Poetics. Aristotle. Thomas Twining (Translator). London, UK. 1789.
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Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (English) (Thomas Twining's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1789 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.)
Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.
Poetics
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-962
1460b8
ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι κτέ.
Aristotle prepares us for the various kinds of
λύσεις by laying down a series of postulates, which may supply the defence with arguments to meet the attacks of the critics. In the first place, he tells us, as the poet is an imitator in much the same way as a painter is that, one must remember that his imitation or picture of things may be either of things as they are (or were), or 324 COMMENTARY 14608 of things as they should be, or of things as they are said or supposed to be. Secondly, as an imitator in language, the poet has by custom more liberty in the use of words than is allowed to a prose writer. Thirdly, if the technical correctness of his description of a thing is questioned, it is to be remembered that poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, and that the right in poetry is not the same thing as the right in other arts or sciences, in politics for instance. At the same time, as the matter of poetry brings it into relation with other arts and sciences, their standard of correctness cannot be ignored in poetry. An offence, however, against their rule of correctness may often be condoned; and in certain cases it even admits of justification (
b24), if it is seen to conduce to the poetical effect.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-963
1460b9
ζωγράφος ἤ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός:
see on
2, I448/8 5.
The term
εἰκονοποιός comprises the sculptor as well as the painter of portraits.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-964
1460b10
οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν.
In chap. 2
Aristotle was speaking of persons only. In the present passage he uses the neuter in order to include the poetic descriptions of things and acts. The order of the words
ἦν ἢ ἔστιν is intentional, stories of the past being regarded as the normal subjects of both epic poetry and Tragedy (see on
2, I448°I8
). It may be observed that in
1461 2
Aristotle avails himself of the distinction implied in
οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, and suggests that a certain incident, which had been criticized in
Homer, may have been probable enough in Homeric times.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-965
1460b11
οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ,
scil.
εἶναι (which covers the ground of both
ἦν and
ἔστιν). The difference between the two things (
οἷά φασιν,
οἷα δοκεῖ), so far as there is one, is like that between
τὰ λεγόμενα and
τὰ δοκοῦντα-'what people usually say', and 'what people usually think, or suppose'.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-966
1460b11_2
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ:
comp. b 34.
1460b11_3
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-967
λέξει ἢ καὶ γλώτταις κτέ.
λέξις is properly a generic term, including the metaphor, the strange word, etc. Here, however.,
Aristotle adds
ἢ καὶ γλώτταις κτέ., in order to remind us of the fact that these various unusual forms of expression are a recognized part of the poetic vocabulary. The practical effect of the addition is to modify the sense of
λέξει, and make it stand for
κυρίᾳ λεξεl, just as in
1, 1447 29
(
v. ad loc.) the addition of
ἢ τοῖς μέτροις has a reflex influence on the preceding word
λόγοις, limiting it for the moment to the sense of 'prose'. The generic word
ὄνομα likewise is occasionally used in a context which gives it the more [ 25. 14608-14 325 1460b II specific sense of
κύριον ὄνομα (see on
22, I458°28
). It is hardly necessary, therefore, to restore
(κυρίᾳ) λέξει with
Heinsius, or
λέξει ⟨ἢ kvpiq⟩ with
Twining, or
λέξει (ἢ κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν) with
Vahlen.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-968
1460b12
πάθη τῆς λέξεως:
i. e. the modifications seen in the
ἐπεκτετα- μένον. the
ὑφῃρημένον, and the
ἐξηλλαγμένον ὄνομα (
21, 1458 1
), which, though substantially identical with the ordinary words (
22, 1458b4
), are distinguished from them through some deviation of form. The term
πάθος is used in this same sense by
Theophrastus in a fragment of his
Περὶ λέξεως (
Rabe, De Theophrasti libris
περὶ λέξεως p. 6
):
τίς ἡ κυρία λέξις, τίς δ᾽ ἡ μεταφορική;
καὶ τίνα τὰ πάθη αὐτῆς, οἷον τί ἀποκοπή, τί συγκοπή, τί ἀφαίρεσις;
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-969
1460b13
δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα:
a recognition of what were afterwards known as poetic licences.
Aristotle has already shown their use and legitimacy in poetry (
22,I458*34
)
1460b13_2
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-970
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτέ.
The kind of criticism
Aristotle has in mind is one sufficiently familiar to us moderns; we know that a picture, for instance, is often censured for errors of anatomy, and a novel for errors of history or archaeology. In
Aristotle's view technical accuracy in such points, though desirable (
b27), is neither the one thing nor the first thing needful in a poem. Poetry, as a distinct art, has an end, a procedure, and a correctness of its own; and it is thus quite possible for a description in a poem to be poetically right, even though it may be wrong in some technical detail.
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-971
1460b14
τῆς πολιτικῆς.
Πολιτική, as the art which deals with human life and conduct, might easily seem to stand in a very intimate relation to poetry, which has to depict human life and conduct (
comp.
6, 1450 8 16
μίμησις πράξεως καὶ βίου); and as a matter of history the connexion between the two arts was posited in the common notion of the older poets being authorities on all questions of
πολιτική, and the great teachers of moral and political wisdom (
comp.
Plato
Rep. 598 D, 606 E
; also
Dümmler,
Kl. Schriften I p. 30
). It is not without reason, therefore., that
Aristotle takes
πολιτική as his instance here, and emphasizes the distinction between the 'political' and the 'poetical' standard of right.. It may perhaps be thought that in affirming this distinction
Aristotle anticipates the idea of 'Art for Art', and regards poetry as raised above the limitations imposed on all ordinary human activities by social or moral law. Such a notion would ill accord with what we read elsewhere in the
Poetics. In
Aristotle's view [ 326 COMMENTARY 1460 14 a deviation in poetry from the ethically right is, just like one from probability or truth, an exceptional procedure, and to be condoned only when it is seen to be necessary for the ultimate poetical effect. The tragic hero, if one is to feel pity for him in his misfortunes, should be a good man either better than, or at least as good as, the average of mankind. The secondary personages too should be each good in their way, unless the plot happens to require a character of a lower type; in which case his baseness should be no more than is wanted for the evolution of the story. Even Comedy, as
Aristotle conceives it, has its ethical limitations: the comic personage, though by hypothesis worse than the average man, is worse only up to a certain point; his faults of character or conduct being such as may be laughed at, i.e. they do not excite anger or abhorrence in the normally minded spectator in the theatre. The tacit assumption throughout the
Poetics is that the theatrical public is on the whole normal in its moral instincts and sympathies, and that the poet should never lose sight of the fact. Readers of the
Nicomachean Ethics will remember that in the Aristotelian hierarchy of arts all the other arts are regarded as subordinate to
πολιτική, the supreme art, which deals with the whole social and moral order of the State, and that there is no hint of the so-called 'aesthetic' arts being outside its purview and control.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-972
1460b15
αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἁμαρτία.
The argument may be thus restated: There is always a twofold possibility of error in the poet's
μίμησις or description of things. (1) Starting with a correct idea of the object to be described, he may fail to express his own meaning; in which case his art as a poet (or
μιμητής) is at fault, and his faulty description is a sign of artistic or literary incapacity. (2) On the other hand the error may be simply due to his starting with an erroneous idea of the object; in which case it arises not from lack of descriptive power on his part, but from insufficient knowledge of something outside poetry, and it is thus in the accidents rather than the essentials of the poetic art.
Vahlen quotes
Soph. el. 33, 1826 33
ἀπορία δ᾽ ἐστὶ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ... ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, to show that an article is not wanted before
ἁμαρτία.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-973
1460b17
ἀδυναμίαν:
comp.
16, 1454621
δι᾽ ἀπορίαν.
δι ἀδυναμίαν is practically equivalent to
δι' ἀτεχνίαν, through lack of artistic power- art being with
Aristotle a kind of.
δύναμις or power (v.
Bon. Ind. 207.b 6
).
1460b18
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-974
εἰ δὲ τῷ προελέσθαι κτέ.
I have not been able to follow
Vahlen in his general view of this passage, which in his edition reads thus :-
εἰ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον ⟨ἀμ᾿⟩ ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα ἢ τὸ καθ'᾽ ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα οἷον τὸ κατ᾿ ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην [ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται] ὁποιανοῦν, οὐ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν. This reading requires us to take
μὴ ὀρθῶς as standing for
μὴ ὀρθῶς εἶχεν, and
ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον κτέ. as a short way of saying
ἀλλὰ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι οἷον τὸν ἵππον κτἑ. It is, however, much simpler to suppose that
μὴ ὀρθῶς =
μὴ ὀρθῶς μιμήσασθαι, and to take
ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον κτέ. (
scil.
μιμήσασθαι) as a concrete instance of the opposite of
ὀρθῶς μιμήσασθαι. The insertion also of
ἅμα before
ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα is unnecessary; these words (as the tense of the participle is enough to show) suggest a picture; and the fault in the picture consists in the horse in motion being depicted with both right legs thrown forward, instead of only one of them. As regards the clause
ἀδύνατα πεποίηται, which
Vahlen (after
Düntzer) excises as a dittographia of the
ἀδύνατα πεποίηται in
623
, it seems to me that the words are wanted for two reasons, (1) to enable us to supply
πεποίηται after
τὸ καθ ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα, and (2) to give the statement the requisite breadth. The error in the poet's picture or description (
comp.
πεποίηται) may be in matters which come under the cogni- zance of some special art or science (
τὸ καθ ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρ- τημα), but it may also be in matters of a less distinctly technical nature.
Aristotle adds
ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται ὁποῖ᾽ ἂν οὖν in order to include this latter kind of error. The instance of it in the context (
b 26
) is the absurdity (
comp.
24, 1460a 15
), or rather the offence against common sense, in the Pursuit of Hector in the
Iliad. That given in
b31
of the other form of error is a mistake in natural history, i. e. in a matter of technical knowledge. The distinction, therefore, between the two kinds of error is a very real one, at any rate in controversy (v. on
25, 1461 b 24
).
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-975
τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα,
scil.
μιμήσασθαι. In
Aristotle's view this is a mistake in natural history, and inconsistent with the general law of the diagonal movement of the legs of quadrupeds walking as laid down in the
De incessu an.14, 712 a 24
:
κινεῖται δὲ τὰ ὀπίσθια πρὸς τὰ ἔμπροσθεν κατὰ διάμετρον μετὰ γὰρ τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν ὄπισθεν κινοῦσιν, εἶτα τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ὄπισθεν... εἰ δὲ τοῖς δεξιοῖς ἀμφοτέροις πρώτοις [scil. ἐποιοῦντο τὴν κίνησιν], ἔξω Generated at Tufts University through HathiTrust on 2026-85-18 19:55 GMT [ 328 COMMENTARY 1460 b 18
ἂν ἐγίγνοντο τῶν ἐρεισμάτων καὶ ἔπιπτον ἄν. He was apparently unaware of the fact that the legs of the horse are actually in the position assumed to be impossible in certain stages of the amble and the rack. A horse with legs in this position is to be seen in modern art in
Meissonier's 'Cavaliers en marche' (Exposition
Meissonier, No. 114-Paris 1893). Illustrations from the life will be found in
E. Muybridge's 'Animal Locomotion '-Philadelphia 1872-93.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-976
1460b21
ὁποῖ᾽ ἂν οὖν,
scil.
ᾗ πεποιημένα ᾖ For the omission of the verb
comp.
Soph. el. 17, 175b27
ὁποτέρῳ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν διαφέρει. -
Eth. N. 3. 10. 1115b 19
ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος. -
Pol. 6. 3, 1318b22
τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι (also
Riddell,
Digest of Idioms § 255
). We should expect simply
ὁποιαοῦν, the formula ordinarily used by
Aristotle in passages like the present.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-977
οὐ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν
(
scil.
ἡ ἁμαρτία τῆς ποιητικῆς) is the apodosis, and the opposite of that in the preceding clause (
b17
),
αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία. The general sense of the passage (with the reading
τῷ προελέσθαι) is briefly this: If it was through a mistake in his original concep- tion of the thing that either the technical error, or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be, have got into his description, the error in that case does not belong to the art of the poet
per se, but only
per accidens.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-598
25.2
3. Car il represente un ſujet tel qu'il étoit, ou tel qu'il est; tel qu'on le dit, ou qu'il paroît; ou tel qu'il doit être.]
1
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-599
25.3
4. Et pour cela il ſe fert, ou de mots propres, ou de mots étrangers, ou des metaphores, & de tous les autres changemens de la diction, dont les Poëtes ont la liberté de se fervir.]
2
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-600
25.4
5. D'ailleurs, il faut bien ſe ſouvenir qu'on ne doit pas juger de l'excellence de la Poësie, comme de celle de la Politique, ny mème comme de celle de tous les autres Arts.]
3
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-601
25.5
6. Quand elle choisit des ſujets au deſſus de fes forces & de ſa portée, voilà celuy qui vient d'elle.]
4
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-602
25.6
7. Et quand elle choisit des ſujets qui ne font pas au deſſus de ses forces, mais qui font vicieux, voilà celuy que j'appelle par accident, elle represente, par exemple, un cheval qui remue en même temps les deux pieds droits.]
5
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-603
25.6
8. Elle peut pecher de mème contre les regles de tous les autres arts, comme contre la Medecine.]
6
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-604
228.
mvp-aristotle-comment-228
NOTE 228.
25.3
P. 123. IN WORDS, EITHER COMMON, OR FOREIGN, &C.
Λέξει ἢ καὶ γλώτταις—.
Heinf. [Heinsius]
ΚΥΡΙΑι λέξει, ἢ καὶ γλώτταις. The insertion seems necessary, but would, perhaps, be better thus:
λέξει, Η ΚΥΡΙΑι, καὶ γλώτταις, &c. Victorius and other commentators suppose
κυρίᾳ to be understood. But this I cannot conceive.
Λέξις appears clearly to be used here, as in
cap. xxii.
for diction in general, including, as in that chapter, every sort of words.
229.
mvp-aristotle-comment-229
NOTE 229.
25.3
P. 123. WHICH ARE THE PRIVILEGE OF POETS.
ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. The same expression is made use of by
Isocrates
, in the following passage, to which I referred in
NOTE 5, p. 158,
and in which the privileges and advantages of the Poet are well set forth, and the importance of verse to the effect of even the best poetry, is strongly insisted on.
Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ ΔΕΔΟΝΤΑΙ κόσμοι. Καὶ γὰρ πλησιάζοντας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοὺς θεοὺς οἷόν τ’ αὐτοῖς ἐστι ποιῆσαι, καὶ διαλεγομένους, καὶ συναγωνιζομένους, οἷς ἂν βουληθῶσι· καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι, μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ, τὰ μὲν, ξένοις, τὰ δὲ, καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ, μεταφοραῖς· καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσι διαποικῖλαι τὴν ποἰησιν.
1
Τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οὐδὲν ἔξεστι τῶν τοιούτων· ἀλλ’ ἀποτόμως, καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τοῖς περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι χρῆσθαι.
2
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἱ μὲν μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ οὐδενὸς τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν· ἃ τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥς, ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν, ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως ταῖς γε εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. Καταμάθοι δ’ ἄν τις ἐκεῖθεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν· ἢν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοἰας καταλίπῃ, τὸ δὲ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεεστέρα τῆς δόξης, ἧς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν.
3
See
NOTE 5, p. 158,
the passage from
Plato
.
230.
mvp-aristotle-comment-230
NOTE 230.
25.4
P. 123. WHAT IS RIGHT IN THE POETIC ART, IS A DISTINCT CONSIDERATION FROM WHAT IS RIGHT IN THE POLITICAL, OR ANY OTHER ART.
This is one of those passages, which the commentators appear to me to have darkened by illustration. See, particularly, Dacier's note. His account of the difference between Poetry and all other arts, seems evidently false. What Aristotle says of Poetry—that it has two kinds of faults, essential, and incidental—is, at least, true of all other imitative arts. It is even true, as Beni has shewn, of Rhetoric and Logic.
4
Aristotle only says, (to give the passage literally,)
"the rightness of the poetic, and the rightness of the political art, are not the same, nor of any other art and the poetic art." The plain meaning of which appears to me to be that which I have given—that the
ὀρθότης, or rectitude, of Poetry itself, is not to be confounded with that of Politics, nor of any other art that may be the incidental subject of the Poetry, which, in itself, may be good, and even excellent, though it may deliver things false or inaccurate in Politics, Natural History, Navigation, Geography, &c. This sense of the passage seems clear of all the difficulties with which the common explanation is embarrassed, and leads naturally to the following division of the faults of Poetry, into essential and incidental. Castelvetro is the only one, of the commentators I have consulted, who appears to agree with me, if I understand him rightly, in this explanation of the passage.
The allusion, here, to the severe objections of PLATO, who would allow of Poetry no farther than as it could be made to coincide with the views of his own strict and moral legislation, has been sufficiently pointed out.
5
The reader may see, particularly, a fine passage to this purpose in the seventh book of his Laws, [
p. 817, ed. Serr.
], where, addressing the Tragic Poets, he refuses to admit them into his republic, till the magistrates have satisfied themselves, by inspection of their poems, that they contain nothing but what is in perfect unison with the laws and moral discipline of the state.
—Μὴ δὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς ῥᾳδίως γε οὕτως ὑμᾶς ποτε παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐάσειν, σκηνάς τε πήξαντας κατ’ ἀγορὰν, καὶ καλλιφώνους ὑποκριτὰς εἰσαγομένους, μεῖζον φθεγγομένους ἡμῶν, ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὸν πάντα ὄχλον, τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντας ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ’, ὡς τὸ πολὺ, καὶ ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖστα. Σχεδὸν γάρ τοι κἂν μαινοἰμεθα τελέως ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἅπασα ἡ πόλις, ἥτις ἐν ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέποι δρᾶν τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, πρὶν κρῖναι τὰς ἀρχὰς, εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ ἐπιτήδεια πεποιήκατε λέγειν εις τὸ μέσον, εἴτε μή. Νῦν οὖν, παῖδες μαλακῶν μουσῶν ἔκγονοι, ἐπιδείξαντες τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρῶτον τὰς ὑμετέρας παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ᾠδὰς, ἂν μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ γε, ἢ καὶ βελτίω, τὰ παρ’ ὑμῶν φαίνηται λεγόμενα, δώσομεν ὑμῖν χορόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὦ φίλοι, οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυναίμεθα. —
De Leg. VII. p. 817.
To this way of talking it was a plain and direct answer, to say—
Οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης ἐστὶ τῆς ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ καὶ τῆς ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ.
In what is added—
οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς—Aristotle may, I think, be supposed to glance more particularly at that part of the tenth book of Plato's Republic, where he exposes the idle notion, current among the rhapsodists, that Homer was a perfect master of all arts and sciences. And with respect to the absurdity of this notion, Aristotle undoubtedly agreed with him. But there was danger, lest the credit of Homer should suffer from the manner in which Plato combated this idea. For those extravagant admirers of Homer not only asserted the fact, that he had an accurate knowledge of every art and science on which he touched, but they went farther, and maintained, that such accuracy was essential to a good Poet:
Ἀνάγκη γὰρ, they urged,
τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ, καλῶς ποιήσειν, εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἷόντε εἶναι ποιεῖν.
Now Plato, whose object here is to vindicate his rigid exclusion of all mimetic poetry, and that of Homer in particular, from his republic, confutes the fact, without confuting the general position. While he shews the pretensions of the Homerists to be false, he seems, at least, to allow, that they ought to be true. For he flings in no savings; he no where says, what Aristotle has here said for him—that the want of this supposed accurate knowledge of arts and sciences no way affects the character of Homer as a Poet. By denying that he had that knowledge, and, at the same time, not denying, or not expressly denying, that he ought to have it, he leaves the reader to understand, that he meant to detract, on this account, from his merit as an imitator. And this, indeed, is perfectly consonant to the whole design of this part of his work, which was, to discredit poetic imitation in general, by shewing the distance of its representations from truth.
6
231.
mvp-aristotle-comment-231
NOTE 231.
25.5
P. 123. THE FAULTS OF POETRY, &C.
The original is—
ΑΥΤΗΣ δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἡ ἁμαρτία. The word
αὐτῆς appears to me to make strange confusion. For Aristotle is here distinguishing two sorts of faults in Poetry, essential and incidental; and his expression, presently after, for the former, is
ΑΥΤΗΣ ἡ ἁμαρτία—
"a fault of the Poetry itself." As the text stands, therefore, it is just as if he had said—
"There are two faults of the Poetry itself: one, of the Poetry itself, and the other, incidental." — Accordingly Dacier, Batteux, and almost all the translators, neglect the word
αὐτῆς. Possibly it might, originally, have stood thus : —
οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης, καὶ ποιητικῆς ἀυτῆς. Τῆς ΔΕ ποιητικῆς, &c.
232.
mvp-aristotle-comment-232
NOTE 232.
25.6
P. 123. IF THE POET HAS UNDERTAKEN TO IMITATE WITHOUT TALENTS FOR IMITATION--.
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι ἀδυναμίαν. —So, the MSS. But
ἀδυναμία never, I believe, means
impossibility, but
want of power, incapacity. This was, long ago, sufficiently proved by Victorius. If the word be right, some preposition must be wanting. Heinsius supplies—
ΚΑΤ’ ἀδυναμίαν. The credit of the conjecture is due to Castelvetro. Still the phrase,
μιμήσασθαι κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν, for
imitating without ability, or talents, for imitation, is harsh, and, as far as I know, unsupported by any other example. It seems not improbable, that Aristotle might have written it—
ΠΑΡΑ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ. Supposing the three first letters of the preposition to have been destroyed, the passage would stand thus—
μιμήσασθαι * * ΑΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ: which it was obvious enough for the transcriber to miscorrect into
ἀδυναμίαν. The phrase,
προείλετο μιμήσασθαι παρὰ δύναμιν, would be clear and unexceptionable. So,
cap. ix.
—
παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες μῦθον.
Victorius remarks, and, I think, justly, that Horace probably had his eye upon this passage, in the lines—
Sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, æquam Viribus; et versate diu, quid ferre recusent, Quid valeant, humeri. ... Cui lecta potenter erit res, &c. —
Epist. ad Pis. v. 38, &c.
—where Aristotle's
προαιρεῖσθαι, he thinks, is expressed by
"sumite materiam," and,
"lecta res:" and
κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν glanced at in the other expressions, but, particularly, in the adverb—
"potenter."
7
25.1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-109
25.3
NEITHER IS THE PROPRIETY OF POETRY THE SAME WITH THAT OF THE POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER ART.
ARISTOTLE means, that in other arts, such as the theory of government, geography, history, the merit of their professors must solely depend on their accurate acquaintance with every circumftance at all relative to the subject on which they write. Now this is by no means the cafe with poetry, which only requires a probable imitation of human actions
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. actions and manners. Had the Winter's Tale of Shakespear been a history, or a treatise on geography, it would have been essentially defective from his supposing Bohemia to be a maritime country. But this has not the smallest effect on the interest, and confequently on the merit of the play. Had Shakespear chofen a mode of imitation to which his powers were unequal, (we may suppose any thing,) and consequently written a bad play, the fault would have been essential, but having undertaken an imitation to which his powers were perfectly equal, and which therefore he executed well, no fault can fall on the play, the action, manners and sentiments, because the poet did not know that Bohemia was an inland country. For it is not the office of the poet to instruct his hearers in particular subjects of art, but to awaken his paffions by general representations of nature. The author of the Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful makes the following remark on this subject in his introduction to that elegant work. Why should a perfon be shocked at a shipwreck on the coast of Bohemia who does not know but that Bohemia may be an island in the Atlantic Ocean? and after all, what reflection is this on the natural good taste of the perfon here supposed." It is true however that at present such an error would condemn the best play that could be possibly written. For there are so many more perfons now, who understand the first elements of geography than are capable of feeling, or judging of a tragedy. Besides, it is impoffible that a poet of the present day could have that general knowledge of human events, and propriety of conduct, fit to enable him to imitate human actions and manners, and be so grofsly ignorant as this must shew him to be. The mistake of Shakespear is a proof of the general igno- 3 S2 rance
rance of his age. Were a poet now to make such an error, it would be corrected in the rehearsal, even by the scene-shifters. A mistake of the same kind, as the illustration from the hind by Aristotle, occurs in the Ode on Spring, by Mr. Warton, one of the most beautiful and original descriptive poems in our language, and which strongly shews the force of poetical imitation in (A) rendering objects that have no beauty in themselves highly beautiful in description. I suppose there are few scenes less pleasing and picturesque in themselves than the view from Catherine Hill near Winchester, over the bare adjacent downs, and on the Itchin at its feet, formed into a navigable canal, and creeping through a wide valley of flat-water meadow, intersected often at right angles by strait narrow water courses. But hear the poet, and observe how the scene appears in the picture he has given of it without changing the features of the original. 'O'er the broad downs, a novel race, • Frisk the lambs with faltering pace, • And with eager bleatings fill • The foss that skirts the beacon'd hill. • His free born vigor yet unbroke • To lordly man's ufurping yoke, • The bounding colt forgets to play, Basking beneath the noontide ray. • And stretch'd upon the daisies pied • Of a green dingle's floping fide; [D] See Note 1. Chap. IV. • While
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. • While far beneath where nature spreads • Her boundless length of level meads, • In loose luxuriance taught to stray • A thousand tumbling rills inlay • With filver veins the vale, or pass • Redundant through the sparkling grass.' Besides the general beauty of the description it must have a particular one in the eyes of every Wykhamist as recalling the idea of the days of early youth, the joys of which are strongly impressed on the memory, while the hours of school restraint, which sometimes confidered going to hills even as a task, are but faintly traced. But to return to the object of the note. What hypercritic would cenfure these lines: ، Scarce a bee with airy wing • Murmurs the blossom'd boughs around, ، That cloath the garden's SOUTHERN MOUND.' Because the fouth wall of a garden is its northern bound ? An impropriety is often found in the works of the earlier engravers from copying directly from the drawing, which occasions the figures of the impreffion to be reversed, and the sword to be in the warrior's left hand, and the shield on his right. This is never discovered without being purposely looked for. As Aristotle observes however, that such errors, however trifling they may be, are still errors, and as fuch ought to be avoided if possible: we may justly censure the arrogance of these writers, who founding their pretenfions
pretenfions to fame on higher excellencies, wantonly, and sometimes wilfully, affect to be negligent and even ignorant of flighter things. This species of self importance will often obtrude itself into the conversation of those persons who think too highly of their own merit, where to the difcerning it has an effect directly the reverse of that which is proposed [B]. It is nevertheless sometimes a defect attending real merit. I knew a gentleman high, and defervedly so, in literary reputation, who had this foible in a great degree. He thought it shewed superior attention to things of extraordinary consequence to pay none to common occurrences. He lived near London; and a friend happening in the spring to ask him the state of vegetation in the country, he answered him, that he was too much employed in other objects to give any attention to things of that nature. His friend, a little piqued at such an absurd affectation of consequence, replied, ' I am furprized, Sir, at that, fince Solomon, who ⚫ had fome reputation for wisdom in his day, could speak of plants from the cedar of Libanus to the hyffop that grew on the wall.' That agreeable and honeft egotist Montaigne speaks of his own ignorance and want of dexterity in many of the common offices of life; but so far from priding himself on it he prefaces his account with the following remark. • But great minds are univerfal minds; open, and pre- ، pared for every thing, and if not actually informed, immediately • capable of receiving information. MONTAIGNE'S Essays, L. II. Ch. XVII. ON PRESUMPTION. [B] The true, strong, and found mind, is the mind that can equally embrace great things ، and small. Now I am told the king of Pruffia will say to a fervant, " Bring me a bottle " of such a wine, which came in such a year; it lies in such a corner of the cellar." BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON, Vol. 11. p. 254. Exactly
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. Exactly correspondent with this was the judgment passed by a country clergyman on a late nobleman in high estimation both in the literary and the political world. 'My lord - -' he said, ' is not a great man: he • does not know wheat from barley.'
25.2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-110
25.6
LIKE SOPHOCLES WHO SAID HE DREW HIS CHARACTERS AS THEY OUGHT TO BE, AND EURIPIDES AS THEY REALLY WERE.
BISHOP HURD, in a note on verse 317 of Horace's Epistle to the Pifos, has given a sense to this passage different from its usual acceptation, and which I had inferted in the first edition of my tranflation. But I think Mr. Twining has clearly confuted this opinion as to the particular [c] application of it here. But of this I shall leave the reader to judge for himself, by laying the reasoning of both before him. The bishop of Worcester, after citing this sentence of Ariftotle proceeds. ، ، ، The meaning of this is, Sophocles from his more extended commerce with mankind had enlarged and widened the narrow partial conception arifing from the contemplation of particular characters, into a complete comprehenfion of the kind. Whereas the philofophic Euripides, having been mostly conversant in the academy, when he came to look into life, keeping his eye too intent on single really exifting perfonages, funk the kind in the individual, and so painted his [c] For the particular purpose of the bishop's note, which is to discriminate between general and particular characters, as objects of the drama, and especially of comedy, nothing can be more accurate and conclufive than the reasoning. characters,
، characters, naturally indeed and truly with regard to the objects in ⚫ view, but fometimes without that general and universally striking like- * ness which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth. 66. • According to this interpretation, To this Mr. Twining answers. • which I am taking the liberty to examine, Sophocles is made to an- • swer the charge [D] by denying its truth: for the answer as here stated agreeable to truth" because they are • will be this. You say my representations are not true, and those of Euripides are true. I deny this. You use the term improperly. My • representations are " If you would have men " from wide observation, from human nature at large;" those of Euripides are not agreeable to truth because they are representations not of • the kind but of individuals. The answer, as I understand Ariftotle, • is very different. The charge is not denied, or explained away, but • admitted and justified. Sophocles says, “ " "collected represented as they are, διοι ἔισι, you must go to Euripides. I have not drawn them so. I never intended to draw them fo; I have done " better. I have delineated mankind not fuch as they really are, but " such as they ought to be." Euripides does not appear to have been charged by those objectors with what may be termed, individual impropriety of imitation, but with too close and portrait-like delineation • of general nature. In short, the difference which I understand to be here intended between the two poets cannot be better expressed than by the ingenious commentator himself in the beginning of the note to which I refer, where it is observed, (page 253) that “ truth may followed too closely in works of imitation, as is evident in two ، ، ، " ... it is respects. For, 1. the artist, when he would give a copy of nature, [D] For not defcribing things according to truth.. " may
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. may confine himself too fcrupulously to the exhibition of particulars, " and so fail of representing the idea of the kind. Or, 2. in applying " himself to give the general idea, he may collect it from an enlarged "view of real life, whereas it were still better taken from the nobler " conception of it as subsisting only in the mind." Now if we apply • the latter of these differences to the two poets in question, if we fay " In applying himself to give the general idea, Euripides collected it " from an enlarged view of real life, whereas Sophocles took it from " the nobler conception of it as subsisting only in the mind;" this • will express exactly what I take to be the sense of Aristotle. To the support which the common interpretation of this passage receives from • Aristotle himself, may be added that which it receives, and I believe • is generally acknowledged to receive, from the tragedies themselves, • which are extant of the two poets in question. That Euripides is in ، general liable to the censure of particular imitation of “ sinking the "kind in the individual," I cannot say I have observed. But who can • read this poet without observing the examples with which he every • where abounds of that very general and universally striking like- " ness which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth." In Sophocles we find more elevation, more dignity, more of that improved likeness and ideal perfection which the philosopher expresses by his ὁία δεῖ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον. In Euripides we find more of the ἀληθὲς, the ὅμοιον. We are oftener reminded of the common nature and common life, which we fee all around us. And if this with other ⚫ causes be sometimes found to lower the imitations of this poet beneath • the proper level of tragic dignity, and to produce something of the κωμωδία τίς ἠθολογεμένη, which Longinus attributes to the Odyssey, the * fault is amply redeemed, perhaps in those very parts by the pleasure * which results from the closeness and obviousness of the imitation. 3 T certainly
، certainly in many others by those precious touches of nature which • must at once strike every individual of every audience; such as if I ⚫ mistake not are much more rarely to be found in Sophocles, and ' such perhaps, after all we have heard about the BEAU IDEAL and ، improved nature, can only be produced by an exact transcript of nature as it is, of what the poet has actually felt himself, and actually seen in others.' This reasoning appears to me unanswerable. That for the purposes of the drama at least, if not for every species of poetry which professes to imitate human actions; a comprehenfive view of real character is much superior to this image of perfection in the mind, is to me evident beyond a doubt, and seems founded on the superiority of truth, to unnatural fiction, exemplified in such characters as Tom Jones and Amelia, when contrasted with Grandison and Clarifsa. It must be remembered also, though it does not seem to have occurred to the bishop, that Aristotle is not drawing a parallel between the two tragic poets here, neither does he here or elsewhere give any shew of preferring Sophocles to Euripides, but rather the contrary; for he has in another place allowed Euripides the merit of attaining the end of tragedy more effectually than [E] any other poet. A compliment of no common magnitude, as it is on the same principle that in the next chapter he finally determines the superiority of tragedy over the epopee. Besides in this chapter, Aristotle is not pointing out beauties, but thewing how faults may be palliated. [E] Chap. XIII. Τραγικώτατος τῶν ποιητῶν. It
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. It is impossible for the English reader to go through Mr. Twining's note without seeing how applicable the parallel between the two Greek tragic poets is to the father of the British drama and our other best tragic writers, as also the French dramatic poets. Substitute Shakespear for Euripides, and Thomson or Voltaire for Sophocles, and the criticifm will be equally just.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-184
Ritter, cap. 25 § 1
Quae in poetarum operibus sive iure sive iniuria reprehenduntur, ea pluribus modis variisque artificiis diluere vel excusare licet. Noli, lector, gravari vel mihi indignari te rursus in uncos illos fatales incurrere: non enim libido mea eos posuit, sed ipsa veritas expostulavit ut illi carnificis officio fungerentur. itaque animum attende et rem cognosce. de problematis loquimur eorumque solutionibus.
προβλήματα verus Aristoteles dixit quaestiones et breves disputationes de rebus quibusdam nondum satis exploratis proponendas, quarum ipse ingentem numerum conscripsit et solvere operam dedit in libris illis
Προβλημάτων etiamnum conservatis. sed quae hoc capite percensentur
προβλήματα, sunt difficultates ad vituperandos poetas epicos et in his prae ceteris Homerum argute excogitatae, quae non tam ad seriam sobriamque doctrinam expromendam quam ad ostentandam vanam scientiam sedulo et turbate propinantur:
λύσεις autem quae dicuntur artificia sunt, quibus illae difficultates (
απορίαι,
ἀπορήματα,
προβλήματα,
ζητήματα,
ἐνστάσεις,
ἐπιτιμήσεις ς.
ἐπιτιμήματα) speciosius plerumque quam verius dissolvuntur. hoc genus captiosarum quaestionum a parvis initiis increscere coepit,posteaquam Zoilus Amphipolitanus non multo ante Aristotelis aetatem editis novem in Homerum libris, in quibus ingenii subtilitatis partim exercendae partim iactandae ac venditandae gratia permulta venerandi vatis vitia coarguere conatus erat, alios ad eandem laudis viam ingrediendam excitavit, alios ad vindicandum ab iniquis reprehensionibus optimum poetam impulit ¹). in his relatos legimus ipsum Aristotelem de quo statim videbimus, tum eius discipulum Heraclidem Ponticum, denique Sosibium et Zenonem Stoicae sectae conditorem et Athenodorum Arati poetae fratrem 2). mire vero illis quaestionibus et concipiendis et solvendis delectabantur Musei Alexandrini alumni et praeceptores, ut narrat Porphyrius in scholiis ad Iliadem I. 688. p. 272 a 4 ed. Bekk.
ἐν τῷ μουσείῳ τῷ κατ' ᾿Αλεξάνδρειαν νόμος ἦν προβάλλεσθαι ζήτημα καὶ τὰς γινομένας λύσεις ἀναγράφεσθαι. conf. eadem scholia ad K. 372. Ad Aristotelem revertimur. is igitur et ipse eiusmodi quaestiones et solutiones pertractasse traditur opere
ἀπορημάτων sive
προβλημάτων Ὁμηρικῶν sex vel septem libris evulgato. eorum qui mentionem fecit primus est Phrynichus (saeculo post Christum altero) s. v.
βασίλισσα p. 225 ed. Lob.
βασίλισσαν ᾿Αλκαῖόν φασι τὸν κωμῳδοποιὼν καὶ ᾿Αριστοτέλην ἐν τοῖς Ὁμήρου ἀπορήμασιν εἰρηκέναι. Diogenes (V, 12, 26) in catalogo librorum Aristoteliorum ponit
ἀπορημάτων Ὁμηρικῶν α΄ β' γ' δ' ε' ς', vitae Aristoteliae auctor incertus apud Menagium
απορημάτων Ὁμηρικῶν ζ'. conf. Pseudo-Ammonius in vita Aristotelis:
ὁ μὲν οὖν ᾿Αριστοτέλης ἔτι νέος ὢν τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων παιδείαν ἐπαιδεύετο,
ὡ δηλοῖ τὰ γεγραμμένα αὐτῷ περὶ ποιητικῶν καὶ πρὸς ποιητάς,
ἔτι μέντοι τὰ Ὁμήρου προβλήματα. sed quid testimonia curiose anquirimus, cum fragmenta satis prolixa ex illo opere a Por- 1) Lege Fr. A. Wolfii Prolegomena ad Homerum c. XLII, post quem hunc litterarum Graecarum historiae locum egregie illustravit K. Lehrs Regimontanus de Aristarchi studiis Homericis р. 200-229 2) Conf. Lehrsius 1. 1. pag. 227.phyrio in Homericas quaestiones recepta in scholiis ad Iliadem etiamnum legamus? sed ea ipsa fragmenta ita omni ingenii vigore et doctrinae commendatione carent, ut nihil cogitari possit ieiunius, ut Aristotelem in Aristoteliis reperire nullo modo possis. lege quae referuntur ad B. 73. 169. 183. 305. 649. Г. 276. 277. 441. 4.88.277. E. 576. 741. 778. Z. 234. H. 93. 228. I. 17.
Κ. 153. 198. 252 (pag. Suo 285 b 6). П. 233. Т. 108.
Ψ. 269.
Ω. 15. 569. iure igitur recteque Lehrsius 3) existimavit subditicio libro usum esse Porphyrium. plane enim abhorret a gravitate viri sana mente et acri iudicio praediti sex septemve libris, vel animi iocique causa, eiusmodi consectari nugas et ineptias, quales ex illo Aristotelis opere transcripsit Porphyrius. itaque hoc statuemus, obscurum quendam grammaticum aetatis Alexandrinae, cum quaestiones Homericas in corpus collectas redegisset, falso auctore inscripto fucum fecisse hominibus credulis et divini philosophi nomen venerantibus. iam vero, et huc in mea causa potissimum attendi volo, duae
ἀπορίαι et duae
λύσεις a Porphyrio ex illo Aristotelis opere transcriptae (ad Iliad. K. 152. p. 279 b 42 et ad K. 252. p. 285 b 6) omnino consentiunt cum duabus isdem difficultatibus et solutionibus quae in huius capitis paragraphis 7 et 13. afferun- 3) De Aristarchi stud. Hom. p. 227: "Saepissime Aristotelis
Ὁμηρικὰ ζητήματα a Porphyrio in commentariis Homericis afferuntur ut, si quidem ea genuina sunt, haud contemnenda ex hoc libro hodie exstent fragmenta. sed equidem nondum potui mihi persuadere, non subdititio libro usum esse Porphyrium. tam omnia ei commemorata ieiuna sunt atque ab Aristotelis ingenio et doctrina aliena. denique cur a commentatoribus Homericis reliquisque Homericas quaestiones tractantibus, ut Plutarcho, hic liber nunquam ad partes vocatus, a solo Porphyrio adscitus?" haec Lehrsius. ego monendum praeterea existimo ne Phrynichum quidem suis oculis vidisse librum istum obscurum et falso nomine venditatum: quippe scribit :
βασίλισσάν φάσι ᾿Αριστοτέλην ἐν τοῖς Ὁμήρου ἀπορήμασιν εἰρη κέναι. ....tur, unde coniectura nascatur omnes
ἀπορίας et
λύσεις hoc capite memoratas ex illo ampliore opere subditicio sumptas et in brevius contractas esse, verum de hac re quae liquido demonstrari certe nequit unusquisque iudicaverit et existimaverit suo arbitratu; ultro concedamus adeo Aristotelem exercitationis aut animi causa in difficultatibus Homericis conquirendis et solvendis elaborasse aliquando, illae tamen nihil faciunt ad artis poeticae et generum poesis naturam accuratius declarandam, ut hoc caput importune absurdeque intrusum esse liqueat. porro ea scribere quae in huius capitis initio et fine proponuntur, isdem bis terve inculcatis, non est hominis sano iudicio instructi, controversias autem conquirere, ut factum videmus §. 9-14., non est iocantis, sed hominis inepti est et otio operaque abutentis. quid igitur de toto hoc loco sentiemus? quid causae fuit cur ille intersereretur? scilicet qui Aristotelis artem poeticam suorum aequalium usui accommodare ausus est, is cum bene versatus esset in istis quaestionibus et solutionibus, haud licere putavit, ut huic operi deesset argumenti tam gravis et tam acriter illa aetate agitati explicatio. quod igitur abesse sine summo libri detrimento non posse videbatur, id pro virili parte supplere ipse adgressus est. luculentas huius sententiae rationes statim ad singulos locos proferemus.
περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων- γένοιτ' ἂν φανερόν: sinistre inducitur de re nova disputatio, quae nullo vinculo cum cetero libri argumento cohaeret. non minus bene verbi causa potuit inferre
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν-ὧδ᾽ ἂν θεωροῦσι γένοιτ᾽ ἂν φανερόν. notanda est etiam ista sive improba modestia sive animi trepidatio in his
ἐκ πόσων τε καὶ ποίων ΑΝ εἰδῶν εἴη,
ὧδ᾽ ΑΝ θεωροῦσι γένοιτ' ΑΝ φανερόν. utrumque prodit hominem sua alienis inserentem.
ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν,
ἢ οἷα φασὶ καὶ δοκεῖ: poetam imitari
οἷα ἦν ἢ ἐστιν, non verum est, sed haec conscribere proprium est rerum scriptoris et annalium confectoris. veri Aristotelis de hac re sententia longe diversa proposita est c. 9. porro
οἷα φασὶ καὶ δοκεῖ enarrat mythographus et
ὁ λογοποιός. poeta traditas fabulas non quidem solvit, sed multa pro consilio suo mutat et nove disponit. vid. с. 14, 5. с. 15, 8. с. 17, 3. او
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-185
Ritter, cap. 25 § 2
ταῦτα δ' ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει ἢ καὶ γλώτταις καὶ μεταφοραῖς: sic scribit quasi
γλῶτται et
μεταφοραί ad
λέξιν non pertineant: quippe suo more
λέξιν intelligit
κυρίαν λέξιν quae caret insolitis et translatis vocibus. mirum est et puerile quod addit, esse multas orationis affectiones, et magis mirum illud
δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. cur haec ille poetis concedit? scilicet benignus est et humanus.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-186
Ritter, cap. 25 § 3
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις - καὶ ποιητικῆς : quaesitum est varieque disputatum cur, dum scribit non eandem esse recti normam politicae artis atque poeticae, politicam prae ceteris huc adsciverit, qua de re equidem ita existimo : politica propria est oratorum et ab his prae ceteris perscrutanda. facultatis autem dicendi cum sit
τέχνη, cumque item sit
τέχνη ποιητική, tamen utriusque diversam esse rationem, ut quod in una reprehendatur non semper in altera reprehensione dignum sit, hoc technicus obscure monuit. idem (non Aristoteles) c. 6, 16. scripsit
τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια.
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἁρμότ τοντα,
ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων (in orationibus)
τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν. post
τῆς πο λιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς tarde succedunt illa
οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς, et continuo tertium subsequitur
αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς, cetera. summa et in his et in ceteris infantia deprehenditur.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αυτήν,
ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: peccatorum quibus poesis obnoxia est unum genus ad ipsam pertinet, alterum ad accidens. ecce interpolator quaedam inaudivit de notionibus illis Aristoteliis, quae
τὸ συμβεβηκὸς et
τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὂν appellantur: sed eas dum ad suam disputationem accommodare studet, non proficit hilum, ut mox videbimus.
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-187
Ritter, cap. 25 § 4
εἰ μὲν γὰρ - οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν: mira et falsadisputatio: si quis imitandum suscipit quod fieri nequit, leges artis poeticae egreditur, sin imitatur quae sunt peccata in alia arte quae admisit
ἀδύνατα, hoc vitium ad poeticam non pertinet. sed si quis alius artis
ἀδύνατα admittentis peccata imitatur, nonne et ipse imitatur quae fieri non possunt? cetera considera.
ἀδυναμία et ceteris Graecis scriptoribus et vero Aristoteli est virium defectus 4): sed hic nove eam posuit pro
αδύνατόν τι, ut apparet ex §. 5., ubi hanc divisionem respiciens scribit
πρῶτον μὲν,
ἂν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην ἀδύνατα πεποίηται,
ἡμάρτηται. corruptum csse nomen
ἀδυναμίαν unde probari possit ego non video.
εἰ δὲ - προβεβληκότα: ex his verbis sanam sententiam et Graecam structuram nondum elicere quisquam potuit: multi editores ad coniecturas confugerunt, sed quae dedere non sufficiunt, sive sententiam respicis sive Graeci sermonis leges et naturam. ego dedi eum loci habitum quem Bekkerus ex codicum auctoritate restituit, sed ne sic quidem tolerabilis sententia neque iusta structura verborum oritur, nisi verba uncis a me circumdata tollentur. sed haec ipsa quo casu nata sunt? hoce: adversus haec verba
εἰ δὲ (intellige
προείλετο μιμήσασθαι)
τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκύτα in margine antiqui cuiusdam libri aliquis adnotavit
τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς, ut lector inde disceret quid sit illud quode in proximis disputaretur. quae verba cum per errorem contextui illata essent, corrector quidam addita voce
ἀλλὰ loci hiatum sarcire se posse putavit.
εἰ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς certe dici non potest pro
εἰ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ac praeterea sic accusativus qui sequitur (
τὸν ἵππον) unde pendeat non habet: utraque difficultas ratione a nobis inita vanescit. disputatio autem quae iam prodit hoc homine satis digna est: si poetica quod fieri nequit imitandum sive describendum suscipit, ipsa peccat, sin Vide Metaphysicorum 4. 12. p. 1019 b 15. conf.
Θ. 2. p. 1040 a 29. 1. 10. p. 1058 b 27... quoddam artis statuariae peccatum (equum illum utroque pede dextro proiecto) vel aliarum artium peccata, ipsa non peccavit. per
τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα designari coniicio nobile cuiusdam statuarii opus insigni vitio in pedibus effingendis commisso illustratum, quemadmodum in horto Schwezingensi prope Mannhemium Apollo visitur qui lyram dextra manu tenet. inde patet primum cur
ΤΟΝ ἵππον scripserit, deinde cur post
τὸν ἵππον προβεβληκότα continuo adiecerit
ἢ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρἢ ἀδύνατα πέποιηται: quae impossibilia
τημα. admisit sive quae impossibilia excidere sibi passa est. quamquam forma media sic quodammodo potest excusari 5), tamen aut locus non sanus, aut interpolator in culpa esse videatur quod
πεποίηται posuit pro
πεποίηκε, praesertim cum statim
πεποίηται passivo intellectu subsequatur. qui
εἰ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται ὁποιαοῦν dederunt, eos sequi nolui, propterea quod a codicibus longius desciscunt.