οὗτος δ’ ὁ χρόνος κτλ.
is still under the influence of
εἰ. With
ἆρ’ οὐ γέλωτ’ ἂν κτλ. cf.
Phaedr. 249 D
ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος, νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολλούς,
Theaet. 172 C
, 174 C—175 B,
Soph. 216 D
and infra 517 D.
οὐκ ἄξιον κτλ.
The prisoners are almost relieved to find themselves able to suppress their higher promptings and sink back into indolence and self-complacency.
καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα κτλ.
is a mani fest and touching allusion to the death of Socrates, whose fate was the most conspicuous example in Greek history of the principle here laid down. See Zeller^{4} II 1, pp. 223—227 and cf. VI 496 C, D notes Read in the light of another and even more momentous sacrifice, the sentence assumes a kind of prophetical import, like the famous passage about the
λόγος θεῖος in the
Phaedo (85 C, D). See Geddes's
Phaedo of Plato pp. 280—283. The text is difficult to determine. If we retain
λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν, we must either a regard
ἆρ’ οὐ— λέγοιτ’ ἄν as equivalent to
ἆρ’ οὐκ οἴει γέλωτ’ ἂν αὐτὸν παρασχεῖν καὶ λέγεσθαι ἄν, and take
λέγεσθαι ἄν as equivalent to
ἐκείνους ἂν εἰπεῖν, carrying on
ἐκείνους as subject to
ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν (Schneider), or b supply
οὐκ οἴει, although these words do not occur after 516 C (J. and C.). The second solution is preferable to the first, but either is a
tour de force. No satisfactory explanation of the infinitive
ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν appears to be possible, and the immediate juxtaposition of the two forms of the infinitive is also in itself suspicious. A few inferior MSS read
ἀποκτενεῖν for the
ἀποκτείνειν and
αὖ for the
ἄν of A: but otherwise there is no important variant. The emendations proposed are (1)
λαβεῖν, κἂν ἀποκτείνειαν (Ast), (2)
λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτείνοιεν ἄν (Stallbaum), (3)
λαβεῖν, κἂν ἀποκτιννύοιεν (Cobet), (4)
λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτείνειαν ἄν (Baiter). The correction in the text appears to me not only easier, but more in harmony with Plato's fulness of expression. I suppose that the error arose thus. A scribe accidentally omitted
ἀποκτιννύναι, and the infinitive was wrongly replaced after, instead of before,
ἀποκτείνειαν. This would give
λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειαν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν, from which the change is inevitable to the text of A.
ταύτην κτλ.
If we interpret the lower section of the line as
ὁρατόν and nothing more, the following comparisons are involved:—(1) Fire=Sun: (2) Shadows of
ἀνδριάντες and other
σκευαστά cast by Fire = Shadows etc. of
φυτευτά and
σκευαστά cast by the Sun: (3)
ἀνδριάντες and other
σκευαστά in the Cave=
φυτευτά and
σκευαστά in the
ὁρατόν: (4) the ascent from the Cave into the
ὁρατόν=the ascent from the
ὁρατόν into the
νοητόν. The second comparison is of little or no importance, for the
ἀπαίδευτος, of whose condition the Cave is an allegory, does not contemplate exclusively or even principally natural shadows of
φυτευτά and
σκευαστά (cf. VI 511 E note). Nor do the other comparisons exhaust the significance of the Cave as an allegory of
ἀπαιδευσία. In order fully to apprehend its meaning, we must regard the lower section of the line as
δοξαστόν in the sense of V 475 E ff. Plato himself does so: see VI 510 A note The shadows and originals within the cave will then symbolise
δόξαι which are respectively twice and once removed from the truth which they seek to portray (see on 517 D), and the ascent from the Cave into the
ὁρατόν will represent the soul's ascent from the
δοξαστόν into the
νοητόν—from the
πολλά (in the widest sense) to the
ἕν. Cf. 514 B and 532 B, C notes
ἐλπίδος
: ‘surmise’: cf. II 383 B note The diffidence of tone recals VI 506 E: cf. infr. 523 A.
φαίνεται
. For the construction cf. I 334 B note
τελευταία
as well as
μόγις should be taken predicatively with
ὁρᾶσθαι. The sentiment is as in VI 505 A (
ὅτι—ἴσμεν), where see note.
τεκοῦσα κτλ.
τεκοῦσα reminds us that the Sun is the
ἔκγονος of the Good (VI 506 E). On
ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν see VI 508 D note
ὅτι δεῖ depends on
φαίνεται, not (as D. and V. translate) on
συλλογιστέα. Cf. VI 505 A, 506 A notes Plato's guardians are not to rest satisfied with the
εἰκών or
ἔκγονος of the Good; they must see the Good itself, and infer (not by intuition, but) by means of
reasoning (
συλλογιστέα) that it is the cause of all. See the notes on VI 511 B (
αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος and
τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου).
ἀσχημονεῖ κτλ.
Cf.
Theaet. 174 B
, C
ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἤ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας—διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει—ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινὴ—γελοῖος φαίνεται. The whole of the description of the
φιλόσοφος in the
Theaetetus should be carefully compared with this passage.
ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων
is logically subordinate to
ἀναγκαζόμενος.
τῶν τοῦ δικαίου κτλ.
treats the Cave as an allegory of
δοξαστά (see on VI 510 A, VII 517 A). The expression ‘shadows of the just’ is vague (cf.
σκιαμαχούντων in 520 C), and
ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί introduces more precision. We may regard
ἀγαλμάτων as symbolising the enacted laws of a city, and their shadows as the “representation or misrepresentation of the existing laws (themselves only ‘images’ of justice) by a rhetorician or pleader” (Nettleship
Hell. p. 141 note 1). Compare (with Shorey
Idea of Good etc. p. 287)
Soph. 234 C
and
Pol. 303 C
.
ὅπῃ ποτὲ ‐‐ ἰδόντων
. For the real point at issue is not the law, but the judges' interpretation thereof. Plato is doubtless thinking of Socrates and his judges throughout the whole of this passage.