Thomas Twining Poetics 256

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Poetics. Thomas Twining. London. 1789.

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Commentary on the Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (English) (Thomas Twining's notes on Aristotle's Poetics, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.)

Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.

Commentary

Commentary on the Poetics (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) (Ingram Bywater's English commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

30. mvp-aristotle-comment-1060

τὰ δ᾽ ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα covers the ground of the group of difficulties considered in 1461 a 9–31 . The common point in these is that they turn primarily on the language rather than the matter of the poem, and may be met by finding another interpretation for the word or phrase to which the critic has taken exception. The difficulties themselves are very far from being all of one kind. In the second ( εἶδος κακός a 12 ), fourth ( ἄλλοι μὲν a 16 ), eighth ( αἶψα δὲ a 34 ), and eleventh ( οἰνοχοεύειν a 30 ) the supposed fault is clearly some inconsistency or self-contradiction; in the third ( ζωρότερον a 14 ) and sixth ( δίδομεν a 22 ), however, it is an offence against morals; in the fifth ( οἴη a 20 ), seventh ( οὗ a 23 ), and ninth ( πλέω a 26 ) one against scientific or other truth; and in the first ( οὐρῆας a 10 ) and tenth ( κασσιτέροιο a 28 ) one against general probability. The formula, therefore, ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα, instead of being restricted to logical incompatibilities, seems to include words and phrases which in the view of the critic are at variance with other standards of judgement. That it was meant to bear this wider sense is shown by the fuller formula in the context, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν [scil. ἐναντίως εἰρηκέναι] ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται (b 18).

30. mvp-aristotle-comment-1061

1461b16 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι. The sense shows that a passive verb (σκεπτέοι?) has to be understood. The same sort of ellipse may be the explanation of the nominative ὥσπερ σφαῖρα in De anima 3. 11, 434 a 13 , where κινεῖται is probably to be supplied from the text which precedes the comparison (see J. of Phil. 17 p. 67 ). The converse of this, an active understood from a passive, is found in Metaph. I 2, 1053 b 14
πῶς δεῖ γνωριμωτέρως λεχθῆναι καὶ μᾶλλον ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ φύσεως
 ( scil. λέγουσιν). The statement in the text is a word of caution not unlike those we have already had in 4 and 31. Aristotle reminds us that the difficulties of language pointed out by the critics are not always real ones, and that, before they are admitted to be real, they should be scrutinized and tested in just the same way as in a dialectical discussion one tests the contradiction or confutation of one's opponent which is sometimes a genuine confutation ( ἔλεγχοs ἀληθινός), and sometimes only the semblance of one ( ἔλεγχος φαινόμενος: v. Bon. Ind. 235 b 42 ). The main points to be considered are briefly indicated in the context, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως. A fuller enumeration of the marks of a genuine ἔλεγχος is found in Soph. el. 5, 167 a 23
ἔλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, μὴ ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὀνόματος μὴ συνωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.
 26, 181 a 1
τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸν ὁρισμὸν γινομένοις τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἀπαντητέον σκοποῦσι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ὅπως ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.

30. mvp-aristotle-comment-1062

1461b18 ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν κτὲ. ὥστε καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ὑπεναντίως εἰρηκέναι ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται ( comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 4 p. 384 ). The sense is: The word or phrase in question must be first ascertained to be really inconsistent either with some actual statement in the poem itself, in the context or elsewhere, or with what may be reasonably assumed as true or probable. In saying ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται, Aristotle sets aside the hasty or arbitrary assumptions which underlay a good deal of the current poetical criticism (see b 3 sqq.). The statement in the text may be compared with the rule laid down for dialectic in Soph. el. 15, 174 b 19
ἔτι καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἢ πρὸς τὰ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενα ἢ πρὸς οὓς ὁμολογεῖ καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν.
 In the note on this passage in his edition Vahlen supposes the clause to mean ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν, scil. σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸν ποιητήν—as though Aristotle were now offering a word of advice to the poets. It seems to me that he is still thinking of the critics and apologists of poetry, and that he is merely telling them to examine the supposed ὑπεναντία and make quite sure they are real ones. These, to be real, must be like the εναντιώματα in a genuine confutation, and capable of standing the same logical tests. The whole point in fact is that the incongruities found in the language of a poem may turn out on examination to be imaginary, just as a confutation in argument may be only a sham confutation.
1461b19

Remarques sur la poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) (André Dacier's French commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

50. mvp-aristotle-comment-646

25.30 50. Pour les choses qui ſemblent contraires, à ce que l'on a dėja dit, il faut les examiner comme on examine les objections dans la Dialectique.] 1

Commentary on the Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (Thomas Twining's notes on Aristotle's Poetics, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.) focus

256. mvp-aristotle-comment-256

NOTE 256.

25.30 P. 131. WHEN THINGS, WHICH APPEAR TO BE CONTRADICTORY—.
Τὰ δ’ ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα—.
The words,
ὡς εἰρημένα
, have distressed all the commentators; and no sense, which they have laboured to force upon the expression, is, to my apprehension, satisfactory. Heinsius corrected by transposition —
Τὰ δ’ ὡς ὑπεναντία εἰρημένα
:
"Ea, quæ tanquam subcontraria dicta videntur."
— An easier and more probable emendation, I think, would be —
Τὰ δ’ ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ εἰρημένα.

257. mvp-aristotle-comment-257

NOTE 257.

25.30 P. 131. AND IN THE SAME SENSE—.
The word is,
ὡσαύτως
:
"simili modo,"
as all the commentators render it. I cannot say I have been able thoroughly to satisfy myself, as to the precise meaning of the expression, from any thing I have found in Aristotle's logical works. 1 If,
"in the same manner,"
does not mean,
"in the same sense,"
I confess I do not know what it means. I understand Aristotle to say, that, if the subject of the propositions, charged with being contradictory, be the same, and spoken of in the same respect, we must still examine, farther, whether the two propositions admit of a sense really and accurately opposite to each other; which cannot be the case, unless the same words, in each proposition, have exactly the same sense.
And this meaning seems to be supported by the following passage from the treatise Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας : —
Καὶ ἔστω τοῦτο ΑΝΤΙΦΑΣΙΣ, (nempe) κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι, τὴν ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ κατὰ ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ, μὴ ὉΜΩΝΥΜΩΣ δέ.
2 That is, as it is well explained in the analytical Synopsis prefixed to Duval's edition:—
"Affirmatio & negatio oppositæ, contradictionem faciunt. Oppositio est ejusdem, de eodem, non homonymè; nam accipi debent termini in oppositione, EODEM MODO AC SENSU."
All that follows—viz.
ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν, ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει, ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται
is either so corrupt, or so darkly expressed, that I have only to confess myself unable even to guess what Aristotle meant to say. 3 Commentators indeed have explained, and translators have translated; but I have seen no explanation that approaches to satisfaction, nor any translation, but what is either unintelligible, or unwarrantable, or both. I do not mean to except myself; for I had translated thus:—
"We must also consider the person who speaks, and whether the contradiction be to what he himself said, or to what any reasonable man would understand him to have said."
But, to wave other objections, which, no doubt, the learned reader will easily make for me, the verb,
ὑποθέσθαι
, will, I believe, by no means bear this sense, of supposing, understanding—
ὑπολαβεῖν
. At least, Aristotle seems always to use it in that of advising, suggesting, &c. So Rhet. I. 9, p. 533 .
ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ΥΠΟΘΟΙΟ· καὶ ὅταν ΥΠΟΘΕΣΘΑΙ, ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας.
Accordingly, Goulston has given the word this sense in his version: —
"videndumque, an eâ in re, quod prudens præceperit, secutus sit."
But, of what force this circumstance is, or how it is to be applied to obviate the charge of contradiction, I do not see.
Being therefore obliged to reject the only version, which seemed to me to offer any tolerable meaning, I have left a blank in my translation.

Commentarius in Aristotelis Poeticam (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) (Ritter's Latin commentary, extracted from the 1839 volume, divided by Ritter's chapters and sections, and linked to the corresponding Perseus reference subsections.) focus

18. mvp-aristotle-comment-201

Ritter, cap. 25 § 18

τὰ δ' ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα οὕτω σκοπεῖν: nihil videtur facilius fieri posse quam cum D. Heinsio scribere τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὑπεναντία aut cum Twiningio τὰ δ' ὑπεναντίως, sed qui tam multa orationis male constructae specimina edidit, ei haec insolita verborum collocatio tutius relinquetur. conf. §. 8 et 15. ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι : quemadmodum in orationibus confutationes, h. e. quae in oratoria institutione tradi solent. εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ: an idem dictum sit quod contrarie dictum fertur. conf. §. 16. εἰ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ: an ad idem referatur, quod cogitat qui contrarie dictum deprehendisse sibi videtur. conf. §. 8. εἰ ὡσαύτως: an eadem ratione dictum sit, quam statuit qui contrarium quoddam arguit. conf. §. 15. ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν: intellige δεῖ σκοπεῖν ἡμᾶς. ipse qui loquitur spectandus est, ut quae verbis illius sententia subsit intelligamus. hoc est quod modo dixit εἰ τὸ αὐτό. tum videndum est ad quae rettulerit sua is qui dicit, πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει, denique quid prudens ex eius verbis intelligat, ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται. hoc paulo ante significavit per εἰ ὡσαύτως, illud per εἰ πρὸς τὸ αὐτό.