Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 10.609

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[609]
τί δέ; κακὸν ἑκάστῳ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν λέγεις; οἷον ὀφθαλμοῖς 609a ὀφθαλμίαν καὶ σύμπαντι τῷ σώματι νόσον, σίτῳ τε ἐρυσίβην, σηπεδόνα τε ξύλοις, χαλκῷ δὲ καὶ σιδήρῳ ἰόν, καί, ὅπερ λέγω, σχεδὸν πᾶσι σύμφυτον ἑκάστῳ κακόν τε καὶ νόσημα;
ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν ὅταν τῴ τι τούτων προσγένηται, πονηρόν τε ποιεῖ ᾧ προσεγένετο, καὶ τελευτῶν ὅλον διέλυσεν καὶ ἀπώλεσεν;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
τὸ σύμφυτον ἄρα κακὸν ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία ἕκαστον ἀπόλλυσιν, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ ἔτι 609b διαφθείρειεν. οὐ γὰρ τό γε ἀγαθὸν μή ποτέ τι ἀπολέσῃ, οὐδὲ αὖ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθόν.
πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη.
ἐὰν ἄρα τι εὑρίσκωμεν τῶν ὄντων, ᾧ ἔστι μὲν κακὸν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν, τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτὸ λύειν ἀπολλύον, οὐκ ἤδη εἰσόμεθα ὅτι τοῦ πεφυκότος οὕτως ὄλεθρος οὐκ ἦν;
οὕτως, ἔφη, εἰκός.
τί οὖν; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ψυχῇ ἆρʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κακήν;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· ἃ νυνδὴ διῇμεν πάντα, ἀδικία τε καὶ 609c ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀμαθία.
ἦ οὖν τι τούτων αὐτὴν διαλύει τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσι; καὶ ἐννόει μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν οἰηθέντες τὸν ἄδικον ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνόητον, ὅταν ληφθῇ ἀδικῶν, τότε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, πονηρίας οὔσης ψυχῆς. ἀλλʼ ὧδε ποίει· ὥσπερ σῶμα ἡ σώματος πονηρία νόσος οὖσα τήκει καὶ διόλλυσι καὶ ἄγει εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν 609d ἅπαντα ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κακίας, τῷ προσκαθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνεῖναι διαφθειρούσης, εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀφικνεῖται—οὐχ οὕτω;
ναί.
ἴθι δή, καὶ ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον σκόπει. ἆρα ἐνοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κακία τῷ ἐνεῖναι καὶ προσκαθῆσθαι φθείρει αὐτὴν καὶ μαραίνει, ἕως ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγαγοῦσα τοῦ σώματος χωρίσῃ;
οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἐκεῖνό γε ἄλογον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὴν μὲν ἄλλου πονηρίαν ἀπολλύναι τι, τὴν δὲ αὑτοῦ μή.
ἄλογον. 609e
ἐννόει γάρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδʼ ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν σιτίων πονηρίας, ἣ ἂν ᾖ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, εἴτε παλαιότης εἴτε σαπρότης εἴτε ἡτισοῦν οὖσα, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν σῶμα ἀπόλλυσθαι·

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Current edition Perseus

Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 10.609 focus

[609] How about this: Do you say that there is for everything its special good and evil, 609a as for example for the eyes ophthalmia, for the entire body disease, for grain mildew, rotting for wood, rust for bronze and iron, and, as I say, for practically everything its congenital evil and disease¹? I do, he said. Then when one of these evils comes to anything does it not make the thing to which it attaches itself bad, and finally disintegrate and destroy it? Of course. Then the congenital evil of each thing and its own vice destroys it, or if that is not going to destroy it, nothing else 609b remains that could; for obviously² the good will never destroy anything, nor yet again will that which is neutral and neither good nor evil³. How could it? he said. If, then, we discover⁴ anything that has an evil which vitiates it, yet is not able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not thereupon know that of a thing so constituted there can be no destruction? That seems likely, he said. Well, then, said I, has not the soul something that makes it evil? Indeed it has, he said, all the things that we were just now enumerating, 609c injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and ignorance. Does any one of these things dissolve and destroy it? And reflect, lest we be misled by supposing that when an unjust and foolish man is taken in his injustice he is then destroyed by the injustice, which is the vice of soul. But conceive it thus: Just as the vice of body which is disease wastes and destroys it so that it no longer is a body at all,⁵ in like manner in all the examples of which we spoke it is the specific evil which, 609d by attaching itself to the thing and dwelling in it with power to corrupt, reduces it to nonentity. Is not that so? Yes. Come, then, and consider the soul in the same way.⁶ Do injustice and other wickedness dwelling in it, by their indwelling and attachment to it, corrupt and wither it till they bring it to death and separate it from the body? They certainly do not do that, he said. But surely, said I, it is unreasonable to suppose that the vice of something else destroys a thing while its own does not. Yes, unreasonable. For observe, Glaucon, 609e said I, that we do not think it proper to say of the body either that it is destroyed by the badness of foods themselves, whether it be staleness or rottenness or whatever it is;⁷

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

διέλυσεν καὶ ἀπώλεσεν . Throughout this argument, as throughout the Phaedo, destruction means dissolution ( διάλυσις).

τὸ ξύμφυτον κτλ. The words ἑκάστου and ἀπολεῖ are bracketed by Herwerden, quite undeservedly. For the statement itself see on 609 E.

ἦν . “Imperfectum illud tempus indicat, quo res nondum satis cognita, et tamen ita, ut nunc apparet, comparata esset” Schneider. Cf. IV 436 C note

ἀδικία ‐‐ ἀμαθία . Vice is the evil peculiar to soul: cf. IV 444 C, Tim. 86 B ff. and Soph. 227 E .

ἀλλ) ὧδε ποίει . ποίει means ‘picture,’ ‘represent.’ που οἴει, which Liebhold conjectures ( Philol. 1880 p. 169), is wholly inapposite; for the sense requires an imperative. Ast suggests νόει or σκόπει, but the text is sound: see on VII 498 A.

ἕως ἂν ‐‐ χωρίσῃ . θάνατον must here be understood of the soul's death, otherwise the parallel with ὥσπερ —ἀφικνεῖται breaks down, and the reasoning becomes not merely fallacious, but absurd. We have, in fact, to distinguish between the death or dissolution of a the body (as described in C above ὥσπερ σῶμα — εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι), b the soul, c the σύνολον, or body plus soul. If the soul is mortal, the moment at which it is dissolved and perishes is when the σύνολον dies, i.e. ( Phaed. 64 C , 67 D) when soul is separated from body (cf. Phaed. 70 A , 77 B, D, E, 80 D and 84 B). Plato reminds us of this by saying ἕως ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγαγοῦσα τοῦσώματος χωρίσῃ instead of merely ἕως ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγάγῃ. Cf. 610 D note

οὐδαμῶς ‐‐ τοῦτό γε . It is strange that Glauco should assent so readily. He is apparently thinking (as in 610 E) of the activity and vitality which wicked men so frequently display; but we may fairly ask ‘Why should soul be the only thing which is incapable of being destroyed by its own vice?’ It would surely be more true to hold that vice is able to kill the soul just because it is able ποιεῖν αὐτὴν κακήν (609 B), and Panaetius actually made use of a similar argument in order to prove the soul mortal (“nihil esse, quod doleat, quin id aegrum esse quoque possit. quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interiturum; dolere autem animos, ergo etiam interire” Cicero Tusc. Disp. I 79). Is ἆρα ἐνοῦσα—χωρίσῃ intended as an appeal to experience? Even if we allowed that experience is the proper tribunal, our experience of the effect of injustice on a human soul is limited to a single life; and why should not one soul wear out many bodies and perish at last through its own vice καὶ ᾖ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος (cf. Phaed. 87 B , 91 D. See also Deichert Plato's Beweise f. die Unsterblichkeit d. Seele pp. 46—48). These difficulties are serious, and possibly fatal: they have even led some critics to stigmatise the whole argument as a petitio principii (e.g. Brandt Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehre v. d. Seelentheilen p. 29). Plato does not attempt to solve them here; but a comparison of the present argument with Phaed. 93 A —94 B helps at all events to explain his position. Soul is always soul, and no soul is more a soul than any other ( Phaed. 93 B ); hence the soul which is made evil by vice retains its vitality unimpaired. It is in fact the conception of soul as the principle of life which explains (from the Platonic point of view) Glauco's emphatic οὐδαμῶς. Cf. I 353 D τί δ) αὖ τὸ ζῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; Μάλιστά γ), ἔφη, with note ad loc. It is on the essential connexion between ‘soul’ and ‘life’ that Plato builds his crowning argument for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo (100 B ff., and especially 105 C, D). Cf. Zeller^{4} II p. 827 and infra 610 D note

αὐτῶν ‐‐ τῶν σιτίων . Herwerden (following Ξ) would omit τῶν σιτίων, but the contrast with σώματος μοχθηρίαν is improved by the presence of these words. αὐτῶν is ‘ipsorum’ exactly as in αὐτῶν ἐκείνων above: ‘of food itself’ )( body.

ὑπὸ δὲ σιτίων κτλ. Cf. 609 A, B. It is difficult to see where the ἔμφυτον κακόν comes in when the organism is destroyed by violence. Surely fire destroys wood without using σηπεδών as its instrument. The fact is that Plato's theory of a ξύμφυτον κακόν by which and which alone each object is destroyed, if destroyed it be, does not apply except where the object is independent of external influences, and such, throughout this proof, he supposes soul to be. Cf. 608 D note and Brandt l.c. p. 29.

Plato Republic 10.609

ed. John Burnet

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