Poetics. Aristotle. Theodore Alois Buckley (Translator). London. 1857.
The Poetic of Aristotle (Theodore Alois Buckley) (OCR draft) (English) (Theodore Alois Buckley's English translation, first published in 1850 and represented from the Henry G. Bohn 1857 printing; corrected against a second OCR and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.)
Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-942
δεδίδαχεν κτέ.
Another of
Homer's merits is said to be his mastery of the artistic lie—one that has something true superadded to make it seem credible. In illustration of this
Aristotle points to the story in
Od. 19. 164-248
; where
Ulysses astutely adds certain particulars (203-248), which
Penelope knows to be true, and which beguile her into accepting the first part of his story as true. The connexion between this and the preceding section (11-18) is left unexplained, and it is certainly far from being obvious. If one may imagine the association of ideas in
Aristotle's mind, it may perhaps have been something like this, that
τὸ θαυμαστόν is a truth with a
πρόσθεσις of falsehood, and the lie artistic (
ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ) a falsehood with a
πρόσθεσις of truth; so that the one is as it were the converse of the other.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-943
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός,
i. e. 'the use of paralogism'.
παραλογισμός is like
παραλογίζεσθαι (v.
infra on 25) an ambiguous term; it may mean either a fallacious argument (
ψευδὴς συλλογισμός) or a deception caused by such an argument (
ἀπάτη διὰ ψευδοῦς συλλογισμοῦ)—this latter being apparently its sense in the present passage, where it comes in to explain
ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ. The distinction, however, is probably clearer to us than it was to
Aristotle himself. The general assumption in his logical writings is that an argument is addressed to some one—to a hearer who has to be convinced or refuted; a fallacious argument is not only logically incorrect but also calculated to mislead the hearer who fails to see the fallacy in it.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-944
οἴονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι.
The artifice depends for its success on a natural weakness of the human intellect, our readiness to infer the presence of the thing from the presence of a 'sign' of it, or the truth of the antecedent from the truth of the consequent. The 'fallacia consequentis' is considered at length in
Soph. el. 5, 167 b 1
:
ὁ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολούθησιν. ὅταν γὰρ τοῦδε ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοδὶ ᾖ, καὶ τοῦδε ὄντος οἷονται καὶ θάτερον εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ὅθεν καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπάται γίνονται. πολλάκις γὰρ τὴν χολὴν μέλι ὑπέλαβον διὰ τὸ ἕπεσθαι τὸ ξανθὸν χρῶμα τῷ μέλιτι· καὶ ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει τὴν γῆν ὕσαντος γίνεσθαι διάβροχον, κἂν ᾖ διάβροχος, ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὗσαι· τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. ἔν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων εἰσίν. βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλαβον ὅτι καλλωπιστὴς ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁρᾶται πλανώμενος, πολλοῖς δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ κατηγορούμενον οὐχ ὑπάρχει. It is recognized as one of the arts of rhetoric in
Rhet. 2. 19, 1392 b 16
, and more fully in
2. 24, 1401 b 9, 20
.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-945
ἄνθρωποι
οἱ ἄνθρωποι seems to be required here; comp. the parallels in
1, 1447 b 13
;
Phys. 4. 6, 213 a 23, 27
;
Metaph. A 2, 982 b 12
;
Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 15
, and
3. 2, 1404 b 9
.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-946
22
τοῦτο δέ ἐστι ψεῦδος.
τοῦτο has been taken to refer to
τὸ πρότερον, the antecedent, which, though not true, we imagine to be true. But it probably refers rather to the mode of argument, which is 'false', i. e. logically incorrect; comp.
An. pr. 1. 17, 37 a 2
;
1. 46, 52 b 28
;
Rhet. 2. 23, 1400 b 2
.
23
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-947
πρῶτον:
[=
πρότερον].
Vahlen illustrates this from
Top. 3. 5, 119 a 2
. For instances in other writers see
Sauppe's
Lexil. Xenophont. p. 112 and
HSt.
s. v.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-948
24
προσθεῖναι,
scil.
τοῦτο τῷ ψεύδει, i. e. to provide the lie with a
πρόσθεσις of truth, in order to beguile the hearer into accepting it as true.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-949
25
παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή:
i. e. we on our side are quite ready to draw the false inference, which a lie of this kind is calculated to suggest.
παραλογίζεσθαι has a noteworthy diversity of senses in
Aristotle, sometimes meaning to draw a false inference, sometimes (with an acc. pers.) to deceive or beguile by a fallacy, and sometimes (as a passive) to be so deceived or beguiled (comp.
Bon.
Ind. 565 a 11
); and it is not always easy to see the sense intended. In the present passage the word must have the first of these three senses, as the emphasis on the pronoun in
ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή points to something that we ourselves are supposed to do: we on our side, knowing the truth of the consequent (
διὰ τὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναι ἀληθὲς ὄν), are ready enough, owing to a natural infirmity of the human mind, to infer the truth of the antecedent; which is what the skilful deceiver wants us to do.
26
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-950
παράδειγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων
is a note more fitted for the rough draft of a lecture than for a book (see on
15, 1454 a 14
and
22, 1458 a 30
). The quotation or explanation is left to be supplied afterwards. How it might have come in may be seen from the parallels in
Rhet. 2. 23, 1399 a 7
παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου· “εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει;" and
Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 29
παράδειγμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐκήδετο ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ τέκνων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀπολόμενα, “μητρὸς δ᾽ ἐν ᕞΑιδου καὶ πατρὸς βεβηκότων οὐκ ἔστ᾿ ἀδελχὸς ὅστις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ".
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-951
ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων:
Od. 19. 164-260
(see on
16, 1454 b 30
). Penelope was the victim of a 'fallacia consequentis', as her only reason for accepting Ulysses' statement in 164-200 as true was her recognition of the truth of that in 220-248.
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-584
24.18
28. Homere est celuy qui a le mieux enseigné aux autres Poetes à faire comme il faut ces agreables mensonges.]
1
29.
mvp-aristotle-comment-585
24.18
29. Et c'est proprement un paralogiſme; car comme tous les hommes font naturellement perfuadez, que, quand une telle choſe est ou ſe fait, une telle autre chose arrive, on leur fait aiſément croire, que fi la derniere eft, la premiere est auſſi par conſequent.]
2
30.
mvp-aristotle-comment-586
24.18
30. En effet, de ce qu'une telle choſe eſt, il ne s'enfuit pas toujours neceſſairement, que l'autre ſoit; mais, parce que nous ſommes perfuadez de la verité de la derniere, nous concluons fauſſement que la premiere est vraye auſſi.]
3
222.
mvp-aristotle-comment-222
NOTE 222.
24.18
P. 119. IT CONSISTS IN A SORT OF SOPHISM, &c.
In the words,
δεὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν προσθεῖναι, inclusively, the text seems evidently mangled beyond all hope of conjectural restoration. This
ulcus insanabile I presume not to touch, either as commentator, or as translator. I can make nothing consistent of it myself: I have seen nothing consistent made of it by others.
The words,
τοῦτο δὲ ἐστι ψεῦδος, are ambiguous. Victorius doubts, whether they mean,
"this posterior fact is false," (the
τοδὶ γίνεται,) or,
"this conclusion is false"—namely,
εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἐστι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι. What follows, had it been tolerably clear, would, probably, have fixed the sense of
ψεῦδος. As this is not the case, I have given it that sense which appears to me most obvious; and I think I am warranted by the very same expression used in the same sense, in the
Rhetoric, II. 23, p. 579, A
, where,
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος, clearly means,
this is a false conclusion.
But the most important question is, in what manner Aristotle meant to apply this logical paralogism to Homer's management of fiction. None of the commentators, whom I have seen, appear to me to have given any satisfactory explanation. The paralogism
παρ’ ἑπόμενον,
à consequenti, here alluded to, the reader will find clearly explained in several parts of the philosopher's other works.
1
It consists in taking a proposition as convertible, that is not so. Because rain wets the ground, we conclude, when we see the ground wet, that it must have rained. Because every man in a fever is hot, we conclude, that a person who is hot must be in a fever:
ἀνάγκη ΚΑΙ τὸν θερμὸν πυρέττειν. These are some of Aristotle's own explanatory instances. Now, he tells us here, that Homer's art of lying—
ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ—consists in imposing his marvellous fictions upon the reader's imagination by a sort of poetic sophism, similar to this logical sophism. And this is all he says. He has left us to make out the similitude as well as we can. No writer, I believe, ever paid more frequent compliments of this kind to the sagacity of his readers.
Dacier, with other commentators, seems to understand nothing more, than that artful intermixture of historical, or acknowledged, truth, which, by throwing the mind, as it were, into a posture of belief and conviction, has its effect even upon what we know to be feigned, and makes the false pass glibly with the true. But I cannot think, that this comes up to Aristotle's meaning, nor that his observation, here, amounts only to that of
Strabo
:—
ἐκ μηδενὸς ἀληθὲς ἀνάπτειν καινὴν τερατολογίαν, οὐχ Ὁμηρικόν, κ. τ. λ.
2
For no one has attempted to shew, and I believe no one can shew, how that, which Aristotle says of the particular paralogism denominated
παρ’ ἑπόμενον, is applicable to the intermixture—the mere juxtaposition, of fact and fiction.
The similitude of the logical and poetic sophism appears to me to be this. It is not merely, that, where there is a mixture of history and fiction, the truth makes the fiction pass; but the comparison, I think, relates to the connection between the fictions of the Poet, considered as cause and effect, as antecedent and consequent. The Poet invents certain extraordinary characters, incidents, and situations. When the actions, and the language, of those characters, and, in general, the consequences of those events, or situations, as drawn out into detail by the Poet, are such as we know, or think, to be true—that is to say, poetically true, or natural; such, as we are satisfied must necessarily, or would probably, follow, if such characters and situations actually existed; this probability, nature, or truth, of representation, imposes on us, sufficiently for the purposes of Poetry. It induces us to believe, with hypothetic and voluntary faith, the existence of those false events, and imaginary personages, those
ἀδύνατα, ἄλογα, ψευδῆ—those marvellous and incredible fictions, which, otherwise managed, we should have rejected: that is, their improbability, or impossibility, would have so forced themselves upon our notice, as to destroy, or disturb, even the slight and willing illusion of the moment.
Whenever, says the philosopher, supposing such a thing to be, it would certainly be followed by such effects; if we see those effects, we are disposed to infer the existence of that cause. And thus, in Poetry, and all fiction, this is the logic of that temporary imposition on which depends our pleasure. The reader of a play, or a novel, does not, indeed, syllogize, and say to himself
"Such beings as are here supposed, had they existed, must have acted and spoken exactly in this manner; therefore, I believe they have existed:"—but he feels the truth of the premises, and he consents to feel the truth of the conclusion; he does not revolt from the imagination of such beings. Every thing follows so naturally, and, even, as it seems, so necessarily, that the probability and truth of nature, in the consequences, steals, in a manner, from our view, even the impossibility of the cause, and flings an air of truth over the whole. With respect to fact, indeed, all is equally
ψεῦδος; for if the causes exist not, neither can the effects. But the consequent lies are so told, as to impose on us, for the moment, the belief of the antecedent, or fundamental fiction.
3
For instances of this art, no reader can be at a loss. He will find them, not only in almost all the
"speciosa miracula" of Homer, but even in the wilder and more absurd miracles of Ariosto; whose poem is, indeed, a striking example of the most improbable, and, in themselves, revolting lies,
4
to which, however, every poetical reader willingly throws open his imagination; principally, I believe, from the easy charm of his language and versification, and the remarkable distinctness of his painting; but, partly too, from the truth and nature which he has contrived to fling into the detail of his description. But were I to choose, from the productions of poetic genius at large, an example, which would, singly, illustrate this passage of Aristotle, more than any other that I recollect, it should be the
Caliban of Shakspeare.
I shall only add, without troubling the reader with any comment of mine, one passage of the
Rhetoric
, which may serve, both to illustrate the paralogism itself, here alluded to, and to confirm the application which I have given it. In that passage, Aristotle applies the paralogism
παρ’ ἑπόμενον, to the effect of oratorical elocution, in producing persuasion and conviction in the hearers.
Πιθανοῖ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· ΠΑΡΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΤΑΙ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὡς ἀληθῶς λεγόντων, ὅτι, ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ὥστε οἴονται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς ὁ λέγων, τὰ πράγματα, οὕτως ἔχειν.
5
"What the Orator says, is, likewise, rendered probable and credible by a suitable diction and elocution. For we are cheated into the persuasion, that the orator speaks truly, merely because we know that men, so circumstanced as he assumes to be, are actually affected in that manner: so that we take it for granted, that things are really as the speaker represents them to be, when, in fact, they are not so."
The art here pointed out by Aristotle, as eminent in Homer's poetry, evidently extends to fiction in general; but, by
ψεῦδη, I understand him to allude, chiefly, to fictions of the extraordinary, marvellous, and improbable kind—such as require the utmost art and management of the Poet to make them pass. The connection of the whole passage, if I am not mistaken, shews this to be the author's meaning; the application of
ψεῦδη being fixed, both by the terms
θαυμαστὸν, and
ἄλογον, in what precedes, and by the
ἀδύνατα καὶ εἰκότα which follow, and which I take to be, or, at least, to include, those very
ψευδῆ λεγόμενα ὡς δεῖ, of which he had, immediately before, been speaking.
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-181
Ritter, cap. 24 § 9
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός: vera et dextra mendaciorum in epopoeia expromendorum ratio
παραλογισμὸν efficit, et ita quidem efficit ut falsis vera nonnulla admixta proferat. -
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος: non semper hoc falsum est, sed tum falsum est, si prius ex altero quod verum est non ita pendet, ut effectus ex causa; et hoc Aristoteles dicere voluit.
διὸ δή,
ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος –
προσθεῖναι: convertas et distinguas: cur vero, si prius falsum, dum alterum hoc verum est, cogimur ut id (h. e. prius) aut esse aut factum esse adiiciamus ? deprehendas quaeso, lector, interpolatorem et molestum eorum quae proxime praecesserunt enarratorem. scilicet ut quae modo tam breviter quam sapienter monita sunt, ea ne prave lectores accipiant, auctor personatus interrogat: "quid cogit ut, si prius falsum alterum autem verum est, etiam prius esse aut factum esse adiiciamus?" idem continuo respondet: nam quia hoc (alterum) verum esse scimus, etiam prius falsa ratiocinatione pro vero anima nostra accipit. tum adiicit exemplum hoc ex Niptris esse. iam primum aliquis quaesiverit, cur eam explicationem interpolatori potius quam ipsi Aristoteli sua bis enuntiaturo vindicaverim, quae respondeam haec habeo. 1. quae istam quaestionem et responsionem antecedit rei expositio, ea et melius et rectius rem declarandam explicat, quam illo additamento fieri videmus. itaque et interrogatio inepta est et responsio inutilis. porro recte dicit Aristoteles homines opinari, h. e. vulgo sive fere opinari, verum esse prius, si esse alterum sciverint quod post prius accidere soleat: interpolator vero idem necessario fieri falso putat. 2. loquendi ratio commentatorem prodit. pro Aristotelio
πρότερον et
ὕστερον ille ponit
πρῶτον et
ἄλλον, pro
οἴονται ἄνθρωποι admittit
παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή. 3. hanc explicationem, quomodo falsa loqui conveniat, exemplum (
παράδειγμα) perverse appellat, idque ex Niptris petitum esse dicit: scilicethuiusmodi falsa quae descripsit Aristoteles, in Niptris esse, et inde eorum descriptionem sumptam esse dicere voluit. sed restat quo praecipue attendi velim. singulas Iliadis et Odysseae partes et in vita communi et a grammaticis propriis nominibus appellatas esse satis quidem constat; constat etiam eorum nominum nonnulla prius exstitisse, quam disciplina et ars grammatica Alexandriae agitari coepisset, prius exstitisse, quam utriusque carminis divisio in viginti quattuor libros instituta esset. sed nihilo minus ego id confidenter pronuntio, in Niptris referri locum illum Odysseae T. 172-248, ubi Ulixes coram Penelopa multa mendacia veri similia profert, non potuisse, antequam quae nunc libro XIX leguntur secreta a ceteris et in unum coniuncta essent, h. e. antequam Odyssea in viginti quattuor rhapsodias distributa esset. nam quae illic posita sunt a versu 1 usque ad 334, ubi
τὰ νίπτρα (Ulixis lavatio) vere incipiunt, ea nihil per se cohaerent cum lavatione Ulixis. inde consequitur locum illum 172- 248 de quo loquimur tum demum in
Νίπτροις referri potuisse, cum versus illi 604, qui hodie librum undevicesimum efficiunt, in unum librum coniuncti et a loco illo eximio (v. 335- 509) nomine
τῶν Νίπτρων consignati essent. scimus autem divisionem utriusque carminis in viginti quattuor libros quos hodie legimus ab Aristarcho 2) demum institutam esse. itaque ille qui haec interposuit post Aristarchum vixit. Restat ut dicamus de huius loci recte scribendi ratione. quod sub initium codices exhibent,
ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ προσθεῖναι, in eo neque iustam structuram neque sensum aliquem agnoscere licet: necesse est esse aut factum esse 2) Vid. grammat. de poesi Hom. 2.
εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ποιήσεις δύο,
Ἰλιὰς καὶ Ὀδύσσεια διηρημένη ἑκατέρα εἰς τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν στοιχείων,
οὐχ ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ,
ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν γραμματικῶν τῶν περὶ ᾿Αρίσταρχον (h. e. ab ipso Aristarcho, de qua dicendi consuetudine v. Lehrsii Quaest. epic. p. 28. not.). conf. Eustath. p. 5 extr. et Wolfii Frolegom. ad Hom. p. CCLVI. not.aut adiicere, quid hoc est? nihil est. prius
ἢ post vocem
ἀνάγκη in
η exeuntem oblitteratum et deinde alieno loco ante
προσθεῖναι repetitum est. hoc si suo loco redditur, exit et sententia et structura haud inepta, quid cogit (
διὸ ἀνάγκη), ut id esse aut factum esse (mente) adiiciamus? hic nihil durum est nisi obiecti (
τὸ πρῶτον) omissio, quod tamen ex antecedentibus huc trahere licet, et aliquid duritiei huius hominis stilo libenter concedimus. in extremis
παράδειγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων optimi quique libri exhibent
τοῦτο, dico AcBc et Mediceos XIV 16 21 et GLPQ, minus boni Na et Mediceus 14
τούτων, ubi
ων exitus ortus est ex subsequentibus
ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων. Hermannus
τούτου scripsit pro
τοῦτο, eumque secutus est Bekkerus: sed iam non
ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων sed
ἐν τοῖς Νίπτροις scribi oportuit, quam scribendi licentiam Hermannus coniectura admodum incerta excusare conatus est.