Poetics. Aristotle. Thomas Twining (Translator). London, UK. 1789.
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Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (English) (Thomas Twining's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1789 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.)
Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.
Poetics
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-97
σημεῖον
A
σημεῖον is that which proves or confirms a proposition; an
αἴτιον, something that explains or gives a reason for it. Aristotle defines a
σημεῖον in
An. pr. 2. 27, 70 a 7
σημεῖον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἔνδοξος.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-98
ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων
: 're ipsa'.
τῶν ἔργων here is often rendered by 'works of art'.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-99
1448b10
γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν
:
Rhet. 1. 11, 1371 b 4
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον τό τε μεμιμημένον ... καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ, κἂν μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμός ἐστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει. —
De part. an. 1. 5, 645 a 11
καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν [i.e. τῶν ζῴων τῶν μὴ κεχαρισμένων] θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-100
1448b12
ἀτιμοτάτων
:
De anima 1. 2, 404 b 3
ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν [i.e. νοῦν] τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις. —
De part. an. 1. 5, 645 a 15
.
1448b13
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-101
καὶ τοῦτο
. For the conjunction comp.
13, 1453 a 17
σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγόμενον. —
De somno 3, 456 a 28
σημεῖον δὲ τούτων καὶ τὰ ὑπνωτικά. —
Meteor. 2. 8, 367 a 11
τεκμήριον δ᾿ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον.
1448b16
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-102
θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν
: comp.
Rhet. 1. c.
, and
Plato Rep. 475 D
οἱ ... φιλοθεάμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι. Our pleasure in the contemplation of a picture or other work of imitative art is explained here to be the natural concomitant of an intellectual act, the discovery or recognition on our part of the meaning of the picture.
1448b17
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-103
οὐχ ᾗ
.
οὐχὶ for
οὐχ ᾗ is found in
Kb in
Eth. N. 8. 12, 1161 b 1, 18
and in
D (the Marcianus) in
An. post. 1. 23, 84 b 8
.
1448b20
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-75
4.4
C'eſt que les Philoſophes ne ſont pas les ſeuls qui aiment à apprendre, & que cette paſſion eſt égalemeut naturelle à tous les autres hommes.]
1
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-76
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-77
4.6
Le plaiſir qu'ils ont alors, ne vient pas de la beauté del'imitation, mais de celle de l'art ou du mélange, & de la vivacité des couleurs, &c.]
3
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-21
NOTE 21.
4.3
P. 70. THE FIGURES OF THE MEANEST AND MOST DISGUSTING ANIMALS.
Θηρίων τε μορφας των ΑΤΙΜΟΤΑΤΩΝ.—This reading is strongly supported by the arguments of Victorius, the authority of MSS, and the sense and purport of the passage itself, which seems to require instances of mean, or disgusting, rather than of terrible, objects. Thus too
Plutarch
, in the passages referred to by Victorius, which undoubtedly allude to this of Aristotle.—
Γεγραμμένην ΣΑΥΡΑΝ η ΠΙΘΗΚΟΝ, ἰδοντες ήδομεθα και θαυμαζομεν, ουχ ὡς καλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὁμοιον ἐσιᾳ γαρ ἐ δυναται καλον γενέσθαι ΤΟ ΑΙΣΧΡΟΝ κ. τ. αλ. And presently after—
και ΝΟΣΩΔΗ μεν ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ, και ΥΠΟΥΛΟΝ,
ὡς ἀτερπες θεαμα, φευγομεν κ. τ. αλ.—See also his
Sympos. Problems. lib. v. Prob. 1.
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-22
NOTE 22.
4.4
P. 70. TO LEARN IS A NATURAL PLEASURE.
To the same purpose, in his
Rhetoric, lib. i. cap. xi. p. 537. Ed. Duval.
"Επει δε το ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ τε ήδυ, και το θαυμάζειν, και τα τοιαυτα, ἀναγκη ήδεα ειναι, το τε μεμιμημενον, ώσπερ ΓΡΑΦΙΚΗ, και ΑΝΔΡΙΑΝΤΟΠΟΙΪΑ, και ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ, και παν ὁ ἀν ἐυ μεμιμημενον , καν μη ή ήδὺ το μιμημα γαρ ἐπι τετῳ χαιρει, άλλα συλλογισμού ἐστι, ὅτι ΤΟΥΤΟ ΕΚΕΙΝΟ· ώστε ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ τι συμβαινει."
1
"And as it is by nature delightful to LEARN, to ADMIRE, and the like, hence we necessarily receive pleasure from imitative arts, as PAINTING, SCULPTURE, and POETRY, and from whatever is well imitated, even though the original may be disagreeable; for our pleasure does not arise from the beauty of the thing itself, but from the inference the discovery, that 'THIS IS THAT,' &c. so that we seem to LEARN something."—
Μανθανειν to learn, to know, i. e. merely to recognize, discover, &c. See
Harris, On Music, Painting, &c. ch. iv. note (b)
. The meaning is sufficiently explained by what follows.
Dryden
, who scarce ever mentions Aristotle without discovering that he had looked only at the wrong side of the tapestry, says—
"Aristotle tells us, that imitation pleases because it affords matter for a rea-
2
soner to enquire into the truth or falsehood of imitation," &c.
3
But Aristotle is not here speaking of reasoners, or inquiry; but, on the contrary, of the vulgar, the generality of mankind, whom he expressly opposes to philosophers, or reasoners: and his
συλλογίζεσθαι is no more than that rapid, habitual, and imperceptible act of the mind, that
"raisonnement aussi prompt que le coup d'œil," (as it is well paraphrased by
M. Batteux
,) by which we collect, or infer, from a comparison of the picture with the image of the original in our minds, that it was intended to represent that original.
The fullest illustration of this passage is to be found in another work of Aristotle, his
Rhetoric, lib. iii. cap. x.
,
4
where he applies the same principle to metaphorical language, and resolves the pleasure we receive from such language, into that which arises from the
μαθησις ΤΑΧEIA—the exercise of our understandings in discovering the meaning, by a quick and easy perception of some quality or qualities common to the thing expressed, and the thing intended—to a mirror, for example, and to the theatre, when the latter is is called metaphorically,
"The mirror of human life."
5
In the
Problems, Sect. 19, Prob. V.
the same principle is applied to Music. The Problem is, Why we are more pleased with singing when we are acquainted with the air that is sung, than when it is new to us?—And one of the answers is,
ὅτι ἡδυ το μανθανειν. i. e. to say, this is such a tune, or song, &c. And indeed the pleasure afforded by recognition, is no where, perhaps, more visibly illustrated, than in the raptures and rhythmical agitation of a popular audience, at the return of the leading air, in that species of infallible ear-trap, the
RONDEAU.
I must add, as somewhat amusing, that
Plato
makes use of this principle to prove a dog to be a philosophical animal:
"for, (he argues,)
7
το φιλομαθες και φιλοσοφον, τ'αυτον, the love of knowing, and the love of wisdom, are one and the same thing. Now dogs are delighted with knowing, simply, and disinterestedly; they fawn upon every one whom they know, and bark at the approach of every stranger;
6
and that, without having ever experienced good from the one, or harm from the other."
The philosophy of Aristotle here, though undoubtedly true, as far as it goes, will, I am afraid, to those who examine it, hardly appear to be perfectly satisfactory, or to reach the bottom of the subject. It is however to be considered, that what he has said, seems applicable chiefly to rude and unskilful spectators, and should, perhaps, be considered as a description of the effect of a picture or a statue upon children, and the multitude, who are little accustomed to view works of imitative art. And even with respect to them, the principle seems scarcely applicable but to portraits, and individual resemblances, such as may not be instantly recognized. When we look at a picture of that kind, we may not discover, till after a comparison of, at least, a few moments, that it is an imitation of this or that person; but, that it is an imitation of a man, we see at once and where there is not even a momentary ignorance, or doubt, I do not see how any information can be said to be acquired by the spectator, nor how, on the philosopher's own principles, (if I rightly understand him,) the pleasure conveyed by the imitation, can, in any sense, be resolved into that, which the mind receives from the exertion of its own powers in inferring, or discovering, the resemblance.
I say, on Aristotle's own principles, because, in the passage above referred to, where he explains himself more fully in applying the principle to metaphor, he expressly allows, that this pleasure of recognition, is not afforded by proper or common words, since they instantly suggest their meaning and cannot be mistaken.
8
Now a painting, considered as an imitation of a man, a horse, a house, in general, obviously answers in this respect, unless the imitation be grossly imperfect, to the common and familiar word; the one suggesting its original, as readily and immediately, as the other suggests its idea.
9
Among Aristotle's illustrations of this physical principle of the pleasure of self-information, as it might be called, there are two short passages, in particular, which seem to be so explicit with regard to the nature of that pleasure, that I will venture to add to the length of this note by a transcript and translation of them both. They will, I think, satisfy the learned reader that I have not, in the foregoing remarks, misrepresented the philosopher's meaning. After having applied the principle to metaphor, he applies it in like manner to the enthymemes, or arguments, of the orator.
"Διο ἐτε τα ἐπιπολαια των ἐνθυμηματων ευδοκιμει (ἐπιπολαια γαρ λέγομεν τα παντι δηλα, και ῾Α ΜΗΔΕΝ ΔΕΙ ΖΗΤΗΣΑΙ·) ἐτε όσα ειρημενα ἀγνοκμενα ἐστι᾿ ἀλλ᾿ ὅσων, ἡ ἁμα λεγομενων ἡ γνωσις γινεται, και ει μη προτερον ὑπηρχεν, μικρον ύστερίζει ἡ διανοια γίνεται γαρ ῾ΟΙΟΝ ΜΑΘΗΣΙΣ· ἐκεινως δε, οὐδετερον."
10
"For the same reason, we are pleased, neither with superficial arguments, (by which we mean such as are obvious to every one, and require no thought or search in the hearer;) nor with such as we do not understand when we have heard them; but, with those, which the mind apprehends, either while we hear them, (though not at first,) or in the moment after they are delivered:—for by these, we, in a manner, LEARN something: by the others, we learn nothing in either of these ways."
The other passage, in which the nature of the pleasure that Aristotle means is still more expressly marked, is this:
"Παντων δε των συλλογισμων θορυβειται μαλιστα τα τοιαυτα όσα ἀρχομενα ΠΡΟΟΡΩΣΙ, μη τῳ ἐπιπολης ἐἶναι ἁμα γαρ και ΑΥΤΟΙ ΕΦ ΕΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΧΑΙΡΟΥΣΙ προαισθανομενοι και ὅσων τοσετον ὑστεριζεσιν, ὡσθ άμα ειρημενων γνωρίζειν."
"Of all arguments, those are most applauded
11
, of which the audience have no sooner heard the beginning, than they foresee the conclusion;—not, however, from their being trite and obvious; for they are pleased, [not only with the ingenuity of the speaker, but] at the same time, WITH THEMSELVES and their own sagacity. Those arguments, also, afford pleasure, which, the moment after they are delivered, we are no longer at a loss to apprehend."
23.
mvp-aristotle-comment-23
NOTE 23.
4.4
P. 70. IN A MORE TRANSIENT AND COMPENDIOUS MANNER.
Επι βραχυ:—literally,
"for a short time." AS
PLATO
,
Rep. iii. p. 396
,
κατα βραχυ, for a moment—
en passant.
Dacier's
explanation—
Quoi qu'ils ne soient pas tous egalement propres à apprendre,—is, surely, wide of Aristotle's purpose. None of the versions, that I have seen, seem to give the exact idea, except that of
Heinsius
:—
"Quamquam minor BREVIORQUE ad hos perveniat voluptas."
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-24
NOTE 24.
4.6
P. 70. FROM THE WORKMANSHIP.—
Δια την ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΝ—
"neatness"—"finishing," &c. In the following passages of
PLATO
, it is opposed to a slight sketch:—
και αυτων τετων [sc. δικαιοσυνης, σωφροσυνης, &c.] ἐχ ΥΠΟΓΡΑΦΗΝ δει, ώσπερ νυν θεασασθαι, άλλα την τελεωτάτην ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΝ μη παριέναι
Rep. vi. p. 504
. So again,
lib. viii. p. 548
, the verb,
ἀπεργαζεσθαι, is opposed to
ὑπογραφειν.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-19
Ritter, cap. 4 § 3
σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων: signum h. 1. memoratum eiusmodi est quo quid verisimile fiat, non unde antecedens pronuntiatum necessario consequatur. vid. Analyt. prior. II, 27. p. 70 a 7.
σημεῖον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴλ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἔνδοξος. Rhetor. I, 2. p. 1357 b 1.
τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ μὲν
οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου,
τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος.
τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τεκμήριον,
τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνώνυμόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν διαφοράν.
ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὖν λέγω ἐξ ὧν γίνεται συλλογισμός. aliud
σημεῖον eiusdem generis recurrit infra §. 14. cf. c. 13. §. 5 et 7. -
ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων:
ἔργα h. 1. vocantur opera imitatione effecta oculisque consideranda. etiam numeri quod efficiunt et concentus eo nomine designatur in Politicis VIII, 5. p. 1340 a 21 et b 7.
δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔρ γων. –
λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων. quae hoc Poeticae loco
ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, eadem Plutarchus
ἐπὶ τῶν θεαμάτων designavit. lege locum statim transcribendum.
τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας-θεωροῦντες: similia Plutarchus protulit in Quaestion. conviv. V, 1. p. 674 A (vol. III. p. II. pag. 757 ed. Wyttenb.):
καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν θεαμάτων ὅμοια πεπόνθαμεν·
ἀνθρώπους μὲν γὰρ ἀποθνήσκοντας καὶ νοσοῦντας ἀνιαρῶς ὁρῶμεν,
τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον Φιλοκτήτην καὶ τὴν πεπλασμένην Ἰοκάστην...
ἡδόμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν.
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-20
Ritter, cap. 4 § 4
αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου: causa autem huius ipsius rei (
τοῦ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι) est quod cet. postquam duas esse artis poeticae causas dixit, imitandi studium et delectationem ex imitamentis consecutam, pergit etiam huius delectationis causam explicare. particula xai indicat eius rei causam iam exponi, quae ipsa alius rei causa modo posita erat. hanc loci sententiam non intellexit qui scripturam a libris M 14 et 16 exhibitam
αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο dedit, quasi tertia poeticae artis causa succederet, quas duas esse paulo ante pronuntiatum est. conf. Augustus Matthiae in diurnis Ienens. a. 1805. n. 224.
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ βραχύ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ: sed breve tempus commercium eius (discendi) continuant. omnes quidem homines ducuntur cupiditate discendi et sciendi (vid. Metaphysica A. 1), sed longe plurimi vulgari contenti eruditione alia negotia gerenda suscipiunt, philosophi totam vitam in discendo consumunt. hac: : de re cum aliis locis Plato disputavit, tum in Gorgia p. 483- 486. conf. Cicer. Tuscul. II, 1.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-21
Ritter, cap. 4 § 5
ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον: uberius eandem sententiam prompsit in Rhetoricis I, 11. p. 1371 b 4.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν,
καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον το τε μεμιμημένον,
ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική,
καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ,
κἂν ᾖ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτό τε τὸ μεμιμημένον·
οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει,
ἀλλὰ συλλογισμός ἐστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο,
ὥστε μαν θάνειν τι συμβαίνει. neque tam bene neque tam accurate voluptatis ex imitamentis quae percipitur causam explicuit Plutarchus Quaestion. conviv. V, 1. p. 673 D (III. pag. 756 ap. Wyttenb.):
ὅτι φύσει λογικοὶ καὶ φιλότεχνοι γεγονότες πρὸς τὸ λογικῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς πραττόμενον οἰκείως διακείμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνηται.
οὐχὶ μίμημα: haec est constans librorum scriptura quos inspexit Victorius et Bekkerus, eorum quoque quorum notitiam Burgesio (vid. Tyrwhitti ed. p. 241) debemus, neque ab his discedere codices Mediceos equidem quovis pignore contendam, quamquam Winstanleius
οὐ διὰ μίμημα exhibendo et de suis codicibus tacendo Buhlio et Graefenhanio fidem fecit, hoc sumptum esse ex quattuor illis codicibus Mediceis.
οὐ διὰ μίμημα in "quodam excuso" Victorius invenit idemque bene intellexit hoc ad correctorem referendum esse, quamquam et alii editores et ipse Bekkerus eo adquieverunt. sed ita locum legi non posse vel inde manifestum est quod verbum
ποιήσει subiecto suo caret, cui etiamsi
μιμητής vel aliud nomen ultro concedere cogitandoque supplere velis, Graecae tamen linguae ratio postulabit
οὐ διὰ μίμησιν, ut recte monuit Hermannus. sed id quoque quod nititur librorum auctoritate,
οὐχὶ μίμημα, ipsum non sufficit, propterea quod iam subsequentia illa
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν non habent quo referantur. huic quidem incommodo occurrit coniectura Hermanni
ουχ,
ᾗ μίμημα, non, quatenus imitamentum; sed vel sic frustra quaerimus quo
ποιήσει referamus. quae cumreputo, crediderim post
οὐχὶ μίμημα quoddam enuntiationis membrum intercidisse, ac locum sic supplere tentaverim :
οὐχὶ μίμημα,
ᾗ μίμημα,
ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν, h. e. non imitamentum faciet delectationem, quatenus est imitamentum, sed per artificium cet.