Poetics. Aristotle. ed. Henry James Pye. London. 1792.
The Poetic of Aristotle (Henry James Pye, revised 1792) (OCR draft) (English) (Henry James Pye's revised 1792 English translation, corrected against the 1788 first edition, aligned to the Kassel reference edition, and supplied with a selective apparatus of substantive 1788 readings.)
Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-857
εὖ μεταφέρειν.
Aristotle is apparently setting aside far-fetched metaphors (
Rhet. 3. 2, 1405a 35
;
3. 3, 1406 b 8
), in which the underlying resemblance is not so real and clear as it should be.
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-858
8
τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν.
For other instances of concurrence of identical forms of the article see
Soph. el. 13, 173 b 15
;
Meteor. 1. 3, 341a 30
;
De resp. 2, 471a 7
;
Metaph. Ν 2, 1089 a 14
.
207.
mvp-aristotle-comment-207
NOTE 207.
22.17
P. 113. FOR IT IS THIS ALONE, WHICH CANNOT BE ACQUIRED, &C.
Well translated, though very freely, by
M. Batteux
.
"C'est la seule chose qu'on ne puisse emprunter d'ailleurs. C'est la production du génie, le coup-d'œil d'un esprit qui voit les rapports." Compare
Rhet. III. 2, p. 585, D.
and
11, p. 595, E.
where it is observed, that,
καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὸ ΟΜΟΙΟΝ, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΠΟΛΥ ΔΙΕΧΟΥΣΙ, θεωρεῖν, ἐυστοχον.—See
Mr. Harris's Philol. Inq. p. 186, 187
, where all these passages are quoted and translated.
22.7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-94
22.17
BUT THE GREATEST ART IS TO BE HAPPY IN FORMING META- PHORS, FOR THAT ALONE CANNOT BE ACQUIRED FROM OTHERS, BUT IS ITSELF A PROOF OF A GOOD NATURAL GENIUS.
THIS distinction of metaphor from the other forms is perfectly just. No particular praise will be given to the poet for the invention of any of the other modes of ornamenting language; it will be quite sufficient if he makes a judicious use of those already invented. But in regard to metaphors the same conduct will subject him to the imputation of plagiarifm. For there is nothing that distinguishes original genius so much as the use of new and just metaphors, as there is nothing that betrays a want of it more than trite and common ones [L]. Many instances have been produced by the critics of confused metaphors where the relation is not kept up compleatly, as in the line of Horace, where he talks of bringing ILL TURNED verses to the ANVIL again [M]. [L] See Mr. Twining's note. [M] Et male tornatos incudi reddere versus.' For other instances of this fort, see Elements of Criticism, Chap. xx. Sect. vi. Befides
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. ، Befides this obvious fault there are many other improprieties that may follow from an injudicious use of this figure. The image may be ridiculous by being unfit for the subject. As in Addison's Essay on the Georgics, where while he is very justly praising the art of the poet in elevating his subject, he attempts, perhaps in imitation of Longinus, to copy the figurative style he is criticising, and fays • he breaks the clods, and tosses the dung about, with an air of gracefulness.' Now one of the most ridiculous of all poffible objects would be a man's really doing this. A metaphor pursued too far has also a very ridiculous effect; indeed this almost falls under the article of allegory, a species of writing which some people are very fond of, but which appears to me only a more laborious kind of riddle. Such is the allegorical description of the human body in the Timæus of Plato, drawn out to a length that is both tedious and disgusting: the hyperbolical praise of which by Longinus, and the imitation of it by Spenser, does no honor to the taste either of the [N] critic or the poet. Sometimes a metaphor is perfectly incongruous and absurd, as in Cowley's Davideis, L. 111. Goliah is described as large as the hill he is coming down. • Vast as the hill down which he march'd he appear'd.' This reminds one of the story in the Connoiffeur, of the citizen, who shewing a map of London to a stranger, to enhance the grandeur of the [N] See Longinus, Sect. xxxII. Fairy Queen, Book II. Canto IX.. metropolis,
metropolis, exclaims, • Don't you fee it is bigger than the map of England ?' < A metaphor also may be too near the truth, as in the line of Dryden. • Men are but children of a larger growth.' This falls under that figure which is now distinguished by the appellation of TRUEISM. A metaphor also may possess properties that tend to make it directly contrary to the sense in which it is meant to be taken, as when King James I. advising the country gentlemen to live on their estates said, 'that in the country they were like ships in a river, and seemed large things, but in town they were like ships at sea, and made no figure at all [o].' Now though in this one point the resemblance holds, in every other circumstance it is exactly the reverse. Mr. Locke observes, ' that as ، [P] wit is chiefly conversant in tracing resemblances, judgment is rather employed in finding differences.' I cannot say the truth of this Arikes me. It feems equally the province of genius to find differences in things generally alike, and likeness in things generally different, and that it is the office of judgment to correct the errors or misrepresentations of fancy in both cafes. [o] This is rather a fimile than a metaphor, but the propriety of each is derived from the fame principles. [P] Locke uses wit for genius here; in the subsequent quotation from Dr. Beattie it is taken in the more confined sense, which is now given it. If,
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. If, as Dr. Beattie says, 'Wit arises from the discovery of minute • relations and likenesses that had escaped the notice of others, and there- 'fore a talent for it implies a habit of minute attention to circumstances and words, whereas a fublime genius directs his view chiefly to the great and more important phenomena of art and nature.' According to the definition of Aristotle we may call a metaphor a fublime piece of wit.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-166
Ritter, cap. 22 § 8
ἔτι δὲ ᾿Αρειφράδης - ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦτο 2) Bene Ammonius de Differentia affin. vocab.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον ἐπ᾿ ἀριθμοῦ τὸ δὲ μικρὸν ἐπὶ μεγέθους τάσσεται,
ἠγνόει: quid attinebat obscurissimi hominis ineptissimam reprehensionem ex secreto secessu excitare? nihil nisi ut curiosi ineptique grammatici doctrina ostentaretur. nam quid ineptius excogitari potest quam tragicis poetis vitio dari (ex. gr. anastropham praepositionum) id quod omnium poetarum commune et ne a vulgari quidem locutione alienum est ? advertas etiam velim quam perturbate exempla afferantur: primum enim ponitur anastropha praepositionis
δομάτων ἄπο, tum tamquam singularia
σέθεν et viv, deinde quarto loco rursus anastrophae exemplum recurrit. advertas putidam diligentiam
δομάτων ἄπο ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ δομάτων, et rursus
᾿Αχιλλέως πέρι ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ ᾿Αχιλλέως. tertium exemplum (viv) mire ita producitur, ut particula versus Sophoclei (Oed. Colon. 987) afferatur, sic
ἐγὼ δένιν ἄκων ἔγημα φθέγγομαί τ' ἄκων τάδε. quod equidem defendere nolim exemplo illo simili c. 21, 10.
μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ. vide etiam quanto cum fastu doctus magistellus sententiam suam concludat:
ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦτο ἠγνόει. restat aliud. tragoediarum scriptores iste appellat
τραγῳδούς, sua sibi loquendi consuetudine, non Aristotelia. serioris aetatis scriptores minus accurate loquentes interdum haec nomina commiscent, ut Athenaeus qui II. p. 35 D. Chaeremonem tragicum poetam
τραγῳδὸν appellavit. -
᾿Αρειφράδης quis tandem sit nescimus. Aristophanes pluribus locis (Equit. 1281 sqq. Vesp. 1280 sqq. cf. Suidas s. v.)
᾿Αριφράδην Arignoti fratrem citharoedum insectatur, quippe qui nefandam linguam infandis locis turpiter admoverit, sed hic potius obscurus quidam grammaticus intelligitur. neque vero id diligentem lectorem effugiet, veram et dignam Aristotele disputationem his illatis non solum non iuvari sed importune interrumpi.