Plato Republic 4.437

ἢ καὶ εἴη . I agree with Bekker, Schneider, and J. and C. in retaining these words, which Galen l.c. also read, and only a few inferior MSS (with the majority of editors) omit. If the words are spurious, no satisfactory theory has yet been advanced to account for their presence in the text; certainly no scribe is at all likely to have added them. A fuller and more emphatic statement of the maxim is natural enough after the emphasis with which the sentence opens ( οὐδὲν—ἐκπλήξει), and Schneider truly observes: “obiter et quodam modo praeter exspectationem eius” (i.e. τοῦ εἶναι), “mentionem fieri adiectum καὶ indicat, quod semel positum mox sine offensione repetitur, omissis vero verbis ἢ καὶ εἴη ante ποιήσειεν non magis quam supra p. 436 B ante πάσχειν locum habiturum fuisset.” πάθοι and ποιήσειεν have reference to actions, εἴη to a state, and εἴη naturally follows πάθοι because e.g. πλείους γίγνεσθαι (an example of πάσχειν) leads up to πλείους εἶναι. It should also be observed that the meaning of πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, which the discussion has not yet brought out, is best apprehended in examples not of πάσχειν or ποιεῖν, but of εἶναι τἀναντία: see 436 B note

ἀλλ’ ὅμως κτλ. The usual Greek idiom, as shewn for example in ἀλγῶ τὴν κεφαλήν (cf. V 462 C ff.), rests on a psychological theory which is inconsistent with that now proposed by Plato. This may be one reason why Plato is at such pains to establish and emphasize his point.

λαβεῖν has been doubted: but see III 407 B note

ἂν (see cr. n.) is better inserted after ἐναντίων than after θείης (Ast) or τοιαῦτα (Hartman). Stallbaum (who formerly read ἂν θείης) in his last edition acquiesces, like Schneider, in the omission of ἄν; but few will agree with him. I have noted the—certain or probable— omission of ἄν in all or the best MSS in Phaed. 62 C , 109 E, Euthyd. 291 E (?), Rep. V 457 D, VII 516 E, VIII 558 D, where the omission is lipographical; also in Phaed. 72 B , Euthyd. 281 C , Crat. 389 E , 409 A, Alc. I 132 B, 133 E, Soph. 266 A , Phil. 47 B , H. Mai. 295 A. Sometimes (as occasionally after πρίν) the omission is perhaps a poetical touch: see my note in Cl. Rev. IV p. 103.

καὶ αὖ . Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 57) presses αὖ too much when he says that ἐθέλειν and βούλεσθαι are definitely represented as not belonging to the category of ἐπιθυμίαι. Plato expresses no opinion on this point; for αὖ, ‘also,’ merely marks the introduction of two new terms.

ἐθέλει ‐‐ ἐρωτῶντος . The difference between ἐθέλει, ‘is willing,’ and βούλεται, ‘wishes,’ is well brought out by the contrast between the more active process described in προσάγεσθαι and the passive assent which ἐπινεύειν expresses. The point is missed by translating (with J. and C.) ‘beckons this with a nod towards herself’: it is merely ‘nods assent to this in reply to herself.’ One part of the soul asks, and the other answers, the psychological process being compared to a kind of dialectic or question and answer inside the soul: see III 400 D note and cf. Isocr. Antid. 256. For the confusion of ἐρῶντος and ἐρωτῶντος—ἐρῶντος is found in several MSS— cf. [ Erast.] 132 D, and Euthyphr. 14 C . With the analysis of desire in this passage cf. Phil. 34 E ff.

ἀπ) αὐτῆς . ἀφ) αὑτῆς Hartman (with Vind. E only), but ἀπελαύνειν is active, not middle. The actions are described as though by a spectator ab externo.

ἐπιθυμιῶν : a defining genitive. For εἶδος see III 402 C note

ἆρ’ οὖν κτλ. This discussion (down to 438 E) is apparently regarded by Susemihl ( Gen. Entw. II pp. 163 f.) as unnecessary for the immediate purposes of the argument, but it is not so. Plato's object is to remove a difficulty which might be felt in holding that desire is restrained, and that by the λογιστικόν. Why should thirst be restrained? an objector might ask. You yourself, Socrates, hold that (1) desire is always of the good; consequently (2) thirst is always the desire of good drink, and (3) is therefore always good. See 438 A, where the gist of the objection is contained. Socrates would reply: The fallacy lurks in (2), for ‘good’ drink is ambiguous. If ‘good’ drink means drink which desire thinks good, then (2) is true; if it means drink which is in reality good, (2) is not true. Desire cannot know what is good. We must therefore amend (2) by omitting ‘good,’ for in reality it is sometimes good and sometimes bad to drink. To what then is the final appeal? To the λογιστικόν. It is this which decides on each occasion whether it is really good or bad to drink, and gives or refuses its assent accordingly (439 C). Bosanquet takes a somewhat similar view ( Companion p. 154). See also notes on 438 A.

οἷον δίψα ‐‐ ψυχροῦ . ‘Thus thirst is thirst—of hot drink, is it, or of cold?’ For the genitive with δίψα (which Richards doubts) cf. 439 A. The repetition of δίψα is like that of ἐπιστήμη in 438 C, and makes the statement formal and precise.

ψυχροῦ ‐‐ θερμοῦ . Hermann transposes these words and is followed by Stallbaum, Baiter, and others. “Palmaria emendatio,” cries Stallbaum; whereas J. and C. hold that it “makes nonsense of the passage.” It is not at first sight quite easy to decide between these conflicting views. The words ἐὰν μέν τις—προσπαρέχοιτ’ ἄν clearly mean that the desire of cold drink is due to thirst plus heat, i.e. thirst supplies the desire of drink, and the heat present in the thirst supplies in addition ( προσπαρέχοιτ’ ἄν) the desire of cold: see also on τοῦ δὲ—προσγιγνόμενα below. This is in harmony with common sense and also with the theory of Lys. 215 E ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου (sc. ἐναντίου ) ἕκαστον, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ὁμοίου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ κτλ.: cf. also Symp. 186 B . But ἐὰν δὲ—πολλὴ ἡ δίψα ᾖ seems to proceed on the opposite or homoeopathic principle. The presence of πλῆθος produces a desire not for its opposite but for itself. The solution of the difficulty is to be found in the different character of the notions θερμότης and πλῆθος. θερμότης is something distinct from δίψος, though superadded to it, for which reason Plato does not use the expression θερμὸν δίψος; whereas πλῆθος is in reality πλῆθος δίψης, and πολλὴ δίψα, as experience shews, desires much drink. The common sense point of view is taken by Plato throughout, and is expressly justified by him in 438 E οὔ τι λέγω ὡς οἵων ἂν ᾖ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔστιν. For these reasons I heartily agree with the Oxford editors. Hermann's proposal is a product of the inveterate tendency to suppose that wherever we turn in Plato we rub against the theory of Ideas; but the use of παρουσία here (in spite of Peiper's Ontol. Pl. pp. 602 ff., Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 560 note, and many other critics) is not metaphysical, but logical, and πλῆθος is certainly not an Idea in this passage. See on this point 438 B, 438 C notes

αὐτοῦ πώματος : ‘merely of drink’ )( much drink, cold drink, etc. Cf. VIII 559 A αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου. For καὶ αὖ κτλ. Herwerden would expect καὶ αὐτὸ <τὸ> πεινῆν <αὐτοῦ> βρώματος. Further specification than Plato gives is unnecessary, for τὸ πεινῆν as well as αὐτὸ τὸ δίψος is subject to οὐ μή ποτε—οὖπερ πέφυκεν. The voice pauses slightly after πεινῆν.

τοῦ δὲ ‐‐ προσγιγνόμενα : as e.g. θερμότης, where it προσγίγνεται τῷ δίψει (cf. E above), is the desire of ψυχροῦ, ψυχρότης of θερμοῦ. The type of desires illustrated by the desire of ψυχρὸν πῶμα appears to Plato composite and not simple.