Plato Republic 5.462

ἆρα . <εἰ> ἄρα was suggested by Dobree; but cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 475 B πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα—ὑπερβάλλει κτλ. The exact translation is ‘to enquire, Do the institutions we have described’ etc.

ἔχομεν οὖν κτλ. Cf. IV 422 E. στάσις was the greatest evil which a Greek city had to fear, and Athens had suffered from it grievously. Now individualism was the peculiar pride and glory of the Athenian State (Thuc. II 37), so that we need not wonder if Plato traced στάσις to individualism, and rushed to the opposite extreme. Cf. Krohn Pl. Fr. p. 4, Pöhlmann Gesch. d. ant. Kommunismus etc. pp. 146—184, and see on II 369 A.

ποιῇ μίαν . J. and C. assert that Plato “has no idea of a unity of opposites or differences— τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον,” and Aristotle argues to the same effect in Pol. B 2. 1261^{a} 22 ff. But it is in fact on such a unity that the entire fabric of Plato's city rests: see IV 423 D note, and cf. also 432 A, 443 D. The perfect city is a ἕν with three πολλά—rulers, auxiliaries, farmers and artisans, or, if rulers and auxiliaries are classed together as guardians, then with two. Plato's object throughout this episode is to keep the whole city ‘one’ by preventing one of its constituent factors, viz. the guardians, from becoming ‘many.’ If the guardians are united—so he holds—no danger to the city's unity need be apprehended from the others (465 B). With the sentiment generally cf. Ar. Eccl. 594 and 674 ( μίαν οἴκησίν φημι ποιήσειν συρρήξασ’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα | ὥστε βαδίζειν εἰς ἀλλήλους). See also on 463 E and App. I.

οἱ μὲν ‐‐ τῆς πόλεως . As when a national disaster is made the occasion of a party victory. Plato may be thinking of scenes which he had witnessed in his native city. Bosanquet cites an excellent illustration from Dem. de Cor. 217.

καὶ ‐‐ ταὐτά : i.e. ὅταν μὴ ἅμα φθέγγωνται—τό τε ἀλλότριον καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἀλλότριον. Hartman ejects καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου as a “futile interpretamentum” on τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν. There is nothing to prove that καὶ—ταὐτά was read by Aristotle ( Pol. B 3. 1261^{b} 18), Plutarch (140 D, 484 B, 767 D), Iamblichus ( de vita Pythag. 167) or Proclus ( in remp. ed. Kroll II pp. 78. 28, 365. 11), though Iamblichus uses the word ἀλλότριον instead of Plato's οὐκ ἐμόν. But as none of these authors pretends to be quoting Plato's ipsissima verba, the omission proves nothing. Although the words add nothing to the sense, they approach the matter from another point of view, and are in my judgment certainly genuine.

ἐν ᾗτινι κτλ. ‘Thus in whatever city the largest number of men agree in applying these expressions, “mine” and “not mine,” to the same thing,’ etc. τοῦτο agrees with the nearest of the two objects, viz. τὸ ἐμόν. For the use of ἐπί cf. Parm. 147 D . The reading ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό—see cr. n.—is as old as Iamblichus: see the passage referred to above, where Iamblichus has ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐμὸν φθέγγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον. It is retained by the majority of editors; but no other instance of λέγειν ἐπί τι has yet been adduced, and the expression is certainly very strange. φέρειν ὄνομα ἐπί τι ( Soph. 237 C , D: cf. also Tim. 37 E ), of which Schneider reminds us, is a different thing from λέγειν ὄνομα ἐπί τι. Various emendations have been proposed. The choice seems to me to lie between ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ and ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The latter emendation—which I once adopted—was (as I learn from Schneider) proposed by Küster instead of ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό in Iamblichus: cf. ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν VII 524 E (‘in the case of the finger’) al. Although the genitive may be right, the dative now seems to me slightly more natural and easy. Hartman ejects ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό altogether, but there is no occasion for the knife. Cf. IV 436 B note For the error see Introd. § 5.

καὶ ἥτις δὴ κτλ. δή is illative, and καί ‘also.’ καὶ—ἔχει (sc. ἄριστα διοικεῖται) is certainly interrogative, as Schneider pointed out: see in D below τοῦτο δ ἐρωτᾷς. Plato recurs to his favourite analogy between man and the State: cf. II 368 E f. notes

οἷον ὅταν κτλ. Poschenrieder ( Die Pl. Dial. in ihrem Verhältnisse zu d. Hippokratischen Schr. p. 67) cites a remarkable parallel from the author of the treatise de locis in homine (Littré VI p. 278 c. 1) εἴ τις βούλεται τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν μέρος κακῶς ποιέειν τὸ σμικρότατον, πᾶν τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεται τὴν πεῖσιν, ὁκοίη ἄν τις ᾗ, διὰ τόδε, ὅτι τοῦ σώματος τὸ σμικρότατον πάντα ἔχει, ὅσαπερ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον· τοῦτο δ’ ὁποῖον ἄν τις πάθῃ ἐπαναφέρει πρὸς τὴν ὁμοεθνίην ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ, ἤν τε κακόν, ἤν τε ἀγαθόν ᾗ· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἀλγέει καὶ ἥδεται ὑπὸ ἔθνεος τοῦ σμικροτάτου τὸ σῶμα, ὅτι ἐν τῷ σμικροτάτῳ πάντ’ ἔνι τὰ μέρεα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσι ἐς τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἕκαστα καὶ διαγγέλλουσι πάντα. The ‘sympathy’ of the different parts of the human body was a Hippocratean tenet ( ξυμπαθέα πάντα de alimento IX c. 23 Littré). Cf. Shakespeare Othello III 4. 146—148, “For let our finger ache, and it indues Our other healthful members ev'n to that sense Of pain.” Plato goes farther, and represents the partnership as extending also to the soul: see next note.

πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία κτλ. : ‘the entire partnership pervading the body with the soul, organized into a single composite organization, viz. that of the ruling power in the partnership’ etc. Plato's language is precise, but difficult. I take ἡ—ψυχήν as defining the κοινωνία. κατὰ τὸ σῶμα is written rather than τοῦ σώματος, because the partnership is not only a partnership of body with soul, but also a partnership of the different parts of body with one another. τεταγμένη—see cr. n. and App. V —appears to suit σύνταξις better than τεταμένη. A σύνταξις is the ordered combination of two or more elements: cf. Tim. 24 C and Laws 903 D ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι. The words τοῦ ἄρχοντος define the σύνταξις; although neuter in gender, they really refer, not to the soul, but to the whole σύνταξις or σύνολον, i.e. ὁ ἄνθρωπος. It is ὁ ἄνθρωπος who rules in the partnership, although he is himself a partner only in the sense in which the whole is partner with its parts. The expression ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ is thus seen to be as exact as possible. The confusion between τεταγμένος and τεταμένος is easy: συντεταμένως, for example, and συντεταγμένως are often confused in MSS: see Ast's Lex. Plat. s.v. ξυντεταμένως and my edition of the Apology p. 127. Cf. also infra 474 A note

ἐν αὐτῇ : i.e. ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ (so also Schneider), not (as Stallbaum) ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Plato means that every single man ( ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου above) is a single organized whole—a partnership in which the whole is partner with, and rules, the parts. See also App. V.

ᾔσθετό ‐‐ ξυνήλγησεν : ‘momentary’ aorists: cf. Theaet. 156 E .

ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν : sc. besides the finger.

ἑνὸς δὴ κτλ. We may compare the Stoic doctrine “incommoda autem et commoda (ita enim εὐχρηστήματα et δυσχρηστήματα appello) communia (sc. inter sapientes) esse voluerunt” (see Cicero de Fin. III 69, and Madvig's note). Not a few of Plato's regulations in Book V foreshadow the communistic theories of Stoicism: see Dyroff Ethik d. alten Stoa pp. 211 f., 226—231. Plato however contrives to make his communism live; whereas the Stoics seldom did.

αὕτη . See cr. n. Schneider says αὐτή is “ea potissimum,” referring to VII 516 B, where however we should (I believe) read οὗτος. See note ad loc. Here αὕτη is required by the contrast with εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις μᾶλλον. For the error cf. VIII 552 A, where q and several MSS wrongly read αὐτή. See also Introd. § 5.

ἔστι . For the syntax see on II 363 A. ἔστι is a privileged verb in Attic prose: cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 61.