236.
mvp-aristotle-comment-236
NOTE 236.
25.11
P. 124. HAS NOT REPRESENTED THINGS CONFORMABLY TO TRUTH-.
Οὐκ ἀληθῆ.
— An
ἐπιτίμησις
very frequent in the mouth of PLATO, to whom, undoubtedly, Aristotle here alludes.
"The Poets ought not,"
says Plato, speaking of the representations of Hesiod and Homer,
" to be permitted to tell us—ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσί τε, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται· ΟΥΔΕ γὰρ ΑΛΗΘΗ."
—They ought not,
λοιδορεῖν ἁπλῶς οὕτω τὰ ἐν ᾅδου, ἀλλὰ, μᾶλλον, ἐπαινεῖν ὡς ΟΥΤ’ ΑΛΗΘΗ λέγοντας, οὔτ’ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς μέλλουσι μαχίμοις ἔσεσθαι.
So again, of Homer's account of the cruel treatment of the body of Hector by Achilles, and of his sacrificing twelve Trojan captives to the manes of Patroclus [
Il. Ψ. 175.
]:
ξύμπαντα ταῦτα ΟΥ φήσομεν ΑΛΗΘΗ εἰρῆσθαι.
— And again, presently after—
οὐθ’ ὅσια ταῦτα, ΟΥΤ’ ΑΛΗΘΗ.
To all which objections, as appears from what follows, Aristotle's answer would have been—
ὅτι οὕτω ΦΑΣΙΝ.
1
2
3
237.
mvp-aristotle-comment-237
NOTE 237.
25.11
P. 124. SOPHOCLES—DREW MEN, SUCH AS THEY SHOULD BE; EURIPIDES, SUCH AS THEY ARE.
The difference here intended, between the two great Tragic Poets, seems to me to be rightly explained by
Dacier
in few words:
"Sophocle tâchoit de rendre ses imitations parfaites, en suivant toujours bien plus ce qu' une belle nature etoit capable de faire, que ce qu'elle faisoit. Au lieu qu' Euripide ne travailoit qu' à les rendre semblables, en consultant davantage ce que cette même nature faisoit, que ce qu'elle etoit capable de faire."
p. 458.
It is thus indeed, that, by comparing different passages, we shall find Aristotle clearly explain himself. What he here means by
ἀληθῆ
, is sufficiently clear from the synonymous expressions,
οἷοἰ εἰσι
—
οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστιν
, in this chapter, and
ὁμοἰους καθ' ἡμᾶς
—and,
οἱ νῦν
, in
chapter ii.
where he explains the different objects of poetic imitation.
4
To these expressions are opposed another set of expressions, which I take to be synonymous with each other—
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ
—
οἵους δεῖ
, here;
τὸ βέλτιον
, and the
παράδειγμα ὑπερέχον
, presently after;
5
καλλίους
,
cap. xv.
6
βελτίονας καθ' ἡμᾶς — βελτίονας τῶν νῦν
,
cap. ii.
All these expressions correspond to the various expressions of,
improved nature—la belle nature—ideal beauty, &c. in modern writers.
The objection then, to which Aristotle here points out the best answer, I understand to be this—
"Your imitation is not true; it is not an exact copy of such nature as we see about us."
The answer is—
"No: but it is an improved copy. If I have not represented things as they are, I have represented them as they ought to be."
A very different explanation of this passage has been given by an eminent critic;
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but, I confess, it appears to me to be irreconcilable with Aristotle's expressions, clearly interpreted, as I think they are, by comparison with each other. According to that explanation, the answer of Sophocles to the objection—
οὐκ ἀληθῆ
, and indeed the sense of the objection itself, are very different from what Dacier, and, I believe, all the commentators, have represented them to be. —The explanation is this:
"And this will further explain an essential difference, as we are told, between the two great rivals of the Greek stage. Sophocles, in return to such as objected a want of truth in his characters, used to plead, that he drew men such as they ought to be, Euripides such as they were.
Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη, αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδης δὲ, οἷοἰ εἰσι.
The meaning of which is, Sophocles, from his more extended commerce with mankind, had enlarged and widened the narrow, partial conception, arising from the contemplation of particular characters, into a complete comprehension of the kind. Whereas the philosophic Euripides, having been mostly conversant in the academy, when he came to look into life, keeping his eye too intent on single, really existing personages, sunk the kind in the individual; and so painted his characters naturally indeed, and truly, with regard to the objects in view, but sometimes without that general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth."
—Again—after an illustration of this meaning, by a comparative examination of the
Electra of Sophocles with that of Euripides, the conclusion is—
"Whether this representation of Sophocles be not more agreeable to truth, as collected from wide observation, i. e. from human nature at large, than that of Euripides, the capable reader will judge. If it be, the reason I suppose to have been, that Sophocles painted his characters,
such as, from attending to numerous instances of the same kind, he would conclude they ought to be; Euripides, such, as a narrower sphere of observation had persuaded him
they were."
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From these two passages compared, it appears, I think, that by
οἷα δεῖ εἶναι
—
such as they ought to be—the learned commentator understands,
such as they ought to be in order to possess "that general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth." But a comparison of Aristotle with himself, in the several passages above referred to, seems to fix the sense clearly to that ideal perfection, that poetic elevation and improvement of nature, which may be said, rather, to exclude such
"general and universally striking likeness"
of
"human nature at large:"
and this, I think, was the very objection made to Sophocles by the patrons of his rival.
According to the interpretation which I am taking the liberty to examine, Sophocles is made to answer the charge by denying its truth: for the answer, as here stated, will be this—
You say, my representations are not true, and those of Euripides are true. I deny this. You use the term improperly. My representations are "agreeable to truth," because they are "collected from wide observation, i. e. from human nature at large;" those of Euripides are not agreeable to truth, because they are representations, not of the kind, but of individuals.
The answer, as I understand Aristotle, is very different. The charge is not denied, or explained away, but admitted and justified.
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Sophocles says,
"If you would have men represented as they are—
οἷοἰ εἰσι
—you must, indeed, go to Euripides.
I have not drawn them so—I never intended to draw them so. I have done better—I have delineated mankind, not such as they really are, but such as they ought to be."
Euripides does not appear to have been charged, by those objectors, with what may be termed
individual improbability of imitation, but with too close and portrait-like delineation of
general nature.
In short, the difference, which I understand to be here intended, between the two Poets, cannot be more exactly expressed, than it is by the ingenious commentator himself, in the beginning of the note to which I refer; where it is observed, [
p. 253
] that
"truth may be followed too closely in works of imitation, as is evident in two respects. For, 1. the artist, when he would give a copy of nature, may confine himself too scrupulously to the exhibition of particulars, and so fail of representing the general idea of the kind. Or, 2. in applying himself to give the general idea, he may collect it from an enlarged view of real life, whereas it were still better taken from the nobler conception of it as subsisting only in the mind."
Now, if we apply the latter of these differences to the two Poets in question—if we say,
"In applying himself to give the general idea, Euripides collected it from an enlarged view of real life; whereas Sophocles took it from the nobler conception of it, as subsisting only in the mind"
—this will express exactly what I take to be the sense of Aristotle.
To the support, which the common interpretation of this passage receives from Aristotle himself, may be added that which it receives, and, I believe, is generally acknowledged to receive, from the Tragedies themselves, which are extant, of the two Poets in question. That Euripides is, in general, liable to the censure of particular imitation—of
"sinking the kind in the individual,"
I cannot say I have observed. But who can read this Poet without observing the examples, with which he every where abounds, of that very
"general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth?"
In Sophocles, we find more elevation, more dignity, more of that improved likeness, and ideal perfection, which the philosopher expresses by his
οἷα δεῖ — πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον
, &c. In Euripides, we find more of the
ἀληθὲς
, the
ὅμοιον
, &c. —
we are oftener reminded of the common nature and common life, which we all see around us. And if this, in conjunction with other causes, be sometimes found to lower the imitations of this Poet, beneath the proper level of Tragic dignity, and to produce something of the
κωμῳδία τις ἠθολογουμένη
, which
Longinus
attributes to the
Odyssey,
10
the fault is amply redeemed, perhaps in those very parts, by the pleasure which results from the closeness and obviousness of the imitation; certainly, in many others, by those precious touches of nature, which must, at once, strike every individual of every audience;
11
such, if I mistake not, as are much more rarely to be found in Sophocles, and such, perhaps, as, after all that we have heard about the
beau ideal and improved nature, can only be produced by an exact transcript of nature, as it is—of what the Poet has actually felt himself, and actually seen in others.
The truth seems to be, that both in Poetry, and in Painting, if the sublime be aimed at, the Poet, and the Artist, must look up to the
οἷα ΔΕΙ εἶναι
: their eyes may
"glance from earth to heaven,"
and they may
"body forth the form of things unknown."
But, if emotion and the pathetic be their object, they will, neither of them, attain their end, unless they submit to descend a little towards earth, and to copy with some closeness that nature which is before their eyes. We are told of Michael Angelo, that
"his people are a superior order of beings;"
that
"there is nothing about them, nothing in the air of their actions, or their attitudes, or the style and cast of their very limbs or features, that puts one in mind of their belonging to our own species."
12
If this be the character of that painter's works, I must confess, for my own part, that I should be disposed to turn from them to those of the charming artist, whose words I quote, where we see human nature
improved, but not forgotten. I am very well content to be reminded of my own species, as he reminds me of them. But this, at least, is certain, that such a character, applied to a Tragic Poet, would be the severest censure that criticism could pronounce.
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