Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 10.610

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[610] ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὲν ἐμποιῇ ἡ αὐτῶν πονηρία τῶν σιτίων τῷ σώματι σώματος μοχθηρίαν, φήσομεν αὐτὸ διʼ ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ κακίας νόσου οὔσης ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπὸ 610a δὲ σιτίων πονηρίας ἄλλων ὄντων ἄλλο ὂν τὸ σῶμα, ὑπʼ ἀλλοτρίου κακοῦ μὴ ἐμποιήσαντος τὸ ἔμφυτον κακόν, οὐδέποτε ἀξιώσομεν διαφθείρεσθαι.
ὀρθότατʼ αὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐὰν μὴ σώματος πονηρία ψυχῇ ψυχῆς πονηρίαν ἐμποιῇ, μή ποτε ἀξιῶμεν ὑπὸ ἀλλοτρίου κακοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ἰδίας πονηρίας ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρου κακῷ ἕτερον.
ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.
ἢ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἐξελέγξωμεν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν, ἢ 610b ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἀνέλεγκτα, μή ποτε φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ μηδʼ αὖ ὑπʼ ἄλλης νόσου μηδʼ αὖ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, μηδʼ εἴ τις ὅτι σμικρότατα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα κατατέμοι, ἕνεκα τούτων μηδὲν μᾶλλόν ποτε ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, πρὶν ἄν τις ἀποδείξῃ ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἀδικωτέρα καὶ ἀνοσιωτέρα γίγνεται· ἀλλοτρίου δὲ κακοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένου, τοῦ δὲ ἰδίου ἑκάστῳ μὴ ἐγγιγνομένου, 610c μήτε ψυχὴν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν ἐῶμεν φάναι τινὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οὐδείς ποτε δείξει, ὡς τῶν ἀποθνῃσκόντων ἀδικώτεραι αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ τὸν θάνατον γίγνονται.
ἐὰν δέ γέ τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἰέναι καὶ λέγειν ὡς πονηρότερος καὶ ἀδικώτερος γίγνεται ὁ ἀποθνῄσκων, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζηται ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, ἀξιώσομέν που, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, τὴν ἀδικίαν εἶναι θανάσιμον τῷ ἔχοντι ὥσπερ νόσον, καὶ ὑπʼ 610d αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ἀποκτεινύντος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει, ἀποθνῄσκειν τοὺς λαμβάνοντας αὐτό, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα θᾶττον, τοὺς δʼ ἧττον σχολαίτερον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν διὰ τοῦτο ὑπʼ ἄλλων δίκην ἐπιτιθέντων ἀποθνῄσκουσιν οἱ ἄδικοι.
μὰ Δίʼ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ ἄρα πάνδεινον φανεῖται ἡ ἀδικία, εἰ θανάσιμον ἔσται τῷ λαμβάνοντι—ἀπαλλαγὴ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κακῶν—ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οἶμαι αὐτὴν φανήσεσθαι πᾶν τοὐναντίον 610e τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποκτεινῦσαν, εἴπερ οἷόν τε, τὸν δʼ ἔχοντα καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν παρέχουσαν, καὶ πρός γʼ ἔτι τῷ ζωτικῷ ἄγρυπνον· οὕτω πόρρω που, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐσκήνηται τοῦ θανάσιμος εἶναι.
καλῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις. ὁπότε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἱκανὴ ἥ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχήν, σχολῇ τό γε ἐπʼ ἄλλου ὀλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ, πλὴν ἐφʼ ᾧ τέτακται.
σχολῇ γʼ, ἔφη, ὥς γε τὸ εἰκός.

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 10.610 focus

[610] but when the badness of the foods themselves engenders in the body the defect of body, then we shall say that it is destroyed owing to these foods, but by¹ its own vice, which is disease. 610a But the body being one thing and the foods something else, we shall never expect the body to be destroyed by their badness, that is by an alien evil that has not produced in it the evil that belongs to it by nature. You are entirely right, he replied.
On the same principle, said I, if the badness of the body does not produce in the soul the soul’s badness we shall never expect the soul to be destroyed by an alien evil apart from its own defect—one thing, that is, by the evil of another. That is reasonable, he said. Either, then, we must refute this 610b and show that we are mistaken, or,² so long as it remains unrefuted, we must never say that by fever or any other disease, or yet by the knife at the throat or the chopping to bits of the entire body, there is any more likelihood of the soul perishing because of these things, until it is proved that owing to these affections of the body the soul itself becomes more unjust and unholy. But when an evil of something else occurs in a different thing and the evil that belongs to the thing is not engendered in it, 610c we must not suffer it to be said that the soul or anything else is in this way destroyed. But you may be sure, he said, that nobody will ever prove this, that the souls of the dying are made more unjust by death. But if anyone, said I, dares to come to grips with the argument³ and say, in order to avoid being forced to admit the soul’s immortality, that a dying man does become more wicked and unjust,⁴ we will postulate that, if what he says is true, injustice must be fatal 610d to its possessor as if it were a disease, and that those who catch it die because it kills them by its own inherent nature, those who have most of it quickest, and those who have less more slowly, and not, as now in fact happens, that the unjust die owing to this but by the action of others who inflict the penalty. Nay, by Zeus, he said, injustice will not appear a very terrible thing after all if it is going to be⁵ fatal to its possessor, for that would be a release from all troubles.⁶ But I rather think it will prove to be quite the contrary, 610e something that kills others when it can, but renders its possessor very lively indeed,⁷ and not only lively but wakeful,⁸ so far, I ween, does it dwell⁹ from deadliness. You say well, I replied; for when the natural vice and the evil proper to it cannot kill and destroy the soul, still less¹⁰ will the evil appointed for the destruction of another thing destroy the soul or anything else, except that for which it is appointed.¹¹ Still less indeed, he said, in all probability.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

ὀρθότατα . See cr. n. Vind. F has ὀρθώτατ’ ἄν, Vind. E ὀρθότατ’ ἄῤ: otherwise there is no variant. Schneider alone retains ἂν—λέγεις, but fails to justify the solecism. ὀρθότατ’ ἂν—λέγοις, which Hermann and Stallbaum take from Ξ and Flor. V, does not suit the situation here, as κάλλιστα ἂν λέγοις does in Laws 897 E. Both here and in Laws 656 A (where A has ὀρθότατα λέγοις) the simplest correction is ὀρθότατα λέγεις. For the error see Introd. § 5.

ἐξελέγξωμεν . Richards proposes ἐξελεγχθῶμεν, but the hortatory subjunctive is quite out of place with the passive here. See also on VII 534 C.

ὅ τι σμικρότατα is more idiomatic than εἰς ὅ τι σμικρότατα, which J. and C. suggest: cf. VI 509 D and Symp. 191 D .

ὁμόδε ‐‐ ἰέναι : ‘dares to close with the argument’ not ‘with us in argument’ (one of J. and C.'s alternatives). Cf. Euthyd. 294 D ὁμόσε ᾔτην τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, Euthyph. 3 C and Theaet. 165 E .

λέγειν ὡς πονηρότερος κτλ. I think it was Dr Johnson who said ‘Every man is a rascal when he is sick.’ For the omission of the copula with ὁμολογεῖν cf. II 374 A note

αὐτοῦ τούτου . See cr. n. The reading αὐτοῦ τοῦ, which has most of the MSS in its favour, is kept by Schneider, Stallbaum and Burnet (“ab ea, utpote suapte vi et natura perimente’ Schneider). Hermann and Jowett and Campbell read αὐτοῦ τούτου, which is intrinsically far better (‘this itself’ ‘just this’ as opposed to the external agencies mentioned below), and might easily have been corrupted into αὐτοῦ τοῦ .

ἀποθνῄσκειν ‐‐ οἱ ἄδικοι . If Injustice kills the soul, which is the principle of life (609 D note), the wicked should die of their own wickedness; for they cannot of course continue to live on after their soul expires. As it is, however, they have to be put to death by others, and (according to Glauco) their wickedness rather increases than diminishes their vitality. The argument may not be conclusive (609 D note); but we are surely not justified in charging Plato (as Brandt apparently does l.c. p. 29) with confounding either here or in 609 D the two notions of physical death and death of the soul.

ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ κτλ. For the construction cf. III 410 B note

διὰ τοῦτο . See cr. n. Schneider defends διὰ τούτου by Aesch. Ag. 447 πεσόντ’ ἀλλοτρίας διαὶ γυναικός: but Aeschylus regards Helen as an agent in the death of the fallen Greeks, and the meaning ‘on account of’ is even more necessary here than in 609 E δἰ ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ κακίας. Cf. VIII 562 B note

οὐκ ἄρα ‐‐ κακῶν . Cf. Phaed. 107 C εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἑρμαῖον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμ’ ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὑτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. The thought expressed in these two passages contains the germ of a new argument for immortality. It might be urged that a future existence is necessary in order that the wicked may pay the penalty for their sins, so that Immortality would become a “postulate of the moral government of the universe” (Deichert l.c. p. 48). Plato is content merely to suggest this argument: neither here nor elsewhere does he place it in the forefront of his dialectical proof of immo<*>ality.

καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν κτλ. Glauco is thin<*>ing of the extreme activity and vitality s<*>metimes displayed by the more aggressive kind of villain. A good example is f<*>nished by the career of Dionysius I of Syracuse. With ἄγρυπνον Stallbaum compares “ut iugulent homines surgunt de no<*> latrones” (Hor. Epp. I 2. 32)—an insta<*>ce on a small and petty scale of the sort of thing which is in Plato's mind.

Plato Republic 10.610

ed. John Burnet

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