τραγῳδίας δὲ εἴδη κτέ. The fifth of the supplementary rules. There are four species of Tragedy—each arising apparently (like the species of Democracy in Pol. 4. 12, 1296 b27 ) through the prominence in it of some one of the several elements in a play. Aristotle insists that for an ideally good tragedy all these elements of interest are wanted, and that in so critical an age none can be neglected with impunity ( μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι ἔχειν κτέ. 1456 a 3 ). The species he is now talking of, or at any rate three out of the number, were probably no discovery of his; terms like πεπλεγμένη τραγῳδία, παθητική τραγῳδία, and ἠθική τραγῳδία may very well be supposed to have been already sanctioned and current in the technical language of the theatre (comp. on 9, 1451 b33 ). If the περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις are 'the whole thing' (as we say), the play is πεπλεγμένη; if the element of πάθος is especially prominent, it is παθητική; if it is mainly a portraiture of character, it is ἠθική; and if it depends largely on the 'spectacle', it is 'spectacular'. This last species Aristotle recognizes as a fact, but as there was no derivative from ὄψις corresponding to our 'spectacular', he has to change his form of expression and speak not of the fourth 'species', but of the fourth element ( τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὄψις), with instances, however, ( αἵ τε Φορκίδες κτέ.) relating to the species of drama in which the element of ὄψις was prominent (see J. of Phil. 14 p. 50 ). These four elements have been already considered, though not quite so directly as Aristotle's language would imply. The περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις, which are assumed to go together (comp. 11, 1452 a32 ), and the πάθος have been distinguished already as elements in the μῦθος (comp. 11, 1452 b9 ); and they are counted here as two parts of the play because each is the prominent factor in a distinct species of tragedy. Two other parts are mentioned, the ἤθη and the ὄψις, apparently for the same reason. If nothing is said of the remaining 'parts' of Tragedy, the reason is obvious; there was no existing species of Tragedy that could be described as consisting mainly of διάνοια or λέξις or μελοποιία. Vahlen and others assume a lacuna in b 34 (after ἀναγνώρισις), on the supposition that Aristotle must have had something to say about the ἁπλῆ τραγῳδία. The ἁπλῆ τραγῳδία, however, is not a species in Aristotle's present sense of the term; and if we are to find a place for it in the text, the same logic would require a recognition of the ἀήθης τραγῳδία ( 6, 1450 a25 ), as being the logical opposite of the ἠθικὴ τραγῳδία in the passage before us. The insertion too, which is due to a desire to bring the present statement into line with that in 24, 1459 b8 , makes it necessary to adopt a highly improbable correction, τερατώδες, in the context ( 1456 a2 ).

τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη. In lieu of τὰ μέρη Tyrwhitt suggests τὰ μύθων, and Ueberweg τὰ μύθου or τοῦ μύθου—which would mean, if I understand Tyrwhitt's note correctly, that the ἠθικὴ τραγῳδία is based on an ἠθικὸς μῦθος. This, however, can hardly be right, if one remembers the sharp distinction drawn between ἦθος and μῦθος in 6, 1450 a4 . The present passage, due allowance being made for the Aristotelian brevity of expression, is intelligible enough in itself; the difficulty is to bring it into harmony with what is said elsewhere in other parts of the book.

τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη

, no doubt, implies a previous statement, which it is impossible to find in the earlier chapters; and the passage in 24, 1459 b9 implies that a ἁπλῆ as well as πεπλεγμένη τραγῳδία had been recognized among the four species of Tragedy in the passage before us. Difficulties of this kind it is better to acknowledge than to remove at the cost of reforming the text. The truth is that Aristotle is more human than we commonly suppose—that his memory is sometimes at fault, and also that he sometimes writes down what occurs to him at the moment, without stopping to reflect whether it is quite reconcilable with what he has said elsewhere. Though there are chapters in the Poetics, more especially in the early part, which are models of careful drafting, I think it clear that, as the work advances, the statement is not always equally admirable, and that it would require a great deal of revision to make it consistent throughout. The difficulty in the reference τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη is not unlike that in ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται in 6, 1450a 13 , and ὅπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις in 18, 1456 a10 .

18.4 Il a été dit que la Tragedie a quatre parties, il y a auſſi quatre especes de Tragedies.] ¹

18.4 THERE ARE FOUR KINDS OF TRAGEDY, DEDUCIBLE FROM SO MANY PARTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED.

It is incumbent on a commentator to state, as clearly as he can, the difficulties of his author, whether he be able to remove them, or not. This has not been done with respect to this passage, in any of the comments that I have seen.

Aristotle says, "There are four species of Tragedy; for so many also are the parts which have been mentioned." This is saying, as expressly as words can say it, that the four different species of Tragedy correspond to, and, of course, arise from, four different parts already mentioned. Now what are those parts? Four parts of quantity have indeed been mentioned; (cap. xii.) but these are quite out of the question. If we have recourse to what are called the parts of quality, these are six; and if, with Dacier, we reduce them to four, by throwing out the decoration and the music, the four that remain, i. e. fable, manners, sentiments, and diction, will furnish out, among them, only one of the species of Tragedy enumerated—that which is denominated . These, then, cannot be the four parts pointed at as the foundation of the four species. There remain only the parts which Aristotle calls : the parts, not of Tragedy, but of one of the essential parts of Tragedy—the Fable. These he enumerated in the 11th chapter, and to these, the commentators, in general, are agreed in understanding Aristotle to allude.

But the difficulty here is, that he refers to four parts mentioned, and here are only three—i. e. , (which he expressly calls ,) and, thirdly, : . There is no mention of , to furnish his third species, the moral Tragedy; nor, indeed, was it, by any means, to be expected there, where he is professedly enumerating the parts of the Fable. , in the sense in which the word is there used, may, unquestionably, be considered as parts of the Fable; , or manners, cannot. ^{1 2 3}

The Abbé Batteux thinks the ethic species is tacitly implied, as the opposite, or negative, of the pathetic. The three parts of the fable, , give, directly, only two species of Tragedy; the two first constituting, (one, or both of them,) the complicated, ( ,) and the third, the pathetic, or disastrous, Tragedy. The two other species are only the negatives of these. If the fable is without revolution or discovery, the Tragedy is simple, as opposed to complicated; ⁴ if, without , or disasters, it is , as opposed to . ⁵ —Such is the explanation of this ingenious writer; which seems to be much favoured by the manner in which these species are arranged afterwards, when applied to Epic Poetry in cap. xxiv.; where we have— ; and, also, by the frequent opposition of and , and , in antient writers ⁶ . It may, indeed, be objected, that this cannot be reconciled to Aristotle's words ; which seem to refer clearly to four parts that had been all expressly mentioned. But, if we should suppose Aristotle here to consider that as said, which was only implied, and as explained, which was only hinted, we should, perhaps, take no liberty that is not warranted by the magisterial and elliptic brevity of his general style, and even by similar instances in his writings ⁷ .

But even this will not entirely remove the difficulty, while, by the parts alluded to, we understand Aristotle to mean only the of the 11th chapter: because, as I before observed, could be neither mentioned, nor implied, as a part of the fable. Perhaps, therefore, he meant to use the word in a general sense, as he clearly does use it, cap. xxiv. , κ. τ. αλ.—where the shews, that the parts he had just mentioned included both the six constituent parts of Tragedy, and the three parts of the fable which he enumerates. If we understand in this way, the meaning will only be, that so many different parts, (of one kind or other,) have been mentioned ( ,) from which these species may be deduced: these are, the three , which furnish the complicated, the simple, and the pathetic, species; and the second of the essential parts of Tragedy, , which, though indeed it be a part of every Tragedy, admits, according to Aristotle's own account, of more or less, and, when predominant, may be characteristic of another species, the ethic, or moral Tragedy, naturally enough opposed to the pathetic.

I confess I see no other possible consistent sense that can be given to this passage, as we now read it: for four parts are here mentioned and four parts cannot be made out, if we confine ourselves to the in cap. xi.

Dacier seems to have perceived this; and his explanation agrees so far with mine, that he, also, makes the four parts that produce the four forts of Tragedy. But when, in order to reduce the seven parts, (i. e. fable, manners, diction, sentiments, discovery, revolution, disasters,) to the four which he wants, he rejects three, i. e. fable, diction, and sentiments, because they are common to all Tragedy, he makes a distinction for which there seems to be no foundation; the manners being equally included by Aristotle among those parts which are expressly . ^{8 9} But, though all these parts necessarily belong, in some degree or other, to every Tragedy, any one of them may be so predominant, as to characterize a Tragedy, and give it, if we please, a specific denomination. Thus, there may be, and there is, such a species as the sentimental Tragedy, of which, in the critic's language, :—another, of which the language may be the most striking character— ; and he himself speaks of a fort of Tragedy that might very well be denominated, , ¹⁰ of which examples are not wanting on the modern stage. The Italian opera is a Tragedy, . But Aristotle's business was not to enumerate all the different species which want of taste or judgment might produce, but those only which were considered as legitimate, and such as sound criticism would approve. Hence, he has recourse, for the formation of the four regular and authorised species, only to the two first and most important of the six constituent parts of Tragedy—the FABLE, and the MANNERS. ¹¹

But after all, when we have made the best we can of the text in this passage, we must allow, I believe, that it is more for the credit of Aristotle to suppose it faulty. And that it is so, I am the rather inclined to think, as one difficulty still remains. The expression—"there are four forts of Tragedy; FOR so many parts have been mentioned"—seems clearly to imply, not merely, that those four forts are deducible, in some way or other, from those parts, but, as I at first observed, that they, respectively, arise from those parts, each of which produces its correspondent species of Tragedy. But this, as we have seen, is by no means the case. Of the four parts, only , and , produce directly their correspondent species, the , and the . The other two parts, , and , denominate one species from their presence, (the ,) and another, (the ,) from their absence.

τραγῳδίας δὲ εἴδη εἰσὶ τέσσαρα· τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη: tragoediae partes non quattuor a vero Aristotele descriptae sunt, sed sex, in quibus explicandis ille versatur inde a c. 6. usque ad c. 22., si quae ab interpolatore sinistre interposita sunt subtrahamus. personatus Aristoteles sane c. 12. quattuor tragoediae partes descripsit, unius quantitatis habita ratione, easque idem hoc loco respexit. monemus, ut lector utrumque locum diligenter collatum expendat, et observet quomodo interpolator sibimet nihil confisus totus ab exemplis pendeat, atque in iis ipsis digerendis ulna et digitis magis quam prudenti iudicio utatur. ne hoc quidem silentio praetereundum videtur, mire haec inferri, τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη. ἡ μὲν πεπλεγμένη, ἧς τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶ περιπέ - τεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις: tragoediam implicatam totam contineri peripetia et agnitione falsum est: immo peripetia et agnitio non magnam fabulae particulam efficiunt. ne opus quidem est, ut in quavis fabula implicata peripetia sit et agnitio, sed alterutra sufficit. male igitur interpolator c. 10. intellexit, quamquam inde haec sua sumpsit. ἡ δὲ παθητική, οἷον οἵ τε Αἴαντες καὶ οἱ Ιξίονες: hoc age, lector benivole. nimirum interpolatori haeret aqua, cum nihil ab ipso Aristotele de fabulis patheticis (motoriis) dictum invenisset. desperans igitur se ipsum definire posse quales sint, ad exempla quasi in portum confugit. si vulgarem illam πάθους definitionem a falso auctore c. 11, 6. propositam ( πάθος δ' ἐστὶ πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἤ ὀδυνηρά κτλ.) comparaverimus, facile intelligemus παθητικὴν fabulam non dici eam quam nos vulgo intelligimus, h. e. perturbationum descriptione conspicuam, sed eam in qua quiscoram spectatoribus sese occidit aut occiditur, sese vulnerat vel vexat aut vulneratur vel vexatur, ein mit Leiden (non mit Leidenschaften) erfülltes Stück. Aiaces igitur huic homini tragoediae sunt παθητικαί, quoniam Aiax Telamonius ipse se interficit, Locrensis a Minerva occiditur; item Ixiones, quoniam Ixion rotae adstrictus graves labores perfert. Ixionis fabulam tres tragoediae Graecae principes scripserunt. fragmenta nonnulla inde conservata sunt. conf. Dindorf. Poet. scen. Gr. in ἀποσπασματίοις p. 8. 42. 95. comoedia Ἰξίων Eubuli laudatur ab Athenaeo VIII. p. 347 D. Sophocles praeter Aiacem μαστιγοφόρον vel Telamonium superstitem etiam Locrum (Oilei f.) composuit, cuius fragmenta vid. ap. Dindorf. p. 29. ἡ δὲ ἠθική, οἷον αἱ Φθιώτιδες καὶ ὁ Πηλεύς: pergit eodem tramite admodum plano ac facili ad incedendum. Phthiotidum Sophoclis fabulae pauca fragmenta lege apud Dindorf. p. 60. Peleum Sophocles et Euripides docuerunt. vid fragmenta apud Dindorf. p. 51. 106. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον, οἷον αἵ τε Φορκίδες καὶ Προ-· μήθεὺς καὶ ὅσα ἐν ῞Αιδου: iam in aliud artum compulsus est nullius iudicii sterilisque ingenii scriptor, nimirum is quartam quandam tragoediarum speciem esse inaudivit, sed eam neque definitione illustrare neque nomine consignare potuit; itaque exempla nonnulla posuisse contentus est. Phorcides Aeschyli tragoedia erat, cuius fragmenta Dindorfius p. 19. dedit. de fabula cf. Apollodorus I, 2.6. p. 13. II, 4, 2. p. 137. et Heynii ad Apollodorum Observationes p. 118 sq. Welckerus in Trilogia Aeschylia p. 381 sqq. grammaticum ἁπλῆν τραγῳδίαν significare voluisse statim videbimus: interim de loci scriptura dispiciamus. nam in voce o ἷov scribenda multi codices aberrant. vid. not. crit. dubitari vix potest quin o ἷov verum sit : nam δης οἷον nihil est nisi librarii aberratio, quam cum alii non concoquerent neque tamen monstrum δης repetere vellent, lacunam indicarunt. quod Victorius in uno codice invenit τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὁμαλὸν οἷον, interpositum ὁμαλὸν recentiori cuidam correctori debetur, qui c.15, 4. τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλὸν huc traxit infelici coniectura ductus : nam τὸ ὁμαλὸν morum ( τῶν ἠθῶν) est proprium, non tragoediae. nec vero ὁμαλὸν pro ἁπλοῦν dici Graece potest, ut Buhlius Victorium de ὁμαλὸν non sine causa dubitantem reprehendens existimavit. qui locum capitis 24, 1. consideraverit, ἁπλοῦν, οἷον in ordinem redigere volet, sed exemplorum desiderium hunc hominem abripuit, ut nomen quarti generis ponere oblivisceretur.