Plato Republic 3.412

ed. John Burnet

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)
Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 3.412 focus

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

τοῦ ‐‐ ἐπιστάτου . Some MSS (including Ξ and q) omit τοῦ, and no precise parallel has yet been adduced for ὁ τοιοῦτός τις used in this way. In IX 581 E, cited by Schneider ( Addit. p. 27), Paris A has ἐν τοιούτῳ τινί, not ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τινί. The article may perhaps be justified by the description of the ἐπιστάτης in the last sentence, and τινὸς taken closely with τοιούτου (‘some such superintendent as we have described’); but there is certainly some ground for suspecting interpolation (with Bekker and others). The ἐπιστάτης, as Jowett observes, is a sort of minister of education, such as we find in Laws 765 D ff. The same function is in Pol. 308 D ff. assigned to the Regal or Political Art.

ὡς οἷόν τέ γε μάλιστα . I have placed a comma before ὡς; cf. Phaed. 74 B φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δἴ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε (Hoefer Part. Plat. p. 33).

χορείας ‐‐ ἱππικούς . See Laws 814 D ff., 822 D ff., 830 C ff., 832 D ff.

οὐκέτι : ‘not now,’ sc. when we have trained our Guardians. On such idiomatic uses of οὐκέτι and its opposite ἤδη see Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle, Vol. I p. 13.

πρεσβυτέρους κτλ. The different principles on which rulers may be appointed are fully discussed in Laws 690 A ff.

φρονίμους κτλ. Intellectual ability and accomplishments, authority, and pa triotic sentiment are the three requisites of the Rulers as laid down here. In VI and VII it is the first which is emphasized, here it is the last. This is in harmony with the whole spirit of I—IV, in which, as Krohn remarks ( Pl. St. p. 29), “the intellect is subordinated to the moral powers, and with the education of the character in richly-endowed natures the fruits of insight ripen of themselves.”

καὶ ἐκείνου . See cr. n. Stobaeus ( Flor. 43. 152) reads καὶ ὅτι (or ὅ τι) μάλιστα ἐκείνου κτλ., which is good enough Greek, and would mean ‘whatever policy he thinks by bringing prosperity to the other brings prosperity also to himself,’ ὅ τι being an accusative of respect belonging to εὖ πράττοντος. If the principle of this interpretation is right, I should read ὅ τι ἄν for ὅταν, taking ἄν with ξυμβαίνειν. ἄν loves the shelter of a relative, particularly ὅ τι, and the corruption is the easier because ὅταν in A and other MSS is written ὅτ’ ἄν. But φιλεῖν cannot well be said of one's attitude to a policy or course of action; and Hermann's proposal gives a more satisfactory sense. The occurrence of ( τοῦτ) ό γ’ ἂν μάλιστα just before may be responsible for the slip. It is to be understood—though Plato has not expressly said so—that the guardians believe their own interests to be best consulted by promoting those of their country. μὴ δέ is μὴ δὲ εὖ πράττοντος, and τοὐναντίον is ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ κακῶς πράττειν.

ἐπιλανθανόμενοι helps out the idea in ἐκβάλλουσιν and forms a natural antithesis to φυλακικοί which, while playing upon φύλακες, also implies the notion of remembering: cf. φύλαξ μουσικῆς 413 E. The word has been undeservedly attacked, chiefly because in 413 B it receives a more special and precise signification. But each of the three temptations to be presently enumerated, κλοπή, βία and γοητεία, may be correctly described as varieties of forgetting; nor is it in Plato's manner to introduce a classification prematurely, as he would have done by writing μήτε γοητευόμενοι μήτε βιαζόμενοι — < μήτε > ἐπιλανθανόμενοι (with Heller), or adding μήτε κλεπτόμενοι before ἐκβάλλουσιν (with Hartman). Cobet, more suo, expunges the word.

ἑκουσίως ἢ ἀκουσίως : with reference to the usual Socratic theory that Knowledge or Virtue is voluntary, Ignorance or Vice involuntary: see on II 382 A.