Plato Republic 5.454

ed. John Burnet

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The Annenberg CPB/Project.

Current edition Perseus

Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)
Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 5.454 focus

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης . ἀντιλογική is defined in Soph. 225 B as a variety of ἀμφισβητητικόν: viz. τὸ ἐν ἰδίοις—opposed to τὸ δικανικόν, which is δημοσίᾳ—αὖ καὶ κατακεκερματισμένον ἐρωτήσεσι πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις. It is described in Phaedr. 261 D ff., and practical illustrations are given in the sophisms of Euthyd. 275 C ff. The Ἀντιλογικοί are spoken of as almost a distinct sect in Plato's time: see Lys. 216 A and Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως 45 ἄλλοι δέ τινες περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις—οὓς ἀντιλογικοὺς καλοῦσιν. Here Plato probably has in view some of the ‘Sophists’ (as in VI 499 A) as well as the Megarian school, whose well-known puzzles— ὁ ψευδόμενος, ὁ διαλανθάνων, Ἠλέκτρα, ὁ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος: see D. L. II 108—are excellent examples of verbal fallacies. The same class of people are also called ἐριστικοί and ἀγωνιστικοί: see Men. 75 C and cf. Theaet. 167 E , Phil. 17 A and Isocr. in Soph. 20 τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας καλινδουμένων—τοιαῦτα λογίδια διεξιόντες οἷς εἴ τις ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων ἐμμείνειεν, εὐθὺς ἂν ἐν πᾶσιν ε<*>η κακοῖς. On the history and place of Eristic in Greek philosophy see E. S. Thompson's elaborate excursus in his edition of the Meno pp. 272—285.

κατ) εἴδη διαιρούμενοι . εἴδη is not of course ‘the Ideas’: but ‘species’ ‘kinds’: cf. Pol. 285 A κατ’ εἴδη— διαιρουμένους and Soph. 253 D κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι. That κατὰ γένη (s. εἴδη) διαλέγειν is the peculiar province of dialectic was the iew of Socrates as well as of Plato: see Xen. Mem. IV 5. 12 ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. See also on III 402 C.

κατ) αὐτὸ ‐‐ ἐναντίωσιν : lit. ‘pursue the contradiction of what has been said according to the name and nothing more’ i.e. ‘aim at the merely verbal contradiction of what has been said.’ We are told by Clement ( Strom. II 7. 968 B ed. Migne) that Critolaus called such persons ὀνοματομάχοι. With διώκειν ἐναντίωσιν cf. III 410 B γυμναστικὴν διώκειν. The implied antithesis to κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα is κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα: cf. Soph. 218 C δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον συνομολογ(ήσασθαι χωρὶς λόγου.

ἔριδι ‐‐ διαλέκτῳ : a common opposition: cf. Men. 75 C ff. and Phil. 17 A .

τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν κτλ. See cr. n. The omission of μή was perhaps due to the erroneous idea that διώκομεν below meant ‘to attack.’ In reality, it means ‘we are pursuing’ (the proposition that), i.e. ‘we are insisting that.’ The way for this somewhat strained use is prepared by διώκειν τὴν ἐναντίωσιν just above. Plato is in fact applying the expression τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν to the special case before us. τὸ λεχθέν would in this case be that ‘different natures are to follow the same pursuits’ (453 E τὰς ἄλλας φύσεις τὰ αὐτά φαμεν νῦν δεῖν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι). Its ἐναντίωσις is that ‘different natures are not to have the same pursuits.’ For τὴν αὐτήν we must therefore read either <μὴ> τὴν αὐτήν or else τὴν ἄλλην (with Baiter). I prefer the former, both because it has some MS authority, and also because, if Plato had chosen to use ἄλλος, he would probably have written τὰς ἄλλας φύσεις as in 453 E. It is also true, as J. and C. observe, that “the opposition of μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν is more like Plato than the conjectural reading τὴν ἄλλην.” Translate ‘we cling to the verbal point and insist that what is not the same nature ought not to have the same pursuits.’

ὡς ἔοικεν marks the irony. For ἡ ἐναντία in the next line a few MSS have ἐναντία, which Hartman approves. If ἡ αὐτή were predicative, Plato would have written ἐναντία, but, as it is, ἡ ἐναντία is correct, being, like ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις, the subject to an ἐστίν understood.

πρὸς ‐‐ τεῖνον corresponds to πρὸς τί τεῖνον in B above. On the corruption in A see Introd. § 5.

ἰατρικὸν κτλ. Plato is illustrating that particular variety of ὁμοίωσις and ἀλλοίωσις which πρὸς αὐτὰ τείνει τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα. As an instance of ὁμοίωσις he gives two ἰατρικοί (cf. I 350 A): these clearly have the same nature πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, i.e. in this case πρὸς τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι. ἀλλοίωσις he illustrates by the difference between an ἰατρικός and a τεκτονικός: these have different natures πρὸς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, for the one is qualified ἰατρεύεσθαι, the other τεκταίνεσθαι. Nothing could be more clear; but the text has been plunged into confusion by the introduction of the words τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα after the second ἰατρικόν. The reading of A—see cr. n.—is indefensible; and the majority of recent editors print ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα with q. But τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα adds nothing to ἰατρικόν. It has indeed been thought that ἰατρικόν by itself suggests a doctor in actual practice, whereas an ἰατρικὸς τὴν ψυχήν need not practise. If so, we may fairly doubt whether the two have the same nature; and at all events the difference between them renders them inapt illustrations of Plato's argument. Jowett and Campbell attempt to escape these difficulties by taking τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα with the first ἰατρικόν as well as with the second; but the Greek does not permit of this solution. Similar objections apply to the readings of Bekker (and apparently Ficinus) ἰατρὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα, of Stephanus and other early editors ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα (partly supported by Θ), and also, with some modifications, to Richards' otherwise unhappy proposal ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν <εὐφυᾶ> τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα. Hermann reads ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντας, but the introduction of women is of course premature. I regard τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα as a relic of ἰατρὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα, a marginal annotation on ἰατρικόν. Cf. Introd. § 5.

ἐλέγομεν : ‘we were saying,’ i.e. ‘we meant.’ Nothing of the sort was actually said before.

διαφέρον : ‘excelling’ rather than ‘differing’ (D. and V.): hence τοῦτο δὴ— ἀποδιδόναι. Richards proposes διαφέρειν, to avoid the singular. But the subjects are distributed, as appears from καὶ τό— καὶ τό, as well as from ἑκατέρῳ; and the infinitive is somewhat less suitable here than it is below. Translate ‘if either the male or the female sex plainly excels the other’ etc.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. ‘Is not our next step to invite?’ &c. Ξ reads κελεύωμεν, which may be right, but the indicative is quite defensible. With τὸν τὰ ἐναντία λέγοντα cf. infra 455 A. It is not likely that a specific allusion to Aristophanes is here intended (see Chiappelli Riv. di Filolog. XI p. 200), but there is some plausibility in the conjecture that the coming argument may be inspired in some measure by the Ecclesiazusae, where the essentially domestic qualities of women are contrasted with their incapacity for government. See App. I.