[351]
This, then, is the question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in sequence.
351a
What is the nature of injustice as compared with justice? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. But now, I said,
if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now fail to recognize that—but what I want is not quite so simple
1
as that. I wish, Thrasymachus, to consider it in some such fashion as this. A city, you would say, may be unjust and
351b
try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection.
Certainly, he said;
and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete.
I understand, I said,
that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this, whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice.
351c
If,
2
he replied,
what you were just now saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice; if it is as I said, with injustice.
Admirable, Thrasymachus, I said;
you not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers.
I am trying to please you, he replied.
Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this: do you think that a city, 3 an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another? 351d Certainly not, said he. But if they didn’t, wouldn’t they be more likely to? Assuredly. For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so? So be it, he replied, not to differ from you. That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable 351e of effective action in common? By all means. Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just? They will, he said. And then will you tell me that if injustice arises in one 4 it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it? Have it that it keeps it, he said.
Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this: do you think that a city, 3 an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another? 351d Certainly not, said he. But if they didn’t, wouldn’t they be more likely to? Assuredly. For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so? So be it, he replied, not to differ from you. That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable 351e of effective action in common? By all means. Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just? They will, he said. And then will you tell me that if injustice arises in one 4 it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it? Have it that it keeps it, he said.
Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.
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