καὶ πρός
: ‘and which moreover’ (“idem est quod
καὶ προσέτι, ac praeterea, atque insuper” Stallbaum). Two kinds of
necessary desires were distinguished viz. (1)
ἃς—ἀποτρέψαι, (2)
ὅσαι—ἡμᾶς. Corresponding to this, which is not of course a mutually exclusive, division, Plato emphasises two distinct features of unnecessary desires: so that
καὶ πρός (‘and which moreover,’ or according to the Greek idiom, ‘and these moreover’: see on II 357 B) is altogether appropriate. Cf. (with Stallbaum)
Euthyd. 298 D
and Blaydes on
Ar.
Knights 578
. Schneider takes
πρὸς οὐδέν together (“nullius rei habita ratione”), but
οὐδὲν cannot easily be separated from
ἀγαθόν, unless we read
<οὐδὲν> πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν, as I formerly suggested. I have no longer any doubt that Stallbaum's view is right. Ast's conjecture
πρὸς οὐδέν) is refuted by Schneider.
αὐτοῦ σίτου
: ‘merely of food,’ as opposed to e.g.
pleasant food,
sweet food (
τῶν τοιῶνδε σιτίων in Epicurus: Usener
Epic. p. 295). See in particular IV 437 D —439 A notes
ἡ μέν γε κτλ.
On
γε see 556 A note and Neil's
Appendix on
γε in his edition of Ar.
Knights p. 192. The words
ᾗ τε—δυνατή should be explained as follows. Hunger, which is the desire of
σῖτος, ‘is capable of putting an end to life’: i.e. it must be gratified (
οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ’ εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι 558 D), or else we die. On this ground, and also because it is
ὠφέλιμος (i.e.
ἀποτελουμένη ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς 558 E), we pronounce it an
ἀναγκαία ἐπιθυμία. The Greek is terse but not obscure. With
παῦσαι ζῶντα cf.
Gorg. 523 C
, D and
Menex. 241 B
. Jowett thinks the expression ‘very strange’ for
ἀποκτιννύναι. It is strictly accurate: the sword kills, but hunger
παύει ζῶντα: we merely ‘cease to live.’ Other views on this passage are discussed in App. III.
ἀλλοίων ‐‐ ἢ τοιούτων
: “alius generis—quam quales modo diximus” (Stallbaum).
χρηματιστικὰς ‐‐ χρησίμους
: ‘money-making or productive, because useful in production.’ Plato
more suo
σοφίζεται περὶ τὸ ὄνομα (VI 509 D note).
οὕτω δή
: they also are
ἀναλωτικαί. Epicurus l.c. describes
ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμία as
φυσικὴ μέν, οὐκ ἀναγκαία δέ.
νῦν δή
. 552 C ff., 555 E ff.
πάλιν τοίνυν κτλ.
Plato's description of the genesis of the democratical man is one of the most royal and magnificent pieces of writing in the whole range of literature, whether ancient or modern. Throughout most of this chapter, in the words of Longinus, the style
πλουσιώτατα καθάπερ τι πέλαγος εἰς ἀναπεπταμένον κέχυται—μέγεθος (
περὶ ὕψους 12. 2), and no better example will ever be discovered of that full tide of lofty thoughts and images and words—a tide ‘too full for sound and foam’—in which the author of the treatise
On the Sublime places the essence of
<*>ψος. We owe to Longinus what is by far the best appreciation of Plato's hierophantic vein: see especially cc. 33—36, where we can hear more than a mere echo of that sublimity which is itself, according to Longinus, the ‘echo of high-mindedness’ (
ὕψος μεγαλοφροσύνης ἀπήχημα ib. 9. 2). For a very different estimate the student may be referred to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (
ad Cn. Pomp. Gem. 753—765 Reiske), whose pedantic criticisms make it tolerably plain that a study of the Attic orators does not qualify a man to sit in judgment upon Plato. The present episode is hardly less remarkable for psychological insight than for elevation of style, and the description of the democratic man as the chameleon of human society paints him for all time (561 C ff.). As a representation of actual fact, the picture is doubtless somewhat exaggerated, as usual; but it is extraordinarily vivid and powerful, and shews that the Platonic analogy between the individual and the State may prove in the hands of a master an admirable clue whereby to unravel the workings of the human soul in the individual as well as in the State.
νῦν δὴ κτλ.
See 558 C, D. With
ἀπαιδεύτως cf. 552 E note
κηφήνων κτλ.
It is clear from the summary of this passage in IX 572 C
συγγενόμενος δὲ κομψοτέροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ἄρτι διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμιῶν that
κηφήνων and
αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς refer to
human drones, and not to the
κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίαι in the young man's heart.
αἴθωσι ‘furious,’ ‘wild’ (Jebb on
Soph.
Ajax 221
) shews that the drones are of the ‘stinging’ order (552 C ff., 555 D ff.).
ὀλιγαρχίας ‐‐ δημοκρατίαν
. See cr. n. Schneider defends the MSS by explaining
μεταβολὴ ὀλιγαρχική as “ea quae ad
ὀλιγαρχίαν pertinet eamque efficit,” and referring
τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ “ad ipsam
ὀλιγαρχίαν in adjectivo latentem.”
δημοκρατικήν he thinks is written for
δημοκρατίαν by a sort of attraction. This explanation is much too difficult and obscure. Nor can
ὀλιγαρχικῆς by itself stand for
ὀλιγαρχικῆς πολιτείας, at all events in this connexion. The MS reading can only mean ‘of the oligarchical change within himself into a democratical,’ an expression which bears no sense. I formerly wrote
ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τοῦ—δημοκρατικόν, comparing 559 E, 560 A; but it may fairly be objected that the ‘oligarchical
element’ within the man does not change into a democratical: it is the
government that changes. For this reason I now prefer my old suggestion (
Cl. Rev. IV p. 357), although the corruption of
ὀλιγαρχικοῦ — δημοκρατικόν is perhaps somewhat easier to explain. For the combination of genitives cf. V 449 A note An alternative solution would be to insert
πολιτείας after
ἑαυτῷ. This gives excellent sense, but it is difficult to assign a plausible reason for the loss of
πολιτείας in all our MSS. I am unable to resist the conclusion that the text is corrupt, otherwise I should not venture to make any alteration. If Plato did not write the passage as it is printed above, there can be little doubt that
πολιτείας has accidentally disappeared.
μετέβαλλε κτλ.
See 556 E.
τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν means of course
τῷ ἑτέρῳ εἴδει τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.
τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ
: ‘the oligarchical element within one.’
ἑαυτῷ is ‘oneself’: cf. III 407 C
μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ἐν αὐτῷ, which Ast adopted (after Stephanus), would be easier; but I think Plato means to suggest that the oligarchical element present in this
νεανίας is a universal feature of the human race. J. and C. think
ἐκείνῳ and
ἑαυτῷ may have changed places—a conjecture which is surely too bold. Schneider, taking
ἑαυτῷ as ‘himself’ and not ‘oneself,’ compares
ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν below and
αὐτῷ—ἐν ἑαυτῷ in 559 D, E; but here there is nothing corresponding to the
αὐτῷ in each of these passages, and
ἑαυτῷ cannot therefore be translated in Schneider's way.