Plato Republic 10.602

δόξαν ὀρθήν . See IV 430 B note

οὔτε ‐‐ πονηρίαν . The word εἰκασία, though not here used, represents the Imitator's state of mind: see on VI 511 E and App. I to Book VII.

ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικός . Stallbaum remarks “cave unam poesim intelli gas”: but ποίησις is certainly ‘poetry’ and nothing else, as Schneider shews, throughout the whole of this episode. It is poetical μίμησις with which the discussion is primarily and chiefly concerned: hence this passing exclamation —for it is nothing more: witness the asyndeton. With χαρίεις (ironical, of course) followed by οὐ πάνυ, in which the irony disappears, cf. IV 426 A, B (J. and C.). <οὔκουν> χαρίεις (Richards) is an unnecessary conjecture. The reading μιμήσει for ποιήσει ( q and some other MSS) is tautological and absurd.

οἷον φαίνεται ‐‐ εἰδόσιν . He will copy τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (V 479 D).

τοῦτο μιμήσεται κτλ. τοῦτο is surely not “a cognate accusative” (J. and C.): see on μιμητὰς εἰδώλων 600 E. For παιδιάν τινα see on 599 A, and on ἐν ἔπεσι 595 C note

πρὸς Διὸς κτλ. The logical sequence is “iam vero haec imitatio non solum futilia efficit, sed etiam futilem animi nostri partem afficit” (Schneider). There is a certain awkwardness in making the transitional sentence interrogative in form, but the extreme animation carries it through. We cannot (with Stephanus) cancel οὐ and print a colon after ἀληθείας, for the interrogation is attested by πρὸς Διός .

μέν τί . μέν of course balances δέ in πρὸς δὲ κτλ., and μέντοι (Stallbaum with some deterioris notae MSS) is not so good.

καὶ ταὐτὰ καμπύλα τε κτλ. Nettleship ( Lect. and Rem. II p. 349 note 2) reminds us that images in water were among Plato's examples of τὰ ἐφ’ οἷς εἰκασία ἐστίν in Book VI 510 A: but, as Jackson points out, Plato is here thinking of refraction, and not of reflection.

πᾶσά τις ‐‐ ψυχῇ . “πᾶσα cum αὕτη coniungendum et per attractionem pro πᾶν τοῦτο dictum videtur. τις nomini praepositum est ut Gorg. p. 522 D αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι” Schneider. For other examples of this sort of attraction see Riddell Digest p. 203 § 201. Conjecture is not necessary; but if it were, we could not acquiesce either in αὐτῇ for αὕτη (Richter Fleck. Jb. 1867 p. 147, with one MS), or even, I think, in πᾶσι for πᾶσα (Richards). B. D. Turner in his edition of Book X thinks we may translate “and this weakness ( πάθημα, as it is afterwards specified) is manifested in our souls as every species of confusion.” This solution gives an awkward sense, and is grammatically less easy than Schneider's.

γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει : ‘leaves no magic art untried.’

τὸ μετρεῖν ‐‐ ἱστάναι . Cf. Euthyph. 7 B , C, Prot. 356 B , Phil. 55 E , [ περὶ δικαίου] 373 A and Xen. Mem. I 1. 9 ἃ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας ἢ μετρήσαντας ἢ στήσαντας εἰδέναι. See also on IX 587 B.

ἐφάνησαν : ‘were discovered’ ‘were invented’= ηὑρέθησαν: cf. φανῆναι VII 528 D. The meaning is not ‘were found by us to be’ etc., as Liebhold supposes ( Fleck. Jb. 1884 p. 522), and even Krohn, who actually thinks ἐφάνησαν may possibly contain a reference to some ‘lost fragment’ of the Republic ( Pl. St. p. 252). Grimmelt, in his reply to Krohn, takes nearly the right view ( de comp. et unit. etc. p. 90 note).

τὸ φαινόμενον ‐‐ βαρύτερον . ‘The apparently larger’ rules in us when we believe the nearer and smaller of two objects to be larger than a more distant object which measurement shews to be larger. Similarly in the other cases. There is no good reason for adding ἢ κουφότερον after βαρύτερον, as Madvig proposes to do: cf. IV 433 D note

τὸ λογισάμενον κτλ. : ‘that which has counted’ etc. For ἢ καί=‘or if you like’ see on 599 A.

τοῦτό γε κτλ. : sc. τὸ λογίσασθαι κτλ. In λογιστικοῦ there is a glance at the etymology of the word: cf. VII 525 B note

τούτῳ δὲ ‐‐ ὓμα περὶ ταὐτά κτλ. ‘And to this principle, when it has measured and signifies that some given objects are greater or less than or equal to some others, the contrary appearances are often presented in connexion with the same objects at the same time.’ τἀναντία is ‘ the contrary,’ i.e. not ‘opposite appearances’ in general, but the contrary (in any given instance) of the impression formed without the aid of measurement: cf. τἀναντία in V 453 C, Euthyph. 6 A et al. The object A, for example, which is nearer and smaller, appears larger than B: but the λογιστικόν discovers after measurement that A is smaller and reports accordingly. We have thus two contrary coexisting impressions of the same object. One of the two impressions belongs to the λογιστικόν: does the other also? No, because, as shewn in IV 436 A—C, it is impossible for the same faculty to hold contrary opinions simultaneously in relation to the same objects. Hence the part of soul which δοξάζει παρὰ τὰ μέτρα is not the same as that which δοξάζει κατὰ τὰ μέτρα (i.e. the λογιστικόν). And as the part which believes λογισμός (viz. the λογιστικόν, cf. 604 D, 605 B) is the best, that which opposes it will be τῶν φαύλων τι ἐν ἡμῖν. J. and C. follow Schneider in translating τῷ αὐτῷ as instrumental (‘with the same faculty to form opposite opinions at the same time’); but it is much more natural to make it the dative with infinitive after ἀδύνατον, in view especially of τὸ—δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς immediately following. Rightly understood, IV 436 B is also in favour of taking τῷ αὐτῷ in this way. For other views of this difficult passage see App. II.