱ νεόπλουτοι ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἢ οἱ ἀρχαιόπλουτοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

[10] αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δοκοῦσι τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν 25 οἱ δʼ οὔ· τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ οὕτω φαινόμενον ἔχειν ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὥστε οἱ ἕτεροι οὐ τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν.

[11] καὶ ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἄξιον, ἀλλά τις ἔστιν ἀναλογία καί τι ἁρμόττον, οἷον ὅπλων κάλλος οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ ἁρμόττει ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ, καὶ γάμοι διαφέροντες οὐ τοῖς νεωστὶ πλουσίοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς 30 εὐγενέσιν· ἂν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὢν μὴ τοῦ ἁρμόττοντος τυγχάνῃ, νεμεσητόν. καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν, μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἴρηται,

Αἴαντος δʼ ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο·

Ζεὺς γὰρ οἱ νεμέσασχʼ, ὅτʼ ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο·

Hom. Il. 11.542 1387b 1 εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ὁ ἥττων τῷ κρείττονι, οἷον εἰ ὁ μουσικὸς τῷ δικαίῳ· βέλτιον γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς μουσικῆς.

[12] οἷς μὲν οὖν νεμεσῶσι καὶ διὰ τί, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· ταῦτα 5 γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν. αὐτοὶ δὲ νεμεσητικοί εἰσιν, ἐὰν ἄξιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ταῦτα κεκτημένοι· τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων ἠξιῶσθαι τοὺς μὴ ὁμοίους οὐ δίκαιον.

[13] δεύτερον δέ, ἂν ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι τυγχάνωσιν· κρίνουσί τε γὰρ εὖ, καὶ τὰ ἄδικα μισοῦσι.

[14] καὶ ἐὰν 10 φιλότιμοι καὶ ὀρεγόμενοί τινων πραγμάτων, καὶ μάλιστʼ ἂν περὶ ταῦτα φιλότιμοι ὦσιν ὧν ἕτεροι ἀνάξιοι ὄντες τυγχάνουσιν.

[15] καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοὶ αὑτοὺς ὧν ἑτέρους μὴ ἀξιοῦσι, νεμεσητικοὶ τούτοις καὶ τούτων· διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀφιλότιμοι οὐ νεμεσητικοί· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν οὗ 15 ἑαυτοὺς οἴονται ἀξίους εἶναι.

[16] φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ ποίοις ἀτυχοῦσι καὶ κακοπραγοῦσιν ἢ μὴ τυγχάνουσι χαίρειν ἢ ἀλύπως ἔχειν δεῖ· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι δῆλα, ὥστʼ ἐὰν τούς τε κριτὰς τοιούτους παρασκευάσῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας 20 ἐλεεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς ἐλεεῖσθαι, δείξῃ ἀναξίους ὄντας τυγχάνειν ἀξίους δὲ μὴ τυγχάνειν, ἀδύνατον ἐλεεῖν.

[1] δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι φθονοῦσι καὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ φαινομένῃ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, μὴ ἵνα τι αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ 25 διʼ ἐκείνους· φθονήσουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἷς εἰσί τινες ὅμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται·

[2] ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθʼ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. καὶ οἷς μικρὸν ἐλλείπει τοῦ μὴ πάντα ὑπάρχειν (διὸ οἱ μεγάλα πράττοντες καὶ οἱ εὐτυχοῦντες φθονεροί εἰσιν)· 30 πάντας γὰρ οἴονται τὰ αὑτῶν φέρειν.

[3] καὶ οἱ τιμώμενοι ἐπί τινι διαφερόντως, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἢ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι φθονερώτεροι τῶν ἀφιλοτίμων. καὶ οἱ δοξόσοφοι· φιλότιμοι γὰρ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. καὶ ὅλως οἱ φιλόδοξοι περί τι φθονεροὶ περὶ τοῦτο. καὶ οἱ μικρόψυχοι· πάντα γὰρ μεγάλα δοκεῖ 35 αὐτοῖς εἶναι.

[4] ἐφʼ οἷς δὲ φθονοῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἴρηται· 1388a 1 ἐφʼ οἷς γὰρ φιλοδοξοῦσι καὶ φιλοτιμοῦνται ἔργοις ἢ κτήμασι καὶ ὀρέγονται δόξης, καὶ ὅσα εὐτυχήματά ἐστιν, σχεδὸν περὶ πάντα φθόνος ἔστι, καὶ μάλισταὧν αὐτοὶ ἢ ὀρέγονται ἢ οἴονται δεῖν αὑτοὺς ἔχειν, ἢ ὧν τῇ κτήσει μικρῷ ὑπερέχουσιν 5 ἢ μικρῷ ἐλλείπουσιν.

[5] φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οἷς φθονοῦσιν· ἅμα γὰρ εἴρηται· τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν· ὅθεν εἴρηται

τὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπίσταται.

καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται· φιλοτιμοῦνται γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς 10 εἰρημένους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μυριοστὸν ἔτος ὄντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσομένους ἢ τεθνεῶτας οὐδείς, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἐφʼ Ἡρακλείαις στήλαις. οὐδʼ ὧν πολὺ οἴονται παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις λείπεσθαι, οὐδʼ ὧν πολὺ ὑπερέχειν, ὡσαύτως καὶ ρὸς τούτους καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

[6] ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς 15 καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐφιεμένους φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν, διόπερ εἴρηται

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ.

Hes. WD 25

[8] καὶ ὧν ἢ κεκτημένων ἢ κατορθούντων ὄνειδος αὐτοῖς (εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οὗτοι οἱ ἐγγὺς καὶ ὅμοιοι)· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι παρʼ αὐτοὺς 20 οὐ τυγχάνουσι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο λυποῦν ποιεῖ τὸν φθόνον.

[9] καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἢ κεκτημένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς προσῆκεν ἢ ἐκέκτηντό ποτε· διὸ πρεσβύτεροί τε νεωτέροις

[10] καὶ οἱ πολλὰ δαπανήσαντες εἰς ταὐτὸ τοῖς ὀλίγα φθονοῦσιν.

[7] καὶ τοῖς ταχὺ οἱ ἢ μόλις τυχόντες ἢ μὴ τυχόντες φθονοῦσιν.

[11] δῆλον 25 δὲ καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες· ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἡσθήσονται. ὥστε ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν παρασκευασθῶσιν οὕτως ἔχειν, οἱ δʼ ἐλεεῖσθαι ἢ τυγχάνειν τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιοῦντες ὦσιν οἷοι οἱ εἰρημένοι, δῆλον ὡς οὐ τεύξονται ἐλέου 30 παρὰ τῶν κυρίων.

[1] πῶς δὲ ἔχοντες ζηλοῦσι καὶ τὰ ποῖα καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν, ἐνθένδʼ ἐστὶ δῆλον· εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων καὶ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τῇ φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ 35 ἔστιν (διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὑτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον), 1388b 1 ἀνάγκη δὴ ζηλωτικοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας αὑτοὺς ἀγαθῶν ὧν μὴ ἔχουσιν, ἐνδεχομένων αὐτοῖς λαβεῖν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀξιοῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀδύνατα (διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι).

[2] καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἃ τῶν ἐντίμων ἄξιά ἐστιν ἀνδρῶν· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα 5 πλοῦτος καὶ πολυφιλία καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· ὡς γὰρ προσῆκον αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι, οἷα προσήκει τοῖς ἀγαθῶς ἔχουσι, ζηλοῦσι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν. καὶ οὓς οἱ ἄλλοι ἀξιοῦσιν.

[3] καὶ ὧν πρόγονοι ἢ συγγενεῖς ἢ οἰκεῖοι ἢ τὸ ἔθνος ἢ ἡ πόλις ἔντιμοι, ζηλωτικοὶ περὶ ταῦτα· οἰκεῖα γὰρ οἴονται 10 αὑτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄξιοι εἶναι τούτων.

[4] εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ζηλωτὰ τὰ ἔντιμα ἀγαθά, ἀνάγκη τάς τε ἀρετὰς εἶναι τοιαύτας, καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἄλλοις ὠφέλιμα καὶ εὐεργετικά (τιμῶσι γὰρ τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθούς), καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πλησίον ἔστιν, οἷον πλοῦτος καὶ κάλλος μᾶλλον ὑγιείας.

[5] φανερὸν 15 δὲ καὶ οἱ ζηλωτοὶ τίνες· οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κεκτημένοι ζηλωτοί· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὰ εἰρημένα, οἷον ἀνδρεία σοφία ἀρχή (οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες πολλοὺς δύνανται εὖ ποιεῖν), στρατηγοί, ῥήτορες, πάντες οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμενοι.

[6] καὶ οἷς πολλοὶ ὅμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι, ἢ πολλοὶ γνώριμοι, ἢ φίλοι 20 πολλοί, ἢ οὓς πολλοὶ θαυμάζουσιν, ἢ οὓς αὐτοὶ θαυμάζουσιν.

[7] καὶ ὧν ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια λέγονται ἢ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν ἢ ὑπὸ λογογράφων. καταφρονοῦσιν δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐναντίον γὰρ ζήλῳ καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὥστε ζηλῶσαί τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσθαι 25 καταφρονητικοὺς εἶναι τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅσοι τὰ ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν· διὸ πολλάκις καταφρονοῦσιν τῶν εὐτυχούντων, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν ὑπάρχῃ αὐτοῖς ἡ τύχη.

διʼ ὧν μὲν οὖν τὰ πάθη ἐγγίγνεται καὶ διαλύεται, ἐξ ὧν αἱ 30 πίστεις γίγνονται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴρηται.

[1] τὰ δὲ ἤθη ποῖοί τινες κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τὰς τύχας, διέλθωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα.

[2] λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ὀργὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον, ἕξεις δὲ ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας, εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων 35 πρότερον, καὶ ποῖα προαιροῦνται ἕκαστοι, καὶ ποίων πρακτικοί ἡλικίαι δέ εἰσι νεότης καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ γῆρας. 1389a 1 τύχην δὲ λέγω εὐγένειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις καὶ ὅλως εὐτυχίαν καὶ δυστυχίαν.

[3] οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἤθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα 5 ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι τῇ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης,

[4] εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἁψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι ταχέως δὲ παύονται (ὀξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι καὶ πεῖναι),

[5] καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἷοι ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ ὀργῇ. 10 καὶ ἥττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ· διὰ γὰρ φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλʼ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖσθαι.

[6] καὶ φιλότιμοι μέν εἰσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι (ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις), καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοχρήματοι (φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστα διὰ τὸ μήπω 15 ἐνδείας πεπειρᾶσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ Πιττακοῦ ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα εἰς Ἀμφιάραον),

[7] καὶ οὐ κακοήθεις ἀλλʼ εὐήθεις διὰ τὸ μήπω τεθεωρηκέναι πολλὰς πονηρίας, καὶ εὔπιστοι διὰ τὸ μήπω πολλὰ ἐξηπατῆσθαι,

[8] καὶ εὐέλπιδες· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, οὕτω διάθερμοί εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως· ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ 20 τὸ μὴ πολλὰ ἀποτετυχηκέναι. καὶ ζῶσι τὰ πλεῖστα ἐλπίδι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστιν ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ παροιχομένου, τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς βραχύ· τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μεμνῆσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἷόν τε, ἐλπίζειν δὲ πάντα. καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοί εἰσι διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον 25 (ἑλπίζουσι γὰρ ῥᾳδίως),

[9] καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι (θυμώδεις γὰρ καὶ εὐέλπιδες, ὧν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ θαρρεῖν ποιεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, τό τε ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθόν τι θαρραλέον ἐστίν),

[10] καὶ αἰσχυντηλοί (οὐ γάρ πω καλὰ ἕτερα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ πεπαίδευνται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου μόνον),

[11] καὶ 30 μεγαλόψυχοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπείνωνται, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄπειροί εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὑτὸν μεγάλων μεγαλοψυχία· τοῦτο δʼ εὐέλπιδος).

[12] καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων· τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ, ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἡ δὲ 35 ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ.

[13] καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἡλικιῶν 1389b 1 διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν, ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους.

[14] καὶ ἅπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἁμαρτάνουσι, παρὰ τὸ Χιλώνειον (πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσι γὰρ ἄγαν καὶ 5 μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὁμοίως), καὶ εἰδέναι ἅπαντα οἴονται καὶ διισχυρίζονται (τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιόν ἐστιν καὶ τοῦ πάντα ἄγαν),

[15] καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν, οὐ κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ βελτίους ὑπολαμβάνειν (τῇ γὰρ αὑτῶν ἀκακίᾳ τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, 10 ὥστε ἀνάξια πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτούς),

[16] καὶ φιλογέλωτες, διὸ καὶ φιλευτράπελοι· ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν.

[1] τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν νέων τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἦθος, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις τὰ 15 πλεῖστα ἔχουσιν ἤθη· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι καὶ πλείω ἐξηπατῆσθαι καὶ ἐξημαρτηκέναι, καὶ τὰ πλείω φαῦλα εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὔτε διαβεβαιοῦνται οὐδέν, ἧττόν τε ἄγανται πάντα ἢ δεῖ.

[2] καὶ οἴονται, ἴσασι δʼ οὐδέν, καὶ ἀμφιδοξοῦντες προστιθέασιν ἀεὶ τὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα, καὶ πάντα 20 λέγουσιν οὕτως, παγίως δʼ οὐδέν.

[3] καὶ κακοήθεις εἰσίν· ἔστι γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα. ἔτι δὲ καχύποπτοί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἄπιστοι δὲ διʼ ἐμπειρίαν.

[4] καὶ οὔτε φιλοῦσιν σφόδρα οὔτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βίαντος ὑποθήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν 25 ὡς φιλήσοντες.

[5] καὶ μικρόψυχοι διὰ τὸ τεταπεινῶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσι.

[6] καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἓν γάρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ οὐσία, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἴσασιν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ κτήσασθαι καὶ ῥᾴδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν.

[7] καὶ δειλοὶ 30 καὶ πάντα προφοβητικοί· ἐναντίως γὰρ διάκεινται τοῖς νέοις· κατεψυγμένοι γάρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί, ὥστε προωδοπεποίηκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος κατάψυξίς τίς ἐστιν.

[8] καὶ φιλόζωοι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπόντος εἶναι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὗ ἐνδεεῖς, τούτου 35 μάλιστα ἐπιθυμεῖν.

[9] καὶ φίλαυτοι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ· μικροψυχία γάρ τις καὶ αὕτη. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοι εἶναι· 1390a 1 τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς.

[10] καὶ ἀναίσχυντοι μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυντηλοί· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὁμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι τοῦ δοκεῖν.

[11] καὶ δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν (τὰ γὰρ πλείω τῶν γιγνομένων 5 φαῦλά ἐστιν· ἀποβαίνει γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον), καὶ ἔτι διὰ τὴν δειλίαν.

[12] καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γὰρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν ὀλίγον τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς πολύ, ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡ δὲ μνήμη τῶν παροιχομένων· ὅπερ αἴτιον καὶ τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς· 10 διατελοῦσι γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα λέγοντες· ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι γὰρ ἥδονται.

[13] καὶ οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῖς δέ εἰσιν, καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ μὲν ἐκλελοίπασιν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσιν, ὥστε οὔτʼ ἐπιθυμητικοὶ οὔτε πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ κέρδος· διὸ σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ τηλικοῦτοι· αἵ τε γὰρ 15 ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκασι καὶ δουλεύουσι τῷ κέρδει.

[14] καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος τὸ δʼ ἦθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν. καὶ τἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν.

[15] ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντές εἰσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ ταὐτὰ τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ 20 φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ διʼ ἀσθένειαν· πάντα γὰρ οἴονται ἐγγὺς εἶναι αὑτοῖς παθεῖν, τοῦτο δʼ ἦν ἐλεητικόν· ὅθεν ὀδυρτικοί εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ ὀδυρτικὸν τῷ φιλογέλωτι.

[16] τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἤθη τοιαῦτα, 25 ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἤθει λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς χρώμενοι τοῖς λόγοις τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.

[1] οἱ δʼ ἀκμάζοντες φανερὸν ὅτι μεταξὺ τούτων τὸ ἦθος ἔσονται ἑκατέρων, ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν ὑπερβολήν, καὶ οὔτε σφόδρα 30 θαρροῦντες (θρασύτης γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον) οὔτε λίαν φοβούμενοι, καλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντες,

[2] οὔτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες οὔτε πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς κρίνοντες μᾶλλον, καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον 1390b 1 ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω, καὶ οὔτε πρὸς φειδὼ οὔτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἁρμόττον,

[3] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ σώφρονες μετʼ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι μετὰ σωφροσύνης. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς γέρουσι διῄρηται 5 ταῦτα· εἰσὶν γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι σώφρονες καὶ δειλοί. ὡς δὲ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, ὅσα μὲν διῄρηνται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν ὠφελίμων, ταῦτα ἄμφω ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπουσιν, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἁρμόττον.

[4] ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα 10 ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐτῶν μέχρι τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἑνὸς δεῖν πεντήκοντα.

περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων ἠθῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

[1] περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνομένων ἀγαθῶν, διʼ ὅσα αὐτῶν 15 καὶ τὰ ἤθη ποιὰ ἄττα συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς.

[2] εὐγενείας μὲν οὖν ἦθός ἐστι τὸ φιλοτιμότερον εἶναι τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτήν· ἅπαντες γάρ, ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τι, πρὸς τοῦτο σωρεύειν εἰώθασιν, ἡ δʼ εὐγένεια ἐντιμότης προγόνων ἐστίν. καὶ καταφρονητικὸν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐστὶν τοῖς προγόνοις 20 αὑτῶν, διότι πόρρω ταὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐγγὺς γιγνόμενα ἐντιμότερα καὶ εὐαλαζόνευτα.

[3] ἔστι δὲ εὐγενὲς μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετήν, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως· ὅπερ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς εὐγενέσιν, ἀλλʼ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελεῖς· φορὰ γὰρ τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς 25 γένεσιν ἀνδρῶν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γιγνομένοις, καὶ ἐνίοτε ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνονται διά τινος χρόνου ἄνδρες περιττοί, κἄπειτα πάλιν ἀναδίδωσιν. ἐξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφυᾶ γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἤθη, οἷον οἱ ἀπʼ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου, τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς 30 ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα, οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος καὶ Περικλέους καὶ Σωκράτους.

[1] τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἃ ἕπεται ἤθη, ἐπιπολῆς ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἅπασιν· ὑβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχοντες ἅπαντα τἀγαθὰ οὕτω διάκεινται· 1391a 1 ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος οἷον τιμή τις τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἄλλων, διὸ φαίνεται ὤνια ἅπαντα εἶναι αὐτοῦ),

[2] καὶ τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλάκωνες, τρυφεροὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι διὰ τὸ πάντας εἰωθέναι 5 διατρίβειν περὶ τὸ ἐρώμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὑπʼ αὐτῶν. καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ζηλοῦν τοὺς ἄλλους ἃ καὶ αὐτοί. ἅμα δὲ καὶ εἰκότως τοῦτο πάσχουσιν (πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ δεόμενοι τῶν ἐχόντων· ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἱέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον 10 γενέσθαι κρεῖττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· πλούσιον εἰπεῖν· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας),

[3] καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀξίους εἶναι ἄρχειν· ἔχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὧν ἕνεκεν ἄρχειν ἄξιον. καὶ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, ἀνοήτου εὐδαίμονος ἦθος ἦθος πλούτου ἐστίν.

[4] διαφέρει δὲ τοῖς 15 νεωστὶ κεκτημένοις καὶ τοῖς πάλαι τὰ ἤθη τῷ ἅπαντα μᾶλλον καὶ φαυλότερα τὰ κακὰ ἔχειν τοὺς νεοπλούτους (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία πλούτου ἐστὶ τὸ νεόπλουτον εἶναι), καὶ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν οὐ κακουργικά, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὑβριστικὰ τὰ δὲ ἀκρατευτικά, οἷον εἰς αἰκίαν καὶ μοιχείαν.

[1] 20 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα φανερά ἐστιν ἤθη. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει δύναμις τῷ πλούτῳ τὰ δὲ βελτίω·

[2] φιλοτιμότεροι γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρωδέστεροί εἰσιν τὰ ἤθη οἱ δυνάμενοι τῶν πλουσίων διὰ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἔργων ὅσα ἐξουσία αὐτοῖς πράττειν διὰ τὴν δύναμιν,

[3] καὶ σπουδαστικώτεροι 25 διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶναι, ἀναγκαζόμενοι σκοπεῖν τὰ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν,

[4] καὶ σεμνότεροι ἢ βαρύτεροι· ποιεῖ γὰρ σεμνοτέρους τὸ ἀξίωμα, διὸ μετριάζουσιν, ἔστι δὲ ἡ σεμνότης μαλακὴ καὶ εὐσχήμων βαρύτης· κἂν ἀδικῶσιν, οὐ μικραδικηταί εἰσιν ἀλλὰ μεγαλάδικοι.

[5] 30 ἡ δʼ εὐτυχία κατὰ μόριά τε τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχει τὰ ἤθη (εἰς γὰρ ταῦτα συντείνουσιν αἱ μέγισται δοκοῦσαι εἶναι εὐτυχίαι), καὶ ἔτι εἰς εὐτεκνίαν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθὰ παρασκευάζει ἡ εὐτυχία πλεονεκτεῖν.

[6] 1391b 1 ὑπερηφανώτεροι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀλογιστότεροι διὰ τὴν εὐτυχίαν εἰσίν, ἓν δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ βέλτιστον ἦθος τῇ εὐτυχίᾳ, ὅτι φιλόθεοί εἰσι καὶ ἔχουσιν πρὸς τὸ θεῖόν πως, πιστεύοντες διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν καθʼ ἡλικίαν καὶ τύχην ἠθῶν εἴρηται· τὰ 5 γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φανερά ἐστιν, οἷον πένητος καὶ ἀτυχοῦς ἦθος καὶ ἀδυνάτου.

[1] ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν πιθανῶν λόγων χρῆσις πρὸς κρίσιν ἐστί (περὶ ὧν γὰρ ἴσμεν καὶ κεκρίκαμεν οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ λόγου), ἔστι δʼ ἐάν τε πρὸς ἕνα τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος προτρέπῃ ἢ ἀποτρέπῃ, 10 οἷον οἱ νουθετοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον κριτὴς ὁ εἷς· ὃν γὰρ δεῖ πεῖσαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς κριτής), ἐάν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάν τε πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν λέγῃ τις, ὁμοίως (τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τὰ ἐναντία, πρὸς ἃ ὥσπερ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται), 15 ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς (ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, ὅλως δὲ μόνος ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς κριτὴς ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὁ τὰ ζητούμενα κρίνων· τά τε γὰρ ἀμφισβητούμενα ζητεῖται πῶς ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ὧν βουλεύονται), περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ἠθῶν ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς 20 εἴρηται πρότερον—ὥστε διωρισμένον ἂν εἴη πῶς τε καὶ διὰ τίνων τοὺς λόγους ἠθικοὺς ποιητέον.

[2] ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον μὲν γένος τῶν λόγων ἕτερον ἦν τὸ τέλος, περὶ ἁπάντων δʼ αὐτῶν εἰλημμέναι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσὶν ἐξ ὧν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσιν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ 25 ἐπιδεικνύμενοι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, ἔτι δὲ ἐξ ὧν ἠθικοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων διώρισται, λοιπὸν ἡμῖν διελθεῖν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν.

[3] πᾶσι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τῷ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου προσχρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἔσται τοὺς δὲ ὡς γέγονε πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι.

[4] 30 ἔτι δὲ τὸ περὶ μεγέθους κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων· χρῶνται γὰρ πάντες τῷ μειοῦν καὶ αὔξειν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι.

[5] 1392a 1 τούτων δὲ διορισθέντων περὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων κοινῇ πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι ἔχομεν, καὶ περὶ παραδειγμάτων, ὅπως τὰ λοιπὰ προσθέντες ἀποδῶμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ μὲν αὔξειν οἰκειότατον τοῖς 5 ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς τοῖς δικανικοῖς (περὶ τούτων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις), τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐσόμενον τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς.

[1] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου λέγωμεν. ἂν δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾖ δυνατὸν ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον 10 δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι δυνατόν, οἷον εἰ δυνατὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑγιασθῆναι, καὶ νοσῆσαι· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων ᾗ ἐναντία. καὶ εἰ τὸ ὅμοιον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον·

[2] καὶ εἰ τὸ χαλεπώτερον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ῥᾷον·

[3] καὶ εἰ τὸ σπουδαῖον καὶ καλὸν γενέσθαι δυνατόν,

[4] καὶ ὅλως δυνατὸν γενέσθαι· χαλεπώτερον 15 γὰρ καλὴν οἰκίαν ἢ οἰκίαν εἶναι.

[5] καὶ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ τέλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ γίγνεται οὐδʼ ἄρχεται γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον τὸ σύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι οὔτʼ ἂν ἄρξαιτο γίγνεσθαι οὔτε γίγνεται. καὶ οὗ τὸ τέλος, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνατή· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνεται.

[6] καὶ εἰ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ 20 οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῇ γενέσει δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον, οἷον εἰ ἄνδρα γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ παῖδα (πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο γίγνεται), καὶ εἰ παῖδα, καὶ ἄνδρα (καὶ ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐκείνη).

[7] καὶ ὧν ἢ ἔρως ἢ ἐπιθυμία φύσει ἐστίν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀδυνάτων ἐρᾷ οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.

[8] καὶ ὧν ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ 25 τέχναι, δυνατὸν ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι.

[9] καὶ ὅσων ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἃ ἡμεῖς ἀναγκάσαιμεν ἂν ἢ πείσαιμεν· ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὧν κρείττους ἢ κύριοι ἢ φίλοι.

[10] καὶ ὧν τὰ μέρη δυνατά, καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ ὧν τὸ ὅλον δυνατόν, καὶ τὰ μέρη ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· εἰ γὰρ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλὶς καὶ 30 χιτὼν δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ ὑποδήματα δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ εἰ ὑποδήματα, καὶ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλίς καὶ χιτών.

[11] καὶ εἰ τὸ γένος ὅλον 1392b 1 τῶν δυνατῶν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ γένος, οἷον εἰ πλοῖον γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ τριήρη, καὶ εἰ τριήρη, καὶ πλοῖον.

[12] καὶ εἰ θάτερον τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα πεφυκότων, καὶ θάτερον, οἷον εἰ διπλάσιον, καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ εἰ 5 ἥμισυ, διπλάσιον.

[13] καὶ εἰ ἄνευ τέχνης καὶ παρασκευῆς δυνατὸν γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον διὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας δυνατόν, ὅθεν καὶ Ἀγάθωνι εἴρηται

καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε τῆς τέχνης πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ

ἡμῖν ἀνάγκῃ καὶ τύχῃ προσγίγνεται.

[14] 10 καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἥττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις δυνατόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἴναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὔθυνος ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὑρεῖν.

[15] περὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτου δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὑπάρχει.

εἰ δὲ γέγονεν, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.

[17] πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, εἰ τὸ ἧττον γίγνεσθαι πεφυκὸς γέγονεν, γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον. καὶ εἰ τὸ ὕστερον εἰωθὸς γίγνεσθαι γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐπιλέλησται, καὶ ἔμαθέ ποτε τοῦτο.

[18] καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο, πέπραχε· πάντες γάρ, ὅταν 20 δυνάμενοι βουληθῶσι, πράττουσιν· ἐμποδὼν γὰρ οὐδέν.

[19] ἔτι εἰ ἐβούλετο καὶ μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω ἐκώλυεν, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ὠργίζετο, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐπεθύμει· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὧν ὀρέγονται, ἂν δύνωνται, ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι διʼ ἀκρασίαν, οἱ δʼ ἐπιεικεῖς ὅτι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

[20] καὶ εἰ 25 ἔμελλε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ποιεῖν· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ποιῆσαι.

[21] καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ὅσα ἢ πέφυκε πρὸ ἐκείνου ἢ ἕνεκα ἐκείνου, οἷον εἰ ἤστραψε, καὶ ἐβρόντησεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπείρασε, καὶ ἔπραξεν. καὶ εἰ ὅσα ὕστερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα γίγνεται γέγονε, καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ τούτου ἕνεκα 30 γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐβρόντησε, καὶ ἤστραψεν, καὶ εἰ ἔπραξεν, ἐπείρασεν.

[22] ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντα. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

[23] 1393a 1 καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον· τό τε γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ ἐν βουλήσει ὂν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ὄντα, ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ὁρμῇ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ μελλήσει ἔσται· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται μᾶλλον 5 τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ τὰ μὴ μέλλοντα.

[24] καὶ εἰ προγέγονε ὅσα πρότερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, οἷον εἰ συννεφεῖ, εἰκὸς ὗσαι.

[25] καὶ εἰ τὸ ἕνεκα τούτου γέγονε, καὶ τοῦτο εἰκὸς γενέσθαι, οἷον εἰ θεμέλιος, καὶ οἰκία.

[26] περὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μείζονός 10 τε καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ ὅλως μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐστιν φανερόν. εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς περί τε μεγέθους ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλάττονος, ὥστε ἐπεὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ 15 καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι διʼ ἐκείνων ληπτέον τὰς αὐξήσεις πᾶσιν.

[27] τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔτι ζητεῖν περὶ μεγέθους ἁπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κενολογεῖν ἐστιν· κυριώτερα γάρ ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τῶν καθόλου τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων. 20

περὶ μὲν οὖν δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ πότερον γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν καὶ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων, εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.

[1] λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πίστεων ἅπασιν εἰπεῖν, ἐπείπερ εἴρηται περὶ τῶν ἰδίων. εἰσὶ δʼ αἱ κοιναὶ πίστεις δύο τῷ γένει, 25 παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γὰρ γνώμη μέρος ἐνθυμήματός ἐστιν.

[2] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἡ δʼ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή.

παραδειγμάτων δὲ εἴδη δύο· ἓν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν παραδείγματος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγενομένα, ἓν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν 30 ποιεῖν. τούτου δὲ ἓν μὲν παραβολὴ ἓν δὲ λόγοι,

[3] οἷον οἱ Αἰσώπειοι καὶ Λιβυκοί.

ἔστιν δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν τοιόνδε τι, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς βασιλέα παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐᾶν Αἴγυπτον χειρώσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ πρότερον Δαρεῖος οὐ πρότερον διέβη πρὶν Αἴγυπτον ἔλαβεν, 1393b 1 λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, καὶ πάλιν Ξέρξης οὐ πρότερον ἐπεχείρησεν πρὶν ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, ὥστε καὶ οὗτος ἐὰν λάβῃ, διαβήσεται, διὸ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον.

[4] παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι οὐ 5 δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοὺς ἀθλητὰς κληροίη μὴ οἳ δύνανται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλʼ οἳ ἂν λάχωσιν, ἢ τῶν πλωτήρων ὅντινα δεῖ κυβερνᾶν κληρώσειεν, ὡς δέον τὸν λαχόντα ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον.

[5] λόγος δέ, οἷος ὁ Στησιχόρου περὶ Φαλάριδος καὶ ὁ Αἰσώπου ὑπὲρ τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ. 10 Στησίχορος μὲν γὰρ ἑλομένων στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῶν Ἱμεραίων Φάλαριν καὶ μελλόντων φυλακὴν διδόναι τοῦ σώματος, τἆλλα διαλεχθεὶς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς λόγον ὡς ἵππος κατεῖχε λειμῶνα μόνος, ἐλθόντος δʼ ἐλάφου καὶ διαφθείροντος τὴν νομὴν βουλόμενος τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον ἠρώτα τινὰ 15 ἄνθρωπον εἰ δύναιτʼ ἂν μετʼ αὐτοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον, ὁ δʼ ἔφησεν, ἐὰν λάβῃ χαλινὸν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβῇ ἐπʼ αὐτὸν ἔχων ἀκόντια· συνομολογήσας δὲ καὶ ἀναβάντος ἀντὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι αὐτὸς ἐδούλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἔφη, ὁρᾶτε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρήσασθαι 20 τὸ αὐτὸ πάθητε τῷ ἵππῳ· τὸν μὲν γὰρ χαλινὸν ἔχετε ἤδη, ἑλόμενοι στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα· ἑὰν δὲ φυλακὴν δῶτε καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐάσητε, δουλεύσετε ἤδη Φαλάριδι.

[6] Αἴσωπος δὲ ἐν Σάμῳ δημηγορῶν κρινομένου δημαγωγοῦ περὶ θανάτου ἔφη ἀλώπεκα διαβαίνουσαν ποταμὸν ἀπωσθῆναι εἰς φάραγγα, οὐ 25 δυναμένην δὲ ἐκβῆναι πολὺν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν καὶ κυνοραιστὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς, ἐχῖνον δὲ πλανώμενον, ὡς εἶδεν αὐτήν, κατοικτείραντα ἐρωτᾶν εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτῆς τοὺς κυνοραιστάς, τὴν δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν· ἐρομένου δὲ διὰ τί, ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν φάναι ἤδη μου πλήρεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὀλίγον ἕλκουσιν αἷμα, ἐὰν δὲ τούτους 30 ἀφέλητε, ἕτεροι ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες ἐκπιοῦνταί μου τὸ λοιπὸν αἷμα. ἀτὰρ καὶ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Σάμιοι, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτι βλάψει (πλούσιος γάρ ἐστιν), ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτον ἀποκτείνητε, 1394a 1 ἕτεροι ἥξουσι πένητες, οἳ ὑμᾶς ἀναλώσουσι τὰ λοιπὰ κλέπτοντες.

[7] εἰσὶ δʼ οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπόν, λόγους δὲ ῥᾷον· ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἄν τις 5 δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὁρᾶν, ὅπερ ῥᾷόν ἐστιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας.

[8] ῥᾴω μὲν οὖν πορίσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν λόγων, χρησιμώτερα δὲ πρὸς τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων· ὅμοια γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγονόσιν.

[9] δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παραδείγμασι οὐκ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐνθυμήματα 10 ὡς ἀποδείξεσιν (ἡ γὰρ πίστις διὰ τούτων), ἔχοντα δὲ ὡς μαρτυρίοις, ἐπιλόγῳ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν· προτιθέμενα μὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἐπαγωγῇ, τοῖς δὲ ῥητορικοῖς οὐκ οἰκεῖον ἐπαγωγὴ πλὴν ἐν ὀλίγοις, ἐπιλεγόμενα δὲ μαρτυρίοις, ὁ δὲ μάρτυς πανταχοῦ πιθανός· διὸ καὶ προτιθέντι μὲν ἀνάγκη 15 πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐπιλέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἓν ἱκανόν· μάρτυς γὰρ χρηστὸς καὶ εἷς χρήσιμος.

πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη παραδειγμάτων, καὶ πῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ πότε χρηστέον, εἴρηται.

[1] περὶ δὲ γνωμολογίας, ῥηθέντος τί ἐστιν γνώμη μάλιστʼ ἂν 20 γένοιτο φανερὸν περὶ ποίων τε καὶ πότε καὶ τίσιν ἁρμόττει χρῆσθαι τῷ γνωμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

[2] ἔστι δὴ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖός τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου, οὔτε περὶ πάντων, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, 25 καὶ ἃ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν, ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὁ περὶ τοιούτων συλλογισμός ἐστιν, σχεδὸν τὰ συμπεράσματα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷον

χρὴ δʼ οὔ ποθʼ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκʼ ἀνήρ

παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.

Eur. Med. 294-295 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν γνώμη· προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί ἐνθύμημά ἐστιν τὸ ἅπαν, οἷον

χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἧς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας,

φθόνον παρʼ ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ,

Eur. Med. 296-297 1394b 1 καὶ τὸ

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πάντʼ ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ,

Eur. fr. 661 καὶ τὸ

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὅστις ἔστʼ ἐλεύθερος

Eur. Hec.. 864 5 γνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἐχομένῳ ἐνθύμημα,

ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστιν ἢ τύχης.

Eur. Hec. 865

[3] εἰ δή ἐστιν γνώμη τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀνάγκη τέτταρα εἴδη εἶναι γνώμης· ἢ γὰρ μετʼ ἐπιλόγου ἔσται ἢ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου.

[4] ἀποδείξεως μὲν οὖν δεόμεναί εἰσιν ὅσαι παράδοξόν τι λέγουσιν 10 ἢ ἀμφισβητούμενον· ὅσαι δὲ μηδὲν παράδοξον, ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου.

[5] τούτων δʼ ἀνάγκη τὰς μὲν διὰ τὸ προεγνῶσθαι μηδὲν δεῖσθαι ἐπιλόγου, οἷον

ἀνδρὶ δʼ ὑγιαίνειν ἄριστόν ἐστιν, ὥς γʼ ἐμὶν δοκεῖ

(φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτω), τὰς δʼ ἅμα λεγομένας 15 δήλας εἶναι ἐπιβλέψασιν, οἷον

οὐδεὶς ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ.

Eur. Tro. 1051

[6] τῶν δὲ μετʼ ἐπιλόγου αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος εἰσίν, ὥσπερ

χρὴ δʼ οὔ ποθʼ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων,

Eur. Med. 294 20 αἱ δʼ ἐνθυμηματικαὶ μέν, οὐκ ἐνθυμήματος δὲ μέρος· αἵπερ καὶ μάλιστʼ εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. εἰσὶν δʼ αὗται ἐν ὅσαις ἐμφαίνεται τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ αἴτιον, οἷον ἐν τῷ

ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φύλασσε θνητὸς ὤν·

τὸ μὲν γὰρ φάναι μὴ δεῖν φυλάττειν γνώμη, τὸ δὲ προσκείμενον 25 θνητὸν ὄντα τὸ διὰ τί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν.

[7] φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πόσα τε εἴδη γνώμης, καὶ περὶ ποῖον ἕκαστον ἁρμόττει· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων μὴ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου, ἀλλʼ ἢ προθέντα τὸν 30 ἐπίλογον γνώμῃ χρῆσθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι (οἷον εἴ τις εἴποι ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε φθονεῖσθαι δεῖ οὔτʼ ἀργὸν εἶναι, οὔ φημι χρῆναι παιδεύεσθαι), ἢ τοῦτο προειπόντα ἐπειπεῖν τὰ ἔμπροσθεν· περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δὲ προστιθέντα τὸ διότι στρογγυλώτατα.

[8] ἁρμόττει δʼ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις 35 καὶ τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα καὶ τὰ αἰνιγματώδη, 1395a 1 οἷον εἴ τις λέγει ὅπερ Στησίχορος ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶπεν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὑβριστὰς εἶναι, ὅπως μὴ οἱ τέττιγες χαμόθεν ᾄδωσιν.

[9] ἁρμόττει δὲ γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικίᾳ μὲν πρεσβυτέρων, περὶ δὲ τούτων ὧν ἔμπειρός τίς ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα γνωμολογεῖν 5 ἀπρεπὲς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ δὲ ὧν ἄπειρος, ἠλίθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. σημεῖον δὲ ἱκανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῖκοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀποφαίνονται.

[10] καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἁρμόττει ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ 10 ἀποδείξαντα.

[11] χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ὦσι χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς ὁμολογούντων πάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἷον παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους

εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης,

Hom. Il. 12.243 15 καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττους ὄντας

ξυνὸς Ἐνυάλιος,

Hom. Il. 18.309 καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα καὶ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα

νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

[12] ἔτι ἔνιαι τῶν παροιμιῶν καὶ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷον παροιμία 20 Ἀττικὸς πάροικος.

[13] δεῖ δὲ τὰς γνώμας λέγειν καὶ παρὰ τὰ δεδημοσιευμένα (λέγω δὲ δεδημοσιευμένα οἷον τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν), ὅταν ἢ τὸ ἦθος φαίνεσθαι μέλλῃ βέλτιον ἢ παθητικῶς εἰρημένη. ἔστι δὲ παθητικὴ μὲν οἷον εἴ τις ὀργιζόμενος φαίη ψεῦδος εἶναι ὡς δεῖ γιγνώσκειν αὑτόν· 25 οὗτος γοῦν εἰ ἐγίγνωσκεν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε στρατηγεῖν ἠξίωσε· τὸ δὲ ἦθος βέλτιον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ὥσπερ φασίν, φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μισεῖν ὡς φιλήσοντας.

[14] δεῖ δὲ τῇ λέξει τὴν προαίρεσιν συνδηλοῦν, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, οἷον οὕτως εἰπόντα, ὅτι δεῖ δὲ φιλεῖν οὐχ ὥσπερ φασίν, 30 ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀεὶ φιλήσοντα· ἐπιβούλου γὰρ θάτερον, ἢ ὧδε, οὐκ ἀρέσκει δέ μοι τὸ λεγόμενον· δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἀληθινὸν φίλον ὡς φιλήσοντα ἀεὶ φιλεῖν, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν· δεῖ γὰρ τούς γε κακοὺς ἄγαν μισεῖν.

1395b 1

ἔχουσι δʼ εἰς τοὺς λόγους βοήθειαν μεγάλην μίαν μὲν διὰ τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκροατῶν· χαίρουσι γὰρ ἐάν τις καθόλου λέγων ἐπιτύχῃ τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν. ὃ δὲ λέγω δῆλον ἔσται ὧδε, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πῶς δεῖ αὐτὰς θηρεύειν. 5 ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνώμη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀπόφανσις καθόλου ἐστίν, χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένου ὃ κατὰ μέρος προϋπολαμβάνοντες τυγχάνουσι· οἷον εἴ τις γείτοσι τύχοι κεχρημένος ἢ τέκνοις φαύλοις, ἀποδέξαιτʼ ἂν τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλεπώτερον ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἠλιθιώτερον τεκνοποιίας, 10 ὥστε δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι ποῖα τυγχάνουσι προϋπολαμβάνοντες, εἶθʼ οὕτως περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν.

[16] ταύτην τε δὴ ἔχει μίαν χρῆσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν, καὶ ἑτέραν κρείττω· ἠθικοὺς γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους. ἦθος δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις· αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν διὰ τὸ 15 ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρέσεων, ὥστε, ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα.

περὶ μὲν οὖν γνώμης, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ πόσα εἴδη ταύτης καὶ πῶς χρηστέον αὐτῇ καὶ τίνα ὠφέλειαν ἔχει, εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.

περὶ δʼ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἴπωμεν τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκάτερον τούτων ἐστίν.

[2] ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ἐστιν, εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ πῶς συλλογισμός, καὶ τί διαφέρει τῶν 25 διαλεκτικῶν·

[3] οὔτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν οὔτε πάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία διὰ τὸ φανερὰ λέγειν. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ πιθανωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους παρʼ ὄχλῳ μουσικωτέρως 30 λέγειν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου λέγουσιν, οἱ δʼ ἐξ ὧν ἴσασι, καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς· ὥστʼ οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν δοκούντων ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν ὡρισμένων λεκτέον, οἷον ἢ τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται, 1396a 1 καὶ τοῦτο διότι οὕτως φαίνεται δῆλον εἶναι ἅπασιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις· καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.

[4] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι 5 εἴτε πολιτικῷ συλλογισμῷ εἴθʼ ὁποιῳοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ τούτου ἔχειν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια· μηδὲν γὰρ ἔχων ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοις συνάγειν.

[5] λέγω δʼ οἷον πῶς ἂν δυναίμεθα συμβουλεύειν Ἀθηναίοις εἰ πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ πολεμητέον, μὴ ἔχοντες τίς ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν, πότερον ναυτικὴ 10 ἢ πεζικὴ ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ αὕτη πόση, καὶ πρόσοδοι τίνες ἢ φίλοι καὶ ἐχθροί, εἶτα τίνας πολέμους πεπολεμήκασι καὶ πῶς, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα·

[6] ἢ ἐπαινεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν 15 ὑπαρχόντων ἢ δοκούντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες.

[7] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τί ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι τοὺς Ἕλληνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας ἠνδραποδίσαντο, Αἰγινήτας 20 καὶ Ποτιδαιάτας, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἁμάρτημα ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. ὡς δʼ αὔτως καὶ οἱ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοπούμενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται.

[8] οὐδὲν δὲ διαφέρει περὶ Ἀθηναίων ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεοῦ, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο 25 δρᾶν· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύοντα τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, καὶ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ ψέγοντα, καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον, ἵνʼ ἐκ τούτων λέγωμεν, ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες εἴ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ὑπάρχει, κατηγοροῦντες δʼ ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι εἴ τι δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, 30 συμβουλεύοντες δʼ εἴ τι συμφέρον ἢ βλαβερόν.

[9] ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ περὶ πράγματος ὁτουοῦν, οἷον περὶ δικαιοσύνης, εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ·

[10] ὥστʼ ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντες οὕτω φαίνονται ἀποδεικνύντες, ἐάν τε ἀκριβέστερον 1396b 1 ἐάν τε μαλακώτερον συλλογίζωνται (οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων λαμβάνουσιν ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπαρχόντων), καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄλλως δεικνύναι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, πρῶτον περὶ ἕκαστον ἔχειν ἐξειλεγμένα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων 5 καὶ τῶν ἐπικαιροτάτων,

[11] περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐξ ὑπογυίου γιγνομένων ζητεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀποβλέποντα μὴ εἰς ἀόριστα ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιγράφοντα ὅ τι πλεῖστα καὶ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος· ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τοσούτῳ ῥᾷον δεικνύναι, ὅσῳ 10 δʼ ἐγγύτερον, τοσούτῳ οἰκειότερα καὶ ἧττον κοινά.

[12] λέγω δὲ κοινὰ μὲν τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἡμιθέων καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ Ἴλιον ἐστρατεύσατο· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖ ἢ Διομήδην· ἴδια δὲ ἃ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκεν 15 ἢ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, οἷον τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἕκτορα τὸν ἄριστον τῶν Τρώων καὶ τὸν Κύκνον, ὃς ἐκώλυσεν ἅπαντας ἀποβαίνειν ἄτρωτος ὤν, καὶ ὅτι νεώτατος καὶ οὐκ ἔνορκος ὢν ἐστράτευσεν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

[13] εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς πρῶτος οὗτος ὁ τοπικός, 20 τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων λέγωμεν· στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό. πρῶτον δὲ εἴπωμεν περὶ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν πρῶτον.

[14] ἔστιν γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἴδη δύο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἐστιν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, τὰ δʼ ἐλεγκτικά, καὶ διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἔλεγχος 25 καὶ συλλογισμός.

[15] ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν.

[16] σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν χρησίμων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἔχονται οἱ τόποι· ἐξειλεγμέναι γὰρ 30 αἱ προτάσεις περὶ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν, ὥστε ἐξ ὧν δεῖ φέρειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα τόπων περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, ἢ καλοῦ ἢ αἰσχροῦ, ἢ δικαίου ἢ ἀδίκου, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ παθημάτων καὶ ἕξεων ὡσαύτως, εἰλημμένοι ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσι πρότερον οἱ τόποι.

1397a 1

ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον καθόλου περὶ ἁπάντων λάβωμεν, καὶ λέγωμεν παρασημαινόμενοι τοὺς ἐλεγκτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀποδεικτικούς, καὶ τοὺς τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων, οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπεί περ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν. δηλωθέντων δὲ 5 τούτων περὶ τῶν λύσεων καὶ ἐνστάσεων διορίσωμεν, πόθεν δεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἐνθυμήματα φέρειν.

[1] ἔστι δὲ εἷς μὲν τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων· δεῖ γὰρ σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ὑπάρχει, 10 οἷον ὅτι τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερόν. ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ· εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἴτιος τῶν παρόντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεῖ ἐπανορθώσασθαι.

εἴ περ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῖς κακῶς δεδρακόσιν

ἀκουσίως δίκαιον εἰς ὀργὴν πεσεῖν

οὐδʼ ἂν ἀναγκασθείς τις εὖ δράσῃ τινά,

προσῆκον εἶναι τῷδʼ ὀφείλεσθαι χάριν.

ἀλλʼ εἴ περ ἔστιν ἐν βροτοῖς ψευδηγορεῖν

πιθανά, νομίζειν χρή σε καὶ τοὐναντίον,

ἄπιστʼ ἀληθῆ πολλὰ συμβαίνειν βροτοῖς.

Eur. fr. 396

[2] 20 ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων· ὁμοίως γὰρ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ δικαίως, νῦν δʼ οὐχ αἱρετὸν τὸ δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν.

[3] ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ καλῶς ἢ δικαίως ποιῆσαι, θατέρῳ τὸ πεπονθέναι, καὶ εἰ τὸ 25 κελεῦσαι, καὶ τὸ πεποιηκέναι, οἷον ὡς ὁ τελώνης Διομέδων περὶ τῶν τελῶν, εἰ γὰρ μηδʼ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν τὸ πωλεῖν, οὐδʼ ἡμῖν τὸ ὠνεῖσθαι. καὶ εἰ τῷ πεπονθότι τὸ καλῶς ἢ δικαίως ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ ποιήσαντι. ἔστι δʼ ἐν τούτῳ παραλογίσασθαι· εἰ γὰρ δικαίως ἔπαθέν τι, δικαίως πέπονθεν, ἀλλʼ ἴσως οὐχ 30 ὑπὸ σοῦ· διὸ δεῖ σκοπεῖν χωρὶς εἰ ἄξιος ὁ παθὼν παθεῖν 1397b 1 καὶ ὁ ποιήσας ποιῆσαι, εἶτα χρῆσθαι ὁποτέρως ἁρμόττει· ἐνίοτε γὰρ διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ Θεοδέκτου

μητέρα δὲ τὴν σὴν οὔ τις ἐστύγει βροτῶν;

φησὶ δὲ ἀποκρινόμενος ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρὴ σκοπεῖν· 5 ἐρομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀλφεσιβοίας πῶς, ὑπολαβών φησιν

τὴν μὲν θανεῖν ἔκριναν, ἐμὲ δὲ μὴ κτανεῖν.

καὶ ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη καὶ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων Νικάνορα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ δικαίως ἐκρίθησαν ἀποκτεῖναι, δικαίως ἔδοξεν ἀποθανεῖν. καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ κελεύει 10 κρίνεσθαι εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.

[4] ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οἷον εἰ μηδʼ οἱ θεοὶ πάντα ἴσασιν, σχολῇ οἵ γε ἄνθρωποι· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπάρχοι μὴ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδʼ ᾧ ἧττον. τὸ δʼ ὅτι 15 τοὺς πλησίον τύπτει ὅς γε καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τοῦ εἰ τὸ ἧττον ὑπάρχον ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει· τοὺς γὰρ πατέρας ἧττον τύπτουσιν ἢ τοὺς πλησίον· ἢ δὴ οὕτως γε ἢ εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἢ εἰ ᾧ ἧττον ὑπάρχει ὑπάρχει, ὁπότερον δεῖ δεῖξαι, εἴθʼ ὅτι ὑπάρχει εἴθʼ ὅτι οὔ.

[5] ἔτι εἰ 20 μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὅθεν εἴρηται

καὶ σὸς μὲν οἰκτρὸς παῖδας ἀπολέσας πατήρ·

Οἰνεὺς δʼ ἄρʼ οὐχὶ τὸν Ἑλλάδος κλεινὸν ἀπολέσας γόνον;

καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μηδὲ Θησεὺς ἠδίκησεν, οὐδʼ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ μηδʼ οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδʼ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ Πάτροκλον Ἕκτωρ, 25 καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ἀλέξανδρος. καὶ εἰ μηδʼ ἄλλοι τεχνῖται φαῦλοι, οὐδʼ οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καὶ εἰ μηδʼ οἱ στρατηγοὶ φαῦλοι ὅτι θανατοῦνται πολλάκις, οὐδʼ οἱ σοφισταί. καὶ ὅτι εἰ δεῖ τὸν ἰδιώτην τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὑμᾶς τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

[6] 30 ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸν χρόνον σκοπεῖν, οἷον ὡς Ἰφικράτης ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον, ὅτι εἰ πρὶν ποιῆσαι ἠξίουν τῆς εἰκόνος τυχεῖν ἐὰν ποιήσω, ἔδοτε ἄν· ποιήσαντι δʼ ἆρʼ οὐ δώσετε; μὴ τοίνυν μέλλοντες μὲν ὑπισχνεῖσθε, παθόντες δʼ ἀφαιρεῖσθε. καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Θηβαίους διιέναι Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, 1398a 1 ὅτι εἰ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Φωκεῖς ἠξίου, ὑπέσχοντο ἄν· ἄτοπον οὖν εἰ διότι προεῖτο καὶ ἐπίστευσεν μὴ διήσουσιν.

[7] ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθʼ αὑτοῦ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ. διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος ᾧ ἐχρήσατο 5 Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα, ἐπερόμενος εἰ προδοίη ἂν τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν· οὐ φάσκοντος δέ, εἶτα εἶπεν σὺ μὲν ὢν Ἀριστοφῶν οὐκ ἂν προδοίης, ἐγὼ δʼ ὢν Ἰφικράτης; δεῖ δὲ ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἂν δοκοῦντα ἀδικῆσαι ἐκεῖνον· εἰ δὲ μή, γελοῖον ἂν φανείη, οἷον εἰ πρὸς Ἀριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα 10 τοῦτό τις ἂν εἴπειεν ἄλλος πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου· ὅλως γὰρ βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ φεύγοντος· τοῦτʼ οὖν ἐξελέγχειν δεῖ. καθόλου δὲ ἄτοπός ἐστιν, ὅταν τις ἐπιτιμᾷ ἄλλοις ἃ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ ἢ ποιήσειεν ἂν, ἢ προτρέπῃ ποιεῖν ἃ αὐτὸς μὴ ποιεῖ μηδὲ ποιήσειεν ἄν.

[8] 15 ἄλλος ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ, οἷον τί τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστιν· ἆρα θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον; καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης, ὅτι γενναιότατος ὁ βέλτιστος· καὶ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι οὐδὲν πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν γενναῖον πρὶν γενναῖόν τι 20 πρᾶξαι. καὶ ὅτι συγγενέστερος αὐτός· τὰ γοῦν ἔργα συγγενέστερά ἐστι τὰ ἐμὰ τοῖς Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἢ τὰ σά. καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὅτι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν τοὺς μὴ κοσμίους οὐχ ἑνὸς σώματος ἀγαπᾶν ἀπόλαυσιν. καὶ διʼ ὃ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον· ὕβριν 25 γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως καὶ εὖ παθόντας ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὁρισάμενοι καὶ λαβόντες τὸ τί ἐστι συλλογίζονται περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν.

[9] ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς.

[10] 30 ἄλλος ἐκ διαιρέσεως, οἷον εἰ πάντες τριῶν ἕνεκεν ἀδικοῦσιν (ἢ τοῦδε γὰρ ἕνεκα ἢ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε), καὶ διὰ μὲν τὰ δύο ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδʼ αὐτοί φασιν.

[11] ἄλλος ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, οἷον ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας, ὅτι περὶ τῶν τέκνων αἱ γυναῖκες πανταχοῦ διορίζουσι τἀληθές· 1398b 1 τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ἀθήνησι Μαντίᾳ τῷ ῥήτορι ἀμφισβητοῦντι πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἀπέφηνεν ἡ μήτηρ, τοῦτο δὲ Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου καὶ Στίλβωνος ἀμφισβητούντων ἡ Δωδωνὶς ἀπέδειξεν Ἰσμηνίου 5 τὸν υἱόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θετταλίσκον Ἰσμηνίου ἐνόμιζον. καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ Νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, εἰ τοῖς κακῶς ἐπιμεληθεῖσι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἵππων οὐ παραδιδόασι τοὺς οἰκείους, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνατρέψασι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ναῦς τὰς οἰκείας, οὐκοῦν εἰ ὁμοίως ἐφʼ ἁπάντων, καὶ τοῖς κακῶς φυλάξασι τὴν 10 ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ χρηστέον ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν σωτηρίαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας, ὅτι πάντες τοὺς σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν· Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καίπερ βλάσφημον ὄντα τετιμήκασι, καὶ Χῖοι Ὅμηρον οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην, καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφῶ καίπερ γυναῖκα οὖσαν, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλωνα καὶ τῶν γερόντων 15 ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα φιλόλογοι ὄντες, καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν, καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ τιμῶσι ἔτι καὶ νῦν, καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις χρησάμενοι εὐδαιμόνησαν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς Λυκούργου, καὶ Θήβησιν ἅμα οἱ προστάται φιλόσοφοι ἐγένοντο καὶ εὐδαιμόνησεν ἡ 20 πόλις.

[12] ἄλλος ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου, μάλιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ ἀεί, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι, ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, ἢ ἀγαθοί, ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οἷς μὴ οἷόν τε 25 ἐναντίον κρίνειν, οἷον τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ οἷς μὴ καλὸν ἐναντίον κρίνειν, οἷον θεοῖς ἢ πατρὶ ἢ διδασκάλοις, ὥσπερ ὃ εἰς Μιξιδημίδην εἶπεν Αὐτοκλῆς, εἰ ταῖς μὲν σεμναῖς θεαῖς καλῶς εἶχεν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δοῦναι τὰ δίκαια, Μιξιδημίδῃ δʼ οὔ. ἢ ὥσπερ Σαπφώ, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ 30 γὰρ οὕτω κεκρίκασιν· ἀπέθνησκον γὰρ ἄν. ἢ ὥσπερ Ἀρίστιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς ᾤετο· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γʼ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν, ἔφη, οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον, λέγων τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ Ἡγησίπολις ἐν Δελφοῖς ἠρώτα τὸν θεόν, πρότερον κεχρημένος Ὀλυμπίασιν, εἰ αὐτῷ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, 1399a 1 ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν, καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἔγραψεν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἴπερ Θησεὺς ἔκρινεν, καὶ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὅτι αἱ θεαὶ προέκριναν, καὶ περὶ Εὐαγόρου, ὅτι σπουδαῖος, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης φησίν· 5 Κόνων γοῦν δυστυχήσας, πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους παραλιπών, ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθεν.

[13] ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς ποία κίνησις ἡ ψυχή· ἥδε γὰρ ἢ ἥδε. παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου· εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ 10 τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει;

[14] ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων συμβαίνει ὥστε ἕπεσθαί τι τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν, οἷον τῇ παιδεύσει τὸ φθονεῖσθαι ἀκολουθεῖ 15 κακὸν ὄν, τὸ δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν· οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ παιδεύεσθαι, φθονεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ δεῖ· δεῖ μὲν οὖν παιδεύεσθαι, σοφὸν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ. ὁ τόπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ Καλλίππου τέχνη, προσλαβοῦσα τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τἆλλα ὡς εἴρηται.

[15] ἄλλος, ὅταν περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένοιν ἢ προτρέπειν 20 ἢ ἀποτρέπειν δέῃ, καὶ τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν χρῆσθαι. διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ τυχόντα ἀντιτίθεται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τἀναντία· οἷον ἱέρεια οὐκ εἴα τὸν υἱὸν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γάρ, ἔφη, τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ ἄνθρωποί σε μισήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ θεοί· δεῖ μὲν 25 οὖν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ θεοί σε φιλήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ ἄνθρωποι. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ ταὐτὸ τῷ λεγομένῳ, τὸ ἕλος πρίασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἅλας· καὶ ἡ βλαίσωσις τοῦτο ἐστίν, ὅταν δυοῖν ἐναντίοιν ἑκατέρῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἕπηται, ἐναντία ἑκάτερα ἑκατέροις.

[16] 30 ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ταὐτὰ φανερῶς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ἀφανῶς, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς μὲν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπαινοῦσι μάλιστα, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα μᾶλλον βούλονται, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι συνάγειν θάτερον· τῶν γὰρ παραδόξων οὗτος ὁ τόπος κυριώτατός ἐστιν.

[17] 35 ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, οἷον ὁ Ἰφικράτης, τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, νεώτερον ὄντα τῆς ἡλικίας, ὅτι μέγας ἦν λειτουργεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, εἶπεν ὅτι εἰ τοὺς μεγάλους τῶν παίδων ἄνδρας νομίζουσι, τοὺς μικροὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν παῖδας εἶναι ψηφιοῦνται, 1399b 1 καὶ Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ Νόμῳ, ὅτι πολίτας μὲν ποιεῖσθε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, οἷον Στράβακα καὶ Χαρίδημον, διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν· φυγάδας δʼ οὐ ποιήσεσθε τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἀνήκεστα διαπεπραγμένους;

[18] 5 ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐὰν ᾖ ταὐτόν, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὧν συμβαίνει ταὐτά· οἷον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεούς ποτε. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐξ ἑκάστου λαμβάνειν 10 ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεί· μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ περὶ Ἰσοκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν. καὶ ὅτι τὸ διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον. ληπτέον δʼ ὁπότερον ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον.

[19] 15 ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ταὐτὸ ἀεὶ αἱρεῖσθαι ὕστερον καὶ πρότερον, ἀλλʼ ἀνάπαλιν, οἷον τόδε τὸ ἐνθύμημα, ἦ φεύγοντες μὲν ἐμαχόμεθα ὅπως κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ὅπως μὴ μαχώμεθα; ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μένειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεσθαι ᾑροῦντο, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ μὴ μάχεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ μένειν.

[20] 20 ἄλλος τὸ οὗ ἕνεκʼ ἂν εἴη ἢ γένοιτο, τούτου ἕνεκα φάναι εἶναι ἢ γεγενῆσθαι, οἷον εἰ δοίη ἄν τίς τινι ἵνʼ ἀφελόμενος λυπήσῃ, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἴρηται,

πολλοῖς ὁ δαίμων οὐ κατʼ εὔνοιαν φέρων

μεγάλα δίδωσιν εὐτυχήματʼ, ἀλλʼ ἵνα

τὰς συμφορὰς λάβωσιν ἐπιφανεστέρας.

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος,

οὐχ ὡς κτάνωσι θῆρʼ, ὅπως δὲ μάρτυρες

ἀρετῆς γένωνται Μελεάγρῳ πρὸς Ἑλλάδα.

Antiphon fr. 2 καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Αἴαντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προείλετο 30 Ὀδυσσέα οὐ τιμῶν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα ἥττων ᾖ ὁ ἀκολουθῶν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τούτου ἕνεκα ποιῆσαι.

[21] ἄλλος, κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ τοῖς συμβουλεύουσι, σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσιν· ταῦτα γάρ 35 ἐστιν ἃ ἐὰν μὲν ὑπάρχῃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, μὴ πράττειν, οἷον, εἰ δυνατὸν καὶ ῥᾴδιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ φίλοις ἢ βλαβερὸν ἐχθροῖς, κἂν ᾖ ἐπιζήμιον, εἰ ἐλάττων ἡ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ προτρέπονται δʼ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἀποτρέπονται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων. 1400a 1 ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται· ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προτρεπόντων κατηγοροῦσιν. ἔστι δʼ ὁ τόπος οὗτος ὅλη τέχνη ἥ τε Παμφίλου καὶ ἡ Καλλίππου.

[22] 5 ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων μὲν γίγνεσθαι ἀπίστων δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔδοξαν, εἰ μὴ ἦν ἢ ἐγγὺς ἦν. καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον· ἢ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰ εἰκότα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν· εἰ οὖν ἄπιστον καὶ μὴ εἰκός, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ διά γε τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανὸν δοκεῖ οὕτως· οἷον Ἀνδροκλῆς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πιτθεὺς κατηγορῶν 10 τοῦ νόμου, ἐπεὶ ἐθορύβησαν αὐτῷ εἰπόντι, δέονται οἱ νόμοι νόμου τοῦ διορθώσοντος, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἰχθύες ἁλός, καίτοι οὐκ εἰκὸς οὐδὲ πιθανὸν ἐν ἅλμῃ τρεφομένους δεῖσθαι ἁλός, καὶ τὰ στέμφυλα ἐλαίου, καίτοι ἄπιστον, ἐξ ὧν ἔλαιον γίγνεται, ταῦτα δεῖσθαι ἐλαίου.

[23] 15 ἄλλος ἐλεγκτικός, τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα σκοπεῖν, εἴ τι ἀνομολογούμενον ἐκ τόπων καὶ χρόνων καὶ πράξεων καὶ λόγων, χωρὶς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, οἷον καὶ φησὶ μὲν φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς, συνώμοσεν δὲ τοῖς τριάκοντα, χωρὶς δʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ, καὶ φησὶ μὲν εἶναί με φιλόδικον, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ 20 ἀποδεῖξαι δεδικασμένον οὐδεμίαν δίκην, χωρὶς δʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὐ δεδάνεικε πώποτε οὐδέν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς λέλυμαι ὑμῶν.

[24] ἄλλος τοῖς προδιαβεβλημένοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις καὶ πράγμασιν, ἢ δοκοῦσι, τὸ λέγειν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ παραδόξου· 25 ἔστιν γάρ τι διʼ ὃ φαίνεται· οἷον, ὑποβεβλημένης τινὸς τὸν αὑτῆς υἱόν, διὰ τὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι ἐδόκει συνεῖναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, λεχθέντος δὲ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐλύθη ἡ διαβολή· καὶ οἷον ἐν τῷ Αἴαντι τῷ Θεοδέκτου Ὀδυσσεὺς λέγει πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα διότι ἀνδρειότερος ὢν τοῦ Αἴαντος οὐ δοκεῖ.

[25] 30 ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου, ἄν τε ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι ἔστι, κἂν μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἅμα γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ οὗ αἴτιον, καὶ ἄνευ αἰτίου οὐθὲν ἔστιν, οἷον Λεωδάμας ἀπολογούμενος ἔλεγε, κατηγορήσαντος Θρασυβούλου ὅτι ἦν στηλίτης γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει, ἀλλʼ ἐκκέκοπται ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα· οὐκ 35 ἐνδέχεσθαι ἔφη· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν πιστεύειν αὑτῷ τοὺς τριάκοντα ἐγγεγραμμένης τῆς ἔχθρας πρὸς τὸν δῆμον.

[26] ἄλλος, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο βέλτιον ἄλλως, ἢ ἐνδέχεται, ὧν ἢ συμβουλεύει ἢ πράττει ἢ πέπραχε σκοπεῖν· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, 1400b 1 εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ πέπραχεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν τὰ φαῦλα καὶ γιγνώσκων προαιρεῖται. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· πολλάκις γὰρ ὕστερον γίγνεται δῆλον πῶς ἦν πρᾶξαι βέλτιον, πρότερον δὲ ἄδηλον.

[27] 5 ἄλλος, ὅταν τι ἐναντίον μέλλῃ πράττεσθαι τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, ἅμα σκοπεῖν, οἷον Ξενοφάνης Ἐλεάταις ἐρωτῶσιν εἰ θύωσι τῇ Λευκοθέᾳ καὶ θρηνῶσιν ἢ μή, συνεβούλευεν, εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δʼ ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θύειν.

[28] ἄλλος τόπος τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτηθέντων κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, 10 οἷον ἐν τῇ Καρκίνου Μηδείᾳ οἱ μὲν κατηγοροῦσιν ὅτι τοὺς παῖδας ἀπέκτεινεν, οὐ φαίνεσθαι γοῦν αὐτούς (ἥμαρτε γὰρ ἡ Μήδεια περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παίδων), ἡ δʼ ἀπολογεῖται ὅτι οὐ ἂν τοὺς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τὸν Ἰάσονα ἂν ἀπέκτεινεν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἥμαρτεν ἂν μὴ ποιήσασα, εἴπερ 15 καὶ θάτερον ἐποίησεν. ἔστι δʼ ὁ τόπος οὗτος τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη.

[29] ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἷον ὡς ὁ Σοφοκλῆς

σαφῶς σιδήρῳ καὶ φοροῦσα τοὔνομα,

Soph. fr. 597 καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπαίνοις εἰώθασι λέγειν, καὶ ὡς 20 Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκάλει, καὶ Ἡρόδικος Θρασύμαχον ἀεὶ θρασύμαχος εἶ, καὶ Πῶλον ἀεὶ σὺ πῶλος εἶ, καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος (χαλεποὶ γάρ)· καὶ ὡς ἡ Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβη εἰς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην

καὶ τοὔνομʼ ὀρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἄρχει θεᾶς,

Eur. Hec. 990 25 καὶ ὡς Χαιρήμων

Πενθεὺς ἐσομένης συμφορᾶς ἐπώνυμος.

Chaeremon fr. 4

[30] εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν μὲν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παρʼ ἄλληλα δὲ φανερὰ εἶναι τῷ ἀκροατῇ μᾶλλον. πάντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλεγκτικῶν καὶ τῶν 30 δεικτικῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα ἀρχόμενα προορῶσι μὴ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι (ἅμα γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς χαίρουσι προαισθανόμενοι), καὶ ὅσων τοσοῦτον ὑστερίζουσιν ὥσθʼ ἅμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν.

[1] ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὲν εἶναι συλλογισμόν, τὸν δὲ μὴ 35 εἶναι μὲν φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνθύμημα τὸ μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ἐνθύμημα φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἐπείπερ τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις.

[2] 1401a 1 τόποι δʼ εἰσὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων εἷς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, καὶ τούτου ἓν μὲν μέρος, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερασματικῶς τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη 5 ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα (ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος)· καὶ ἔοικε τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως. ἔστι δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια 10 λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δʼ ἑτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς δʼ Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρωσε· ἕκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐξ ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνεσθαι.

ἓν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, τὸ φάναι σπουδαῖον εἶναι μῦν, ἀφʼ οὗ γʼ ἐστὶν ἡ τιμιωτάτη πασῶν τελετή· 15 τὰ γὰρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμιωτάτη τελετή. ἢ εἴ τις κύνα ἐγκωμιάζων τὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνοι, ἢ τὸν Πᾶνα, ὅτι Πίνδαρος ἔφησεν

ὦ μάκαρ, ὅν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα παντοδαπὸν

καλέουσιν Ὀλύμπιοι,

20 ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύνʼ ἀτιμότατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ κύνα δῆλον ὅτι τίμιον. καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν φάναι τὸν Ἑρμῆν εἶναι μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν· μόνος γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς. καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, ὅτι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οὐ χρημάτων ἀλλὰ λόγου εἰσὶν ἄξιοι· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἄξιον οὐχ ἁπλῶς 25 λέγεται.

[3] ἄλλος τὸ τὸ διῃρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐκ ὂν ταὐτὸ πολλάκις, ὁπότερον χρησιμώτερον, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λόγος, οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τριήρης ἐμ Πειραεῖ ἐστίν· ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν. καὶ τὸν τὰ 30 στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, μηδὲ τὸ ἓν φάναι ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἓν κακόν ἐστιν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐλεγκτικόν, ὧδε δὲ δεικτικόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἓν ἀγαθὸν δύο κακά· ὅλος δὲ ὁ τόπος παραλογιστικός. πάλιν τὸ 35 Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ὅτι τριάκοντα τυράννους κατέλυσε· συντίθησι γάρ. ἢ τὸ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τῷ Θεοδέκτου· ἐκ διαιρέσεως γάρ ἐστιν·

δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἥτις ἂν κτείνῃ πόσιν,

Theodectes fr. 5 ἀποθνῄσκειν ταύτην, καὶ τῷ πατρί γε τιμωρεῖν τὸν υἱόν, 1401b 1 οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πέπρακται· συντεθέντα γὰρ ἴσως οὐκέτι δίκαιον. εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τίνος.

[4] ἄλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀνασκευάζειν· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὅταν, μὴ δείξας ὅτι ἐποίησεν μηδʼ ὅτι 5 οὐκ ἐποίησεν, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ποιεῖ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ὡς οὐ πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων αὔξῃ, ἢ ὡς πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν αὐξῇ. οὔκουν ἐστὶν ἐνθύμημα· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ὁ ἀκροατὴς ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐ δεδειγμένου.

[5] ἄλλος τὸ ἐκ σημείου· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ 10 καὶ τοῦτο· οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες· ὁ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως κατέλυσε τὸν τύραννον Ἵππαρχον, ἢ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι κλέπτης Διονύσιος· πονηρὸς γάρ· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς πονηρὸς κλέπτης, ἀλλὰ κλέπτης πᾶς πονηρός.

[6] ἄλλος 15 διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὃ λέγει Πολυκράτης εἰς τοὺς μῦς, ὅτι ἐβοήθησαν διατραγόντες τὰς νευράς· ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθῆναι τιμιώτατον· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐμήνισε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν Τενέδῳ· ὁ δʼ ὡς ἀτιμαζόμενος ἐμήνισεν, συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι.

[7] 20 ἄλλος τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι μεγαλόψυχος· ὑπεριδὼν γὰρ τὴν πολλῶν ὁμιλίαν ἐν τῇ Ἴδῃ διέτριβεν καθʼ αὑτόν· ὅτι γὰρ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι, καὶ οὗτος μεγαλόψυχος δόξειεν ἄν. καὶ ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστὴς καὶ νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός· τοιοῦτοι γάρ. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ὅτι 25 ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς οἱ πτωχοὶ καὶ ᾄδουσι καὶ ὀρχοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς φυγάσιν ἔξεστιν οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν θέλωσιν· ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς ταῦτα ὑπάρχει δόξαιεν ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς· διὸ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἐμπίπτει.

[8] ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ 30 ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον, οἷον τῷ ἅμα ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο γεγονέναι· τὸ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν· μετʼ ἐκείνην γὰρ συνέβη ὁ πόλεμος.

[9] ἄλλος παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, 35 οἷον ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἑλένην· αἵρεσις γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐδόθη παρὰ τοῦ πατρός. οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσως, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι τούτου κύριος. 1402a 1 ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ τύπτειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὕβριν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ πάντως, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἄρχῃ χειρῶν ἀδίκων.

[10] ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος 5 συλλογισμός, οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν ὄν, ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον, ἔστιν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον ὅτι ἄγνωστον, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἐστιν φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῶς εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ 10 καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει

τάχʼ ἄν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτʼ εἶναι λέγοι,

βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα.

γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκός. ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, 15 ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός.

[11] ἔστι δʼ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόπου ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη· ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ᾖ τῇ αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενὴς ὢν αἰκίας φεύγει (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός), κἂν ἔνοχος 20 ᾖ, οἷον ἰσχυρὸς ὤν (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι εἰκὸς ἔμελλε δόξειν). ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ γὰρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ· φαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀμφότερα εἰκότα, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ εἴρηται· καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτʼ ἔστιν. καὶ 25 ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέραινον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεῦδός τε γάρ ἐστιν, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐριστικῇ.

[1] καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων, καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων, 30 εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ λύσεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰπεῖν. ἔστιν δὲ λύειν ἢ ἀντισυλλογισάμενον ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκόντα.

[2] τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀντισυλλογίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων, δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν·

[3] αἱ δʼ ἐνστάσεις 35 φέρονται καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἢ ἐκ τῶν κεκριμένων.

[4] λέγω δὲ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ μέν, οἷον εἰ περὶ ἔρωτος εἴη τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὡς σπουδαῖος, 1402b 1 ἡ ἔνστασις διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ καθόλου εἰπόντα ὅτι πᾶσα ἔνδεια πονηρόν, ἢ κατὰ μέρος ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐλέγετο Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ πονηροὶ ἔρωτες.

[5] ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἔνστασις φέρεται, οἷον, εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἦν 5 ὅτι ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖ, ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς.

[6] ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου, οἷον, εἰ ἦν τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἀεὶ μισοῦσιν, ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ οἱ εὖ πεπονθότες ἀεὶ φιλοῦσιν.

[7] αἱ δὲ κρίσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀνδρῶν, οἷον εἴ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν 10 ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ἔνστασις ὅτι οὔκουν ὁ Πιττακὸς αἰνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ.

[8] ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων, τὰ δὲ τέτταρα ταῦτʼ ἐστίν, εἰκὸς παράδειγμα τεκμήριον σημεῖον, ἔστι δὲ 15 τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ὄντων ἢ δοκούντων συνηγμένα ἐνθυμήματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἐπαγωγῆς ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου, ἢ ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ὅταν λαβὼν τὸ καθόλου εἶτα συλλογίσηται τὰ κατὰ μέρος, διὰ παραδείγματος, τὰ δὲ διὰ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντος διὰ τεκμηρίου, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ 20 τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, ἐάν τε ὂν ἐάν τε μή, διὰ σημείων, τὸ δὲ εἰκὸς οὐ τὸ ἀεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἔνστασιν,

[9] ἡ δὲ λύσις φαινομένη ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἀεί· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός λύει ὁ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον·

[10] διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ 25 ἔστι πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπολογούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ κατηγοροῦντα διὰ τοῦτον τὸν παραλογισμόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν διὰ εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸ λῦσαι ἢ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀεὶ δʼ ἔχει ἔνστασιν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ ἅμʼ ἀεὶ εἰκός, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον), ὁ δὲ κριτὴς 30 οἴεται, ἂν οὕτω λυθῇ, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὑτῷ κριτέον, παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν), οὔκουν ἱκανὸν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός.

[11] 35 τοῦτο δὲ συμβήσεται ἐὰν ᾖ ἡ ἔνστασις μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἢ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δὲ εἰ ἀμφοῖν· 1403a 1 εἰ γὰρ τὰ πλείω καὶ πλεονάκις οὕτως, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον.

[12] λύεται δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμήματα εἰρημένα, κἂν ᾖ ὑπάρχοντα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· ὅτι γὰρ ἀσυλλόγιστόν ἐστιν πᾶν σημεῖον, δῆλον ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν 5 Ἀναλυτικῶν.

[13] πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματώδη ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις καὶ τὰ εἰκότα· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἕν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις ἄλλως, ἐάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι τὸ παρὸν οὐχ 10 ὅμοιον ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἢ διαφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει.

[14] τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια καὶ τεκμηριώδη ἐνθυμήματα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον οὐκ ἔσται λῦσαι (δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦθʼ ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν), λείπεται δʼ ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λεγόμενον δεικνύναι. εἰ δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅτι τεκμήριον, ἄλυτον ἤδη γίγνεται 15 τοῦτο· πάντα γὰρ γίγνεται ἀπόδειξις ἤδη φανερά.

[1] τὸ δʼ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθυμήματος στοιχεῖον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον· ἔστιν γὰρ στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπος εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει. τὸ δʼ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, 20 ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν.

[2] ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν πάντα περὶ ἃ οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὥστʼ εἰ μηδὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ἐνθυμήματος τόπος, οὐδὲ τὸ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν.

[3] οὐδὲ τὰ λυτικὰ ἐνθυμήματος 25 εἶδός τί ἐστιν ἄλλο τῶν κατασκευαστικῶν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι λύει μὲν ἢ δείξας ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκών, ἀνταποδείκνυσι δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, οἷον εἰ ἔδειξε ὅτι γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, εἰ δὲ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι γέγονεν· ὥστε αὕτη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ διαφορά (τοῖς αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρῶνται ἀμφότεροι· 30 ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν, ἐνθυμήματα φέρουσιν)·

[4] ἡ δʼ ἔνστασις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθύμημα, ἀλλά, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τὸ εἰπεῖν δόξαν τινὰ ἐξ ἧς ἔσται δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συλλελόγισται ἢ ὅτι ψεῦδός τι εἴληφεν.

[5] ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, 35 ὑπὲρ μὲν παραδειγμάτων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ὅλως τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, 1403b 1 ὅθεν τε εὐπορήσομεν καὶ ὡς αὐτὰ λύσομεν, εἰρήσθω ἡμῖν τοσαῦτα, λοιπὸν δὲ διελθεῖν περὶ λέξεως καὶ τάξεως.

Translations (1)

The "Art" of Rhetoric Perseus (Aristotle. The "Art" of Rhetoric. Freese, John Henry, translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1926 (printing).) — 2.1 focus

[1] 1377b 16 Such then are the materials which we must employ in exhorting and dissuading, praising and blaming, accusing and defending, and such are the opinions and propositions that are useful to produce conviction in these circumstances; for they are the subject and source of enthymemes, 20 which are specially suitable to each class (so to say) of speeches.¹

[2] But since the object of Rhetoric is judgement—for judgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric and judicial proceedings are a judgement—it is not only necessary to consider how to make the speech itself demonstrative and convincing, but also that the speaker should show himself to be of a certain character and should know how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind.

[3] For it makes a great difference with regard to producing conviction—especially in demonstrative, and, next to this, in forensic oratory—that the speaker should show himself to be possessed of certain qualities and that his hearers should think that he is disposed in a certain way towards them; and further, that they themselves should be disposed in a certain way towards him.²

[4] In deliberative oratory, it is more useful that the orator should appear to be of a certain character, in forensic, that the hearer should be disposed in a certain way; for opinions vary, according as men love or hate, are wrathful or mild, 1378a 1 and things appear either altogether different, or different in degree; for when a man is favorably disposed towards one on whom he is passing judgement, he either thinks that the accused has committed no wrong at all or that his offence is trifling; but if he hates him, the reverse is the case. And if a man desires anything and has good hopes of getting it, if what is to come is pleasant, he thinks that it is sure to come to pass and will be good; but if a man is unemotional or not hopeful³ it is quite the reverse.

[5] For the orator to produce conviction three qualities are necessary; for, independently of demonstrations, the things which induce belief are three in number. These qualities are good sense, virtue, and goodwill; for speakers are wrong both in what they say and in the advice they give, because they lack either all three or one of them.

[6] For either through want of sense they form incorrect opinions, or, if their opinions are correct, through viciousness they do not say what they think, or, if they are sensible and good,⁴ they lack goodwill; wherefore it may happen that they do not give the best advice, although they know what it is. These qualities are all that are necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily convince his hearers.

[7] The means whereby he may appear sensible and good⁵ must be inferred from the classification of the virtues;⁶ for to make himself appear such he would employ the same means as he would in the case of others. We must now speak of goodwill and friendship in our discussion of the emotions.

[8] 20 The emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions and their contraries.

[9] And each of them must be divided under three heads; for instance, in regard to anger, the disposition of mind which makes men angry, the persons with whom they are usually angry, and the occasions which give rise to anger. For if we knew one or even two of these heads, but not all three, it would be impossible to arouse that emotion. The same applies to the rest. Just as, then, we have given a list of propositions⁷ in what we have previously said, we will do the same here and divide the emotions in the same manner.

[1] Let us then define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight,⁸ affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved.

[2] If this definition is correct, the angry man must always be angry with a particular individual (for instance, with Cleon, but not with men generally), 1378b 1 and because this individual has done, or was on the point of doing, something against him or one of his friends; and lastly, anger is always accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come. For it is pleasant to think that one will obtain what one aims at; now, no one aims at what is obviously impossible of attainment by him, and the angry man aims at what is possible for himself. Wherefore it has been well said of anger, that

Far sweeter than dripping honey down the throat it spreads in men's hearts.⁹

for it is accompanied by a certain pleasure, for this reason first,¹⁰ and also because men dwell upon the thought of revenge, and the vision that rises before us produces the same pleasure as one seen in dreams.

[3] Slighting is an actualization of opinion in regard to something which appears valueless; for things which are really bad or good, or tend to become so, we consider worthy of attention, but those which are of no importance or trifling¹¹ we ignore. Now there are three kinds of slight: disdain, spitefulness, and insult.

[4] For he who disdains, slights, since men disdain those things which they consider valueless and slight what is of no account. And the spiteful man appears to show disdain; for spitefulness consists in placing obstacles in the way of another's wishes, not in order that any advantage may accrue to him who spites, but to prevent any accruing to the other. Since then he does not act in this manner from self-interest, it is a slight; 20 for it is evident that he has no idea that the other is likely to hurt him, for in that case he would be afraid of him instead of slighting him; nor that he will be of any use to him worth speaking of, for in that case his thought would be how to become his friend.¹²

[5] Similarly, he who insults another also slights him; for insult¹³ consists in causing injury or annoyance whereby the sufferer is disgraced, not to obtain any other advantage for oneself besides the performance of the act, but for one's own pleasure; for retaliation is not insult, but punishment.

[6] The cause of the pleasure felt by those who insult is the idea that, in ill-treating others, they are more fully showing superiority. That is why the young and the wealthy are given to insults; for they think that, in committing them, they are showing their superiority. Dishonor is characteristic of insult; and one who dishonors another slights him; for that which is worthless has no value, either as good or evil. Hence Achilles in his wrath exclaims:

He has dishonored me, since he keeps the prize he has taken for himself,¹⁴

and

[has treated me] like a dishonored vagrant,¹⁵

[7] as if being angry for these reasons. Now men think that they have a right to be highly esteemed by those who are inferior to them in birth, power, and virtue, 1379a 1 and generally, in whatever similar respect¹⁶ a man is far superior to another; for example, the rich man to the poor man in the matter of money, the eloquent to the incompetent speaker in the matter of oratory, the governor to the governed, and the man who thinks himself worthy to rule to one who is only fit to be ruled. Wherefore it has been said:

Great is the wrath of kings cherished by Zeus,¹⁷

and

Yet it may be that even afterwards he cherishes his resentment,¹⁸

for kings are resentful in consideration of their superior rank.

[8] Further, men are angry at slights from those by whom they think they have a right to expect to be well treated; such are those on whom they have conferred or are conferring benefits, either themselves, or some one else for them, or one of their friends; and all those whom they desire, or did desire, to benefit.

[9] It is now evident from these considerations what is the disposition of those who are angry, with whom they are angry, and for what reasons. Men are angry when they are pained, because one who is pained aims at something; if then anyone directly opposes him in anything, as, for instance, prevents him from drinking when thirsty, or not directly, but seems to be doing just the same; and if anyone goes against him or refuses to assist him, or troubles him in any other way when he is in this frame of mind, he is angry with all such persons.

[10] Wherefore the sick, the necessitous, [those at war], the lovesick, the thirsty, in a word, all who desire something and cannot obtain it, are prone to anger and easily excited, especially against those who make light of their present condition; for instance, the sick man is easily provoked in regard to his illness,¹⁹ the necessitous in regard to his poverty, the warrior in regard 20 to warlike affairs, the lover in regard to love affairs, and so with all the rest; for the passion²⁰ present in his mind in each case paves the way for his anger.

[11] Again, men are angry when the event is contrary to their expectation, for the more unexpected a thing is, the more it pains; just as they are overjoyed if, contrary to expectation, what they desire comes to pass. From this it is obvious what are the seasons, times, states of mind, and conditions of age in which we are easily moved²¹ to anger; and what are the various times, places, and reasons, which make us more prone to anger in proportion as we are subject to their influence.

[12] Such then are the dispositions of those who are easily roused to anger. As to the objects of their anger, men are angry with those who ridicule, mock, and scoff at them, for this is an insult. And with those who injure them in ways that are indications of insult. But these acts must be of such a kind that they are neither retaliatory nor advantageous to those who commit them; for if they are, they then appear due to gratuitous insult.

[13] And men are angry with those who speak ill of or despise things which they themselves consider of the greatest importance; for instance, if a man speaks contemptuously of philosophy or of personal beauty in the presence of those who pride themselves upon them; and so in all other cases.

[14] But they are far more angry if they suspect that they do not possess these qualities, either not at all, or not to any great extent, or when others do not think they possess them. 1379b 1 For when they feel strongly that they do possess those qualities which are the subject of mockery, they pay no heed to it.

[15] And they are more angry with those who are their friends than with those who are not, for they think that they have a right to be treated well by them rather than ill.

[16] And they are angry with those who have been in the habit of honoring and treating them with respect, if they no longer behave so towards them; for they think that they are being treated with contempt by them, otherwise they would treat them as before.

[17] And with those who do not return their kindnesses nor requite them in full; and with those who oppose them, if they are inferiors; for all such appear to treat them with contempt, the latter as if they regarded them as inferiors, the former as if they had received kindnesses from inferiors.

[18] And they are more angry with those who are of no account, if they slight them; for anger at a slight was assumed to be felt at those who ought not to behave In such a manner; for inferiors ought not to slight their superiors.

[19] And they are angry with friends, if they neither speak well of nor treat them well, and in an even greater degree, if they do the opposite. And if they fail to perceive that they want something from them, as Plexippus²² in Antiphon's tragedy reproached Meleager; for failure to perceive this is a sign of slight; since, when we care for people, these things are noticed.²³

[20] And they are angry with those who rejoice, or in a general way are cheerful when they are unfortunate; for this is an indication of enmity or slight. And with those who do not care if they pain them; 20 whence they are angry with those who bring bad news.

[21] And with those who listen to the tale of their faults, or look on them with indifference, for they resemble slighters or enemies;

[22] for friends sympathize and all men are pained to see their own faults exposed.²⁴ And further, with those who slight them before five classes of persons: namely, their rivals, those whom they admire, those by whom they would like to be admired, those whom they respect, or those who respect them; when anyone slights them before these, their anger is greater.

[23] They are also angry with those who slight such persons as it would be disgraceful for them not to defend, for instance, parents, children, wives, and dependents.²⁵ And with those who are ungrateful,²⁶ for the slight is contrary to all sense of obligation.

[24] And with those who employ irony, when they themselves are in earnest;

[25] for irony shows contempt. And with those who do good to others, but not to them; for not to think them worthy of what they bestow upon all others also shows contempt.

[26] Forgetfulness also is a cause of anger, such as forgetting names, although it is a mere trifle, since even forgetfulness seems a sign of slight; for it is caused by indifference, and indifference is a slight. 1380a 1

[27] We have thus stated at one and the same time the frame of mind and the reasons which make men angry, and the objects of their anger. It is evident then that it will be necessary for the speaker, by his eloquence, to put the hearers into the frame of mind of those who are inclined to anger, and to show that his opponents are responsible for things which rouse men to anger and are people of the kind with whom men are angry.

[1] And since becoming angry is the opposite of becoming mild, and anger of mildness, we must determine the state of mind which makes men mild, towards whom they become mild, and the reasons which make them so.

[2] Let us then define making mild as the quieting and appeasing of anger.

[3] If then men are angry with those who slight them, and slight is voluntary, it is evident that they are mild towards those who do none of these things, or do them involuntarily, or at least appear to be such;

[4] and towards those who intended the opposite of what they have done, and all who behave in the same way to themselves, for no one is likely to slight himself.

[5] And towards those who admit and are sorry for a slight; for finding as it were satisfaction in the pain the offenders feel at what they have done, men cease to be angry. Evidence of this may be seen in the punishment of slaves; for we punish more severely those who contradict us and deny their offence, but cease to be angry with those who admit that they are justly punished. The reason is that to deny what is evident is disrespect, and disrespect 20 is slight and contempt;

[6] anyhow, we show no respect for those for whom we entertain a profound contempt. Men also are mild towards those who humble themselves before them and do not contradict them, for they seem to recognize that they are inferior; now, those who are inferior are afraid, and no one who is afraid slights another. Even the behavior of dogs proves that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves, for they do not bite those who sit down.²⁷

[7] And men are mild towards those who are serious with them when they are serious, for they think they are being treated seriously, not with contempt.

[8] And towards those who have rendered them greater services.²⁸ And towards those who want something and deprecate their anger, for they are humbler.

[9] And towards those who refrain from insulting, mocking, or slighting anyone, or any virtuous man, or those who resemble themselves.

[10] And generally speaking, one can determine the reasons that make for mildness by their opposites. Thus, men are mild towards those whom they fear or respect, as long as they feel so towards them, for it is impossible to be afraid and angry at the same time.

[11] And against those who have acted in anger they either feel no anger or in a less degree, for they do not seem to have acted from a desire to slight. For no one slights another when angry, since slight is free from pain, 1380b 1 but anger is accompanied by it.

[12] And men are not angry with those who usually show respect for them.²⁹

It is also evident that those are mild whose condition is contrary to that which excites anger, as when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in success, in abundance,³⁰ and, in general, in freedom from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, or in virtuous hope. Further, those whose anger is of long standing and not in its full flush, for time appeases anger.

[13] Again, vengeance previously taken upon one person appeases anger against another, even though it be greater. Wherefore Philocrates,³¹ when someone asked him why he did not justify himself when the people were angry with him, made the judicious reply, Not yet. When then? When I see someone accused of the same offence; for men grow mild when they have exhausted their anger upon another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus.³² For although the Athenians were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted him, because they had condemned CalIicrates to death on the previous day.

[14] Men also grow mild towards those whom they pity³³; and if an offender has suffered greater evil than those who are angry would have inflicted, for they have an idea that they have as it were obtained reparation.

[15] And if they think that they themselves are wrong and deserve what they suffer, for anger is not aroused against what is just; they no longer think that they are being treated otherwise than they should be, which, as we have said, is the essence of anger. Wherefore we should inflict a preliminary verbal chastisement, for even slaves are less indignant at punishment 20 of this kind.

[16] And men are milder if they think that those punished will never know that the punishment comes from them in requital for their own wrongs; for anger has to do with the individual, as is clear from our definition.³⁴ Wherefore it is justly said by the poet:

Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities,³⁵

as if Polyphemus would not have been punished,³⁶ had he remained ignorant who had blinded him and for what. So that men are not angry either with any others who cannot know who punishes them,³⁷ or with the dead, since they have paid the last penalty and can feel neither pain nor anything else, which is the aim of those who are angry.³⁸ So then, in regard to Hector, Homer, when desirous of restraining the anger of Achilles against a dead man, well says:

For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath.³⁹

[17] It is evident, then, that men must have recourse to these topics when they desire to appease their audience, putting them into the frame of mind required and representing those with whom they are angry as either formidable or deserving of respect, or as having rendered them great services, or acted involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they have done.

[1] Let us now state who are the persons that men love⁴⁰ or hate, and why, after we have defined love and loving.

[2] Let loving, then, be defined as wishing for anyone the things which we believe to be good, for his sake but not for our own, 1381a 1 and procuring them for him as far as lies in our power. A friend is one who loves and is loved in return, and those who think their relationship is of this character consider themselves friends.

[3] This being granted, it necessarily follows that he is a friend who shares our joy in good fortune and our sorrow in affliction, for our own sake and not for any other reason. For all men rejoice when what they desire comes to pass and are pained when the contrary happens, so that pain and pleasure are indications of their wish.

[4] And those are friends who have the same ideas of good and bad, and love and hate the same persons, since they necessarily wish the same things; wherefore one who wishes for another what he wishes for himself seems to be the other's friend.

[5] We also like those who have done good either to us or to those whom we hold dear, if the services are important, or are cordially rendered, or under certain circumstances, and for our sake only; and all those whom we think desirous of doing us good.

[6] And those who are friends of our friends and who like those whom we like, and those who are liked by those who are liked by us;

[7] and those whose enemies are ours, those who hate those whom we ourselves hate, and those who are hated by those who are hated by us; for all such persons have the same idea as ourselves of what is good, so that they wish what is good for us, which, as we said, is the characteristic of a friend.

[8] Further, we like those who are ready to help others in the matter of 20 money or personal safety; wherefore men honor those who are liberal and courageous and just.

[9] And such we consider those who do not live upon others; the sort of men who live by their exertions, and among them agriculturists, and, beyond all others, those who work with their own hands.⁴¹

[10] And the self-controlled, because they are not likely to commit injustice;

[11] and those who are not busybodies, for the same reason. And those with whom we wish to be friends, if they also seem to wish it; such are those who excel in virtue and enjoy a good reputation, either generally, or amongst the best, or amongst those who are admired by us or by whom we are admired.⁴²

[12] Further, those who are agreeable to live or spend the time with; such are those who are good-tempered and not given to carping at our errors, neither quarrelsome nor contentious, for all such persons are pugnacious, and the wishes of the pugnacious appear to be opposed to ours.

[13] And those are liked who are clever at making or taking a joke, for each has the same end in view as his neighbor, being able to take a joke and return it in good taste.

[14] And those who praise our good qualities, especially those which we ourselves are afraid we do not possess; 1381b 1

[15] those who are neat in their personal appearance and dress, and clean-living;

[16] those who do not make our errors or the benefits they have conferred a matter of reproach, for both these are inclined to be censorious;

[17] those who bear no malice and do not cherish the memory of their wrongs, but are easily appeased; for we think that they will be to ourselves such as we suppose them to be to others;

[18] and those who are neither given to slander, or eager to know the faults of their neighbors nor our own, but only the good qualities;

[19] for this is the way in which the good man acts. And those who do not oppose us when we are angry or occupied, for such persons are pugnacious; and those who show any good feeling towards us; for instance, if they admire us, think us good men, and take pleasure in our company,

[20] especially those who are so disposed towards us in regard to things for which we particularly desire to be either admired or to be thought worthy or agreeable.

[21] And we like those who resemble us and have the same tastes, provided their interests do not clash with ours and that they do not gain their living in the same way; for then it becomes a case of

Potter [being jealous] of potter.⁴³

[22] And those who desire the same things, provided it is possible for us to share them; otherwise the same thing would happen again.

[23] And those with whom we are on such terms that we do not blush before them for faults merely condemned by 20 public opinion, provided that this is not due to contempt;

[24] and those before whom we do blush for faults that are really bad. And those whose rivals we are,⁴⁴ or by whom we wish to be emulated, but not envied,—these we either like or wish to be friends with them.

[25] And those whom we are ready to assist in obtaining what is good, provided greater evil does not result for ourselves.

[26] And those who show equal fondness for friends, whether absent or present; wherefore all men like those who show such feeling for the dead.

In a word, men like those who are strongly attached to their friends and do not leave them in the lurch; for among good men they chiefly like those who are good friends.

[27] And those who do not dissemble with them; such are those who do not fear to mention even their faults. (For, as we have said, before friends we do not blush for faults merely condemned by public opinion; if then he who blushes for such faults is not a friend, he who does not is likely to be one).⁴⁵ And men like those who are not formidable, and in whom they have confidence; for no one likes one whom he fears.

[28] Companionship, intimacy, kinship, and similar relations are species of friendship. Things that create friendship are doing a favor,

[29] and doing it unasked, and not making it public after doing it; for then it seems to have been rendered for the sake of the friend, and not for any other reason.

[30] 1382a 1 As for enmity and hatred, it is evident that they must be examined in the light of their contraries. The causes which produce enmity are anger, spitefulness, slander.

[31] Anger arises from acts committed against us, enmity even from those that are not; for if we imagine a man to be of such and such a character, we hate him. Anger has always an individual as its object, for instance Callias or Socrates, whereas hatred applies to classes; for instance, every one hates a thief or informer. Anger is curable by time, hatred not; the aim of anger is pain, of hatred evil; for the angry man wishes to see what happens;⁴⁶ to one who hates it does not matter. Now, the things which cause pain are all perceptible, while things which are especially bad, such as injustice or folly, are least perceptible; for the presence of vice causes no pain. Anger is accompanied by pain, but hatred not; for he who is angry suffers pain, but he who hates does not. One who is angry might feel compassion in many cases, but one who hates, never; for the former wishes that the object of his anger should suffer in his turn, the latter, that he should perish.

[32] It is evident, then, from what we have just said, that it is possible to prove that men are enemies or friends, or to make them such if they are not; to refute those who pretend that they are, and when they oppose us through anger or enmity, to bring them over to whichever side may be preferred. 20 The things and persons that men fear and in what frame of mind, will be evident from the following considerations.

[1] Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain; for men do not fear all evils, for instance, becoming unjust or slow-witted, but only such as involve great pain or destruction, and only if they appear to be not far off but near at hand and threatening, for men do not fear things that are very remote; all know that they have to die, but as death is not near at hand, they are indifferent.

[2] If then this is fear, all things must be fearful that appear to have great power of destroying or inflicting injuries that tend to produce great pain. That is why even the signs of such misfortunes are fearful, for the fearful thing itself appears to be near at hand, and danger is the approach of anything fearful.

[3] Such signs are the enmity and anger of those able to injure us in any way; for it is evident that they have the wish,⁴⁷ so that they are not far from doing so.

[4] And injustice possessed of power is fearful, for the unjust man is unjust through deliberate inclination.⁴⁸ 1382b 1

[5] And outraged virtue when it has power, for it is evident that it always desires satisfaction, whenever it is outraged, and now it has the power.

[6] And fear felt by those able to injure us in any way, for such as these also must be ready to act.

[7] And since most men are rather bad than good and the slaves of gain and cowardly in time of danger, being at the mercy of another is generally fearful, so that one who has committed a crime has reason to fear his accomplices as likely to denounce or leave him in the lurch.

[8] And those who are able to ill-treat others are to be feared by those who can be so treated; for as a rule men do wrong whenever they can. Those who have been, or think they are being, wronged, are also to be feared, for they are ever on the look out for an opportunity. And those who have committed some wrong, when they have the power, since they are afraid of retaliation,

[9] which was assumed to be something to be feared. And those who are our rivals for the same things, whenever it is impossible to share them, for men are always contending with such persons.

[10] And those who are feared by those who are stronger than we are, for they would be better able to injure us, if they could injure those stronger than ourselves and those whom those who are stronger than ourselves are afraid of, for the same reason.

[11] And those who have overthrown those who are stronger than us and those who attack those who are weaker, for they are either already to be feared, or will be, when they have grown stronger.

And among those whom we have wronged, or are our enemies or rivals,we should fear not the hot-tempered or 20 outspoken, but those who are mild, dissemblers, and thorough rascals; for it is uncertain whether they are on the point of acting, so that one never knows whether they are far from it.⁴⁹

[12] All things that are to be feared are more so when, after an error has once been committed, it is impossible to repair it, either because it is absolutely impossible, or no longer in our power, but in that of our opponents; also when there is no possibility of help or it is not easy to obtain. In a word, all things are to be feared which, when they happen, or are on the point of happening, to others, excite compassion. These are, so to say, nearly all the most important things which are to be feared and which men fear. Let us now state the frame of mind which leads men to fear.

[13] If then fear is accompanied by the expectation that we are going to suffer some fatal misfortune, it is evident that none of those who think that they will suffer nothing at all is afraid either of those things which he does not think will happen to him, or of those from whom he does not expect them, or at a time when he does not think them likely to happen. It therefore needs be that those who think they are likely to suffer anything should be afraid, either of the persons at whose hands they expect it, or of certain things, and at certain times.

[14] Those who either are, or seem to be, highly prosperous do not think they are likely to suffer anything; 1383a 1 wherefore they are insolent, contemptuous, and rash, and what makes them such is wealth, strength, a number of friends, power. It is the same with those who think that they have already suffered all possible ills and are coldly indifferent to the future, like those who are being beaten to death; for it is a necessary incentive to fear that there should remain some hope of being saved from the cause of their distress. A sign of this is that fear makes men deliberate, whereas no one deliberates about things that are hopeless.

[15] So that whenever it is preferable that the audience should feel afraid, it is necessary to make them think they are likely to suffer, by reminding them that others greater than they have suffered, and showing that their equals are suffering or have suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a manner and at times when they did not think it likely.

[16] Now, since we have made clear what fear and fearful things are, and the frame of mind in each case which makes men fear, one can see from this what confidence is, what are the things that give it, and the frame of mind of those who possess it; for confidence is the contrary of fear and that which gives confidence of that which causes fear, so that the hope of what is salutary is accompanied by an impression that it is quite near at hand, while the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off.

[17] Confidence is inspired by the remoteness of fearful things, 20 or by the nearness of things that justify it.⁵⁰ If remedies are possible, if there are means of help, either great or numerous, or both; if we have neither committed nor suffered wrong if we have no rivals at all, or only such as are powerless, or, if they have power, are our friends, or have either done us good or have received it from us; if those whose interests are the same as ours are more numerous, or stronger, or both.

[18] We feel confidence in the following states of mind: if we believe that we have often succeeded and have not suffered, or if we have often been in danger and escaped it; for men are unaffected by fear in two ways, either because they have never been tested or have means of help; thus, in dangers at sea, those who have never experienced a storm and those who have means of help as the result of experience have confidence as to the future.

[19] We are also reassured, when a thing does not inspire fear in our equals, our inferiors, or those to whom we think ourselves superior; and we think ourselves superior to those whom we have conquered, either themselves or their superiors or equals.

[20] And if we think we possess more or more considerable advantages, such as make their possessors formidable; 1383b 1 such are abundance of money, strength of body, friends, territory, military equipments, either all or the most important. And if we have never done wrong to anyone, or only to a few, or not to such as are to be feared;

[21] and, generally, if it is well with us in regard to the gods, especially as to intimations from signs and oracles, and everything else of the kind; for anger inspires confidence, and it is the wrong that we suffer and not that which we inflict upon others that causes anger, and the gods are supposed to assist those who are wronged.⁵¹

[22] Lastly, we feel confidence when, at the beginning of any undertaking, we do not expect disaster either in the present or future, or hope for success. Such are the things that inspire fear or confidence.

[1] What are the things of which men are ashamed or the contrary, and before whom, and in what frame of mind, will be clear from the following considerations.

[2] Let shame then be defined as a kind of pain or uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present, or future, which seem to tend to bring dishonor; and shamelessness as contempt and indifference in regard to these same things.

[3] If this definition of shame is correct, it follows that we are ashamed of all such misdeeds as seem to be disgraceful, either for ourselves or for those whom we care for. Such are all those that are due to vice, such as throwing away one's shield or taking to flight, for this is due to cowardice; 20 or withholding a deposit, for this is due to injustice.

[4] And illicit relations with any persons, at forbidden places or times, for this is due to licentiousness.

[5] And making profit out of what is petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak, such as the indigent or dead; whence the proverb, to rob even a corpse, for this is due to base love of gain and stinginess.

[6] And to refuse assistance in money matters when we are able to render it, or to give less than we can; to accept assistance from those less able to afford it than ourselves;

[7] to borrow when anyone seems likely to ask for a loan, to ask for a loan from one who wants his money back, and asking for repayment from one who wants to borrow; to praise in order to seem to be asking for a loan, and when you have failed to obtain it to keep on asking; for all these are signs of stinginess.

[8] And to praise people when they are present, to overpraise their good qualities and to palliate the bad, to show excessive grief at another's grief when present, and all similar actions; for they are signs of flattery.

[9] And not to submit to toils, which those put up with who are older 1384a 1 or live luxuriously or hold higher positions, or, generally speaking, are less fitted to do so; for all these are signs of effeminacy.

[10] To accept favors from another and often, and then to throw them in his teeth; for all these things are signs of littleness and abasement of soul.

[11] And to speak at great length about oneself and to make all kinds of professions, and to take the credit for what another has done; for this is a sign of boastfulness. Similarly, in regard to each of all the other vices of character, the acts resulting from them, their signs, and the things which resemble them, all these are disgraceful, and should make us ashamed.

[12] It is also shameful not to have a share in the honorable things which all men, or all who resemble us, or the majority of them, have a share in. By those who resemble us I mean those of the same race, of the same city, of the same age, of the same family, and, generally speaking, those who are on an equality; for then it is disgraceful not to have a share, for instance, in education and other things, to the same extent. All these things are the more disgraceful, if the fault appears to be our own; for they are at once seen to be due rather to natural depravity if we ourselves are the cause of past, present, or future defects.

[13] And we are ashamed when we suffer or have suffered or are likely to suffer things which tend to ignominy and reproach; such are prostituting one's person or performing disgraceful actions, including unnatural lust. And of these actions those that promote licentiousness are disgraceful, whether voluntary or involuntary (the latter being those that are done under compulsion), 20 since meek endurance and the absence of resistance are the result of unmanliness or cowardice.

These and similar things are those of which men are ashamed.

[14] And since shame is an impression about dishonor, and that for its own sake and not for its results; and since no one heeds the opinion of others except on account of those who hold it, it follows that men feel shame before those whom they esteem.

[15] Now men esteem those who admire them and those whom they admire, those by whom they wish to be admired, those whose rivals they are, and whose opinion they do not despise.

[16] They desire to be admired by those, and admire those who possess anything good that is greatly esteemed, or from whom they urgently require something which it is in their power to give, as is the case with lovers.

[17] And they are rivals of those who are like them; and they give heed to the men of practical wisdom as likely to be truthful; such are the older and well educated.

[18] They are also more ashamed of things that are done before their eyes and in broad daylight; whence the proverb, The eyes are the abode of shame.⁵² That is why they feel more ashamed before those who are likely to be always with them or who keep watch upon them, 1384b 1 because in both cases they are under the eyes of others.

[19] Men are also ashamed before those who are not open to the same accusations, for it is evident that their feelings are contrary. And before those who are not indulgent towards those who appear to err; for a man is supposed not to reproach others with what he does himself, so it is clear that what he reproaches them with is what he does not do himself.

[20] And before those who are fond of gossiping generally; for not to gossip about the fault of another amounts to not regarding it as a fault at all. Now those who are inclined to gossip are those who have suffered wrong, because they always have their eyes upon us; and slanderers, because, if they traduce the innocent, still more will they traduce the guilty. And before those who spend their time in looking for their neighbors' faults, for instance, mockers and comic poets; for they are also in a manner slanderers and gossips. And before those from whom they have never asked anything in vain,⁵³ for they feel as if they were greatly esteemed. For this reason they feel ashamed before those who ask them for something for the first time, as never yet having lost their good opinion. Such are those who have recently sought their friendship (for they have only seen what is best in them, which is the point of the answer of Euripides to the Syracusans),⁵⁴ or old acquaintances who know nothing against us.

[21] And men are ashamed not only of the disgraceful things we have spoken of, but also of indications of them, for instance, not only of sensual pleasures, but also of the indications of them; and not only of doing,

[22] but also 20 of saying disgraceful things. Similarly, men are ashamed not only before those who have been mentioned, but also before those who will reveal their faults to them, such as their servants or friends.

[23] In a word, they are not ashamed either before those whose opinion in regard to the truth they greatly despise—for instance, no one feels shame before children or animals—or of the same things before those who are known to them and those who are not; before the former, they are ashamed of things that appear really disgraceful, before strangers, of those which are only condemned by convention.

[24] Men are likely to feel shame in the following situations; first, if there are any who are so related to them as those before whom we said that they feel shame. These, as we pointed out, are those who are admired by them or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from whom they need some service, which they will not obtain if they lose their reputation. These, again, are either persons who directly see what is going on (just as Cydias, when haranguing the people about the allotment of the territory of Samos , begged the Athenians to picture to themselves that the Greeks were standing round them and would not only hear, but also see what they were going to decree); or neighbors; or those likely to be aware of what they say or do. That is why men do not like, when unfortunate, to be seen by those who were once their rivals, 1385a 1 for rivalry presumes admiration.

[25] Men also feel shame when they are connected with actions or things which entail disgrace,⁵⁵ for which either they themselves, or their ancestors, or any others with whom they are closely connected are responsible. In a word, men feel shame for those whom they themselves respect;⁵⁶ such are those mentioned and those who have any relation to them, for instance, whose teachers or advisers they have been; similarly, when they are in rivalry with others who are like them;

[26] for there are many things which they either do or do not do owing to the feeling of shame which these men inspire.

[27] And they are more likely to be ashamed when they have to be seen and to associate openly with those who are aware of their disgrace. Wherefore the tragic poet Antiphon,⁵⁷ when he was about to be flogged to death by order of Dionysius, seeing that those who were to die with him covered their faces as they passed through the gates, said, Why cover your faces? Is it because you are afraid that one of the crowd should see you tomorrow? Let this account of shame suffice; as for shamelessness, it is evident that we shall be able to obtain ample knowledge of it from the contrary arguments.

[1] The persons towards whom men feel benevolent,⁵⁸ and for what reasons, and in what frame of mind, will be clear when we have defined what favor is.

[2] Let it then be taken to be the feeling in accordance with which one who has it is said to render a service to one who needs it, not in return for something nor in the interest of him who renders it, but in that of the recipient. And the favor will be great 20 if the recipient is in pressing need, or if the service or the times and circumstances are important or difficult, or if the benefactor is the only one, or the first who has rendered it, or has done so in the highest degree.

[3] By needs I mean longings, especially for things the failure to obtain which is accompanied by pain; such are the desires, for instance, love; also those which arise in bodily sufferings and dangers, for when a man is in pain or danger he desires something. That is why those who help a man who is poor or an exile, even if the service be ever so small, are regarded with favor owing to the urgency and occasion of the need; for instance, the man who gave the mat⁵⁹ to another in the Lyceum.

[4] It is necessary then, if possible, that the service should be in the same direction⁶⁰; if not, that it should apply to cases of similar or greater need.

Since then it is evident on what occasions,⁶¹ for what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling of benevolence arises, it is clear that we must derive our arguments from this—to show that the one side either has been, or still is, in such pain or need, and that the other has rendered, or is rendering, such a service in such a time of need.

[5] It is evident also by what means it is possible to make out that there is no favor at all, or that those who render it are not actuated by benevolence⁶²; 1385b 1 for it can either be said that they do, or have done so, for their own sake, in which case there is no favor; or that it was mere chance; or that they acted under compulsion; or that they were making a return, not a gift, whether they knew it or not; for in both cases it is an equivalent return, so that in this case also there is no favor.

[6] And the action must be considered in reference to all the categories; for if there is a favor it is so because of substance, quantity, quality, time, or place.⁶³ And it denotes lack of goodwill, if persons have not rendered a smaller service,⁶⁴ or if they have rendered similar, equal, or greater services to our enemies; for it is evident that they do not act for our sake in this case either. Or if the service was insignificant, and rendered by one who knew it; for no one admits that he has need of what is insignificant.

[1] Let this suffice for benevolence and the opposite. We will now state what things and persons excite pity, and the state of mind of those who feel it.

[2] Let pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near. For it is evident that one who is likely to feel pity must be such as to think that he, or one of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil, and such an evil as has been stated in the definition, or one similar, or nearly similar.

[3] Wherefore neither those who are utterly ruined, 20 are capable of pity, for they think they have nothing more to suffer, since they have exhausted suffering; nor those who think themselves supremely fortunate, who rather are insolent. For if they think that all good things are theirs, it is clear that they think that they cannot possibly suffer evil, and this is one of the good things.

[4] Now those persons who think they are likely to suffer are those who have already suffered and escaped; the advanced in age, by reason of their wisdom and experience; and the weak, and those who are rather more timid; and the educated, for they reckon rightly;

[5] and those who have parents, children, or wives, for these are part of them and likely to suffer the evils of which we have spoken;

[6] and those who are not influenced by any courageous emotion, such as anger or confidence, for these emotions do not take thought of the future and those who are not in a wantonly insolent frame of mind, for they also take no thought of future suffering; but it is those who are between the two extremes that feel pity. Those who are not in great fear; for those who are panic-stricken are incapable of pity, because they are preoccupied with their own emotion.

[7] And men feel pity if they think that some persons are virtuous; for he who thinks that no one is will think that all deserve misfortune. 1386a 1 And, generally speaking, a man is moved to pity when he is so affected that he remembers that such evils have happened, or expects that they may happen, either to himself or to one of his friends.

[8] We have stated the frame of mind which leads men to pity; and the things which arouse this feeling are clearly shown by the definition. They are all painful and distressing things that are also destructive, and all that are ruinous; and all evils of which fortune is the cause, if they are great.

[9] Things distressing and destructive are various kinds of death, personal ill-treatment and injuries, old age, disease, and lack of food.

[10] The evils for which fortune is responsible are lack of friends, or few friends (wherefore it is pitiable to be torn away from friends and intimates), ugliness, weakness, mutilation; if some misfortune comes to pass from a quarter whence one might have reasonably expected something good;

[11] and if this happens often; and if good fortune does not come until a man has already suffered, as when the presents from the Great King were not dispatched to Diopithes until he was dead. Those also are to be pitied to whom no good has ever accrued, or who are unable to enjoy it when it has.

These and the like things, then, excite pity.

[12] The persons men pity are those whom they know, provided they are not too closely connected with them for if they are, they feel the same as if they themselves were likely 20 to suffer. This is why Amasis⁶⁵ is said not to have wept when his son was led to execution, but did weep at the sight of a friend reduced to beggary, for the latter excited pity, the former terror. The terrible is different from the pitiable, for it drives out pity, and often serves to produce the opposite feeling.

[13] Further, the nearness of the terrible makes men pity.⁶⁶ Men also pity those who resemble them in age, character, habits, position, or family; for all such relations make a man more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well. For, in general, here also we may conclude that all that men fear in regard to themselves excites their pity when others are the victims.

[14] And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at hand, while those that are past or future, ten thousand years backwards or forwards, either do not excite pity at all or only in a less degree, because men neither expect the one nor remember the other, it follows that those who contribute to the effect by gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic action generally, are more pitiable; for they make the evil appear close at hand, setting it before our eyes as either future or past. 1386b 1

[15] And disasters that have just happened or are soon about to happen excite more pity for the same reason.

[16] Pity is also aroused by signs and actions, such as the dress of those who have suffered, and all such objects, and the words and everything else that concerns those who are actually suffering, for instance, at the point of death. And when men show themselves undaunted⁶⁷ at such critical times it is specially pitiable; for all these things,⁶⁸ because they come immediately under our observation, increase the feeling of pity, both because the sufferer does not seem to deserve his fate, and because the suffering is before our eyes.

[1] Now what is called indignation⁶⁹ is the antithesis to pity; for the being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same character. And both emotions show good character,

[2] for if we sympathize with and pity those who suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with those who prosper undeservedly; for that which happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust, wherefore we attribute this feeling even to gods.

[3] It would seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as being akin to or identical with indignation, although it is really different; envy also is indeed a disturbing pain and directed against good fortune, but not that of one who does not deserve it, but of one who is our equal and 20 like. Now, all who feel envy and indignation must have this in common, that they are disturbed, not because they think that any harm will happen to themselves, but on account of their neighbor; for it will cease to be indignation and envy, but will be fear, if the pain and disturbance arise from the idea that harm may come to themselves from another's good fortune.

[4] And it is evident that these feelings will be accompanied by opposite feelings; for he who is pained at the sight of those who are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at least not be pained at the sight of those who are deservedly so; for instance, no good man would be pained at seeing parricides or assassins punished; we should rather rejoice at their lot, and at that of men who are deservedly fortunate; for both these⁷⁰ are just and cause the worthy man to rejoice, because he cannot help hoping that what has happened to his like may also happen to himself.

[5] And all these feelings arise from the same character and their contraries from the contrary; for he who is malicious is also envious, 1387a 1 since, if the envious man is pained at another's possession or acquisition of good fortune, he is bound to rejoice at the destruction or non-acquisition of the same. Wherefore all these emotions are a hindrance to pity, although they differ for the reasons stated; so that they are all equally useful for preventing any feeling of pity.

[6] Let us then first speak of indignation, the persons with whom men feel indignant, for what reasons, and in what frame of mind; and then proceed to the rest of the emotions.

[7] What we have just said will make matters clear. For if indignation is being pained at the sight of good fortune that is apparently undeserved, in the first place it is clear that it is not possible to feel indignation at all good things;

[8] for no one will be indignant with a man who is just or courageous, or may acquire any virtue (for one does not feel pity in the case of opposites of those qualities),⁷¹ but men are indignant at wealth, power, in a word, at all the advantages of which good men are worthy. [And those who possess natural advantages, such as noble birth, beauty, and all such things.]⁷²

[9] And since that which is old seems closely to resemble that which is natural, it follows that, if two parties have the same good, men are more indignant with the one who has recently acquired it and owes his prosperity to it; for the newly rich cause more annoyance than those who have long possessed or inherited wealth. The same applies to offices of state, 20 power, numerous friends, virtuous children, and any other advantages of the kind. And if these advantages bring them some other advantage, men are equally indignant; for in this case also the newly rich who attain to office owing to their wealth cause more annoyance than those who have long been wealthy; and similarly in all other cases of the same kind.

[10] The reason is that the latter seem to possess what belongs to them, the former not; for that which all along shows itself in the same light suggests a reality, so that the former seem to possess what is not theirs.⁷³

[11] And since every kind of good is not suitable to the first comer, but a certain proportion and suitability are necessary (as for instance beautiful weapons are not suitable to the just but to the courageous man, and distinguished marriages not to the newly rich but to the nobly born), if a virtuous man does not obtain what is suitable to him, we feel indignant. Similarly, if the inferior contends with the superior, especially among those engaged in the same pursuit,—whence the saying of the poet,

He avoided battle with Ajax, son of Telamon,⁷⁴ for Zeus was indignant with him, when he would fight with a better man;

1387b 1 or, if the pursuit is not the same, wherever the inferior contends with the superior in anything whatever, as for instance, the musician with the just man; for justice is better than music.

From this it is clear, then, with whom men are indignant and for what reasons; they are these or of such a kind.

[12] Men are prone to indignation, first, if they happen to deserve or possess the greatest advantages, for it is not just that those who do not resemble them should be deemed worthy of the same advantages;

[13] secondly, if they happen to be virtuous and worthy,⁷⁵ for they both judge correctly and hate what is unjust.

[14] And those who are ambitious and long for certain positions, especially if they are those which others, although unworthy, have obtained.⁷⁶

[15] And, in general, those who think themselves worthy of advantages of which they consider others unworthy, are inclined to be indignant with the latter and because of these advantages. This is why the servile and worthless and unambitious are not inclined to indignation; for there is nothing of which they think themselves worthy.

[16] It is evident from this what kind of men they are whose ill fortunes, calamities, and lack of success must make us rejoice or at least feel no pain; for the opposites are clear from what has been said. If then the speaker puts the judges into such a frame of mind and proves that 20 those who claim our pity (and the reasons why they do so) are unworthy to obtain it and deserve that it should be refused them, then pity will be impossible.

[1] It is equally clear for what reason, and of whom, and in what frame of mind, men are envious, if envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man getting anything, but because of others possessing it. For those men will be envious who have, or seem to have, others like them.

[2] I mean like in birth, relationship, age, moral habit, reputation, and possessions. And those will be envious who possess all but one of these advantages⁷⁷; that is why those who attempt great things and succeed are envious, because they think that every one is trying to deprive them of their own.

[3] And those who are honored for some special reason, especially for wisdom or happiness. And the ambitious are more envious than the unambitious. And those who are wise in their own conceit, for they are ambitious of a reputation for wisdom; and, in general, those who wish to be distinguished in anything are envious in regard to it. And the little-minded, because everything appears to them to be great.

[4] The advantages which excite envy have already been stated. 1388a 1 Nearly all the actions or possessions which make men desire glory or honor and long for fame, and the favors of fortune, create envy, especially when men long for them themselves, or think that they have a right to them, or the possession of which makes them slightly superior or slightly inferior.

[5] And it is evident whom men envy, for it has just been stated by implication. They envy those who are near them in time, place, age, and reputation, whence it was said,

Kinship knows how to envy also;⁷⁸

and those with whom they are in rivalry, who are those just spoken of; for no man tries to rival those who lived ten thousand years ago, or are about to be born, or are already dead; nor those who live near the Pillars of Hercules;⁷⁹ nor those who, in his own opinion or in that of others, are either far inferior or superior to him; and the people and things which one envies are on the same footing.⁸⁰

[6] And since men strive for honor with those who are competitors, or rivals in love, in short, with those who aim at the same things, they are bound to feel most envious of these; whence the saying,

Potter [being jealous] of potter.⁸¹

[7] And those who have succeeded with difficulty or have failed envy those whose success has been rapid.

[8] And those whose possessions or successes are a reproach to themselves, and these, too, are those near or like them; for it is clear that it is their own fault 20 that they do not obtain the same advantage, so that this pains and causes envy.

[9] And those who either have or have acquired what was naturally theirs or what they had once acquired; this is why an older man is envious of a younger one.

[10] Those who have spent much envy those who have only spent little to obtain the same thing.

[11] And it is clear at what things and persons the envious rejoice, and in what frame of mind; for, as when they do not possess certain things, they are pained, so when they do possess them, they will rejoice in the opposite circumstances.⁸² So that if the judges are brought into that frame of mind, and those who claim their pity or any other boon are such as we have stated, it is plain that they will not obtain pity from those with whom the decision rests.

[1] The frame of mind in which men feel emulation, what things and persons give rise to it, will be clear from the following considerations. Let us assume that emulation is a feeling of pain at the evident presence of highly valued goods, which are possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those who naturally resemble us—pain not due to the fact that another possesses them, but to the fact that we ourselves do not. Emulation therefore is virtuous and characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy is base and characteristic of base men; for the one, owing to emulation, fits himself to obtain such goods, while the object of the other, owing to envy, is to prevent his neighbor possessing them. 1388b 1 Necessarily, then, those are emulous who hold that they have a claim to goods that they do not possess;⁸³ for no one claims what seems impossible.

[2] Hence the young and high-minded are emulous. And so are those who possess such advantages as are worthy of honorable men, which include wealth, a number of friends, positions of office, and all similar things. For, believing it their duty to be good, because such goods naturally belong to those who are good, they strive to preserve them. And those are emulous, whom others think worthy of them.

[3] Honors obtained by ancestors, kinsfolk, intimates, nation, or city make men emulous in regard to such honors; for they think that these honors really belong to them and that they are worthy of them.

[4] And if highly valued goods are the object of emulation, it necessarily follows that the virtues must be such and all things that are useful and beneficial to the rest of mankind, for benefactors and virtuous men are honored; to these we may add all the goods which our neighbors can enjoy with us, such as wealth and beauty, rather than health.⁸⁴

[5] It is also evident who are the objects of emulation; for they are those who possess these or similar goods, such as have already been spoken of, for instance, courage, wisdom, authority; for those in authority, such as generals, orators, and all who have similar powers, can do good to many.

[6] And those whom many desire to be like, or to be their acquaintances 20 or friends;⁸⁵ those whom many or ourselves admire;

[7] those who are praised or eulogized either by poets or by prose writers.⁸⁶ The opposite characters we despise; for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the idea of emulation of the idea of contempt. And those who are in a condition which makes them emulate, or be emulated by, others, must be inclined to despise those persons⁸⁷ (and for that reason) who suffer from defects contrary to the good things which excite emulation. That is why we often despise those who are fortunate, whenever their good fortune is not accompanied by highly valued goods. The means of producing and destroying the various emotions in men, from which the methods of persuasion that concern them are derived, have now been stated.

[1] Let us now describe the nature of the characters of men according to their emotions, habits, ages, and fortunes.

[2] By the emotions I mean anger, desire, and the like, of which we have already spoken; by habits virtues and vices, of which also we have previously spoken, as well as the kind of things men individually and deliberately choose and practise. The ages are youth, the prime of life, and old age. 1389a 1 By fortune I mean noble birth, wealth, power, and their contraries, and, in general, good or bad fortune.⁸⁸

[3] The young, as to character, are ready to desire and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily desires they chiefly obey those of sensual pleasure and these they are unable to control.

[4] Changeable in their desires and soon tiring of them, they desire with extreme ardor, but soon cool; for their will, like the hunger and thirst of the sick, is keen rather than strong.

[5] They are passionate, hot-tempered, and carried away by impulse, and unable to control their passion; for owing to their ambition they cannot endure to be slighted, and become indignant when they think they are being wronged.

[6] They are ambitious of honor, but more so of victory; for youth desires superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority. And their desire for both these is greater than their desire for money, to which they attach only the slightest value, because they have never yet experienced want, as Pittacus⁸⁹ said in his pithy remark on Amphiaraus.

[7] They are not ill-natured but simple-natured,⁹⁰ because they have never yet witnessed much depravity; confiding, because they have as yet not been often deceived;

[8] full of hope, for they are naturally as hot-blooded as those who are drunken with wine, and besides they have 20 not yet experienced many failures. For the most part they live in hope, for hope is concerned with the future as memory is with the past. For the young the future is long, the past short; for in the morning of life it is not possible for them to remember anything, but they have everything to hope; which makes them easy to deceive, for they readily hope.

[9] And they are more courageous, for they are full of passion and hope, and the former of these prevents them fearing, while the latter inspires them with confidence, for no one fears when angry, and hope of some advantage inspires confidence.

[10] And they are bashful, for as yet they fail to conceive of other things that are noble, but have been educated solely by convention.⁹¹

[11] They are high-minded, for they have not yet been humbled by life nor have they experienced the force of necessity; further, there is high-mindedness in thinking oneself worthy of great things, a feeling which belongs to one who is full of hope.

[12] In their actions, they prefer the noble to the useful; their life is guided by their character⁹² rather than by calculation, for the latter aims at the useful, virtue at the noble.

[13] At this age more than any other they are fond of their friends and companions 1389b 1 because they take pleasure in living in company and as yet judge nothing by expediency, not even their friends.

[14] All their errors are due to excess and vehemence and their neglect of the maxim of Chilon,⁹³ for they do everything to excess, love, hate, and everything else. And they think they know everything, and confidently affirm it, and this is the cause of their excess in everything.

[15] If they do wrong, it is due to insolence, not to wickedness. And they are inclined to pity, because they think all men are virtuous and better than themselves⁹⁴; for they measure their neighbors by their own inoffensiveness, so that they think that they suffer undeservedly.

[16] And they are fond of laughter, and therefore witty; for wit is cultured insolence. Such then is the character of the young.

[1] Older men and those who have passed their prime have in most cases characters opposite to those of the young. For, owing to their having lived many years and having been more often deceived by others or made more mistakes themselves, and since most human things turn out badly, they are positive about nothing, and in everything they show an excessive lack of energy.

[2] They always think, but know nothing; and in their hesitation they always add perhaps, or maybe; all their 20 statements are of this kind, never unqualified.

[3] They are malicious; for malice consists in looking upon the worse side of everything. Further, they are always suspicious owing to mistrust, and mistrustful owing to experience.

[4] And neither their love nor their hatred is strong for the same reasons; but, according to the precept of Bias,⁹⁵ they love as if they would one day hate, and hate as if they would one day love.

[5] And they are little-minded, because they have been humbled by life; for they desire nothing great or uncommon, but only the necessaries of life.

[6] They are not generous, for property is one of these necessaries, and at the same time, they know from experience how hard it is to get and how easy to lose.

[7] And they are cowardly and inclined to anticipate evil, for their state of mind is the opposite of that of the young; they are chilled, whereas the young are hot, so that old age paves the way for cowardice, for fear is a kind of chill.

[8] And they are fond of life, especially in their last days, because desire is directed towards that which is absent and men especially desire what they lack.

[9] And they are unduly selfish, for this also is littleness of mind. And they live not for the noble, but for the useful, more than they ought, because they are selfish; 1390a 1 for the useful is a good for the individual, whereas the noble is good absolutely.

[10] And they are rather shameless than modest; for since they do not care for the noble so much as for the useful, they pay little attention to what people think.

[11] And they are little given to hope owing to their experience, for things that happen are mostly bad and at all events generally turn out for the worse, and also owing to their cowardice.

[12] They live in memory rather than in hope; for the life that remains to them is short, but that which is past is long, and hope belongs to the future, memory to the past. This is the reason of their loquacity; for they are incessantly talking of the past, because they take pleasure in recollection.

[13] Their outbursts of anger are violent, but feeble; of their desires some have ceased, while others are weak, so that they neither feel them nor act in accordance with them, but only from motives of gain. Hence men of this age are regarded as self-controlled, for their desires have slackened, and they are slaves to gain.

[14] In their manner of life there is more calculation than moral character, for calculation is concerned with that which is useful, moral character with virtue. If they commit acts of injustice it is due to vice rather than to insolence.

[15] The old, like the young, are inclined to pity, but not for the same reason; the latter show pity 20 from humanity, the former from weakness, because they think that they are on the point of suffering all kinds of misfortunes, and this is one of the reasons that incline men to pity. That is why the old are querulous, and neither witty nor fond of laughter; for a querulous disposition is the opposite of a love of laughter.

[16] Such are the characters of the young and older men. Wherefore, since all men are willing to listen to speeches which harmonize with their own character and to speakers who resemble them,⁹⁶ it is easy to see what language we must employ so that both ourselves and our speeches may appear to be of such and such a character.

[1] It is evident that the character of those in the prime of life will be the mean between that of the other two, if the excess in each case be removed. At this age, men are neither over-confident, which would show rashness, nor too fearful, but preserving a right attitude in regard to both,

[2] neither trusting nor distrusting all, but judging rather in accordance with actual facts. Their rule of conduct is neither the noble nor the useful alone, 1390b 1 but both at once. They are neither parsimonious nor prodigal, but preserve the due mean.

[3] It is the same in regard to passion and desire. Their self-control is combined with courage and their courage with self-control, whereas in the young and old these qualities are found separately; for the young are courageous but without self-control, the old are self-controlled but cowardly. Speaking generally, all the advantages that youth and old age possess separately, those in the prime of life possess combined; and all cases of excess or defect in the other two are replaced by due moderation and fitness.

[4] The body is most fully developed from thirty to thirty-five years of age, the mind at about forty-nine. Let this suffice for youth, old age, and the prime of life, and the characters which belong to each.

[1] Let us next speak of the goods that are due to fortune, all those, at least, which produce certain characters in men.

[2] A characteristic of noble birth is that he who possesses it is more ambitious; for all men, when they start with any good, are accustomed to heap it up, and noble birth is a heritage of honor from one's ancestors. Such men are prone to look down even upon those who are as important as their ancestors, 20 because the same things⁹⁷ are more honorable and inspire greater vanity when remote than when they are recent.

[3] The idea of noble birth refers to excellence of race, that of noble character to not degenerating from the family type, a quality not as a rule found in those of noble birth, most of whom are good for nothing. For in the generations of men there is a kind of crop as in the fruits of the field; sometimes, if the race is good, for a certain period men out of the common are born in it, and then it deteriorates. Highly gifted families often degenerate into maniacs, as, for example, the descendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius; those that are stable into fools and dullards, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

[1] The characters which accompany wealth are plain for all to see. The wealthy are insolent and arrogant, being mentally affected by the acquisition of wealth, for they seem to think that they possess all good things; 1391a 1 for wealth is a kind of standard of value of everything else, so that everything seems purchasable by it.

[2] They are luxurious and swaggerers, luxurious because of their luxury and the display of their prosperity, swaggerers and ill-mannered because all men are accustomed to devote their attention to what they like and admire, and the rich suppose that what they themselves are emulous of is the object of all other men's emulation. At the same time this feeling is not unreasonable; for those who have need of the wealthy are many in number. Hence the answer of Simonides to the wife of Hiero concerning the wise and the rich, when she asked which was preferable, to be wise or to be rich. Rich, he answered, for we see the wise spending their time at the doors of the rich.

[3] And the rich think they are worthy to rule, because they believe they possess that which makes them so.⁹⁸ In a word, the character of the rich man is that of a fool favored by fortune.

[4] At the same time there is a difference between the character of the newly rich and of those whose wealth is of long standing, because the former have the vices of wealth in a greater degree and more; for, so to say, they have not been educated to the use of wealth. Their unjust acts are not due to malice, but partly to insolence, partly to incontinence, which tends to make them commit assault and battery and adultery.

[1] 20 In regard to power, nearly all the characters to which it gives rise are equally clear; for power, compared with wealth, exhibits partly identical, and partly superior characteristics.

[2] Thus, the powerful are more ambitious and more manly in character than the rich, since they aim at the performance of deeds which their power gives them the opportunity of carrying out.

[3] And they are more energetic; for being obliged to look after their power, they are always on the watch.⁹⁹

[4] And they are dignified rather than heavily pompous; for their rank renders them more conspicuous, so that they avoid excess; and this dignity is a mild and decent pomposity. And their wrongdoings are never petty, but great.

[5] Good fortune in its divisions¹⁰⁰ exhibits characters corresponding to those which have just been mentioned; for those which appear to be the most important kinds of good fortune tend in their direction; further, good fortune furnishes advantages over others in the blessing of children and bodily goods.

[6] 1391b 1 Now, although men are more arrogant and thoughtless owing to good fortune, it is accompanied by a most precious quality. Fortunate men stand in a certain relation to the divinity and love the gods, having confidence in them owing to the benefits they have received from fortune. We have spoken¹⁰¹ of the characters associated with different ages and fortunes; the opposite characters to those described, for instance, of the poor, of the unfortunate, and of the weak, are obvious from their opposites.

[1] Now¹⁰² the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement; for when a thing is known and judged, there is no longer any need of argument. And there is judgement, whether a speaker addresses himself to a single individual and makes use of his speech to exhort or dissuade, as those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this single individual is equally a judge, since, speaking generally, he who has to be persuaded is a judge; if the speaker is arguing against an opponent or against some theory, it is just the same, for it is necessary to make use of speech to destroy the opposing arguments, against which he speaks as if they were the actual opponent; and similarly in epideictic speeches, for the speech is put together with reference to the spectator as if he were a judge. Generally speaking, however, only he who decides questions at issue in civil controversies¹⁰³ is a judge in the proper sense of the word, for in judicial cases the point at issue is the state of the case, in deliberative the subjects of deliberation.¹⁰⁴ We have already spoken of the characters of forms of government in treating 20 of deliberative rhetoric,¹⁰⁵ so that it has been determined how and by what means we must make our speeches conform to those characters.

[2] Now, since each kind of Rhetoric, as was said,¹⁰⁶ has its own special end, and in regard to all of them we have gathered popular opinions and premises whence men derive their proofs in deliberative, epideictic, and judicial speeches,¹⁰⁷ and, further, we have determined¹⁰⁸ the special rules according to which it is possible to make our speeches ethical, it only remains to discuss the topics common to the three kinds of rhetoric.

[3] For all orators are obliged, in their speeches, also to make use of the topic of the possible and impossible, and to endeavor to show, some of them that a thing will happen, others that it has happened.

[4] Further, the topic of magnitude is common to all kinds of Rhetoric, for all men employ extenuation or amplification whether deliberating, praising or blaming, accusing or defending. 1392a 1

[5] When these topics have been determined, we will endeavor to say what we can in general about enthymemes and examples, in order that, when we have added what remains, we may carry out what we proposed at the outset. Now, of the commonplaces amplification is most appropriate to epideictic rhetoric, as has been stated;¹⁰⁹ the past to forensic, since things past are the subject of judgement; and the possible and future to deliberative.

[1] Let us first speak of the possible and the impossible. If of two contrary things it is possible that one should exist or come into existence, then it would seem that the other is equally possible; for instance, if a man can be cured, he can also be ill; for the potentiality of contraries, qua contraries, is the same.¹¹⁰ Similarly, if of two like things the one is possible, so also is the other.

[2] And if the harder of two things is possible, so also is the easier.

[3] And if it is possible for a thing to be made excellent or beautiful,

[4] it is possible for it to be made in general; for it is harder for a beautiful house to be made than a mere house.¹¹¹

[5] Again, if the beginning is possible, so also is the end; for no impossible thing comes, or begins to come, into existence; for instance, that the diameter of a square should be commensurable with the side of a square is neither possible nor could be possible. And when the end is possible, so also is the beginning; for all things arise from a beginning.

[6] And if that which is subsequent in 20 being or generation can come into being, so then can that which is antecedent; for instance, if a man can come into being, so can a child, for the child is antecedent; and similarly, if a child can come into being, so can a man, for the child is a beginning.

[7] And things which we love or desire naturally are possible; for as a rule no one loves the impossible or desires it.

[8] And those things which form the subject of sciences or arts can also exist and come into existence.

[9] And so with all those things, the productive principles of which reside in those things which we can control by force or persuasion, when they depend upon those whose superiors, masters, or friends we are.

[10] And if the parts are possible, so also is the whole; and if the whole is possible, so also are the parts, speaking generally; for instance, if the front, toe-cap, and upper leather,¹¹² can be made, then shoes can be made, and if shoes, then the above parts.

[11] And if the whole genus 1392b 1 is among things possible to be made, so is the species, and if the species, so the genus; for example, if a vessel can be built, so can a trireme, if a trireme can, so can a vessel.

[12] If of two naturally corresponding things one is possible, so also is the other; for instance, if the double is possible, so is the half, if the half, so the double.

[13] If a thing can be made without art or preparation, much the more can it be made with the help of art and carefulness. Whence it was said by Agathon¹¹³:

And moreover we have to do some things by art, while others fall to our lot by compulsion or chance.

[14] And if a thing is possible for those who are inferior, or weaker, or less intelligent, it will be still more so for those whose qualities are the opposite; as Isocrates said, it would be very strange if he were unable by himself to find out what Euthynus had learnt [with the help of others].

[15] As for the impossible, it is clear that there is a supply of arguments to be derived from the opposite of what has been said about the possible.

[16] The question whether a thing has or has not happened must be considered from the following points of view.

[17] In the first place, if that which is naturally less likely has happened, then that which is more likely will most probably have happened. If that which usually happens afterwards has happened, then that which precedes must also have happened; for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, he must once have learnt it.

[18] If a man was able and wished to do a thing, he has done it; for all men 20 do a thing, when they are able and resolve to do it, for nothing hinders them.

[19] Further, if a man wished to do it and there was no external obstacle; if he was able to do it and was in a state of anger; if he was able and desired to do it; for men as a rule, whenever they can, do those things which they long for, the vicious owing to want of self-control, the virtuous because they desire what is good.

[20] And if anything was on the point of being done, it most probably was done; for it is likely that one who was on the point of doing something has carried it out.

[21] And if all the natural antecedents or causes of a thing have happened; for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if a man has already attempted a crime, he has also committed it. And if all the natural consequences or motives of actions have happened, then the antecedent or the cause has happened; for instance, if it has thundered, it has also lightened, and if a man has committed a crime, he has also attempted it.

[22] Of all these things some are so related necessarily, others only as a general rule. To establish that a thing has not happened, it is evident that our argument must be derived from the opposite of what has been said.

[23] 1393a 1 In regard to the future, it is clear that one can argue in the same way; for if we are able and wish to do a thing, it will be done; and so too will those things which desire, anger, and reasoning urge us to do, if we have the power. For this reason also, if a man has an eager desire, or intention, of doing a thing, it will probably be done; since, as a rule, things that are about to happen are more likely to happen than those which are not.

[24] And if all the natural antecedents have happened; for instance, if the sky is cloudy, it will probably rain.

[25] And if one thing has been done with a view to another, it is probable that the latter will also be done; for instance, if a foundation has been laid, a house will probably be built.

[26] What we have previously said clearly shows the nature of the greatness and smallness of things, of the greater and less, and of things great and small generally. For, when treating of deliberative rhetoric,¹¹⁴ we spoke of greatness of goods, and of the greater and less generally. Therefore, since in each branch of Rhetoric the end set before it is a good, such as the expedient, the noble, or the just, it is evident that all must take the materials of amplification from these.

[27] To make any further inquiry as to magnitude and superiority absolutely would be waste of words; for the particular has more authority than the general for practical purposes. 20 Let this suffice for the possible and impossible; for the question whether a thing has happened, or will happen, or not; and for the greatness or smallness of things.

[1] It remains to speak of the proofs common to all branches of Rhetoric, since the particular proofs have been discussed. These common proofs are of two kinds, example and enthymeme (for the maxim is part of an enthymeme).

[2] Let us then first speak of the example; for the example resembles induction, and induction is a beginning.¹¹⁵

There are two kinds of examples; namely, one which consists in relating things that have happened before, and another in inventing them oneself. The latter are subdivided into comparisons or fables,

[3] such as those of Aesop and the Libyan.¹¹⁶ It would be an instance of the historical kind of example, if one were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the Great King and not to allow him to subdue Egypt ; for Darius did not cross over to Greece until he had obtained possession of Egypt ; 1393b 1 but as soon as he had done so, he did. Again, Xerxes did not attack us until he had obtained possession of that country, but when he had, he crossed over; consequently, if the present Great King shall do the same, he will cross over, wherefore it must not be allowed.

[4] Comparison is illustrated by the sayings of Socrates; for instance, if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, for this would be the same as choosing as representative athletes not those competent to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as choosing any of the sailors as the man who should take the helm, as if it were right that the choice should be decided by lot, not by a man's knowledge.¹¹⁷

[5] A fable, to give an example, is that of Stesichorus concerning Phalaris, or that of Aesop on behalf of the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the people of Himera had chosen Phalaris dictator and were on the point of giving him a body-guard, after many arguments related a fable to them: A horse was in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having come and done much damage to the pasture, the horse, wishing to avenge himself on the stag, asked a man whether he could help him to punish the stag. The man consented, on condition that the horse submitted to the bit and allowed him to mount him javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms and the man mounted him, but instead of obtaining vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time became the man's slave. So then, said he, do you take care lest, in your desire to avenge yourselves on the enemy, 20 you be treated like the horse. You already have the bit, since you have chosen a dictator; if you give him a body-guard and allow him to mount you, you will at once be the slaves of Phalaris.

[6] Aesop, when defending at Samos a demagogue who was being tried for his life, related the following anecdote. A fox, while crossing a river, was driven into a ravine. Being unable to get out, she was for a long time in sore distress, and a number of dog-fleas clung to her skin. A hedgehog, wandering about, saw her and, moved with compassion, asked her if he should remove the fleas. The fox refused and when the hedgehog asked the reason, she answered: ‘They are already full of me and draw little blood; but if you take them away, others will come that are hungry and will drain what remains to me.’ You in like manner, O Samians, will suffer no more harm from this man, for he is wealthy; but if you put him to death, 1394a 1 others will come who are poor, who will steal and squander your public funds.

[7] Fables are suitable for public speaking, and they have this advantage that, while it is difficult to find similar things that have really happened in the past, it is easier to invent fables; for they must be invented, like comparisons, if a man is capable of seizing the analogy; and this is easy if one studies philosophy.¹¹⁸

[8] Thus, while the lessons conveyed by fables are easier to provide, those derived from facts are more useful for deliberative oratory, because as a rule the future resembles the past.

[9] If we have no enthymemes, we must employ examples as demonstrative proofs, for conviction is produced by these; but if we have them, examples must be used as evidence and as a kind of epilogue to the enthymemes.¹¹⁹ For if they stand first, they resemble induction, and induction is not suitable to rhetorical speeches except in very few cases; if they stand last they resemble evidence, and a witness is in every case likely to induce belief. Wherefore also it is necessary to quote a number of examples if they are put first, but one alone is sufficient if they are put last; for even a single trustworthy witness is of use. We have thus stated how many kinds of examples there are, and how and when they should be made use of.

[1] In regard to the use of maxims, it will most readily be evident 20 on what subjects, and on what occasions, and by whom it is appropriate that maxims should be employed in speeches, after a maxim has been defined.

[2] Now, a maxim is a statement, not however concerning particulars, as, for instance, what sort of a man Iphicrates was, but general; it does not even deal with all general things, as for instance that the straight is the opposite of the crooked, but with the objects of human actions, and with what should be chosen or avoided with reference to them. And as the enthymeme is, we may say,¹²⁰ the syllogism dealing with such things, maxims are the premises or conclusions of enthymemes without the syllogism. For example:

No man who is sensible ought to have his children taught to be excessively clever,¹²¹

is a maxim; but when the why and the wherefore are added, the whole makes an enthymeme; for instance,

for, not to speak of the charge of idleness brought against them,¹²² they earn jealous hostility from the citizens.

1394b 1 Another example:

There is no man who is happy in everything;¹²³

or,

There is no man who is really free.

The latter is a maxim, but taken with the next verse it is an enthymeme:

for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune.¹²⁴

[3] Now, if a maxim is what we have stated, it follows that maxims are of four kinds; for they are either accompanied by an epilogue or not.¹²⁵

[4] Now all those that state anything that is contrary to the general opinion or is a matter of dispute, need demonstrative proof; but those that do not, need no epilogue,¹²⁶

[5] either because they are already known, as, for instance,

Health is a most excellent thing for a man, at least in our opinion,¹²⁷

for this is generally agreed; or because, no sooner are they uttered than they are clear to those who consider them, for instance,

He is no lover who does not love always.¹²⁸

[6] As for the maxims that are accompanied by an epilogue, some form part of an enthymeme, as

No one who is sensible, etc.,¹²⁹

20 while others are enthymematic, but are not part of an enthymeme;¹³⁰ and these are most highly esteemed. Such are those maxims in which the reason of what is said is apparent: for instance,

Being a mortal, do not nourish immortal wrath;¹³¹

to say that one should not always nourish immortal wrath is a maxim, but the addition being a mortal states the reason. It is the same with

A mortal should have mortal, not immortal thoughts.¹³²

[7] It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, how many kinds of maxims there are, and to what it is appropriate to apply them in each case. For in the case of matters of dispute or what is contrary to the general opinion, the epilogue is necessary; but either the epilogue may be put first and the conclusion used as a maxim, as, for example, if one were to say, As for me, since one ought neither to be the object of jealousy nor to be idle, I say that children ought not to be educated; or put the maxim first and append the epilogue. In all cases where the statements made, although not paradoxical, are obscure, the reason should be added as concisely as possible.

[8] In such cases Laconic apophthegms and riddling sayings are suitable; 1395a 1 as, for instance, to say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cicadas should be forced to chirp from the ground.¹³³

[9] The use of maxims is suitable for one who is advanced in years, and in regard to things in which one has experience; since the use of maxims before such an age is unseemly, as also is story-telling; and to speak about things of which one has no experience shows foolishness and lack of education. A sufficient proof of this is that rustics especially are fond of coining maxims and ready to make display of them.

[10] To express in general terms what is not general is especially suitable in complaint or exaggeration, and then either at the beginning or after the demonstration.

[11] One should even make use of common and frequently quoted maxims, if they are useful; for because they are common, they seem to be true, since all as it were acknowledge them as such; for instance, one who is exhorting his soldiers to brave danger before having sacrificed may say,

The best of omens is to defend one's country,¹³⁴

and if they are inferior in numbers,

The chances of war are the same for both,¹³⁵

and if advising them to destroy the children of the enemy even though they are innocent of wrong,

Foolish is he who, having slain the father, suffers the children to live.¹³⁶

[12] Further, some proverbs are also maxims; for example, 20 An Attic neighbor.¹³⁷

[13] Maxims should also be used even when contrary to the most popular sayings, such as Know thyself and Nothing in excess, either when one's character is thereby likely to appear better, or if they are expressed in the language of passion. It would be an instance of the latter if a man in a rage were to say, It is not true that a man should know himself; at any rate, such a man as this, if he had known himself, would never have claimed the chief command. And one's character would appear better, if one were to say that it is not right, as men say, to love as if one were bound to hate, but rather to hate as if one were bound to love.

[14] The moral purpose also should be made clear by the language, or else one should add the reason; for example, either by saying that it is right to love, not as men say, but as if one were going to love for ever, for the other kind of love would imply treachery; or thus, The maxim does not please me, for the true friend should love as if he were going to love for ever. Nor do I approve the maxim ‘Nothing in excess,’ for one cannot hate the wicked too much.

[15] 1395b 1 Further, maxims are of great assistance to speakers, first, because of the vulgarity¹³⁸ of the hearers, who are pleased if an orator, speaking generally, hits upon the opinions which they specially hold.¹³⁹ What I mean will be clear from the following, and also how one should hunt for maxims. The maxim, as we have said, is a statement of the general; accordingly, the hearers are pleased to hear stated in general terms the opinion which they have already specially formed. For instance, a man who happened to have bad neighbors or children would welcome any one's statement that nothing is more troublesome than neighbors or more stupid than to beget children. Wherefore the speaker should endeavor to guess how his hearers formed their preconceived opinions and what they are, and then express himself in general terms in regard to them.

[16] This is one of the advantages of the use of maxims, but another is greater; for it makes speeches ethical. Speeches have this character, in which the moral purpose is clear. And this is the effect of all maxims, because he who employs them in a general manner declares his moral preferences; if then the maxims are good, they show the speaker also to be a man of good character. Let this suffice for what we had to say concerning maxims, their nature, how many kinds of them there are, the way they should be used, and what their advantages are.

[1] 20 Let us now speak of enthymemes in general and the manner of looking for them, and next of their topics; for each of these things is different in kind.

[2] We have already said that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism, what makes it so, and in what it differs from the dialectic syllogisms;

[3] for the conclusion must neither be drawn from too far back¹⁴⁰ nor should it include all the steps of the argument. In the first case its length causes obscurity, in the second, it is simply a waste of words, because it states much that is obvious. It is this that makes the ignorant more persuasive than the educated in the presence of crowds; as the poets say, the ignorant are more skilled at speaking before a mob.¹⁴¹ For the educated use commonplaces and generalities, whereas the ignorant speak of what they know and of what more nearly concerns the audience. Wherefore one must not argue from all possible opinions, but only from such as are definite and admitted, for instance, either by the judges themselves or by those of whose judgement they approve. 1396a 1 Further, it should be clear that this is the opinion of all or most of the hearers; and again, conclusions should not be drawn from necessary premises alone, but also from those which are only true as a rule.

[4] First of all, then, it must be understood that, in regard to the subject of our speech or reasoning, whether it be political or of any other kind, it is necessary to be also acquainted with the elements of the question, either entirely or in part; for if you know none of these things, you will have nothing from which to draw a conclusion.

[5] I should like to know, for instance, how we are to give advice to the Athenians as to making war or not, if we do not know in what their strength consists, whether it is naval, military, or both, how great it is, their sources of revenue, their friends and enemies, and further, what wars they have already waged, with what success, and all similar things?

[6] Again, how could we praise them, if we did not know of the naval engagement at Salamis or the battle of Marathon, or what they did for the Heraclidae, and other similar things? for men always base their praise upon what really are, or are thought to be, glorious deeds.

[7] Similarly, they base their censure upon actions that are contrary to these, examining whether those censured have really, or seem to have, committed them; for example, that the Athenians subjugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the Aeginetans and Potidaeans 20 who had fought with distinction on their side against the barbarians, and all such acts, and whatever other similar offences may have been committed by them. Similarly, in accusation and defence, speakers argue from an examination of the circumstances of the case.

[8] It makes no difference in doing this, whether it is a question of Athenians or Lacedaemonians, of a man or a god. For, when advising Achilles, praising or censuring, accusing or defending him, we must grasp all that really belongs, or appears to belong to him, in order that we may praise or censure in accordance with this, if there is anything noble or disgraceful; defend or accuse, if there is anything just or unjust; advise, if there is anything expedient or harmful.

[9] And similarly in regard to any subject whatever. For instance, in regard to justice, whether it is good or not, we must consider the question in the light of what is inherent in justice or the good.

[10] Therefore, since it is evident that all men follow this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason strictly 1396b 1 or loosely—since they do not derive their arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from what is inherent in each particular subject, and reason makes it clear that it is impossible to prove anything in any other way¹⁴²—it is evidently necessary, as has been stated in the Topics,¹⁴³ to have first on each subject a selection of premises about probabilities and what is most suitable.

[11] As for those to be used in sudden emergencies, the same method of inquiry must be adopted; we must look, not at what is indefinite but at what is inherent in the subject treated of in the speech, marking off as many facts as possible, particularly those intimately connected with the subject; for the more facts one has, the easier it is to demonstrate, and the more closely connected they are with the subject, the more suitable are they and less common.¹⁴⁴

[12] By common I mean, for instance, praising Achilles because he is a man, or one of the demigods, or because he went on the expedition against Troy ; for this is applicable to many others as well, so that such praise is no more suited to Achilles than to Diomedes. By particular I mean what belongs to Achilles, but to no one else; for instance, to have slain Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus, who prevented all the Greeks from disembarking, being invulnerable; to have gone to the war when very young, and without having taken the oath; and all such things.

[13] One method of selection then, and this the first, is the topical. 20 Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same thing). But let us first make some necessary remarks.

[14] There are two kinds of enthymemes, the one demonstrative, which proves that a thing is or is not, and the other refutative, the two differing like refutation and syllogism in Dialectic.

[15] The demonstrative enthymeme draws conclusions from admitted premises, the refutative draws conclusions disputed by the adversary.¹⁴⁵

[16] We know nearly all the general heads of each of the special topics that are useful or necessary; for the propositions relating to each have been selected, so that we have in like manner already established all the topics from which enthymemes may be derived on the subject of good or bad, fair or foul, just or unjust, characters, emotions, and habits. 1397a 1

[17] Let us now endeavor to find topics about enthymemes in general in another way, noting in passing¹⁴⁶ those which are refutative and those which are demonstrative, and those of apparent enthymemes, which are not really enthymemes, since they are not syllogisms. After this has been made clear, we will settle the question of solutions and objections, and whence they must be derived to refute enthymemes.

[1] One topic of demonstrative enthymemes is derived from opposites; for it is necessary to consider whether one opposite is predicable of the other, as a means of destroying an argument, if it is not, as a means of constructing one, if it is;¹⁴⁷ for instance, self-control is good, for lack of self-control is harmful; or as in the Messeniacus,¹⁴⁸

If the war is responsible for the present evils, one must repair them with the aid of peace.

And,

For if it is unfair to be angry with those who have done wrong unintentionally, it is not fitting to feel beholden to one who is forced to do us good.¹⁴⁹

Or,

If men are in the habit of gaining credit for false statements, you must also admit the contrary, that men often disbelieve what is true.¹⁵⁰

[2] 20 Another topic is derived from similar inflections, for in like manner the derivatives must either be predicable of the subject or not; for instance, that the just is not entirely good, for in that case good would be predicable of anything that happens justly; but to be justly put to death is not desirable.

[3] Another topic is derived from relative terms. For if to have done rightly or justly may be predicated of one, then to have suffered similarly may be predicated of the other; there is the same relation between having ordered and having carried out, as Diomedon the tax-gatherer said about the taxes, If selling is not disgraceful for you, neither is buying disgraceful for us.¹⁵¹ And if rightly or justly can be predicated of the sufferer, it can equally be predicated of the one who inflicts suffering; if of the latter, then also of the former. However, in this there is room for a fallacy. For if a man has suffered justly, he has suffered justly, but perhaps not at your hands. Wherefore one must consider separately whether the sufferer deserves to suffer, 1397b 1 and whether he who inflicts suffering is the right person to do so, and then make use of the argument either way; for sometimes there is a difference in such a case, and nothing prevents [its being argued], as in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes¹⁵²:

And did no one of mortals loathe thy mother?

Alcmaeon replied: We must make a division before we examine the matter. And when Alphesiboea asked How?, he rejoined,

Their decision was that she should die, but that it was not for me to kill her.

Another example may be found in the trial of Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor.¹⁵³ For since it was decided that they had justly slain him, it was thought that he had been justly put to death. Again, in the case of the man who was murdered at Thebes , when the defendants demanded that the judges should decide whether the murdered man deserved to die, since a man who deserved it could be put to death without injustice.

[4] Another topic is derived from the more and less. For instance, if not even the gods know everything, hardly can men; for this amounts to saying that if a predicate, which is more probably affirmable of one thing, does not belong to it, it is clear that it does not belong to another of which it is less probably affirmable. And to say that a man who beats his father also beats his neighbors, is an instance of the rule that, if the less exists, the more also exists.¹⁵⁴ Either of these arguments may be used, according as it is necessary to prove either that a predicate is affirmable or that it is not.

[5] Further, if 20 there is no question of greater or less; whence it was said,

Thy father deserves to be pitied for having lost his children; is not Oeneus then equally to be pitied for having lost an illustrious offspring?¹⁵⁵

Other instances are: if Theseus did no wrong,¹⁵⁶ neither did Alexander Paris; if the sons of Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Alexander; and if Hector did no wrong in slaying Patroclus, neither did Alexander in slaying Achilles; if no other professional men are contemptible, then neither are philosophers; if generals are not despised because they are frequently defeated,¹⁵⁷ neither are the sophists; or, if it behoves a private citizen to take care of your reputation, it is your duty to take care of that of Greece .

[6] Another topic is derived from the consideration of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against Harmodius, says: If, before accomplishing anything, I had demanded the statue from you in the event of my success, you would have granted it; will you then refuse it, now that I have succeeded? Do not therefore make a promise when you expect something, and break it when you have received it.¹⁵⁸ Again, to persuade the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territory into Attica , 1398a 1 they were told that if he had made this request before helping them against the Phocians, they would have promised; it would be absurd, therefore, if they refused to let him through now, because he had thrown away his opportunity and had trusted them.

[7] Another topic consists in turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves; and this is an excellent method.¹⁵⁹ For instance, in the Teucer¹⁶⁰ . . . and Iphicrates employed it against Aristophon, when he asked him whether he would have betrayed the fleet for a bribe; when Aristophon said no, Then, retorted Iphicrates, if you, Aristophon, would not have betrayed it, would I, Iphicrates, have done so? But the opponent must be a man who seems the more likely to have committed a crime; otherwise, it would appear ridiculous, if anyone were to make use of such an argument in reference to such an opponent, for instance, as Aristides¹⁶¹; it should only be used to discredit the accuser. For in general the accuser aspires to be better than the defendant; accordingly, it must always be shown that this is not the case. And generally, it is ridiculous for a man to reproach others for what he does or would do himself, or to encourage others to do what he does not or would not do himself.

[8] Another topic is derived from definition. For instance, that the daimonion¹⁶² is nothing else than a god or the work of a god; but he who thinks it to be the work of a god necessarily thinks that gods exist. When Iphicrates desired to prove that the best man is the noblest, he declared that there was nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and Aristogiton, before they did something 20 noble; and, I myself am more akin to them than you; at any rate, my deeds are more akin to theirs than yours. And as it is said in the Alexander¹⁶³ that it would be generally admitted that men of disorderly passions are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one woman's person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates refused to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful not to be in a position to return a favor as well as an injury.¹⁶⁴ In all these cases, it is by definition and the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that conclusions are drawn upon the subject in question.

[9] Another topic is derived from the different significations of a word, as explained in the Topics, where the correct use of these terms has been discussed.¹⁶⁵

[10] Another, from division. For example, There are always three motives for wrongdoing; two are excluded from consideration as impossible; as for the third, not even the accusers assert it.

[11] Another, from induction. For instance, from the case of the woman of Peparethus, it is argued that in matters of parentage women always discern the truth; 1398b 1 similarly, at Athens , when Mantias the orator was litigating with his son, the mother declared the truth;¹⁶⁶ and again, at Thebes , when Ismenias and Stilbon were disputing about a child, Dodonis¹⁶⁷ declared that Ismenias was its father, Thettaliscus being accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias. There is another instance in the law of Theodectes: If we do not entrust our own horses to those who have neglected the horses of others, or our ships to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if this is so in all cases, we must not entrust our own safety to those who have failed to preserve the safety of others. Similarly, in order to prove that men of talent are everywhere honored, Alcidamas said: The Parians honored Archilochus, in spite of his evil-speaking; the Chians Homer, although he had rendered no public services;¹⁶⁸ the Mytilenaeans Sappho, although she was a woman; the Lacedaemonians, by no means a people fond of learning, elected Chilon one of their senators; the Italiotes honored Pythagoras, and the Lampsacenes buried Anaxagoras, although he was a foreigner, and still hold him in honor. . .¹⁶⁹ The Athenians were happy as long as they lived under the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes , as soon as those who had the conduct of affairs became philosophers,¹⁷⁰ 20 the city flourished.

[12] Another topic is that from a previous judgement in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter, if possible when the judgement was unanimous or the same at all times; if not, when it was at least that of the majority, or of the wise, either all or most, or of the good; or of the judges themselves or of those whose judgement they accept, or of those whose judgement it is not possible to contradict, for instance, those in authority, or of those whose judgement it is unseemly to contradict, for instance, the gods, a father, or instructors; as Autocles¹⁷¹ said in his attack on Mixidemides, If the awful goddesses were content to stand their trial before the Areopagus, should not Mixidemides? Or Sappho, Death is an evil; the gods have so decided, for otherwise they would die. Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed himself too presumptuously, said, Our friend at any rate never spoke like that, referring to Socrates. Hegesippus,¹⁷² after having first consulted the oracle at Olympia , asked the god at Delphi whether his opinion was the same as his father's, 1399a 1 meaning that it would be disgraceful to contradict him. Helen was a virtuous woman, wrote Isocrates, because Theseus so judged; the same applies to Alexander Paris, whom the goddesses chose before others. Evagoras was virtuous, as Isocrates says, for at any rate Conon.¹⁷³ in his misfortune, passing over everyone else, sought his assistance.

[13] Another topic is that from enumerating the parts, as in the Topics: What kind of movement is the soul? for it must be this or that.¹⁷⁴ There is an instance of this in the Socrates of Theodectes: What holy place has he profaned? Which of the gods recognized by the city has he neglected to honor?

[14] Again, since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, another topic consists in employing the consequence to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame. For instance, education is attended by the evil of being envied, and by the good of being wise; therefore we should not be educated, for we should avoid being envied; nay rather, we should be educated, for we should be wise. This topic is identical with the Art of Callippus, when you have also included the topic of the possible and the others which have been mentioned.

[15] Another topic may be employed when it is necessary to exhort or dissuade 20 in regard to two opposites, and one has to employ the method previously stated in the case of both. But there is this difference, that in the former case things of any kind whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For instance, a priestess refused to allow her son to speak in public; For if, said she, you say what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust, the gods will. On the other hand, you should speak in public; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, if you say what is unjust, men will. This is the same as the proverb, To buy the swamp with the salt¹⁷⁵; and retorting a dilemma on its proposer takes place when, two things being opposite, good and evil follow on each, the good and evil being opposite like the things themselves.

[16] Again, since men do not praise the same things in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise what is just and beautiful, and in secret rather wish for what is expedient, another topic consists in endeavoring to infer its opposite from one or other of these statements.¹⁷⁶ This topic is the most weighty of those that deal with paradox.

[17] Another topic is derived from analogy in things. For instance, Iphicrates, when they tried to force his son to perform public services because he was tall, although under the legal age, said: If you consider tall boys men, you must vote that short men are boys. 1399b 1 Similarly, Theodectes in his law,¹⁷⁷ says: Since you bestow the rights of citizenship upon mercenaries such as Strabax and Charidemus on account of their merits, will you not banish those of them who have wrought such irreparable misfortunes?

[18] Another topic consists in concluding the identity of antecedents from the identity of results.¹⁷⁸ Thus Xenophanes said: There is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist. And, generally speaking, one may always regard as identical the results produced by one or other of any two things: You are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone, but about education generally, whether it is right to study philosophy.¹⁷⁹ And, to give earth and water is slavery, and to be included in the common peace¹⁸⁰ implies obeying orders. Of two alternatives, you should take that which is useful.

[19] Another topic is derived from the fact that the same men do not always choose the same thing before and after, but the contrary. The following enthymeme is an example: If, when in exile, we fought to return to our country [it would be monstrous] if, now that we have returned, we were to return to exile to avoid fighting!¹⁸¹ This amounts to saying that at one time they preferred to hold their ground at the price of fighting; at another, not to fight at the price of not remaining.¹⁸²

[20] 20 Another topic consists in maintaining that the cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or possibly might, be the cause of it; for example, if one were to make a present of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it. Whence it has been said:

It is not from benevolence that the deity bestows great blessings upon many, but in order that they may suffer more striking calamities.¹⁸³

And these verses from the Meleager of Antiphon:

Not in order to slay the monster, but that they may be witnesses to Greece of the valor of Meleager.¹⁸⁴

And the following remark from the Ajax of Theodectes, that Diomedes chose Odysseus before all others,¹⁸⁵ not to do him honor, but that his companion might be his inferior; for this may have been the reason.

[21] Another topic common to forensic and deliberative rhetoric consists in examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not. Now, these are the reasons which, if they exist, determine us to act, if not, not; for instance, if a thing is possible, easy, or useful to ourselves or our friends, or injurious and prejudicial to our enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit. From these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from their contraries. 1400a 1 It is on the same grounds that we accuse and defend; for what dissuades serves for defence,¹⁸⁶ what persuades, for accusation. This topic comprises the whole Art of Pamphilus and Callippus.

[22] Another topic is derived from things which are thought to happen but are incredible, because it would never have been thought so, if they had not happened or almost happened. And further, these things are even more likely to be true; for we only believe in that which is, or that which is probable: if then a thing is incredible and not probable, it will be true; for it is not because it is probable and credible that we think it true.¹⁸⁷ Thus, Androcles¹⁸⁸ of Pitthus, speaking against the law, being shouted at when he said the laws need a law to correct them, went on, and fishes need salt, although it is neither probable nor credible that they should, being brought up in brine; similarly, pressed olives need oil, although it is incredible that what produces oil should itself need oil.

[23] Another topic, appropriate to refutation, consists in examining contradictories, whether in dates, actions, or words, first, separately in the case of the adversary, for instance, he says that he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty; next, separately in your own case, he says that I am litigious, but he cannot 20 prove that I have ever brought an action against anyone; lastly, separately in the case of your adversary and yourself together: he has never yet lent anything, but I have ransomed many of you.

[24] Another topic, when men or things have been attacked by slander, in reality or in appearance,¹⁸⁹ consists in stating the reason for the false opinion; for there must be a reason for the supposition of guilt. For example, a woman embraced her son in a manner that suggested she had illicit relations with him, but when the reason was explained, the slander was quashed. Again, in the Ajax of Theodectes, Odysseus explains to Ajax why, although really more courageous than Ajax, he is not considered to be so.

[25] Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist; for the effect exists with the cause, and without cause there is nothing. For example, Leodamas, when defending himself against the accusation of Thrasybulus that his name had been posted in the Acropolis¹⁹⁰ but that he had erased it in the time of the Thirty, declared that it was impossible, for the Thirty would have had more confidence in him if his hatred against the people had been graven on the stone.

[26] Another topic consists in examining whether there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, or has been, carried out. For it is evident that, 1400b 1 if this has not been done,¹⁹¹ a person has not committed a certain action; because no one, purposely or knowingly, chooses what is bad. However, this argument may be false; for often it is not until later that it becomes clear what was the better course, which previously was uncertain.

[27] Another topic, when something contrary to what has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them together. For instance, when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they ought to sacrifice and sing dirges to Leucothea,¹⁹² or not, he advised them that, if they believed her to be a goddess they ought not to sing dirges, but if they believed her to be a mortal, they ought not to sacrifice to her.

[28] Another topic consists in making use of errors committed, for purposes of accusation or defence. For instance, in the Medea of Carcinus,¹⁹³ some accuse Medea of having killed her children,—at any rate, they had disappeared; for she had made the mistake of sending them out of the way. Medea herself pleads that she would have slain, not her children, but her husband Jason; for it would have been a mistake on her part not to have done this, if she had done the other. This topic and kind of enthymeme is the subject of the whole of the first Art of Theodorus.¹⁹⁴

[29] Another topic is derived from the meaning of a name. For instance, Sophocles says,

Certainly thou art iron, like thy name.¹⁹⁵

This topic is also commonly employed in praising the gods. 20 Conon used to call Thrasybulus the man bold in counsel, and Herodicus said of Thrasymachus, Thou art ever bold in fight, and of Polus, Thou art ever Polus (colt) by name and colt by nature,¹⁹⁶ and of Draco the legislator that his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon, so severe were they. Hecuba in Euripides¹⁹⁷ speaks thus of Aphro-dite:

And rightly does the name of the goddess begin like the word aphro-syne (folly);

and Chaeremon¹⁹⁸ of Pentheus,

Pentheus named after his unhappy future.

[30] Enthymemes that serve to refute are more popular than those that serve to demonstrate, because the former is a conclusion of opposites¹⁹⁹ in a small compass, and things in juxtaposition are always clearer to the audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are specially applauded, the result of which the hearers foresee as soon as they are begun, and not because they are superficial (for as they listen they congratulate themselves on anticipating the conclusion); and also those which the hearers are only so little behind that they understand what they mean as soon as they are delivered.

[1] But as it is possible that some syllogisms may be real, and others not real but only apparent, there must also be real and apparent enthymemes, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism.

[2] 1401a 1 Now, of the topics of apparent enthymemes one is that of diction, which is of two kinds. The first, as in Dialectic, consists in ending with a conclusion syllogistically expressed, although there has been no syllogistic process, therefore it is neither this nor that, so it must be this or that; and similarly in rhetorical arguments a concise and antithetical statement is supposed to be an enthymeme; for such a style appears to contain a real enthymeme. This fallacy appears to be the result of the form of expression. For the purpose of using the diction to create an impression of syllogistic reasoning it is useful to state the heads of several syllogisms: He saved some, avenged others, and freed the Greeks;²⁰⁰ for each of these propositions has been proved by others, but their union appears to furnish a fresh conclusion.

The second kind of fallacy of diction is homonymy.²⁰¹ For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an important animal, since from it is derived the most honored of all religious festivals, namely, the mysteries²⁰²; or if, in praising the dog, one were to include the dog in heaven (Sirius), or Pan, because Pindar said,²⁰³

O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog of the Great Mother, taking every form,

20 or were to say that the dog is an honorable animal, since to be without a dog is most dishonorable. And to say that Hermes is the most sociable of the gods, because he alone is called common;²⁰⁴ and that words are most excellent, since good men are considered worthy, not of riches but of consideration; for λόγου ἄξιος has a double meaning.²⁰⁵

[3] Another fallacy consists in combining what is divided or dividing what is combined. For since a thing which is not the same as another often appears to be the same, one may adopt the more convenient alternative. Such was the argument of Euthydemus, to prove, for example, that a man knows that there is a trireme in the Piraeus , because he knows the existence of two things, the Piraeus and the trireme;²⁰⁶ or that, when one knows the letters, one also knows the word made of them, for word and letters are the same thing. Further, since twice so much is unwholesome, one may argue that neither is the original amount wholesome; for it would be absurd that two halves separately should be good, but bad combined. In this way the argument may be used for refutation, in another way for demonstration, if one were to say, one good thing cannot make two bad things. But the whole topic is fallacious. Again, one may quote what Polycrates said of Thrasybulus, that he deposed thirty tyrants,²⁰⁷ for here he combines them; or the example of the fallacy of division in the Orestes of Theodectes:²⁰⁸ It is just that a woman who has killed her husband should be put to death, and that the son should avenge the father; 1401b 1 and this in fact is what has been done. But if they are combined, perhaps the act ceases to be just. The same might also be classed as an example of the fallacy of omission; for the name of the one who should put the woman to death is not mentioned.

[4] Another topic is that of constructing or destroying by exaggeration, which takes place when the speaker, without having proved that any crime has actually been committed, exaggerates the supposed fact; for it makes it appear either that the accused is not guilty, when he himself exaggerates it, or that he is guilty, when it is the accuser who is in a rage. Therefore there is no enthymeme; for the hearer falsely concludes that the accused is guilty or not, although neither has been proved.

[5] Another fallacy is that of the sign, for this argument also is illogical. For instance, if one were to say that those who love one another are useful to States, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus; or that Dionysius is a thief, because he is a rascal; for here again the argument is inconclusive; not every rascal is a thief although every thief is a rascal.

[6] Another fallacy is derived from accident; for instance, when Polycrates says of the mice, that, they rendered great service by gnawing the bowstrings.²⁰⁹ Or if one were to say that nothing is more honorable than to be invited to a dinner, for because he was not invited Achilles was angry with the Achaeans at Tenedos ; whereas he was really angry because he had been treated with disrespect, but this was an accident due to his not having been invited.²¹⁰ 20

[7] Another fallacy is that of the Consequence.²¹¹ For instance, in the Alexander Paris it is said that Paris was high-minded, because he despised the companionship of the common herd and dwelt on Ida by himself; for because the high-minded are of this character, Paris also might be thought high-minded. Or, since a man pays attention to dress and roams about at night, he is a libertine, because libertines are of this character. Similarly, the poor sing and dance in the temples, exiles can live where they please; and since these things belong to those who are apparently happy, those to whom they belong may also be thought happy. But there is a difference in conditions;²¹² wherefore this topic also falls under the head of omission.

[8] Another fallacy consists of taking what is not the cause for the cause, as when a thing has happened at the same time as, or after, another; for it is believed that what happens after is produced by the other, especially by politicians. Thus, Demades declared that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all the evils that happened, since it was followed by the war.

[9] Another fallacy is the omission of when and how. For instance, Alexander Paris had a right to carry off Helen, for the choice of a husband had been given her by her father. But (this was a fallacy), for it was not, as might be thought, for all time, but only for the first time; for the father's authority only lasts till then. 1402a 1 Or, if one should say that it is wanton outrage to beat a free man; for this is not always the case, but only when the assailant gives the first blow.

[10] Further, as in sophistical disputations, an apparent syllogism arises as the result of considering a thing first absolutely, and then not absolutely, but only in a particular case. For instance, in Dialectic, it is argued that that which is not is, for that which is not is that which is not²¹³; also, that the unknown can be known, for it can be known of the unknown that it is unknown. Similarly, in Rhetoric, an apparent enthymeme may arise from that which is not absolutely probable but only in particular cases. But this is not to be understood absolutely, as Agathon says:

One might perhaps say that this very thing is probable, that many things happen to men that are not probable;

for that which is contrary to probability nevertheless does happen, so that that which is contrary to probability is probable. If this is so, that which is improbable will be probable. But not absolutely; but as, in the case of sophistical disputations, the argument becomes fallacious when the circumstances, reference, and manner are not added, so here it will become so owing to the probability being not probable absolutely but only in particular cases.

[11] The Art of Corax is composed of this topic. For if a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is accused of, for instance if, being weak, he is accused of assault and battery, his defence will be that the crime is not probable; but if he is likely to be guilty, for instance, 20 if he is strong, it may be argued again that the crime is not probable, for the very reason that it was bound to appear so. It is the same in all other cases; for a man must either be likely to have committed a crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear equally probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable absolutely, but only in the conditions mentioned. And this is what making the worse appear the better argument means. Wherefore men were justly disgusted with the promise of Protagoras²¹⁴; for it is a lie, not a real but an apparent probability, not found in any art except Rhetoric and Sophistic. So much for real or apparent enthymemes.

[1] Next to what has been said we must speak of refutation. An argument may be refuted either by a counter-syllogism²¹⁵ or by bringing an objection.

[2] It is clear that the same topics may furnish counter-syllogisms; for syllogisms are derived from probable materials and many probabilities are contrary to one another.

[3] An objection is brought, as shown in the Topics, in four ways: it may be derived either from itself,²¹⁶ or from what is similar, or from what is contrary, or from what has been decided.

[4] In the first case, if for instance the enthymeme was intended to prove that love is good, 1402b 1 two objections might be made; either the general statement that all want²¹⁷ is bad, or in particular, that Caunian love²¹⁸ would not have become proverbial, unless some forms of love had been bad.

[5] An objection from what is contrary is brought if, for instance, the enthymeme is that the good man does good to all his friends; it may be objected: But the bad man does not do harm [to all his friends].²¹⁹

[6] An objection from what is similar is brought, if the enthymeme is that those who have been injured always hate, by arguing that those who have been benefited do not always love.

[7] The fourth kind of objection is derived from the former decisions of well-known men. For instance, if the enthymeme is that one should make allowance for those who are drunk, for their offence is the result of ignorance, it may be objected that Pittacus then is unworthy of commendation, otherwise he would not have laid down severer punishment for a man who commits an offence when drunk.

[8] Now the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources—probabilities, examples, necessary signs, and signs. Conclusions are drawn from probabilities, when based upon things which most commonly occur or seem to occur; from examples, when they are the result of induction from one or more similar cases, and when one assumes the general and then concludes the particular by an example; from necessary signs, when based upon that which is necessary and ever²²⁰ exists; from signs, when their material is the general or 20 the particular, whether true or not. Now, the probable being not what occurs invariably but only for the most part, it is evident that enthymemes of this character can always be refuted by bringing an objection.

[9] But the objection is often only apparent, not real; for he who brings the objection endeavors to show, not that the argument is not probable, but that it is not necessary.

[10] Wherefore, by the employment of this fallacy, the defendant always has an advantage over the accuser. For since the latter always bases his proof upon probabilities, and it is not the same thing to show that an argument is not probable as to show that it is not necessary, and that which is only true for the most part is always liable to objection (otherwise it would not be probable, but constant and necessary),—then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made in this manner,²²¹ either that the argument is not probable, or that it is not for him to decide,²²² being deceived by the fallacy, as we have just indicated. For his judgement must not rest upon necessary arguments alone, but also upon probabilities; for this is what is meant by deciding according to the best of one's judgement. It is therefore not enough to refute an argument by showing that it is not necessary; it must also be shown that it is not probable. This will be attained if the objection itself is specially based upon what happens generally.

[11] This may take place in two ways, from consideration either of the time or of the facts.²²³ The strongest objections are those in which both are combined; 1403a 1 for a thing is more probable, the greater the number of similar cases.

[12] Signs and enthymemes based upon signs, even if true, may be refuted in the manner previously stated²²⁴; for it is clear from the Analytics²²⁵ that no sign can furnish a logical conclusion.

[13] As for enthymemes derived from examples, they may be refuted in the same manner as probabilities. For if we have a single fact that contradicts the opponent's example, the argument is refuted as not being necessary, even though examples, more in number and of more common occurrence, are otherwise²²⁶; but if the majority and greater frequency of examples is on the side of the opponent, we must contend either that the present example is not similar to those cited by him, or that the thing did not take place in the same way, or that there is some difference.

[14] But necessary signs and the enthymemes derived from them cannot be refuted on the ground of not furnishing a logical conclusion, as is clear from the Analytics²²⁷; the only thing that remains is to prove that the thing alleged is non-existent. But if it is evident that it is true and that it is a necessary sign, the argument at once becomes irrefutable; for, by means of demonstration, everything at once becomes clear.²²⁸

[1] Amplification and depreciation are not elements of enthymeme (for I regard element and topic as identical), since element (or topic) is a head under which several enthymemes are included, but they are enthymemes which serve to show that a thing is great or small, 20 just as others serve to show that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything else.

[2] All these are the materials of syllogisms and enthymemes; so that if none of these is a topic of enthymeme, neither is amplification or depreciation.

[3] Nor are enthymemes by which arguments are refuted of a different kind from those by which they are established; for it is clear that demonstration or bringing an objection is the means of refutation. By the first the contrary of the adversary's conclusion is demonstrated; for instance, if he has shown that a thing has happened, his opponent shows that it has not; if he has shown that a thing has not happened, he shows that it has. This, therefore, will not be the difference between them; for both employ the same arguments; they bring forward enthymemes to show that the thing is or that it is not.

[4] And the objection is not an enthymeme, but, as I said in the Topics, it is stating an opinion which is intended to make it clear that the adversary's syllogism is not logical, or that he has assumed some false premise.

[5] Now, since there are three things in regard to speech, to which special attention should be devoted, let what has been said suffice for examples, maxims, enthymemes, and what concerns the intelligence²²⁹ generally; 1403b 1 for the sources of a supply of arguments and the means of refuting them. It only remains to speak of style and arrangement.

Notes on the current edition

Rhetoric

1. 1. Discussion of the πίστις ἐν τω̃ ἤθει του̃ λέ γοντος.

2. 2.

3. 3.

4. Those subjects about which deliberative oratory is concerned, least of all admit any thing like absolute certainty, for we can only form conjectures of what will be from what has been; and Aristotle has already told us, " that men lend a readier and more implicit belief to the good on all questions whatsoever; but on those whose nature precludes our arriving at certainty, but compels us to remain in doubt, we rely entirely on them." Book i. chap. ii. § 4.

5. 4.

6. 5. Three requisites for the orator's gaining belief. i. φρόνη σις. ii. ἀρετή. iii. εὔνοια. 6.

7. 7. The

8. See Pericles's defence of himself, Thucyd. ii. 60; and above, book i. chap. viii. § 6.

9. A celebrated scholar of the present day, after having described the eloquence of Mr. Fox, as remarkably characterized

10. two first discussed before.

11. 8. The latter to be known by the emotions, which must therefore be considered.

12. 9. The discussion is divided into three heads in every instance. i. ii. iii.

13. 1. Anger defined.

14. by πίστις ἠθικὴ, proceeds thus—“Hac de causa, quos audienti mihi motus adhibere voluit, illi semper in animo oratoris impressi et inusti esse videbantur." Parr's Pref. to Bellenden, p. 12, edit. 1787.

15. The definition, given more briefly in the Ethics, is " οι̃ς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη.” Eth. Nich. ii. 5.

16. ῎Ορεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως. Eth. Nich.

17. 2. Anger is felt against the individual, not the species.

18. Is attended with pleasure.

19. 3. We feel anger on account of a supposed slight.

20. Three species of ὀλιγωρία. i. κατα φρόνησις. ii. ἐπηρε ασμός. iii. ὕβρις. 4.

21. Compare lib. i. c. xi. § 9, οὑδεὶς γὰρ ὀργίζεται τῴ ἀδυ νάτῳ, K. T. λ.

22. Compare book i. chap. xi. § 13 ; and also book i. chap. x. § 17. This is expressed in the Ethics, lib. iii. c. viii. Καὶ ol ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγου̃σι, τιμωρούμενοι δ᾽ ἥδονται.

23. Pope's translation of Homer.

24. 6.

25. 6.

26. 7.

27. It is an essential feature of vexatiousness, and in fact of every species of slight, that there is a total absence of any selfish motive on the part of him who offers it; the appearance of any such motive having actuated him, would be a salvo to the pride of him who is made the subject of such treatment; but to be exposed to an opinion that one is utterly beneath consideration ( δόξα περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον), is a reflection to which no person, actuated by the common feelings of our nature, ever can submit.

28. 8.

29. 9. With what feelings, and how situated, men are angry.

30. 10.

31. 11.

32. 12. Towards whom men feel anger.

33. 13.

34. 14.

35. Here also Aristotle maintains the absolute exclusion of any thing like self-interest as characteristic of this species of ὀλι γωρία. See note on the last chapter.

36. Alluding to Plato's doctrine of ideas, which Aristotle himself so warmly controverted. See Eth. Nich. i. 6.

37. See chap. iv. § 14, where he says, we are fond of those who praise us on points where we esteem ourselves weak.

38. 15.

39. 16.

40. 17.

41. 18.

42. 19.

43. 20.

44. 21.

45. 22.

46. Plexippus was a brother of Althaea, Meleager's mother, and a character in a play of Antipho's, now lost.

47. . 10 And the first bringer of unwelcome news Hath but a losing office. Shakspeare.

48. wards those who slight them before persons of five descriptions. i. Whom they emulate. ii. Whom they admire. iii. By whom they wish to be admired. iv. Before whom they are sensible of delicate feelings. v. Before those who have a delicacy of feeling towards them. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

49. Vide this chapter, § 3.

50. [ BOOK II.

51. 1.

52. 2. Placability defined.

53. 3. Towards whom men are placable.

54. 4.

55. 5. The repentant.

56. 6. The humble.

57. This passion, different from all the others, supposes the previous existence of another in the mind, the emotions of which it may be said to allay more properly, than to be itself an emotion. Rochefoucault, Maxim 328.

58. " A soft answer tumeth away wrath."

59. See the instance of Ahab's humiliation of himself, (1 Kings xxi. 27,) and that of the Ninevites, (Jonah iii. 5, etc.,) to which we may add David.

60. 7. Those who are attentive to us.

61. 8.

62. 9.

63. 10.

64. Whom we fear.

65. 11. Towards the angry.

66. 12.

67. In what situations men are apt to be placable, and how affected.

68. 13. When

69. Cleon was aware of this when he exclaimed against a

70. ance has been taken.

71. 14.

72. 15.

73. 16. When the object is insensible.

74. second hearing of the Mitylenaeans;— θαυμάζω μὲν τω̃ν χρόνον

75. Χρόνος γὰρ εὐμαρὴς ϑεός. Soph. Elec. 179.

76. Well illustrated in Richard the First's pardon of Bertrand de Gourdon, on his death-bed:—“ Wretch," said the king, " what have I ever done to you to oblige you to seek my life ?" " What have you done to me ?" coolly replied the prisoner: " you killed, with your own hands, my father and my two brothers; and you intended to have hanged myself," etc. Richard, struck with the reasonableness of this reply, and humbled by the near approach of death, ordered Gourdon to be set at liberty, and a sum of money to be given to him. Hume.

77. 17. How we are to appease the audience.

78. Thus Gloucester, in Henry VI., Down, down to hell, and say—I sent thee thither, etc.

79. Again, in the Aeneid, the hero tells Tumus, Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas Immolat.

80. Πα̃σα δυσμένεια τῳ̃ βίῳ τούτῳ συναποτίθεται. Synes. Quoted in Hooker, v. § 7, vol. ii. p. 26. Compare Byron's tragedy of the Two Foscari, act v. last scene : BARBARIGO (to Loredano).-What art thou writing, With such an earnest brow, upon thy tablets ? LOREDANO (pointing to the Doge's body).-That he has paid me.*

81. * "L' ha pagata." An historical fact; see History of Venice, by P. Darns, p. 411, vol. ii.

82. [BOOK II.

83. 1.

84. 2. Definition of friendliness.

85. 3. Towards whom we feel it.

86. 4.

87. 5. Benefactors.

88. 6.

89. Thus the feeling discussed in the Ethics is called εὒνια ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι μὴ λανθάνουσα. Eth. Nich. vii. 2.

90. Bis dat, qui cito date

91. 7,

92. 8.

93. The brave and liberal. 9. The just.

94. Husbandmen.

95. 10.

96. 11.

97. 12. Companions, etc.

98. The character given by Clarendon of Sir Edward Herbert (afterwards Earl of Montgomery), one of the favourites of James I., seems to answer to Aristotle's description of a person likely to conciliate friendship:—“ He pretended to no other qualifications than to understand horses and dogs very well; which his master loved him the better for, (being at his first coming to England very jealous of those who had the reputation of great parts,) and to be believed honest and generous, which made him many friends, and left him no enemy." Clarendon's History, vol. i. p. 59.

99. 13.

100. 14.

101. 15. Those neat in dress.

102. 16.

103. 17. The forgiving.

104. 18.

105. 19.

106. 20.

107. 21.

108. See Eth. Nich. iv. 8.

109. So long as we are imitated at a respectful distance: Non ita certandi cupidus, quam propter amorem Quod te imitari aveo : Lucretius, iii. 5. our pride is flattered; but when this imitation has been so successfully continued as to resemble competition, our envy is quickly awakened. To this point Rochefoucault well observes,-“ Those who endeavour to imitate us we like much better than those who endeavour to equal us. Imitation is a sign of esteem, but competition of envy." Maxims, No. 113.

110. 22. Those who imitate us.

111. 23.

112. 24.

113. 25.

114. 26. Such as love the dead.

115. 27. The sincere.

116. 28. Three sorts of friendship.

117. 29. Causes of friendship :

118. Two of a trade can ne'er agree.

119. There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear. I John iv. 18.

120. 30. and of hatred.

121. 31. Six points of comparison between anger and hatred.

122. Callias is attacked by Lucian in his dialogue, entitled Τιμὼν ἢ Μισάνθρωπος, where Mercury, taxing Plutus with not going to those who deserve riches, says, ’ Αριστείδην καταλιπὼν Ιππονίκω καὶ καλλὶα προσή̣εις. p. 232, Scrip. Graec.; and several times in Aristophanes.

123. So chap. iii. § 16. It was remarked that a man who is affected by anger does not consider that he has his revenge, unless the object perceive both at whose hands, and in return for what, he suffers. From this, as from many other of its distinctive characteristics, ANGER will be confessed to be a more generous passion than HATRED. To this purpose Lord Bacon well remarks, that " Some, when they take revenge, are desirous the party should know whence it cometh : this is the more generous; for the delight scemeth to be not so much in doing the hurt, as in making the party repent; but base and crafty cowards are like the arrow that flieth in the dark." Essays: Of Revenge.

124. 32. These heads the orator is to use.

125. 1. Fear defined.

126. Quern oderunt, perisse expetunt. Ennius ap. Cic. de Off.

127. It is essential to that evil which is the object of fear, that it seem qualified to destroy or inflict pain. It must be in fact such an evil as anger would inflict, rather than which hatred would.

128. This is the description of evil against which the brave man must arm himself, or, in the language of the Ethics, ὄσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα. ὄΕth. Nich. iii. 6.

129. 2. Objects which occasion it.

130. 3. Danger.

131. 4. Injustice.

132. 5. Insulted virtue.

133. 6. The fear of our enemies.

134. 7.

135. Accomplices.

136. 8.

137. Compare c. 19, § 19. See Dr. Johnson's motives for suppressing some of Savage's remarks on the great: " What was the result of Mr. S.'s inquiry, though he was not accustomed to conceal his discoveries, it may not be entirely safe to relate, because the persons whose characters he criticised are powerful ; AND POWER AND RESENTMENT ARE SELDOM STRANGERS," etc. Life of Savage, p. 336.

138. The wronged.

139. 9. Rivals.

140. 10.

141. 11.

142. The mild and dissembling, etc.: more to be feared than the hasty.

143. " It is too common for those who have unjustly suffered pain, to inflict it likewise in their turn with the same injustice, and to imagine that they have a right to treat others as they have themselves been treated." Ibid. p. 339.

144. If the maxim of Tacitus be true—“ Proprium humani ingenii est odisse quern lreseris;" then surely Aristotle's position, that they are to be feared, will follow as a corollary from it ;- Quern metuunt oderunt, Quern oderunt, perisse expetunt. Ennius apud Cic. de Offic.

145. Victorius, wishing to show that'this is not “ a distinction without a difference," remarks, that by φοβεροὐς, the term used in the former case, we are to understand persons evidently possessed of that which all the world knows to be dreadful: whereas, in the latter case, Aristotle alludes to persons, whose power not being quite so manifest, we fear only because we see those people fear it, whose means of resistance are superior to our own.

146. [BOOK II.

147. 12. Greatest objects of terror.

148. Fear and pity closely allied.

149. 13. How those are affected that feel fear.

150. 14.

151. Fuisset; Quern metui moritura? Aen. iv. 603.

152. 15.

153. 16. Confidence de. fined.

154. 17. Circumstances that create confidence.

155. Thus Seneca;—“ Desines timere, si sperare desieris." " I have often thought, that after a man has taken the resolution to kill himself, it is not courage in him to do any thing, however desperate, because he has nothing to fear. When a man, either from fear, or pride, or conscience, or whatever motive, has resolved to kill himself; when once the resolution is taken, he has nothing to fear. He may then go and take the king of Prussia by the nose at the head of his army. He cannot fear the rack who is resolved to kill himself. When Eustace Budgell was walking down to the Thames, determined to drown himself, he might if he pleased, without any apprehension of danger, have turned aside and first set fire to St. James's palace.”—Boswell’s Johnson, A. D. 1773; Aet. 64. Satan, in his address to the sun, says,- So farewell hope, and with hope farewell fear, Farewell remorse; all good to me is lost. Par. Lost, lib. iT. 108.

156. 18. Persons who feel confidence. The successful.

157. 19.

158. 20. The rich, etc.

159. It is on this topic that Aeneas rests his consolation to his distressed followers. O socii, (neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum,) O passi graviora ; dabit Dens his quoque finem. Vos et Scyllaeam rabiem penitusque sonantes Adcestis scopulos: vos et Cyclopia saxa Expert!. Aen. i. 198. So Lord Byron in the Giaour: Though far and near the bullets hiss, I've scaped a bloodier hour than this.

160. The innocent.

161. 21.

162. 22. Such as think themselves secure.

163. 1.

164. 2. Definition of shame; of impudence.

165. 3. The occasions when shame is felt.

166. Aristotle is here giving us the reasons why the two lastmentioned descriptions of persons are confident: those who never injured any, because it is natural to them to feel anger, which is in itself a source of confidence; and those who are well with heaven, from their reliance on the protection of the gods. The last case is beautifully exemplified in the confidence felt by Nicias in Sicily.

167. Cowardice.

168. 4.

169. Intemperance.

170. 5.

171. Meanness.

172. 6.

173. 7.

174. 8. Adulation.

175. 9.

176. 10.

177. Spartano cuidam respondit Pythia vates : Haud impunitum quondam fore, quod dubitaret Depositum retinere, etc. Juv. xiii. 139. See the account of the deposit left by a Milesian with Glaucus the son of Epicydes. Herodot. vi. 86.

178. CHAP. VI.

179. 11. Vani. ty.

180. 12.

181. 13.

182. It was by a somewhat similar consideration that Dr. Johnson refuted the argument of those who opposed the education of the poor on the ground of its raising their ideas above their sphere of life. " If," said he, " a few only are educated, it is a distinction, and those few may be proud; if it be general, it ceases to be a distinction, and, of course, to be a ground of pride. And the contrary will be the result; for instead of its being ground of pride that a man has been educated, it will be matter of shame if he has not.” Boswell's Life.

183. 14. Persons in whose presence men feel shame. Whom they esteem.

184. 15.

185. 16. Admire.

186. 17. Their equals.

187. 18. Those with whom they must live.

188. 19. The innocent.

189. Οἱ. φρόνιμοι, more properly, men of the world. Such a character Cicero seems to have had in view, according to Victorius, when he says, " qui est versatus in rebus, vel usu, quern aetas denique affert, vel auditione et cogitatione, quae studio et diligentia praecurrit aetatem.” Cic. de Orat. ii. 30.

190. 20. Tattlers.

191. 21.

192. 22.

193. It appears that Euripides had been sent to Sicily as ambassador, but finding the Syracusans inclined to reject his proposals for a peace, he told them, " that they surely ought to have some respect for a people who held them in such high consideration, particularly as this was their first request."

194. Quod factu foedum est, idem est et dictu turpe. Οὐ yap αὐδα̣̃ν ἔσθ’ a μηδὲ δρα̣̃ν καλόν. Soph'oc. (Ed. Tyr. 1409.

195. Servants.

196. 23.

197. 24. How affected men feel shame.

198. When the world is looking on.

199. 25. When discredit may attach.

200. He told us above (chap. iv. § 23), that those people were usually regarded as friends " before whom we feel no delicacy on matters of mere opinion, though far from disregarding their opinions."

201. 26. With their equals.

202. 27. When openly disgraced.

203. 1.

204. 2. Definition of χάρις.

205. The Stoics had observed this feeling of carrying our views onward to posthumous glory; and found the love of glory the most difficult of all passions to eradicate:— διὸ καὶ ἔχατος

206. plicius in Comm. ad Epicteti, cap. 48. Tacitus, in speaking of the great love of fame manifested by Helvidius Priscus, justines him, by observing that Etiam sapientibus cupido gloria novissima exuitur. Hist. iv. 6. A mode of expression which strongly brings to our recollection the passage in Milton's Lycidas,

207. Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise, That last infirmity of noble mind. Lycid. 70.

208. 3.

209. 4.

210. 5. How the orator must in-

211. I This chapter presents considerable difficulty from the double meaning of which the word χάρις is capable. See Schrader's Note, Animadv.

212. Hence the value of the aid sent by the Athenians to the Lacedaemonians, when the Helots had possessed themselves of Ithome.

213. vest the audience with grateful feelings, or otherwise.

214. 6.

215. The ease with which impressions of gratitude might be effaced, appears to have been fully conceived by that French statesman, who said, when he granted a favour, " J' at fait dix mécontents, et un ingrat.”

216. Horace sneers at this kind of liberality. —Quo more pyris vesci Calaber jubet hospes, Tu me fecisti locupletem.—Vescere sodes.- Jam satis est.—At tu quantum vis tolle.—Benigne.— Non invisa feres pueris munuscula parvis.- Tarn teneor dono, quam si dimittar onustus.- Ut libet: " haec porcis hodie comedenda relinquish

217. Ep. lib. i. 7, 14.

218. [BOOK II.

219. 1.

220. 2. Definition of pity.

221. 3. Per

222. Grieffor the calamity of another is PITY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore it is called also compassion, and, in the phrase of the present time, a fellow-feeling: and therefore, for calamity arriving from great wickedness the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity those men hate pity, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same. Hobbes's Leviathan. See Rochefoucault's Maxims, No. 342, where the above is quoted in the note.

223. The evil in the case of pity is of the same character as was stated to be the object of fear. In fact, whatever when befalling another excites pity, in one's own case excites fear. Vid. chap. v. § 12.

224. It is on this principle that, in the Poetics, describing the character best adapted to the purposes of tragedy, and in whose sufferings we shall be most likely to take an interest, he excludes an absolutely vicious character ;— ἀτραγω̣τότον γὰρ

225. Perhaps the whole germ of Aristotle's doctrine on this subject may be traced, however briefly expressed, in the celebrated sentence of Terence, " Homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto."

226. sons who feel pity,

227. 4.

228. 5.

229. 6. and do not feel pity.

230. 7.

231. So Dido, " Haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco."

232. Exemplified in Priam's appeal to Achilles:

233. Sophocles, Oed. Tyr. 873:— ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον.With the same view of human nature Aristotle, when he says that persons affected by pleasure are disposed to placability, qualified his expression by the exclusion of wanton insolence;

234. 8 Lear, Act v. sc. iii. : This judgment of the heavens, which makes us tremble, Touches us not with pity.

235. Thus the old, from their experience of the depravity of

236. 8. Circumstances which excite pity.

237. 9.

238. 10.

239. 11.

240. 12. Persons to be pitied.

241. man, are less susceptible of pity than the young, whose inexperience judges well of human nature. See chapters xii. and xiii.

242. For chance in a great measure excludes the idea of the person's deserving the evil he suffers.

243. In the last act of The Gamester there is a fine illustration of this; where Beverley hears of his succession to the inheritance just as he has drunk poison.

244. Horror is distinct from pity.

245. 13.

246. 14.

247. Perhaps Aristotle quoted from memory; and it is not improbable that he may have been mistaken as to the person to whom he attributes this conduct, since Herodotus relates the story, not of Amasis, but of his son Psammenitus; who remarks, in perfect accordance with the principles of the philosopher, τὰ μὲνοἰκήϊα— μέζω κακὰ ἢ ἔστε ἀνακλαίειν, Herod. iii. 14. See the conduct of Gelimer, the Vandal king of Africa, who burst into laughter at his interview with Belisarius after the loss of his kingdom and liberty. Gibbon, Dec. and Fall, chap. 41, note 31.

248. On this principle is founded one of his criteria of excess of criminality, viz. if the recital of its effects produce fear instead of pity ;— ὂ οἱ ἀκούοντες Φοβου̃νται μα̃λλον, ἢ ἐλευ̃σι, μει̃ζον, lib. i. c. xiv. § 5.

249. θαι, Poet. § 27. See a very pleasant paper of Addison's on this subject, Spectator, No. 42. “We know the effect of the skull and black hangings in The Fair Penitent, the scaffold in Venice Preserved, the tomb in Romeo and Juliet," etc. Twining.

250. 15.

251. 16.

252. 1. Indignation opposed to pity. Definition of it.

253. 2.

254. Witness the effect of Antony's display of the robe of Caesar stained with his blood. Julius Caesar.

255. Illustrated in the effect produced by Polyxena's resignation and anxiety to preserve, even in death, the decorum of female delicacy :-

256. Eurip. Hecuba, 563.

257. 3. Envy opposed to pity.

258. Definition of it.

259. 4. Oppo- Rite feelings are consequent on these emotions.

260. 5. Both are useful to repress pity.

261. Thus Herodotus attributes the turn in the fortunes of Croesus to his having incurred the divine indignation :— Μετὰ

262. τον. Herodotus, i. 34.

263. The envious and indignant have this in common, viz. the good fortune of their neighbour, as the object of their respective passions; and the absence of any apprehension as to the degree in which their own circumstances may be affected by such good fortune; for the moment they begin to calculate the probability of any detriment arising to themselves therefrom, the feeling, ceasing to be any longer envy or indignation, will have become fear.

264. That is, deservedly.

265. 6. Persons who excite indignation.

266. 7.

267. 8. Not such as have moral advantages, but

268. ' Επιχαιρεκακία, or, in the language of the " Ethica Magna," χαιρεκακία, is one of the extremes between which νέμεσις is said to exist: the other extreme is φθονερία, an aptitude to feelings of envy. Speaking of the " great power and force " of the Greek language, a late translator of the Agamemnon of Aeschylus remarks, that" One word would sometimes require for its translation a whole sentence of modern language; as, for instance, ' Επιχαιρεκακία, a disposition to feel pleasure at the misfortunes of others; which makes a sentence, and constitutes a maxim in Rochefoucault, " 11 y a toujours dans le malheur d'autrui quelque chose qui ne nous deplait pas;" and adds in a note, that Lord Bacon (Essays) has beautifully touched on this disposition : " There is a natural malignity; for there be that in their nature do not affect the good of others." Preface to Symmons's translation of the Agamemnon.

269. Pity is not felt at the absence of these qualities from any one, because they cannot be absent without being deservedly so ; and it is essential to pity that its object be undeservedly exposed to that inconvenience which he suffers; on the other hand, indignation cannot be felt at their presence, because it is the distinguishing feature of moral advantages that they cannot be possessed, without being deserved.

270. those of fortune.

271. 9.

272. Such as are newly fortunate.

273. 10. They seem to possess what they have no right to.

274. 11. Such as have any good incongruously.

275. Such as compare two objects which admit not of comparison.

276. 12. Men likely to feel indignation.

277. 13.

278. 14. The ambitious.

279. 15.

280. 16. On what occasions men feel indignant.

281. The remark is made of Cebriones, 1l. ii. v. 542; where, however, the second line quoted by Aristotle does not occur.

282. CHAP. X.]

283. 1. Envy.

284. Its definition.

285. 2.

286. Men likely to feel envy are: those within a little of the summit.

287. 3. The ambitious.

288. The wise.

289. The narrowminded.

290. 4. Objects which . cite envy.

291. See § 7 and 8 of the last chapter, where he excludes moral excellence from the number of the goods which excite indignation ; and in justification of their exclusion in that place it may be observed, that the simple fact of their being possessed is proof of their being deserved. And their exclusion from the subjects of envy may be justified by the consideration that the envious will, in general, esteem moral excellence scarcely worth troubling themselves about.

292. See the parable of the ewe lamb, addressed by Nathan to David.

293. 5. Men likely to be envied.

294. Equals.

295. Rivals.

296. 6.

297. 7. The successful,

298. 8. Those whose success is a tacit reproach to us.

299. This apophthegm should seem to justify the caution of Cleobulus,— Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος τίνα δει̃

300. Πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ ποδῶν, φθόνος οὐδεὶς φύεται. Philo. Hooker, v. § 2, p. 26.

301. 9.

302. 10.

303. 11.

304. The orator by exciting envy will remove pity.

305. 1. 'Emulation.

306. Its definition.

307. It is a virtuous emotion.

308. The merely apparent presence of this description of goods is sufficient to excite emulation. The character of the goods which this passion has as its object is entirely different from that which excites envy and indignation.

309. Persons likely to feel emulation.

310. The young and highspirited.

311. 2. Those whom others esteem.

312. 3. Whose ancestry or relations are worthy.

313. 4. Things which are objects of emulation. Virtues. Goods. Wealth, etc.

314. 5. Persons who are objects of emulation.

315. 6. All whom men wish to resemble,

316. 7. or admire.

317. Contempt is the contrary to emulation.

318. 1. Characters of mankind.

319. This description of orators were justly said to be λογογρά φοι, ( λόγους γραφεὶν;) indeed it appears from the third book, that epideictic orations in general were intended rather for perusal than recitation. Speaking of the style of epideictic orators, he remarks, τὸ ipyov αὐτη̃ς άνάγνιοσις, lib. iii. cap. xii. § 6.

320. Viz. πίστις παθητικὴ, the third branch of πίστις ἐντέχνη. See book i. chap. ii. § 3, 4, 5.

321. This discussion of the dispositions of persons, under a few of the most striking circumstances of life, was promised in the first book (chap. x. ἤθη, § 11).

322. a " The word taken in its utmost extent, includes every thing that is habitual and characteristic; but it is often used in a limited sense, for the habitual temper or disposition." Twining. Probably " humour," in the sense in which it has been defined by Ben Jonson, comes nearer to ἦθος than any word in our language :—

323. 2. Vary in their i. Passions. ii. Habits.

324. ii. Ages. iv. Fortunes.

325. 3. Character of the young. Ardent.

326. Inconstant.

327. 4.

328. Irritable.

329. 5.

330. Ambitious.

331. 6.

332. 7. Sanguine.

333. Power pleases the violent and proud : wealth delights the placid and timorous. Youth therefore flies at power, and age grovels after riches. Johnson's Journey to the Hebrides, p. 344.

334. It is not known what this saying of Pittacus was..

335. Credulous.

336. 8.

337. Their life is one of hope.

338. 9. Rash.

339. 10. Bashful.

340. 11. Highspirited.

341. 12. With a sense of honour.

342. 13. Social.

343. Λογισμὸς is that one of the seven causes of human action which least affects the young. They usually act from ϑυμὸ or ἐπιθυμία.

344. 14. Their errors are on the side of excess.

345. 15. Their insults are mischievous not malicious. Prone to pity.

346. 16. Are gracefully facetious.

347. 1. Character of the old.

348. Vide note a, chap. xiii. p. 154.

349. Εὐτράπελοι. I know no word in our language of similar moral signification in which the metaphorical allusion to Τρέπω, the turn, or easy adaptation of manner, is preserved, unless indeed Minshew be correct in his etymology of Buxome, which, according to him, is derived from the German word booghsacm, i. FLEXILIS, and refers to the article pliant for further explanation. If this etymology be true, then Milton's expression, buxom, blythe, and debonnaire, though applied rather to female than manly grace, will convey a notion of what is here intended by Aristotle. But see Minshew, p. 106, edit. 1627. In the Ethics, b. 4, he compares εὐτραπλία to gracefulness of person; which, in conformity with the notions of most ancient writers, he seems to think only discoverable in motion, not in rest. Compare also " Crito, or a Dialogue on Beauty."

350. The old are doubtful.

351. 2.

352. Indecisive.

353. 3. View things on the dark side. Suspicious.

354. 4. Cautious.

355. 5. Cowardly.

356. 6. Illiberal.

357. 7. Timid.

358. 8. Tenacious of life.

359. 9. Selfish.

360. 10. Despise appear- UnIes.

361. 11. Desponding.

362. 12. Their life is one of memory.

363. 13. Weak in anger, but keen.

364. Live from calculation.

365. 14., Err on the side of malice.

366. 15. Are apt to pity,

367. from weakness.

368. Querulous.

369. Their principles of action are the very contraries of those which principally influence the young; ἔθος and λογισμός being the usual springs of action in the man of advanced life.

370. The two leading principles of pity were stated to be, a conviction that the sufferer is undeserving what he suffers, and that you consider yourself liable to be placed in similar circumstances. It was on the former of these principles that the young were stated

371. 16. How the orator must use these characters.

372. 1. Character of the matured.

373. They are moderate.

374. 2.

375. 3.

376. Are spirited with coolness.

377. to be apt to pity; because they take a favourable view of human nature. The old are equally liable to be affected by that passion, but it is on the latter principle ; for though they view human nature in an unfavourable light, yet have they so strong a sense of their own liability to suffering, that they are led to commiserate others. Compare chap. viii. § 7; and chap. xii. § 15.

378. In the Rambler, No. 196, the change of sentiments usual as men advance from youth to age is beautifully traced; and the whole paper affords a striking illustration of the subject treated in this and the preceding chapter.

379. 4. Prime of life for the body and mind.

380. 1. Character of men of high birth.

381. 2. Ambitious.

382. Contemptuous.

383. 3. Distinction between the noble and generous. The generations of man

384. compared to the soil.

385. 1. Character of the wealthy. Insolent.

386. 2. Fastidious. Purse- proud.

387. Μανικώτερα. In connexion with this word it should be borne in mind, that the Greeks were accustomed to consider every kind of enthusiastic impetuosity as a species of madness. See Twining on the Poetics, note 140.

388. Σόλοικοι, the inhabitants of Soli in Cilicia, whose corruptions of the Greek language became proverbial. The word was used also to designate those who were guilty of impropriety in conduct, as well as in expression. Massinger, in enumerating some instances of ill breeding, uses the expression. He ne'er observed you To twirl a dish about, you did not like of, All being pleasing to you; or to take A say of venison or stale fowl by your nose, Which is a solecism at another's table, etc. Unnatural Combat, act iii. sc. 1. See too Ben Jonson's Fox, vol. iii. p. 275.

389. ing.

390. 3. Arrogant of place and power.

391. 4. Difference between the newly rich and those who have been so from of old.

392. It is on this principle that Clytemnestra congratulates Cassandra on being the slave of an ancient family, rather than one recently advanced in the world:

393. .Esc. Agam. 1010.

394. Vide illustrations in Symmons's Translation, p. 97. See Johnson's Life of Savage, p. 338, vol. vii. edit. 1823, of his works; Examples, etc. See Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 35.

395. CHAP. XVII. ]

396. 1. Character of men in power resembles the rich ; but they are more ambitious, more manly.

397. 2.

398. 3. Less trifling. 4. Are dignified.

399. 5. Character of the fortunate.

400. 6. Overbearing.

401. Yet religious.

402. [BOOK 11.

403. 1. That there are certain κοινὰ εἴδη.

404. 2.

405. Under the word πολιτικὸς, he seems, according to Victorius, to embrace judicial as well as deliberative questions.

406. 3. They are four in number. i. The possible or impossible. 4. ii.Whether the fact has or has not taken place. iii. Whether it will or will not. 5. iv. The great and small.

407. 1. First of the possible and impossible. The possible is of which the contrary ispossible.

408. We may, if we please, consider this as the ἀπόδοσις of the sentence; and all the previous clauses as so many distinct parentheses-; as the author of the Analysis has done, p. 101.

409. This discussion of possibility was promised in the course of what he said on judicial oratory, book i. chap. xii. § 2.

410. 2. The like. 3. The more difficult. 4. The more excellent.

411. 5. The beginning.

412. The end.

413. 6. The subsequent.

414. 7. Things which we love.

415. 8. Subjects of art or science.

416. 9.

417. lO.Where the parts are possible, so is the whole.

418. Thus it is argued, that if all may receive the ἀρχὴ of regeneration, baptism; all may receive its τέλος, salvation. Baptism is expressly called by St. Basil, ἀρχὴ μοὶ ζωη̃ς TO βάπτισμα. De Spir. Sanct. c. 10.

419. 11. If the genus, then the species; and vice versa, etc.

420. 12.

421. 13. If without art, then with art.

422. 14. If inferiors can do it, then can superiors.

423. 15. Things impossible are the opposite.

424. 16. Secondly, a thing has taken place.

425. 17. When its subsequent has happened.

426. 18. If the agent was willing.

427. 19. And

428. The admirers of Sterne will do well, on reading this passage, to borrow a hint from him, and consult the learned Albertus Rubenius upon it, or at least some one of the many great authorities mentioned chap. 19, vol. vi. of Tristram Shandy.

429. under the influence of anger or desire.

430. 20. If he was on the eve of doing it, etc.

431. 21.

432. 22.Things which have not happened are to be inferred from the opposite. Thirdly, what will

433. 23. happen are subjects of the passions.

434. 24. If the antecedents have happened.

435. 25.

436. Compare chap. v. § 3, 4.

437. Fulmen est ubi cum potestate habitat iracundia. Publius Syrus.

438. 26. Fourthly, of the great and small.

439. 27.

440. 1. Example discussed.

441. 2. A species of inauction.

442. 1st. ing real instances. 2nd. Fabricating them. 3. This latter is subdivided into i. παρα ii. λόγος. Example.

443. 4. Illustration.

444. o. Fable.

445. He here applies the generic term to the species first mentioned, viz. the citing actual matters of fact.

446. Bentley seems to suspect this story as applying to Phalaris, " because," says he, " Conon, a writer in Julius Caesar's time, gives us the very same narrative; but, instead of Phalaris, he says it was Gelon that Stesichorus spoke of. And the circumstances of Gelon's history seem to countenance Conon; for Gelon was in great favour and esteem with the Himeraeans." CODon, Narrat. 42. Bent!. in Phalaris, p. 38.

447. 6.

448. 7. Fables are suited to the deliberative orator:

449. 8. being easy.

450. 9. He who has not enthymemswill use examples as proofs, and put them first. He who has enthymems uses examples as testimonies, and puts them last.

451. He again remarks on the facility here ascribed to minds of a philosophical turn, when, in speaking of metaphors, he remarks, TO ὃμοιον Kal iv πολὺ διέχουσι ϑεωρει̃ν, εὐστόχου, lib. iii. cap. xi. § 5.

452. This is the principle on which he has all along recommended example as more peculiarly available to the views of the deliberative orator. At the end of his illustrations of the subject of demonstrative rhetoric, after stating amplification to be more proper to it than either of the other common means of persuasion, he says, τὰ παραδείγματα τοι̃ς συμβουλευτικοι̃ς lie γὰρ τω̃ν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρί νομεν, lib. i. cap. ix. § 40. Neither, says he, (cap. iv. § 8,) ought the orator to rely on the result of his own observation.

453. CHAP. XXI.]

454. 1. Maxim, γνώμη.

455. 2. Its definition.

456. Conclusions of most enthymems are maxims.

457. Having told you that maxims are certain general propositions, he cautions you against supposing that every general proposition deserves this appellation. For example, mathematical truths are asserted in propositions, general enough it is true, which however do not come up to the notion which Aristotle would have you form of the γνώμη. I hardly know whether it be allowable to attempt an explanation of Aristotle from a popular comedy ; but those readers who remember the School for Scandal, may probably derive some illustration of this subject from the ' sentiments' there put in the mouth of Joseph Surface ; e. g. " The heart that is conscious of its own integrity, is ever slow to credit another's treachery." Act iv. scene 3.

458. In other words, the maxim is to the enthymem what propositions are to syllogisms. Not to every enthymem does the γνώμη hold this relation, but to such only as are conversant with " the actions and passions of common life." Aristotle has not ventured to tell us that all enthymems relate to these subjects; he says only that " nearly" all of them are so conversant ; περὶ τοιούτων ἐστὶ σχεδόν.

459. 3. Maxims are of four kinds.

460. 4. i. μετ' ἐρικόγου. ii. ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου.

461. 5.

462. 6. Those μετ' ἐπι λόγου are either, Ist. part of an enthymem ; or 2nd. Enthymemoatic.

463. Euripides, Medea, 294.

464. From a lost drama of Euripides, entitled Sthenoboea.

465. Euripides, Hecuba, 864.

466. I have ventured thus to render ἐπίλογος; for that such is Aristotle's meaning, is evident from his having himself used ἀπόδειξις, at the beginning of the section, to denote the same thing.

467. These last are most approved.

468. 7. Maxims not evident must have the reason prefixed or subjoined.

469. 8. With concise ness.

470. 9. Maxims

471. So also says Horace :— Quid aeternis minorem Consiliis animum fatigas? Od. ii. 11, 11. A notion, by the way, which Aristotle controverts elsewhere, Nich. Eth. x. 7.

472. To state the rule in the words of Hobbes, it is this—“ A sentence not manifest ought to be either inferred or confirmed; inferred, (as in the text,) confirmed thus,-A wise man will not have his children over-learned, (prefixing what, in the former disposition, had been put last,) seeing too much learning both softens a man's mind, and procures him envy among his fellow-citizens," (and subjoining what before had been prefixed.)

473. Meaning, lest their country should be so utterly devastated as that not a tree would remain for a cigala to sit upon.

474. suit the old.

475. 10.

476. 11. Common ones are useful.

477. 12. Old sayings.

478. 13. It is good to contravene a common maxim.

479. A young man ought not to use maxims.

480. On the principle,—Vox populi est vox Dei.

481. So thought Lee's hero, Caesar Borgia, for he tells Machiavel in the tragedy, 'Tis not my way to lop, for then the tree May sprout again; but root him, and he lies Never to bluster. Act v. se. 2.

482. If.

483. 15. Maxims aid a speech. i. From gratifying the vanity of the audience.

484. The words probably of some panegyrist of Iphicrates, who, in the warmth of declamation, must have produced a very great effect by contradicting a maxim so generally received, and which bore an authority more than human, (e ccelo descendit γνω̃θι σεαυτὸν,) while at the same time he placed the merit of the general in a most striking light. For the original obscurity of Iphicrates, see book i. chap. vii § 32.

485. [BOOK II.

486. 16. ii. They give the speech an air of character.

487. 1. Enthymems.

488. 2.

489. 3. i. They must not be far- fetched.

490. See the argument founded on the distinction between them, chap. xxvi. § 1.

491. ii. They must be on definite points.

492. iii. Our conclusions must be drawn both necessarily and contingently.

493. 4. We must know the facts of the case in every species of oratory. 5. Deliberative.

494. 6. Epideictic.

495. 7.

496. Euripides, Hippolytus, 989.

497. We should allege not τεκμήρια alone, but εἲκοτα as well.

498. Πολιτικὸς συλλογισμὸς means the syllogism peculiar to rhetoric. Victor, vide Animadv.

499. Aristotle has himself given an outline of the kind of information which ought to be possessed with a view to speaking on five of the most important questions of deliberative oratory, book i. chap. 4.

500. Judicial.

501. 8.

502. 9.

503. 10.

504. Herodotus, viii. 93.

505. Having illustrated his meaning by two examples, taken respectively from subjects of deliberative and demonstrative rhetoric, he concludes with a third from the subjects recognised by judicial; it being his great object to keep awake in the memory of the reader the original grand division of questions.

506. 11. The orator must seize the peculiar points.

507. 12.

508. The topic of selection.

509. 13.

510. 14. Two sorts of enthymems: δεικτικὰ. ἐλεκτικὰ.

511. 15.

512. Cum pervestigare argumentum aliquod volumus, locos nosse debemus: sic enim appellatae sunt hae quasi sedes, e quibus argumenta promuntur. Cicero, Topic, cap. ii.

513. 16.

514. 17.

515. 1. i. Element,that of contraries.

516. An oration spoken by Alcidamas in behalf of the Messenians, referred to above, i. 13, § 3. See the Sophism. Hudibras, P. ii. c. ii. § 123.

517. 2. ii. Of conjugate inflections.

518. 3. iii. From relatives.

519. See book i. 7, § 27. Hobbes calls this cognomination, or affinity of words.

520. See book i. 9, § 15.

521. Cicero illustrates this " place " by a similar example: " Nam si Rhodiis turpe non est portorium locate, nec Hermacreonti quidem turpe est conducere." De Inven. lib. i.

522. Upon this fallacy the reasoning of Oleon was grounded in the debate about the Mitylenaeans; and Dioclotus, in his reply, uniformly strives at exposing it, while he urges, that however they might merit death, the Athenians were not the people who should inflict it. Thucyd. lib. iii.

523. 4. iv. From comparisoil in three ways. i.a fortiori.

524. ii. a minori.

525. 5. iii. By parity of reasoning.

526. The argument a fortiori.

527. 6. v. From respect of time.

528. 7. vi. From retorting assertions

529. Under this head he considers both Time generally, and also Opportunity ( καιρὸς), which, however, have been thus distinguished— Χρόνος ἐατὶν ἐν ὦ καιρὸς, καὶ Καιρὸς, ἐν ὦ χρόνος οὐ πολύς. Hippocrates, in Precept. 61. Καιρὸς again has been described as o προσφυὴς καὶ ἁρμόδιος έκάστῳ χρόνς.

530. A striking instance of appeal to this topic occurs in Macbeth, act i. Lady Macbeth. then you were a man; Nor time, nor place, Did then adhere, and yet you would make both : They have made themselves, and that their fitness now Does unmake you.

531. See also Thucyd. book i. 140; ii. 6. Demosthenes frequently employs this topic, as in Olynth. iii. 'iva χρόνον, ἢ τίνα καιρὸν, ὦ ἂνδρες Αθηναῖοι, του̃ πάροντος βέλτω ζητει̃τε. The force of the appeal thus made cannot be better illustrated than by the frequency of its employment.

532. on your adversary.

533. 8. vii. From definition.

534. In addition to the instances of recourse to this topic quoted in the text, we may mention that of expediency in the speech of the Plataeans (Thucydides, iii. 56) ; and one used by Alcibiades in his speech at Sparta, vi. 89, πα̃ν TO ἐνατιούμενον τῳ̃ δυναϭτεύοντι, δη̃μος ὀνομασταὶ, K. T. λ.

535. One of the arguments used by Socrates to prove his belief in the existence of gods; for if, as was granted, he held the existence of his attending spirit ( τὸ δαιμόυιον), then necessarily must it either be itself a god, or at least a divine production. See Plato, Apolg. Socr.

536. See the concluding chapter of Tacitus's Life of Agricola.

537. 9. viii. From the number of meanings of the term. 10. ix. From the division.

538. 11. x. From induotion.

539. 12. xi. From former decisions.

540. " Εγραψεν, because demonstrative orations were seldom composed for delivery, but rather, as we should say, for the closet, book iii. c. 12, § 6, ἡ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικω τάτη, τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτη̃ς ἀνάγνωσις. See note chap. xi. § 7.

541. 13. xii. From the enumeration of parts.

542. 14. xiii. From the consequents.

543. 15. xiv. From the dilemma.

544. See book i. chap. vi. § 26; where, in stating that to be good which is an object of preference, he cites these two instances.

545. It is, however, a mode of argument sometimes so falla. cious, that we may say with Ovid, careat successibus opto Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat.

546. Phyllis Demoph.

547. 16. xv. From the different motives of mankind.

548. 17. xvi. From analogy.

549. 18. xvii.From the similarity of consequents.

550. See an instance of this mode of arguing used by Tiresias, Euripides, Phoenissae, 968. Of this kind is also the argument of Gamaliel: " If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but, if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it." Acts v. 38, 39.

551. 19. xviii. From the inconsistency of men.

552. 20. xix. From assuming a possible end as the real one.

553. 21. xx. From consider-

554. From an Oration by Lysias.

555. Evertêre domes totas optantibus ipsis Dii faciles.

556. ing the motives.

557. 2. xxi. From that which is incredible yet true.

558. Πρα̃γμα : by this word he designates the object of desire and pursuit. Victor.

559. That is to say, those very same faculties which the deliberative orator would employ in exhorting a person to act, would, if existing in reference to one under accusation, be turned against him by the judicial speaker as circumstances confirmative of suspicion. And, vice versâ, the circumstances of difficulty attending the undertaking, which would be employed to dissuade from its attempt, might be alleged in defence of an individual under suspicion, as points of the case which render his guilt improbable.

560. The argument may be formally stated thus : Men believe either what is actual fact, or probable; this is believed; this therefore is either fact, or probable; it is not probable, therefore it is fact. It is needless to observe that the slight possibility, that it may be neither one nor the other, is completely slurred over.

561. 23. Refutative element. i. From consideration of contradictions.

562. 24. ii. From explanation.

563. 25. iii. By arguing from

564. Thus M. Livius Salinator having at one period narrowly escaped conviction for embezzlement, afterwards, when he was made Censor, disfranchised all the tribes except that by whose vote he had been acquitted, " quod aut prius se injuste condemnassent; aut postea tantoe honores non recte tribuissent." Aur. Victor, de viris illus.

565. cause to effect, and viceversA.

566. 26. iv. From observing whether the fact could have been done better.

567. 27. v. From the anomaly of the present act to the past.

568. 28. vi. From errors before committed.

569. 29. vii. From

570. Ino, Cadmi filia, nonne Leucothea nominata a Graecis, Matuta habetur a nostris ? Cicero, Tusc. i. 12.

571. the equivocation of the term.

572. 30. Reasons why refutative enthymems are more in repute than confirmative.

573. Though he does not inform us what mode of praise this is to which he alludes, we may infer that it consisted in punning on their respective appellations as often as the case admitted it.

574. In this solitary instance of all the tissue does our language admit of preserving the pun of the original; and this, while it will serve sufficiently to illustrate our author's meaning, will not leave him any great cause to regret that he has lost the force of the others.

575. Folly, in Greek ἀφροσύνη. The tragedian seems to have strained the etymology of ' Αφροδίτη to suit his purpose. However, there are no liberties which punsters and theorists will not take. The words occur in the Troades, 990. Byron, speaking of love, says, " Begun in Folly, closed in Tears." Giaour.

576. Πένθεα.

577. θορυβου̃νται : respecting this word, see a note, book i. chap. 2.

578. For the principles on which this pleasure arises, see b. i. 11, § 21, on the ground that the apprehension of them is facili-

579. 1. Fallacious enthymems.

580. 2. 1st. From the diction of two kinds. i. Asserting a conclusion not inferred.

581. ii. Ambiguous terms, etc.

582. tated, and our admiration excited; and § 27 on the principle that TO σοφὀν δοκει̃ν ἡδύ. For our self-admiration is gratified by so easily perceiving the drift of the speaker.

583. 3. 2nd.From division and composition.

584. I An instance of the flagrant absurdity which may arise from taking conjointly what is true only separately: Euthydemus knew there were galleys in existence, and he was in the Piraeus when he had this knowledge; he knew therefore that there were galleys in the Piraeus, i. e. he being in the Piraeus.

585. Of this nature was the sneering recommendation of a Dictionary as a book of general information.

586. 4. 3rd. From exaggeration.

587. 5. 4th. From a σημει̃ον.

588. The fallacy consists in this, that it leads you to suppose that Thrasybulus had destroyed thirty distinct tyrannies, whereas he had in fact only suppressed one, the power of which happened to be shared between thirty different individuals.

589. This is the first of the fallacies which are independent of the diction, and may be termed, for the sake of distinction, real or material fallacies.

590. Meaning of course the specific σημει̃ον, for no fallacy can result from the τεκμήριον, vide book i. chap. ii. § 16. This fallacy he has elsewhere denominated τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἃγνοιαν του̃ ἐλέγχου.

591. CHAP. XXIV.]

592. 6. 6th. From the accidents of a thing.

593. 7. 6th. From asserting that as a logical property which is not.

594. 8. 7th. From asserting that as a cause which is not a cause.

595. This Polycrates was one of the Sophists; he was mentioned above (§3). The circumstance respecting the mice is recorded by Herodotus, ii. 141.

596. The fallacy in this instance arises from taking the simple converse of a universal affirmative proposition; as also in the instance cited § 5.

597. 9. 8th. From the omission of particulars.

598. 10. 9th. From arguing.

599. II.

600. See Euripides, Iphig. in AuI. 66.

601. See the epigram, which, alluding to Socrates's declaration, " that he knew nothing," concludes thus, Hoc aliquid nihil est, hoc nihil est aliquid.

602. Compare the wards of Sir Philip Sidney, that " a wonder is no wonder in a wonderful subject."

603. Sophistry of rotagoras.

604. 1. Solution of arguments two ways. Contradictory.

605. Compare lib. i. cap. xii. § 5, τὰ λίαν ἰν φανερῳ̃, κ. τ. X.

606. There were some persons who charged Socrates with doing this, and thence concluded that he was a person dangerous to the State— ἒστι τις Σωκράτης, ἀνὴρ σοφὸς, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γη̄ν πάντα ἀναζητηκὼς, KA'I T'ON "HTTO Λ'ΟΓΟΝ KPE'ITTO ΠOIΩN. Plato Apol. Socr. § 2. Compare also the dialogue of the two λόγοι, in the Clouds of Aristophanes.

607. Protagoras Abderites, Prodicus Ceius, Hippias Eleus, aliique multi docere Be profitebantur arrogantibus sane verbis, “ quemadmodum causa inferior, ita enim loquebantur, dicendo fieri superior posset” Cicero, Brut. c. vii. Τω̃ν ἄλλων τεχ νω̃ν οὐδεμία τἀναντία ϭυλλογίζεται, i. i. § 12.

608. ' Αντισυλλογισμὸς is a syllogism, whose conclusion is con-

609. mentA. Objections.

610. 2.

611. 3. Objections are fourfold.

612. 4. 1st. From the same source.

613. i. Generally. ii. Particularly.

614. 5. 2nd.From a contrary.

615. 6. 3rd. From a similar case.

616. 7. 4th. From points decided.

617. tradictory of that adduced by your opponent: ἔνστασις is the showing that his reasonings are fallacious either in matter or form.

618. Alluding to the loves of Byblis and her brother Caunus. See Ovid. Metaph. ix. 453.

619. Or to use the English phrase, " by parity of reasoning."

620. Victorius remarks, that "however at first sight this instance would seem to be one of ἔνστασις ἡ ὰπὸ του̃ εναντίου, it is not inapplicable to the present case, inasmuch as the injured stand to the injurers in a relation similar to that in which, the benefited stand to their benefactors.

621. The question how far ἀγνόων may be considered a free agent, is discussed in the Nicomachaean Ethics, lib. iii. cap. i. 5; and Hooker, book i.

622. 8. Reasonings derived from four sources: i. Probability. ii. Example. iii. Τεκ μήριον. iv. ση μεῑον.

623. 9. Solution of εἰκὸς sometimes fallacious: 10. and is of more service to defendant than plaintiff.

624. The orator must therefore show on which side the greater probability lies. " There are objections," said Dr. Johnson, " against a plenum, and objections against a vacuum; yet one of them must be right." Whately.

625. 11.

626. 12. Specific signs are refutable.

627. 13. Solution of examples.

628. 14. τεκ μήρια irrefutable. except by assailing the premises.

629. That is to say, by a λύσις φαινομένη.

630. As we cannot object to the form of the reasoning, our only resource is to attack the matter: to deny the premises.

631. CHAP. XXVI.]

632. 1. Amplification and its opposite not τόποι, but enthymema.

633. 2.

634. 3. Enthymems of refutation and confirmation are the same in kind.

635. 4. Objection is not an enthymemo Definition of ἔνστασις.

636. 5.

637. In taking leave of a series of terms which have occurred hitherto so frequently, we may as well remark that examples, maxims, enthymems, etc. denote the particular modification of the proof, or the shape in which it is served up, without refer-

638. ence to its degree of validity: while probability, signs, τεκμήρια, etc. refer to its degree of validity, without regard to the shape or manner in which the proof is conveyed.

639. I Having now despatched the first and most important of the three grand divisions of his work, viz. the subject of πίστις, it only remains to discuss the remaining two, λέξις and τάξις. In fact, having told the speaker what he is to say, he has now only to tell how he is to say it.

640. The subjects of πίστις, and τάξις, it will be recollected, constitute the widest and most general arrangement of his work. See book iii. chap. i. § 1.

Aristotle Rhetoric 2

Theodore Alois Buckley (Translator)