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Book 3

Of the Parts of Rhetoric.

As there are three points which ought to be handled ¹ respecting a speech; one, as to the sources out of which will arise means of persuasion; a second, respecting the style; a third, how we ought to arrange the parts of a speech. On the subject of the means of persuasion much has been said, as well as to how many the sources are out of which [they arise], namely, that they are three; also, what is the nature of these sources, and why they are no more: for all those who decide, are persuaded either by being themselves impressed in a certain way, or from conceiving the speakers to be men of a certain character, or from the matter of fact having been proved1.

It has been stated also with respect to enthymems, whence we are to furnish ourselves with them; for [of those sources], some are elementary propositions, peculiar [to the several branches of rhetoric] ; others are places [of universal applicability]. It follows that ² we treat of the subject of style; for the mere being in possession of what one ought to say is not enough; but it is moreover necessary that we deliver it as we ought; [and the doing this] contributes much to your speech's appearing to be of a certain character.

Now that by which its nature is first, was, con- ³ formably to nature, investigated the first; viz. whence these things derive their persuasive efficacy: next to this, was the disposition of them in the speaking: and thirdly, [arose an inquiry] of the greatest con- ⁴ sequence, but which never yet has been handled, on the subject of delivery; for it was introduced into tragedy and the public recitations at a late period, since at first the poets used themselves to sustain the dialogue in their tragedies. It is therefore plain that some such power exists in relation to rhetoric, as well as to poetry; which [as connected with the latter art! Glauco the Teian. and some others, have ⁵ treated of. And it depends on the voice, as to how we ought to manage it in reference to each several passion; when, for instance, we should employ a loud, when a low, and when a moderate pitch of voice; and on the manner in which we should employ its tones, viz. the acute, the grave, and the intermediate; and on certain rhythms in reference to each ; for the points, in reference to which they conduct their inquiries, are three, viz. the loudness of the voice, the fitness of its tones, and its rhythm. Now these proficients bear away nearly all the prizes in the disputations ; and as in the other contests the actors now produce a greater effect than the poets, so likewise do they in civil causes, owing to the depravity of ⁶ states. There is not yet however any system compiled respecting these points, (since even the subject of style was brought forward at a late period,) and, if rightly conceived of, it appears an ornament adapted to vulgar tastes5; but as the whole subject of rhetoric ⁷⁸⁹¹⁰ has reference to opinion, we should pay attention to it, not as to a subject of absolute propriety, but as one of necessity; for as to mere matter of justice, we ought not to inquire further on the subject of speeches than so as to avoid giving pain, at the same time that we do not delight; for the rule of right is, that the contest be carried on by means of the facts themselves; so that, except the proof, all the rest is superfluous6; but it is notwithstanding, as has been ¹¹ stated, a point of great moment, in consequence of the weak judgment of the auditor. The subject of style, however, has some necessary though trifling claim on our attention in every system; for the expressing one's self in this or that way makes some difference with a view to exhibiting the subject clearly, not however to so great a degree [as is generally supposed] : all these points are however mere idea, and have a reference to the auditor; wherefore it is that no one teaches geometry in such a style.

This art then, be it introduced when it may7, will produce the same effect as that of acting. And some ¹² to a small extent have already made an effort to treat of it; Thrasymachus, for instance, on the excitement of compassion. Again, the being qualified for de- ¹³ livery is a gift of nature, and rather without the province of art; the subject of style, however, is clearly reducible to an art. Wherefore rewards are bestowed in turn on those who are proficients in this, just as there are on those rhetoricians [who claim] ¹⁴¹⁵¹⁶ on the ground of delivery; for written orations influence more by means of their style than through the sentiment.

¹⁷ Now the poets, as was natural, began to make a stir upon the subject at first; for words are imitations, and the voice, of all our parts, is the most imitative8; on which account also these arts were constructed, both that of recitation, and of acting, ¹⁸ and of others too. But as the poets, though what they said was very frivolous, appeared to acquire their reputation by means of their style; on this account the first style [of rhetoric] was formed on that of poetry, witness the style of Gorgias; and even at the present time the majority of ignorant people fancy that such orators speak most delight- fully : this however is not the case, but the style of poetry and that of prose is distinct, and the result shows it; for not even the writers of tragedy themselves any longer employ the same turn of diction, ¹⁹ but just as they have passed from trochaic to iambic metre9, because the latter is most like prose of all the other metres ; so have they also relinquished all those terms which are foreign to the style of conversation, with which however the early writers used to embellish [their works], and which even at the present day are employed by those who write in heroic metre; wherefore it is ridiculous to imitate the tragedians, who in their own case no longer employ that turn of diction.

²⁰ So that it is evident that we need not discuss with minuteness all points soever which it is possible to treat of under the head of style, but so many only as belong to such an art as we are speaking of: the other part of the subject has been spoken of in my treatise on Poetry. ²¹²²

²³

On Excellence of Style as made up of single Words.

LET this then have been discussed: and let excel- ²⁴ lence of style be defined to consist in its being clear ; (a sign of this is this, that the diction, unless it make the sentiment clear, will not effect its purpose1;) and neither low, nor above the dignity of the subject, but in good taste; for the style of poetry indeed is not low, yet it is not becoming in prose.

Of nouns and verbs those which are in general use ²⁵ produce the effect of clearness: to prevent its being low, and to give it ornament, there are other nouns which have been mentioned in the Poetics, for a departure [from ordinary acceptations] causes it to appear more dignified ; for men are affected in respect of style in the very same way as they are towards foreigners and citizens. On which account you ²⁶ should give your phrase a foreign air ; for men are admirers of things out of the way, and what is an ob- ²⁷²⁸²⁹ ject of admiration is pleasant4. Now in the case of metrical compositions, there are many things which produce this effect, and there are very becoming, because both the subject and the person stand more apart [from ordinary life]; in prose, however, these helps are much fewer, for the subject is less exalted: since even in that art were a slave, or a mere youth, or [any one, in fact, in speaking] of mere trifles to express himself in terms of studied ornament, it would be rather unbecoming; but here too [as in poetry] the rule of good taste is, that your style be ³⁰ lowered or raised according to the subject. On which account we must escape observation in doing this, and not appear to speak in a studied manner, but naturally, for the one is of a tendency to persuade, the other is the very reverse5; because people put themselves on their guard, as though against one who has a design upon them, just as they would against adulterated wine. [Let your style then be such] as was the case with the voice of Theodorus as compared with that of the other actors6; for it appeared to be that of the character which was speaking, theirs ³¹ however were foreign from the character. And the deceit is neatly passed off if one frame his nomenclature upon a selection from ordinary conversation ; the thing which Euripides does, and first gave the hint of.

Words to be but As however nouns and verbs are [the materials] of which the speech is made up, and as nouns admit ³²³³³⁴³⁵ so many species as have been examined in the Poetics, ³⁶ out of the number of these we must employ but sparingly, and in very few places, exotic and compound words, and those newly coined; where they may be employed I will state hereafter9: the reason [of the restriction] has been mentioned, viz. because they remove your style from that of common life] more than is consistent with good taste. Words however ³⁷ of ordinary use, and in their original acceptations10, and metaphors, are alone available in the style of prose: a proof [that this is the fact, is] that these are the only words which all persons employ; for every body carries on conversation by means of metaphors, and words in their primary sense, and those of ordinary use. Thus it is plain that, if one should have constructed his style well, it will be both of a foreign character, and that [the art of the orator] may still elude observation, and [the style itself] will have the ³⁸³⁹⁴⁰⁴¹ advantage of clearness; this however was laid down ⁴² to be the perfection of rhetorical language. But of all nouns, those which are equivocal suit the purposes of the sophist, for by their help he effects his fallacies, while synonyms are of use to the poet; I mean these which are both synonyms and of common usage, as πορεύησθαι and βαδίζειν, for these two are both of common usage and synonymous to each other.

The nature then of each of these varieties, and how many species of metaphor there are, and also that this ornament is of the greatest effect, as well in poetry as prose, has been explained, (as I have ob- ⁴³ served above,) in the Poetics. In prose11 however we should bestow the greater attention on them, in proportion as an oration has to be made up of fewer adjuments than a metrical composition. Moreover the metaphor possesses in an especial manner [the beauties of] clearness and sweetness, with an air of being foreign12; and it is not possible to derive it from any other person13.

⁴⁴ You must however apply, in the case both of epithets and metaphors, such as are appropriate; and this will depend on their being constructed on principles of analogy, otherwise they will be sure to appear in bad taste ; because contraries show themselves to be such, particularly when set by each other. But you must consider, as a purple garment becomes a ⁴⁵⁴⁶ youth, what is equally so to an old man; since the same garment does not become [both].

And if you wish to embellish your subject, see ⁴⁷ you deduce your metaphor from such things coming under the same class as are better; and if to cry it down, from such as are worse: I mean, as the cases are opposed and come under the same genus, that the saying, for example, of a beggar, that "he prays," and of one who is praying, that " he begs," (both being species of asking,) is to do the thing which has been mentioned ; just as Iphicrates called Callias " a mere collector to the goddess, and not a bearer of the torch." He however replied, "that he must needs be uninitiated himself, or he would not call him a collector, but a bearer of the torch." For these are both services connected with the goddess; the one however is respectable, while the other is held in no repute. And some one [speaks of the courtiers of Dionysius as] Dionysian parasites; they however call themselves artificers14. And these expressions are both metaphors; the one of persons who would depreciate, the other the contrary. Even robbers, now-a-day, call themselves purveyors15. On which principle we may say of a man who " has acted unjustly," that he " is in error;" and of one who " is in error," that he "has acted unjustly." Again, of one who has stolen, both that has taken, [in way of diminution,] and that has ravaged [in exaggera- ⁴⁸⁴⁹ tion 16]. But the saying, as the Telephus of Euripides does, " that he lords it o'er the oars, and landing in Mysia," etc., is out of taste; for the expression, " lording it over," is above the dignity of the subject; [the rhetorical artifice then, is not palmed ⁵⁰ off. There will also be a fault in the syllables, unless they are significant of a grateful sound; for instance, Dionysius, surnamed Chalcous18, in his elegies, calls poetry, " the clangor of Calliope," because both are vocal sounds ; the metaphor, however, is a paltry one, and couched in uncouth expressions19.

12. iT. Must not be far- fetched. Again, our metaphors should not be far-fetched; but we should make the transfer, on the principle of assigning names out of the number of kindred objects, and such as are the same in species, to objects which are unnamed, of which however it is clear, simultaneously with their being uttered, that they are akin, as in that approved enigma, " A man I once beheld, [and wondering view'd,] Who, on another, brass with fire had glued20:" TWINING. for the operation is undesignated by any name21, and both are species of attaching; wherefore the writer called the application of the cupping instrument, a gluing. And, generally speaking, it is possible out of neatly constructed enigmas to extract excellent metaphors: because it is on the principles of metaphor ⁵¹⁵²⁵³⁵⁴⁵⁵⁵⁶ that men construct enigmas; so that it is evident, that [if the enigma be a good one] the metaphor has been properly borrowed.

The transfer also should be made from objects ⁵⁷ which are beautiful; beauty however of words consists, as Licymnius observes, in the sound or in the idea conveyed; as does also their inelegance. And there is moreover a third 22, which does away the sophistical doctrine; since it is not the fact, as Bryso argues, " that' no one speaks inelegantly, if indeed the using one expression instead of another, carries with it the same meaning:" for this is a fallacy; because some words are nearer in their ordinary acceptations, more assimilated, and have more peculiar force of setting the object before the eyes than others. And what is more, one word represents the object under different circumstances from another; so that we may even on this principle lay it down, that one word has more or less of beauty and inelegance than another: for although both words, [at the same time,] express [properties which are] beautiful, as well as such as are inelegant; yet they either express them not qua they are beautiful, or not qua they are inelegant; or granting they do, yet they express them, the one in a greater, the other in a less degree. But we are to deduce our metaphors from these sources;—from such as are beautiful either in sound, in meaning, or [in the image they present] to the sight, or any other sense. And there is a difference, in the saying, for instance, " the rosy-fingered Aurora;" rather than the purple-fingered;" or, what is still worse, " the crimson-fingered."

Also in the case of epithets, it is very possible to ⁵⁸ derive one's epithets from a degrading or disgraceful view of the case; for instance, " the murderer of his mother23:" and we may derive them from a view on ⁵⁹⁶⁰⁶¹ the better side; as, the avenger of his father." And Simonides24, when the victor in a race by mules offered him a trifling present, was not disposed to write, as though feeling hurt at writing on demiasses; when, however, he offered a sufficient present, he composed the poem- Hail! Daughters of the generous Horse, That skims, like wind, along the course, etc. HARRIS. ⁶² and yet they were daughters of asses as well. Again, it is possible to express the self-same thing diminutively. And it is the employment of diminutives which renders both good and evil less; just as Aristophanes jests in " The Babylonians using, instead of gold, " a tiny piece of gold instead of " a garment," " a little garment;" instead of " reproach," " puny reproach;" and instead of " sickness," " slight indisposition." We ought, however, to be careful, and always keep to the mean in both cases.

On Frigidity of Style.

⁶³ FRIGIDITY1, as dependent on the style, consists in four points. In the use of compound words; like Lycophron2, where he says, "the many-faced heaven," and " the mighty-topped earth," and " the narrow-pathed shore." And as Gorgias used the expression, " a beggarly-mused flatterer," and " the strictly-bound-by-oath and fully-sworn men." Or like Alcidamas, [who talks of] " the soul replete with anger, and the visage waxing fire-coloured." Again, ⁶⁴⁶⁵⁶⁶ " he supposed their zeal would be completion-working ;" and " he settled a completion-working persuasiveness of speech;" and " the azure-hued level of the main." For all these expressions, by reason of their being compounded, appear poetical3.

This, then, is one cause: also the employment of ⁶⁷ foreign idioms is one; as when Lycophron calls Xerxes, " prodigious hero," and Sciron, " baneful man 4;" or Alcidamas, when he says, " gambollings in poetry," and " nature's improbity," and " whetted by unrestrained rage of soul."

A third description of frigidity consists in the em- ⁶⁸ plyment of epithets either too long, out of place, or too frequent; for in poetry, indeed, it is becoming enough to say " white milk;" in prose, however, it is rather bad taste. Some also, should there be a superabundance of them, betray [the rhetorician's art], and make it evident that the whole is a mere made-up thing; this, however, you may occasionally avail yourself of, since it produces a departure from the ordinary style, and renders the diction foreign. Yet ought we to aim at the mean; for [the too free indulgence in the licence] does more harm than the speaking carelessly ; for the one has no beauty, the other has [positive] fault. Hence it is that the writings of Alcidamas appear frigid; for he employs epithets not as the seasoning, but as the food, with such profusion does he scatter them, and those both too long, and where the meaning is self-evident: thus, he does not say the sweat, but the moist sweat5:" nor to the ⁶⁹⁷⁰⁷¹ Isthmian games, but " to Isthmus' full assemblage nor does he speak of laws; but of " the laws, the sovereigns of states:" nor, of the race; but of " the soul's rapid impulse:" nor of a museum; but of " taking nature's museum with you:" and of " rueful care of the soul." Nor does he speak of favour; but of " the fabricator of a whole people's favour:" and of " a dispenser of the pleasure of his audience." [He would not tell you] of branches; but " amid the branches of the wood did he conceal it:" nor, that he covered his person; but " the nakedness of his person and of " desire the counter-rival of the soul (for this is at once a compound word and an epithet, so that it becomes poetry:) and of "such an illomen'd excess of improbity." Hence those who express themselves with this poetic air, produce by their want of taste both the ridiculous and the frigid, and from their loquacious prosing, become deficient in clearness ; for whenever one unnecessarily obtrudes any thing on an auditor who already apprehends him, putting an end to all perspicuity, he produces obscurity.

People, however, do employ compounds, when the ⁷²subject is without a proper appellative, and the position is easily effected: for instance pastime;" but if it occur frequently, it is decidedly poetical. Wherefore a style characterized by compounds, is most available to the Dithyrambic poets; for such words are sonorous: exotic words are most useful to epic poets6; for they have something dignified and superb: metaphor however to iambic verse ; for [dramatists] now employ it, as has been already stated.

⁷³ Moreover, fourthly, frigidity originates in metaphor; for there are even metaphors which are unbecoming: some, from their being ridiculous7; for the writers of ⁷⁴⁷⁵⁷⁶ comedy employ metaphor: others, from their being too dignified, and having too great an air of tragedy8; and should they be far-fetched, they become indistinct; like Gorgias, [when he talks of] things as wan, and [again] as ruddy. " You have sown in shame, and reaped in ruin for this has too much the air of poetry. And as Alcidamas, [who calls] " philosophy the rampart of the laws;" and " the Odyssey a beautiful mirror of human life9." Again, introducing no such gambolling in poetry:" since all these expressions, for the reasons above-mentioned, are destitute of persuasive efficacy. But what Gorgias said on a swallow, when in its flight it had muted on him, was in the best style of tragedy; for he exclaimed, " Oh! fie Philomela;" for to a bird, indeed, the act was not unbecoming, to a young lady, however, it would have been. So that he reproached her neatly enough, speaking of her as what she had been, not as what she then was.

Of Simile.

THE simile, too, is in fact metaphor; for the differ- ⁷⁷ ence is trifling: for when [the poet] says of Achilles, " Like a lion he leaped on them," it is a simile; but when he says, " A very lion he leaped on them," it is a metaphor: for since both are brave, [the poet,] ⁷⁸⁷⁹⁸⁰ making the transfer, has spoken of Achilles as a lion. The simile is useful too in prose, though seldom, since it carries with it the air of poetry. And you must introduce them just as you would metaphors; for they are metaphors differing in that particular which has been stated1.

⁸¹ The following are similes ; viz. that which Androtion employed against Idrieus,'that " he was like puppies loosed from their chain for they rushing at people bite them, and Idrieus, too, now that he was discharged, was a dangerous person. Again, as Theodamus, in a simile, compared Archidamus to Euxenus, without his knowledge of geometry; on the principles of similar ratios: for [conversely] Euxenus would be Archidamus, had [the latter] a knowledge of geometry. Also the instance which occurs in the Politeia of Plato, that those who spoil the dead are like young dogs, " which bite the stone, without touching the person who throws it." Also the [simile] which he employed against the populace, " that it was like a pilot, strong indeed, but rather deaf." And of the metres of poets, " they are like those in the prime of youth who are without beauty for the latter having lost their freshness, and the former their numerical arrangement, are no longer like the same thing. Also the simile of Pericles against the Samians, [who said] " they were like young children, who indeed accept the sop, but still cry:" and against the Boeotians, that " they were like holm-oaks; for these holm-oaks are cut down by their own means2, as were also the Boeotians, in their contests with each ⁸²⁸³ other." And what Demosthenes used before the populace, that " it is like those who are sea-sick when on board." So, too, Democritus likened the orators to nurses, " who, swallowing the sop themselves, besmear the infants with spittle." And in the same way Antisthenes likened Cephisidotus the slim to frankincense, for " in its consumption it spreads universal delight."

[ Thus the simile is metaphor], for it is free to you to enunciate all these both as metaphors and as similes. So that it is plain that as many as, when enunciated as metaphors, are approved, will also become similes; and [vice versâ] the similes, when without the note [of similitude, will become metaphors. But the metaphor, which is constructed on ⁸⁴ the principle of similar ratios, ought always to admit of paying back [the borrowed term3] ; as also in other cases, and in that of [metaphor], from species to species : for instance, if a cup be called " the shield of Bacchus," it is also proper to call a shield " the cup of Mars." Of these materials, then, is a discourse made up.

On the Necessity of speaking the Language with Purity.

BUT purity in speaking your language is the found- ⁸⁵ ation of all style ; and this depends on five particulars. First, on the connective particles2, whether ⁸⁶⁸⁷⁸⁸⁸⁹⁹⁰ one pay them back or not, just as they are of a nature to precede or follow, and as each requires ; thus, although and on my part, require yet and on his part [to follow them]. And it is necessary to make a return of the one to the other while it is yet recollected, and not to suspend them at too great intervals: neither should we [insert another] connective before making a return to the connective which already has a claim on us; for in very few instances is this appropriate. "But I, after he spoke to me, for Cleon came up beseeching me and putting it to me, went, taking them along with me:" for in these words many connectives are thrown in before the first connective has been paid back ; and if the interval between the words "I" and "went" be great, a want of clearness takes place. One source then of correct- ⁹¹ ness originates in the connectives. And a second, in the expressing yourself in the appropriate terms, and not in generals3. A third, in terms which are not ambiguous : this, however, only when you do not deliberately choose the opposite ; the very thing which they do, who, whilst they have nothing to say, yet affect to say something marvellous; for such persons, in their invention of somewhat to say, give vent to these terms, just as Empedocles did. For the circumlocution by its length imposes on people, and the auditors are affected in the very self-same way as the populace in transactions with soothsayers ; for when they utter their ambiguities, they yield assent as they go on; [as in the famous oracle], " Croesus having crossed the Halys will overthrow a mighty empire." And it is because the chance of mistake is less, that soothsayers express themselves in generals on their subject: for in "even and odd4" he will more frequently be right who cries [only generally] ⁹²⁹³⁹⁴ either " even" or " odd,” than one who would [specify] the exact number; and so one who predicts simply that a thing will happen, than he who would subjoin when 5. On which account the soothsayers never add the further distinction of “when? All these errors then are similar; so that, unless it be with a view to some such end, they are to be avoided.

The fourth essential is the preserving the distinc- ⁹⁵ tion which Protagoras marked out between the genders of nouns, viz. masculine, feminine, and neuter; for it will be necessary to make these correspond correctly. Thus, " She, having come and having conversed, departed."

The fifth consists in correctly quoting the plural, ⁹⁶ dual, and singular numbers. “ They, coming up, commenced beating me."

In a word, the written style ought to be easily ⁹⁷ read and understood ; and in these requisites it is the same [as that of recitation]; the very qualities however these which numerous connectives do not possess : neither the compositions which it is not easy to point, as those of Heraclitus. For the pointing of Heraclitus' works is quite a task, from its being far from clear whether words refer to those which precede or those which follow them6. Fop example, in the beginning of his work, “Of reason existing always men are ignorant:" for it is not clear to which branch of the sentence we should point off the " always."

This moreover produces a solecism; the failure ⁹⁸ in paying back the idea, if, [in the case of two words,] you do not bring each under an expression adapted to both7: for example, to the words " colour ⁹⁹¹⁰⁰¹⁰¹¹⁰² or sound," the expression "seeing" has not a common reference; whereas the expression " perceiving" has. Again, sentences become indistinct, if, delaying to thrust in many intermediate remarks, you do not put first and state [what naturally comes first]. For example, " For I intended, after I had conversed with him on this and that subject, and so on, to depart:" not, [stating it naturally thus,] "For I intended to depart;" and afterwards introducing, " after I had conversed on this and that, and so on."

¹⁰³

On Elevation of Style.

THE following expedients contribute to elevation of the style, viz.-the employing the definition instead of the noun; saying, for instance, not " a circle," but " a plane superficies, whose circumference is at all points equidistant from the centre." The reverse, however, viz. the use of the noun instead of the definition, contributes to abruptness.

¹⁰⁴ Again, [ the avoiding either, J if it be indelicate or unbecoming ; i. e. using the noun, if the indelicacy be in the definition ; or the definition, if it be in the noun.

Also, the illustration of the subject by metaphor and epithets, guarding, however, against what savours of poetry. And the putting what is but single as many, the thing which the poets do: though the haven be but one, yet they tell you of “ Grecian havens;”—and, " the letters' many-opening folds 1. ”

Also, the not bringing all your words under a ¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁶ common particle, but assigning to each its own: ¹⁰⁷ " This woman, this my wife. And the expressing yourself with a connective ; but if abruptly, without a connective indeed, though not unconnectedly; for instance, " Having departed and having spoken to him;” or, " having departed, I spoke to him."

The precept of Antimachus, too, is of service, viz. the drawing your expressions from absent qualities 2, which he does in celebrating the hill Teumessus, [commencing,] " There is a certain little hill visited by the winds3;" for thus the subject is carried on to infinity. And this expedient holds good alike in the case of qualities which are good, and such as are bad ., just as the subject has them not, in whichever way it may be of service. Hence the poets deduce their expressions 5, the "stringless" and the lyreless melody;" for they build their epithets on privatives. And this expedient is also approved in analogical metaphors; for instance, the saying of " a trumpet," that it is a " lyreless harmony." ¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁹¹¹⁰¹¹¹

¹¹²

Of the becoming in Style.

¹¹³ STYLE will possess the quality of being in good taste, if it be expressive at once of feeling and character, and in proportion to the subject-matter. This proportion, however, is preserved, provided the style be neither careless on questions of dignity, nor dignified on such as are mean : neither to a mean word let ornament be superadded; otherwise it appears mere burlesque; as Cleophon uses to do; for he has expressed some things equally ridiculously, as though he were to say, " August fig-tree."

¹¹⁴¹¹⁵ But [ the style expressive of feeling, supposing the case be one of assault, is the style of a man in a passion ; if, however, it be one of loathsomeness and impiety, the expressing yourself with disgust and painful caution ; if, however, the case demand praise, with exultation ; if pity, with submission ; and so on ¹¹⁶ in the other cases. And a style which is appropriate, moreover, invests the subject with persuasive efficacy. For the mind is cheated into a persuasion, that the orator is speaking with sincerity, because, under such circumstances, men stand affected in that manner. So that people suppose things to be even as the speaker states them, what though, in reality, they are ¹¹⁷ not: and the hearer has a kindred feeling with the orator, who expresses himself feelingly, even should he say nothing to the purpose; availing themselves of which, many bear down their hearers in the storm of passion.

¹¹⁸ But moreover, this mode of showing by means of signs is expressive of character; because, on every condition and habit of life, is consequent a language suited to it. I use the expression condition, in reference to the stage of life ; as youth, manhood, or age; and [to the sex], as man, or woman; and [ to na- ¹¹⁹ tion], as Lacedaemonian, or Thessalian. [I mean] ¹²⁰ by habits, those conformably to which one is of a certain character in life; for it is not according to every habit that the life assumes a certain character: if then one express himself in the language appropriate to the habit, he will produce the effect of being characteristic; for a rustic and a man of education, will express themselves neither in the same words, nor in the same manner. And the auditors are affected, in some way, by that feeling of which the declaimers avail themselves, till it nauseates ; [putting it to their audience thus], it who knows not ?"— “ all men know it." For the auditor acknowledges with a kind of confusion, that he participates [in that information] which all the rest of the world possess. The employment of them opportunely, or inoppor- ¹²¹ tunely, is, however, a consideration common to every species [of ornament]; but for every excess [in them], ¹²² there is that corrective which is in the mouth of every body ; for, of yourself, you should append a reproof on yourself; for it appears in reality [an ornament], at least since the use of it does not escape the notice of the speaker himself. Further, the speaker is not at ¹²³ once to employ every thing which is proportionate; for thus the hearer has the deceit passed off on him. I mean that, if the terms be harsh, he is not to employ a harsh tone and expression of countenance, and the other peculiarities [ of harshness] : if this caution be not observed, [our artifices] severally appear what they really are. But if he employ some and not others, without observation he produces the same effect. Still, if expressions of softness be uttered harshly, and such as are harsh with softness, they become divested of efficacy to persuade. But com- ¹²⁴ pound words, and a plurality of epithets, and foreign idioms, are appropriate chiefly to one who speaks under the excitement of some passion ;-for with one, [for instance,] who is affected by anger, we have a fellow-feeling in his calling his wrongs heaven- measuring," or "prodigious :” they are so, too, when one is already master of his audience, and has wrought them up to enthusiasm, either by panegyric or invective, by [the excitement] of anger or friendly feeling ; the which Isocrates does in " The Panegyric," near the conclusion; "-the record and remembrance ;” and, " men who had the spirit-.” For the speaker, in a transport of enthusiasm, gives utterance to expressions such as these ; so that the audience also, being forsooth similarly affected themselves, readily welcome them. Wherefore they are adapted to poetry; for poetry is the language of enthusiasm.

It is, then, either in this way [that we are to employ poetical expressions], or in irony; as Gorgias was in the habit of doing; and [as Socrates does] in the Phaedrus [of Plato].

Of Rhythm.

¹²⁵ THE modelling of the diction should, however, be neither metrical nor without rhythm 1: for the first has no persuasive efficacy (since it appears to have been got up), and at the same time it also draws off [the attention]; for it causes one to fix his attention on the similarities of cadence, when they will recur again; just in the way that little children anticipate the crier ; (for when he demands,—“ Whom does this freedman choose as his patron ?" — [they exclaim, " Cleon:") that, however, which is without ¹²⁶ rhythm, has no measure. The diction ought, however, to be measured, yet without metre; for what is destitute of measure is displeasing and indistinct. But by number all things are measured; and in modelling the diction, the number is rhythm 1, of which ¹²⁷¹²⁸ the metres are certain divisions3. Hence the sentence ¹²⁹ should possess rhythm, though not metre; for then it will become verse; and its very rhythm should be without preciseness. This, however, will be the case if, up to a certain point, it be preserved.

But of the rhythms, the heroic is stately, and not ¹³⁰ adapted to conversation, and deficient in varied cadence ; the iambic, however, is the very style of the multitude ; whence it is that persons in conversation give utterance to iambic lines, most of all metres. But fin a speech] there should be a degree of stateliness and departure from [the ordinary phrase]. Yet ¹³¹ the trochaic metre is too ripping 4; and all tetrameters show it; for tetrameters are a kind of dancing rhythm 5. But the paean remains, which orators, com- ¹³² mencing with T hrasymachus, began to employ; they were not, however, able to explain what it was. Yet the paean is the third, and comes next to those [rhythms] which have been mentioned; for it is as three to two. But of the former rhythms, the ratio ¹³³ is] of the one, [the heroic,] as one to one; of the others, [the iambic and trochaic,] as two to one6. But ¹³⁴¹³⁵¹³⁶¹³⁷¹³⁸¹³⁹ next to these ratios ranks that of whole and half;; and this is the paean. The others then are to be abandoned for the reasons stated, and because they are resolvable into verse: the paean is, however, to be retained; since out of that only rhythm, of all which have been mentioned, it is not possible to construct any metre; so that [in employing it] most of all rhythms, an orator will elude detection 8. At present, indeed, the orators employ one paean, [as well in concluding] as on opening; the conclusion, however, ought to differ from the opening [of a ¹⁴⁰ speech]. And there are two species of paeans, opposed to each other; whereof the one is adapted to the opening, (just, in fact, as they employ it;) this is that one of which the long syllable is first, and the three short ones at the end, [as in the word] Δᾱλο̆γένε̆ς, and Χρῡσε̆οκο̆μᾰ. The other, however, contrariwise, is that whereof the three short syllables are first, and the long at the end, [as in the conclusion of the line]— ¹⁴¹¹⁴²¹⁴³ Afterwards night obscured both earth, and water, and ocean.

This [paean] makes a good conclusion; whereas the short syllable, owing to its being incomplete, renders the sentence mutilated. But it is right to break off with a long syllable, for your conclusion to be clearly marked, not by means of the amanuensis, nor merely by annotations on the margin, but by means of the rhythm.

That, then, the diction should be conformable to rhythm, and not deficient in it, the particular rhythms too which will render it so conformable, and these under what arrangement, have been stated.

Of Style continuous and its opposite 1.

THE style must needs be either continuous, and united ¹⁴⁴ by means of connectives, just like the protracted odes of the dithyrambic poets 2; or reflex, and like the antistrophic odes of the old poets.

Now the continuous style is the old style, as, " This is the exposition of the historical research of Herodotus, of Thurium 3," etc. For formerly indeed every ¹⁴⁵¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁷¹⁴⁸ one employed it, but now very few. I call that continuous, which in itself has no termination, should not the circumstance under narration have been terminated. But it is unpleasant, from its being indefinite; for all like to descry the end. Wherefore it is that racers pant and faint away just at the turn ; for before, while they have the goal in view before them, they do not tire. The continuous style, then, is this.

¹⁴⁹ But the reflex is that which consists of periods. I call a period a form of words which has independently in itself a beginning and ending, and a length easily taken in at a glance. A diction of this description is pleasing, and easily conveys information : now ¹⁵⁰ it is pleasing from its being the opposite of that which is indefinite4; and because the hearer all along supposes that he is securing something, from the circumstance that something is constantly finished off for him; but the not foreseeing nor despatching any ¹⁵¹ thing is unpleasant: and it easily conveys information, because it is easily remembered; this, however, is the case, because the diction which consists of periods has number, which of all things is most easily recollected. And hence every one remembers verse better than prose; for it has numbers by which it is ¹⁵² measured. The period ought also to be terminated with the sense, and not to be interrupted like this verse of Sophocles,- ¹⁵³ " This is Calydon, land of the territory of Pelops 5.” For by dividing it is possible to understand the contrary [of the fact], as in the case of the instance cited, that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

A period either consists of clauses, or is simple. ¹⁵⁴ But the period consisting of clauses is a mode of speech perfect and distinct, and easily pronounced at a breath; not, however, at the point of division, like the fore-mentioned period, but altogether. And a clause is one subdivision of it. By a simple period, I mean one consisting of a single clause.

But neither the clauses nor the periods ought to ¹⁵⁵ be either curtailed or prolix ; for their brevity often causes the hearer to feel a hitch ; since it needs must be, if while he is yet [in thought] hastening onward, that limit of termination which he conceives within himself happens to be thrown back by the speakers ceasing, that a kind of hitch, as it were, occurs, owing to the impulse backward. Those, however, which ¹⁵⁶ are prolix cause the hearer to be left behind; just as they who make the turn too far on the outside of the goal, for they don't keep up with those walking with them 6; and in a similar way, periods which are prolix grow into an oration, and are something like a desultory ode. So that that occurs which Democritus, the Chian, joked Melanippides about, viz. that he produced desultory odes instead of anti strophes. "A man in framing a nuisance for others, frames one for himself; and long tedious odes are the greatest nuisance to him who produces them ; ” for it is appropriate enough to hold such language as this respecting the framers of prolix clauses. But those which are brief in their clauses do not, in fact, become periods ; therefore they draw on the hearer by fits and starts. ¹⁵⁷¹⁵⁸¹⁵⁹¹⁶⁰

¹⁶¹¹⁶² Of style which consists of periods, one species is merely divided [by disjunctives], another has an antithesis. Simply divided, as, " I have often felt surprised at those who convened the general assemblies and established the gymnastic contests." The style, however, which has antithesis, is that in which, in each clause, either there is one contrary put in conjunction with another, or the same is linked in connexion with contraries: as, " They benefited both, as well those who remained behind, as those who joined the expedition; since they made acquisitions for the latter more than they possessed at home; while to the former they abandoned, in what remained at home, a full competence.” The ideas set in opposition are,-staying behind,-joining the expedition ; competence,—more. [And in this sentence] : " So that both to those who wanted money, and to those who desired to enjoy it,” etc. Here enjoyment stands opposed to acquisition. And again: ‘‘ It happens frequently in these cases, that while the prudent fail, the simple succeed.”—“ Forthwith, indeed, they claimed the prize of highest valour, and not long after they gained the sovereignty of the sea.”-‟ That he sailed, indeed, through the main land, and marched across the sea; joining with a bridge the Hellespont, while he channelled through mount Athos." Again: " That, citizens though they were by birth, they were yet deprived by law of their franchise in the city.”—“ While some of them miserably perished, others were disgracefully preserved." Again : “ That privately, indeed, he employed barbarian slaves ; while in public he allowed many of the allies to be in slavery — ¹⁶³ " Either they would possess it while alive, or leave it behind when dead." Again, the expression which some one made use of against Pitholaus and Lycophron in the court: "They sold you, indeed, when they were at home; but when they were come to us, they were themselves bought.”— For all these [antitheses] produce the fore-mentioned effect. ¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁵ And a style of this description is pleasing, because contraries are most easily apprehended, and, when set by each other's side, they become still more easy of apprehension: and because they bear a resemblance to a reasoning process; for the elenchus is an inference of contraries. Such, then, is antithesis:—but an ¹⁶⁶ equipoise occurs if the clauses be equal; and alliteration, if each of the clauses have its extremities similar : and [this similarity] it needs must have either at the beginning or ending; and the beginning always has original words [similar 10]; but the ending, either last syllables [which are similar], or inflections of the same word, or the same word itself. [Instances of alliteration] at the beginning, are as follow 11: ̓ΑΓρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ̓ΑρΓὸν παρ’ αὺτου̃, For he received from him land untill'd. Δωρητοί T* ’ ΕΠΕλοντο, παράῤῥητοί T' ’ ΕΠΕεσσιν, By presents pleased, by words appeased. And at the ending, thus: Ὠήθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοΚΕΝΑΙ, ἀλλ’ αὐτου̃ αἴτιον γεγο- NENAI. They thought that he was the father, but that there was a cause for it. 'EI πλείσταις φρονΤΙΣΙ, καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπΙΣΙ. Anxiety at the highest, hope at the lowest. Inflections of the same word,—“What ! give him a brazen statue who did not deserve a brass farthing ?" The same word,—“In his life you spoke ill of him, ¹⁶⁷¹⁶⁸ and now after his death you write ill." And on a single syllable,—“ What ill would you have suffered, if you had witnessed an indolent man ?"

¹⁶⁹ And it is possible for the same words to possess, at the same time, all these ; and for the same example to be both an antithesis, equipoised, and having rhyme. But the heads of periods have nearly been enumerated in my Rhetoric to Theodectes. Also there are false antitheses, such as Epicharmus was in the habit of making: as, “ Once was I in their [country] ; once was I among them."

Whence are quoted the Elegancies and approved Beauties of Style.

¹⁷⁰ BUT as a detail of these subjects has been given, we must state whence the elegancies and approved beauties [of style] are derived. Now the power of inventing them belongs, either to the man of high natural genius, or to one of talent chastened by discipline; but to exhibit the sources of them is the business of this system; wherefore, let us treat of, and fully enumerate them.

¹⁷¹ And let this be our fundamental principle: for the receiving information with ease, is naturally pleasing to all 1; and nouns are significant of something ; so that all those nouns whatsoever which produce knowledge in the mind, are most pleasing. Now, the foreign expressions are unintelligible; and words of ¹⁷² common use we already understand. But the metaphor in the highest degree produces this effect [of giving pleasure]; for when the poet calls old age " stubble,” he produces in us a knowledge and in- ¹⁷³ formation by means of a common genus 2; for both are past their prime. Now, the similes of the poets ¹⁷⁴ also produce the same effect; on which account, should they be neatly managed, an elegance strikes you. For the simile, as has been remarked before3, is metaphor with the difference of the addition [of a particle denoting similitude]; on which account it is less pleasing, because more at length: and it does not assert that " this is that;" the mind therefore does not at all require it4.

It cannot but be, then, both that the style and the ¹⁷⁵ arguments which render the act of information rapid, are elegant; on which account, neither are superficial arguments held in approbation; (for, by superficial, I mean such as are obvious to every one, and which require no search;) nor those which, when stated, are not understood 5:but all those whatsoever which are apprehended, either simultaneously with their being uttered, (supposing even that no previous knowledge of them existed,) or by which the intellect is a little left behind; for there accrues, as it were, a piece of information ; in the two former cases, however, none.

As far, then, as respects the meaning of what is ¹⁷⁶ said, reasonings of this description are approved; but as to the expression, if they be worded (in figure) antithetically6; as, "deeming the common peace of ¹⁷⁷¹⁷⁸¹⁷⁹¹⁸⁰¹⁸¹¹⁸² the rest, a very war to their individual interests here "war" is opposed to " peace;" and (in single words) if they possess metaphor, and this neither far- fetched, for it will be difficult to view it in connexion ; nor superficial, for it produces no effect: and, moreover, if they place the object before your eyes ; for it needs must be, that one sees more clearly what is actually in the course of being done, than what is about ¹⁸³ to be. We ought then to aim at three things, metaphor, antithesis, and personification 7.

But of metaphor, which is fourfold, that species is in the highest degree approved which is constructed on similar ratios; just as Pericles said, that the youth which had perished in the war, had so vanished from the city, as if one were to take the spring from the year9." And Leptines, speaking of the Lacedaemonians, " that he would do all in his power to prevent Greece from being deprived of an eye." And Cephisodotus, when Chares was eager to present the accounts about the Olynthiac war, grew nettled, and said, " Now that he has got the populace with their necks in a halter, he is endeavouring to present his accounts." Again, when he once was exhorting the Athenians, as they were going for provisions, to go to Eu boea for them, he said, " the decree of Miltiades should go forth to the expedition." And Iphicrates, when the Athenians had made a league with Epidaurus and the neighbourhood of the coast, was indignant, and exclaimed that, " of themselves they had ¹⁸⁴¹⁸⁵¹⁸⁶¹⁸⁷ cut off the very provision of the war." And Pitho- ¹⁸⁸ laus called [the state yacht] Paralus, " the mace of the populace;" and Sestus, " the corn-chest of the Piraeus." And Pericles bade them away with Aegina, ‘‘the eye-sore of the Piraeus.” And Mcerocles said, " that he was no more a knave than the other," namo ing some good sort of man; " since that person indeed played the rogue at the rate of thirty per cent., himself however merely at ten per cent. usury 10.” And that iambic verse of Anaxandrides on his daughters, who were long in getting married: " The virgins have forfeited the nuptial recognisance 11” And that saying of Polyeuctus about one Speusippus, who was struck by apoplexy, " that he was unable to keep quiet, bound as he was by fortune in a complete pillory of a disease." Cephisodotus, too, used to call the triremes, " painted corn-mills:” as did the Cynic Diogenes the taverns, " the public tables 12 of Athens." Aesion, too, used the expression, "pouring out the city into Sicily," (for this is metaphorical, and sets the object before the eyes,) " so that all Greece exclaimed and this too is in a certain way a metaphor, and personifies. And as Cephisodotus bade them be ¹⁸⁹¹⁹⁰¹⁹¹ on their guard, " lest they rendered their very popular assemblies so many rows;" just as Isocrates, also, [ used the expression] of persons “ making a row in the general convention." And as in the funeral speech [of Lycias], " there was reason for Greece to shear her locks over the grave of those who fell at Salamis, since her liberty had been buried jointly with their valour:" for had he said that " there was reason she should weep, her liberty having been buried with them;" it would indeed have been a metaphor, and have given personification; but the words, "their valour," “ her liberty," convey a kind of antithesis. And, as Iphicrates said, " The path of my arguments is through the midst of the actions of Chares:" the metaphor here is on similar ratios, and the expression, " through the midst," produces personification. Also the saying, " that he challenged dangers to be his allies against dangers," is both a personification and a metaphor. And Lycoleon, pleading for Chabrias, said, " [What, not pardon him] out of a respect for the suppliancy13 of his brazen statue:" for in the then crisis it was a metaphor, but not always; but the personification [was perpetual] ; for pending his trial the statue acts as suppliant, the inanimate as an animated object,—" that memento of the exploits of the state." Again, " Making it their study, by every means, to think meanly;" [this is metaphorical,] since study is with a view to advance [not to diminish]. And the expression that “ God has kindled the intellect as a light in the soul for both in a certain sense illuminate.—“ For we put no period to our wars, but put them off;" since both putting off, and a peace of ¹⁹² this description, are alike things of the future. And again, the declaring " that a truce was a trophy more splendid than those won in war; since the latter was the result of a trivial occurrence or a single accident, the former were the result of the whole tenour of the war;" for both [agree in being] indications of victory. And, that " states pay a heavy punishment to the censure of mankind for punishment is a sort of hurt consonant to justice 14.

Thus, then, it has been stated that the elegancies result from metaphor constructed on similar ratios, and from personification.

Of Personification.

BUT it must be stated what we mean by the expres- ¹⁹³¹⁹⁴ sion, “ setting forth to the eyes, and in doing what this effect results. I mean, then, that those expressions which represent the object as in action, do all of them produce the setting before the eyes: for instance, the saying of “ a good man," that he is " a cube 1,” is a metaphor; for both are perfect; but this does not personify: whereas the speaking of one as " having his prime yet blooming," is a personification. And this, “—but you just as a thing let loose," is a personification. And [in the line] " Then the Greeks springing forth with their feet 2;—” the expression, " springing," is both a personification and a metaphor, for it expresses rapidity. Again, as Homer has in ¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁶¹⁹⁷ many places employed it, the putting inanimate ¹⁹⁸ things as animate, by means of a metaphor; and in all from their producing personification, they are approved; as in these instances3: " Back to the plain still roll'd the shameless stone." Again, " The arrow fle ω.” And, " Eager to wing its way." And, " Deep fix'd in earth, eager their blood to drain." And, " Right through his breast th' impetuous weapon sped." For in all these instances, the objects, from their being animated, appear personified; for the expressions, shamelessness, and eagerness, and the rest, are personifications. These, however, has he appended by means of the metaphor from analogy : for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is he who is insensible of shame, to the object in regard to which he is so ¹⁹⁹ insensible. He does this, too, in his approved similes, in the case of inanimate objects ; as, " The waves behind impel the waves before, Wide rolling, foaming high, and tumbling to the shore4." for he produces every thing in life and action. But personification is an imitation [of nature ]. ²⁰⁰ But it is fitting to draw your metaphors, as has been stated, from terms which are appropriate and not obvious; just as in philosophy, also, it is the privilege of one who conjectures happily, to discern the point of similitude6; as when Archytas observes, " that an arbitrator and an altar are the same," since ²⁰¹²⁰²²⁰³²⁰⁴ to both does the party who has been wronged fly for refuge. Or if one were to say, " that an anchor and a pot-hanger were the same;" for both are somewhat the same, but they differ in the circumstance of suspending from above and below. Again, the expression, " the states have been levelled" is the same in objects widely differing, equality both in power and in superficies.

Also the greatest number of elegancies arise from ²⁰⁵ metaphor, and from additionally deceiving the hearer7; for the point becomes more clear that he has learnt something, from the meaning being the opposite [of what it was supposed], and the mind seems to say, " How true is this ! I however was wrong." And the elegancies of proverbial expressions arise from one's meaning not what he says; for instance, the words of Stesichorus, that " the grasshoppers shall chirp on the ground 8." Also ideas neatly put enigmatically, are for the same reason pleasing; for there is an acquisition of knowledge, and a metaphor is introduced. Again, that embellishment which ²⁰⁶ Theodorus calls, " saying out-of-the-way things;" this, however, occurs when the sentiment is paradoxical, and (as he has it) does not square with previous opinion 9; just on the same principle as in jokes, words submitted to a slight change. An effect which ²⁰⁷ those jests also produce, which depend on the change ²⁰⁸²⁰⁹²¹⁰ of a letter, for they deceive [the hearer's anticipation] : it happens also in metre; for it terminates not in the way in which the hearer supposed; thus, f στειχε δ' ε̃χων ύπὸ ποσσὶ χίμετλα !! He proceeded wearing under his feet-chilblains 10. Whereas the hearer was imagining that " sandals ( πέδιλα), would be the word11. This, however, as soon as it is uttered, ought to be clear. But these changes of a letter cause the speaker to say, not what the word expresses, but what its inversion signifies : as in the jest of Theodorus, on Nicon the lyrist, " Thee did a Thracian —" ( θράττη) ; for what he pretends to say is, " It annoys ( θράττει) you 12," and deceives the audience ; wherefore to one who has caught it, the joke is pleasing; since if one is not aware that he is a Thracian. it will not appear to ²¹¹ be a beauty. Again, the expression, you wish him περσαι [i. e. either to side with Persia-to ruin him. Both meanings, however, should be in point, and so also in the case of the elegancies; thus the saying, " The sovereignty ( ἀρχὴ) of the sea, was not the beginning ( ἀρχὴ) of evils to the Athenians; since it was a gain to them." Or, as Isocrates says, " that its sovereignty ( ἀρχὴ) was to the city a beginning ²¹²²¹³²¹⁴ ( ἀρχὴ) of evils." For in either acceptation, that is stated which one did not imagine he would say; and that it is true, is acknowledged. For to assert that a beginning is a beginning, shows no great wisdom; but he repeats [the word ἀp χὴ], not in this sense, but differently ; and he does not repeat the same ἀρχὴ which he first said, but in a different sense. And in all these cases, if one introduce the term ²¹⁵ appropriately under an equivocation or metaphor, then there is wit; for instance, there is no bearing Baring 13: here the speaker denies the correspondence of signification, but appropriately enough, if [tbe person alluded to] be disagreeable." Again, " You cannot become more a stranger [ ξένος], than becomes you as a guest [ ξένος]," or not in a greater degree than you ought, which is the same; and " it becomes not a stranger [ ξένος] always to be a guest [ ξένος]." For the meanings here also are different. The same, too, is that commended saying of Anaxandrides, " It is honourable to die before doing aught worthy death;" for it is the same as saying, " It is worthy a man to die when he is not worthy to suffer death;" or, " It is worthy a man to die when he is not worthy [the punishment] of death; or, when he has not committed acts worthy that punishment." Now the form of the diction of these sentences is the ²¹⁶ same; but in proportion as [the idea happens to be enunciated in fewer words and with antithesis, in the same proportion is it more approved. And the reason is, that the information becomes by means of the antithesis, fuller; by means of brevity, more rapid. Such sentiments ought always to have either some ²¹⁷ one of whom they are said, or happiness of expression (if what you say [would appear] earnest, and not mere idle remark) ; for it is possible to have one of those qualities without the other: for instance, " You ought to die without having committed an error;" [the sentiment is just enough], but [the expression] is not elegant: " A deserving man should ²¹⁸ marry a deserving woman;" but this is not elegant14; but if it possess both qualities at the same time, as " It is worthy a man to die while he is not worthy of suffering death." But in proportion as a sentence possesses the greater number of these ornaments, in the same proportion does it appear more elegant; if, for instance, the words be metaphors, and metaphors of such a species, and if there be antithesis, and equipoise of clauses, and if it have personification.

²¹⁹²²⁰ Similes also, as has been uniformly stated in the foregoing, are in some way approved metaphors; for they always are expressed in two terms, like the analogical metaphor; thus, " the shield," we say, " is the cup of Mars the bow, " a stringless lyre." Thus, then, persons express the metaphor not unaccompanied ; whereas the calling a bow, " a lyre;" or a shield " a cup," is without accompanying explan- ²²¹ ation 16. And on this principle men construct their similes ; for instance, that of a flute-player to an ape, and of a near-sighted person to a sputtering ²²² lamp; for both contract themselves. But the excellence will exist when there is a metaphor; for you may represent by a simile the shield as " the cup of Mars," and a ruin as " the rags of a house ;" and the saying of Niceratus, that, " he was himself a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys," as Thrasymachus drew the simile when he saw Niceratus, who had been beaten by Pratys in a contest of rhapsodists 17, with his hair ²²³²²⁴²²⁵²²⁶ long and disordered, and his person still neglected. In which points, if they be not neatly managed, the poets most frequently get hissed off, even should they in other respects stand high. I mean when the poet replies [to his particle of similitude thus], "Like parsley he has crooked legs."—"Like Philammon on the bench, struggling with the ball" [or, with Corycus]. And all such expressions are similes ; but that similes are metaphors has frequently been stated.

Proverbs also are metaphors from species to spe- ²²⁷ cies: thus if any one, as though likely to experience a benefit, should himself introduce a measure and afterwards suffer loss from it, then one exclaims, " As the Carpathian fetched the hare 18 !" for both parties have experienced the thing in point. Now the sources whence these elegancies are deduced, and the cause why [they are pleasing], has nearly been told you.

Again, hyperboles which are recognised are meta- ²²⁸ phors; as that about a person with a black eye: " You would have thought him a basket of mulberries for the part beneath the eye is somewhat suffused with blood: but this is greatly forced. But the [simile with the expression of similitude] just as, so and so, is hyperbole, differing merely in the diction. " Like Philammon on the bench struggling with the ball," [becomes hyperbole thus;] " You would have thought he was Philammon struggling with the ball." " Like parsley he has crooked legs," [thus arranged becomes an hyperbole;] "I thought not that he had legs, but parsley stalks, so crooked were they." But hyperboles suit with the ²²⁹ amen ot the young, or they evince a vehemence ot ²³⁰²³¹ temper; (on which account the angry most frequently utter them; [thus Achilles in his wrath exclaims,] Though bribes were heap'd on bribes, in number more Than dust in fields, or sands along the shore, Atrides' daughter never shall be led, An ill-match'd consort to Achilles' bed; Like golden Venus though she charm'd the heart, Or vied with Pallas in the works of art 19. POPE.

The Attic rhetoricians, too, particularly employ this figure;) on which account for a man in advanced life to utter them is bad taste.

That a distinct Style is appropriate to each Species of Rhetoric.

²³² NEITHER ought it to escape us, that to each kind of rhetoric is adapted a peculiar style; for neither are the style which is adapted to writing and that of disputation the same, nor the style of deliberative and that of judicial rhetoric. But it is necessary to be acquainted with both [the first and the second] : for the one consists in knowing the purity of language ; the other in the not being obliged to sit mute, if one wish to communicate any thing to others; the very predicament in which they who know not how to ²³³ write are placed. But the style of writing is the most precise: that of disputation partakes more of declamation ; and of it there are two species, the one conveys the impress of character, the other of feeling. And hence actors choose this description of drama, and the poets this sort [ of actors]. But poets fit for perusal are carried about with us, like Choeremon, for he is as nicely finished as a rhetorician ; and, of the Dithyrambic poets, Licymnius.

Thus also, on comparing speeches together, those ²³⁴ adapted to writing appear jejune when delivered at disputations ; while those of the declaimers, excellent as they were when delivered, seem mere common- place in the closet; and the reason is, that in disputation [these things are appropriate enough. On which ²³⁵ account, compositions framed for declamation, inasmuch as, when abridged of their declamation, they do not produce their effect, appear ridiculous: thus, the omission of connectives, and frequent repetitions, in a written style are justly exploded ; yet in the style of disputation even the rhetoricians employ them, for they are adapted to declamation. Yet it is necessary ²³⁶ in repeating the same thing to vary the expression ; which indeed opens a way, as it were, to declamation: [e. g.] " This is he who robbed you ; this is he who defrauded you ; this is he who at last endeavoured to betray you." Just as Philemon the actor used to do in the " Gerontomania " of Anaxandrides, when Rhadamanthus and Palamedes speak; and in the opening scene of the " Devotees " [in the recurrence of] the word I. For if one does not give these passages with declamation, it becomes [a case in point with the proverb] " Stiff as one carrying a beam." And so also ²³⁷ where connectives are wanting, "I came, I met, I besought him;" for you needs must give it with declamation, and not, as though simply saying one thing, enunciate it with the same manner and tone. There is, moreover, a certain peculiarity which omissions of connectives possess; for it strikes one that, in an equal length of time, many things have been stated ; for the connective makes many, one ; so that if it be taken away, it is evident that on the contrary one will be many. It possesses, then, amplification ; " I came, I conversed with, I besought," being many,— " he seems to overlook all I have said, all I now say." Homer is desirous of producing this effect in the lines: " Three ships with Nireus sought the Trojan shore, Nireus, whom Agläe to Charopus bore, Nireus, in faultless shape 1," etc. POPE. ²³⁸ For of whom a great deal is said, that man must needs be spoken of frequently; and therefore if one be spoken of frequently, it appears that a great deal has been said of him. So that the poet mentioning him only once, by help of this sophism amplifies the character, and has excited a recollection of him, though he no where subsequently mentions him.

²³⁹ Now the deliberative style is exactly like sketching ; for in proportion as the crowd is larger, the view is taken from a greater distance ; on which account, in the one as well as in the other, productions of an exquisite finish are superfluous, and look worse than others. But the judicial is a thing of greater nicety: and in a still higher degree where it is before a single judge ; for least of all is this within the reach of rhetorical artifice ; since the peculiar points of the case are more easily concentrated to the view, than what is merely external: and the heat of disputation is out of the question, so that the decision is fair and clear. And on this account the same speakers are not approved in all these kinds; but where there is most of declamation, there least of all is accuracy: this, however, is the case where power of voice is requisite, and particularly if a considerable power.

²⁴⁰ The demonstrative style, however, is most adapted to writing ; for its purpose is perusal: second to it [in this adaptation] is the judicial.

But to draw any further distinctions on the subject of style, that it ought to be pleasing and magnificent, is superfluous: for why should it be such rather than temperate and liberal, or if there be any other moral virtue ? For that the foregoing rules will cause it to be pleasing is manifest, if indeed excellence of style has been correctly defined:—for with a view to what must it be, [according to our definition,] " clear and not mean, but-in good taste?" For should it become prosing, it is no longer clear, neither if it should be too concise. But it is plain that the mean is appropriate. And the foregoing precepts will cause its being pleasing, should the ordinary expressions have been judiciously blended with the foreign, and should rhythm [not be wanting], and the persuasive influence resulting from good taste.

The subject of style has then been treated 2, as well generally, respecting all the species of rhetoric, as particularly, respecting each. But it yet remains to treat of arrangement.

Of the Parts of a Speech.

THE parts of a speech are two; for it is necessary to ²⁴¹ state the case about which it is, and to prove it. Wherefore for one, after stating, not to prove it, or to proceed to prove it without a previous statement, is out of the question: for whoever proves, proves something; and he who makes a previous statement, makes such statement with a view to subsequently proving it. And of these parts, the one is the state- ²⁴² ment, the other the proof; just as though one were to make a division into problem and demonstration. But the divisions which they now usually make are ridiculous; for narration is a kind of peculiarity to judicial speeches alone; for how can there, in demonstrative and deliberative speeches, be any narration such as they speak of, or any reply, confutation of an adversary, or any peroration of points selected for display of character ?

But exordium, contrast of argument, and recapitulation 2, do then only occur in deliberative speeches ²⁴³²⁴⁴²⁴⁵ when an altercation happens ; for, considered as accusation and defence, they frequently [admit these branches, but not in their character of a piece of ²⁴⁶ advice. But the peroration, moreover, is not an essential of every judicial; for instance, if the speech be a short one, or the case easy to be remembered. For it is usual to detract only from what is prolix. The necessary divisions, then, are the statement and the proofs.

²⁴⁷ The essential divisions then are these; but the greatest number are, exordium, statement, proof, peroration. The confutation of an adversary belongs to the proof; and the contrast of arguments is an amplification of one's own, so as to be a kind of branch of the proof; for one who does this proves something : but not so either exordium or peroration ; but [the latter refreshes the recollection.

²⁴⁸ But should one draw distinctions with regard to these, that will be the case which the followers of Theodorus used to do, there will be a narration distinct from post-narration, and prae-narration, together with refutation, and post-refutation. But the writer should affix a title only after marking out a distinct species and difference4, otherwise it becomes mere emptiness and trifling; just like Licymnius, who in his treatise gives the titles, irruption-digressionramifications, etc. Iphitus et Pelias mecum; quorum Iphitus aevo Jam gravior, Pelias et vulnere tardus Ulixi. Aeneid, ii. 435. ' ΕΠΑΝΟΔΟΣ dicitur Graecb, nostri regressionem vocant. Quintil. ix. 3, 36-apud Em. Lex. Techn. ²⁴⁹²⁵⁰

²⁵¹

Of the Exordium.

Now the exordium is the commencement of the ²⁵² speech; which in poetry is the prologue, and in the performances on the pipe, the prelude: for these are all commencements, and, as it were, an opening of the way for what is to succeed.

The prelude, then, corresponds to the exordium of demonstrative speeches; for the performers on the pipe, using as a prelude any piece whatever which they are able to execute with skill, connect the whole by an inserted passage: and so in demonstrative speeches ought we to write; for the speaker ought, after stating whatever he lists straightway to employ the insertion, and link it [to the body of the speech]. Which indeed all do, having as their model the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates: for there exists no very near connexion between Helen and the artifices of sophists2. At the same time, if the exordium be out of the way of the subject, there is this advantage, that the whole speech is not of one uniform character. But the exordia of demonstrative ²⁵³ speeches are derived from praise, or from blame, (like Gorgias in the Olympic oration,-" Men worthy, O Greeks, of admiration among many;" for he is eulogizing those who instituted the general assemblies : Isocrates, however, blames them, " because they distinguish by prizes the excellencies of person, while for those who are wise they propose no reward ;") and thirdly, from suggesting advice ; for in- ²⁵⁴ stance, " -because it is fitting to honour the good," on that account [the orator] himself also speaks the praises of Aristides, or such characters as neither enjoy reputation, nor are worthless, but as many as, though they be excellent persons, are obscure; just ²⁵⁵²⁵⁶ as was Paris, the son of Priam: for thus the orator ²⁵⁷ conveys advice. Again [we may borrow demonstrative exordia] from those proper to judicial rhetoric, i. e. from appeals to the auditor, in case the speech be respecting any thing revolting to opinion, or difficult, or already noised abroad among many, so as to obtain his pardon : as Choerilus begins, " Now after every thing has become public."

The exordia, then, of demonstrative rhetoric arise from these sources,-from praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, and appeals to the hearers. The inserted connective clauses may be either foreign or appropriate to the subject.

²⁵⁸ With regard to the exordia of judicial rhetoric, we must assume that they are equivalent to the opening scenes of dramas, and the exordia of epic poems ; for the commencement of dithyrambic poetry resembles demonstrative exordia,—"on account of thee, thy gifts, thy spoils." But in the drama, and in epic poetry, the commencement is an intimation of the subject, that the hearer may foresee what the story is about, and that his mind may not be in suspense ; for whatever is indeterminate bewilders us. He then who puts, as it were, into the hand the beginning of the clue, causes him who holds it to follow on the story. On this account we have, " Sing, muse, the wrath," etc. " The man, O muse, resound," etc. " This too declare; from Asia's coasts afar, How upon Europe burst the mighty war." And the tragedians give some insight into the plot of the drama, if not forthwith, as Euripides does, yet they give it some where at least in the opening scene ; just as also does Sophocles Polybus was my father3!" And comedy in the same way. The most necessary business of the exordium, and this is peculiar to it, is to throw some light on the end for the sake of which the speech is made. For which very reason, if this be evident, and the case a brief one ²⁵⁹ we need not employ an exordium. The other species ²⁶⁰ which speakers employ are correctives, and general,4: these are, however, deduced from 1. the speaker himself ; 2. his hearer; 3. the subject; 4. and from the adversary. Every thing whatsoever which refers to the doing away or the casting an aspersion of character, has a relation to one's self or the adversary. But these things are not done exactly in the same way: for by one speaking on a defence, whatever tends to aspersion of character should be put first; but by one who is laying an accusation, in his peroration. And the reason why is not indistinct; for it is necessary that one who is making a defence, when he is about to introduce himself, should sweep away every stumbling block ; so that the prepossession against you must first be removed: by him, however, who raises the unfavourable impression, let it be raised in winding up, in order that the judges may the rather recollect it.

The correctives, however, which refer to the hearer, ²⁶¹ are drawn out of conciliating his good will, and inflaming him with anger, and occasionally from attracting his attention, or the reverse ; for it is not at all times convenient to render him attentive, for which reason many endeavour to induce them to laughter. But all these will conduce to tractability [on thejudge's part], if one wishes it, as does also the showing one's self a person of character; for to such do people the rather give heed. But men are attentive to objects of importance, of a peculiar description, or deserving admiration, or pleasing. Hence we ought to throw in a hint that the speech is concerning subjects of this nature. But if you would have them not attentive, hint that the matter is trifling, concerns them not, or is disgusting. But it ought not to escape our ²⁶² observation, that the whole of this is foreign to the subject; for they are addressed to a hearer of sorry ²⁶³²⁶⁴ taste, and one who lends an ear to points foreign to the subject; for if the hearer be not of this character, there is no need of exordium, except so far as to state the matter summarily, that, like a body, it may have a head.

²⁶⁵ Again, the business of exciting attention is common to all the divisions of a speech, wherever it may be necessary; for the audience relax their attention any where rather than at the beginning. For which reason it is ridiculous to range this head at the beginning, when more particularly every one is at the summit of attention. So that, whenever it is convenient, we may use the formulary, "Lend me your whole attention, for the question does not affect me any more than yourselves;" and this one,-" for I will relate to you a thing so strange, so wonderful, as you never yet heard." But this is just what Prodicus says he used to do,—" whenever the audience ²⁶⁶ happen to nod, to insert, by the bye, a display of his penteconta-drachmial demonstration 5." But that these things are referred to the hearer not in his proper capacity as such, is evident; for all create unfavourable impressions or do them away in their exordia : as, " O king, I confess indeed, that not with haste," etc.6: and again, " Why such long preludes7."

²⁶⁷ They, too, employ exordia who have, or appear to have, the worse case; for it is better to pause any where than on the case itself. On which account servants tell not what is asked them, but all the circumstances, and make long preambles.

²⁶⁸ But the means out of which we must conciliate have been stated, and each other point of that nature8: and, as it is well remarked by the poet, " Grant that I may reach the Phoeacians a friend and object of their compassion;" we ought, therefore, to aim at ²⁶⁹²⁷⁰²⁷¹²⁷² these two objects. And in demonstrative orations, ²⁷³ you should cause the hearer to suppose that he is praised simultaneously with the subject, either in his own person or his family, or in his maxims of conduct, or at least somehow or other. For true it is, as Socrates remarks, that " To praise Athenians before an Athenian audience is no difficult thing, however it may be in the presence of Lacedaemonians9."

But the exordia of deliberative rhetoric are derived ²⁷⁴ from those of judicial: but this species has them naturally least of all the three; for indeed the audience are aware of the subject; and the case needs no exordium except 1. on account of the speaker himself; 2. or his opponent; or 3. if the audience conceive of the importance of the matter otherwise than he could wish, thinking it either too serious or too trifling: with a view to which objects respectively there is a necessity for either exciting or doing away a prejudice, or for amplification or diminution. On account of these things there is need of exordium; 4. or otherwise for the sake of ornament; since without it a speech appears hastily got up. Of this sort was the panegyric of Gorgias on the Eleans; for without any thing like the preluding display of gesture and attitude in the Gymnasium, he begins forthwith,—" O Elis, city blest by fortune!"

Topicsfor removing Imputations to your Prejudice.

TOUCHING the subject of an imputation cast upon ²⁷⁵ you, one means of removing it will be the recurring to those topics, by means of which one might do away ²⁷⁶²⁷⁷ any surmises prejudicial to him; for it matters not whether they be entertained in consequence of the allegations of any one or not. So that this topic is universally applicable.

²⁷⁸ Another mode is, the confronting it like a point under litigation, [arguing] either that it is not the case, or is not hurtful, or not to the particular individual ; or that it is not of such importance, or not unjust, or not considerable, or not disgraceful, or of no consequence ; for in points of this description the question originates: just as Iphicrates argued against Nausicrates; for he pleaded, that he did what the prosecutor alleged, and indeed hurt him, but yet did not act unjustly. Or confessedly acting unjustly he may offer some equivalent: e. g. though hurtful, yet was it honourable ; though painful, yet was it beneficial ; by some other such expedient.

²⁷⁹ Another method is, the arguing that the action is merely a fault, or an error or that it was necessary ; such as the plea of Socrates, " that he trembled, not as the calumniator alleged, that he might appear an old man, but of necessity; since his eighty years of age did not overtake him of his own choice." And you may attempt a commutation of motives; e. g. " that he did not wish to hurt, but to do this or that, and not what the accuser insinuated; but that it so happened that hurt was sustained. But that it were fair enough to hate him, had he acted purposely with a view to this taking place."

²⁸⁰ Another mode is, the considering whether the prosecutor has either now or formerly, in his own person, or in that of his connexions, been involved in the charge. Another, whether others, whom they ²⁸¹ themselves acknowledge not liable to the imputation, be also comprehended; for instance, if he acknowledge an adulterer to be exempt from the charge, ²⁸² surely then also is this or that person. Another consists in ascertaining whether he has cast any false imputations on others ; or whether, like the party in ²⁸³ the present case, any other has calumniated persons, ²⁸⁴ or whether, without direct imputation, any ever were suspected who have yet appeared innocent. Another, in raising a counter prejudice against the calumniator ; for it is absurd, if, while the man is himself void of credit, his words obtain it. Another, in inquiring whether a decision has been already made; just as Euripides did in reply to Hygiaenon, who, in an action of Antidosis, accused him as being an impious person, inasmuch as exhorting to perjury he wrote,—" The tongue hath sworn, but the mind is unsworn 2;" for Euripides argued, "that by bringing into court the decisions of the Dionysiac contest he acted unjustly; for there he had given, or would give an account, should he wish to impeach him." Another, in impeaching calumny itself, as to how ²⁸⁵ great an evil it is; and this because it produces decisions foreign to the point, and that it relies not on the strength of its case.

But the citing presumptive signs is a topic common to both parties: thus, in the Teucer, Ulysses insinuates that " he is of kin to Priam; for [his mother] Hesione was Priam's sister." He, however, replies on the ground that, " Telamon, his father, was the enemy of Priam, and that he did not denounce the spies."

Another, peculiar to an accuser, is, for one after ²⁸⁶ bestowing short praise to censure at great length, putting forward great virtues briefly, or very many [which are not relevant], then to censure in one point which bears home upon the case. Such methods are the most crafty and malignant; for they attempt injury by means of one's virtues, by blending them with a man's failings.

But it is a resource common to the calumniator ²⁸⁷ and one who meets a calumny, that, as it is possible for the same action to have been done from many motives, by the calumniator, indeed, facts should be taken in a bad sense, as he makes his selection of motives on the worse side; while by the respondent ²⁸⁸ it should be made on the better. Take, for instance, the fact that Diomede chose Ulysses: one will say it was, "because he conceived Ulysses to be the bravest;" the other, that " it was not, but because he alone could not become a rival, such a poltroon was he."

Thus much, then, on the subject of imputations.

Of the Narration.

²⁸⁹ IN demonstrative speeches the narration is not given in continuity, but in scattered portions ; for one must go over the actions out of which the speech arises: for a speech is a kind of compound, having one portion, indeed, independent of art, [since the speaker is not at all the cause of the actions themselves,] and another portion originating in art; and this last is either the showing that it is fact should it be incredible, or such either in character or degree, or in show- ²⁹⁰ ing all these points at once. Owing to this, there are times when one ought not to narrate every fact successively ; because this mode of exposition is difficult to remember. From some, then, establish the character for courage, from others for wisdom, and from others for justice. The one style of narration is too simple ; the other has the grace of variety, and is not ²⁹¹ so void of elegance. But you have only to awaken the recollection of facts well known; on which account, many subjects will stand in no need of narration : supposing, for instance, you would praise Achilles, because all are acquainted with his actions ; but you must employ them at once. But in praising Critias, an orator must narrate; for not many are acquainted with his exploits.

²⁹² But now people tell us, ridiculously enough, that the narration should be rapid. And yet I would say, as did one to a baker, who inquired whether he should knead his bread hard or soft," — " What," ²⁹³ said he, " is it then impossible to knead it properly ? And so here [in rhetoric a mean is to be observed]. For one should not narrate at too great length, just as he should not make too long an exordium, nor state his proofs [too fully]. For neither in this case does propriety consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a mean betwixt both: and this is the stating just so much as will make the matter clear, or as will cause one to conceive that it has taken place, or that the party has inflicted hurt, or committed injustice, or that the case is of that importance which the speaker wishes to establish; and to the opposite party the opposite points will avail. And ²⁹⁴ an orator should narrate, by the bye, such incidents as conduce to his own excellence: thus, " I all along used to instruct them in what was just, bidding them not to abandon their children,"—or, to the villany of the other party;- " -but he replied to me, that wherever he might be he should have other children." Which, Herodotus says, was the reply of the Egyptians on their revolting. Or whatever is pleasing to the judges.

In the case of a defendant, the matter will be more ²⁹⁵brief; the points for dispute being, either that it has not taken place, or is not hurtful, or not unjust, or not of such importance. So that on acknowledged points he need not pause, unless they conduce in some degree to the objects suggested; e. g. if the fact be acknowledged, but its injustice disputed. Moreover, you should mention as already done those ²⁹⁶ things which, in the course of being done, failed of producing pity or horror. The story of Alcinous is an instance, which is despatched to Penelope in sixty verses. And as Phäyllus does in the circle, and the opening scene of the CEneus. The narra- ²⁹⁷tion should also convey a notion of the character: this will be secured, if we know what gives rise to the moral character. One source is the manifestation of deliberate choice; and of what kind is moral ²⁹⁸²⁹⁹ character we ascertain from knowing of what kind this is; and of what kind the deliberate choice is, from being acquainted with its proposed end. Hence the doctrines of mathematics have no display of character, for neither have they deliberate choice; and this for that they have not the influence of motive 2: but the Socratic discourses have this display!, for ³⁰⁰³⁰¹ they treat concerning subjects of this kind. But those things convey a notion of character, which is consequent upon the several characters 3; e. g. " Whilst saying this he began to hasten off for this manifests a hardihood and rusticity of character. And be cautious not to speak coldly as from the understanding merely, as orators do now-a-days, but as though from the deliberate choice 4. " I, for I wished and deliberately preferred this; and if I profit nothing by it, then it is the more honourable:" for the one is characteristic of a prudent, the other of a good man : since [the proposed end] of the prudent consists in pursuing the expedient; of a good man, in pursuing what is honourable. And should any circumstance be incredible, you must subjoin the reason; as Sophocles does. He furnishes an example in the Antigone, that she mourned more for her brother than for a husband or children; for these, if lost, might again be hers. ³⁰²³⁰³³⁰⁴³⁰⁵³⁰⁶³⁰⁷³⁰⁸ ³⁰⁹

³¹⁰ But if you should have no reason to offer, then avow " that you are well aware that you speak what exceeds belief, but that such is your nature:" for the world discredit a man's doing any thing voluntarily, except what is expedient.

Again, draw your remarks out of those things ³¹¹ which are indicative of the passions ; narrating both their attendant circumstances, and those which the audience know, and which attach peculiarly either to the speaker himself or his adversary:—" He, having scowled at me, departed." And as AEschines said of Cratylus, " that whistling and snapping his fingers—:" for they have a tendency to persuade: therefore these things which they know, become indices of that which they do not know. Such instances one may get in abundance out of Homer:— " Thus Penelope spoke, and the old woman covered her face with her hands 7:" for those who are beginning to shed tears cover their eyes. And forthwith ³¹² insinuate yourself as a person of a certain character, in order that they may look upon you as one of such a description, and your adversary [as the reverse] : but beware of observation as you do it. And that it is easy to effect this we may observe in those who report any thing to us; for respecting the communication (of which as yet we know nothing), we ³¹³³¹⁴ still catch a kind of guess 8. But the narration must be carried on in different parts, and, in some instances, even at the commencement.

³¹⁵ But in deliberative speeches narration occurs least of all, because no one narrates respecting what is yet to be: if, however, there should be any narration, it will be respecting things which have already happened, that the recollection of them having been awakened, the judges may determine better on the future; the orator either reprehending or praising them: but he is not then performing the functions proper to him as an adviser. If, however, the thing narrated be incredible, see you promise to state a reason for it immediately9, and to submit it to whom they please : like the Jocasta of Carcinus in his Oedipus, who always keeps promising when he who was seeking out her son inquires of her: and the Haemon of Sophocles 10.

Of the Proof.

³¹⁶ PROOF should be demonstrative; and the points of dispute being four, you must demonstrate by producing proof respecting the particular point at issue: thus, if the adversary question the fact, you must at the trial produce proof of this point above the rest; should it be that he did no harm, then of that point; and so should he urge that the action is not of the importance supposed, or that it was done justly: [and it must be done in the latter cases] exactly in the same way as if the inquiry were respecting the ³¹⁷³¹⁸³¹⁹ ter of fact. And let it not escape us that in this sin- ³²⁰³²¹ gle inquiry, it must needs be that one party is guilty 1: for it is not ignorance which is to blame, as though any were to dispute on a point of justice. So that, in this inquiry, the circumstance should be employed ; but not in the other [three].

But, in demonstrative rhetoric, amplification, for ³²² the most part, will constitute the proof, because the facts are honourable and useful; for the actions should be taken on credit 2, since, even on these subjects, a speaker on very rare occasions does adduce proof, if either the action be passing belief, or if another have the credit of it3.

But, in deliberative speeches, the orator may either ³²³ contend that the circumstances will not take place, or that what he directs will indeed take place, but that it is not just, or not beneficial, or not in such a degree. And it will be well for him to observe whether any falsehood appears in the extraneous observations of his adversary ; for these appear as so many convincing proofs, that he is false in the case of the other more important statements.

And example is best adapted to deliberative rhe- ³²⁴ toric; while enthymem is more peculiar to judicial4. For the former is relative to the future; so that out of what has been heretofore, we needs must adduce examples: the latter respects what is or is not matter of fact, to which belong more especially demonstration and necessity; for the circumstances of the past involve a necessity. The speaker ought not, ³²⁵ however, to bring forward his enthymems in a continued series, but to blend them by the way; should he not do this, they prove an injury one to the other, ³²⁶ ³²⁷³²⁸³²⁹ for there is some limit on the score of quantity too : " Oh friend, since you have spoken just so much as a prudent man would5;" but the poet does not say, of ³³⁰ such a quality. Neither should you seek after enthymems on every subject; otherwise you will be doing the very thing which some philosophers do, who infer syllogistically conclusions in themselves better known, and more readily commanding belief, than the premises out of which they deduce them. ³³¹ And when you would excite any passion, do not employ an enthymem; for either it will expel the passion, or the enthymem will be uttered to no purpose ; for the emotions which happen at the same time expel each other, and either cancel or render one or the other feeble. Neither when one aims at speaking with the effect of character, ought he at all to aim at the same time at enthymem; for demonstration possesses neither an air of character, nor deliberate ³³² choice. But a speaker should employ maxims alike in narration and in proof; for it has an expression of character:—"Yes; I delivered it, even knowing that one ought never to repose implicit confidence." And if one speak with a view to excite passion: " And injured though I be, yet I do not repent; for the gain, indeed, is on his side, but justice on mine."

³³³ And deliberative is more difficult than judicial rhetoric, and probably enough,-because it respects the future; whereas, in the latter, the question is respecting the past, which has already become matter of absolute science, even to diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan used to say; for he did not exercise his art of divination respecting things yet to be, but respecting those which had already happened indeed, but which were obscure: again, in judicial questions, ³³⁴ there is the law as the basis of reasonings ; but for ³³⁵ one who has something wherewith to begin, it is easier to discover means of proof. Neither has [deliberative rhetoric] many opportunities of digression; none, for instance, in reference to an adversary, or respecting one's self, or in order to excite passion6; but it possesses these opportunities least of all the three branches, unless it depart from its proper province. If, then, you are at a loss, you should do what the rhetoricians at Athens do, and particularly Isocrates; for in the course of deliberative speaking he accuses the Lacedaemonians, for instance, in the panegyric, and Chares in the speech about the alliance. But in demonstrative speaking, you should ³³⁶ insert praise in the speech by way of episode, as Isocrates does, for he all along keeps introducing something. And that saying of Gorgias, " That he never failed of something to say," is nothing more nor less than this: for if he be speaking of Achilles, he praises Peleus, then Aeacus, then his goddess mother, and so, too, valour in the abstract; or he does something or another in this strain.

Now the language of one who possesses proof, ³³⁷ should be both fraught with the impress of character, and fitted to convey the proof. But if you possess not enthymems, let it convey an impression of your character; and the show of goodness more befits a virtuous man, than accuracy of speech.

But of enthymems the refutative are more approved than the confirmative 7: because in the case of as many as produce reductio ad absurdum, it is more plain that a conclusion has really been arrived at; for opposites, when set by each other, are more clearly recognised. ³³⁸³³⁹

³⁴⁰³⁴¹ Touching reasonings directed against the adversary, they are not in any thing different in species ; but it belongs to the province of proof to do away his arguments, some by starting an objection, others by contrary inference8. And the speaker who begins, ought, both in deliberative and judicial rhetoric, first to state his own proofs; and subsequently to meet objections by doing them away, or by treating them with contempt beforehand. But should the points objected to be many, first he must confront the objections, as did Callistratus in the Messeniac assembly; for previously having swept away what his adversaries would be likely to allege in this way, he then ³⁴² spoke on his own part. But the last speaker should speak first what makes against the adversary's speech, doing it away, and drawing opposite inferences ; and particularly should his arguments have been well received. For just as one's mind does not cordially receive a person on whom a slur has been previously cast; in the same way neither does it favourably listen to a speech, if the opposite speaker appear to have spoken truly. It is necessary, then, to gain a footing in the hearer's mind for the intended speech; and it will be gained if you sweep away objections: wherefore a speaker, having combated either all, or the most important, or the most approved arguments of his adversary, or those which readily admit a contrary inference, is in this way to substantiate his own case: " The fame o' th' Goddesses I '11 first defend,- For Juno and 9." In this she first lays hold of the most silly point.- Thus much, then, of proof.

³⁴³ But as to the effect of character, since the saying ³⁴⁴³⁴⁵ some things respecting one's self, either is invidious, ³⁴⁶ or involves prolixity, or a liability to contradiction; and respecting another, either slander or rusticity;— it behoves one to introduce another as speaking: the thing which Isocrates does in the speech respecting Philip, and in the Antidosis; and as Archilochus conveys reproof, for he introduces the father saying, in an iambic line respecting his daughter, " There is not any thing which may not be expected, nothing which may be affirmed impossible on oath and Charon, the mechanic, in that iambic whose beginning is, " I regard not the wealth of Gyges;" and as Sophocles introduces Haemon pleading in behalf of Antigone to his father, as though another character were speaking.

But it is necessary sometimes to alter the form of ³⁴⁷ our enthymems, and to make them into maxims : for example, " It behoves men of sense to come to reconciliation while yet successful; for thus will they be the greatest gainers." But, in enthymematic form, it is thus : " If persons ought then to be reconciled when the reconciliation will be most to their advantage and profit, they should be reconciled while yet they are successful."

Of Interrogation and Ridicule.

BUT respecting interrogation, it is the happiest time ³⁴⁸ for employing it when an admission has been made in such a way, that a single further question being put, an absurdity occurs: thus Pericles asked Lampon respecting the initiation to the rites of [Ceres] the protectress ; and on his saying, " That it was not possible for him, an uninitiated person, to hear it," -he asked Whether he knew himself?" when ³⁴⁹ he said he did, [Pericles subjoined,] ,,And how do you know who are uninitiated ? ”

³⁵⁰³⁵¹ Next to this is the crisis, when [of two points] one is clear, and it is manifest to the party putting the question, that his adversary will concede the other; for one ought, after having ascertained by inquiry the one proposition, not to interrogate further respecting the point which is clear, but state the conclusion. Just as Socrates, when Meletus denied that he believed in the gods, asked " Whether he asserted the being of any demon ?" When he allowed that he had, Socrates asked, " Whether these demons were not either sons of the gods, or something of divine nature?" And when he allowed it, " Is there, then," said he, " one who thinks that sons of the gods exist, and not the gods themselves ? "

³⁵²³⁵³³⁵⁴³⁵⁵

Again, when one is likely to exhibit the adversary as speaking contradictions, or somewhat revolting to general opinion.

Fourthly, when he may not be able to rid himself of the question otherwise than by a sophistical answer : for if he answer in this way, that it is, and is not, or partly is, and partly is not,—or, one way it is, another way is not; the hearers hoot him off, being at a loss for his meaning.

Under any other circumstances do not attempt interrogation ; for should the party interrogated start an objection to the question, you appear to have been overcome : since it is not possible to put many questions by reason of the imbecility of the hearer. On which account we ought, as much as possible, to compress even our enthymems.

³⁵⁶ But one must give his answers to equivocal questions with a distinction1, and not concisely; and to what seems a contradiction, by directly offering an explanation in the reply, before the interrogator can put the next succeeding question, or draw the inference he aims at; for it is no difficult thing to ³⁵⁷ foresee on what the speech turns. Be this, however, and the means of answering, clear to us from the Topics. And as to a party drawing his conclusion, ³⁵⁸ if his question produce that conclusion, you are to assign the cause : as Sophocles, when questioned by Pisander, "Whether it had been his opinion, as it had of the other commissioners, to establish the four hundred," acknowledged that it had.—“But how," rejoined the other, " seemed it not to you to be wrong ?" He said it did. " Did you not, then, do that which was wrong?" “Yes, forsooth," replied he, " for I had no better alternative." And as the Lacedaemonian, when called to an account respecting his ephorship, on having the question put, " Whether the rest appeared to him to have perished justly," said they did. " Then," retorted the other, " did you not enact the same things as they ? " And when he acknowledged that he had, " Would not you also," asked the other, "justly perish?" "No, indeed," said he, " for they did this on a bribe; I did not, but merely from judgment." Wherefore one ought not ³⁵⁹ after the conclusion to put a further question, nor to put, interrogatively, the conclusion itself, unless the truth lies abundantly on our side.

But with respect to Ridicule, inasmuch as it seems ³⁶⁰ to possess a kind of use in disputation2, and as "one ought," says Gorgias, " to mar the grave earnestness of our adversary by ridicule, and his ridicule by sober earnestness," making the remark justly enough,-it has been stated in the Poetic how many species of ridicule there are; whereof, some befit the gentleman, others do not: so that each must see to it that he take that which befits himself. But the playing a man off is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the former produces the ridicule for his own sake, the buffoon for that of another. ³⁶¹³⁶²

³⁶³

Of the Peroration.

³⁶⁴ THE peroration is composed of four things:—of getting the hearer favourable to one's self, and ill-disposed towards the adversary; and of amplification and extenuation; and of placing the hearer under the influence of the passions; and of awakening his recollection.

For after showing yourself to be on the right side, and your adversary on the wrong, it naturally follows to praise and blame, and to give the last finish. And one of two things the speaker ought to aim at, either to show that he is good relatively to them, [the audience,] or is so absolutely; and that the other party is bad, either relatively to them, or absolutely. And the elements, out of which one ought to get up persons as of such characters, have been stated; both whence one should establish them as bad, and whence ³⁶⁵ as good. Next to this, these points having been already shown, it follows naturally to amplify or diminish: for the facts must needs be acknowledged, if one be about to state their quantity; for the increase of bodies is from substances previously existing. But the elements, out of which one must amplify and diminish, are above set forth.

³⁶⁶ Next to this, the facts being clear both as to their nature and degree, it follows that we excite the hearer to passion; such as are, pity, terror, anger, hatred, envy, emulation, and contentiousness: the elements of these also have been stated above.

³⁶⁷ So that it merely remains to awaken a recollection of what has been before stated. And this we are to do here, in the way in which some erroneous teachers say we should in the exordium: for in order that the facts may be readily perceived, they bid us state them frequently. Now there [in the exordium] indeed we ought to state the case at full, in order that it may not be unknown to the hearer upon what the trial turns; here, however, [in the peroration,] merely the means by which it has been proved, and that summarily.

The commencement of the peroration will be, that ³⁶⁸ one has made good what he undertook; so that it will be to be stated, as well what one has adduced, as for what reasons. And it is expressed either by means of a juxtaposition with the adversary's statements; and draw the comparison either between every point whatsoever, which both have stated relative to the same thing; or else not by a direct opposition. " He, indeed, on this subject said so and so ; but I so and so, and for such reasons." Or, by a kind of bantering: thus, "He said so and so, and I so and so." And, " What would he do, had he proved this, and not the other point!" Or by interrogation :-" What has not been fully proved on my side ?" or, " What has this man established?" Either in this way, then, must the speaker conclude, or he must, in natural order, so state his reasoning as it was originally stated; and, again, if he pleases, he may state distinctly that of the adversary's speech. And, for ³⁶⁹ the close, the style without connectives is becoming, in order that it may be a peroration, not an oration1: I have spoken,—you have heard,-the case is in your hands,-pronounce your decision 2. ³⁷⁰³⁷¹

Rhetoric. Aristotle. Theodore Alois Buckley (Translator). London. 1857.

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Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric (Theodore Alois Buckley) (OCR draft) (English) (Theodore Alois Buckley's English translation, first published in 1850 and represented from the Henry G. Bohn 1857 printing; corrected against a second OCR of the same printing.)

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Editions (1)

Ῥητορική Perseus (Aristotle. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1959 (printing).) — 3.1 focus

[1] 6 ἐπειδὴ τρία ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἓν μὲν ἐκ τίνων αἱ πίστεις ἔσονται, δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, τρίτον δὲ πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, περὶ μὲν τῶν πίστεων εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ πόσων, ὅτι ἐκ τριῶν 10 εἰσί, καὶ ταῦτα ποῖα, καὶ διὰ τί τοσαῦτα μόνα (ἢ γὰρ τῷ αὐτοί τι πεπονθέναι οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ τῷ ποιούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς λέγοντας, ἢ τῷ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, πείθονται πάντες), εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, πόθεν δεῖ πορίζεσθαι (ἔστι γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἴδη τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, τὰ δὲ τόποι)·

[2] περὶ 15 δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ συμβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον.

[3] τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐζητήθη κατὰ φύσιν ὅπερ πέφυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν, 20 δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τούτων ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην, οὔπω δʼ ἐπικεχείρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ῥαψῳδίαν ὀψὲ παρῆλθεν· ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν 25 ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικήν, ὅπερ ἕτεροί τέ τινες ἐπραγματεύθησαν καὶ Γλαύκων ὁ Τήιος.

[4] ἔστιν δὲ αὕτη μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὐτῇ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος, οἷον πότε μεγάλῃ καὶ πότε μικρᾷ καὶ μέσῃ, καὶ πῶς τοῖς τόνοις, οἷον ὀξείᾳ καὶ βαρείᾳ καὶ μέσῃ, καὶ 30 ῥυθμοῖς τίσι πρὸς ἕκαστα. τρία γάρ ἐστιν περὶ ἃ σκοποῦσιν· ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶ μέγεθος ἁρμονία ῥυθμός. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἆθλα σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὗτοι λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖ μεῖζον δύνανται νῦν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὑποκριταί, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἀγῶνας, διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν 35 πολιτῶν.

[5] οὔπω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὀψὲ προῆλθεν· 1404a 1 1 καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ὑπολαμβανόμενον. ἀλλʼ ὅλης οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, οὐχ ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον, ἐπεὶ τό γε δίκαιόν ἐστι μηδὲν πλέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὥστε μήτε 5 λυπεῖν μήτʼ εὐφραίνειν· δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τἆλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι περίεργα ἐστίν· ἀλλʼ ὅμως μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν.

[6] τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως ὅμως ἔχει τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ· διαφέρει γάρ τι 10 πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον, ἀλλʼ ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτʼ ἐστί, καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν· διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδάσκει.

[7] ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθῃ ταὐτὸ ποιήσει τῇ ὑποκριτικῇ, ἐγκεχειρήκασιν δὲ ἐπʼ ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινές, οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς 15 Ἐλέοις· καὶ ἔστιν φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον. διὸ καὶ τοῖς τοῦτο δυναμένοις γίνεται πάλιν ἆθλα, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν· οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μεῖζον ἰσχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.

[8] 20 ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινῆσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, οἱ ποιηταί· τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν, ὑπῆρξεν δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν· διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν ἥ τε ῥαψῳδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι γε.

[9] ἐπεὶ δʼ οἱ ποιηταί, λέγοντες εὐήθη, διὰ τὴν 25 λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίου, καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων τοὺς τοιούτους οἴονται διαλέγεσθαι κάλλιστα. τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ 30 οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρῶνται τὸν αὐτὸν πρόπον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν, οἷς δʼ οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἔτι 35 νῦν οἱ τὰ ἑξάμετρα ποιοῦντες ἀφείκασιν. διὸ γελοῖον μιμεῖσθαι τούτους οἳ αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρῶνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ,

[10] ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλʼ ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἵας λέγομεν. περὶ δʼ ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

[1] 1404b 1 ἔστω οὖν ἐκεῖνα τεθεωρημένα καὶ ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι (σημεῖον γάρ τι ὁ λόγος ὤν, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον), καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν· ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἴσως οὐ ταπεινή, 5 ἀλλʼ οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ.

[2] τῶν δʼ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τἆλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν· ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, 10 τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχουσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν·

[3] διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν, ἡδὺ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μέτρων πολλά τε ποιεῖται οὕτω καὶ ἁρμόττει ἐκεῖ (πλέον γὰρ ἐξέστηκεν περὶ ἃ καὶ περὶ οὓς ὁ λόγος), ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψιλοῖς λόγοις πολλῷ ἐλάττω· 15 ἡ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις ἐλάττων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, εἰ δοῦλος καλλιεποῖτο ἢ λίαν νέος, ἀπρεπέστερον, ἢ περὶ λίαν μικρῶν· ἀλλʼ ἔστι καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπισυστελλόμενον καὶ αὐξανόμενον τὸ πρέπον·

[4] διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιοῦντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως ἀλλὰ πεφυκότως (τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, 20 ἐκεῖνο δὲ τοὐναντίον· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντα διαβάλλονται, καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς οἴνους τοὺς μεμιγμένους), καὶ οἷον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔοικεν εἶναι, αἱ δʼ ἀλλότριαι.

[5] κλέπτεται δʼ εὖ, ἐάν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου 25 ἐκλέγων συντιθῇ· ὅπερ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος.

ὄντων δʼ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων τοσαῦτʼ ἐχόντων εἴδη ὅσα τεθεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως, τούτων γλώτταις μὲν καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ πεποιημένοις ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὀλιγαχοῦ 30 χρηστέον (ὅπου δέ, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, τό τε διὰ τί εἴρηται·

[6] ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ ἐξαλλάττει τοῦ πρέποντος), τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόνα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν. σημεῖον δʼ ὅτι τούτοις μόνοις πάντες χρῶνται· πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις 35 καὶ τοῖς κυρίοις, ὥστε δῆλον ὡς ἂν εὖ ποιῇ τις, ἔσται τε ξενικὸν καὶ λανθάνειν ἐνδέξεται καὶ σαφηνιεῖ· αὕτη δʼ ἦν ἡ τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ λόγου ἀρετή.

[7] τῶν δʼ ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμίαι, 1405a 1 λέγω δὲ κύριά τε καὶ συνώνυμα οἷον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα καὶ κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις.

τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι, καὶ πόσα εἴδη μεταφορᾶς, καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο πλεῖστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ 5 ἐν λόγοις, αἱ μεταφοραί, εἴρηται, καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς·

[8] τοσούτῳ δʼ ἐν λόγῳ δεῖ μᾶλλον φιλοπονεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅσῳ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων βοηθημάτων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν μέτρων· καὶ τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν ἔχει μάλιστα ἡ μεταφορά, καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν παρʼ 10 ἄλλου.

[9] δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς ἁρμοττούσας λέγειν. τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπρεπὲς φανεῖται διὰ τὸ παρʼ ἄλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὡς νέῳ φοινικίς, οὕτω γέροντι τί

[10] (ὁὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ πρέπει ἐσθής), καὶ ἐάν τε κοσμεῖν 15 βούλῃ, ἀπὸ τῶν βελτίστων τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει φέρειν τὴν μεταφοράν, ἐάν τε ψέγειν, ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων· λέγω δʼ οἷον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, τὸ φάναι τὸν μὲν πτωχεύοντα εὔχεσθαι τὸν δὲ εὐχόμενον πτωχεύειν, ὅτι ἄμφω αἰτήσεις, τὸ εἰρημένον ἐστὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς καὶ Ἰφικράτης Καλλίαν 20 μητραγύρτην ἀλλʼ οὐ δᾳδοῦχον, ὁ δὲ ἔφη ἀμύητον αὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ δᾳδοῦχον· ἄμφω γὰρ περὶ θεόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τίμιον τὸ δὲ ἄτιμον. καὶ ὁ μὲν διονυσοκόλακας, αὐτοὶ δʼ αὑτοὺς τεχνίτας καλοῦσιν (ταῦτα δʼ ἄμφω μεταφορά, ἡ μὲν ῥυπαινόντων ἡ δὲ 25 τοὐναντίον), καὶ οἱ μὲν λῃσταὶ αὑτοὺς ποριστὰς καλοῦσι νῦν (διὸ ἔξεστι λέγειν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν, τὸν δʼ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ τὸν κλέψαντα καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ πορίσασθαι). τὸ δὲ ὡς ὁ Τήλεφος Εὐριπίδου φησίν,

κώπης ἀνάσσων κἀποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν,

30 ἀπρεπές, ὅτι μεῖζον τὸ ἀνάσσειν ἢ κατʼ ἀξίαν· οὐ κέκλεπται οὖν.

[11] ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἁμαρτία, ἐὰν μὴ ἡδείας ᾖ σημεῖα φωνῆς, οἷον Διονύσιος προσαγορεύει ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις κραυγὴν Καλλιόπης τὴν ποίησιν, ὅτι ἄμφω φωναί· φαύλη δὲ ἡ μεταφορὰ †ταῖς ἀσήμοις φωναῖσ†.

[12] ἔτι δὲ 35 οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μεταφέρειν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὠνομασμένως ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι συγγενές 1405b 1 (ὁἷον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδοκιμοῦντι

ἄνδρʼ εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπʼ ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα·

ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἔστι δʼ ἄμφω πρόσθεσίς τις· κόλλησιν τοίνυν εἶπε τὴν τῆςσικύας προσβολήν), καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν εὖ ᾐνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορὰς λαβεῖν ἐπιεικεῖς· μεταφοραὶ 5 γὰρ αἰνίττονται, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι εὖ μετενήνεκται.

[13] καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν· κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, καὶ αἶσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον ὃ λύει τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων οὐθένα αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ 10 σημαίνει τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦδε εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ψεῦδος· ἔστιν γὰρ ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριώτερον καὶ ὡμοιωμένον μᾶλλον καὶ οἰκειότερον, τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὀμμάτων. ἔτι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχον σημαίνει τόδε καὶ τόδε, ὥστε καὶ οὕτως ἄλλου ἄλλο κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον θετέον· ἄμφω μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλὸν 15 ἢ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ᾗ αἰσχρόν· ἢ ταῦτα μέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. τὰς δὲ μεταφορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ τῇ ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει. διαφέρει δʼ εἰπεῖν, οἷον ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἠὼς μᾶλλον ἢ φοινικοδάκτυλος, 20 ἢ ἔτι φαυλότερον ἐρυθροδάκτυλος.

[14] καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ἔστιν μὲν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ φαύλου ἢ αἰσχροῦ, οἷον ὁ μητροφόντης, ἔστι δʼ ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος, οἷον ὁ πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ· καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὀρεῦσιν, οὐκ ἤθελε ποιεῖν, ὡς 25 δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμιόνους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δʼ ἱκανὸν ἔδωκεν, ἐποίησε

χαίρετʼ ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων·

Simonides fr. 7 καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἦσαν. ἔστιν αὖ τὸ ὑποκορίζεσθαι·

[15] ἔστιν δὲ ὁ ὑποκορισμὸς ὃ ἔλαττον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ 30 κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης σκώπτει ἐν τοῖς Βαβυλωνίοις, ἀντὶ μὲν χρυσίου χρυσιδάριον, ἀντὶ δʼ ἱματίου ἱματιδάριον, ἀντὶ δὲ λοιδορίας λοιδορημάτιον καὶ ἀντὶ νοσήματος νοσημάτιον. εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ μέτριον.

[1] 35 τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ ἐν τέτταρσι γίγνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἔν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οἷον Λυκόφρων τὸν πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανὸν τῆς μεγαλοκορύφου γῆς, καὶ ἀκτὴν δὲ στενοπόρον, καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ὠνόμαζεν πτωχομουσοκόλοκας 1406a 1 ἐπιορκήσαντας κατʼ εὐορκήσαντος, καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας μένους μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν πληρουμένην, πυρίχρων δὲ τὴν ὄψιν γιγνομένην, καὶ τελεσφόρον ᾠήθη τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν γενήσεσθαι, καὶ τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθὼ τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν, καὶ κυανόχρων 5 τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἔδαφος· πάντα ταῦτα γὰρ ποιητικὰ διὰ τὴν δίπλωσιν φαίνεται.

[2] μία μὲν οὖν αὕτη αἰτία,μία δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, οἷον Λυκόφρων Ξέρξην πέλωρον ἄνδρα, καὶ Σκίρων σίνις ἀνήρ, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκράτῳ 10 τῆς διανοίας ὀργῇ τεθηγμένον.

[3] τρίτον δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις τὸ ἢ μακροῖς ἢ ἀκαίροις ἢ πυκνοῖς χρῆσθαι· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ποιήσει πρέπει γάλα λευκὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν δὲ λόγῳ τὰ μὲν ἀπρεπέστερα· τὰ δέ, ἂν ᾖ κατακορῆ, ἐξελέγχει καὶ ποιεῖ φανερὸν ὅτι ποίησις ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ δεῖ γε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς (ἐξαλλάττει 15 γὰρ τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν), ἀλλὰ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μεῖζον ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ εἰκῇ λέγειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εὖ, ἡ δὲ τὸ κακῶς. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις τοῖς οὕτω πυκνοῖς 20 καὶ μείζοσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις, οἷον οὐχ ἱδρῶτα ἀλλὰ τὸν ὑγρὸν ἱδρῶτα, καὶ οὐκ εἰς Ἴσθμια ἀλλʼ εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰσθμίων πανήγυριν, καὶ οὐχὶ νόμους ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους, καὶ οὐ δρόμῳ ἀλλὰ δρομαίᾳ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρμῇ, καὶ οὐχὶ μουσεῖον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν 25 μουσεῖον, καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τὴν φροντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐ χάριτος ἀλλὰ πανδήμου χάριτος δημιουργός, καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ οὐ κλάδοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῆς ὕλης κλάδοις ἀπέκρυψεν, καὶ οὐ τὸ σῶμα παρήμπισχεν ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος αἰσχύνην, καὶ ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς 30 ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν (τοῦτο δʼ ἅμα καὶ διπλοῦν καὶ ἐπίθετον, ὥστε ποίημα γίνεται), καὶ οὕτως ἔξεδρον τὴν τῆς μοχθηρίας ὑπερβολήν. διὸ ποιητικῶς λέγοντες τῇ ἀπρεπείᾳ τὸ γελοῖον καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμποιοῦσι, καὶ τὸ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν· ὅταν γὰρ γιγνώσκοντι ἐπεμβάλλῃ, διαλύει τὸ σαφὲς 35 τῷ ἐπισκοτεῖν. οἱ δʼ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς διπλοῖς χρῶνται ὅταν ἀνώνυμον ᾖ καὶ ὁ λόγος εὐσύνθετος, οἷον τὸ χρονοτριβεῖν· ἀλλʼ ἂν πολύ, πάντως ποιητικόν· 1406b 1 διὸ χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλῆ λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοποιοῖς (οὗτοι γὰρ ψοφώδεις), αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς (σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αὔθαδες), ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις (τούτοις γὰρ νῦν χρῶνται, ὥσπερ 5 εἴρηται).

[4] καὶ ἔτι τέταρτον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίνεται· εἰσὶν γὰρ καὶ μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρῶνται γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖς), αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν· ἀσαφεῖς δέ, ἂν πόρρωθεν, οἷον Γοργίας χλωρὰ καὶ ἄναιμα τὰ πράγματα, σὺ 10 δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχρῶς μὲν ἔσπειρας κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας· ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτείχισμα τῷ νόμῳ, καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, καὶ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει προσφέρων· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπίθανα διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα. 15 τὸ δὲ Γοργίου εἰς τὴν χελιδόνα, ἐπεὶ κατʼ αὐτοῦ πετομένη ἀφῆκε τὸ περίττωμα, ἄριστα ἔχει τῶν τραγικῶν· εἶπε γὰρ αἰσχρόν γε, ὦ Φιλομήλα. ὄρνιθι μὲν γάρ, εἰ ἐποίησεν, οὐκ αἰσχρόν, παρθένῳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. εὖ οὖν ἐλοιδόρησεν εἰπὼν ὃ ἦν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὃ ἔστιν.

[1] 20 ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν μεταφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ μικρόν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα

ὡς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν

, εἰκών ἐστιν, ὅταν δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσε, μεταφορά· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄμφω ἀνδρείους εἶναι, προσηγόρευσεν μετενέγκας λέοντα τὸν Ἀχιλλέα.

[2] χρήσιμον δὲ ἡ εἰκὼν καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὀλιγάκις 25 δέ· ποιητικὸν γάρ. οἰστέαι δὲ ὥσπερ αἱ μεταφοραί· μεταφοραὶ γάρ εἰσι, διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἰρημένῳ.

[3] εἰσὶν δʼ εἰκόνες οἷον ἣν Ἀνδροτίων εἰς Ἰδριέα, ὅτι ὅμοιος τοῖς ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν κυνιδίοις· ἐκεῖνά τε γὰρ προσπίπτοντα δάκνειν, καὶ Ἰδριέα λυθέντα ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν εἶναι χαλεπόν. καὶ 30 ὡς Θεοδάμας εἴκαζεν Ἀρχίδαμον Εὐξένῳ γεωμετρεῖν οὐκ ἐπισταμένῳ ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Εὔξενος Ἀρχίδαμος γεωμετρικός. καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι οἱ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας σκυλεύοντες ἐοίκασι τοῖς κυνιδίοις ἃ τοὺς λίθους δάκνει, τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἁπτόμενα, καὶ 35 ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυκλήρῳ ἰσχυρῷ μὲν ὑποκώφῳ δέ, καὶ ἡ εἰς τὰ μέτρα τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι ἔοικε τοῖς ἄνευ κάλλους ὡραίοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπανθήσαντες, τὰ δὲ διαλυθέντα 1407a 1 οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται. καὶ ἡ Περικλέους εἰς Σαμίους, ἐοικέναι αὐτοὺς τοῖς παιδίοις ἃ τὸν ψωμὸν δέχεται μέν, κλαίοντα δέ, καὶ εἰς Βοιωτούς, ὅτι ὅμοιοι τοῖς πρίνοις· 5 τούς τε γὰρ πρίνους ὑφʼ αὑτῶν κατακόπτεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχομένους. καὶ ὃ Δημοσθένης εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιός ἐστιν τοῖς ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ναυτιῶσιν. καὶ ὡς Δημοκράτης εἴκασεν τοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς τίτθαις αἳ τὸ ψώμισμα καταπίνουσαι τῷ σιάλῳ τὰ παιδία 10 παραλείφουσιν. καὶ ὡς Ἀντισθένης Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν λιβανωτῷ εἴκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει. πάσας δὲ ταύτας καὶ ὡς εἰκόνας καὶ ὡς μεταφορὰς ἔξεστι λέγειν, ὥστε ὅσαι ἂν εὐδοκιμῶσιν ὡς μεταφοραὶ λεχθεῖσαι, δῆλον ὅτι αὗται καὶ εἰκόνες ἔσονται, καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες μεταφοραὶ 15 λόγου δεόμεναι.

[4] ἀεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ἀνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν, οἷον εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἀσπὶς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδαἁρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην Ἄρεως.

[1] ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος συντίθεται ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι δʼ ἀρχὴ 20 τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἑλληνίζειν· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἐν πέντε,

[2] πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, ἂν ἀποδιδῷ τις ὡς πεφύκασι πρότεροι καὶ ὕστεροι γίγνεσθαι ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἔνιοι ἀπαιτοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ μέν καὶ ὁ ἐγὼ μέν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δέ καὶ τὸν ὁ δέ. δεῖ δὲ ἕως μέμνηται ἀνταποδιδόναι ἀλήλλοις, καὶ μήτε μακρὰν 25 ἀπαρτᾶν μήτε σύνδεσμον πρὸ συνδέσμου ἀποδιδόναι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου· ὀλιγαχοῦ γὰρ ἁρμόττει. ἐγὼ μέν, ἐπεί μοι εἶπεν (ἦλθε γὰρ Κλέων δεόμενός τε καὶ ἀξιῶν), ἐπορευόμην παραλαβὼν αὐτούς. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ πολλοὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἀποδοθησομένου συνδέσμου προεμβέβληνται σύνδεσμοι· ἐὰν δὲ πολὺ 30 τὸ μεταξὺ γένηται τοῦ ἐπορευόμην, ἀσαφές.

[3] ἓν μὲν δὴ τὸ εὖ ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν.

[4] τρίτον μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις. τοῦτο δʼ ἂν μὴ τἀναντία προαιρῆται, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν ὅταν μηδὲν μὲν ἔχωσι λέγειν, προσποιῶνται δέ τι λέγειν· οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι 35 ἐν ποιήσει λέγουσιν ταῦτα, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· φενακίζει γὰρ τὸ κύκλῳ πολὺ ὄν, καὶ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς μάντεσιν· ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ἀμφίβολα, συμπαρανεύουσιν—

Κροῖσος Ἅλυν διαβὰς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύσει

Hdt. 1.53 , Hdt. 1.91 1407b 1 —καὶ διὰ τὸ ὅλως ἔλαττον εἶναι ἁμάρτημα διὰ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν οἱ μάντεις· τύχοι γὰρ ἄν τις μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἄρτια ἢ περισσὰ εἰπὼν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσα ἔχει, καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἔσται ἢ τὸ πότε, διὸ οἱ χρησμολόγοι 5 οὐ προσορίζονται τὸ πότε. ἅπαντα δὴ ταῦτα ὅμοια, ὥστʼ ἂν μὴ τοιούτου τινὸς ἕνεκα, φευκτέον.

[5] τέταρτον, ὡς Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διῄρει, ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεύη· δεῖ γὰρ ἀποδιδόναι καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς·

[6] ἡ δʼ ἐλθοῦσα καὶ διαλεχθεῖσα ᾤχετο. πέμπτον ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα 10 καὶ ἓν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν· οἱ δʼ ἐλθόντες ἔτυπτόν με.

ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὔφραστον· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτό· ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδʼ ἃ μὴ ῥᾴδιον διαστίξαι, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον 15 εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτῇ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ τοῦ λόγου τοῦδʼ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται· ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἀεί, πρὸς ποτέρῳ δεῖ διαστίξαι.

[7] ἔτι τόδε ποιεῖ σολοικίζειν, τὸ μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιζευγνύῃς ὃ ἀμφοῖν ἁρμόττει, 20 οἷον ἢ ψόφῳ καὶ χρώματι τὸ μὲν ἰδὼν οὐ κοινόν, τὸ δʼ αἰσθόμενος κοινόν· ἀσαφῆ δὲ ἂν μὴ προθεὶς εἴπῃς, μέλλων πολλὰ μεταξὺ ἐμβάλλειν, οἷον ἔμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεὶς ἐκείνῳ τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὧδε πορεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεὶς πορεύεσθαι, εἶτα τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὧδε 25 ἐγένετο.

[1] εἰς ὄγκον δὲ τῆς λέξεως συμβάλλεται τάδε, τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ἀντʼ ὀνόματος, οἷον μὴ κύκλον, ἀλλʼ ἐπίπεδον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον· εἰς δὲ συντομίαν τὸ ἐναντίον, ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου ὄνομα.

[2] καὶ ἐὰν αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀπρεπές, ἐὰν μὲν ἐν τῷ 30 λόγῳ ᾖ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τοὔνομα λέγειν, ἐὰν δʼ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, τὸν λόγον.

[3] καὶ μεταφορᾷ δηλοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, εὐλαβούμενον τὸ ποιητικόν.

[4] καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ ποιεῖν, ὅπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ ποιοῦσιν· ἑνὸς ὄντος λιμένος ὅμως λέγουσι

λιμένας εἰς Ἀχαϊκούς

35 καὶ

δέλτου μὲν αἵδε πολύθυροι διαπτυχαί.

Eur. IT 727

[5] καὶ μὴ ἐπιζευγνύναι, ἀλλʼ ἑκατέρῳ ἑκάτερον, τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας· ἐὰν δὲ συντόμως, τοὐναντίον, τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός.

[6] καὶ μετὰ συνδέσμου λέγειν· ἐὰν δὲ συντόμως, ἄνευ μὲν συνδέσμου, μὴ ἀσύνδετα δέ, 1408a 1 οἷον πορευθεὶς καὶ διαλεχθείς, πορευθεὶς διελέχθην.

[7] καὶ τὸ Ἀντιμάχου χρήσιμον, ἐξ ὧν μὴ ἔχει λέγειν, ὃ ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ Τευμησσοῦ,

ἔστι τις ἠνεμόεις ὀλίγος λόφος·

αὔξεται γὰρ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ 5 ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ὅπως οὐκ ἔχει, ὁποτέρως ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον, ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἱ ποιηταὶ φέρουσιν, τὸ ἄχορδον καὶ τὸ ἄλυρον μέλος· ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν· εὐδοκιμεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνάλογον, οἷον τὸ φάναι τὴν σάλπιγγα ἱέναι μέλος ἄλυρον.

[1] 10 τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἕξει ἡ λέξις, ἐὰν ᾖ παθητική τε καὶ ἠθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον.

[2] τὸ δʼ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδʼ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπῇ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ 15 Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπειεν ἂν πότνια συκῆ.

[3] παθητικὴ δέ, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ ὕβρις, ὀργιζομένου λέξις, ἐὰν δὲ ἀσεβῆ καὶ αἰσχρά, δυσχεραίνοντος καὶ εὐλαβουμένου καὶ λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐπαινετά, ἀγαμένως, ἐὰν δὲ ἐλεεινά, ταπεινῶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ὁμοίως.

[4] πιθανοῖ δὲ τὸ 20 πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· παραλογίζεταί τε γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς λέγοντος, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὥστʼ οἴονται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς λέγει ὁ λέγων, τὰ πράγματα οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ συνομοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν μηθὲν λέγῃ.

[5] διὸ πολλοὶ καταπλήττουσι 25 τοὺς ἀκροατὰς θορυβοῦντες.

[6] καὶ ἠθικὴ δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις, ὅτε ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ ἁρμόττουσα ἑκάστῳ γένει καὶ ἕξει. λέγω δὲ γένος μὲν καθʼ ἡλικίαν, οἷον παῖς ἢ ἀνὴρ ἢ γέρων, καὶ γυνὴ ἢ ἀνήρ, καὶ Λάκων ἢ Θετταλός, ἕξεις δέ, καθʼ ἃς ποιός τις τῷ βίῳ· οὐ γὰρ καθʼ ἅπασαν 30 ἕξιν οἱ βίοι ποιοί τινες.

[7] ἐὰν οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα λέγῃ τῇ ἕξει, ποιήσει τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ οὐδʼ ὡσαύτως ἀγροῖκος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν. πάσχουσι δέ τι οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ᾧ κατακόρως χρῶνται οἱ λογογράφοι, τίς δʼ οὐκ οἶδεν;, ἅπαντες ἴσασιν· ὁμολογεῖ 35 γὰρ ὁ ἀκούων αἰσχυνόμενος, ὅπως μετέχῃ οὗπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

[8] τὸ δʼ εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι 1408b 1 κοινὸν ἁπάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστιν.

[9] ἄκος δʼ ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ θρυλούμενον· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ προσεπιπλήττειν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἐπεὶ οὐ λανθάνει γε ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν λέγοντα.

[10] ἔτι 5 τοῖς ἀνάλογον μὴ πᾶσιν ἅμα χρήσασθαι (οὕτω γὰρ κλέπτεται ὁ ἀκροατής)· λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα σκληρὰ ᾖ, μὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἁρμόττουσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, φανερὸν γίνεται ἕκαστον ὅ ἐστιν. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, λανθάνει ποιῶν τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ 10 σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγηται, πιθανὸν γίγνεται.

[11] τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ διπλᾶ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἁρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς· συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένῳ κακὸν φάναι οὐρανόμηκες, ἢ πελώριον εἰπεῖν, καὶ ὅταν ἔχῃ ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάσαι ἢ ἐπαίνοις 15 ἢ ψόγοις ἢ ὀργῇ ἢ φιλίᾳ, οἷον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ οἵτινες ἔτλησαν· φθέγγονται γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δηλονότι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἥρμοσεν· ἔνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποίησις. ἢ δὴ οὕτως δεῖ, ἢ 20 μετʼ εἰρωνείας, ὥσπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ.

[1] τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μήτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι μήτε ἄρρυθμον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον (πεπλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ), καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐξίστησι· προσέχειν γὰρ ποιεῖ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, πότε πάλιν ἥξει· ὥσπερ οὖν τῶν κηρύκων προλαμβάνουσι τὰ 25 παιδία τὸ τίνα αἱρεῖται ἐπίτροπον ὁ ἀπελευθερούμενος; Κλέωνα·

[2] τὸ δὲ ἄρρυθμον ἀπέραντον, δεῖ δὲ πεπεράνθαι μέν, μὴ μέτρῳ δέ· ἀηδὲς γὰρ καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον. περαίνεται δὲ ἀριθμῷπάντα· ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμός ἐστιν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμήματα·

[3] 30 διὸ ῥυθμὸν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μή· ποίημα γὰρ ἔσται. ῥυθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται ἐὰν μέχρι του ᾖ.

[4] τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνῆς ἀλλʼ οὐ λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δʼ ἴαμβος αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν (διὸ μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων 35 ἰαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες), δεῖ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστῆσαι. ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος· δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα· 1409a 1 ἔστι γὰρ τροχερὸς ῥυθμὸς τὰ τετράμετρα. λείπεται δὲ παιάν, ᾧ ἐχρῶντο μὲν ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξάμενοι, οὐκ εἶχον δὲ λέγειν τίς ἦν. ἔστι δὲ τρίτος ὁ παιάν, καὶ ἐχόμενος τῶν εἰρημένων· τρία γὰρ πρὸς δύʼ ἐστίν, 5 ἐκείνων δὲ ὁ μὲν ἓν πρὸς ἕν, ὁ δὲ δύο πρὸς ἕν, ἔχεται δὲ τῶν λόγων τούτων ὁ ἡμιόλιος· οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ παιάν.

[5] οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα ἀφετέοι, καὶ διότι μετρικοί· ὁ δὲ παιὰν ληπτέος· ἀπὸ μόνου γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι μέτρον τῶν ῥηθέντων ῥυθμῶν, ὥστε μάλιστα λανθάνειν.

[6] 10 νῦν μὲν οὖν χρῶνται τῷ ἑνὶ παιᾶνι καὶ ἀρχόμενοι καὶ τελευτῶντες, δεῖ δὲ διαφέρειν τὴν τελευτὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς. ἔστιν δὲ παιᾶνος δύο εἴδη ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἓν ἀρχῇ ἁρμόττει, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶνται· οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν οὗ ἄρχει μὲν ἡ μακρά, τελευτῶσιν δὲ τρεῖς βραχεῖαι,

Δαλογενὲς εἴτε Λυκίαν,

15 καὶ

Χρυσεοκόμα Ἕκατε παῖ Διός

· ἕτερος δʼ ἐξ ἐναντίας, οὗ βραχεῖαι ἄρχουσιν τρεῖς, ἡ δὲ μακρὰ τελευταία·

μετὰ δὲ γᾶν ὕδατά τʼ ὠκεανὸν ἠφάνισε νύξ.

Simonides fr. 26β οὗτος δὲ τελευτὴν ποιεῖ· ἡ γὰρ βραχεῖα διὰ τὸ ἀτελὴς εἶναι ποιεῖ κολοβόν.

[7] ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῇ μακρᾷ ἀποκόπτεσθαι, καὶ 20 δήλην εἶναι τὴν τελευτὴν μὴ διὰ τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν παραγραφήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ῥυθμόν.

[1] ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὔρυθμον δεῖ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ ἄρρυθμον, καὶ τίνες εὔρυθμον ποιοῦσι ῥυθμοὶ καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴρηται· τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ εἰρομένην 25 καὶ τῷ συνδέσμῳ μίαν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν τοῖς διθυράμβοις ἀναβολαί, ἢ κατεστραμμένην καὶ ὁμοίαν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν ἀντιστρόφοις.

[2] ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη λέξις ἡ ἀρχαία ἐστίν Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἥδʼ ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις (ταύτῃ γὰρ πρότερον μὲν ἅπαντες, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρῶνται)· λέγω δὲ 30 εἰρομένην ἣ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθʼ αὑτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἀηδὴς διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτῆρσιν ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται· προορῶντες γὰρ τὸ πέρας οὐ κάμνουσι πρότερον.

[3] ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεώς ἐστιν 35 ἥδε, κατεστραμμένη δὲ ἡ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθʼ αὑτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. 1409b 1 ἡδεῖα δʼ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθής, ἡδεῖα μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν τῷ ἀπεράντῳ, καὶ ὅτι ἀεί τὶ οἴεται ἔχειν ὁ ἀκροατὴς καὶ πεπερθ́νθαι τι αὑτῷ, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν προνοεῖν μηδὲ ἀνύειν ἀηδές· εὐμαθὴς δὲ 5 ὅτι εὐμνημόνευτος, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ ἐν περιόδοις λέξις, ὃ πάντων εὐμνημονευτότατον. διὸ καὶ τὰ μέτρα πάντες μνημονεύουσιν μᾶλλον τῶν χύδην· ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ἔχει ᾧ μετρεῖται.

[4] δεῖ δὲ τὴν περίοδον †καὶ τῇ διανοία† τετελειῶσθαι, καὶ μὴ διακόπτεσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ Σοφοκλέους ἰαμβεῖα, 10

Καλυδὼνμὲν ἥδε γαῖα· Πελοπίας χθονός·

Eur. fr. 515 τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν τῷ διαιρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου τὴν Καλυδῶνα εἶναι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

[5] περίοδος δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν κώλοις ἡ δʼ ἀφελής. ἔστιν δʼ ἐν κώλοις μὲν λέξις ἡ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ διῃρημένη καὶ 15 εὐανάπνευστος, μὴ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει †ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ περίοδος,† ἀλλʼ ὅλη (κῶλον δʼ ἐστὶν τὸ ἕτερον μόριον ταύτης)· ἀφελῆ δὲ λέγω τὴν μονόκωλον.

[6] δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μυούρους εἶναι μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταίειν πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατήν (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὅταν, 20 ἔτι ὁρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον οὗ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅρον, ἀντισπασθῇ παυσαμένου, οἷον πρόσπταισιν γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν)· τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρω ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ τέρματος· ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπεριπατοῦντας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ 25 περίοδοι αἱ μακραὶ οὖσαι λόγος γίνεται καὶ ἀναβολῇ ὅμοιον, ὥστε γίνεται ὃ ἔσκωψεν Δημόκριτος ὁ Χῖος εἰς Μελανιππίδην ποιήσαντα ἀντὶ τῶν ἀντιστρόφων ἀναβολάς 28

οἷ τʼ αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων,

ἡ δὲ μακρὰ ἀναβολὴ τῷ ποιήσαντι κακίστη·

Hes. WD 265 30 ἁρμόττει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ εἰς τὰς μακροκώλους λέγειν. αἵ τε λίαν βραχύκωλοι οὐ περίοδος γίνεται· προπετῆ οὖν ἄγει τὸν ἀκροατήν.

[7] τῆς δὲ ἐν κώλοις λέξεως ἡ μὲν διῃρημένη ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ ἀντικειμένη, διῃρημένη μὲν, οἷον πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν 35 τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων, ἀντικειμένη δέ, ἐν ᾗ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ κώλῳ ἢ πρὸς ἐναντίῳ ἐναντίον σύγκειται ἢ ταὐτὸ ἐπέζευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, 1410a 1 οἷον ἀμφοτέρους δʼ ὤνησαν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πλείω τῆς οἴκοι προσεκτήσαντο, τοῖς δʼ ἱκανὴν τὴν οἴκοι κατέλιπον· 5 ἐναντία ὑπομονὴ ἀκολούθησις, ἱκανὸν πλεῖον. ὥστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι βουλομένοις· ἀπόλαυσις κτήσει ἀντίκειται. καὶ ἔτι συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας κατορθοῦν. εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἠξιώθησαν, οὐ 10 πολὺ δὲ ὕστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον. πλεῦσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δʼ Ἄθω διορύξας. καὶ φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως στέρεσθαι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δʼ αἰσχρῶς ἐσώθησαν. 15 καὶ ἰδίᾳ μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι, κοινῇ δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν συμμάχων περιορᾶν δουλεύοντας. ἢ ζῶντας ἕξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν. καὶ ὃ εἰς Πειθόλαόν τις εἶπεν καὶ Λυκόφρονα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, οὗτοι δʼ ὑμᾶς οἴκοι μὲν ὄντες ἐπώλουν, ἐλθόντες δʼ ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐώνηνται. 20 ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ποιεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον.

[8] ἡδεῖα δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις, ὅτι τἀναντία γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρʼ ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα, καὶ ὅτι ἔοικεν συλλογισμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν.

[9] ἀντίθεσις μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐστίν, παρίσωσις δʼ ἐὰν 25 ἴσα τὰ κῶλα, παρομοίωσις δὲ ἐὰν ὅμοια τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχῃ ἑκάτερον τὸ κῶλον· ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἢ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἔχειν, καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ δὲ τελευτῆς τὰς ἐσχάτας συλλαβὰς ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος πτώσεις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα· ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν 30 παρʼ αὐτοῦ,

δωρητοί τʼ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τʼ ἐπέεσσιν·

Hom. Il. 9.526 ἐπὶ τελευτῆς δέ ᾠήθης ἂν αὐτὸν οὐ παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν παιδίον γεγονέναι, ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν. πτώσεις δὲ ταὐτοῦ ἀξιοῖ δὲ σταθῆναι 35 χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν χαλκοῦ; ταὐτὸ δʼ ὄνομα σὺ δʼ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς. ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς δέ τί ἂν ἔπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρʼ εἶδες ἀργόν; ἔστιν δὲ ἅμα πάντα ἔχειν ταὐτό, 1410b 1 καὶ ἀντίθεσιν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάρισον καὶ ὁμοιοτέλευτον. αἱ δʼ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηρίθμηνται.

[10] εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀντιθέσεις, οἷον καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐποίει, 5

τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγὼν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις ἐγών.

[1] ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται περὶ τούτων, πόθεν λέγεται τὰ ἀστεῖα καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα λεκτέον. ποιεῖν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν τοῦ εὐφυοῦς ἢ τοῦ γεγυμνασμένου, δεῖξαι δὲ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

[2] εἴπωμεν οὖν καὶ διαριθμησώμεθα· ἀρχὴ δʼ ἔστω 10 ἡμῖν αὕτη. τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥᾳδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἥδιστα. αἱ μὲν οὖν γλῶτται ἀγνῶτες, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν· ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα· ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸ γῆρας καλάμην, ἐποίησεν μάθησιν καὶ 15 γνῶσιν διὰ τοῦ γένους· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀπηνθηκότα.

[3] ποιοῦσιν μὲν οὖν καὶ αἱ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰκόνες τὸ αὐτό· διόπερ ἂν εὖ, ἀστεῖον φαίνεται. ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ εἰκών, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, μεταφορὰ διαφέρουσα προθέσει· διὸ ἧττον ἡδύ, ὅτι μακροτέρως· καὶ οὐ λέγει ὡς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ 20 ζητεῖ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχή.

[4] ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ λέξιν καὶ ἐνθυμήματα ταῦτʼ εἶναι ἀστεῖα ὅσα ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν ταχεῖαν· διὸ οὔτε τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εὐδοκιμεῖ (ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἃ μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι), οὔτε ὅσα εἰρημένα ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἀλλʼ ὅσων ἢ ἅμα λεγομένων ἡ 25 γνῶσις γίνεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν, ἢ μικρὸν ὑστερίζει ἡ διάνοια· γίγνεται γὰρ οἷον μάθησις, ἐκείνων δὲ οὐδετέρου.

[5] κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τῷ μὲν σχήματι, ἐὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται, οἷον καὶ τὴν 30 τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν εἰρήνην νομιζόντων τοῖς αὑτῶν ἰδίοις πόλεμον· ἀντίκειται πόλεμος εἰρήνῃ·

[6] τοῖς δʼ ὀνόμασιν, ἐὰν ἔχῃ μεταφοράν, καὶ ταύτην μήτʼ ἀλλοτρίαν, χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνιδεῖν, μήτʼ ἐπιπόλαιον, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν. ἔτι εἰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ· ὁρᾶν γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ 35 μέλλοντα. δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, μεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας.

[7] τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν 1411a 1 εὐδοκιμοῦσι μάλιστα αἱ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἠφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλοι. καὶ 5 Λεπτίνης περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, οὐκ ἂν περιιδεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἑτερόφθαλμον γενομένην. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος, σπουδάζοντος Χάρητος εὐθύνας δοῦναι περὶ τὸν Ὀλυνθιακὸν πόλεμον, ἠγανάκτει, φάσκων εἰς πνῖγμα τὸν δῆμον ἄγχοντα τὰς εὐθύνας πειρᾶσθαι δοῦναι. καὶ παρακαλῶν ποτὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους 10 εἰς Εὔβοιαν ἐπισιτισαμένους ἔφη δεῖν ἐξιέναι τὸ Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα. καὶ Ἰφικράτης σπεισαμένων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Ἐπίδαυρον καὶ τὴν παραλίαν ἠγανάκτει, φάσκων αὐτοὺς τὰ ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου παρῃρῆσθαι. καὶ Πειθόλαος τὴν πάραλον ῥόπαλον τοῦ δήμου, Σηστὸν δὲ τηλίαν τοῦ 15 Πειραιέως. καὶ Περικλῆς τὴν Αἴγιναν ἀφελεῖν ἐκέλευσε, τὴν λήμην τοῦ Πειραιέως. καὶ Μοιροκλῆς οὐθὲν ἔφη πονηρότερος εἶναι, ὀνομάσας τινὰ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν· ἐκεῖνον μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρίτων τόκων πονηρεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιδεκάτων. καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου ἰαμβεῖον ὑπὲρ τῶν θυγατέρων πρὸς τὸν 20 γάμον ἐγχρονιζουσῶν

ὑπερήμεροί μοι τῶν γάμων αἱ παρθένοι.

Anaxandrides fr. 68 καὶ τὸ Πολυεύκτου εἰς ἀποπληκτικόν τινα Σπεύσιππον, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐν πεντεσυρίγγῳ νόσῳ δεδεμένον. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος τὰς τριήρεις ἐκάλει μύλωνας ποικίλους, ὁ Κύων δὲ τὰ καπηλεῖα τὰ Ἀττικὰ 25 φιδίτια· Αἰσίων δέ, ὅτι εἰς Σικελίαν τὴν πόλιν ἐξέχεαν· τοῦτο γὰρ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ ὥστε βοῆσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ ὥσπερ Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευεν μὴ πολλὰς ποιήσωσιν τὰς συνδρομάς ἐκκλησίας. καὶ Ἰσοκράτης 30 πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν. καὶ οἷον ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, διότι ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῷ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τελευτησάντων κείρασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὡς συγκαταθαπτομένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας· εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι ἄξιον δακρῦσαι συγκαταθαπτομένης 35 τῆς ἀρετῆς, μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων, 1411b 1 τὸ δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀντίθεσίν τινα ἔχει. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης εἶπεν ἡ γὰρ ὁδός μοι τῶν λόγων διὰ μέσων τῶν Χάρητι πεπραγμένων ἐστίν μεταφορὰ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τὸ διὰ μέσου πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ. καὶ τὸ φάναι παρακαλεῖν 5 τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων καὶ μεταφορά. καὶ Λυκολέων ὑπὲρ Χαβρίου οὐδὲ τὴν ἱκετηρίαν αἰσχυνθέντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῆν· μεταφορὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων· κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἱκετεύει ἡ εἰκών, τὸ 10 ἔμψυχον δὴ ἄψυχον, τὸ ὑπόμνημα τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες· τὸ γὰρ μελετᾶν αὔξειν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνῆψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ἄμφω γὰρ δηλοῖ τι. οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλʼ ἀναβαλλόμεθα· ἄμφω γάρ 15 ἐστιν μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη. καὶ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας φάναι τρόπαιον εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν καὶ μιᾶς τύχης, αὗται δʼ ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου· ἄμφω γὰρ νίκης σημεῖα. καὶ ὅτι αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν 20 ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόασιν· ἡ γὰρ εὔθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν.

[1] ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τε τῆς ἀνάλογον λέγεται καὶ τῷ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, εἴρηται· λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιοῦσι γίγνεται τοῦτο.

[2] λέγω 25 δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει, οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά, (ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια), ἀλλʼ οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνθοῦσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμήν ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ σὲ δʼ ὥσπερ ἄφετον ἐλεύθερον ἐνέργεια, καὶ 30

τοὐντεῦθεν οὖν Ἕλληνες ᾄξαντες ποσίν·

Eur. IA 80 τὸ ᾄξαντες ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορά· ταχὺ γὰρ λέγει.

[3] καὶ ὡς κέχρηται πολλαχοῦ Ὅμηρος, τὸ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα ποιεῖν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ, οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε,

αὖτις ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής,

Hom. Od. 11.598 καὶ

ἔπτατʼ ὀιστός,

Hom. Il. 13.587 καὶ

ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίνων,

Hom. Il. 4.126 1412a 1 καὶ

ἐν γαίῃ ἵσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἆσαι,

Hom. Il. 11.574 καὶ

αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο μαιμώωσα.

Hom. Il. 15.541 ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμψυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐνέργεια. 5 ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς κατʼ ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον.

[4] ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐδοκιμούσαις εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ταὐτά·

κυρτά, φαληριόωντα· πρὸ μέν τʼ ἄλλʼ, αὐτὰρ ἐπʼ ἄλλα·

Hom. Il. 13.799 10 κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἡ δʼ ἐνέργεια κίνησις.

[5] δεῖ δὲ μεταφέρειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν εὐστόχου, ὥσπερ Ἀρχύτας ἔφη ταὐτὸν εἶναι διαιτητὴν καὶ βωμόν· ἐπʼ ἄμφω γὰρ τὸν 15 ἀδικούμενον καταφεύγειν. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄγκυραν καὶ κρεμάθραν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἄμφω γὰρ ταὐτό τι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῷ ἄνωθεν καὶ κάτωθεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολὺ διέχουσιν ταὐτό, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ καὶ δυνάμεσι τὸ ἴσον.

[6] ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ μεταφορᾶς καὶ 20 ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ γίγνεται δῆλον ὅ τι ἔμαθε παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, καὶ ἔοικεν λέγειν ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ ἥμαρτον. καὶ τῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων δὲ τὰ ἀστεῖά ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὅ φησι λέγειν, οἷον τὸ Στησιχόρου, ὅτι οἱ τέττιγες ἑαυτοῖς χαμόθεν ᾄσονται. καὶ τὰ εὖ ᾐνιγμένα 25 διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδέα (μάθησις γάρ ἐστι καὶ μεταφορἄ, καὶ (ὃ λέγει Θεόδωρος) τὸ καινὰ λέγειν. γίγνεται δὲ ὅταν παράδοξον ᾖ, καὶ μή, ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, πρὸς τὴν ἔμπροσθεν δόξαν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παραπεποιημένα (ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα· 30 ἐξαπατᾷ γάρ), καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκούων ὑπέλαβεν·

ἔστειχε δʼ ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμεθλα·

ὁ δʼ ᾤετο πέδιλα ἐρεῖν. τούτου δʼ ἅμα λεγομένου δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι. τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ ὃ λέγει λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ὃ μεταστρέφει ὄνομα, οἷον τὸ Θεοδώρου εἰς Νίκωνα 35 τὸν κιθαρῳδὸν θράξει σε, προσποιεῖται γὰρ λέγειν τὸ Θρᾷξ εἶ σύ καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ· ἄλλο γὰρ λέγει. 1412b 1 διὸ μαθόντι ἡδύ, ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπολαμβάνει Θρᾷκα εἶναι, οὐ δόξει ἀστεῖον εἶναι.

[7] καὶ τὸ βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι. δεῖ δὲ ἀμφότερα προσηκόντως λεχθῆναι. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα, οἷον τὸ φάναι 5 Ἀθηναίοις τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν μὴ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν· ὄνασθαι γάρ. ἢ ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τὴν ἀρχὴν τῇ πόλει ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν. ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν ᾠήθη τις ἐρεῖν, τοῦτʼ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐγνώσθη ὅτι ἀληθές· τό τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν φάναι ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐθὲν σοφόν, ἀλλʼ 10 οὐχ οὕτω λέγει ἀλλʼ ἄλλως, καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὃ εἶπεν ἀπόφησιν, ἀλλʼ ἄλλως.

[8] ἐν ἅπασι δὲ τούτοις, ἐὰν προσηκόντως τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγκῃ ὁμωνυμίᾳ ἢ μεταφορᾷ, τότε τὸ εὖ. οἷον Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ ἀνασχετός ὁμωνυμίᾳ ἀπέφησε, ἀλλὰ προσηκόντως, εἰ ἀηδής. καὶ

οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ ξένος·

15 ξένος γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ τὸν ξένον ξένον ἀεὶ εἶναι· ἀλλότριον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον,

καλόν γʼ ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν ἄξιον·

Anaxandrides fr. 64 ταὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἰπεῖν ἄξιόν γʼ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ὄντα 20 ἄξιον ἀποθανεῖν, ἢ ἄξιόν γʼ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ θανάτου ἄξιον ὄντα, ἢ μὴ ποιοῦντα θανάτου ἄξια.

[9] τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς λέξεως τούτων· ἀλλʼ ὅσῳ ἂν ἐν ἐλάττονι καὶ ἀντικειμένως λεχθῇ, τοσούτῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ μᾶλλον. τὸ δʼ αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ 25 ἐν ὀλίγῳ θᾶττον γίνεται.

[10] δεῖ δʼ ἀεὶ προσεῖναι ἢ τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται ἢ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς καὶ μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον ἔσται· ἔστιν γὰρ ταῦτα χωρὶς ἔχειν, οἷον ἀποθνῄσκειν δεῖ μηθὲν ἁμαρτάνοντα ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀστεῖον, τὴν ἀξίαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀστεῖον, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐὰν 30 ἅμα ἄμφω ἔχῃ· ἄξιόν γʼ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ἄξιον ὄντα τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν. ὅσῳ δʼ ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ, τοσούτῳ ἀστειότερον φαίνεται, οἷον εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα μεταφορὰ εἴη καὶ μεταφορὰ τοιαδὶ καὶ ἀντίθεσις καὶ παρίσωσις, καὶ ἔχοι ἐνέργειαν.

[11] εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω, 35 αἱ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι τρόπον τινὰ μεταφοραί· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν λέγονται, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορά, οἷον ἡ ἀσπίς, φαμέν, ἐστι φιάλη Ἄρεως, καὶ τὸ τόξον φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος. 1413a 1 οὕτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οὐχ ἁπλοῦν, τὸ δʼ εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην ἁπλοῦν.

[12] καὶ εἰκάζουσιν δὲ οὕτως, οἷον πιθήκῳ αὐλητήν, λύχνῳ ψακαζομένῳ εἰς μύωπα· 5 ἄμφω γὰρ συνάγεται.

[13] τὸ δὲ εὖ ἐστὶν ὅταν μεταφορὰ ᾖ· ἔστιν γὰρ εἰκάσαι τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλῃ Ἄρεως καὶ τὸ ἐρείπιον ῥάκει οἰκίας, καὶ τὸ τὸν Νικήρατον φάναι Φιλοκτήτην εἶναι δεδηγμένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος, ὥσπερ εἴκασεν Θρασύμαχος ἰδὼν τὸν Νικήρατον ἡττημένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος ῥαψῳδοῦντα, 10 κομῶντα δὲ καὶ αὐχμηρὸν ἔτι. ἐν οἷς μάλιστά τʼ ἐκπίπτουσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐὰν μὴ εὖ, καὶ ἐὰν εὖ, εὐδοκιμοῦσιν· λέγω δʼ ὅταν ἀποδιδῶσιν·

ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖ.

ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.

15 καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντʼ εἰκόνες εἰσίν. αἱ δʼ εἰκόνες ὅτι μεταφοραί, εἴρηται πολλάκις.

[14] καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ μεταφοραὶ ἀπʼ εἴδους ἐπʼ εἶδος εἰσίν· οἷον ἄν τις ὡς ἀγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγάγηται, εἶτα βλαβῇ, ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιός, φασιν, τὸν λαγώ· ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ 20 εἰρημένον πεπόνθασιν. ὅθεν μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα λέγεται καὶ διότι, σχεδὸν εἴρηται τὸ αἴτιον·

[15] εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ αἱ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι ὑπερβολαὶ μεταφοραί, οἷον εἰς ὑπωπιασμένον ᾠήθητε δʼ ἂν αὐτὸν εἶναι συκαμίνων κάλαθον· ἐρυθρὸν γάρ τι τὸ ὑπώπιον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πολὺ σφόδρα. τὸ δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ καὶ τὸ ὑπερβολὴ 25 τῇ λέξει διαφέρουσα.

ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ,

ᾠήθης δʼ ἂν αὐτὸν Φιλάμμωνα εἶναι μαχόμενον τῷ κωρύκῳ.

ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖν,

ᾠήθης δʼ ἂν οὐ σκέλη ἀλλὰ σέλινα ἔχειν, οὕτως οὖλα.

[16] 30 εἰσὶ δʼ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ μειρακιώδεις· σφοδρότητα γὰρ δηλοῦσιν. διὸ ὀργιζόμενοι λέγουσιν μάλιστα·

οὐδʼ εἴ μοι τόσα δοίη ὅσα ψάμαθός τε κόνις τε.

κούρην δʼ οὐ γαμέω Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο,

οὐδʼ εἰ χρυσείῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ κάλλος ἐρίζοι,

ἔργα δʼ Ἀθηναίῃ·

Hom. Il. 9.385 1413b 1 διὸ πρεσβυτέρῳ λέγειν ἀπρεπές· χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες.

[1] δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἑκάστῳ γένει ἁρμόττει λέξις. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀγωνιστική, οὐδὲ δημηγορικὴ 5 καὶ δικανική. ἄμφω δὲ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασιωπᾶν ἄν τι βούληται μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν.

[2] ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη 10 (τ̔αύτης δὲ δύο εἴδη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ παθητική)· διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκουσι, καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τοιούτους. βαστάζονται δὲ οἱ ἀναγνωστικοί, οἷον Χαιρήμων (ἀκριβὴς γὰρ ὥσπερ λογογράφος), καὶ Λικύμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν. καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι οἱ 15 μὲν τῶν γραφέων λόγοι ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι στενοὶ φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων, εὖ λεχθέντες, ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν. αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἁρμόττει τὰ ὑποκριτικά· διὸ καὶ ἀφῃρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη, οἷον τά τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις 20 τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὀρθῶς ἀποδοκιμάζεται, ἐν δὲ ἀγωνιστικῇ οὔ, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται· ἔστι γὰρ ὑποκριτική.

[3] ἀνάγκη δὲ μεταβάλλειν τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντας, ὅπερ ὥσπερ ὁδοποιεῖ τῷ ὑποκρίνεσθαι· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ κλέψας ὑμῶν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐξαπατήσας, οὗτος ὁ τὸ ἔσχατον προδοῦναι 25 ἐπιχειρήσας, οἷον καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ ὑποκριτὴς ἐποίει ἔν τε τῇ Ἀναξανδρίδου Γεροντομαχίᾳ, ὅτε λέγοι Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Παλαμήδης, καὶ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν Εὐσεβῶν τὸ ἐγώ· ἐὰν γάρ τις τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ ὑποκρίνηται, γίγνεται ὁ τὴν δοκὸν φέρων.

[4] καὶ τὰ ἀσύνδετα ὡσαύτως· ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα, 30 ἐδεόμην· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὡς ἓν λέγοντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἤθει καὶ τόνῳ εἰπεῖν. ἔτι ἔχει ἴδιόν τι τὰ ἀσύνδετα· ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ χρόνῳ πολλὰ δοκεῖ εἰρῆσθαι· ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἓν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλά, ὥστε ἐὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἔσται τὸ ἓν πολλά. ἔχει οὖν αὔξησιν· ἦλθον, διελέχθην, ἱκέτευσα 1414a 1 (πολλὰ δοκεῖ), ὑπερεῖδεν ὅσα εἶπον. τοῦτο δὲ βούλεται ποιεῖν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τῷ

Νιρεὺς αὖ Σύμηθεν,

Νιρεὺς Ἀγλαΐης,

Νιρεὺς ὃς κάλλιστος.

Hom. Il. 2.671-673 περὶ οὗ γὰρ πολλὰ λέγεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πολλάκις εἰρῆσθαι· 5 εἰ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖ, ὥστε ηὔξηκεν, ἅπαξ μνησθείς, διὰ τὸν παραλογισμόν, καὶ μνήμην πεποίηκεν, οὐδαμοῦ ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λόγον ποιησάμενος.

[5] ἡ μὲν οὖνδημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικεν τῇ σκιαγραφίᾳ· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ᾖ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρώτερον ἡ 10 θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περίεργα καὶ χείρω φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ἡ δὲ δικανικὴ ἀκριβεστέρα. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ἐν ἑνὶ κριτῇ· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ ἔνεστι ῥητορικῆς· εὐσύνοπτον γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν ἄπεστιν, ὥστε καθαρὰ ἡ κρίσις. διὸ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ 15 ἐν πᾶσιν τούτοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν ῥήτορες· ἀλλʼ ὅπου μάλιστα ὑπόκρισις, ἐνταῦθα ἥκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἔνι. τοῦτο δὲ ὅπου φωνῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅπου μεγάλης.

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις·

[6] δευτέρα δὲ ἡ δικανική. τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι 20 τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἡδεῖαν δεῖ εἶναι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, περίεργον· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ σώφρονα καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη ἤθους ἀρετή; τὸ δὲ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι ποιήσει δηλονότι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ὥρισται ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς λέξεως· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δεῖ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι ἀλλὰ 25 πρέπουσαν; ἄν τε γὰρ ἀδολεσχῇ, οὐ σαφής, οὐδὲ ἂν σύντομος, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἁρμόττει. καὶ τὸ ἡδεῖαν τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει, ἂν εὖ μιχθῇ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ τὸ ξενικόν, καὶ ὁ ῥυθμός, καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρέποντος.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως εἴρηται, καὶ κοινῇ περὶ ἁπάντων 30 καὶ ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου γένους· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τάξεως εἰπεῖν.

[1] ἔστι δὲ τοῦ λόγου δύο μέρη· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τό τε πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν περὶ οὗ, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀποδεῖξαι. διὸ εἰπόντα μὴ ἀποδεῖξαι ἢ ἀποδεῖξαι μὴ προειπόντα ἀδύνατον· ὅ τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύων τι ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ ὁ προλέγων ἕνεκα 35 τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι προλέγει.

[2] τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρόθεσίς ἐστι τὸ δὲ πίστις, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις διέλοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρόβλημα τὸ δὲ ἀπόδειξις.

[3] νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως· διήγησις γάρ που τοῦ δικανικοῦ μόνου λόγου ἐστίν, ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ καὶ δημηγορικοῦ πῶς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διήγησιν οἵαν λέγουσιν, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον, 1414b 1 ἢ ἐπίλογον τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν; προοίμιον δὲ καὶ ἀντιπαραβολὴ καὶ ἐπάνοδος ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντιλογία ᾖ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία πολλάκις, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡ συμβουλή· ἀλλʼ 5 ὁ ἐπίλογος ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ παντός, οἷον ἐὰν μικρὸς ὁ λόγος ἢ τὸ πρᾶγμα εὐμνημόνευτον· συμβαίνει γὰρ τοῦ μήκους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

[4] ἀναγκαῖα ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ πίστις. ἴδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα προοίμιον πρόθεσις πίστις ἐπίλογος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον τῶν 10 πίστεών ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὔξησις τῶν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μέρος τι τῶν πίστεων (ἀποδείκνυσι γάρ τι ὁ ποιῶν τοῦτο), ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ προοίμιον, οὐδʼ ὁ ἐπίλογος, ἀλλʼ ἀναμιμνήσκει.

[5] ἔσται οὖν, ἄν τις τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρῇ, ὅπερ ἐποίουν οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον, διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδιήγησις 15 καὶ προδιήγησις, καὶ ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος. δεῖ δὲ εἶδός τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορᾷ ὄνομα τίθεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρῶδες, οἷον Λικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὄζους.

[1] τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιόν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ λόγου, ὅπερ ἐν 20 ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει προαύλιον· πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταῦτʼ εἰσί, καὶ οἷον ὁδοποίησις τῷ ἐπιόντι. τὸ μὲν οὖν προαύλιον ὅμοιον τῷ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοιμίῳ· καὶ γὰρ οἱ αὐληταί, ὅ τι ἂν εὖ ἔχωσιν αὐλῆσαι, τοῦτο προαυλήσαντες συνῆψαν τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς 25 λόγοις δεῖ οὕτως γράφειν, ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν βούληται εὐθὺ εἰπόντα ἐνδοῦναι καὶ συνάψαι, ὅπερ πάντες ποιοῦσιν. παράδειγμα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προοίμιον· οὐθὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς καὶ Ἑλένῃ. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἐκτοπίσῃ, ἁρμόττει, καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὁμοειδῆ 30 εἶναι.

[2] λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαίνου ἢ ψόγου (οἷον Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες· ἐπαινεῖ γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας· Ἰσοκράτης δὲ ψέγει ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων ἀρετὰς δωρεαῖς ἐτίμησαν, τοῖς 35 δʼ εὖ φρονοῦσιν οὐθὲν ἆθλον ἐποίησαν),

[3] καὶ ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς (οἷον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ, ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους οἳ μήτε εὐδοκιμοῦσιν μήτε φαῦλοι, ἀλλʼ ὅσοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἄδηλοι, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Πριάμου· 1415a 1 οὗτος γὰρ συμβουλεύει)·

[4] ἔτι δʼ ἐκ τῶν δικανικῶν προοιμίων· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν, εἰ περὶ παραδόξου λόγος ἢ περὶ χαλεποῦ ἢ περὶ τεθρυλημένου πολλοῖς, ὥστε συγγνώμην ἔχειν, οἷον Χοιρίλος

νῦν δʼ ὅτε πάντα δέδασται.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν λόγων προοίμια ἐκ τούτων, ἐξ ἐπαίνου, ἐκ ψόγου, ἐκ προτροπῆς, ἐξ ἀποτροπῆς, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν· δεῖ δὲ ἢ ξένα ἢ οἰκεῖα εἶναι τὰ ἐνδόσιμα τῷ λόγῳ.

[5] τὰ δὲ τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμια δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ταὐτὸ δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι 10 καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ προοίμια· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν διθυράμβων ὅμοια τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς· διὰ σὲ καὶ τεὰ δῶρα εἴτε σκῦλα.

[6] ἐν δὲ προλόγοις καὶ ἔπεσι δεῖγμά ἐστιν τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα προειδῶσι περὶ οὗ ᾖ ὁ λόγος καὶ μὴ κρέμηται ἡ διάνοια· τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾷ· ὁ δοὺς οὖν ὥσπερ εἰς τὴν χεῖρα 15 τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἐχόμενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. διὰ τοῦτο

μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά.

Hom. Il. 1.1

ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, μοῦσα.

Hom. Od. 1.1

ἥγεό μοι λόγον ἄλλον, ὅπως Ἀσίας ἀπὸ γαίης

ἦλθεν ἐς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας.

καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ οὗ τὸ δρᾶμα, κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς 20 ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ, ἀλλά πού γε, ὥσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς

ἐμοὶ πατὴρ ἦν Πόλυβος.

Soph. OT 774 καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία ὡσαύτως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαιότατον ἔργον τοῦ προοιμίου καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο, δηλῶσαι τί ἐστιν τὸ τέλος οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος (διόπερ ἂν δῆλον ᾖ καὶ μικρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα, 25 οὐ χρηστέον προοιμίῳ)·

[7] τὰ δὲ ἄλλα εἴδη οἷς χρῶνται, ἰατρεύματα καὶ κοινά. λέγεται δὲ ταῦτα ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου οἷά περ διαβολὴν λῦσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι (ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως· ἀπολογουμένῳ μὲν 30 γὰρ πρῶτον τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν, κατηγοροῦντι δʼ ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ· διʼ ὃ δέ, οὐκ ἄδηλον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογούμενον, ὅταν μέλλῃ εἰσάξειν αὑτόν, ἀναγκαῖον ἀνελεῖν τὰ κωλύοντα, ὥστε λυτέον πρῶτον τὴν διαβολήν· τῷ δὲ διαβάλλοντι ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ διαβλητέον, ἵνα μνημονεύσωσι μᾶλλον). τὰ δὲ 35 πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἔκ τε τοῦ εὔνουν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε τὸ προσεκτικὸν ἢ τοὐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρει ποιεῖν προσεκτικόν, διὸ πολλοὶ εἰς γέλωτα πειρῶνται προάγειν. εἰς δὲ εὐμάθειαν ἅπαντα ἀνάξει, ἐάν τις βούληται, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικῆ φαίνεσθαι· 1415b 1 προσέχουσι γὰρ μᾶλλον τούτοις. προσεκτικοὶ δὲ τοῖς μεγάλοις, τοῖς ἰδίοις, τοῖς θαυμαστοῖς, τοῖς ἡδέσιν· διὸ δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ὡς περὶ τοιούτων ὁ λόγος· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ προσεκτικούς, ὅτι μικρόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνους, ὅτι λυπηρόν.

[8] δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν 5 ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα· πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα· ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾖ, οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου, ἀλλʼ ἢ ὅσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς, ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλήν.

[9] ἔτι τὸ προσεκτικοὺς ποιεῖν πάντων τῶν μερῶν 10 κοινόν, ἐὰν δέῃ· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνιᾶσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρχόμενοι· διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἀρχῇ τάττειν, ὅτε μάλιστα πάντες προσέχοντες ἀκροῶνται· ὥστε ὅπου ἂν ᾖ καιρός, λεκτέον καί μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν· οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμὸν ἢ ὑμέτερον, καὶ ἐρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν οἷον οὐδεπώποτε ἀκηκόατε δεινὸν ἢ 15 οὕτω θαυμαστόν. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔφη Πρόδικος, ὅτε νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν τι τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμου αὐτοῖς.

[10] ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν οὐχ ᾗπερ ὁ ἀκροατής, δῆλον· πάντες γὰρ ἢ διαβάλλουσιν ἢ φόβους ἀπολύονται ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις· 20

ἄναξ, ἐρῶ μὲν οὐχ ὅπως σπουδῆς ὕπο,

Soph. Ant. 223

τί φροιμιάζῃ;,

Eur. IT 1162 καὶ οἱ πονηρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχοντες ἢ δοκοῦντες· πανταχοῦ γὰρ βέλτιον διατρίβειν ἢ ἐν τῷ πράγματι, διὸ οἱ δοῦλοι οὐ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ κύκλῳ, καὶ προοιμιάζονται.

[11] 25 πόθεν δʼ εὔνους δεῖ ποιεῖν, εἴρηται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἐπεὶ δʼ εὖ λέγεται

δός μʼ ἐς Φαίηκας φίλον ἐλθεῖν ἠδʼ ἐλεεινόν,

Hom. Od. 7.327 τούτων δεῖ δύο στοχάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς οἴεσθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν συνεπαινεῖσθαι τὸν ἀκροατήν, ἢ αὐτὸν 30 ἢ γένος ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματʼ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἄλλως γέ πως· ὃ γὰρ λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίοις.

[12] τὰ δὲ τοῦ δημηγορικοῦ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ δικανικοῦ λόγου ἐστίν, φύσει δὲ ἥκιστα ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ οὗ ἴσασιν, 35 καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖται τὸ πρᾶγμα προοιμίου, ἀλλʼ ἢ διʼ αὐτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ἡλίκον βούλει ὑπολαμβάνωσιν, ἀλλʼ ἢ μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον, διὸ ἢ διαβάλλειν ἢ ἀπολύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἢ αὐξῆσαι ἢ μειῶσαι. τούτων δὲ ἕνεκα προοιμίου δεῖται, ἢ κόσμου χάριν, 1416a 1 ὡς αὐτοκάβδαλα φαίνεται ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ. τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἠλείους· οὐδὲν γὰρ προεξαγκωνίσας οὐδὲ προανακινήσας εὐθὺς ἄρχεται Ἦλις, πόλις εὐδαίμων.

[1] περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἓν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις ὑπόληψιν 5 δυσχερῆ ἀπολύσαιτο (οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἴτε εἰπόντος τινὸς εἴτε μή, ὥστε τοῦτο καθόλου)·

[2] ἄλλος τόπος ὥστε πρὸς τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα ἀπαντᾶν, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ὡς οὐ βλαβερὸν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ, ἢ ὡς οὐ τηλικοῦτον, ἢ οὐκ ἄδικον ἢ οὐ μέγα, ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἢ οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος· περὶ γὰρ 10 τοιούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, ὥσπερ Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ναυσικράτην· ἔφη γὰρ ποιῆσαι ὃ ἔλεγεν καὶ βλάψαι, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν. ἢ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι ἀδικοῦντα, εἰ βλαβερόν, ἀλλʼ οὖν καλόν, εἰ λυπηρόν, ἀλλʼ ὠφέλιμον, ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

[3] ἄλλος τόπος ὡς ἐστὶν ἁμάρτημα ἢ ἀτύχημα ἢ 15 ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη τρέμειν οὐχ ὡς ὁ διαβάλλων ἔφη, ἵνα δοκῇ γέρων, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐ γὰρ ἑκόντι εἶναι αὑτῷ ἔτη ὀγδοήκοντα. καὶ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, ὅτι οὐ βλάψαι ἐβούλετο ἀλλὰ τόδε, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο ὃ διεβάλλετο ποιῆσαι, συνέβη δὲ βλαβῆναι· δίκαιον δὲ 20 μισεῖν, εἰ ὅπως τοῦτο γένηται ἐποίουν.

[4] ἄλλος, εἰ ἐμπεριείληπται ὁ διαβάλλων, ἢ νῦν ἢ πρότερον, ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐγγύς τις.

[5] ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλοι ἐμπεριλαμβάνονται οὓς ὁμολογοῦσιν μὴ ἐνόχους εἶναι τῇ διαβολῇ, οἷον εἰ, ὅτι καθάριος, ὁ δεῖνα μοιχός, καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρα.

[6] ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλους 25 διέβαλεν ἢ ἄλλος ἢ αὐτός, ἢ ἄνευ διαβολῆς ὑπελαμβάνοντο ὥσπερ αὐτὸς νῦν, οἳ πεφήνασιν οὐκ ἔνοχοι.

[7] ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιδιαβάλλειν τὸν διαβάλλοντα· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὃς αὐτὸς ἄπιστος, οἱ τούτου λόγοι ἔσονται πιστοί.

[8] ἄλλος, εἰ γέγονεν κρίσις, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα ἐν 30 τῇ ἀντιδόσει κατηγοροῦντα ὡς ἀσεβής, ὅς γʼ ἐποίησε κελεύων ἐπιορκεῖν,

ἡ γλῶσσʼ ὀμώμοχʼ, ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.

Eur. Hipp. 612 ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν τὰς ἐκ τοῦ Διονυσιακοῦ ἀγῶνος κρίσεις εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἄγοντα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν δεδωκέναι 35 λόγον, ἢ δώσειν εἰ βούλεται κατηγορεῖν.

[9] ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ διαβολῆς κατηγορεῖν, ἡλίκον, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἄλλας κρίσεις ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πιστεύει τῷ πράγματι.

κοινὸς δʼ ἀμφοῖν ὁ τόπος τὸ σύμβολα λέγειν, 1416b 1 οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτι οἰκεῖος τῷ Πριάμῳ· ἡ γὰρ Ἡσιόνη ἀδελφή· ὁ δὲ ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ἐχθρὸς τῷ Πριάμῳ, ὁ Τελαμών, καὶ ὅτι οὐ κατεῖπε τῶν κατασκόπων.

[10] ἄλλος τῷ διαβάλλοντι, 5 τὸ ἐπαινοῦντα μικρὸν μακρῶς ψέξαι μέγα συντόμως, ἢ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ προθέντα, ὃ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα προφέρει ἓν ψέξαι. τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικώτατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι· τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ βλάπτειν πειρῶνται, μιγνύντες αὐτὰ τῷ κακῷ.

κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ 10 τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἕνεκα πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ ἀπολυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τὸν Ὀδυσσέα προείλετο, τῷ μὲν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, τῷ δʼ ὅτι οὕ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ ἀνταγωνιστεῖν 15 ὡς φαῦλον.

[1] καὶ περὶ μὲν διαβολῆς εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα, διήγησις δʼ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ἐστιν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὰς πράξεις διελθεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος· σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον (οὐθὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων 20 τῶν πράξεων), τὸ δʼ ἐκ τῆς τέχνης· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ἔστι δεῖξαι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἄπιστον, ἢ ὅτι ποιόν, ἢ ὅτι ποσόν, ἢ καὶ ἅπαντα.

[2] διὰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐφεξῆς δεῖ διηγεῖσθαι πάντα, ὅτι δυσμνημόνευτον τὸ δεικνύναι οὕτως· ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀνδρεῖος, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε σοφὸς ἢ δίκαιος. καὶ 25 ἁπλούστερος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ποικίλος καὶ οὐ λιτός.

[3] δεῖ δὲ τὰς μὲν γνωρίμους ἀναμιμνήσκειν· διὸ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐδὲν δέονται διηγήσεως, οἷον εἰ θέλεις Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖν (ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες τὰς πράξεις), ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι αὐταῖς δεῖ. ἐὰν δὲ Κριτίαν, δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἴσασιν

[4] 30 νῦν δὲ γελοίως τὴν διήγησίν φασι δεῖν εἶναι ταχεῖαν. καίτοι ὥσπερ ὁ τῷ μάττοντι ἐρομένῳ πότερον σκληρὰν ἢ μαλακὴν μάξῃ τί δʼ, ἔφη τις, εὖ ἀδύνατον;, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως· δεῖ γὰρ μὴ μακρῶς διηγεῖσθαι ὥσπερ οὐδὲ προοιμιάζεσθαι μακρῶς, οὐδὲ τὰς πίστεις λέγειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦθά 35 ἐστι τὸ εὖ ἢ τὸ ταχὺ ἢ τὸ συντόμως, ἀλλὰ τὸ μετρίως· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅσα δηλώσει τὸ πρᾶγμα, 1417a 1 ἢ ὅσα ποιήσει ὑπολαβεῖν γεγονέναι ἢ βεβλαφέναι ἢ ἠδικηκέναι, ἢ τηλικαῦτα ἡλίκα βούλει, τῷ δὲ ἐναντίῳ τὰ ἐναντία·

[5] παραδιηγεῖσθαι δὲ ὅσα εἰς τὴν σὴν ἀρετὴν φέρει (οἷον ἐγὼ δʼ ἐνουθέτουν, ἀεὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγων, μὴ τὰ τέκνα 5 ἐγκαταλείπειν), ἢ θατέρου κακίαν· ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατό μοι ὅτι, οὗ ἂν ᾖ αὐτός, ἔσται ἄλλα παιδία, ὃ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους Αἰγυπτίους ἀποκρίνασθαί φησιν ὁ Ἡρόδοτος· ἢ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς δικασταῖς.

[6] ἀπολογουμένῳ δὲ ἐλάττων ἡ διήγησις· αἱ γὰρ ἀμφισβητήσεις ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ βλαβερὸν εἶναι ἢ 10 μὴ ἄδικον ἢ μὴ τηλικοῦτον, ὥστε περὶ τὸ ὁμολογούμενον οὐ διατριπτέον, ἐὰν μή τι εἰς ἐκεῖνο συντείνῃ, οἷον εἰ πέπρακται, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἄδικον.

[7] ἔτι πεπραγμένα δεῖ λέγειν ὅσα μὴ πραττόμενα ἢ οἶκτον ἢ δείνωσιν φέρει· παράδειγμα ὁ Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος, ὃς πρὸς τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐν ἑξήκοντα 15 ἔπεσιν πεποίηται, καὶ ὡς Φάϋλλος τὸν κύκλον, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Οἰνεῖ πρόλογος.

[8] ἠθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι· ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο, ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ. ἓν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιὰν ταύτην, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιὰ τῷ τέλει· διὰ τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ 20 λόγοι ἤθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν (τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν), ἀλλʼ οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν.

[9] ἄλλα δʼ ἠθικὰ τὰ ἑπόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἤθει, οἷον ὅτι ἅμα λέγων ἐβάδιζεν· δηλοῖ γὰρ θρασύτητα καὶ ἀγροικίαν ἤθους. καὶ μὴ ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν, ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν, 25 ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐβουλόμην· καὶ προειλόμην γὰρ τοῦτο· ἀλλʼ εἰ μὴ ὠνήμην, βέλτιον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φρονίμου τὸ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ· φρονίμου μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τὸ ὠφέλιμον διώκειν, ἀγαθοῦ δʼ ἐν τῷ τὸ καλόν. ἂν δʼ ἄπιστον ᾖ, τότε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, ὥσπερ Σοφοκλῆς ποιεῖ· παράδειγμα 30 τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐκήδετο ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ τέκνων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀπολομένων,

μητρὸς δʼ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πατρὸς βεβηκότων

οὐκ ἔστʼ ἀδελφὸς ὅς τις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ.

Soph. Ant. 911-912 ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς αἰτίαν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς ἄπιστα λέγων, 35 ἀλλὰ φύσει τοιοῦτος εἶ· ἀπιστοῦσι γὰρ ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἑκόντα πλὴν τὸ συμφέρον.

[10] ἔτι ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν λέγε διηγούμενος καὶ τὰ ἑπόμενα καὶ ἃ ἴσασι, καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἢ σεαυτῷ ἢ ἐκείνῳ προσόντα· ὁ δʼ ᾤχετό με ὑποβλέψας. 1417b 1 καὶ ὡς περὶ Κρατύλου Αἰσχίνης, ὅτι διασίζων, τοῖν χειροῖν διασείων· πιθανὰ γάρ, διότι σύμβολα γίγνεται ταῦτα ἃ ἴσασιν ἐκείνων ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν. πλεῖστα δὲ τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν ἐξ Ὁμήρου ἔστιν· 5

ὧς ἄρʼ ἔφη, γρῆυς δὲ κατέσχετο χερσὶ πρόσωπα·

Hom. Od. 19.361 οἱ γὰρ δακρύειν ἀρχόμενοι ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. καὶ εὐθὺς εἴσαγε καὶ σεαυτὸν ποιόν τινα, ἵνα ὡς τοιοῦτον θεωρῶσιν, καὶ τὸν ἀντίδικον· λανθάνων δὲ ποίει. ὅτι δὲ ῥᾴδιον, ὅρα ἐκ τῶν ἀπαγγελλόντων· περὶ ὧν γὰρ μηθὲν 10 ἴσμεν, ὅμως λαμβάνομεν ὑπόληψιν τινά. πολλαχοῦ δὲ δεῖ διηγεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ.

[11] ἐν δὲ δημηγορίᾳ ἥκιστα διήγησις ἔστιν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων οὐθεὶς διηγεῖται· ἀλλʼ ἐάν περ διήγησις ᾖ, τῶν γενομένων ἔστω, ἵνα ἀναμνησθέντες ἐκείνων βέλτιον βουλεύσωνται 15 περὶ τῶν ὕστερον, ἢ διαβάλλοντος ἢ ἐπαινοῦντος· ἀλλὰ †τότε οὐ† τὸ τοῦ συμβούλου ποιεῖ ἔργον. ἂν δʼ ᾖ ἄπιστον, ὑπισχνεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ αἰτίαν λέγειν εὐθὺς καὶ διατάττειν ὡς βούλονται, οἷον ἡ Ἰοκάστη ἡ Καρκίνου ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι ἀεὶ ὑπισχνεῖται πυνθανομένου τοῦ ζητοῦντος τὸν 20 υἱόν, καὶ ὁ Αἵμων ὁ Σοφοκλέους.

[1] τὰς δὲ πίστεις δεῖ ἀποδεικτικὰς εἶναι· ἀποδεικνύναι δὲ χρή, ἐπεί περ τεττάρων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητουμένου φέροντα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, οἷον, εἰ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἐν τῇ κρίσει δεῖ τούτου μάλιστα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν 25 φέρειν, εἰ δʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἔβλαψεν, τούτου, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τοσόνδε ἢ ὅτι δικαίως, ὡσαύτως καὶ εἰ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦτο ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις.

[2] μὴ λανθανέτω δʼ ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει μόνῃ τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι πονηρόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄγνοια αἰτία, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τινες περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖεν, 30 ὥστʼ ἐν τούτῳ χρονιστέον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔ.

[3] ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς τὸ πολὺ ὅτι καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα ἡ αὔξησις ἔστω· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα δεῖ πιστεύεσθαι· ὀλιγάκις γὰρ καὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις φέρουσιν, ἐὰν ἄπιστα ᾖ ἢ ἐὰν ἄλλος αἰτίαν ἔχῃ.

[4] ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται ἀμφισβητήσειεν 35 ἄν τις, ἢ ὡς ἔσται μὲν ποιοῦσιν ἃ κελεύει, ἀλλʼ οὐ δίκαια ἢ οὐκ ὠφέλιμα ἢ οὐ τηλικαῦτα. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁρᾶν εἴ τι ψεύδεται ἐκτὸς τοῦ πράγματος· τεκμήρια γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτι ψεύδεται.

[5] 1418a 1 ἔστιν δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα δημηγορικώτερα, τὰ δʼ ἐνθυμήματα δικανικώτερα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ μέλλον, ὥστʼ ἐκ τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκη παραδείγματα λέγειν, ἡ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἢ μὴ ὄντων, οὗ μᾶλλον 5 ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκην.

[6] οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλʼ ἀναμιγνύναι· εἰ δὲ μή, καταβλάπτει ἄλληλα. ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὅρος.

ὦ φίλʼ, ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅσʼ ἂν πεπνυμένος ἀνήρ,

Hom. Od. 4.204 ἀλλʼ οὐ τοιαῦτα.

[7] καὶ μὴ περὶ πάντων ἐνθυμήματα ζητεῖ· 10 εἰ δὲ μή, ποιήσεις ὅπερ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι τῶν φιλοσοφούντων, οἳ συλλογίζονται τὰ γνωριμώτερα καὶ πιστότερα ἢ ἐξ ὧν λέγουσιν.

[8] καὶ ὅταν πάθος ποιῇς, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα (ἢ γὰρ ἐκκρούσει τὸ πάθος ἢ μάτην εἰρημένον ἔσται τὸ ἐνθύμημα· ἐκκρούουσι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας αἱ ἅμα, καὶ ἢ 15 ἀφανίζουσιν ἢ ἀσθενεῖς ποιοῦοιν), οὐδʼ ὅταν ἠθικὸν τὸν λόγον, οὐ δεῖ ἐνθύμημά τι ζητεῖν ἅμα· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει οὔτε ἦθος οὔτε προαίρεσιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

[9] γνώμαις δὲ χρηστέον καὶ ἐν διηγήσει καὶ ἐν πίστει· ἠθικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ δέδωκα, καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰδὼς ὡς οὐ δεῖ πιστεύειν· ἐὰν δὲ παθητικῶς, 20 καὶ οὐ μεταμέλει μοι καίπερ ἠδικημένῳ· τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ περίεστιν τὸ κέρδος, ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον.

[10] τὸ δὲ δημηγορεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικάζεσθαι, εἰκότως, διότι περὶ τὸ μέλλον, ἐκεῖ δὲ περὶ τὸ γεγονός, ὃ ἐπιστητὸν ἤδη καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν, ὡς ἔφη Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρής (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ 25 τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἐμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν ἀδήλων δέ), καὶ ὁ νόμος ὑπόθεσις ἐν τοῖς δικανικοῖς· ἔχοντα δὲ ἀρχὴν ῥᾷον εὑρεῖν ἀπόδειξιν. καὶ οὐκ ἔχει πολλὰς διατριβάς, οἷον πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὑτοῦ, ἢ παθητικὸν ποιεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἥκιστα πάντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξιστῇ. δεῖ οὖν 30 ἀποροῦντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες ποιοῦσι καὶ Ἰσοκράτης· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύων κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάρητος δʼ ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ.

[11] ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα εἰσάγει. καὶ 35 ὃ ἔλεγεν Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, ταὐτό ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγει Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἶτα Αἰακόν, εἶτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἣ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἢ τοιόνδε ἐστίν.

[12] ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἠθικῶς λεκτέον καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ἐνθυμήματα, ἠθικῶς· 40 καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ἁρμόττει 1418b 1 χρηστὸν φαίνεσθαι ἢ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ.

[13] τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὅτι ὅσα ἔλεγχον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δῆλον ὅτι συλλελόγισται· παρʼ ἄλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τἀναντία γνωρίζεται.

[14] 5 τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον οὐχ ἕτερόν τι εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τῶν πίστεών ἐστι τὸ τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν συμβουλῇ καὶ ἐν δίκῃ ἀρχόμενον μὲν λέγειν τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πίστεις πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ πρὸς τἀναντία ἀπαντᾶν λύοντα καὶ προδιασύροντα. ἂν δὲ πολύχους ᾖ ἡ 10 ἐναντίωσις, πρότερον τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον ἐποίησε Καλλίστρατος ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνιακῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ· ἃ γὰρ ἐροῦσι προανελὼν οὕτως τότε αὐτὸς εἶπεν.

[15] ὕστερον δὲ λέγοντα πρῶτον πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον λεκτέον, λύοντα καὶ ἀντισυλλογιζόμενον, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν εὐδοκιμηκότα ᾖ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον προδιαβεβλημένον 15 οὐ δέχεται ἡ ψυχή, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ λόγον, ἐὰν ὁ ἐναντίος εὖ δοκῇ εἰρηκέναι. δεῖ οὖν χώραν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀκροατῇ τῷ μέλλοντι λόγῳ· ἔσται δὲ ἂν ἀνέλῃς· διὸ ἢ πρὸς πάντα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα ἢ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἢ τὰ εὐέλεγκτα μαχεσάμενον οὕτω τὰ αὑτοῦ πιστὰ ποιητέον. 20

ταῖς θεαῖσι πρῶτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι·

ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἥραν·

Eur. Tro. 969-971 ἐν τούτοις ἥψατο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐηθεστάτου.

[16] περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα. εἰς δὲ τὸ ἦθος, ἐπειδὴ ἔνια περὶ αὑτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπίφθονον ἢ μακρολογίαν ἢ ἀντιλογίαν 25 ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ λοιδορίαν ἢ ἀγροικίαν, ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀντιδόσει, καὶ ὡς Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα λέγοντα περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ

χρημάτων δʼ ἄελπτον οὐθέν ἐστιν οὐδʼ ἀπώμοτον,

Archilochus fr. 74 30 καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ οὗ ἀρχὴ

οὔ μοι τὰ Γύγεω,

καὶ ὡς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἵμονα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὡς λεγόντων ἑτέρων.

[17] δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἷον χρὴ δὲ τὰς 35 διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας εὐτυχοῦντας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μέγιστα πλεονεκτοῖεν, ἐνθυμηματικῶς δὲ εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὠφελιμώταται ὦσιν καὶ πλεονεκτικώταται αἱ καταλλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εὐτυχοῦντας δεῖ καταλλάττεσθαι.

[1] 40 περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, εὔκαιρόν ἐστι ποιεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν 1419a 1 ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον εἰρηκὼς ᾖ, ὥστε ἑνὸς προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοπον, οἷον Περικλῆς Λάμπωνα ἐπήρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας ἱερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἤρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτός, φάσκοντος 5 δὲ καὶ πῶς, ἀτέλεστος ὤν;

[2] δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερὸν ᾖ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δῆλον ᾖ ὅτι δώσει· πυθόμενον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἷον Σωκράτης, Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν, εἰρηκότος δὲ ὡς δαιμόνιόν 10 τι λέγοι, ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἤτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶεν ἢ θεῖόν τι, φήσαντος δὲ ἔστιν οὖν,

[3] ἔφη, ὅστις θεῶν μὲν παῖδας οἴεται εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ οὔ; ἔτι ὅταν μέλλῃ ἢ ἐναντία λέγοντα δείξειν ἢ παράδοξον.

[4] τέταρτον δὲ ὅταν μὴ ἐνῇ ἀλλʼ ἢ σοφιστικῶς ἀποκρινάμενον λῦσαι· ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτως ἀποκρίνηται, 15 ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δʼ οὔ, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δʼ οὔ, ἢ πῇ μὲν πῇ δʼ οὔ, θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντος. ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἐγχείρει. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐνστῇ, κεκρατῆσθαι δόξεις· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πολλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ· διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν δεῖ.

[5] 20 ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα διαιροῦντα λόγῳ καὶ μὴ συντόμως, πρὸς δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐναντία τὴν λύσιν φέροντα εὐθὺς τῇ ἀποκρίσει, πρὶν ἐπερωτῆσαι τὸ ἐπιὸν ἢ συλλογίσασθαι· οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν προορᾶν ἐν τίνι ὁ λόγος. φανερὸν δʼ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν Τοπικῶν καὶ τοῦτο 25 καὶ αἱ λύσεις.

[6] καὶ συμπεραινομένου, ἐὰν ἐρώτημα ποιῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς, ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ Πεισάνδρου εἰ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προβούλοις, καταστῆσαι τοὺς τετρακοσίους, ἔφη τί δέ; οὐ πονηρά σοι ταῦτα ἐδόκει εἶναι; ἔφη. οὐκοῦν σὺ ταῦτα 30 ἔπραξας τὰ πονηρά; ναὶ, ἔφη, οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα βελτίω. καὶ ὡς ὁ Λάκων εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτώμενος εἰ δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἀπολωλέναι ἅτεροι, ἔφη. ὁ δὲ οὐκοῦν σὺ τούτοις ταὐτὰ ἔθου; καὶ ὃς ἔφη. οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ ἀπόλοιο; οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη, οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα 35 λαβόντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔ, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ. διὸ οὔτε ἐπερωτᾶν δεῖ μετὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα, 1419b 1 οὔτε τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐπερωτᾶν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ πολὺ περιῇ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

[7] περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδή τινα δοκεῖ χρῆσιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν 5 τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ, ὀρθῶς λέγων, εἴρηται πόσα εἴδη γελοίων ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἁρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δʼ οὔ, ὅπως τὸ ἁρμόττον αὑτῷ λήψεται. ἔστι δʼ ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἑτέρου.

[1] 10 ὁ δʼ ἐπίλογος σύγκειται ἐκ τεττάρων, ἔκ τε τοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσαι εὖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον φαύλως, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐξῆσαι καὶ ταπεινῶσαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν ἀκροατὴν καταστῆσαι, καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως. πέφυκε γάρ, μετὰ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι αὐτὸν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὸν δὲ 15 ἐναντίον ψευδῆ, οὕτω τὸ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ ἐπιχαλκεύειν. δυοῖν δὲ θατέρου δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἢ ὅτι τούτοις ἀγαθὸς ἢ ὅτι ἁπλῶς, ὁ δʼ ὅτι κακὸς τούτοις ἢ ὅτι ἁπλῶς. ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ τοῦτο κατασκευάζειν δεῖ, εἴρηνται οἱ τόποι πόθεν σπουδαίους δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ φαύλους.

[2] τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο, 20 δεδειγμένων ἤδη, αὔξειν ἐστὶν κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ταπεινοῦν· δεῖ γὰρ τὰ πεπραγμένα ὁμολογεῖσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποσὸν ἐρεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων αὔξησις ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων ἐστίν. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ αὔξειν καὶ ταπεινοῦν ἔκκεινται οἱ τόποι πρότερον.

[3] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, δήλων ὄντων καὶ οἷα καὶ ἡλίκα, εἰς 25 τὰ πάθη ἄγειν τὸν ἀκροατήν. ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ἔλεος καὶ δείνωσις καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ μίσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις. εἴρηνται δὲ καὶ τούτων οἱ τόποι πρότερον,

[4] ὥστε λοιπὸν ἀναμνῆσαι τὰ προειρημένα. τοῦτο δὲ ἁρμόττει ποιεῖν οὐχ ὥσπερ φασὶν ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες. ἵνα γὰρ 30 εὐμαθὴς ᾖ, κελεύουσι πολλάκις εἰπεῖν. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ περὶ οὗ ἡ κρίσις, ἐνταῦθα δὲ διʼ ὧν δέδεικται, κεφαλαιωδῶς.

[5] ἀρχὴ δὲ διότι ἃ ὑπέσχετο ἀποδέδωκεν, ὥστε ἅ τε καὶ διʼ ὃ λεκτέον. λέγεται δὲ ἐξ ἀντιπαραβολῆς τοῦ ἐναντίου. παραβάλλειν δὲ ἢ ὅσα 35 περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄμφω εἶπον, ἢ μὴ καταντικρύ ( ἀλλʼ οὗτος μὲν τάδε περὶ τούτου, ἐγὼ δὲ ταδί, 1420a 1 καὶ διὰ ταῦτα), ἢ ἐξ εἰρωνείας (οἷον οὗτος γὰρ τάδʼ εἶπεν, ἐγὼ δὲ ταδί, καὶ τὶ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ τάδε ἔδειξεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ταδί), ἢ ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως ( τί οὖν δέδεικται; ἢ οὗτος τί ἔδειξεν;). ἢ δὴ οὕτως ἢ ἐκ παραβολῆς 5 ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ὡς ἐλέχθη, οὕτως τὰ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, χωρὶς τὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου λόγου.

[6] τελευτὴ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἁρμόττει ἡ ἀσύνδετος, ὅπως ἐπίλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος ᾖ· εἴρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε.

Translations (1)

The "Art" of Rhetoric Perseus (Aristotle. The "Art" of Rhetoric. Freese, John Henry, translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1926 (printing).) — 3.1 focus

[1] 6 There are three things which require special attention in regard to speech: first, the sources of proofs; secondly, style; and thirdly, the arrangement of the parts of the speech. We have already spoken of proofs and stated that they are three in number, what is their nature, and why there are only three; for in all cases persuasion is the result either of the judges themselves being affected in a certain manner, or because they consider the speakers to be of a certain character, or because something has been demonstrated. We have also stated the sources from which enthymemes should be derived—some of them being special, the others general commonplaces.

[2] We have therefore next to speak of style; for it is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to say it, and this largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain character.

[3] In the first place, following the natural order, we investigated that which first presented itself—what gives things themselves their persuasiveness; 20 in the second place, their arrangement by style; and in the third place, delivery, which is of the greatest importance but has not yet been treated of by anyone. In fact, it only made its appearance late in tragedy and rhapsody, for at first the poets themselves acted their tragedies.¹ It is clear, therefore, that there is something of the sort in rhetoric as well as in poetry, and it has been dealt with by Glaucon of Teos among others.

[4] Now delivery is a matter of voice, as to the mode in which it should be used for each particular emotion; when it should be loud, when low, when intermediate; and how the tones, that is, shrill, deep, and intermediate, should be used; and what rhythms are adapted to each subject. For there are three qualities that are considered,—volume, harmony, rhythm. Those who use these properly nearly always carry off the prizes in dramatic contests, and as at the present day actors have greater influence on the stage than the poets, it is the same In political² contests, owing to the corruptness of our forms of government.

[5] But no treatise has yet been composed on delivery, since the matter of style itself only lately came into notice; 1404a 1 and rightly considered it is thought vulgar.³ But since the whole business of Rhetoric is to influence opinion,⁴ we must pay attention to it, not as being right, but necessary; for, as a matter of right, one should aim at nothing more in a speech than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure. For justice should consist in fighting the case with the facts alone, so that everything else that is beside demonstration is superfluous; nevertheless, as we have just said, it is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer.

[6] However, in every system of instruction there is some slight necessity to pay attention to style; for it does make a difference, for the purpose of making a thing clear, to speak in this or that manner; still, the difference is not so very great, but all these things⁵ are mere outward show for pleasing the hearer; wherefore no one teaches geometry in this way.

[7] Now, when delivery comes into fashion, it will have the same effect as acting. Some writers have attempted to say a few words about it, as Thrasymachus, in his Eleoi⁶; and in fact, a gift for acting is a natural talent and depends less upon art, but in regard to style it is artificial. Wherefore people who excel in this in their turn obtain prizes, just as orators who excel in delivery; for written speeches owe their effect not so much to the sense as to the style. 20

[8] The poets, as was natural, were the first to give an impulse to style; for words are imitations, and the voice also, which of all our parts is best adapted for imitation, was ready to hand; thus the arts of the rhapsodists, actors, and others, were fashioned.

[9] And as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias.⁷ Even now the majority of the uneducated think that such persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas this is not the case, for the style of prose is not the same as that of poetry. And the result proves it; for even the writers of tragedies do not employ it in the same manner, but as they have changed from the tetrametric to the iambic meter, because the latter, of all other meters, most nearly resembles prose, they have in like manner discarded all such words as differ from those of ordinary conversation, with which the early poets used to adorn their writings, and which even now are employed by the writers of hexameters. It is therefore ridiculous to imitate those who no longer employ that manner of writing.

[10] Consequently, it is evident that we need not enter too precisely into all questions of style, but only those which concern such a style as we are discussing. As for the other kind of style,⁸ it has already been treated in the Poetics.

[1] 1404b 1 Let this suffice for the consideration of these points. In regard to style, one of its chief merits may be defined as perspicuity. This is shown by the fact that the speech, if it does not make the meaning clear, will not perform its proper function; neither must it be mean, nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate to it; for the poetic style may be is not mean, but it is not appropriate to prose.

[2] Of nouns and verbs it is the proper ones that make style perspicuous⁹; all the others which have been spoken of in the Poetics¹⁰ elevate and make it ornate; for departure from the ordinary makes it appear more dignified. In this respect men feel the same in regard to style as in regard to foreigners and fellow-citizens.

[3] Wherefore we should give our language a foreign¹¹ air; for men admire what is remote, and that which excites admiration is pleasant. In poetry many things conduce to this and there it is appropriate; for the subjects and persons spoken of are more out of the common. But in prose such methods are appropriate in much fewer instances, for the subject is less elevated; and even in poetry, if fine language were used by a slave or a very young man, or about quite unimportant matters, it would be hardly becoming; for even here due proportion consists in contraction and amplification as the subject requires.

[4] Wherefore those who practise this artifice must conceal it and avoid the appearance of speaking artificially instead of naturally; for that which is natural persuades, 20 but the artificial does not. For men become suspicious of one whom they think to be laying a trap for them, as they are of mixed wines. Such was the case with the voice of Theodorus as contrasted with that of the rest of the actors; for his seemed to be the voice of the speaker, that of the others the voice of someone else.

[5] Art is cleverly concealed when the speaker chooses his words from ordinary language¹² and puts them together like Euripides, who was the first to show the way.

Nouns and verbs being the components of speech, and nouns being of the different kinds which have been considered in the Poetics, of these we should use strange, compound, or coined words only rarely and in few places. We will state later¹³ in what places they should be used;

[6] the reason for this has already been mentioned, namely, that it involves too great a departure from suitable language. Proper and appropriate words and metaphors are alone to be employed in the style of prose; this is shown by the fact that no one employs anything but these. For all use metaphors in conversation, as well as proper and appropriate words; wherefore it is clear that, if a speaker manages well, there will be some thing foreign about his speech, while possibly the art may not be detected, and his meaning will be clear. And this, as we have said, is the chief merit of rhetorical language.

[7] (In regard to nouns, homonyms are most useful to the sophist, for it is by their aid that he employs captious arguments, and synonyms to the poet. 1405a 1 Instances of words that are both proper and synonymous are going and walking: for these two words are proper and have the same meaning.)¹⁴

It has already been stated, as we have said, in the Poetics,¹⁵ what each of these things¹⁶ is, how many kinds of metaphor there are, and that it is most important both in poetry and in prose.

[8] But the orator must devote the greater attention to them in prose, since the latter has fewer resources than verse. It is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and it cannot be learnt from anyone else;¹⁷

[9] but we must make use of metaphors and epithets that are appropriate. This will be secured by observing due proportion; otherwise there will be a lack of propriety, because it is when placed in juxtaposition that contraries are most evident. We must consider, as a red cloak suits a young man, what suits an old one;

[10] for the same garment is not suitable for both. And if we wish to ornament our subject, we must derive our metaphor from the better species under the same genus; if to depreciate it, from the worse. Thus, to say (for you have two opposites belonging to the same genus) that the man who begs prays, or that the man who prays begs (for both are forms of asking)¹⁸ is an instance of doing this; as, when Iphicrates¹⁹ called Callias²⁰ 20 a mendicant priest instead of a torch-bearer, Callias replied that Iphicrates himself could not be initiated, otherwise he would not have called him mendicant priest but torch-bearer²¹; both titles indeed have to do with a divinity, but the one is honorable, the other dishonorable. And some call actors flatterers of Dionysus, whereas they call themselves artists. Both these names are metaphors, but the one is a term of abuse, the other the contrary. Similarly, pirates now call themselves purveyors²²; and so it is allowable to say that the man who has committed a crime has made a mistake, that the man who has made a mistake is guilty of crime, and that one who has committed a theft has either taken or ravaged. The saying in the Telephus of Euripides,

Ruling over the oar and having landed in Mysia ,

is inappropriate, because the word ruling exceeds the dignity of the subject, and so the artifice can be seen.

[11] Forms of words also are faulty, if they do not express an agreeable sound; for instance, Dionysius the Brazen²³ in his elegiacs speaks of poetry as

the scream of Calliope;

both are sounds, but the metaphor is bad, because the sounds have no meaning.²⁴

[12] Further, metaphors must not be far-fetched, but we must give names to things that have none by deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the same kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is clearly seen to be akin, 1405b 1 as in the famous enigma,

I saw a man who glued bronze with fire upon another.

There was no name for what took place, but as in both cases there is a kind of application, he called the application of the cupping-glass gluing.²⁵ And, generally speaking, clever enigmas furnish good metaphors; for metaphor is a kind of enigma, so that it is clear that the transference is clever.

[13] Metaphors should also be derived from things that are beautiful, the beauty of a word consisting, as Licymnius says, in its sound or sense, and its ugliness in the same. There is a third condition, which refutes the sophistical argument; for it is not the case, as Bryson²⁶ said, that no one ever uses foul language, if the meaning is the same whether this or that word is used; this is false; for one word is more proper than another, more of a likeness, and better suited to putting the matter before the eyes. Further, this word or that does not signify a thing under the same conditions; thus for this reason also it must be admitted that one word is fairer or fouler than the other. Both, indeed, signify what is fair or foul, but not qua fair or foul; or if they do, it is in a greater or less degree. Metaphors therefore should be derived from what is beautiful either in sound, or in signification, or to sight, or to some other sense. For it does make a difference, for instance, whether one says rosy-fingered morn, rather than purple-fingered, 20 or, what is still worse, red-fingered.

[14] As for epithets, they may be applied from what is vile or disgraceful, for instance, the matricide, or from what is more honorable, for instance, the avenger of his father.²⁷ When the winner in a mule-race offered Simonides a small sum, he refused to write an ode, as if he thought it beneath him to write on half-asses; but when he gave him a sufficient amount, he wrote,

Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds!²⁸

and yet they were also the daughters of asses. Further, the use of diminutives amounts to the same.

[15] It is the diminutive which makes the good and the bad appear less, as Aristophanes in the Babylonians jestingly uses goldlet, cloaklet, affrontlet, diseaselet instead of gold, cloak, affront, disease. But one must be careful to observe the due mean in their use as well as in that of epithets.

[1] Frigidity of style arises from four causes: first, the use of compound words, as when Lycophron²⁹ speaks of the many-faced sky of the mighty-topped earth, narrow-passaged shore; and Gorgias of a begging-poet flatterer, 1406a 1 those who commit perjury and those who swear right solemnly.³⁰ And as Alcidamas says, the soul full of anger and the face fire-colored, he thought that their zeal would be end-accomplishing, he made persuasive words end-accomplishing, and the azure-colored floor of the sea, for all these appear poetical because they are compound.

[2] This is one cause of frigidity; another is the use of strange words; as Lycophron calls Xerxes a monster of a man, Sciron a human scourge³¹; and Alcidamas says plaything in poetry, the audaciousness of nature, whetted with unmitigated wrath of thought.

[3] A third cause is the use of epithets that are either long or unseasonable or too crowded; thus, in poetry it is appropriate to speak of white milk, but in prose it is less so; and if epithets are employed to excess, they reveal the art and make it evident that it is poetry. And yet such may be used to a certain extent, since it removes the style from the ordinary and gives a foreign air. But one must aim at the mean, for neglect to do so does more harm than speaking at random; for a random style lacks merit, but excess is vicious. That is why the style of Alcidamas appears frigid; for he uses epithets not as a seasoning but as a regular dish, so crowded, 20 so long, and so glaring are they. For instance, he does not say sweat but damp sweat; not to the Isthmian games but to the solemn assembly of the Isthmian games; not laws, but the laws, the rulers of states; not running, but with a race-like impulse of the soul; not museum, but having taken up the museum of nature³²; and the scowling anxiety of the soul; creator, not of favor, but all-popular favor; and dispenser of the pleasure of the hearers; he hid, not with branches, but with the branches of the forest; he covered, not his body, but the nakedness of his body. He also calls desire counter-initiative of the soul—an expression which is at once compound and an epithet, so that it becomes poetry—and the excess of his depravity so beyond all bounds. Hence those who employ poetic language by their lack of taste make the style ridiculous and frigid, and such idle chatter produces obscurity; for when words are piled upon one who already knows, it destroys perspicuity by a cloud of verbiage. People use compound words, when a thing has no name and the word is easy to combine, as χρονοτριβεῖν, to pass time; but if the practice is abused, the style becomes entirely poetical. 1406b 1 This is why compound words are especially employed by dithyrambic poets, who are full of noise; strange words by epic poets, for they imply dignity and self-assertion; metaphor to writers of iambics, who now employ them, as we have stated.

[4] The fourth cause of frigidity of style is to be found in metaphors; for metaphors also are inappropriate, some because they are ridiculous—for the comic poets also employ them—others because they are too dignified and somewhat tragic; and if they are farfetched, they are obscure, as when Gorgias says: Affairs pale and bloodless³³; you have sown shame and reaped misfortune; for this is too much like poetry. And as Alcidamas calls philosophy a bulwark of the laws,³⁴ and the Odyssey a beautiful mirror of human life, and introducing no such plaything in poetry. All these expressions fail to produce persuasion, for the reasons stated. As for what Gorgias said to the swallow which, flying over his head, let fall her droppings upon him, it was in the best tragic style. He exclaimed, Fie, for shame, Philomela!; for there would have been nothing in this act disgraceful for a bird, whereas it would have been for a young lady. The reproach therefore was appropriate, addressing her as she was, not as she is.

[1] 20 The simile also is a metaphor; for there is very little difference. When the poet says of Achilles,³⁵

he rushed on like a lion,

it is a simile; if he says, a lion, he rushed on, it is a metaphor; for because both are courageous, he transfers the sense and calls Achilles a lion.

[2] The simile is also useful in prose, but should be less frequently used, for there is something poetical about it. Similes must be used like metaphors, which only differ in the manner stated.

[3] The following are examples of similes. Androtion³⁶ said of Idrieus that he was like curs just unchained; for as they attack and bite, so he when loosed from his bonds was dangerous. Again, Theodamas likened Archidamus to a Euxenus ignorant of geometry, by proportion;³⁷ for Euxenus will be Archidamus acquainted with geometry. Again, Plato in the Republic³⁸ compares those who strip the dead to curs, which bite stones, but do not touch those who throw them; he also says that the people is like a ship's captain who is vigorous, but rather deaf;³⁹ that poets' verses resemble those who are in the bloom of youth but lack beauty;⁴⁰ for neither the one after they have lost their bloom, nor the others after they have been broken up,⁴¹ 1407a 1 appear the same as before. Pericles said that the Samians were like children who cry while they accept the scraps.⁴² He also compared the Boeotians to holm-oaks; for just as these are beaten down by knocking against each other,⁴³ so are the Boeotians by their civil strife. Demosthenes compared the people to passengers who are seasick.⁴⁴ Democrates said that orators resembled nurses who gulp down the morsel and rub the babies' lips with the spittle.⁴⁵ Antisthenes likened the skinny Cephisodotus to incense, for he also gives pleasure by wasting away. All such expressions may be used as similes or metaphors, so that all that are approved as metaphors will obviously also serve as similes which are metaphors without the details.

[4] But in all cases the metaphor from proportion should be reciprocal and applicable to either of the two things of the same genus; for instance, if the goblet is the shield of Dionysus, then the shield may properly be called the goblet of Ares.⁴⁶

[1] Such then are the elements of speech. But purity, 20 which is the foundation of style, depends upon five rules.

[2] First, connecting particles should be introduced in their natural order, before or after, as they require; thus, μέν and ἐγὼ μέν require to be followed by δέ and ὁ δέ. Further, they should be made to correspond whilst the hearer still recollects; they should not be put too far apart, nor should a clause be introduced before the necessary connection⁴⁷; for this is rarely appropriate. For instance, As for me, I, after he had told me—for Cleon came begging and praying—set out, taking them with me. For in this phrase several connecting words have been foisted in before the one which is to furnish the apodosis; and if the interval between I and set out is too great, the result is obscurity.

[3] The first rule therefore is to make a proper use of connecting particles; the second, to employ special, not generic terms.

[4] The third consists in avoiding ambiguous terms, unless you deliberately intend the opposite, like those who, having nothing to say, yet pretend to say something; such people accomplish this by the use of verse, after the manner of Empedocles.⁴⁸ For the long circumlocution takes in the hearers, who find themselves affected like the majority of those who listen to the soothsayers. For when the latter utter their ambiguities, they also assent; for example,

Croesus, by crossing the Halys, shall ruin a mighty dominion.⁴⁹

1407b 1 And as there is less chance of making a mistake when speaking generally, diviners express themselves in general terms on the question of fact; for, in playing odd or even, one is more likely to be right if he says even or odd than if he gives a definite number, and similarly one who says it will be than if he states when. This is why soothsayers do not further define the exact time. All such ambiguities are alike, wherefore they should be avoided, except for some such reason.⁵⁰

[5] The fourth rule consists in keeping the genders distinct—masculine, feminine, and neuter,⁵¹ as laid down by Protagoras; these also must be properly introduced:

[6] She, having come ( fem.) and having conversed ( fem.) with me, went away. The fifth rule consists in observing number, according as many, few, or one are referred to: They, having come ( pl.), began to beat ( pl.) me.

Generally speaking, that which is written should be easy to read or easy to utter, which is the same thing. Now, this is not the case when there is a number of connecting particles, or when the punctuation is hard, as in the writings of Heraclitus.⁵² For it is hard, since it is uncertain to which word another belongs, whether to that which follows or that which precedes; for instance, at the beginning of his composition he says: Of this reason which exists⁵³ always men are ignorant, where it is uncertain whether always should go with which exists or with are ignorant.

[7] Further, a solecism results from not appropriately connecting or joining two words with a word which is equally suitable to both. 20 For instance, in speaking of sound and color, the word seeing should not be used, for it is not suitable to both, whereas perceiving is. It also causes obscurity, if you do not say at the outset what you mean, when you intend to insert a number of details in the middle; for instance, if you say: I intended after having spoken to him thus and thus and in this way to set out instead of I intended to set out after having spoken to him, and then this or that happened, in this or that manner.

[1] The following rules contribute to loftiness of style. Use of the description instead of the name of a thing; for instance, do not say circle, but a plane figure, all the points of which are equidistant from the center. But for the purpose of conciseness the reverse—use the name instead of the description.

[2] You should do the same to express anything foul or indecent; if the foulness is in the description, use the name; if in the name, the description.

[3] Use metaphors and epithets by way of illustration, taking care, however, to avoid what is too poetical.

[4] Use the plural for the singular, after the manner of the poets, who, although there is only one harbor, say

to Achaean harbors,

and,

Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablet.⁵⁴

[5] You should avoid linking up, but each word should have its own article: τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας. But for conciseness, the reverse: τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός.

[6] Employ a connecting particle or for conciseness omit it, but avoid destroying the connection; 1408a 1 for instance having gone and having conversed with him, or, having gone, I conversed with him.

[7] Also the practice of Antimachus is useful, that of describing a thing by the qualities it does not possess; thus, in speaking of the hill Teumessus,⁵⁵ he says,

There is a little windswept hill;

for in this way amplification may be carried on ad infinitum. This method may be applied to things good and bad, in whichever way it may be useful. Poets also make use of this in inventing words, as a melody without strings or without the lyre; for they employ epithets from negations, a course which is approved in proportional metaphors, as for instance, to say that the sound of the trumpet is a melody without the lyre.

[1] Propriety of style will be obtained by the expression of emotion and character, and by proportion to the subject matter.

[2] Style is proportionate to the subject matter when neither weighty matters are treated offhand, nor trifling matters with dignity, and no embellishment is attached to an ordinary word; otherwise there is an appearance of comedy, as in the poetry of Cleophon,⁵⁶ who used certain expressions that reminded one of saying madam fig.

[3] Style expresses emotion, when a man speaks with anger of wanton outrage; with indignation and reserve, even in mentioning them, of things foul or impious; with admiration of things praiseworthy; with lowliness of things pitiable; and so in all other cases.

[4] Appropriate style 20 also makes the fact appear credible; for the mind of the hearer is imposed upon⁵⁷ under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, his feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them; and the hearer always sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really says nothing.

[5] This is why speakers often confound their hearers by mere noise.

[6] Character also may be expressed by the proof from signs, because to each class and habit there is an appropriate style. I mean class in reference to age—child, man, or old man; to sex—man or woman; to country—Lacedaemonian or Thessalian. I call habits those moral states which form a man's character in life;

[7] for not all habits do this. If then anyone uses the language appropriate to each habit, he will represent the character; for the uneducated man will not say the same things in the same way as the educated. But the hearers also are impressed in a certain way by a device employed ad nauseam by writers of speeches:⁵⁸ Who does not know? Everybody knows; for the hearer agrees, because he is ashamed to appear not to share what is a matter of common knowledge.

[8] The opportune or inopportune use of these devices 1408b 1 applies to all kinds of Rhetoric.⁵⁹

[9] But whenever one has gone too far, the remedy may be found in the common piece of advice—that he should rebuke himself in advance;⁶⁰ then the excess seems true, since the orator is obviously aware of what he is doing.

[10] Further, one ought not to make use of all kinds of correspondence⁶¹ together; for in this manner the hearer is deceived. I mean, for instance, if the language is harsh, the voice, features, and all things connected should not be equally harsh; otherwise what each really is becomes evident. But if you do this in one instance and not in another, the art escapes notice, although the result is the same. If mild sentiments are harshly expressed or harsh sentiments mildly, the speech lacks persuasiveness.

[11] Compound words, a number of epithets, and foreign words especially, are appropriate to an emotional speaker; for when a man is enraged it is excusable for him to call an evil high-as-heaven or stupendous. He may do the same when he has gripped his audience and filled it with enthusiasm, either by praise, blame, anger, or friendliness, as Isocrates does at the end of his Panegyricus⁶²: Oh, the fame and the name! and In that they endured. For such is the language of enthusiastic orators, and it is clear that the hearers accept what they say in a sympathetic spirit. Wherefore this style is appropriate to poetry; for there is something inspired in poetry. It should therefore be used either in this way or 20 when speaking ironically, after the manner of Gorgias, or of Plato in the Phaedrus.⁶³

[1] The form of diction should be neither metrical nor without rhythm. If it is metrical, it lacks persuasiveness, for it appears artificial, and at the same time it distracts the hearer's attention, since it sets him on the watch for the recurrence of such and such a cadence; just as, when the public criers ask, Whom does the emancipated⁶⁴ choose for his patron? the children shout Cleon.

[2] If it is without rhythm, it is unlimited, whereas it ought to be limited (but not by meter); for that which is unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable. Now all things are limited by number, and the number belonging to the form of diction is rhythm, of which the meters are divisions.⁶⁵

[3] Wherefore prose must be rhythmical, but not metrical, otherwise it will be a poem. Nor must this rhythm be rigorously carried out, but only up to a certain point.

[4] Of the different rhythms the heroic is dignified, but lacking the harmony of ordinary conversation; the iambic is the language of the many, wherefore of all meters it is most used in common speech; but speech should be dignified and calculated to rouse the hearer. The trochaic is too much like the cordax; this is clear from the tetrameters, 1409a 1 which form a tripping rhythm. There remains the paean, used by rhetoricians from the time of Thrasymachus, although they could not define it.

The paean is a third kind of rhythm closely related to those already mentioned; for its proportion is 3 to 2, that of the others 1 to 1 and 2 to 1, with both of which the paean, whose proportion is 1 1/2 to 1, is connected.⁶⁶

[5] All the other meters then are to be disregarded for the reasons stated, and also because they are metrical; but the paean should be retained, because it is the only one of the rhythms mentioned which is not adapted to a metrical system, so that it is most likely to be undetected.

[6] At the present day one kind of paean alone is employed, at the beginning as well as at the end;⁶⁷ the end, however, ought to differ from the beginning. Now there are two kinds of paeans, opposed to each other. The one is appropriate at the beginning, where in fact it is used. It begins with a long syllable and ends with three short:

Δα¯λο˘γε˘νε˘ς εἴτε Λυ˘κι˘αν, ( O Delos-born, or it may be Lycia ),

and

Χρυ¯σε˘ο˘κό˘μα¯ Ἕ˘κα˘τε˘ παῖ Διό˘ς ( Golden-haired far-darter, son of Zeus).

The other on the contrary begins with three short syllables and ends with one long one:

με˘τὰ˘ δε˘ γᾶν ὕ˘δα˘τά˘ τ’ ὠκε˘α˘νὸν ἠφά˘νι˘σε˘νύξ⁶⁸ ( after earth and waters, night obscured ocean).

This is a suitable ending, for the short syllable, being incomplete, mutilates the cadence. But the period should be broken off by a long syllable and 20 the end should be clearly marked, not by the scribe nor by a punctuation mark,⁶⁹ but by the rhythm itself.

[7] That the style should be rhythmical and not unrhythmical, and what rhythms and what arrangement of them make it of this character, has now been sufficiently shown.

[1] The style must be either continuous and united by connecting particles, like the dithyrambic preludes, or periodic, like the antistrophes of the ancient poets. The continuous style is the ancient one; for example,

[2] This is the exposition of the investigation of Herodotus of Thurii . It was formerly used by all, but now is used only by a few. By a continuous style I mean that which has no end in itself and only stops when the sense is complete. It is unpleasant, because it is endless, for all wish to have the end in sight. That explains why runners, just when they have reached the goal,⁷⁰ lose their breath and strength, whereas before, when the end is in sight, they show no signs of fatigue.

[3] Such is the continuous style. The other style consists of periods, and by period I mean a sentence that has a beginning and end in itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped. 1409b 1 What is written in this style is pleasant and easy to learn, pleasant because it is the opposite of that which is unlimited, because the hearer at every moment thinks he is securing something for himself and that some conclusion has been reached; whereas it is unpleasant neither to foresee nor to get to the end of anything. It is easy to learn, because it can be easily retained in the memory. The reason is that the periodic style has number, which of all things is the easiest to remember; that explains why all learn verse with greater facility than prose,⁷¹ for it has number by which it can be measured.

[4] But the period must be completed with the sense and not stop short, as in the iambics of Sophocles,⁷²

This is Calydon, territory of the land of Pelops;

for by a division of this kind it is possible to suppose the contrary of the fact, as in the example, that Calydon is in Peloponnesus .

[5] A period may be composed of clauses, or simple. The former is a complete sentence, distinct in its parts and easy to repeat in a breath, not divided like the period in the line of Sophocles above, but when it is taken as a whole.⁷³ By clause I mean one of the two parts of this period, and by a simple period one that consists of only one clause.

[6] But neither clauses nor periods should be curtailed or too long. If too short, they often make the hearer stumble; for when he is hurrying on 20 towards the measure of which he already has a definite idea, if he is checked by the speaker stopping, a sort of stumble is bound to occur in consequence of the sudden stop. If too long, they leave the hearer behind, as those who do not turn till past the ordinary limit leave behind those who are walking with them. Similarly long periods assume the proportions of a speech and resemble dithyrambic preludes. This gives rise to what Democritus of Chios ⁷⁴ jokingly rebuked in Melanippides,⁷⁵ who instead of antistrophes composed dithyrambic preludes:

A man does harm to himself in doing harm to another, and a long prelude is most deadly to one who composes it;⁷⁶

for these verses may be applied to those who employ long clauses. Again, if the clauses are too short, they do not make a period, so that the hearer himself is carried away headlong.

[7] The clauses of the periodic style are divided or opposed; divided, as in the following sentence: I have often wondered at those who gathered together the general assemblies and instituted the gymnastic contests;⁷⁷ opposed, in which, in each of the two clauses, one contrary is brought close to another, or the same word is coupled with both contraries; 1410a 1 for instance, They were useful to both, both those who stayed and those who followed; for the latter they gained in addition greater possessions than they had at home, for the former they left what was sufficient in their own country. Here staying behind, following, sufficient, more are contraries. Again: to those who need money and those who wish to enjoy it; where enjoying is contrary to acquiring. Again: It often happens in these vicissitudes that the wise are unsuccessful, while fools succeed: At once they were deemed worthy of the prize of valor and not long after won the command of the sea: To sail over the mainland, to go by land over the sea, bridging over the Hellespont and digging through Athos : And that, though citizens by nature, they were deprived of the rights of citizenship by law: For some of them perished miserably, others saved themselves disgracefully: Privately to employ barbarians as servants,⁷⁸ but publicly to view with indifference many of the allies reduced to slavery: Either to possess it while living or to leave it behind when dead.⁷⁹ And what some one said against Pitholaus and Lycophron⁸⁰ in the lawcourt: These men, who used to sell you when they were at home, having come to you have bought you. 20 All these passages are examples of antithesis.

[8] This kind of style is pleasing, because contraries are easily understood and even more so when placed side by side, and also because antithesis resembles a syllogism; for refutation is a bringing together of contraries.

[9] Such then is the nature of antithesis; equality of clauses is parisosis; the similarity of the final syllables of each clause paromoiosis. This must take place at the beginning or end of the clauses. At the beginning the similarity is always shown in entire words; at the end, in the last syllables, or the inflections of one and the same word, or the repetition of the same word. For instance, at the beginning: Ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ,⁸¹ for he received from him land untilled;

δωρητοί τ’ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τ’ ἐπέεσσιν,⁸² they were ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by words;

at the end: ᾠήθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγονέναι,⁸³ they thought that he was the father of a child, but that he was the cause of it; ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν, in the greatest anxiety and the smallest hopes. Inflections of the same word: ἄξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν χαλκοῦ, worthy of a bronze statue, not being worth a brass farthing. Repetition of a word: σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς, while he lived you spoke ill of him, now he is dead you write ill of him. Resemblance of one syllable: τί ἂν ἔπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ’ εἶδες ἀργόν, what ill would you have suffered, if you had seen an idle man? All these figures may be found in the same sentence at once— 1410b 1 antithesis, equality of clauses, and similarity of endings. In the Theodectea⁸⁴ nearly all the beginnings⁸⁵ of periods have been enumerated.

[10] There are also false antitheses, as in the verse of Epicharmus:

τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγὼν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις ἐγών, at one time I was in their house, at another I was with them.⁸⁶

[1] Having settled these questions, we must next state the sources of smart and popular sayings. They are produced either by natural genius or by practice; to show what they are is the function of this inquiry.

[2] Let us therefore begin by giving a full list of them, and let our starting-point be the following. Easy learning is naturally pleasant to all, and words mean something, so that all words which make us learn something are most pleasant. Now we do not know the meaning of strange words, and proper terms we know already. It is metaphor, therefore, that above all produces this effect; for when Homer⁸⁷ calls old age stubble, he teaches and informs us through the genus; for both have lost their bloom.

[3] The similes of the poets also have the same effect; wherefore, if they are well constructed, an impression of smartness is produced. For the simile, as we have said, is a metaphor differing only by the addition of a word,⁸⁸ wherefore it is less pleasant because it is longer; it does not say that this is that, so that 20 the mind does not even examine this.

[4] Of necessity, therefore, all style and enthymemes that give us rapid information are smart. This is the reason why superficial enthymemes, meaning those that are obvious to all and need no mental effort, and those which, when stated, are not understood, are not popular, but only those which are understood the moment they are stated, or those of which the meaning, although not clear at first, comes a little later; for from the latter a kind of knowledge results, from the former neither the one nor the other.⁸⁹

[5] In regard to the meaning of what is said, then, such enthymemes are popular. As to style, popularity of form is due to antithetical statement; for instance, accounting the peace that all shared to be a war against their private interests,⁹⁰ where war is opposed to peace;

[6] as to words, they are popular if they contain metaphor, provided it be neither strange, for then it is difficult to take in at a glance, nor superficial, for then it does not impress the hearer; further, if they set things before the eyes; for we ought to see what is being done rather than what is going to be done. We ought therefore to aim at three things—metaphor, antithesis, actuality.

[7] Of the four kinds of metaphor⁹¹ 1411a 1 the most popular are those based on proportion. Thus, Pericles said that the youth that had perished during the war had disappeared from the State as if the year had lost its springtime.⁹² Leptines, speaking of the Lacedaemonians, said that he would not let the Athenians stand by and see Greece deprived of one of her eyes. When Chares was eager to have his accounts for the Olynthian war examined, Cephisodotus indignantly exclaimed that, now he had the people by the throat, he was trying to get his accounts examined⁹³; on another occasion also he exhorted the Athenians to set out for Euboea without delay and provision themselves there, like the decree of Miltiades.⁹⁴ After the Athenians had made peace with Epidaurus and the maritime cities, Iphicrates indignantly declared that they had deprived themselves of provisions for the war.⁹⁵ Pitholaus called the Paralus⁹⁶ the bludgeon of the people, and Sestos the corn-chest⁹⁷ of the Piraeus . Pericles recommended that Aegina , the eyesore of the Piraeus , should be removed. Moerocles, mentioning a very respectable person by name, declared that he was as much a scoundrel as himself; for whereas that honest man played the scoundrel at 33 per cent. he himself was satisfied with 10 per cent.⁹⁸ And the iambic of Anaxandrides,⁹⁹ on girls who were 20 slow to marry,

My daughters are past the time of marriage.

And the saying of Polyeuctus¹⁰⁰ upon a certain paralytic named Speusippus, that he could not keep quiet, although Fortune had bound him in a five-holed pillory of disease. Cephisodotus called the triremes parti-colored mills,¹⁰¹ and [Diogenes] the Cynic used to say that the taverns¹⁰² were the messes of Attica . Aesion¹⁰³ used to say that they had drained the State into Sicily ,¹⁰⁴ which is a metaphor and sets the thing before the eyes. His words so that Greece uttered a cry are also in a manner a metaphor and a vivid one. And again, as Cephisodotus bade the Athenians take care not to hold their concourses too often; and in the same way Isocrates, who spoke of those who rush together in the assemblies.¹⁰⁵ And as Lysias says in his Funeral Oration, that it was right that Greece should cut her hair at the tomb of those who fell at Salamis , since her freedom was buried along with their valor. If the speaker had said that it was fitting that Greece should weep, her valor being buried with them, it would have been a metaphor and a vivid one, 1411b 1 whereas freedom by the side of valor produces a kind of antithesis. And as Iphicrates said, The path of my words leads through the center of the deeds of Chares; here the metaphor is proportional and the words through the center create vividness. Also, to say that one calls upon dangers to help against dangers is a vivid metaphor. And Lycoleon on behalf of Chabrias said, not even reverencing the suppliant attitude of his statue of bronze,¹⁰⁶ a metaphor for the moment, not for all time, but still vivid; for when Chabrias is in danger, the statue intercedes for him, the inanimate becomes animate, the memorial of what he has done for the State. And in every way studying poorness of spirit,¹⁰⁷ for studying a thing implies to increase it.¹⁰⁸ And that reason is a light that God has kindled in the soul, for both the words reason and light make something clear. For we do not put an end to wars, but put them off,¹⁰⁹ for both ideas refer to the future—putting off and a peace of such a kind. And again, it is a metaphor to say that such a treaty is a trophy far more splendid than those gained in war; for the latter are raised in memory of trifling advantages and a single favor of fortune, but the former commemorates the end of the whole war;¹¹⁰ for both treaty and trophy are signs of victory. Again, that cities also render 20 a heavy account to the censure of men; for rendering an account¹¹¹ is a sort of just punishment.

[1] We have said that smart sayings are derived from proportional metaphor and expressions which set things before the eyes. We must now explain the meaning of before the eyes, and what must be done to produce this.

[2] I mean that things are set before the eyes by words that signify actuality. For instance, to say that a good man is four-square¹¹² is a metaphor, for both these are complete, but the phrase does not express actuality, whereas of one having the prime of his life in full bloom¹¹³ does; similarly, thee, like a sacred animal ranging at will¹¹⁴ expresses actuality, and in

Thereupon the Greeks shooting forward with their feet¹¹⁵

the word shooting contains both actuality and metaphor.

[3] And as Homer often, by making use of metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate; and it is to creating actuality in all such cases that his popularity is due, as in the following examples:

Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plain.¹¹⁶

The arrow flew.¹¹⁷

[The arrow] eager to fly [towards the crowd].¹¹⁸

1412a 1

[The spears] were buried in the ground, longing to take their fill of flesh.¹¹⁹

The spear-point sped eagerly through his breast.¹²⁰

. For in all these examples there is appearance of actuality, since the objects are represented as animate: the shameless stone, the eager spear-point, and the rest express actuality. Homer has attached these attributes by the employment of the proportional metaphor; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless one to the one who is shamelessly treated.

[4] In his popular similes also he proceeds in the same manner with inanimate things:

Arched, foam-crested, some in front, others behind;¹²¹

for he gives movement and life to all, and actuality is movement.

[5] As we have said before, metaphors should be drawn from objects which are proper to the object, but not too obvious; just as, for instance, in philosophy it needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in things that are apart. Thus Archytas said that there was no difference between an arbitrator and an altar, for the wronged betakes itself to one or the other. Similarly, if one were to say that an anchor and a pot-hook hung up were identical; for both are the same sort of thing, but they differ in this—that one is hung up above and the other below.¹²² And if one were to say the cities have been reduced to the same level, this amounts to the same in the case of things far apart—the equality of levelling in regard to superficies and resources.¹²³

[6] Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor, 20 and also from misleading the hearer beforehand.¹²⁴ For it becomes more evident to him that he has learnt something, when the conclusion turns out contrary to his expectation, and the mind seems to say, How true it is! but I missed it. And smart apophthegms arise from not meaning what one says, as in the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that the grasshoppers will sing to themselves from the ground.¹²⁵ And clever riddles are agreeable for the same reason; for something is learnt, and the expression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus calls novel expressions arise when what follows is paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance with our previous expectation; just as humorists make use of slight changes in words. The same effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change of letter; for they are deceptive. These novelties occur in poetry as well as in prose; for instance, the following verse does not finish as the hearer expected:

And he strode on, under his feet—chilblains,

whereas the hearer thought he was going to say sandals. This kind of joke must be clear from the moment of utterance. Jokes that turn on the word are produced, not by giving it the proper meaning, but by perverting it; for instance, when Theodorus said to Nicon, the player on the cithara, you are troubled ( θράττει); for while pretending to say something troubles you, he deceives us; for he means something else.¹²⁶ 1412b 1 Therefore the joke is only agreeable to one who understands the point; for if one does not know that Nicon is a Thracian, he will not see any joke in it.

[7] Similarly, you wish to destroy him ( πέρσαι).¹²⁷ Jokes of both these kinds¹²⁸ must be suitably expressed. Similar instances are such witticisms as saying that the empire of the sea was not the beginning of misfortunes for the Athenians, for they benefited by it; or, with Isocrates,¹²⁹ that empire was the beginning of misfortunes for the city; in both cases that which one would not have expected to be said is said, and recognized as true. For, in the second example, to say that empire is empire shows no cleverness, but this is not what he means, but something else; in the first, the ἀρχή which is negatived is used in a different sense.

[8] In all these cases, success is attained when a word is appropriately applied, either by homonym or by metaphor. For example, in the phrase Anaschetos (Bearable) is Unbearable,¹³⁰ there is a contradiction of the homonym, which is only appropriate, if Anaschetus is an unbearable person. And, Thou shalt not be more of a stranger than a stranger, or not more than you should be, which is the same thing. And again,

The stranger must not always be a stranger,

for here too the word repeated is taken in a different sense.¹³¹ It is the same with the celebrated verse of Anaxandrides,

It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves death;¹³²

for this is the same as saying that it is worthy to die when one does not 20 deserve to die, or, that it is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death, or, when one does nothing that is worthy of death.

[9] Now the form of expression of these sayings is the same; but the more concisely and antithetically they are expressed, the greater is their popularity. The reason is that antithesis is more instructive and conciseness gives knowledge more rapidly.

[10] Further, in order that what is said may be true and not superficial, it must always either apply to a particular person or be suitably expressed; for it is possible for it to have one quality and not the other. For instance, One ought to die guiltless of any offence, The worthy man should take a worthy woman to wife. There is no smartness in either of these expressions, but there will be if both conditions are fulfilled: It is worthy for a man to die, when he is not worthy of death. The more special qualities the expression possesses, the smarter it appears; for instance, if the words contain a metaphor, and a metaphor of a special kind, antithesis, and equality of clauses, and actuality.

[11] Similes also, as said above, are always in a manner approved metaphors;¹³³ since they always consist of two terms, like the proportional metaphor, as when we say, for instance, that the shield is the goblet of Ares, and the bow a lyre without strings. 1413a 1 But such an expression is not simple, but when we call the bow a lyre, or the shield a goblet, it is.¹³⁴

[12] And similes may be formed as follows: a flute-player resembles an ape,¹³⁵ a short-sighted man a spluttering lamp; for in both cases there is contraction.¹³⁶

[13] But they are excellent when there is a proportional metaphor; for it is possible to liken a shield to the goblet of Ares and a ruin to the rag of a house; to say that Niceratus is a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys, to use the simile of Thrasymachus, when he saw Niceratus, defeated by Pratys in a rhapsodic competition, still dirty with his hair uncut.¹³⁷ It is herein that poets are especially condemned if they fail, but applauded if they succeed. I mean, for instance, when they introduce an answering clause:¹³⁸

He carries his legs twisted like parsley,

or again,

Like Philammon punching the leather sack.

All such expressions are similes, and similes, as has been often said, are metaphors of a kind.

[14] Proverbs also are metaphors from species to species. If a man, for instance, introduces into his house something from which he expects to benefit, but afterwards finds himself injured instead, it is as the Carpathian¹³⁹ says of the hare; for both have 20 experienced the same misfortunes. This is nearly all that can be said of the sources of smart sayings and the reasons which make them so.

[15] Approved hyperboles are also metaphors. For instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all black and blue, you would have thought he was a basket of mulberries, because the black eye is something purple, but the great quantity constitutes the hyperbole. Again, when one says like this or that there is a hyperbole differing only in the wording:

Like Philammon punching the leather sack,

or, you would have thought that he was Philammon fighting the sack;

Carrying his legs twisted like parsley,

or, you would have thought that he had no legs, but parsley, they being so twisted. There is something youthful about hyperboles;

[16] for they show vehemence. Wherefore those who are in a passion most frequently make use of them:

Not even were he to offer me gifts as many in number as the sand and dust. . . but a daughter of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, I will not wed, not even if she rivalled golden Aphrodite in beauty, or Athene in accomplishments.¹⁴⁰

1413b 1 (Attic orators are especially fond of hyperbole.¹⁴¹) Wherefore¹⁴² it is unbecoming for elderly people to make use of them.

[1] But we must not lose sight of the fact that a different style is suitable to each kind of Rhetoric. That of written compositions is not the same as that of debate; nor, in the latter, is that of public speaking the same as that of the law courts. But it is necessary to be acquainted with both; for the one requires a knowledge of good Greek, while the other prevents the necessity of keeping silent when we wish to communicate something to others, which happens to those who do not know how to write.

[2] The style of written compositions is most precise, that of debate is most suitable for delivery. Of the latter there are two kinds, ethical and emotional; this is why actors are always running after plays of this character, and poets after suitable actors. However, poets whose works are only meant for reading are also popular, as Chaeremon, who is as precise as a writer of speeches, and Licymnius¹⁴³ among dithyrambic poets. When compared, the speeches of writers appear meagre in public debates, while those of the rhetoricians, however well delivered, are amateurish when read. The reason is that they are only suitable to public debates; hence speeches suited for delivery, when delivery is absent, do not fulfil their proper function and appear silly. For instance, asyndeta and frequent 20 repetition of the same word are rightly disapproved in written speech, but in public debate even rhetoricians make use of them, for they lend themselves to acting.¹⁴⁴

[3] (But one must vary the expression when one repeats the same thing, for this as it were paves the way for declamation:¹⁴⁵ as, This is he who robbed you, this is he who deceived you, this is he who at last attempted to betray you. This is what Philemon the actor did in The Old Man's Folly of Anaxandrides, when he says Rhadamanthus and Palamedes, and when he repeats the word I in the prologue to The Pious.¹⁴⁶ For unless such expressions are varied by action, it is a case of the man who carries the beam¹⁴⁷ in the proverb.)

[4] It is the same with asyndeta: I came, I met, I entreated. For here delivery is needed, and the words should not be pronounced with the same tone and character, as if there was only one clause. Further, asyndeta have a special characteristic; for in an equal space of time many things appear to be said, because the connecting particle makes many things one, so that, if it be removed, it is clear that the contrary will be the case, and that the one will become many. Therefore an asyndeton produces amplification: thus, in I came, I conversed, I besought, 1414a 1 the hearer seems to be surveying many things, all that the speaker said.¹⁴⁸ This also is Homer's intention in the passage

Nireus, again, from Syme . . .,

Nireus son of Aglaia . . .,

Nireus, the most beautiful . . . ;¹⁴⁹

for it is necessary that one of whom much has been said should be often mentioned; if then the name is often mentioned, it seems as if much has been said¹⁵⁰; so that, by means of this fallacy, Homer has increased the reputation of Nireus, though he only mentions him in one passage; he has perpetuated his memory, though he never speaks of him again.

[5] The deliberative style is exactly like a rough sketch,¹⁵¹ for the greater the crowd, the further off is the point of view; wherefore in both too much refinement is a superfluity and even a disadvantage. But the forensic style is more finished, and more so before a single judge, because there is least opportunity of employing rhetorical devices, since the mind more readily takes in at a glance what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it; there is no discussion,¹⁵² so the judgement is clear. This is why the same orators do not excel in all these styles; where action is most effective, there the style is least finished, and this is a case in which voice, especially a loud one, is needed.

The epideictic style is especially suited to written compositions, for its function is reading;¹⁵³

[6] and next to it comes the forensic style. It is superfluous to make the further distinction 20 that style should be pleasant or magnificent. Why so, any more than temperate, liberal, or anything else that indicates moral virtue? For it is evident that, if virtue of style has been correctly defined, what we have said will suffice to make it pleasant. For why, if not to please, need it be clear, not mean, but appropriate? If it be too diffuse, or too concise, it will not be clear; but it is plain that the mean is most suitable. What we have said will make the style pleasant, if it contains a happy mixture of proper and foreign words, of rhythm, and of persuasiveness resulting from propriety. This finishes what we had to say about style; of all the three kinds of Rhetoric in general, and of each of them in particular. It only remains to speak of arrangement.

[1] A speech has two parts. It is necessary to state the subject, and then to prove it. Wherefore it is impossible to make a statement without proving it, or to prove it without first putting it forward; for both he who proves proves something, and he who puts something forward does so in order to prove it.

[2] The first of these parts is the statement of the case, the second the proof, a similar division to that of problem and demonstration.

[3] But the division now generally made is absurd; for narrative only belongs in a manner to forensic speech, but in epideictic or deliberative speech how is it possible that there should be narrative as it is defined, or a refutation; 1414b 1 or an epilogue in demonstrative speeches?¹⁵⁴ In deliberative speeches, again, exordium, comparison, and recapitulation are only admissible when there is a conflict of opinion. For both accusation and defence are often found in deliberative, but not qua deliberative speech. And further, the epilogue does not even belong to every forensic speech, for instance, when it is short, or the matter is easy to recollect; for in the epilogue what happens is that there is a reduction of length.¹⁵⁵

[4] So then the necessary parts of a speech are the statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every speech, and at the most the parts are four in number—exordium, statement, proof, epilogue; for refutation of an opponent is part of the proofs, and comparison is an amplification of one's own case, and therefore also part of the proofs; for he who does this proves something, whereas the exordium and the epilogue are merely aids to memory.

[5] Therefore, if we adopt all such divisions we shall be following Theodorus¹⁵⁶ and his school, who distinguished narrative, additional narrative, and preliminary narrative, refutation and additional refutation. But one must only adopt a name to express a distinct species or a real difference; otherwise, it becomes empty and silly, like the terms introduced by Licymnius in his Art, where he speaks of being wafted along, wandering from the subject,¹⁵⁷ and ramifications.

[1] The exordium is the beginning of a speech, as 20 the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute-playing; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a paving the way for what follows. The prelude resembles the exordium of epideictic speeches; for as flute-players begin by playing whatever they can execute skilfully and attach it to the key-note, so also in epideictic speeches should be the composition of the exordium; the speaker should say at once whatever he likes, give the key-note and then attach the main subject. And all do this, an example being the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates; for the eristics and Helen have nothing in common.¹⁵⁸ At the same time, even if the speaker wanders from the point, this is more appropriate than that the speech should be monotonous.

[2] In epideictic speeches, the sources of the exordia are praise and blame, as Gorgias, in the Olympiacus, says, Men of Greece , you are worthy to be admired by many, where he is praising those who instituted the solemn assemblies. Isocrates on the other hand blames them because they rewarded bodily excellences, but instituted no prize for men of wisdom.

[3] Exordia may also be derived from advice, for instance, one should honor the good, wherefore the speaker praises Aristides, or such as are neither famous nor worthless, but who, although they are good, remain obscure, as Alexander, son of Priam; 1415a 1 for this is a piece of advice.

[4] Again, they may be derived from forensic exordia, that is to say, from appeals to the hearer, if the subject treated is paradoxical, difficult, or commonly known, in order to obtain indulgence, like Choerilus¹⁵⁹:

But now when all has been allotted.

These then are the sources of epideictic exordia—praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer. And these exordia¹⁶⁰ may be either foreign or intimately connected with the speech.

[5] As for the exordia of the forensic speech, it must be noted that they produce the same effect as dramatic prologues and epic exordia (for those of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia:

For thee and thy presents or spoils).¹⁶¹

[6] But in speeches¹⁶² and epic poems the exordia provide a sample of the subject, in order that the hearers may know beforehand what it is about, and that the mind may not be kept in suspense, for that which is undefined leads astray; so then he who puts the beginning, so to say, into the hearer's hand enables him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the story. Hence the following exordia:

Sing the wrath, O Muse.¹⁶³

Tell me of the man, O Muse.¹⁶⁴

Inspire me with another theme, how from the land of Asia a great war crossed into Europe .¹⁶⁵

Similarly, tragic poets make clear the subject of their drama, if not at the outset, 20 like Euripides, at least somewhere in the prologue, like Sophocles,

My father was Polybus.¹⁶⁶

It is the same in comedy. So then the most essential and special function of the exordium is to make clear what is the end or purpose of the speech; wherefore it should not be employed, if the subject is quite clear or unimportant.

[7] All the other forms of exordia in use are only remedies,¹⁶⁷ and are common to all three branches of Rhetoric. These are derived from the speaker, the hearer, the subject, and the opponent. From the speaker and the opponent, all that helps to destroy or create prejudice. But this must not be done in the same way; for the defendant must deal with this at the beginning, the accuser in the epilogue. The reason is obvious. The defendant, when about to introduce himself, must remove all obstacles, so that he must first clear away all prejudice; the accuser must create prejudice in the epilogue, that his hearers may have a livelier recollection of it.

The object of an appeal to the hearer is to make him well disposed or to arouse his indignation, and sometimes to engage his attention or the opposite; for it is not always expedient to engage his attention, which is the reason why many speakers try to make their hearers laugh. As for rendering the hearers tractable, everything will lead up to it if a person wishes, including the appearance of respectability, 1415b 1 because respectable persons command more attention. Hearers pay most attention to things that are important, that concern their own interests, that are astonishing, that are agreeable; wherefore one should put the idea into their heads that the speech deals with such subjects. To make his hearers inattentive, the speaker must persuade them that the matter is unimportant, that it does not concern them, that it is painful.

[8] But we must not lose sight of the fact that all such things are outside the question, for they are only addressed to a hearer whose judgement is poor and who is ready to listen to what is beside the case; for if he is not a man of this kind, there is no need of an exordium, except just to make a summary statement of the subject, so that, like a body, it may have a head.

[9] Further, engaging the hearers' attention is common to all parts of the speech, if necessary; for attention slackens everywhere else rather than at the beginning. Accordingly, it is ridiculous to put this¹⁶⁸ at the beginning, at a time when all listen with the greatest attention. Wherefore, when the right moment comes, one must say, And give me your attention, for it concerns you as much as myself; and, I will tell you such a thing as you have never yet heard of, so strange and wonderful. This is what Prodicus used to do; whenever his hearers began to nod, he would throw in a dash of his fifty-drachma lecture.

[10] But it is clear that one does not speak thus to the hearer qua hearer;¹⁶⁹ for all in their exordia endeavor either to arouse prejudice or to remove their own apprehensions: 20

O prince, I will not say that with haste [I have come breathless].¹⁷⁰

Why this preamble?¹⁷¹

This is what those also do who have, or seem to have, a bad case; for it is better to lay stress upon anything rather than the case itself. That is why slaves never answer questions directly but go all round them, and indulge in preambles.

[11] We have stated¹⁷² how the hearer's goodwill is to be secured and all other similar states of mind. And since it is rightly said,

Grant that on reaching the Phaeacians I may find friendship or compassion,¹⁷³

the orator should aim at exciting these two feelings.

In epideictic exordia, one must make the hearer believe that he shares the praise, either himself, or his family, or his pursuits, or at any rate in some way or other. For Socrates says truly in his Funeral Oration that it is easy to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in the presence of Lacedaemonians.¹⁷⁴

[12] Deliberative oratory borrows its exordia from forensic, but naturally they are very uncommon in it. For in fact the hearers are acquainted with the subject, so that the case needs no exordium, except for the orator's own sake, or on account of his adversaries, or if the hearers attach too much or too little importance to the question according to his idea. Wherefore he must either excite or remove prejudice, and magnify or minimize the importance of the subject. Such are the reasons for exordia; or else they merely serve the purpose of ornament, 1416a 1 since their absence makes the speech appear offhand. For such is the encomium on the Eleans, in which Gorgias, without any preliminary sparring or movements, starts off at once, Elis , happy city.

[1] One way of removing prejudice is to make use of the arguments by which one may clear oneself from disagreeable suspicion; for it makes no difference whether this suspicion has been openly expressed or not; and so this may be taken as a general rule.

[2] Another way¹⁷⁵ consists in contesting the disputed points, either by denying the fact or its harmfulness, at least to the plaintiff; or by asserting that its importance is exaggerated; or that it is not unjust at all, or only slightly so; or neither disgraceful nor important. These are the possible points of dispute: as Iphicrates, in answer to Nausicrates, admitted that he had done what the prosecutor alleged and inflicted damage, but denied that he had been guilty of wrongdoing. Again, one may strike the balance, when guilty of wrongdoing, by maintaining that although the action was injurious it was honorable, painful but useful, or anything else of the kind.

[3] Another method consists in saying that it was a case of error, misfortune, or necessity; as, for example, Sophocles said that he trembled, not, as the accuser said, in order to appear old, but from necessity, for it was against his wish that he was eighty years of age.¹⁷⁶ One may also substitute one motive for another, and say that one did not mean to injure but to do something else, not that of which one was accused, and that the wrongdoing was accidental: I should deserve 20 your hatred, had I acted so as to bring this about.

[4] Another method may be employed if the accuser, either himself or one closely related to him, has been involved in a similar charge, either now or formerly;

[5] or, if others are involved who are admittedly not exposed to the charge; for instance, if it is argued that so-and-so is an adulterer, because he is a dandy, then so-and-so must be.

[6] Again, if the accuser has already similarly accused others, or himself been accused by others;¹⁷⁷ or if others, without being formally accused, have been suspected as you are now, and their innocence has been proved.

[7] Another method consists in counter-attacking the accuser; for it would be absurd to believe the words of one who is himself unworthy of belief.

[8] Another method is to appeal to a verdict already given, as Euripides did in the case about the exchange of property;¹⁷⁸ when Hygiaenon accused him of impiety as having advised perjury in the verse,

My tongue hath sworn, but my mind is unsworn,¹⁷⁹

Euripides replied that his accuser did wrong in transferring the decisions of the court of Dionysus to the law courts; for he had already rendered an account of what he had said there,¹⁸⁰ or was still ready to do so, if his adversary desired to accuse him.

[9] Another method consists in attacking slander, showing how great an evil it is, and this because it alters the nature of judgements,¹⁸¹ and that it does not rely on the real facts of the case.

Common to both parties is the topic of tokens, 1416b 1 as in the Teucer,¹⁸² Odysseus reproaches Teucer with being a relative of Priam, whose sister his mother Hesione was; to which Teucer replied that his father Telamon was the enemy of Priam, and that he himself did not denounce the spies.¹⁸³

[10] Another method, suitable for the accuser, is to praise something unimportant at great length, and to condemn something important concisely; or, putting forward several things that are praiseworthy in the opponent, to condemn the one thing that has an important bearing upon the case. Such methods¹⁸⁴ are most artful and unfair; for by their use men endeavor to make what is good in a man injurious to him, by mixing it up with what is bad.

Another method is common to both accuser and defender. Since the same thing may have been done from several motives, the accuser must disparage it by taking it in the worse sense, while the defender must take it in the better sense. For instance, when Diomedes chose Odysseus for his companion, it may be said on the one hand that he did so because he considered him to be the bravest of men, on the other, that it was because Odysseus was the only man who was no possible rival for him, since he was a poltroon. Let this suffice for the question of prejudice.

[1] In the epideictic style the narrative should not be consecutive, but disjointed; for it is necessary to go through the actions which form the subject of the speech. For a speech is made up of one part that is inartificial (the speaker being in no way the author 20 of the actions which he relates), and of another that does depend upon art. The latter consists in showing that the action did take place, if it be incredible, or that it is of a certain kind, or of a certain importance, or all three together.

[2] This is why it is sometimes right not to narrate all the facts consecutively, because a demonstration of this kind¹⁸⁵ is difficult to remember. From some facts a man may be shown to be courageous, from others wise or just. Besides, a speech of this kind is simpler, whereas the other is intricate and not plain.

[3] It is only necessary to recall famous actions; wherefore most people have no need of narrative—for instance, if you wish to praise Achilles; for everybody knows what he did, and it is only necessary to make use of it. But if you wish to praise Critias, narrative is necessary, for not many people know what he did . . .¹⁸⁶

[4] But at the present day it is absurdly laid down that the narrative should be rapid. And yet, as the man said to the baker when he asked whether he was to knead bread hard or soft, What! is it impossible to knead it well? so it is in this case; for the narrative must not be long, nor the exordium, nor the proofs either. For in this case also propriety does not consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a due mean; that is, one must say all that will make the facts clear, 1417a 1 or create the belief that they have happened or have done injury or wrong, or that they are as important as you wish to make them. The opposite party must do the opposite.

[5] And you should incidentally narrate anything that tends to show your own virtue, for instance, I always recommended him to act rightly, not to forsake his children; or the wickedness of your opponent, for instance, but he answered that, wherever he might be, he would always find other children, an answer attributed by Herodotus¹⁸⁷ to the Egyptian rebels; or anything which is likely to please the dicasts.

[6] In defence, the narrative need not be so long; for the points at issue are either that the fact has not happened or that it was neither injurious nor wrong nor so important as asserted, so that one should not waste time over what all are agreed upon, unless anything tends to prove that, admitting the act, it is not wrong.

[7] Again, one should only mention such past things as are likely to excite pity or indignation if described as actually happening; for instance, the story of Alcinous, because in the presence of Penelope it is reduced to sixty lines,¹⁸⁸ and the way in which Phayllus dealt with the epic cycle,¹⁸⁹ and the prologue to the Oeneus.¹⁹⁰

[8] And the narrative should be of a moral character, and in fact it will be so, if we know what effects this. One thing is to make clear our moral purpose; for as is the moral purpose, so is the character, and as is the end, so is the moral purpose. For this reason mathematical treatises have no 20 moral character, because neither have they moral purpose; for they have no moral end. But the Socratic dialogues have; for they discuss such questions.

[9] Other ethical indications are the accompanying peculiarities of each individual character; for instance, He was talking and walking on at the same time, which indicates effrontery and boorishness. Nor should we speak as if from the intellect, after the manner of present-day orators; but from moral purpose: But I wished it, and I preferred it; and even if I profited nothing, it is better. The first statement indicates prudence, the second virtue; for prudence consists in the pursuit of what is useful, virtue in that of what is honorable. If anything of the kind seems incredible, then the reason must be added; of this Sophocles gives an example, where his Antigone says that she cared more for her brother than for her husband or children; for the latter can be replaced after they are gone,

but when father and mother are in the grave, no brother can ever be born.¹⁹¹

If you have no reason, you should at least say that you are aware that what you assert is incredible, but that it is your nature; for no one believes that a man ever does anything of his own free will except from motives of self-interest.¹⁹²

[10] Further, the narrative should draw upon what is emotional by the introduction of such of its accompaniments as are well known, and of what is specially characteristic of either yourself or of the adversary: And he went off looking grimly at me; 1417b 1 and as Aeschines¹⁹³ says of Cratylus, that he hissed violently and violently shook his fists. Such details produce persuasion because, being known to the hearer, they become tokens of what he does not know. Numerous examples of this may be found in Homer:

Thus she spoke, and the aged nurse covered her face with her hands;¹⁹⁴

for those who are beginning to weep lay hold on their eyes. And you should at once introduce yourself and your adversary as being of a certain character, that the hearers may regard you or him as such; but do not let it be seen. That this is easy is perfectly clear¹⁹⁵ from the example of messengers; we do not yet know what they are going to say, but nevertheless we have an inkling of it.

[11] Again, the narrative should be introduced in several places, sometimes not at all at the beginning. In deliberative oratory narrative is very rare, because no one can narrate things to come; but if there is narrative, it will be of things past, in order that, being reminded of them, the hearers may take better counsel about the future. This may be done in a spirit either of blame or of praise; but in that case the speaker does not perform the function of the deliberative orator. If there is anything incredible, you should immediately promise both to give a reason for it at once and to submit it to the judgement of any whom the hearers approve;¹⁹⁶ as, for instance, Jocasta in the Oedipus of Carcinus¹⁹⁷ is always promising, when the man who is looking for her son makes inquiries 20 of her; and similarly Haemon in Sophocles.¹⁹⁸

[1] Proofs should be demonstrative, and as the disputed points are four, the demonstration should bear upon the particular point disputed; for instance, if the fact is disputed, proof of this must be brought at the trial before anything else; or if it is maintained that no injury has been done; or that the act was not so important as asserted; or was just, then this must be proved, the three last questions being matters of dispute just as the question of fact.

[2] But do not forget that it is only in the case of a dispute as to this question of fact that one of the two parties must necessarily¹⁹⁹ be a rogue; for ignorance is not the cause, as it might be if a question of right or wrong were the issue; so that in this case one should spend time on this topic, but not in the others.

[3] In epideictic speeches, amplification is employed, as a rule, to prove that things are honorable or useful; for the facts must be taken on trust, since proofs of these are rarely given, and only if they are incredible or the responsibility is attributed to another.²⁰⁰

[4] In deliberative oratory, it may be maintained either that certain consequences will not happen, or that what the adversary recommends will happen, but that it will be unjust, inexpedient, or not so important as supposed. But one must also look to see whether he makes any false statements as to things outside the issue; for these look like evidence that he makes misstatements about the issue itself as well. 1418a 1

[5] Examples are best suited to deliberative oratory and enthymemes to forensic. The first is concerned with the future, so that its examples must be derived from the past; the second with the question of the existence or non-existence of facts, in which demonstrative and necessary proofs are more in place; for the past involves a kind of necessity.²⁰¹

[6] One should not introduce a series of enthymemes continuously but mix them up; otherwise they destroy one another. For there is a limit of quantity; thus,

Friend, since thou hast said as much as a wise man would say,²⁰²

[7] where Homer does not say τοιαῦτα (such things as), but τόσα (as many things as). Nor should you try to find enthymemes about everything; otherwise you will be imitating certain philosophers, who draw conclusions that are better known and more plausible than the premises from which they are drawn.²⁰³

[8] And whenever you wish to arouse emotion, do not use an enthymeme, for it will either drive out the emotion or it will be useless; for simultaneous movements drive each other out, the result being their mutual destruction or weakening. Nor should you look for an enthymeme at the time when you wish to give the speech an ethical character; for demonstration involves neither moral character nor moral purpose.

[9] Moral maxims, on the other hand, should be used in both narrative and proof; for they express moral character; for instance, I gave him the money and that although I knew that one ought not to trust. Or, to arouse emotion: 20 I do not regret it, although I have been wronged; his is the profit, mine the right.

[10] Deliberative speaking is more difficult than forensic, and naturally so, because it has to do with the future; whereas forensic speaking has to do with the past, which is already known, even by diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan said; for he used to divine, not the future, but only things that were past but obscure.²⁰⁴ Further, the law is the subject in forensic speaking; and when one has a starting-point, it is easier to find a demonstrative proof. Deliberative speaking does not allow many opportunities for lingering—for instance, attacks on the adversary, remarks about oneself, or attempts to arouse emotion. In this branch of Rhetoric there is less room for these than in any other, unless the speaker wanders from the subject. Therefore, when at a loss for topics, one must do as the orators at Athens , amongst them Isocrates, for even when deliberating, he brings accusations against the Lacedaemonians, for instance, in the Panegyricus,²⁰⁵ and against Chares in the Symmachikos (On the Peace).²⁰⁶

[11] Epideictic speeches should be varied with laudatory episodes, after the manner of Isocrates, who is always bringing somebody in. This is what Gorgias meant when he said that he was never at a loss for something to say; for, if he is speaking of Peleus, he praises Achilles, then Aeacus, then the god; similarly courage, which does this and that,²⁰⁷ or is of such a kind.

[12] If you have proofs, then, your language must be both ethical and demonstrative; if you have no enthymemes, ethical only. In fact, it is more fitting that a virtuous man 1418b 1 should show himself good than that his speech should be painfully exact.

[13] Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative, because, in all cases of refutation, it is clearer that a logical conclusion has been reached; for opposites are more noticeable when placed in juxtaposition.²⁰⁸

[14] The refutation of the opponent is not a particular kind of proof; his arguments should be refuted partly by objection, partly by counter-syllogism.²⁰⁹ In both deliberative and forensic rhetoric he who speaks first should state his own proofs and afterwards meet the arguments of the opponent, refuting or pulling them to pieces beforehand. But if the opposition is varied,²¹⁰ these arguments should be dealt with first, as Callistratus did in the Messenian assembly; in fact, it was only after he had first refuted what his opponents were likely to say that he put forward his own proofs.

[15] He who replies should first state the arguments against the opponent's speech, refuting and answering it by syllogisms, especially if his arguments have met with approval. For as the mind is ill-disposed towards one against whom prejudices have been raised beforehand, it is equally so towards a speech, if the adversary is thought to have spoken well. One must therefore make room in the hearer's mind for the speech one intends to make; and for this purpose you must destroy the impression made by the adversary. Wherefore it is only after having combated all the arguments, or the most important, or those which are plausible, or most easy to refute, that you should substantiate your own case: 20

I will first defend the goddesses, for I [do not think] that Hera . . .²¹¹

in this passage the poet has first seized upon the weakest argument.

[16] So much concerning proofs. In regard to moral character, since sometimes, in speaking of ourselves, we render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of prolixity, or contradiction, or, when speaking of another, we may be accused of abuse or boorishness, we must make another speak in our place, as Isocrates does in the Philippus²¹² and in the Antidosis.²¹³ Archilochus uses the same device in censure; for in his iambics he introduces the father speaking as follows of his daughter:

There is nothing beyond expectation, nothing that can be sworn impossible,²¹⁴

and the carpenter Charon in the iambic verse beginning

I [care not for the wealth] of Gyges;²¹⁵

Sophocles, also,²¹⁶ introduces Haemon, when defending Antigone against his father, as if quoting the opinion of others.

[17] One should also sometimes change enthymemes into moral maxims; for instance, Sensible men should become reconciled when they are prosperous; for in this manner they will obtain the greatest advantages, which is equivalent to the enthymeme If men should become reconciled whenever it is most useful and advantageous, they should be reconciled in a time of prosperity.

[1] In regard to interrogation, its employment is especially opportune, 1419a 1 when the opponent has already stated the opposite, so that the addition of a question makes the result an absurdity²¹⁷; as, for instance, when Pericles interrogated Lampon about initiation into the sacred rites of the savior goddess. On Lampon replying that it was not possible for one who was not initiated to be told about them, Pericles asked him if he himself was acquainted with the rites, and when he said yes, Pericles further asked, How can that be, seeing that you are uninitiated?

[2] Again, interrogation should be employed when one of the two propositions is evident, and it is obvious that the opponent will admit the other if you ask him. But the interrogator, having obtained the second premise by putting a question, should not make an additional question of what is evident, but should state the conclusion. For instance, Socrates, when accused by Meletus of not believing in the gods, asked²¹⁸ whether he did not say that there was a divine something; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went on to ask if divine beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. When Meletus again said yes, Socrates rejoined,

[3] Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods exist without at the same time admitting that the gods exist? Thirdly, when it is intended to show that the opponent either contradicts himself or puts forward a paradox.

[4] Further, when the opponent can do nothing else but answer the question by a sophistical solution; for if he answers, Partly yes, and partly no, Some are, but some are not, In one sense it is so, in another not, the hearers cry out against him as being in a difficulty.²¹⁹ In other cases interrogation should not be attempted; for if the adversary raises an objection, the interrogator seems to be defeated; for it is impossible to ask a number of questions, owing to the hearer's weakness. Wherefore also we should compress our enthymemes as much as possible. 20

[5] Ambiguous questions should be answered by defining them by a regular explanation, and not too concisely; those that appear likely to make us contradict ourselves should be solved at once in the answer, before the adversary has time to ask the next question or to draw a conclusion; for it is not difficult to see the drift of his argument. Both this, however, and the means of answering will be sufficiently clear from the Topics.²²⁰

[6] If a conclusion is put in the form of a question, we should state the reason for our answer. For instance, Sophocles²²¹ being asked by Pisander whether he, like the rest of the Committee of Ten, had approved the setting up of the Four Hundred, he admitted it. What then? asked Pisander, did not this appear to you to be a wicked thing? Sophocles admitted it. So then you did what was wicked? Yes, for there was nothing better to be done. The Lacedaemonian, who was called to account for his ephoralty, being asked if he did not think that the rest of his colleagues had been justly put to death, answered yes. But did not you pass the same measures as they did? Yes. Would not you, then, also be justly put to death? No; for my colleagues did this for money; I did not, but acted according to my conscience. For this reason we should not ask any further questions after drawing the conclusion, 1419b 1 nor put the conclusion itself as a question, unless the balance of truth is unmistakably in our favor.

[7] As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good—to confound the opponents' earnest with jest and their jest with earnest. We have stated in the Poetics²²² how many kinds of jests there are, some of them becoming a gentleman, others not. You should therefore choose the kind that suits you. Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the first is employed on one's own account, the second on that of another.

[1] The epilogue is composed of four parts: to dispose the hearer favorably towards oneself and unfavorably towards the adversary; to amplify and depreciate; to excite the emotions of the hearer; to recapitulate. For after you have proved that you are truthful and that the adversary is false, the natural order of things is to praise ourselves, blame him, and put the finishing touches.²²³ One of two things should be aimed at, to show that you are either relatively or absolutely good and the adversary either relatively or absolutely bad. The topics which serve to represent men as good or bad have already been stated.²²⁴

[2] After this, 20 when the proof has once been established, the natural thing is to amplify or depreciate; for it is necessary that the facts should be admitted, if it is intended to deal with the question of degree; just as the growth of the body is due to things previously existing. The topics of amplification and depreciation have been previously set forth.²²⁵

[3] Next, when the nature and importance of the facts are clear, one should rouse the hearer to certain emotions—pity, indignation, anger, hate, jealousy, emulation, and quarrelsomeness. The topics of these also have been previously stated,²²⁶

[4] so that all that remains is to recapitulate what has been said. This may appropriately be done at this stage in the way certain rhetoricians wrongly recommend for the exordium, when they advise frequent repetition of the points, so that they may be easily learnt. In the exordium we should state the subject, in order that the question to be decided may not escape notice, but in the epilogue we should give a summary statement of the proofs.

[5] We should begin by saying that we have kept our promise, and then state what we have said and why. Our case may also be closely compared with our opponent's; and we may either compare what both of us have said on the same point, or without direct comparison: My opponent said so-and-so, and I said so-and-so on this point 1420a 1 and for these reasons. Or ironically, as for instance, He said this and I answered that; what would he have done, if he had proved this, and not simply that? Or by interrogation: What is there that has not been proved? or, What has my opponent proved? We may, therefore, either sum up by comparison, or in the natural order of the statements, just as they were made, our own first, and then again, separately, if we so desire, what has been said by our opponent.

[6] To the conclusion of the speech²²⁷ the most appropriate style is that which has no connecting particles, in order that it may be a peroration, but not an oration: I have spoken; you have heard; you know the facts; now give your decision.²²⁸

Notes on the current edition

Rhetoric

1. 1. Three points in a speech. πίστις. λέ ξις. τάξις. The two last to be treated.

2. 2.

3. 3. ὑπόκρι σις not yet handled.

4. I See book i. chap. ii. § 3.

5. 4. It consisus in three things. μέγεθος. ὰρμονία. ρυθμός.

6. 5. No art yet compiled on it.

7. That the two departments of author and actor were united in the same person, is asserted also by Horace, Art. Poet. 277, and by Plutarch, έθεύσαιοτο TO. θέσπιν αὺτὸν ὑποκρινόμενου, ῶσπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς αλαιοῖς.

8. That ποκριτὴςcame to designate an actor from the cumstance of his sustaining the dialogue with the chorus, may be evinced by reference to the etymology of the word. Its successive meanings have been clearly traced in the Quarterly Review : " Qui respondet, ab ὑποκρίνεσθαιrespondere, Homer, Herodot. Histrio, quia primo tragoediae statu histrio Choro respondebat. Suidas, o ποκρινόμενος ῴορῴ- Simulator, quia histriones fietas partes tuebantur." No. xliv. Art 2, p. 326.

9. Those for the prize in the tragic games.

10. Φορτικόν.It appears from Twining's excellent illustrations of the meaning of thin word, that it is used to imply any thing extravagant, violent, overcharged, outré :---as applied to

11. Its influence is great.6.

12. 7.

13. Delivery is a gift of nature.

14. persons, it means troublesome, tiresome, etc., or insolent, overbearing, etc., synonymously with ἀνελεύθερος, βάναυσος, popular, low, vulgar, illiberal, etc. Athenaeus, in speaking of the rejection of Hippoclides, one of the suitors of Agarista, daughter of Clisthenes, king of Sicyon, attributes it to the disgust conceived by her father at him, ΦΟρΤΙΚΩΣ ὀρχησάμενον (see Herodot. vi. 129). Aristotle himself classes the φορτικοὶ. with the βωμολόχοι, (Eth. Nich. iv. 8,) and with the οἱ πολλοὶ (ibid. i. 5). It is in fact, (to adopt an expression of Pope's,) any thing levelled to please the populace.

15. B. i. c. 1. § 10. οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεĩ, πλὴν ἀποδεῖξαι on οὕτως ἔχει.

16. ' Υπόκρισις : for he clearly foresees that from its obvious importance it must eventually become an adjunct of rhetoric, as it has already become of dramatic exhibitions.

17. 8. Poets first used recitation and delivery with success.

18. 9. Hence early rhetoricians adopted the florid poetical style.

19. But have gradually relinquished it, as the tragedians have also done.

20. 10.

21. So that of course the poet, whose business was imitation, would immediately put in requisition these two most obvious sources of it.

22. The trochaic metre occurs frequently in the plays of Aschylus, the most ancient of the tragedians extant, particularly in the Persae ; as also in those of Euripides, especially in the Phoenissae and Orestes; but in those of Sophocles, rarely, if (:.

23. CHAP. II.]

24. 1. Excellence of style defined to be the TO σαφές.

25. 2. Words that are κύρια duce perspicuity.

26. 3. To elevate style we must use fixa, etc.

27. " Perspicuity consists in the using of proper terms for the ideas or thoughts which he would have pass from his own mind into that of another man. It is this that gives them an easy entrance; and it is with delight that men hearken to those whom they easily understand; whereas what is obscurely said, dying as it is spoken, is usually not only lost, but creates a prejudice in the hearer, as if he that spoke knew not what he said, or was afraid to have it understood." Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study, vol. iv. p. 601.

28. As Aristotle proceeds henceforth to a complete analysis of the subject of style, he first considers it in reference to the single words of which it is made up ( έξ ὧν συνέστηκε, § 5), which occupies him to the end of the fourth chapter. He then considers it as made up of whole sentences; the means of investing these with dignity, of adapting them to the subject, of constructing them to please the ear, and as addressed to the intellect; and concludes with enumerating their several elegancies. First, then, he considers the beauties of style as depending on single words.

29. Should the epithet foreign, as applied to a quality of style, not be immediately apprehended, it may be well to recollect that it means the excellence opposed to the fault which we designate homeliness.

30. 4. We must conceal our art.

31. 5.

32. This was asserted book i. chap. 11, § 23, 24.

33. Ubicunque ars ostentatur, veritas abesse videtur. Quintil. Instit. x. 3. Artis est celare artem.

34. Harris seems to have had this passage in view when he wrote the following: " 'Tis in writing as in acting; the best writers are like our late admired Garrick. And how did that able genius employ his art ? Not by a vain ostentation of any one of his powers, but by a latent use of them all in such an exhibition of nature, that, while we were present in a theatre, and only beholding an actor, we could not help thinking ourselves in Denmark with Hamlet, or in Bosworth Field with Richard." Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 4.

35. In this practice, Euripides stands remarkably opposed to his predecessor AEschylus.

36. sparingly employed.

37. 6. Words κύρια, οἱ κεία, με ταφοραὶ, proper for prose.

38. Γλω̃ττα : " any word that belongs either to another language, or another dialect of the same language, and that is not naturalized by common and popular use." Twining.

39. In the seventh chapter he says, that they may be used with effect when you would assume the language of high excitement: see § 11.

40. Kupia are words in general use, opposed to γλω̃τται, outlandish expressions. Οἰκεία, words in their primary and literal acceptations, opposed to μεταφοραὶ, words transferred from their primary meaning to some analogous meaning. Many words are κύρια which yet are not οἰκεία. In fact, of the three divisions the οἰκεία are necessarily the fewest; since the proper and original designations of individual objects cannot extend to a number sufficiently great to answer all the purposes of language; the resources of which must therefore be augmented by metaphorical transfer. Even these words in time become so naturalized by common use as no longer to have any thing " of the effect of metaphor upon the hearer. On the contrary, like proper terms" ( οἰκεία), " they suggest directly to his mind, without the intervention of any image, the ideas which the speaker proposed to convey by them." Philos. of Rhet. vol. i. p. 185, 186. From those sounds which we hear on small or on coarse occasions, we do not easily receive strong impressions, or delightful images; and words to which we are nearly strangers [terms of art, etc.], whenever they occur, draw that attention on themselves which they should transmit to things. Johnson's Life of Dryden, vol. vi. p. 395, edit. 1823. Vide the whole passage.

41. p

42. 7.Equivocal words suit the sophist, synonyms the poet.

43. 8. Metaphors. Rules for.

44. 9. i. Must be κατ' ἀναλο ylay.

45. As to metaphorical expression, that is a great excellence in style, when it is used with propriety, for it gives you two ideas for one ;-conveys the meaning more luminously, and generally with a perception of delight." Boswell's Johnson, Aet. 68.

46. Aristotle seems to subjoin this as the crowning praise of metaphor; for he has already told us that, that is a good the principle of which centres in ourselves; so also, in the Topica, he lays down that o μή ἐστι παρ' ἄλλου πορίσασθαι as a greater good ἥ o ἐστί παρ' ἄλλου. In the third book of the Nicomachaean Ethics he employs a similar topic of praise : o 'cap' ἐτέ ρου μὴ οἱόν τε μηδὲ μαθεῖν. See also book i. c. 7, § 33, of the present treatise.

47. 10. ii. From a better class if to embellish: from a lower if to debase.

48. Διονυσοκόλακας. This term, by which the tribe of flatterers seem to have been exposed to ridicule on the stage ( κόλακες τοῡ Διονυσίου, was ingeniously enough borrowed from the name of the patron of the theatre, Διόνυσος; they however thought proper to exchange one theatrical appellation for another more respectable, and dignified themselves by the name τεχνίται. This, as well as the corresponding Latin term, artifices, seems to have been more commonly applied to actors, musicians, etc. See Keuchen, note on Corn. Nep. vita Chabriae, c. i. By the way, this sort of metaphorical embellishment appears not to be unusual in the present day, if it be true (as we are told) that the important personage who directs the culinary operations in great families be entitled the artist.

49. IS Compare Thucyd. b. i. sub init.

50. 11. iii. The euphony must be attended to.

51. See book i. chap. 13, § 9, 10.

52. Is too glaring, is seen through.

53. Were it not that Plutarch attributes this surname of Dionysius (" the Brazen") to a suggestion of his for employing brass currency at Athens, the specimen here quoted might lead us to suppose that he derived the appellation from some characteristic harshness of style.

54. " Ασημος φωνὴ, vox quae vel formâ vel signification turpis est. Ern. Lex. Tec.

55. This enigma is ingenious, and means the operation of cupping, performed in ancient days by a machine of brass. Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 10.

56. Metaphor took its rise from the poverty of language. Men, not finding upon every occasion words ready made for their ideas, were compelled to have recourse to words analogous, and transfer them from their original meaning, to the meaning then required." Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 10.

57. 13. v. They must be borrowed from beautiful objects. Beauty of words consists in the sound. The idea. The application.

58. 14. Epithets to be used in the same way.

59. We may perhaps term this third beauty of words, delicacy in their application.

60. N ominibus mollire licet mala; fusca vocetur Nigrior Illyrica cut pice sanguis erit, etc.

61. Ovid. Ar. Am. I. ii.

62. 15. ὑπο κορισμός.

63. 1. Four causes of a frigid style. i. Compound words.

64. See Bentley on Phalaris, p. 156. Zanclaeans and Messenians.

65. Having in the last chapter discussed the beauties of style as dependent on single words, he now proceeds to consider its defects, as they arise from the single words employed: see note on chap. ii. § 2.

66. a This Lycophron was a sophist, and is not to be confounded with the poet who flourished under Ptolemy Philadelphus.

67. 2. ii. Use of foreign words.

68. 3. iii. Epitheta too long, too frequent, or out of place.

69. Take the following specimen: " To so vast a height did the never-too-much-to-be-extolled reputation of this eximious man," etc. Sir Thomas Urquhart's Jewel. See also " The Rejected Addresses;" Art. " Address of the Editors of the Morning Post."

70. The expression in the original alludes to Sinnis, a famous robber, whose peculiar method of torture it was to bind his victims to the boughs of trees forcibly bent together, and suddenly loosened, so that the violence of their reflex tore the limbs from their bodies. However a Σίννις ἀνὴρ was probably not more elegant in Greek, than the expression " a Turpin" is considered in English.

71. Victorius thinks that Boccaccio, in his Decameron, has

72. Compound words suited to Dithyrambic poetry; exotic to epic; metaphors to the drama.

73. 4. iv. Improper metaphors.

74. employed too profusely this poetical ornament. Comment, in Demet. Phal.

75. May we not instance Milton's Hebraisms ?

76. A striking instance of this occurs in two well-known lines, in which Winter is said, " To glaze the lakes, and bridle up the floods, And perriwig with wool the bald-pate woods."

77. 1. Simile: how it differs from a metaphor.

78. Such was the language of the poet who, describing the footmen's flambeaux at the end of an opera, sung or said, Now blazed a thousand flaming suns, and bade Grim night retire. Harris, Philolog. Inq.

79. However correct Mr. Harris's taste may be in considering this an elegant metaphor, it seems extraordinary that he should quote the passage thus: " According to Aristotle, the Odyssey of Homer was elegantly called by Alcidamas, καλὸν ἀνρωπίνου βίου κατόπτρον, etc." Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 10. Surely Aristotle does not consider this as an elegant metaphor.

80. 2. Is ful in prose.

81. 3. Instances of similes.

82. Viz. the insertion of the particle denoting similitude, ' ΩΣ λέων, instead of λέων ἐπόρουσεν.

83. Victorius's conjecture as to the means whereby these trees destroy themselves appears rather forced. May there not be some allusion to the original of the lately discovered fable of Phaedrus; in which the trees, having been made to dispute about providing a handle for the woodman's axe, after seeing the fatal use lie makes of the present, acknowledge that they deserve that destruction which they had provided for themselves ? The Latin fabulist himself seems to think that his master, Aesop, had carried matters too far in making trees speak, since he deems it necessary to apologize :

84. 4. Metaphors must admit of paying back the borrowed term.

85. 1. Purity of style depends on five points.

86. " Calumniari si quis autem voluerit, Quod arbores loquantur," etc. Phaed. Prol. lib. i.

87. A metaphor is said ἀνταποδίδοσθαι, when it may be inverted: for instance, just as you would call a pilot, " the ruler of his vessel;" so may you call a ruler, " the pilot of the state." Ern. Lex.

88. I Aristotle having in the last three chapters given us the necessary information respecting the materials of style, its single words, proceeds now to treat of the arrangement of those materials in whole sentences.

89. One is surprised to find another great critic of antiquity

90. 2. i. On the connective particles.

91. 3. ii. In using terms distinct, and not vague. 4. iui. In terms not ambiguous.

92. declaring it unnecessary to be very particular in this respect:— χρὴ δὲ Kai τοὺς συνδέσμους μὴ μάλα ἀνταποδίδοσθαι. ἀκριβω̃ς, otov τῴ μὲν, T6 δέ. Demet. Phal. περὶ ἑρμηνείας, § 53.

93. a By τοῖς περιέχουσιν is meant, not circumlocutions, but the use of a general instead of a particular term, as ἐρυθρὸς in the place of φοῖνιξ, which of course much weakens the idea.

94. Ludere par impar. Hor. Sat. lib. ii. 3, 248.

95. 5. iv. In the proper genders.

96. 6. v. In the proper numbers.

97. Four general rules. i. Style ought to be easy to read and to understand. ii. It must not depend on the punctuation.

98. in. In an expression of more than one word we must

99. Hence the distinguishing superiority of the prophecies of our Saviour's coming; for in them not the simple fact alone, but the very period at which it should occur was specified.

100. We can no where find a more striking instance of the want of clearness to which a neglect of these cautions gives rise, than in book ii. chap. 18, of the worthy Stagyrite's own work.

101. Or, to take his own illustration, in speaking of the objects of different senses, be careful not to annex a verb which denotes the operation of one sense alone. This is well exposed

102. use a verb applicable to all. iv. There must be no long parentheses.

103. 1. Elevation produced by seven expedients. i. Using the definition in place of the noun. The reverse produces abruptness.

104. 2. ii. Avoiding either, if out of taste. 3. iii. Illustration by metaphor and epithets. 4. iv. By using the plural for the singular. 5. v. As-

105. in the Spectator:—“ I have known a hero compared to a thunderbolt, a lion, and the sea ; all and each of them proper metaphors for impetuosity, courage, or force. But by bad management it hath so happened, that the thunderbolt hath overflowed its banks; the lion hath been darted through the skies; and the billows have rolled out of the Libyan desert." No. 595.

106. Eurip. Iph. in Taur. 727.

107. signing to each word a distinct particle. vi. Using connectives, but if abruptly without them. 7. vii. By negative qualities.

108. How much may be made of a mere summary of negations, will readily be acknowledged by those who have read Rochester's poem on Nothing; and another in Latin on the same subject (if subject it may be called), by Passerat, a poet and critic of the sixteenth century, in France. This last is usually subjoined to Johnson's Life of Rochester.

109. a These words, it will be observed, do not in themselves afford an instance of the precept here recommended; but, as it appears that the work of Antimachus was well known, they were probably intended as a hint at a passage in which an illustration was to be found. Of Aristotle's quotations in general, it may be remarked that, however naturally we might expect to meet with beautiful passages, in illustration of the several beauties of style which he successively discusses, they present but a series of allusions (now obscure and scarcely intelligible), to passages which were easily accessible to his audience, but which have been lost to us amid the general wreck of ancient literature. See Victorius's remark, cap. iii. § 3.

110. * Whether in praising or blaming.

111. It should be remembered that these negative epithets are very common to the Greek poets. Victorius points out many instances: as, κω̃μον ἀναυλότατον, Eurip. Phoen. 818; θίασον ἀβάκχευτον, Orest. 319; μηνυτη̃ρος ἄφθεγκτου, Aesch. Eumen. 245; ἀπτεροῑς πωτήμασ ιν, ibid. 250, etc. There is a fine instance of this negative mode of explaining a metaphor in Isaiah, li. 21.—" Thou drunken, but not with wine.” Twining.

112. [BOOK III.

113. 1. What constitutes good taste in style is, that it be παθητικὴ, ἠθική : and both suitably to the subject- matter.

114. 2.

115. 3. παθη τικὴ renders the audience sympathetic.

116. 4.

117. 5.

118. 6. ἠθικὴ -renders the speech appropriate to the audience.

119. Might we borrow an expression from the language cf the painter, we should say, " in proper KEEPING with."

120. 7.

121. 8. General rules.

122. 9. We must correct ourselves as it were.

123. 10. We must occasionally neglect the rules of art.

124. 11. We must not use compound words except when excited.

125. 1. The style must have rhythm, but not metre.

126. 2.

127. In pursuance of that systematic plan which we have remarked that Aristotle has adopted in considering the subject of style, he proceeds here to treat of it as addressed to the ear.

128. " Rhythm differs from metre, inasmuch as rhythm is pro-

129. 3.

130. 4. Rhythms of various kinds. Heroic. Iambic.

131. Trochaic.

132. Paean.

133. Ratios of the rhythms.

134. portion applied to any motion whatever; metre is proportion, applied to the motion of words spoken." Harris. " The rhythm of a dactyl and anapaest is the same; the metre is different. The distinction is similar to that of permutations and combinations in arithmetic." Scale, Analysis of Greek Metres. Metre, in short, cannot exist independently of articulate sounds ; while rhythm may be heard in any proportionate succession of sounds; as in the ringing of hammers on an anvil, or the flapping of the wings of a bird.

135. Metre is distinctly stated, in the Poetic, to be a species of rhythm. Harris also says, " All metre is rhythm, yet all rhythm is not metre." Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 2.

136. Twining illustrates it by the following line :— " Jolly mortals, fill your glasses; noble deeds are done by wine."

137. Κορδακικώτερος—namby-pamby : κόρδαξ was a species of immodest, lascivious dance.

138. As the Greeks considered a long syllable as equivalent to two times, and a short only to one, two short syllables were of course equivalent to one long; so that, in either of the feet of which heroic metre is composed, a ratio of equality exists; (for instance, in the dactyl, ̄ : ̆̆ ̆ : : 2 : 1 and 1; or, in the spondee, ̄ : ̄ : : 2 :2.) The same observation will explain the

139. 5. The paean is to be retained.

140. 6. Two sorts of paean. The first suited to the opening. The second to the conelusion.

141. ratio of the iambus, ( ̆ : ̄ : 1 : 2,) and the trochee ( ̄ :: : 2 : 1). Now the paean ( ̆ ̆ ̆ : ̄ : : 3 : 2) holds a mean ratio between that of the heroic metre on the one hand, and that of the iambic and trochaic respectively on the other; the ratio of the former being merely that of equality, while the ratio of the latter was too much in excess.

142. ̔Ημιόλιος—sesquiduplex—a whole and half besides ;— " Necesse—partem pedis aut oequalem esse alteri parti; aut altero tanto, aut sesqui esse majorem. Ita fit aequalis, dactylus; duplex, iambus; sesquiplex, paeon.”—Cicero, Orate c. 56.

143. Though the illustrations already given have been perhaps too prolix, I cannot forbear transcribing the following passage from Harris, in illustration of the whole subject:—“ The rhythm of the heroic foot is one to one, which constitutes, in music, what we call common time; and in musical vibration, what we call the unison. The rhythm of the iambic is one to two, which constitutes, in music, what we call triple time; and in musical vibration, what we call the octave. The rhythm next to these, is that of two to three, or else its equivalent, three to two; a rhythm compounded of the two former times united; and which constitutes, in musical vibration, what we call the fifth. 'Twas here then they discovered the foot they wanted; that foot which, being neither the heroic nor the iambic, was yet so far connected with them, as to contain virtually within itself the rhythms of them both.”—Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 2.

144. 1. Style is of two sorts, εἰρομένη, κατε στραμ μένη. 2. i. εἰρο μένη, έ,or uninterrupted.

145. I Style is here considered as addressed to the intellect of the auditor.

146. AlEtis εἰρομένη, in which the sentence has no other unity than that which copulatives give it, nor any other measure than the completion of the sense, and the necessity of taking breath ; or, as Cicero in few words so admirably describes it, " illa sine intervallis loquacitas perennis et profluens." This Aristotle compares to what he calls the ἀναβολαὶ in dithyrambic poetry; meaning, I think, evidently the long, irregular, protracted odes of the more modern dithyrambic poets: for the word ἀναβολὴ, here, does not, I believe, signify exordium, prooemium, as usually understood, but was, probably, the name by which ὠδαὶ μακραὶ καὶ πολυειδεῑς were distinguished,' etc. -Twining, note 17.

147. Herodotus, though a native of Halicarnassus, went latterly as a colonist to Thurium.

148. tion of it.

149. 3. Reflex style in periods,

150. is pleasing.

151. Easily remembered.

152. 4. The period must finish with the sense.

153. 4 "While other sentences are indefinite, and (like a geometrical right line) may be produced indefinitely, the period (like a circular line) is always circumscribed, returns and terminates at a given point. In other words, while other sentences, by the help of common copulatives, have a sort of boundless effusion, the constituent parts of a period have a sort of reflex union, in which union the sentence is so far complete, as neither to require, nor even to admit a further extension. Readers find a pleasure in this grateful circuit, which leads them so agreeably to an acquisition of knowledge." Harris, Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 4. He quotes the commencement of his own Hermes and Philosophical Arrangements, with the opening of Cicero's Offices, Demosthenes' Oration concerning the Crown, and that of the Panegyric by Isocrates, (whom he calls the father of periods,) as instances of periodical style.

154. 5. A period is either in clauses or simple.

155. 6. They must not be curtailed.

156. Nor prolix.

157. This line is found quoted by Lucian, as taken from a drama of Euripides, no longer extant, entitled Meleager.

158. Probably an English sergeant would have illustrated this by a column wheeling into line.

159. See the note on § 1 of this chapter.

160. A neat parody this on Hesiod, Opp. et D. v. 263.

161. [BOOK III.

162. 7. Style of periods is either διῃρημένη or ἀντι κειμένη.

163. 8.

164. " In hoc loco τὸ καὶ non tarn copulandi, quam discernendi vim habet." Ernest. Lex. Tech.

165. CHAP. IX.]

166. 9. Equipoise, παρίσ ω σ ις. Alliteration, παοο μοἰωσις.

167. If you would produce alliteration at the commencement of a clause, you must employ words which, in their original form and previously to any inflection, are similar ; since in that situation, a similarity will fail of striking you which depends merely on one or two syllables at the end of the words, such as may be found to exist, in a greater or lesser degree, between all nouns of the same declension, etc. (e. g. Latin nouns of the third declension ending in o); at the conclusion, however, of a clause, a weaker and less striking similarity will suffice. Compare his first example with those following the words ἐπὶ τελευτη̃.

168. As no English words occur to me which will at once emplify the alliteration, and prove a literal translation of the Greek, I have set down the original words as I find them. They have been given in Latin thus,—AGRum accepit AeGRum ab ipso.

169. Same words may have antithesis, equipoise, and rhyme at once. 10. False antitheses.

170. 1. Elegancies and approved beauties of style.

171. 2. The fundamental principle is μάθη σις.

172. Metaphor produces this,

173. See this principle of pleasure stated in book i. c. 11, § 23. Again, (book ii. c. 24, § 30,) refutative enthymems are preferred to confirmative on the same principle,— διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν ἐναντίων εἶναι iv ΜΙΚρΩ.

174. 3. and similes.

175. 4. Words which produce rapid μά θησις are elegant.

176. 5. The expression must be antithetical.

177. " By the genus; that is, where the common quality which constitutes the likeness immediately occurs," etc. Twining. This metaphor, according to the distinction of the Poetic, would be called ἀπ’ εἰδου̃ς ἐπὶ εἶδος—from one species of things decayed to another.

178. in the fourth chapter of this book.

179. For the mind, hurrying on to obtain further information respecting the object in question, without pausing to ascertain what it is like or equal to, desires only to know what it really is. See chap. 4, § 1.

180. The case with these two descriptions of argument is the same as with the γλὤτται and κύρια ὀνόματα respectively. With this passage compare book ii. c. 24, § 30.

181. The consideration of ἀστεα having been ranged under the heads of their διύνοια and ις, he proceeds here to subdivide his discussion of λέξις, in reference to its whole sentences,

182. 6.

183. Three things to be aimed at: metaphor, antithesis, personification. 7. Metaphors are fourfold: analogical ones the best.

184. (i. e. its figure, σχήμα,) or its single words, (i. e. what is usually called trope).

185. From the variety of words by which ἐνέργεια has been rendered, " personification " has been selected, as approaching the nearest to the correspondent expression, πρὸ ὀμμάτων. The effect is produced by representing inanimate objects as the agents in any thing: thus, " pontem indignatus Araxes." See the next chapter.

186. A metaphorical word is a word transferred from its proper sense, either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from one species to another, or in the way of analogy. Poet. xxi. transl. by Twining. See chap. 2, § 14, seq.

187. See book i. 7, § 34. Herodotus puts a similar expression in the mouth of Gelon, book vii. 162.

188. Various instances of approved metaphors.

189. The highest rate of interest ( τόκος) permitted among the Greeks appears to have been one third of the principal ( ἐπίτριτος); the lowest rate which was usual was one tenth merely of the principal ( ἐπιδέκατος): so that Moerocles was less a villain than this in the same ratio in which ten per cent. was less usurious than three and thirty. The metaphor, however, is stated by some as resulting from the comparison of the ratio of character to the ratio of usury; and by others, from the application of the general word, πονηρεύεσθαι, to the transactions of usurers in particular. It will be observed, that in translating ἐπίτριτος, the round numbers have been taken.

190. Addison, too, classes certain of his fair readers (though certainly differently circumstanced from the daughters of Anaxandrides) under the metaphorical appellation of " demurrers,” borrowed from the English legal nomenclature. See Spectator, No. 89.

191. φειδίτια, the public tables of Lacedaemon, remarkable for their plainness and frugality: so that, in saying that the only φειδίτια of Athens were its taverns, Diogenes conveyed a most bitter sarcasm against the manners of its citizens.

192. Chabrias seems to have been the first who ordered his troops to assume a kneeling position in receiving the charge of an enemy: at the time when he adopted this manoeuvre, he headed some Athenian troops auxiliary to the Boeotians, and completely succeeded in repulsing the forces of Agesilaus. This improvement in tactics seems to have been so favourably received, that statues were decreed him to be erected in the

193. 1. Personification re-, presents the object as animated.

194. 2.

195. We cannot forbear adding to this long catalogue the metaphor used by Herodotus, in speaking of the scheme for the defence of Peloponnesus, at the time of the Persian invasion, by throwing a wall across the Isthmus : his words are, , that even many cloaks of walls would be insufficient;— εl καὶ πολλοὶ τειχέων ΚΙΩΝΕΣ ἦσαν κ.τ.λ. Book vii. c. 139.

196. See the expression, Eth. Nich. book i. c. 10.

197. a See Eurip. Iph. in Aul. 80.

198. 3. Metaphors produce it.

199. 4. And similes.

200. 5. Metaphors to produce it must be appropriate, yet not obvious.

201. These passages severally stand as follows: (1.) Od. xi. 597. (2.) 11. xiii. 587. (3.) Il. iv. 126. (4.) 11. xi. 573. (5.) 11. xv. 542.

202. Pope's translation, Il. xiii. (of the original), line 799.

203. And, if an imitation, necessarily pleasing. See this principle of pleasure stated, book i. c. 11, § 23.

204. In speaking of the fable, he attributed this faculty of catching such features of resemblance as, without immediately striking, are yet appropriate ( οἴκεια μὴ Φάνερα), to those of a philosophic turn of mind :— τὸ ὅμοιον ὁᾃόρᾃν, ὄπερ ᾃῥᾃόν ῥἐστιν ἐκ ΦιλοσοΦίας. Lib. ii. cap. 20, § 7.

205. 6. They deceive the hearers agreeably.

206. Paradoxes.

207. Jests which are trap' ὐπό νοtav.

208. Besides the ornament of metaphor, by leading the hearer, throughout the sentence, to expect something very different from what you really mean, and undeceiving him only by the last word; e. g. " Quid hinc abest nisi reset virtus!" Cic. de Orate ii. 70. Here you expect a panegyric; the last word converts the whole into reproach. Of this description, too, are the following lines of Pope :— " Here thou, great Anna ! whom three realms obey, Dost sometimes counsel take, and sometimes tea !" Rape of the Lock, iii. 7. The precept may be further illustrated by Porson's insidious commendation of Blackmore's poetry:—" He will be read when Homer and Milton are forgotten,-but not till then."

209. Already quoted, ii. 21, § 8.

210. Probably the English word humour would best designate this quaintness of Theodorus.

211. 7. Puns.

212. See note 1, at p. 88, of Carrington's translation of Aristophanes' Plutus; where a similar surprise arises from the use of ἔπινες instead of εκρίνης.

213. This is sometimes aptly enough termed παρἀ προσδοκίαν, baffling the expectation.

214. Nicon, it seems, was the son of a Thracian slave; and Theodorus, conveniently mistaking the word θράττΗ for θράττΕΙ, takes an opportunity of taunting him with his low birth. θράττω, probably contracted from ταράττω. Vid. Blomfield in Aeschyl. Prom. Vinct. 649. There are on record two excellent replies to taunts of this nature; one made by Mnestheus, son of Iphicrates, who declared that he esteemed his mother above his father,—" Nam Pater, quantum in se fuit, Thracem me genuit: contra ea, mater Atheniensem (Corn. Nep. Iphic. 3;) where it should be observed, that Rutgersius, for contra ea mater, proposes to read cum Thraca mater. The other is attributed to Timotheus, who having the condition of his mother as a Thracian slave thrown out against him as a reproach, replied, " But to her I owe it that I am Conon's son." Athenaeus, lib. xii.

215. 8.

216. 9.

217. 10. There should be some person to whom they must apply.

218. So, too, the Latins, Lepidus non lepidus.

219. 11.

220. Similes are a sort of metaphor.

221. 12.

222. 13.

223. As far as the expression is concerned, this instance seems to possess the necessary elegance; but it is deficient in the second requisite, viz. τὸ πρὸς ov λέγεται.

224. The metaphor constructed on similar ratios ( κατ' ἀναλο γίαν) is here alluded to: see chap. 10, § 7.

225. In the Poetic, he says that, in the case of the analogical metaphor, " sometimes the proper term is also introduced, besides its relative term and this, with a view to guard the metaphor from any incidental harshness or obscurity: with such an adjunct, the metaphor ceases to be ἁπλου̃ς : e. g. φιάλη Ἄρεος–thus expressed, the metaphor is ου̃χ ἁπλου̃ς; but if stated simply φιάλη, it is ἁπλου̃ς. See Twining, notes 184, 189, on the Poetic.

226. With a view to elucidate the simile of Thrasymachus, it

227. 14. And proverbs also.

228. 15. So too are hyperboles.

229. 16.

230. has been conjectured that the story of Philoctetes might have been the subject of this rhapsodical declamation.

231. The island of Carpathus being destitute of hares, one of the inhabitants brought over some of these animals, which proved so fatally prolific as to consume all the crops in the island; and the Carpathians became more anxious to extirpate them than they had ever been for their introduction.

232. 1. Different styles are suitable to each sort of oratory.

233. 2. The written style is most precise ; that of disputation most declamatory, and is of two kinds, ἠθικὴ, παθητι κή.

234. Iliad, ix. 385—388.

235. Declamatory compositions when read appear ridiculous.

236. 3.

237. 4.

238. I Iliad, ii. 671.

239. 5. Deliberative style like sketching, and not accurate. Judicial style more precise.

240. Epideictie style more suited to writing. The judicial next. 6. Conclusion of the second division, scil. λέξις.

241. 1. Two parts of a speech.

242. 2. Statement. Proof. 3. Divisions made by other writers censured.

243. a Thus ends the second branch of the grand division of the work;— πίστις— λέξις— τάξις. See the last note on book ii.

244. I That is, to adopt the language of mathematicians, the statement corresponds to their problem, the proof to their demonstration. It will readily be observed that πίστις is here used in a sense different from that which it has hitherto preserved.

245. Est et illud repetendi genus quod seme! proposita iterat et dividit:—

246. Peroration not always necessary.

247. 4. Enumeration of certain of them.

248. 5. No farther distinctions to be drawn.

249. It should be carefully borne in mind, that Aristotle admits only these two branches as essential to every speech. His reasons for superadding exordium and peroration will be developed in the sequel.

250. Without such a restraint, a rhetorician may go on ad infinitum drawing distinctions where no difference exists.

251. CHAP. XIV.]

252. 1. The exordium resembles the prologue and the prelude. Prooemium of epideictic oratory resembles the prelude, and connected with the piece by the ἐνὀό σιμον. As the Helen of Isocrates.

253. 2. The exordium may be derived from either of the three sorts of oratory.

254. 3.

255. There is, in demonstrative rhetoric, no limitation as to the source whence the exordium is to be derived.

256. In a reprehension of which this exordium is employed.

257. 4.

258. 5. The exordium of judicial oratory resembles the prologue of a play. 6. It must therefore declare the object of the speech.

259. Oedipus Tyr. 774.

260. 7. Other exordia are an antidote to weariness. i. ἰατρεύ ματα. Refutation of calumny or its opposite iflatesto the speaker and adversary. Different use of it when plaintiff. or defendant.

261. ii. ἐκ τοῡ ἀκροατοῡ, excitement of the hearer; attracting his attention, or the reverse.

262. 8. All these points however

263. ' Ιατρεύματα, a sort of antidotes to ennui and listlessness of the auditory, which are literally so general ( κοινὰ) as not only to be unlimited to the exordia of either branch of rhetoric, but as to admit of being introduced at will into any part of the speech. See § 9.

264. are extraneous to the subject.

265. 9. Awakening the attention is common to all parts of a speech.

266. 10.

267. Those who have the worst side employ exordia.

268. 11.

269. Prodicus professed to teach a mode of reasoning with universal success in all descriptions of cases : the premium on initiation being fifty drachms, he called it Πεντηκοντάδραχμον. Plato in Cratyl.

270. Sophocles, Antig. 223.

271. Euripides, Iph. in Taur. 1162.

272. See book ii. chap. 1, § 5.

273. A compliment to be paid to the audience.

274. Exordia of deliberative oratory wanted only in four cases. i..On account of the speaker. ii. On account of the adversary. iii. To impress the hearer with the value of the case. iT. For the sake of embellishment.

275. 1. Topics to refute aspersions.

276. This sentiment has been already quoted, book i. chap. 9, § 30, in illustration of the rule Σκοπει̃ν παρ' οἷς o ἔπαινος. The remark of Socrates may be found in Plato's Menexenus, but differently expressed.

277. i. moving unfavourable impressions.

278. 2. ii. Contradicting the point.

279. 3. iii. By extenuation and excuse.

280. 4. iv. By recrimination of the accuser.

281. o. v. By comparison with others.

282. 6. vi. By ascertaining whether the

283. For the distinctions between ὰμαρτήματα and ἁτυχήματα, see book i. chap. 15, § 16.

284. accuser has been proved a calumniator before. 7. vii. By raising a counter prejudice. 8. viii. If the affair has been already decided.

285. 9. ix. By declaiming against calumny itself. x. Citing the presumptive signs: a topic useful to both.

286. 10. xi. Praising a little to blame much. This suits the accuser.

287. xii. By assuming the motives which suit your purpose.

288. Hippolytus, 612.

289. 1. The narration in epideictic oratory is not continuous but disjointed.

290. 2.

291. 3.

292. 4. In judicial, the narration must

293. make the subject clear,

294. 5. and bias the audience in favour of the orator.

295. 6. The defendant's narration is brief;

296. 7.

297. 8. and conveys an impress of character. i. By

298. See Herodotus, ii. 30.

299. ing moral purpose.

300. 9.

301. ii. By narration of the concomitant circumstances. iii. By speaking with feeling.

302. " But father now and mother both being lost, A brother's name can ne'er be hail'd again6."

303. * See the next chapter, § 8.

304. Using, in fact, the σημει̃ον of the action as an evidence of the thought, or taking the result of the feeling for the feeling itself; as Pericles does when alluding to the morose looks of the Lacedaemonians, a process which, though ingenious, yet often leads to a fallacy.

305. Which is will regulated by the understanding. See Nich.

306. Eth. book iii. chap. 2, 3, etc.

307. That is, the prudent speak from the dictates of the understanding solely, the good on the impulse of deliberate choice.

308. Sophocles, Antigone, 911. See the speech of the wife of Intaphemes to Darius, on asking the life of a brother in preference to those of her husband or children:— Ὠ βασιλευ̃, ἀνὴρ

309. ἀδελεὸς ἂν ἄλλος οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ γένοιτο. Herodotus, Thalia,

310. CHAP. XVI.]

311. 10. Let the narration be παθητι κή,

312. and ἠθική.

313. cap. 119. See the reply of Robert Duke of Normandy to William Rufus, justifying himself for allowing him to get water during the siege at Mont St. Michael:—" How am I to blame? should I have suffered our brother to die of thirst, what other have we if we had lost him ?" Lord Lyttleton, vol. i. p. 111. Compare the words of Edward I. on hearing at the same time of the death of his father and infant son, " that the death of a son was a loss which he might hope to repair; the death of a father was a loss irreparable." Hume. And the lines quoted in " the Antiquary," vol. iii. chap. 11:— He turned him right and round again, Said, Scorn na at my mither; Light loves I may get mony a ane, But minnie ne'er anither.

314. Odyssey, book xix. 361.

315. 11. Narration least used in deliberative oratory.

316. 1. Proof in judicial oratory: four points. i. The fact. ii. The mischief. iii. The degree.

317. * See the Trachiniae of Sophocles, verse 869, where part of the Chorus conjecture, from the dejected looks of the nurse as she approaches, that some calamity is about to be announced.

318. An instance of this occurs in the statement of finance which Pericles laid before the Athenians, to substantiate the hopes which he had held out to them. Thucyd. ii. 13.

319. See the Antigone, 635, etc.

320. 2. iv. The moral character of the action.

321. 3.

322. In epideictic the proof is made by amplification.

323. 4. In deliberative we must observe the fallacies of the adversary, for these are a part of our proof.

324. 5. Example best suited to it.

325. 6. How enthymems are to be used. Not in a series.

326. He states the same doctrine in the Nich. Eth. v. 2:-

327. " For the facts are taken for granted; so that it only mains to invest them with grandeur." Book i. chap. 9, § 40.

328. Victorius notices the use of the phrase αἰτίαν ἓχειν in a good sense.

329. He asserts this, and assigns the reason, at the end of his consideration of demonstrative rhetoric, book i. c. 9, § 40.

330. 7. Nor on all subjecta.

331. 8. Nor to excite any emotions or passions.

332. 9. But maxims may be used in the proof and narration.

333. 10. Reasons why deliberative is more difficult than judicial oratory. i. It is on the future. ii. Judi-

334. The words of Menelaus to Pisistratus, the son of Nestor. Odyssey, lib. iv. 204. The force of the illustration here seems to be this: the poet, no less than the philosopher, thought it no small praise to know when to stop; so that, without allusion to the prudence of what had been said, (to the category of quality, τοιαυ̃τα) he commends him merely on the score of its due quantity.

335. cial oratory has law for a basis. iii. The deliberative orator cannot digress so easily.

336. 11.

337. 12. If you have enthymems speak ἠθικω̃ς and ἀπο δεικτ κως. If not, only ἠθικω̃ς. 13. Refutative en thymems better than confirmative.

338. Now, according to the early part of this work, all this is done easily enough in judicial cases, since there the judge has no personal interest, and easily resigns himself to the speaker; but in deliberative rhetoric, every one addressed is supposed, more or less, to have an interest in the question at issue, and is therefore more jealous of the speakers artifice. Book i. c. 1 § 10.

339. See book ii. chap. 23, § 30.

340. [BOOK III.

341. 14. Mode of replying to our adversary. The first speaker must give his proofs and anticipate objections.

342. 15. The last speaker must refute the adversary's arguments, and draw opposite inferences. The reason why.

343. 16. Character of

344. Compare book ii. chap. 25, § 1, 2.

345. See the Troades of Euripides, 969, where Hecuba, replying to the defence made by Helen, lays hold of that part of it which seemed to insinuate that the three goddesses had been instrumental to her abandonment of her husband ;-a point which, it will readily be perceived, was E' Υ'ΕΛΕΓΤΟΝ.

346. the speaker best conveyed by introducing a third person.

347. 17. Enthymems are occasionally to be altered into maxims.

348. 1. Interrogation. When to be employed. i. When an absurdity will result.

349. See book ii. chap. 21, § 2.

350. 2.

351. ii. When your conclusion will be established by it.

352. 3.

353. iii. When the opponent must Contradict himself.

354. 4.

355. iv. When we reduce our opponent to sophistical answers. Caution as to interrogations.

356. 5. How to answer an equivocal question. i. By distinction. ii. By anticipation.

357. See the answer of our Saviour to the captious question of the Pharisees,—“ What thinkest thou ? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Caesar, or not ?" Matt. xxii. 17—22.

358. 6. iii. By explanation.

359. No question to be put after the conclusion.

360. 7. Ridicule, how to be used.

361. " Ridiculum acri Fortius et melius plerumque secat res." HOR. Sat. i. 10, 14.

362. See book i. chap. 11, § 29.

363. [BOOK III

364. 1. Peroration consists of four things. i. ii. iii. iv. i. We must incline the hearers favourably.

365. 2. ii. We must amplify and diminish.

366. 3. ii. We must excite the hearers.

367. 4. iv. We must awaken the memory.

368. 5. The peroration must assert that the orator has proved his point. He must compare his arguments with those of his opponent, either ironically, or by interrogation.

369. 6. The disjointed style is suitable to the peroration.

370. See the conclusion of Lysias' oration against Eratosthenes.

371. It cannot fail of being observed how neatly Aristotle employs this his concluding chapter, as at once an illustration of the subject and a farewell to the reader.

Aristotle Rhetoric 3

Theodore Alois Buckley (Translator)