Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 1.351

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[351]
τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἑξῆς διασκεψώμεθα 351a >τὸν λόγον, ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὂν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχθη γάρ που ὅτι καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἴη ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δέ γʼ, ἔφην, εἴπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετή ἐστιν δικαιοσύνη, ῥᾳδίως οἶμαι φανήσεται καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἡ ἀδικία— οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο ἀγνοήσειεν—ἀλλʼ οὔ τι οὕτως ἁπλῶς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῇδέ πῃ σκέψασθαι· 351b πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφʼ ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην;
πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη. καὶ τοῦτό γε ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος.
μανθάνω, ἔφην, ὅτι σὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ τόδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ· πότερον ἡ κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἕξει, ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; 351c
εἰ μέν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες ἔχει—ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία—μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δʼ ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἀδικίας.
πάνυ ἄγαμαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεις μόνον καὶ ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνῃ πάνυ καλῶς.
σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι.
εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε· δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν ἢ στρατόπεδον ἢ λῃστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κοινῇ ἐπί τι ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πρᾶξαι ἄν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῖεν ἀλλήλους; 351d
οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
τί δʼ εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖεν; οὐ μᾶλλον;
πάνυ γε.
στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἥ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν· ἦ γάρ;
ἔστω, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι.
ἀλλʼ εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε. τόδε δέ μοι λέγε· ἆρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις ἐγγιγνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι κοινῇ μετʼ 351e ἀλλήλων πράττειν;
πάνυ γε.
τί δὲ ἂν ἐν δυοῖν ἐγγένηται; οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσουσιν καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἔσονται ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις;
ἔσονται, ἔφη.
ἐὰν δὲ δή, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἑνὶ ἐγγένηται ἀδικία, μῶν μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕξει;
μηδὲν ἧττον ἐχέτω, ἔφη.

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 1.351 focus

[351] This, then, is the question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in sequence. 351a What is the nature of injustice as compared with justice? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. But now, I said, if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now fail to recognize that—but what I want is not quite so simple¹ as that. I wish, Thrasymachus, to consider it in some such fashion as this. A city, you would say, may be unjust and 351b try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection. Certainly, he said; and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete. I understand, I said, that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this, whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice. 351c If,² he replied, what you were just now saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice; if it is as I said, with injustice. Admirable, Thrasymachus, I said; you not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers. I am trying to please you, he replied.
Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this: do you think that a city,³ an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another? 351d Certainly not, said he. But if they didn’t, wouldn’t they be more likely to? Assuredly. For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so? So be it, he replied, not to differ from you. That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable 351e of effective action in common? By all means. Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just? They will, he said. And then will you tell me that if injustice arises in one⁴ it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it? Have it that it keeps it, he said.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

ἐλέχθη γάρ που : 344 C, 348 E. It has nowhere been expressly said that Injustice is δυνατώτερον than Justice, but καὶ δυνατώτερον is added for emphasis (see on ἢ λέγειν in 350 A); and indeed according to the theory of Thrasymachus δύναμις (power in a general sense) rests solely on ἰσχύς (physical strength). δύναμις and ἰσχύς are clearly distinguished in Prot. 351 A .

ἁπλῶς . The Platonic use of ἁπλοῦν has been investigated by Bonitz in Hermes II (1867) pp. 307 ff. Its antitheses are διπλοῦν, διάφορον, σύνθετον, πεπλεγμένον, ποικίλον, and the like, and it denotes that which is uniform, or single and simple, or true without any difference or qualifications. ἁπλῶς οὕτως means merely ‘in this simple or general way’ (“im Allgemeinen” Schneider): a more elaborate and profounder proof (thinks Socrates) is necessary.

καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι is rejected by Cobet, but successfully defended by Heller ( Fl. Jahrb. 1875 p. 172). There is in reality no pleonasm: we have first an attempt ( ἐπιχειρεῖν), then a successful attempt ( καταδεδουλῶσθαι), then the results of success ( πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ’ ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην). A powerful city like Athens might, and often did, display her energy in all three directions simultaneously. For the collocation of δουλοῦσθαι and καταδουλοῦσθαι (middle) Heller compares infra IX 589 D, E and Menex. 240 A .

ἡ ἀρίστη . Thrasymachus refuses to withdraw from the position that ἀδικία is ἀρετή, in spite of Socrates' refutation. This is why Socrates says μανθάνω κτλ. ‘I understand: (you say so) because this was your theory.’ ὅτι is not ‘that’: see above on 332 A. Richter suggested κρατίστη for ἀρίστη on account of κρείττων just below; but κρείττων is said not by Thrasymachus, but by Socrates.

εἰ ‐‐ ἔχει . After ἔχει, εἰ is inserted by Stallbaum, following a suggestion of Baiter's. Cf. also J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. X p. 111. It so happens that ἡ is written in A over an erasure large enough to have contained εἰ ἡ, but there is no trace of εἰ, and mere erasures in A are seldom useful in determining the text. For ἡ Richter suggests ᾖ, which would however give a wrong meaning. Tucker also offers a variety of conjectures, but the text is perfectly sound: cf. II 359 B μάλιστ’ ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες (i.e. εἰ δόντες ) ἐξουσίαν —εἶτ’ ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν κτλ. and IX 589 D εἴπερ τοιόνδε τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων (i.e. εἰ λαμβάνων )— καταδουλοῦται.

ἢ λῃστὰς κτλ. Cf. (with Ast) Isocrates Panath. 226 οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτοὺς ( τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας) διά γε τὴν ὁμόνοιαν δικαίως ἐπαινέσειεν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς καταποντιστὰς καὶ λῃστὰς καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀδικίας ὄντας· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὁμονοοῦντες τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπολλύουσιν. There must be some honour even among thieves.

ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν . The conception of δικαιοσύνη which meets us in Book IV 433 A—434 E is dimly outlined here.

ἐν ἐλευθέροις κτλ. : ‘whether it makes its appearance among freemen or among slaves.’ Plato wishes to emphasize the universality of the rule, and that is why he specifies the two classes into which society is divided. Cf. Gorg. 514 D , 515 A. It is less natural and easy to construe (with Tucker) ‘in a society where there are both freemen and slaves.’

ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις . So in 349 C above it is said that the unjust try to overreach both one another and the just.

ἐν ἑνὶ κτλ. The results of Book IV are foreshadowed more clearly in what follows. The notion that justice present in the individual keeps the individual at peace with himself is more fully developed in 441 D, and implicitly assumes a psychological theory like that in Book IV, where soul is shewn to have ‘parts’ (435 C ff.). Further, in Book IV, Plato first describes justice in the State, and afterwards justice in the individual, using the larger aggregate to assist him to find it in the smaller. The same method is observed here in the description of injustice, and afterwards in Books VIII and IX, where the varieties of ἀδικία in states and individuals are described. The present passage (351 A —352 A), in fact, contains the undeveloped germ of the whole method and doctrine of the Republic (with the exception of Books V—VII). Cf. Hirmer Entst. u. Kompos. d. Pl. Pol. p. 608.

μῶν μὴ (a strengthened num) occurs only twice in the Republic, here and in VI 505 C. In the later dialogues μῶν is especially frequent (Frederking in Fl. Jahrb. 1882 p. 539). A classified list of examples is given by Kugler de part. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 40.

οἵαν ‐‐ ποιεῖν . See cr. n. ποιεῖ would involve (as even Schneider admits) “durissimum et haud scio an vitiosum anacoluthon.” Cf. οἷοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν in 334 D. Tucker proposes to eject οἵαν and retain ποιεῖ, but the reading of II is preferable in every way. For the error see Introd. § 5.

Plato Republic 1.351

ed. John Burnet

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