Aristotle Rhetoric 1

Theodore Alois Buckley (Translator)

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Rhetoric. Aristotle. Theodore Alois Buckley (Translator). London. 1857.

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Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric (Theodore Alois Buckley) (OCR draft) (English) (Theodore Alois Buckley's English translation, first published in 1850 and represented from the Henry G. Bohn 1857 printing; corrected against a second OCR of the same printing.)

Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.

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Rhetoric

1. 1. Rhetoric corresponds to Logic.
2. 2
3. Aristotle appears to have contemplated a much greater variety of occasions for the exercise of his ' ρητορικὴ, than we consider proper to that ill-defined art, or habit, or faculty, vaguely called rhetoric. In fact, according to him, any man who attempts to persuade another, under whatever circumstances, and with whatever object, may be said to exercise ῥητορικὴ.
4. Muretus explains the passage as conveying a censure on Plato, who extolled logic, but compared rhetoric to cookery— ὀψοποιητικη̃. He therefore would have it convey this ing, " Rhetoric is the counterpart, not of cookery, as Plato asserts, but of his own favourite science, dialectics." See also note 19, p. 23.
5. Sir P. Sidney, arguing that all arts are but attempts to methodise natural subjects, says, that " the rhetorician and logician, considering what in nature will soonest prove and persuade, thereon give artificial rules, which are still compressed within the circle of a question, according to the proposed matter." Defense of Poetry.
6. That we can reduce them to a system.
7. 3. Strictures on previous systems.
8. ’ Εξετάζειν καὶ ὐπέχειν, quà Logicians ; ἀπολογει̃σθαι καὶ κατηγορει̃ν, quà Rhetoricians : so that the faculties which form the basis of each of these arts appear to be natural to every man. Zeno elegantly illustrated the distinction between the two by a simile taken from the hand. The close power of Logic he compared to the fist, or hand compressed; the diffuse power of Rhetoric to the palm, or hand open. Cicero, Orator.
9. The vulgar can give reasons to a certain degree, and can examine, after a manner, the reasons given them by others. And what is this but NATURAL LOGIC ? If therefore these efforts of theirs have an effect, and nothing happen without a cause, this effect must of necessity be derived from certain principles. The question then is, What these principles are; for if these can once be investigated, and then knowingly applied, we shall be enabled to do by rule what others do by hazard ; and in what we do, as much to excel the uninstructed reasoner, as a disciplined boxer surpasses an untaught rustic. Harris's Philosophical Arrang. ch. i.
10. An effect is produced; sometimes indeed accidentally, and sometimes from the person's having been habituated to that which he attempts. Now if we can ascertain and methodise the causes of this his success, so as to insure the success of subsequent attempts, we shall have constructed something similar to an art: for, in some points, chance and art are not unlike; whence the verse of Agatho;—
11. See Eth. Nich. vi. 4. 7 Πίστις.—If the translation of this word shall appear frequently to be vague and indeterminate, the reader is requested to observe that we have no equivalent expression in English; for it is conceived that “proof” (the usual translation) always implies something qualified to convince the understanding;
12. Neglect of the πίσ­τις*.
13. 4. Hence undue appeals to the passions.
14. 5.
15. 6.
16. whereas Aristotle designates by the word πίστις, every thing which has a tendency to persuade the will. It is not, however, meant to be denied that proof (properly such) frequently has, and always ought to have, a tendency to persuade; but, at the same time, it would be too much to say that it is the only thing which is qualified to do so. Vide Mitchell's Aristoph. vol. i.; Pal. Diss. p. 72; ibid. p. 75.
17. For a similar use of the word διαβολὴ, cf. Thucyd. lib. i. c. 127.— οὐ μέντοι τοσου̃τον πιζονπαθει̃ν av αὐτὸν του̃το, ὃσον διαβολὴν οἲσειν αὐτω̣̃ πρὸς τὴν .".oÂ"v.
18. Κριτὴς του̃ νόμον κάνων. Aristotle employs the same metaphor in his Ethics :— τοὺ γὰρ αὸρίστου, αὄριστος καὶ ὸ κακών
19. Denique ut in fabrica, si prava est regula prima, N ormaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit, * * * * * * Omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa necesse est, etc.
20. 7. Reasons why as little as possible should be left to the judge.
21. 1st.
22. 2nd.
23. 3rd.
24. As the young man can learn consequences ( ὃτι)* ere he discovers principles, ( διότι, Eth. lib. i.,) so can most men better judge of individual cases by δικαστικὴ φρόνησις, than frame laws by νομοθετικὴ φρόνησις. (Eth. lib. vi.) And this is proved by the universal bias of orators to individual cases founded on law. To borrow an illustration from the arts, we may say, that as a person placed in the centre of a landscape has a fuller view of any individual object in it than the painter himself, but loses proportionately the general effect; so the judge can discern all the particulars of a given case, but cannot, as the legislator who contemplates at a distance, view so well the general bearings and effects of any law when united or contrasted with others. Cf. also the Ethics, lib. v. c. 1.— ὸρθω̄ς μὲν νόμος ὁ κείμενος ὀρθω̃ς' χει̃ρον δὲ O ἀπεσχεδιασμένος.
25. 8. But questions of fact, etc. must be left to him.
26. 9.
27. 10. Reasons why men prefer judicial to deliberative oratory.
28. Cf. Hooker, v. § 9, p. 36.
29. It is not in the nature of things that any human legislator should determine on the infinite number of possible cases; or that he should not, with regard to some, be an unsafe guide to our decisions : for the last of these inconveniences we have a remedy in ὲπιείκεια; since equity is, as he subsequently describes it, τὸ του̃ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἒλλειμμα, and τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον.—lib. i. c. xiii. § 13. And again in the Ethics, ὲπανόρθωμα νόμου, η̣̚ ὲλλείπιι did τὸ καθόλου, v. 10.
30. This error is a consequence on the one mentioned before, § 3: from the disregard there noticed of the enthymem and πίστις, orators are naturally led to attach themselves to that branch of public speaking which requires enthymem least; and such is judicial pleading, inasmuch as the cause there rests mainly on evidence, properly so called, on the ἀτέχναι πίστεις. Aristotle himself gives as another reason for this preference, the greater ease of judicial oratory. (Vide lib. iii. c. xvii. § 10.)
31. And this he proves, first, because that which has been is plain to all, even to diviners; secondly, the orator having law for a premiss, the demonstration is easier. To these reasons may be added one which the master of Alexander would not willingly have allowed, namely, the loss of liberty to Greece, and the consequent loss of all interest in deliberative questions, to men whose future fates were totally out of their own power.
32. A writer in the Quarterly Review, No. 26, after contrasting the perplexity of English law with the simplicity of Athenian jurisprudence, says, " This simplicity in the law made it the orator's business less to hunt for cases and precedents than to discriminate character; less to search for errors in a bill than for flaws or errors in a witness's life or testimony. And the prevalence of this practice may be inferred from a subsequent passage in this book, (c. ix. § 38,) where Isocrates is mentioned as an adept in the comparison of characters, " which," says Aristotle, " he used to do to further his familiarity with judicial pleading." To this we may subjoin the following remarks of Mitford on a speech by Alcibiades: “ The multitude ordinarily composing an Athenian court of justice was so great, that the pleaders always addressed it as under the impulse of the same interests, and subject to the same feelings as the general assembly, and equally without responsibility. Impartiality was never supposed; the passions were always applied to; and it never failed to be contended between the parties, which could most persuade the jurors that their interest was implicated with his, and that by deciding in his favour they would be gainers." Hist. of Greece, vol. v. p. 94. So also Xenophon, in his Athenian Republic, c. i. § 13.— ἒν τε τοῑς δικαστηρίοις οὐ τοῡ δικαίου
33. 11. Reasons why the logician will probably be the beet rhetorician.
34. 12. Utility of Rhetoric proved. 1st.
35. 2nd.
36. Πεφύκασιν ἱκανω̃ς, have naturally a considerable aptitude toward what is true.
37. 3rd.
38. 4th.
39. The communication of ideas requires a similitude, of thought and language: the discourse of a philosopher would vibrate without effect on the ear of a peasant. Gibbon's Decline and Fall, c. 1. note 90.
40. In the words of Falconbridge, let the orator resolve to “ smack of observation; Which, though I will not practise to deceive, Yet, to avoid deceit, I mean to learn.”
41. Riccobon remarks, that a person may at first be inclined to doubt the truth of the assertion that Rhetoric and Logic alone recognise contraries; seeing that music, for instance, recognises harmony and discord; grammar, the improprieties and the proprieties of language, etc. This doubt is however removed, he says, by the word ὁμοίως, for these alone recognise with equal propriety each of the two contraries ; whereas other arts apply more strictly to one than to another.
42. 13. Objection against the abuse of it answered.
43. 14. End and duty of Rhetoric.
44. This is an àminori argument, to understand the full force of which we ought to bear in mind the great importance attached to the δὐναμις ὰγωνιστικὴ by the Greeks.
45. Non tamen idcirco crimen liber omnis habebit: Nil prodest quod non laedere possit idem. Igne quid utilius ? Si quia tamen urere tecta Comparat, audaces instruit igne manus. Eripit interdum, modo dat medicina salutem, Quaeque juvans monstrat, quaeque sit herba nocens. Et latro, et cautus praecingitur ense viator: Ilie sed insidias, hie sibi portal opem. Discitur innocuas ut agat facundia causas : Protegit haec sontes, immeritosque premit. Ovid. Trist. lib. ii. 1. 265.
46. Having told us what we may expect from Rhetoric, he now tells us what we are not to expect from it. Persuasion. though the end, is not the duty of rhetoric : " Officium ejus facultatis videtur esse, dicere apposite ad persuadendum : Finis, persuadere dictione." (Cicero de Inv.) In the arts whose foundation is conjectural [ στοχαστικαὶ τέχναι ], among which we must class rhetoric, if the artist had done all that the case admitted, his duty was conceived to have been fulfilled, and he was entitled to commendation though he had entirely failed of success.
47. Difference in Logic and Rhetoric as regards
48. That he is consistent in thus classifying characters according to their moral principles, will appear from his application of the appellation ' Αλαζὼν by the same rule in the Ethics: Οὐκ ὲν τη̣̃ δυνάμει ὲστὶν ὀ ἀλαζὼν, ἀλλ' iv τη̣̃ προαιρέσει. Ethics, iv. c. 7.
49. In order more fully to illustrate the nature of rhetoric, Aristotle has considered it throughout this chapter as analogous to logic. Each, he says, is founded on a faculty naturally possessed by all men; each is useful, and applicable with equal propriety to any class of subjects whatever. Besides this, logic and rhetoric alone, of all arts, are equally conversant with opposite inferences; and of course with sound and specious arguments (whether in the form of syllogism or enthymem). Now as logic and rhetoric are in their own nature indifferent to truth or falsehood, it must require an act of choice in either case to select the former or the latter, and the constant repetition of that choice will ultimately form a corresponding habit. Hence the διαλεκτικὸς may be considered as δυνάμει σοφιστὴς, and the σοφιστὴς as δυνάμει διαλεκτὸς. But when logic is prostituted to the support of false propositions, by the bad principles (the πρσαὶρεσις) of its professors, it is branded with the name of sophistry, and the persons who so misapply it are called sophists: whereas, in the case of rhetoric, no such distinction in reference to the principles of its professors ever obtained ; but the name of orator is enjoyed equally by all who aremasters of the art, whether they exercise it fairly or not,
50. προαίρεσιν, 'ρήτωρ. A reason for this distinction may haps be furnished from the nature of the subject-matter respectively. The subject-matter of logic is which is uniform, absolute, and admits not of degrees. Hence the sophistical logician may fairly be supposed aware of the fallacy he uses, and is stigmatized accordingly. But the subject-matter of rhetoric being τὸ ὃμοιον τω̣̃ ἀληθει̃, (v. § 11,) or πιθανὸν, has many and various degrees, from the lowest presumption
51. the name of the professors.
52. 16.
53. 1. Definition of Rhetoric.
54. 2. Two classes of πιστεις — ἔντεχ­ νοι, ἄτεχ- VOL.
55. up to moral certainty. Here then a fallacy is not so easily discoverable, even by the orator himself; and candour requires us not to brand as moral what after all may be merely mental imperfection in the speaker.
56. 8
57. 4. i. Character of the speaker.
58. 5. ii. Feelings of the auditor. ­
59. I Πιστεις διὰ του̃ λόγου, or artificial, of three kinds, ἐν τω̃ ἠθει̃ του̃ λέγοντος— ἐν τῳ̃ τὸν ἀκροατὴς διαθει̃ναι πιος— ἐν αὐτῳ̃ τῳ̃ λόγῳ.
60. In so high estimation did Menander hold the manner of an address, that he attributed the whole effect to it;— τρόπος ἔσθ’ o πειθων του̃ λέγοντος, οὐ, λόγος. And as Plutarch observes upon this line, Kat τρόπος μὲν οὕν Kai λόγος ἥ TPO' ΠΟΣ AIA' ΛΟ'ΓΟΥ. De Audiend. Poet. t. i. Op. Mor. p. 125. edit. Wyttenb.
61. 6. iii. The speech itself.
62. 7. Rhetoric an offshoot of Dialectics and Politics.
63. Πολιτικὴ. For an explanation of this term-an enumeration of the various arts which he comprehends under it-and for an account of the estimation in which he holds it, see Ethics, lib. i. c. 2.
64. ' Υποδύεται. So blind are men to this affectation of rhetoric and its professors, that he who, having had no occasion for the display of his persuasive powers, other than the ordinary course of affairs presents, would be accused of great arrogance were he to talk of having exercised rhetoric. Now Aristotle, so far from holding a person guilty of presumption for such an use of the term, would rather retort on the accuser the charge of ignorance of its true import. For with a view to invest their art, and of consequence themselves, with an air of dignity, the professors of rhetoric, said he, would have the world think (some of them, poor creatures, δι’ ἀπαιδευσιαν) that it was applicable exclusively to such cases as are of high concernment to society. This in part is true; rhetoric is παραφυὲς τη̃ς Πολιτει̃ας : but, as Majoragius observes, " Virgulta magnam quidem cum arboribus quibus adnascuntur habent similitudinem, et rerum naturam redolent. Sed tamen multo 8unt inferiora, neque tam uberes fructus ferunt.” So far prevalent is this notion to this very day, that we only apply this word by way of ridicule to persuasion on ordinary topics.
65. 8. Subdivision of πιστεις, ἐν αὐτω̃ τω̃ λόγῳ̃: i. Enthymem, ii. Example.
66. 9. Example.
67. Definition of Syllogism.
68. 10. Various styles of speaking.
69. Or, each style of rhetoric has its peculiar advantage.
70. Is ' ρητορεια, the words of an orator, modelled according to rhetoric, whose object it is to persuade; versus, λόγος, the words of a logician, modelled according to logic, whose object it is to convince.
71. 11. Rhetoric considere the πιθανὸν for a class, not an individual,
72. and draws its supplies from subjects of deliberation.
73. 12. Audience held to be άπλοι.
74. θορυβου̃νται. Twining, in his notes on the Poetic, quoting a subsequent passage of this Treatise, in which this word again occurs, (ii. 23,) translates it, " are applauded," and observes, that " the commentators strangely mistake the sense of this word here, and in lib. i. c. 2. They render it absurdly,­ vehementius percellunt—perturbant maxime. Whether an audience be pleased or displeased, to any great degree, noise is equally the consequence; and the word ϑορυβει̃ν is used, sometimes for the uproar of approbation, and sometimes for that of dislike .”
75. 13. Hence concluding ἐκ συλλελο­ γισμένων πρότε­ being lengthy, and ἐξ ὰσυλλο­ γιστων μὲν δεομέ­ υων δὲ συλλο­ γισ μου̃, being unadmitted —are to be. avoided.
76. A man under a mistaken idea of the nature of the subject may possibly deliberate on a question, the nature of which is fixed and necessary. Still, however, as long as he remains under this impression, the subject relatively to him is of a contingent nature.
77. Cicero gives a similar caution:—“ Haec nostra oratio multitudinis est auribus accommodanda, ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda quae non aurificis statera, sed quadampopular! trutina examinantur." De Drat. lib. ii. We may further prove that this precept has its foundation in nature, by quoting the words of a celebrated modern writer, who, at least in penetration and knowledge of mankind, had few superiors: " The receipt to make a speaker, and an applauded one too, is short and easy. Take common sense quantum sufficit ; add a little application to the rules and orders of the House; throw obvious thoughts in a new light, and make up the whole with a large quantity of purity, correctness, and elegance of style. Take it for granted that by far the greatest part of mankind neither analyse nor search to the bottom; they are incapable of penetrating deeper than the surface. ” Lord Chesterfield's Letters.
78. 14. Enthymems are deduced either from εικότα or σημεια.
79. In despair of finding adequate English expressions for the words εἰκὸς and σημει̃ον, I have acquiesced in the usual, but erroneous translation. At the risk of incurring the charge of prolixity, the following are given as the most popular ways of explaining this difficult subject. Dr. Whately considers this is a division of arguments according to the relation of the subject-matter of the premises to that of the conclusion." The εἰκὸς (or διότι of Aristotle) he takes to be an a priori ment, which may be employed to account for the fact supposed granted. The σημει̃ον (or on of Aristotle) and example, arguments which could not be so employed : vide Rhetoric, p. 116. Others, again, maintain that the σημει̃ον is an argument to prove past matters, the εἰκὸς to prove future. The majority of commentators, however, consider the εἰκὸς and σημεῖον as propositions in different matter : thus,­
80. 15. Definition of εἰκὸς.
81. Another explanation, founded on three passages, the first in the Analytics; the second by Cicero (de Inv. i. 30); the third in Quintilian, (v. c. ix. 10,) adopted by Majoragius, is as follows : The σημεῖον is some sensible fact, either attested by sense or reducible thereto, not a general truth; hence it will be the minor premiss in the enthymem, not the major, the σημειόμενον or thing signified by it, being the conclusion, and as the latter is known solely through and by the former, there is always a real or supposed connexion between them.
82. st. The thing signified may be contained in the sign which implies not only that, but something more. The latter then, as regards the former, will stand in the ratio of a whole to its part; as individual or particular nature to common or generic: what is definite always containing or implying more than what is indefinite (on which principle we are told in logic that the species is more of a whole than a genus). Hence it is defined, ὡς τῶν καθεκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ αθόλου, and is called ἂναγκαῖον or τεκμήριον. Hence Quintilian, observing the conclusiveness of this argument, denies it the name of argument at all: " Non sunt argumenta, quia ubi illa sunt, queestio non est;" an error resembling that made by certain modern philosophers, who deny the utility of logic because the premises of a syllogism virtually imply the conclusion.
83. nd. The thing signified may not be contained or implied in the sign. The latter being more vague and indefinite than the former; bearing to the thing signified the ratio of a part to the whole, as common or generic nature to individual or particular, ὡς τῶνκαθόλου τὶ πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. This enthymem pears in the same mood as the first, scilicet, Barbara, but in the second figure, hence an illicit process of the minor term. Note, that as the σημεῖον is always the minor and the thing signified the conclusion, the relation here spoken of as καθόλον, and κατὰ μέρος, must be understood not of the logical relation in the syllogism between the major premiss and the conclusion, but of the relation between two things, one specific, the other general. Now in the εὶκὸς enthymem, on the contrary, the
84. 16. Three
85. relation of εἰκὸς and the conclusion ( ἐκεῖνο πρὸς o εἰκὸς) is the strict logical relation of universal to particular, or of a generic law to its application in an individual instance. The εἰκὸς therefore is the major premiss, not the minor.
86. We see that the universal major in the σημεῖον enthymem cannot be the σημεῖον itself, because it is detached from any particular relation, and involves no particular deduction : nor yet is this major, though universal, an εἰκὸς, being ἁπλῶς and totally true, which is inconsistent with the very meaning of the word " probable."
87. Again, though the minor premiss of the εἰκὀς enthymem contains a simple matter of fact, it is not a σημεῖν, for to constitute a sign it must point to something else equally necessary with itself; a condition not fulfilled by the εἰκὸς enthymem conclusion. Still there is so much affinity between the minor premiss of the εἰκὸς enthymem, and the ἀνὡνυμον σημεῖον, that by converting the major premiss, with the addition of the word " probably" to the copula, we shall change the σημεῖον into an εἰκὸς of low degree: e. g. All who have a fever breathe hard. This man breathes hard. This man has a fever. Those who breathe hard probably have a fever. This man breathes hard. This man probably has a fever. And this affinity perhaps led Quintilian to confound Aristotle'a ἀνώνυμου σημεῖον with his εἰκὸς. (lib. v. c. ix. § 8.) It is this kind of " sign" and the argument deducible from it, which constitutes what, in criminal cases, is called circumstantial evidence.
88. Aristotle mentions another sort of σημεῖον (§ 18) which comes out a syllogism in the third figure, with an universal conclusion, and hence its error is an illicit process of the minor term. The principle on which this syllogism proceeds is an imperfect, precarious induction, and endeavours to deduce a general truth from a particular instance. The ratio, therefore, of the sign to the thing signified, is as one to all. This, it will be observed, is a new signification of the terms καθόλου and καθ᾽ ἒκαστον, but one which they will obviously admit, and borne out by the example he adduces.
89. The above explanation has been given rather at length, because it is not generally so well known as the others, nor so easy to follow.
90. The usual definition of e ἰκὀs is considered by Aristotle as too vague; he limits it, therefore, to contingent matter, and would have it stand in such a relation to the conclusion to be drawn, as an universal to a particular. For instance, the
91. different sorts of σημεῖα.
92. 17. τεκ­ μήριον.
93. 18. ση­ μεῖα- a νώ­ νυμα.
94. Corinthians at Athens state as an εἰκὸς, that the Corcyraeans were addicted to piracy, their shunning alliances with other states, because those who would become pirates study secrecy; but this broad fact is, when compared with the single case of the Corcyraeans, as an universal to a particular, or as a whole to a part, pirates being one class only of the many who study secrecy as a veil to crime. It is moreover a case in contingent matter; for those who study secrecy, may or may not be addicted to piracy.
95. Τεκμήριον, the other species of σημεῖον : e. g. " Ut mihi Platonis illud, seu quis dixit alius, perelegans esse videatur; quern cum ex alto ignotas ad terras tempestas et in desertum littus detulisset, timentibus caeteris propter ignorationem locorum, animadvertisse dicunt in arena geometricas formas quasdam esse descriptas; quas ut vidisset, exclamavisse ut bono essent animo; videre enim Be hominum vestigia; quae videlicet ille non ex agri consituri, quam cemebat, sed ex doctrinae indiciis interpretabatur." Cic. de Rep. c. xvii. p. 52.
96. 19. Example, or rhetorical induc- tion. ως μέρος μέ­ ρος.
97. In the Analytics, he says, " the εἰκὸς is πρότασις ἔνδοξος, but the σημει̃ον professes to be πρότασις ὰποδεικτικὴ, whether necessary or probable. Now an enthymem (he continues is an imperfect syllogism, consisting or είκότα. and σημει̃α, and the latter are assumed in three ways, according to the number of the figures of syllogism (for Aristotle made only three), the first, second, and third of logic. In all these the σημει̃ον is the μέσον (i. e. the argumentum, or minor proposition), but the first alone is ἄλυτον." Analytic. Prior, lib. ii. c. xxix. Edit. Bipont.
98. Not as a part to a whole, for that would be σημει̃ον; nor as a whole to a part, for that would be τεκμήριον: nor as a whole to a whole, for that would be ἐπαγωγὴ (which, when perfect, reasons from a whole taken individually to the same taken collectively). Example therefore is in the ratio of a part to a part.
99. 20. Two different sorts of enthymemo
100. 21.
101. 1st. τό­ ποι.
102. 2nd. είδη.
103. By the τὸ αὐτὸ γένος is understood a common circumstance and property of nature ; by the τὸ OO'TO καθόλου, the general proposition in reference to all such cases.
104. Διαλεκτικούς Kal ῥητορικοὺς, i. e. so exactly corresponding, in point of extent, to these arts, as to be applicable as often, and with as little limitation, as they are themselves.
105. This appears evident enough; yet the whole system of judicial astrology and the planetary influences was nothing more than an attempt of the kind.
106. 22.
107. εἶδη first discussed.
108. Βελτίω, . ie. better, qu'a the art in question is concerned; -though as regarded by the logician or rhetorician, they will be in fact worse, inasmuch as they tend to merge these faculties, whose characteristic is universal applicability, in that particular art from whence the προτάσεις happen to be deduced.
109. We may here mention that διαλεκτικὴ, is not quite what we understand by logic, but seems rather to have been the faculty of conversation, which the ancients cultivated as a science, and of which logic was a species. " Zeno, the Eleatic, divided his dialectics into three parts : on consequences, ἐρώ­ τησις and ἐριστικὴ." Whately's Logic. Diog. Laert. in Platone, 52, § 87.
110. He here designates, by the name εἶδη, those propositions of limited applicability which he had before called ἴδια ; those, in fact, which he considers as contradistinguished from the τόποι or general arguments, which he tells us are applicable to a range of subjects as little limited as the subjects of rhetoric itself.
111. 1. An oration pre- supposes three things: 1st. a speaker: 2nd. a subject: 3rd. a hearer.
112. 2. Hearers of three sorts.
113. 3. Hence three kinds of rhetoric; Deliberative, Judicial, Epideictic. Business
114. 4. Time
115. Cf. lib. ii. c. 22, § 13: στοιχει̃ον δὲ λέλω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυ­ μήματος TO αὐτό : and lib. ii. c. 26, § 1 : τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχει̃ον Kai τόπον.
116. I Both hearers are interested; but the ϧεωρὸς is a speculative, the κριτὴς a practical, auditor.
117. Vide Quarterly Review, July, 1822, No. liv. vol. 27, p. 391.
118. 5. and end peculiar to each.
119. 6. Proof of this from fact.
120. " Passion may be as much excited by the orator's reasonings on a future event, as on one past; and indeed the future, caeteris paribus, produces the greater effect on us, as that to which we are approaching, and what every moment gives us the added interest in, which it takes from the past. But then the past has the counterbalancing privilege of being susceptible of infinitely better testimony and evidence, from memory, present effects, etc.; memory, indeed, the great eye of the mind, unlike that of the body, sees all we have left behind, and nothing before it." Campbell, Phil. of Rhet.
121. 7. The orator in each class must have κοι­ ναὶ προ­ τάσεις.
122. 8.
123. 9.
124. 1. The deliberative orator advises on subjects,
125. 2. not necessary,
126. This limitation was established in cap. ii. § 12. He developes this point more fully, Nich. Eth. iii. cap. 3.
127. 3. nor on all that are contingent ;
128. but where we apprehend a power of performance.
129. 4. Minute discussions here to be avoided, as not in the province of rhetoric,
130. 5. which is made up of the
131. * Τω̃ν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι Kal μή. It may be well to remark of this expression, which has occurred so often already, . and will much more frequently in the sequel, that it is Aristotle's usual appellative for things contingent, things which may as well happen as not. He has himself defined it thus— λέγω
132. i. c. 13. I call that a contingent, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such a supposition.
133. " Inciditur omnis jam deliberatio si intelligitur non posse fieri, aut si necessitas affertur." Cicero de Orate ii. For an account of things, δυνατὰ ἡμι̃ν, vide lib. ii. c. 19.
134. Such minute research, as it tends rather to bewilder, must of necessity be excluded from rhetoric, which is always supposed to address an audience of ordinary abilities; o κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἁπλου̃ς, cap. ii. § 13; whereas such distinctions could only be appreciated by the philosopher and man of education.
135. analytical and political sciences ;
136. 6. and whoever treats it not as a faculty but a science, deviates from the art.
137. 7. Five occasions for the employment of deliberative oratory. 1. πόροι. 2. πολέ­ μοι. 3. φυλακὴ. 4. τροφή. 5. νόμοι. 8. i. πό­ ροι. Finances.
138. The analytical science seems to have been the analysis of arguments.
139. All society supposes law ( νόμοι) ; the first object of which is the support of its inhabitants internally ( τροφὴ); and the second its territory externally ( φυλακὴ); in maintaining which war ( πόλεμος) must some time or other be unavoidable, and to carry that on, fixed revenues ( πόροι) are requisite. We may observe, then, a regular gradation in these five questions; though in his examination of them Aristotle proceeds analytically, and takes that which first presents itself in civilized society ; namely, the ways and means. Xenophon also, in his Memorabilia, represents Socrates as using nearly the same five subjects and arrangement, when dissuading Glaucon, a young Athenian, from attempting politics too early. Perhaps Aris. totle may have borrowed the hint from him. Cf. Xenoph. Mem. lib. iii. c. 6 : and a translation of the whole passage in the posthumous works of Dr. Franklin, vol. v. p. 77. Lond. 1819. The reader will find an instance of τροφὴ practised by the piratical states of Greece, in Thucydides, lib. i. c. 5, and of πόροι in the first tax levied at Rome, when the militia were turned into a standing army, during the war with Veil. Livy, lib. iv.
140. 9. ii. πό­ λεμοςκαὶ είρήνη. War and peace.
141. See this point touched on by Pericles, Thucyd. i. 141, where he declares the Peloponnesians to be πολεμει̃ν, μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκεύην ἀδύνατοι.
142. CHAP. IV.]
143. 10. iii. φυ­ λακὴ. Safeguard of the country.
144. 11. iv. Provision, i. e. imports and exports.
145. 12. v. νό­ μοι. Legislation.
146. Is He gives hints, § 9, about what is necessary, ὁπω̃ς πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κρείτους εἰρηνεύηται.
147. For a statement of the things, peculiar to democracy and oligarchy, which have a tendency to destroy them, see the speeches of Megabyzus and Darius, on the question of the con-
148. 13.
149. The accounts given by travellers of foreign states are also useful.
150. stitution fittest for Persia, after the assassination of Smerdis, the Magian usurper. Herodot. iii. 81, 82. See also Eth. Nich. viii. 10.
151. CHAP. V.]
152. 1. Happiness the general object.
153. 3. Four definitions of it.
154. 4.
155. The end of deliberation is τὰ συμφέροντα, of action f.ÚðaL/A-Ou ίa.
156. The first of these is the opinion of the Socratic school; the second, of the Stoics; the third, of the Epicureans; the last, the popular one. See a similar description, Hooker, v. § 76, p. 413.
157. Of these, the first enumerated as far as " character " inclusive, may be considered δυνάμεις: the two next, " honour and good fortune," as τίμια: the last, namely, “ virtue and its constituents," as ἐπαιντὰ, according to the mode of philosophic division mentioned in the Ethics, lib. i. c. 12.
158. Goods arc internal or external.
159. 5. External. 1st. High birth. i. National.
160. ii. Individual.
161. 6. Good offspring. i. Public.
162. ii. Private.
163. It was the boast of the Athenians that they were αὐτόχθο­ νες; and in reference to this Cicero says of their state, " Quae vetustate ea est, ut ipsa ex sese snOB cives genuisse dicatur." Orat. pro L. Flacco.
164. 7. Wealth must be,
165. L άσφα­ λη̃. ii. ἐλευ θέρια. iii. χρἡ­ σιμα.
166. 8. Goodness of character.
167. 9. Honour.
168. * Aristotle'a οἱ εὐεργετηκότες may be found beautifully enumerated in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chap. 44.
169. 10. Internal. 2nd. Health.
170. 11. Beauty.
171. Instanced in the compliment paid to the memory of Brasidas at Amphipolis, Thucyd. v. Hooker, v. § 34, p. 133 ; and § 47, p. 179.
172. Here perhaps we may mention a remarkable compliment paid to fallen valour by the civil law; a father of three sons was entitled to considerable immunities, which continued to him even after their death, if they had fallen in battle : " Hi enim qui pro Republicâ ceciderunt in perpetuum per gloriam vivere intelliguntur." Instit. lib. ii. tit. xxv. § 1. Hooker, ii. p. 293.
173. Herodicus was a physician, B. C. 440.
174. 12. Strength
175. 13. Stature.
176. 14. Gymnastic excellence.
177. 15. Good old age.
178. [ BOOK I.
179. 16. Friends.
180. 17. Good fortune.
181. 18. Virtue.
182. On the affinity of art and chance, see Eth. Nich. VI. 4.­ Τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε, καὶ τύχη τέχνην. Agatho.
183. The affinity appears to consist in this, that arts very often owe their origin to chance; as the capital of the Corinthian pillar, for instance, from a basket of acanthus flowers; and painting from tracing a shadow on the wall. Compare also the Poetics, ch. vi. where he deduces poetry from the αὐτοσχεδιάσματα or extemporaneous effusions of its rude votaries.
184. Cf. ch. x. § 12.
185. The subject of Epideictic Rhetoric.
186. 1. The deliberative orator advises on " the means," therefore he must know the σνμφέ­ ρον.
187. 2.
188. 3. Consequences are twofold.
189. Things
190. This principle, which he insists on even in his moral treatises, is peculiarly adapted for a test in rhetoric; where, if the subject be only reconciled to this standard of previous opinion, the end, persuasion, is forthwith answered.
191. Hooker, v. § 65, p. 306.
192. are ductive in three ways.
193. 4. Indisputable goods.
194. 5.
195. 6.
196. 7.
197. 8.
198. 9.
199. First, continuous; second, discrete; third, contingent.
200. We may observe of Aristotle's several enumerations of εἶδη, that he usually refers a few instances of earliest rence to the respective definitions or axioms at the outset of the subject, by virtue of which they belong to the class to which he assigns them. Thus, in the enumeration of good here instituted, he refers to his general canons of good which have just been admitted; e. g. virtue may be classed among goods, by virtue of def. 5 and 7. It would be useful to pursue the comparison, if not through all the instances quoted, at least through the greater part of them ; since it will at once serve the purpose of impressing on the memory his leading examples, and of helping us to a fuller acquaintance with his theory.
201. 10.
202. 11.
203. 12.
204. 13.
205. 14.
206. 15.
207. 16.
208. \7.
209. 18. Disputable goods.
210. 19.
211. 20.
212. " Priam surely would exult," etc. II. a, 1. 255 5.
213. See Otho's speech to the soldiers on Vitellius's usurpation after the murder of Galba:—Si Vitellio et satellitibus ejus eligendi facultas detur, quern nobis animum, quas mentes imprecentur; quid aliud quam seditionem et discordiam optabunt ? Tacit. Hist. i. 84.
214. 21.
215. 22.
216. 23.
217. 24.
218. So Shakspeare quotes the proverb, " Misery makes a man acquainted with strange bedfellows."
219. A good which requires no qualification ; e. g. moral truths.
220. To desire evil as evil, and feel pleasure in it as such, is perfectly unnatural. Hence St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, ch. i. ver. 32, sums up the iniquity of the Gentile world in this one word; that not only did they in person commit the enormities, but " had pleasure in them that do them."
221. Virgil therefore could not have praised AEneas more than when he makes Diomede say,- -Stetimus tela aspera contra, Contulimusque manus : experto credite, quantus In clypeum assurgat, quo turbine torqueat hastam. An.
222. 25.
223. 26.
224. 27.
225. 28.
226. Glaucus the Lycian, who was of Corinthian descent, assisted the Trojans, consequently Simonides meant to praise them ; but from the known bias of this writer to " censure in disguise," (of which another instance may be found, lib. iii. ch. 2,) the Corinthians might very fairly suspect his purpose.
227. Vide ii. c. 23, § 12, sub fin. περὶ 'Αλεξάνδρου, " ov ai θεαὶ προέκριναν.”
228. J2 Vide c. xii. § ], εἴτε ἂν λαθεῑν πράξαντες, ἢ, μὴ λαθόντες, μὴ δου̃ναι δίκην, K. T. X.
229. 29.
230. 30.
231. 1. The greater good must be discussed.
232. 2. Definition of the excess and the exceeded.
233. So Horace ........ O ! si angulus ille Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum !
234. If seen through the deceitful medium of desire.
235. 3. Different στοι­ χεῑα of the greater good.
236. 4.
237. Greater, in reference to quantity continuous, or magnitude; more, in reference to quantity discrete, or multitude.
238. The meaning of this passage appears to be this,-that while all terms designating quantity are relative, the grammatical degrees of comparison imply relation to certain objects then more immediately before us. Those who are puzzled by this doctrine of excess and defect, had better take Victorius's hint, and illustrate each remark by an example from numbers.
239. This qualification is absolutely necessary to the truth of the position; for it may happen, if the plurality be not of things of the same species as the less number, that the less number is of higher value than the greater. Five guineas are " a greater good" than two, i. e. the greater number than the less, of things of the same species; yet it does not therefore follow that five farthings are better than two guineas, for there the less number is not, as in the first case it was, virtually enumerated in the greater. Compare Ethics, lib. i. c. vii. § 8.
240. Or, as Lord Bacon expresses it, " That kind is altogether best, whose excellence or pre-eminence is best."
241. 5.
242. 6.
243. 7.
244. 8.
245. 9.
246. As is the excess of the male above the female sex, so is the excess of the greatest man above the greatest woman; and conversely, as is the excess of the greatest man above the greatest woman, so is the excess of the male above the female sex.
247. E. g. Eight exceeds two by six, which is also greater than the original number two.
248. 10.
249. 11.
250. 12.
251. 13. The same object may be made to appear the greater good in different ways.
252. Man's will hath two several kinds of operation, the one natural or necessary, whereby it desireth simply whatsoever is good in itself, and shunneth as generally all things which hurt; the other deliberate, when we therefore embrace things as good, because the eye of understanding judgeth them good to that end which we simply desire. Thus in itself we desire health, physic only for health's sake; and in this sort special reason oftentimes causeth the will by choice to prefer one thing before another, etc. Hooker, v. § 48, p. 186.
253. άρχὴ is the beginning of a thing, αἴτιον the cause; the latter consequently is prior to the former. In a plant, the seed is the ἀρχὴ, the vegetative power the αἴτιον.
254. By the rule which states the principle to be superior to that which is not so.
255. That is, supposing it to be an end; for, by a former rule,
256. 14.
257. 15.
258. 16.
259. 17.
260. ends are superior to means: thus, by one nile the superiority is assigned to ends, and by another to principles. So that, whichever side you take, you will have something to allege.
261. On this principle Aristotle argues in his Poetics for the superiority of the fable above the other five constituents of the drama, inferring its superior worth from its superior difficulty and rarity. " Quae rara, cara."
262. Perrault, the French critic, misled possibly by this very passage, impotently ridiculed Pindar for the triteness of this idea: being ignorant that the poet alluded to the philosophy of Thales, who borrowed and taught the Phoenician doctrine, that water was the principle of all things. Vide Wharton on Pope, vol. i. p. 132.
263. 18.
264. 19.
265. 20.
266. 21.
267. To φιλέταιρον ει̉ναι καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον ; i. e. the being affected by these several feelings to such a degree, that they become a leading feature of the character; in which case, there is an ὑπερόχη, as it were, of the feelings.
268. 22.
269. 23.
270. 24.
271. 25.
272. 26.
273. 27.
274. 28.
275. Whence it follows that prudence is competent to decide on the nature of good.
276. 29.
277. 30.
278. 31.
279. 32.
280. 33.
281. 34.
282. 35.
283. 36.
284. ἄϭιλλα is properly the yoke which was laid across the shoulder, from which the basket hung.
285. Horn. Odyss. xxii. 347.
286. Whether we suppose the ἐπιτάφιον to have been lost, or feel inclined to charge Aristotle with a lapsus memorize, so it is that the words are not attributed to Pericles in any work which has come down to us. The same illustration was used by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, to the deputies from the states of Greece, who implored his assistance. Herodotus, vii. 162.
287. Τέλος, the end or object of life: εὐδαιμία scilicet.
288. 37.
289. 38.
290. 39.
291. 40.
292. 41.
293. A strikingly ostentatious principle of benevolence this: but it is one which an exact observance of human nature, even now that it has met the rebuke of Divine wisdom, will perhaps too fully justify Aristotle in laying down.
294. According to the argument of the sophist Thrasymachus. Plato. Rep. lib. i.
295. I have thus ventured to understand ἡμα̃ς with λανθάνει ; for it appears the simplest way of getting over the difficulty which is caused by the illustration, which would appear better adapted to one of the former ει̉δη than to this.
296. Zaleucus established among the Locrians the law of retaliation, " an eye for an eye." But on one occasion a man with a single eye being threatened with blindness by his enemy, procured a clause to be added, denouncing the loss of both eyes to him who deprived another of his only one. Demosth. Cont. Timocr. p. 744.
297. 1. Reasons why the deliberative orator must know governments.
298. i.
299. 2.
300. ii.
301. Dr. Parr, quoting the following passage from the Politics,
302. φιλει̃ν, To τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητὸν," remarks:—" I suspect that ἀγαπητὸν here means more than carum, it may be rendered unicum, atque adeo carom. Aristotle, in lib. i. c. 7, Rhetor. says of the eye, destroyed in him who had only one, ἀγαπητὸν ἀφή̨ρηται : see Hen. Stephens's Thesaurus: but I should observe, that in the margin of Aristotle, καὶ μόνον are added, perhaps, as explanatory. Upon the word ἀγαπητὸν in SS. for μονογένη, see Suidas and Hesychius in v. and the notes." Spital. Sermon, notes, p. 39.
303. To ϭώζον πολιτείαν appears with Aristotle to have been equivalent to abstract expediency; and he therefore cannot be charged with a violation of his own rule against entering into particulars on any subject as peculiar to rhetoric, because every question of expediency will ultimately be viewed in reference to the constitution under which the parties live : at any rate the question is treated merely in a popular διηκρίβωται γὰρ ἐν τοι̃ς πολιτικοι̃ς.
304. 3. Four forms.
305. 4. Democracy.
306. Oligarchy.
307. Aristocracy.
308. Monarchy.
309. 5. Ends of each government
310. In the Ethics (lib. viii. c. 10) democracy is not stated as a distinct form, but merely as a deviation ( παρέκβαϭις) from timocracy, or πολιτεία ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων.
311. We find a remarkable proof of this in the account given by Herodotus of the anxiety of the Persians for the personal safety of Xerxes after the battle of Salamis ;- οὐκ οὕτω περὶ τω̃ν νεω̃ν ἀχόμενοι, ὡς wept αὐτω̣̃ Ξέρξη̣ δειμαίνοντες, viii. 99. A remarkable expression occurs in Sophocles from which the same inference may be drawn; Oedipus, asking Creon why the murder of Laius had not been more fully investigated, thus expresses himself:
312. 6. The speaker must know these constitutional forms in order to impress the hearers with a good-will towards him.
313. 7.
314. Where we may observe, that not simply is the person of the tyrant spoken of, but the very government itself, as though it had fallen with him.
315. It is required (lib. ii. c. 1) that he be further possessed of νηϭις.Let it be remembered that these qualities must be evinced by the speech, and not simply be taken for granted from a previous knowledge of the man. See Pearson on the Creed, Art. i. p. 5.
316. CHAP. IX.]
317. 1. The subjects of Epideictic oratory discussed.
318. 2.
319. 3. τὸ κα­ λὸν defined in I two ways.
320. 4. Perfect virtue and its constituent parts are honourable.
321. I As praise is the proper reward of virtue, so are blame and disgrace proper to vice; in order that the world may be warned by the example of the one, and excited to emulate that of the other : ἀρετὰ γὰρ ἐπαινεομένη, δένδρον ὡς, ἀέξεται.
322. Aristotle never omits an opportunity of inculcating this wholesome lesson, that the practice of virtue conduces to our true interest. Its necessity in bodies politic, as being emi-
323. 5.
324. 6.
325. 7.
326. 8.
327. 9.
328. 10.
329. 11.
330. nently τὸ ϭώζον τὴν πολιτείαν, is thus stated in another of his
331. In the Ethics he places liberality first;— φιλου̃νται ϭχεδὸν
332. ἐν τη̨̃ δόϭει. Eth. Nich. iv. 1. Courage may be ranked first, because on occasions we may be disqualified from the exercise of other virtues if this be wanting.
333. A Consistently with the doctrine held in the Ethics, he does not admit every sort of daring to the praise of courage. For of some persons, whose daring is at first sight not inconsiderable, it is true, as Juvenal remarks- Justa pericli Si ratio est et honesta, timent pavidoque gelantur Pectore, nee tremulis possunt insistere plantis : Fortem animum praestant rebus, quas turpiter audent.
334. SAT. vi. 94.
335. 12.
336. 13.
337. 14.
338. TO καλὰ enumerated.
339. 15.
340. Alluding to the division made in the Ethics of virtues into those of the ἐπιθυμήτικον and λόγον ἔχον έρος of the soul; the former whereof is the subject of the moral, the latter of the intellectual virtues. Vid. Eth. i. 13.
341. Philo, p. 35, Allegor. ed. Par.
342. Those who have not read the Ethics will be surprised to hear that the virtues which he here despatches in one section, should there occupy a book and a half. This popular discussion of them is, as far as it goes, conformable to the more philosophical view taken in the other treatise, except in respect to the criterion which is assigned of the comparative excellence of each virtue, viz. μέγιϭτας ει̉ναι ὰρετα̃ς τὰς τοι̃ς ἄλλοις χρη­ ϭιώτατοις ; and that stated § 23- αἱ ἀπολαύϭτικαι ἄλλοις μα̃λλον, κ. τ. λ. Such a test, however inadequate to the views of the philosopher, is good enough for the orator, since it is one in which nine-tenths of the world will acquiesce.
343. 16.
344. 17. Every thing free from the selfish principle is honourable.
345. is.
346. 19.
347. 20.
348. 21.
349. The passage from πάθη to ἀδίκως must be considered as a note ; and the words κατὰ To? ἄλλάς— ὡσαύτως, considered as the conclusion of the sentence preceding it.
350. Victorius cites an anecdote of Themistocles, preserved by Cicero, as illustrative of this remark. " Noctu ambulabat in publico Themistocles, quod somnum capere non posset: quaerentibusque respondebat, Miltiadis tropaeis se e somno excitari." TUBe. iv. 19. It will be needless to remark, that " noble
351. 22.
352. 23.
353. 24. Re venge is honourable.
354. 25.
355. 26.
356. Badges are honourable.
357. minds " alone can be sensible of this high excitement- ἀγωνία. And Thucydides on hearing Herodotus read his History.
358. The greatness and dignity of all manner of actions is measured by the worthiness of the subject from which they proceed, and of the object whereabout they are conversant. Hooker, Eccles. Pol. v. § 6, p. 23.
359. This is a striking instance of that species of sophistry by which our unenlightened reason reconciles us to the gratification of our worst passions; and we should learn from it to glory in that heavenly wisdom which has taught us " to do good to those who hate us, to pray for those who despitefully use us and persecute us."
360. ' Ελευθέρια, τὰ μὴ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν. See cap. v. § 7.
361. This idea appears, in ancient times, to have been very prevalent; a singular instance of its influence is mentioned in Stobaeus : " Παρ' 'Ινδοι̃ς ἐάν τις ἀποϭτερηθη̃ δανείου, h παρα-
362. 27.
363. 28. We must regard apparent good qualities as real.
364. 29.
365. The Lacedaemonians used to wear their hair long, in memoration of the victory obtained by Othryades and his two comrades over the three Argive champions, for the land at Thyrea. Herodot. i. 82. Or perhaps, being inconvenient to those engaged in servile occupations, length of hair might be considered as a badge of the more noble pursuits of the wearer. Collins has a fine allusion to this practice in the opening of his Ode to Liberty :— Who shall awake the Spartan fife, And call in solemn sounds to life The youths, whose locks divinely spreading, Like vernal hyacinths in sullen hue, At once the breath of fear and virtue shedding, Applauding Freedom loved of old to view ? Among the Franks, the privilege of wearing the hair long was peculiar to the princes and their descendants, the rest of the nation being obliged to shave the hinder part of the head. Gibbon's Decline and Fall, c. xxxv. note 17, and Agathias quoted in Heraldic Anomalies, vol. i. p. 168.
366. IS Aristotle, in his Ethics, makes this remark of the μεγα-
367. Horace recommends an innocent use of this sort of sophistry among friends, as a preservative of friendship-
368. 30. We must see in whose presence our commendation is held.
369. 31.
370. That is, under the direction of the law, ὡς 6 νόμος κελεύει, καὶ ὑπηρετικὸς τῳ̃ νόμῳ. § 7.
371. is The epitaph was on Archedice, daughter of Hippias, and wife of Oantides, tyrant of Lampsacus. See Thucyd. vi. 59.
372. [BOOK I.
373. 32. We must show that the person praised has acted on principle.
374. 33. ἔπαινος defined.
375. 34.
376. 35. Common point of epideictic and deliberative oratory.
377. See Ethics, lib. ii. c. 4. Δικαίως ἣ ϭωφρόνως πράττεται
378. ἐὰν βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ· and, in fact, unless the καλὰ be done under some restriction of principle, mode, and propriety, they lose their character, as Zonaras has, on another occasion, observed: ‛' Οτι οὐ καλὸν ὅταν μὴ καλω̃ς γί­ νηται : in Can. Apost. 66, quoted in Hooker, at the end of book i.
379. On the subject of ἐγκώμιον and ἔπαινος, see Eth. Nich. i. 12, where he is inquiring whether commendation or praise be more appropriate to happiness :— ὁ μὲν ἔπαινος τη̃ς ἀρετη̃ς,
380. Laudes nonnullae a voluntate bona cum reverentia con-
381. 36.
382. 37.
383. 38. Amplification to be used;
384. and
385. juncta proficiscuntur, quae sane laudum formula Principibus et Viris quibuscunque dignioribus debetur: Laudando proecipere : cum scilicet apud illos praedicando quales sint, humiliter moneas quales esse debeant. Bacon's Essays, De Laude.
386. parison of character.
387. 39. Amplification suits epideictic oratory.
388. 40.
389. Example suits deliberative, enthymem judicial oratory.
390. 41.
391. For the general principles upon which EXAMPLES influence us, and their peculiar adaptation to deliberative cases, see book ii. chap. 20. Meanwhile let us anticipate our author's discussion of the subject, and quote a few words of a modern writer to show how completely this vehicle of proof is adapted to the purpose of the orator, whose demonstrations should always be as little laboured as possible.—" Our lives in this world are partly guided in rules, and partly directed by examples. To conclude out of general rules and axioms by discourse of wit our duties in every particular action, is both troublesome, and many times so full of difficulty, that it maketh deliberations hard and tedious to the wisest men. Whereupon we naturally all incline to observe examples, to mark what others have done before us, and, in favour of our own ease, rather to follow them, than to enter into a new consultation, if in regard of their virtue and wisdom we may but probably think they have waded without error. So that the willingness of men to be led by example of others, both discovereth and helpeth the imbecility of our judgment." Hooker, Ecc. Pol. v. § 65, p. 307.
392. 1. Judicial oratory considered in three
393. 2. i. The motives. ii. The disposition of the agents. in. Thepersons injured.
394. 3. Injustice defined. Division of law. i. General. ii. Particular.
395. 4. Two
396. I Rewards and punishments do always presuppose something willingly done well or ill; without which respect, though we may sometimes receive good or harm, yet then the one is only a benefit and not a reward, the other simply a hurt and not a punishment. From the sundry dispositions of man's will, which is the root of all his actions, there groweth variety in the sequel of rewards and punishments, which are by these and the like rules measured: Take away the will, and all acts are equal: That which we do not, and would do, is commonly accepted as done. Hooker, i. § 9, p. 239.
397. causes of injustice. i. Depravity. ii. Incontinence.
398. 5.
399. 6. The motives of injustice proceed from
400. Cf. James, chap. i. 15.
401. How complete an insight into the nature of man does this disquisition display ; and how admirable a key is here afforded to all the operations of the human heart! This branch of knowledge has always been insisted on as essential to those employed in judicial investigations. — Thus, Bolingbroke, speaking of the education of lawyers, says, " They must pry into the secret recesses of the human heart, and become well acquainted with the whole moral world, that they may discover the abstract reason of all laws," etc. Stud. of Hist. p. 353: edit. 4to.
402. 7. the mofives of all human action.
403. 8.
404. These are seven in number: i. Chance. ii. Compulsion. iii. Nature. iv. Custom. v. Will. vi. Anger. vii. Appetite.
405. 9.
406. 10.
407. 11.
408. 12.
409. i. Chance.
410. 13.
411. ii. Nature.
412. 14.
413. iii. Compulsion.
414. He here first informs us that he shall not make his exclusion so rigid as he had above stated, but will admit youth and age, etc. to a particular consideration, as holding an important influence over character, though that influence ought philosophically to be referred to one of the seven above-mentioned principles; while every thing else which people choose to fix upon as a principle of conduct will, In examination, prove to be merely secondary, and to act mediately through one or other of the seven.
415. Vide chap. v. § 17.
416. 15.
417. iv. Habit.
418. 16.
419. v. Will.
420. 17.
421. vi Anger.
422. 18.
423. vii. Appetite.
424. These motives are briefly comprehended in one word, pleasure.
425. Revenge is a kind of wild justice. Bacon's Essays.
426. ( BOOK 1.
427. 19. What objects are pleasant, therefore, must be discussed.
428. 1. Immediate motives of injustice considered. Definition of pleasure.
429. 2. Pain is ἔξτασις.
430. 3. A reversion to nature is pleasant.
431. In all judicial questions a knowledge of the constituents of pleasure will be of essential service; for they all suppose some wrong done, and there is no man dotA a wrong for the wrong's sake, but thereby to purchase himself profit , or pleasure, or honour, or the like. Bacon's Essays.
432. 4. All freedom " from constraint.
433. 6. Appetites are pleasant.
434. Irrational.
435. Rational.
436. 6. Hope and memory are pleasant.
437. 7.
438. 8.
439. 9.
440. 10.
441. 11.
442. Criterion of love.
443. 12. Sorrow.
444. Suave mari magno, turbantibus aequora ventis, Alterius procul e terra spectare dolorem, etc. Lucretius.
445. 13. Revenge.
446. 14. Vietory.
447. 15.Hence, amusements.
448. 16. Honour and character.
449. See book ii. chap. 2, § 1.
450. If this rendering for the word ἐσπουδασμένη be not that which the Greek might first suggest, yet it is that which seems best to suit the context; for sporting and hunting do not very well accord with our ideas of grave and serious amusements, though exercised as they were by the Greeks, as mere preparatives for the labours of military duty, they might justly deserve serious attention.
451. 17. Friends.
452. 18. Being admired.
453. Flattery.
454. 19. Habitual action.
455. 20. Variety.
456. It may be interesting to compare the grounds on which Dr. Johnson considered flattery pleasant with these of Aristotle. The Doctor's words are, " Flattery pleases very generally. In the first place, the flatterer may think what he says to be true; but, in the second place, whether he thinks so or not, he certainly thinks those whom he flatters of consequence enough to be flattered." Boswell's Life, A. D. 1775, Aet. 66, p. 86, vol. iii.
457. Eurip. Orest. 234.
458. 21. Learning : admiration.
459. 22. To do good: to receive good.
460. 23. Imitation.
461. Painting Sculpture. Poetry.
462. 24. Reverses. Narrow escapes.
463. 25. Sumlarity and conformity to nature and ourselves.
464. This principle of pleasure has been thus developed by Hooker: " As to love them of whom we receive good things is a duty, because they satisfy our desires in that which else we should want; so to love them on whom we bestow is nature, because in them we behold the effects of our own virtue."—Ecc. Pol. v. § 63, p. 285. See also what is said towards the end of this chapter, of the love borne towards whatever is, in any sense, an ἔργον of own—as children, works of genius, etc.
465. when, in a drama, the things that are doing have an effect the very reverse of which is expected from them." ii. 77.
466. 26.
467. 27.Power.
468. Wisdom. Censure.
469. 28. Dwelling on one's own excellencies.
470. One passion is often productive of another: examples are without number; the sole difficulty is a proper choice. I begin with self-love, and the power it hath to generate love to children. Every man, beside making part of a greater system, like a comet, a planet, or satellite only, hath a less system of his own, in the centre of which he represents the sun, darting his fire and heat all around; especially upon his nearest connexions: the connexion between a man and his children, fundamentally that of cause and effect, becomes, by the addition of other circumstances, the completest that can be among individuals; and therefore self-love, the most vigorous of all passions, is readily expanded upon children. Lord Kames's Elements of Criticism, chap. ii. part 1, § 5.
471. The completion of what has been left unfinished was before stated to be pleasant on another principle. See § 22.
472. 29. Laughter.
473. 1. Πω̃ς ἔχοντες, or the agents of injustice, then act unjustly, when it seems possible that they shall escape detection.
474. 2.
475. The talented.
476. to In one of the books which has unfortunately been lost. His definition of it is, αἰσχρὸν ἄνευ λυπηρου̃.
477. They are, in fact, τόποι ii. 19.
478. The erful.
479. 3.
480. 4.If likely to escape detection.
481. 5. Such as the opposites to the charge, etc.
482. 6.
483. He remarks, in his Politics, the general tendency to insubordination and disobedience to laws observable in the rich and
484. same principle Tacitus remarks, " Opes principibus infensas." Ann. lib. xi. c. 1.
485. In the Ethics, where, in speaking of Βούλευσις, he limits its sphere first and generally to things possible, he remarks-
486. The Thessalonian Menon, in Xenophon, courted the friendship of men in power with this view: Φίλος τ' ἐβούλετο
487. Anab. lib. ii. c. b. via. infra.
488. The vast assistance to be derived from friends and porters by those who are under accusation, may be illustrated by the following strong expressions of Augustus, who said, " Cunctari se, ne, si superesset, eriperet legibus reum; sin deesset, destituere, ac proedamnare amicum videretur." Sueton.
489. 7.
490. 8. Such as have means of concealment.
491. 9. Where there is great gain.
492. 10. Where the punishment is only opprobrium.
493. 11. The undetected. The unlucky.
494. 12. Where the pleasure is immediate.
495. 13. Or sometimes when remote.
496. 14. Where another motive will be attributed.
497. 15. Men in want. i. Who want necessaries. ii. Who want superfluities.
498. 16. Men of good character. Men of bad character.
499. 17. The persons exposed to injustice are: such as have the desired object.
500. 18. The distant. The near.
501. Although incontinence, properly so called, is excited by a limited description of objects, yet there is a feeling analogous to, and, in the vague language of the world, synonymous with it, which may be excited by any objects whatsoever;— ὑποληπ­
502. όμοιότητα λέγομεν. Eth. Nich. vii. 4. This is another of the many instances, in which Aristotle supposes the rhetorician to take a popular view of his subject.
503. Exilis domus est ubi non et multa supersunt. Hor. Ep. lib. i. 6, 45.
504. This may have been a proverbial expression for designating any attack on a remote object; since, considered in
505. 19.
506. The indolent.
507. Those who have a high sense of honour.
508. 20.
509. 21. The wronged. The unharmed.
510. 23. Those in disgrace.
511. 23. Such as offer a pretext.
512. 24. Friends. Enemies.
513. reference to Greece under the then imperfect state of navigation, Carthage was an object not easily got at.
514. The Mysians were so effeminate and unwarlike, that their neighbours made encroachments on their territory with impunity, so that they became proverbial through Greece.
515. Some traits in the character of the Thessalian Menon, as given by Xenophon, will serve to illustrate Aristotle's catalogue of these objects of villany. Of Menon it was remarked,
516. Upon this principle the remark of Demonax was grounded
517. The friendless. Those who are not eloquent nor active.
518. 25. Those who cannot afford to wait.
519. 26. The unjust.
520. 27.
521. 28.
522. 29. Our enemies.
523. 30. Those just on the point
524. λευτοι. Nor did this escape the penetration of that keen server of human nature, Tacitus : Quibus deerat inimicus, per amico8 oppress!. Hist. i. 3. Pomponium Flaccum, veterem stipendiis, et arctâ cum rege amicitiâ, eo accommodatiorem ad fallendum, ob id maxime Moesiae praefecit. Ann. ii. 66. To this purpose, too, is the maxim of P. Syrus, Mage cavenda est amicorum invidia, quam insidiae hostium. See also Proverbs, iii. 29.
525. of being injured by others.
526. 31. Those whom they can compensate.
527. 32. Men injure where the articles are easy to conceal. 33.
528. 34. Portable.
529. 35. Difficult to be identified. Where the party injured feels a delicacy in alluding to the subject. Where it looks litigious to demand justice.
530. The amusement of the κότταβος had become so popular at the Grecian banquets, that persons who practised it with superior dexterity were presented with rewards, κοτταβει̃α, supposed by some commentators to have been a sort of cups or vessels peculiarly adapted to the purposes of the game. See Meursius de Ludis Vet. Graec. p. 28, v. Κοτταβισμός. Vid. Athenae, fol. 666, ubi de Cottabo. Critias ibid.:
531. See Victorius, and also Barnes's note on Frag. 105, in his edition of Anacreon.
532. Thus, too, the Jesuits contended that " evil might be done in order to produce good."
533. 1. All injuries offend against either:
534. 2. i. The particular. ii. The general law.
535. I Vide Eth. Nich. v. 7.
536. The description of Law given by Demosthenes is, perhaps, the most perfect and satisfactory that can either be found or conceived: 01 δὲ νόμοι τὸ δίκαιον feat τὸ καλὸν καὶ T6 συμΦέ­
537. ζῃ̃ν τοι̃ς ἐν τῃ̃ πολει. The design and object of LAWS is to ascertain what is just, honourable, and expedient; arid when that is discovered, it is proclaimed as a general ordinance, equal and impartial to all. This is the origin of law, which, for various reasons, all are under an obligation to obey, but especially because all law is the invention and gift of Heaven, the sentiment of wise men, the correction of every offence, and the general compact of the state; to live in conformity with which is the duty of every individual in society. Orate i. contr. Aristogit. Notes on Blackstone.
538. This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any
539. CHAP. XIII.J
540. 3.
541. Injustice against the communit.
542. Injustice against the individual.
543. other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original. Blackstone, Comment. Introduct. § 2, p. 41.
544. See the subject of natural law admirably illustrated in the first book of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, § 8, 9.
545. Thus Lord Hale says of the common law of England, " The original of the common law is as undiscoverable as the head of the Nile." Hist. Corn. Law, 55.
546. Is Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species,—private wrongs and public wrongs. The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals, and are therefrom frequently termed civil injuries. The latter are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a community," etc. Blackstone's Commentaries, b. ii. c. 1.
547. 4.
548. 5.
549. 6.
550. 7.
551. 8.
552. 9. We must know the definition of the various acts of injustice.
553. 10.
554. 11.
555. The unwritten law is twofold; 12. i. καθ᾽ ὑπερβο­ λὴν ἀρε­ τη̃ς Kat κακίας.
556. ii. TO του̃ ἰὸίου Kai γεγραμ­ μένου ἔλ­ λειμμα, or equity. 13.
557. ᾽ΕΠΑΝΟ'ρΘΩΜΑ νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. Ethics, v. 10. " The correction of that, wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient." Grotius de Aequitate, § 3.
558. We see in contracts, and other dealings which daily pass
559. 14.
560. between man and man, that, to the utter undoing of some, many things by strictness of law may be done, which EQUITY and HONEST MEANING forbiddeth. Not that the LAW is unjust, but imperfect; nor equity against, but above the law, binding men's consciences in things which the law cannot reach unto. Will any man say that the virtue of private equity is opposite and repugnant to that law, the silence whereof it supplieth in all such private dealing? No more is public equity against the law of public affairs; albeit, the one permit unto some, in special considerations, that which the other, agreeably with general rules of justice, doth in general sort forbid. For, sith all good laws are the voices of right reason, which is the instrument wherewith God will have the world guided, and impossible it is that right should withstand right; it must follow that principles and rules of justice, be they never so generally uttered, do no less effectually intend, than if they did plainly express, an exception of all particulars, wherein their literal practice might any way prejudice equity. Hooker, b. v. § 9, p. 35.
561. οι̃ον τὲ ὀρθω̃ς εἰπει̃ν καθόλου. Arist. Ethics, v. 10. Compare the whole chapter with what is said above.
562. Not without singular wisdom, therefore, it hath been provided, that as the ordinary course of common affairs is disposed of by general laws, so likewise men's rarer incident necessities and utilities should be with special equity considered. Hooker, b. v. c. 9, p. 35.
563. 15. Equity consists in fellow- feeling.
564. 16.
565. 17. In sympathy.
566. 18. In looking to the motive more than the act.
567. 19. Willingness to arbitrate.
568. Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf, which enacted, " that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity," was held after long debate not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit. Blackstone, Comment. Introd. § 2, p. 61. For a variety of such cases, see Rhet. ad Herennium, lib. i. c. ii. etc.
569. [ BOOK 1.
570. 1. Greater offences are those arising from greater principle.
571. 2. Where the penalty is not equivalent.
572. 3. Where the injured party hath wronged himself in consequence.
573. See Gibbon's Decline and Fall, c. 44, at note 188. Measure of Guilt, vol. viii. p. 98.
574. So much for the standard of injustice; for it is evident that any man who is sufficiently depraved to cheat you for a farthing, would not scruple to do so for a larger sum. But in the contrary habit of the mind, a contrary ratio holds, in the case of conforming to rules of justice— τὰ ἐλάχιστα, ἐλάχιστα; for a man may be very honest in minor transactions, who would not scruple to cheat you if a greater temptation were thrown in his way.
575. As in the case of Lucretia: her killing herself was an aggravation of the guilt of Tarquin.
576. 4. Where the offending was the first.
577. 5. The more brutal.
578. 6. Those done on the place of punishment.
579. 7. Violation of the unwritten
580. and written law.
581. A Among the aggravations of affrays by the law of England one is, " Where a respect for the particular place ought to restrain and regulate men's behaviour, more than in common ones; as in the king's court, and the like." Blackstone, b. iv. c. 11, § 5.
582. 1. ἄτεχνοι πίστεις.
583. 2. Five in number.
584. 3. L Laws.
585. 4. Argu-­ ments for the orator to whom the written law is opposed.
586. 5.
587. 6.
588. He here apologizes for his violation of the proposed arrangement, in treating of the ἀτέχναι πίστεις, before he has fully despatched the ἐντέχναι. In fact, the former class of πίστεις are so nearly confined to judicial, that their tion, though a little out of place, as an appendix to the subject of judicial rhetoric, is very appropriate. N ot, however, but that πίστεις of this class may be available in deliberative oratory; and indeed Aristotle himself seems to hint as much in using the words προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα (expressions peculiar to deliberation), as well as κατηγορυ̃ντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον, § 3.
589. The judges were bound by oath, first, to an adherence to the laws, and in cases unrecognised by law, to exercise their best judgment, ( γνώμη ἡ ὰρίστη :) this, as Aristotle here observes, left grounds for the appeal of an orator. 1
590. 7.
591. 8.
592. 9.
593. 10.
594. 11.
595. 12. Argumenta for him on whose side is the written law.
596. Already quoted in chap. 13, § 2.
597. Vide the arguments adduced in favour of Catholic emancipation.
598. 13. 2nd. On witnesses, which are twofold. i. παλαι­ οὶ. ii. πρό­ σφατοι.
599. 14. Witnesses of the future are soothsayers. Proverbs are witnesses.
600. Πρόσφατοι seems to imply viva voce witnesses, those from whom oral testimony may be gained, and perhaps for that reason applied to signify modern in general.
601. See Herodotus, Polymnia, 143.
602. That is, according to his declaration that any known decisions of illustrious persons might be of service in proof. Now proverbs have the advantage of being universally known, and are acquiesced in by all as the decisions of men of prudence at least. Vater explains the passage differently: vide Animadv.
603. 15. Modern witnesses partake of the risk,
604. 16. and only testify to the fact.
605. 17.
606. Most ancient and most credible. Arguments for him who has no witnesses:
607. and for him who has.
608. 18. Testimony is
609. Vide Herodot. i. 155. Cyrus is apprehensive of constant annoyance if he should not enslave the Lydians:— ὁμοίως γάρ
610. By the οἱ ἄπωθεν he should seem to imply both οἱ παλαιοὶ, and οἱ ἐκτὸς πρόσφατοι· the first removed by time, the last by their being unconcerned in the present question, which may be considered in one sense as a distance in point of interest at least.
611. To ἐκ ποδω̃ν οὔτ᾽ αντιπίπτει teal τετίμηται ἀφθόνως. Gregor. Naz. ἐν Στιχ. Hooker, vol. ii. p. 26.
612. either for one's self or the adversary.
613. 19.
614. 20.
615. 3rd. Deeds.
616. 21. To be treated as witnesses. Arguments for him who has them on his side.
617. Thus it is one of the arguments in favour of the validity of the prophecies of our Saviour's coming, that they are contained in books of which the Jews, who are the enemies of Christianity, had the custody. See Home's Sermon on " The case of the Jews."
618. LAW is essentially distinguished from deeds or private compacts, in that it is a rule; " for a compact is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command directed to us. The language of a compact is, ' I will, or will not, do this;' that of a law is, ῾Τhou shalt, or shalt not, do it.' It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts we ourselves determine
619. 22.
620. 23. Argumenta for him who has them not on his side.
621. 24.
622. 25.
623. and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do, it; in laws we are obliged to act without ourselves determining or promising any thing at all." Blackstone, Comment Introdi 2, p. 45. 13 Vid. Ethics.
624. [BOOK I.
625. 26. 4th. Torture a kind of evidence. When on our side.
626. When against us.
627. 27. 5th. Oaths; a four-fold division made. i. ii. iii. iv.
628. 28. i. When the orator refuses to tender the oath.
629. The Pandects (lib. xlviii. tit. xviii.) contain the sentiments of the most eminent civilians on the subject of torture. They confine it to slaves; and Ulpian acknowledges, that “Res est fragilis, et periculosa, et quae veritatem fallet."
630. However strangely this wrangling for the administration of oaths may sound, at the present day, when they are uniformly insisted on, yet in the early periods of our own history the evidence for accused persons against the king could not be examined on oath,-nor till the reign of Anne could any one accused of felony produce witnesses on oath. Edin. Review, No. lxxxix. Art. 3, p. 79, 80. It was not till so late as the reign of Anne, that the English courts were authorized to administer an oath to persons called by a prisoner on his defence.
631. 29. ii. When he refuses to accept it.
632. 30. ii. When he accepts it.
633. 31. iv. When he tenders it.
634. 32. Arguments for the same taken conjointly.
635. Arguments if any previous oath has been taken.
636. 33. Perjury.