μεγαλοπρέπειαν
: ‘highmindedness,’ not (as Jowett) ‘magnificence.’ See VI 486 A note
τὰ τοιαῦτα
(“das dazu gehörige” Schneider) is quite general, and means how so-and-so is in respect of the virtues just enumerated: cf. VIII 549 D. The Oxford editors wrongly understand
τὰ τοιαῦτα as
τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη.
λανθάνουσι κτλ.
: ‘they unconsciously use cripples and bastards for any of these services that happen, as friends in the one case, and in the other rulers.’ Schneider explains
τούτων as “horum negotiorum, hoc est, aliquam ex his, quae dictae sunt, virtutibus requirentium.” This is perhaps safer than to understand it merely of the services rendered by friends and rulers. In either case cf. for
τούτων VIII 543 C note J. and C. have rightly noted that “the subject of
τύχωσι is the same with that of
λανθάνουσι”: but they are mistaken in referring
τούτων to
τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη, and in connecting
πρός with
χωλοῖς τε καὶ νόθοις. It is certain that
χρώμενοι is understood with
τύχωσι, and, if so,
πρός can belong only to
χρώμενοι. D. and V. are consistently wrong in the translation of this somewhat perplexing little clause.
ἀρτιμελεῖς κτλ.
For
ἀρτιμελεῖς cf. 535 A.
ἄσκησιν is of course the
physical discipline: note the chiasmus.
ἥ τε δίκη κτλ.
Cf. VI 487 A where
οὐδ’ ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμφαιτο similarly concludes the earlier enumeration of qualities necessary to the philosophic ruler.
καὶ πράξομεν
. καί (which some inferior MSS omit) is “paullo insolentius positum, sed ita ut
τἀναντία πάντα partim ad civitatis conditionem—partim ad opinionem hominum atque existimationem philosophiae, quam sequi errorem istum oporteat, spectare et
utramque contra, quam dictum optandumque sit, casuram esse significet” (Schneider).
γελοῖον
takes up
γέλωτα just before, hence
καί. My extreme
προθυμία, says Socrates in effect, was fitted to provoke a smile (cf. VI 506 D).
ἐν τῷ παρόντι
. The reference is to 535 C and VI 495 C—496 A. After
παρόντι Burnet adds <
τι>, needlessly: see on III 388 D.
ἐπαίζομεν
. Literature is not life, but ‘noble play’—
παγκάλην— παιδιὰν—τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν (
Phaedr. 276 E
. Cf. also X 599 A note). See Hirzel
der Dialog I p. 180, where this thoroughly Platonic view is admirably expounded. There is a touch of pathos in Plato's application of it to his own dialogues, recalling to my mind, I know not exactly why, the saying of Isaac Newton about gathering pebbles by the shore, as well as Heraclitus'
αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων πεσσεύων (
Fr. 79 B
ywater).
μᾶλλον ἐντεινάμενος
. Plato's apology is by no means intended to appease the ‘bald little tinker’ (VI 495 E) and his crew; for he still holds them responsible for the insults levelled at philosophy (
τοῖς αἰτίοις). He is merely apologising, not without a characteristic touch of irony, for an offence against the canons of literary taste. One ought not to turn ‘play’ into earnest, and, as Longinus remarks,
κἀν βακχεύμασι νήφειν ἀναγκαῖον (
περὶ ὕφους 16. 4).
πρεσβύτας ἐξελέγομεν
. III 412 C. It is quite clear that the
προτέρα ἐκλογή is not supplemented but superseded by the provisions now laid down. Cf. VIII 543 D note
γηράσκων κτλ.
γηράσκω δ) αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος Solon
Fr. 18 B
ergk. The line is quoted in [
Erast.] 133 C and alluded to again in
Lach. 188 B
, 189 A.
ἧττον
. ἔτι ἧττον, which Herwerden proposes, is no improvement, but rather the reverse. Plato may be alluding to some proverbial saying, as D. and V. appear to believe, translating thus: “an old man can sooner run than learn.”
νέων δὲ κτλ.
Cf.
Eur.
I. T. 122
μόχθος γὰρ οὐδεὶς τοῖς νέοις σκῆψιν φέρει and
Theaet. 146 B
,
Symp. 175 E
.
παισὶν οὖσι κτλ.
This preliminary survey is clearly meant to take place in the years during which ‘Music’ and Gymnastic are chiefly cultivated. See Nettleship
Lect. and Rem. II p. 290.
οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες κτλ.
We must bear in mind throughout the whole of this subject that Plato is legislating for a select class who naturally love labour and truth. They alone are nature's freemen and must be treated as such in their education, but the compulsory method may be necessary, Plato would say, in order to educate others, so far as others can be educated at all. With the general sense cf.
Phaedr. 240 C
and Theogn. 472
πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ’ ἀνιηρὸν ἔφυ.
παίζοντας
: with a play on
παῖδας: cf. infra VIII 545 E and
ἀτεχνῶς παισὶν—μετὰ παιδιᾶς—μανθάνειν in
Laws 819 B, a passage in which the general idea is that play should be study, whereas here it is that study should be play.