Plato Republic 8.558

θεσπεσία καὶ ήδεῖα is almost a hendiadys: cf. IV 429 E note Democracy is political hedonism: see on 561 C. Hermann's θεσπεσία ὡς ἡδεῖα is inelegant and even questionable Greek: nor does θεσπεσία καὶ θεία (Stallbaum) merit praise.

τί δέ; ἡ πραότης κτλ. : ‘And is not the perfect good temper of some who have been tried exquisite? or have you never seen in such a State, when people have been condemned to death or exile, how none the less they remain and roam about in public, and the culprit saunters round as though unheeded and unseen like some spirit from another world?’ They bear the State no malice, and shew their good temper by stopping where they are—for the sentence remains unexecuted. See also App. II.

δικασθέντων has been thought to be neuter (Weil Rev. d. Phil. VIII pp. 171 ff.); but although the usage of the word in other passages of Plato ( Critias 120 C, Laws 867 E, infra X 614 D, Crit. 50 B , Gorg. 523 C and elsewhere) favours this view, it yields no satisfactory sense, and πραότης is an attribute of persons rather than of things. The perfect passive—it is not the middle—of δικάζω is similarly used of persons in Lysias 21. 18 αἰσχρὰς δίκας δεδίκασμαι. The circumstances of Socrates' own imprisonment after his condemnation illustrate, though only imperfectly, what is said here, for the Athenians were not careful to prevent him from escaping: see Crit. passim and my Introduction to that dialogue pp. ix f.

ἀνθρώπων κτλ. The construction is extremely irregular. Perhaps the simplest and least unsatisfactory solution is to make καταψηφισθέντων a genitive absolute and regard μενόντων etc. as attracted by ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων (so also J. and C.). See App. II.

θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς κτλ. For the genitive Kühner ( Gr. Gr. II p. 332) compares θανάτου κρίνεσθαι, ὑπάγεσθαι and the like, in which δίκην is probably understood. The genitive of the penalty seems not to occur elsewhere with καταψηφί‐ ζεσθαι, and we should perhaps, read θάνατον ἢ φυγήν. The pronoun αὐτῶν is half pleonastic: cf. IV 428 A note

καὶ ὡς κτλ. The change from plural to singular (cf. 1 347 A note) “rem magis insignem et imaginem evidentiorem reddit” (Schneider). The same effect is produced by making the clause independent—a common transition, for examples of which see Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III pp. 41—43.

περινοστεῖ κτλ. : i.e. ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον μεταβαίνει κτλ. (Schol. on Ar. Plut. 121 ). The word has a contemptuous ring—a rolling stone gathers no moss— and suggests a vagrant or loafer. Cf. Ar. l.c. and ib. 494 ἢν γὰρ ὁ Πλοῦτος νυνὶ βλέψῃ καὶ μὴ τυφλὸς ὢν περινοστῇ, with Lucian Tim. 24 ἄνω καὶ κάτω πλανῶμαι περινοστῶν. The comparison ὥσπερ ἥρως is suggested by ὁρῶντος οὐδενός. They excite no more notice and remark than an invisible ἥρως or circumambient spirit of one who has joined the happy or unhappy dead: see Rohde Psyche^{2} I pp. 146 ff. and especially p. 182 notes, or Roscher Lex. d. Myth. s.v. Heros. Weil ( Rev. d. Phil. VIII pp. 171 ff.) seems to think there is a specific reference to such an invisible hero as sometimes rendered service in battle (cf. Paus. III 19. 12 with Frazer's note, and Hdt. VIII 64); but Plato's language is quite general. The meaning cannot be ‘parades like a hero’ (as Jowett translates), for ἥρως is not thus used in Greek, and a parading hero always excites popular attention. J. and C. think ‘there is an implied allusion to the νόστοι. “He is welcomed wherever he goes like one of the heroes returning from the siege of Troy”.’ But what of οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὁρῶντος οὐδενός? It may be noted that the superstition of which Plato here avails himself was widely prevalent in Greece as elsewhere. Hence some of the Pythagoreans asserted ψυχὴν ε<*>ναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα (Arist. de An. I 2. 404^{a} 18), and commanded τὰ πίπτοντα ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης μὴ ἀναιρεῖσθαι (Mullach Fr. Phil. Gr. I p. 507)—a precept on which Diogenes Laertius remarks Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ τῶν ἡρώων φησὶν εἶναι τὰ πίπτοντα (VIII 34). The famous passage in Cor. I 11. 10 looks like a relic of some similar idea. Cf. also Phaed. 81 C , Zeller^{5} I p. 452 notes, Rohde Psyche^{2} II pp. 320 note 1, 346 ff. notes, 361 notes, and Dieterich Nekyia pp. 88 f. notes For other views on the whole of this difficult sentence see App. II.

καὶ πολλούς γε . The reply differs somewhat in form from the question: cf. V 465 E note It is difficult not to believe that Plato is exaggerating, although the frequency of the δίκη <*>ξούλης in Athens shews that in civil cases at all events it was often far from easy to enforce the verdict.

συγγνώμη : ‘considerateness,’ viz. in making allowance for want of education in their demagogues, as the rest of the sentence shews. The irony is of the truly Platonic kind. Jowett's “forgiving spirit” misses the point.

σμικρολογία κτλ. : ‘haggling about trifles’ etc., like education, forsooth ! ἐλέγομεν refers to IV 424 E ff. and VI 492 E.

καταπατήσασα κτλ. Cf. Gorg. 484 A . The reading αὐτά for ταῦτα—see cr. n.—is intrinsically weak, and has no MS support except A. On ἐξ ὁποίων κτλ. see VI 488 B note

γενναία . γενναῖα—see cr. n.—is much less elegant, in spite of the exclamatory anacoluthon ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς κτλ. See on V 465 E. Apelt strangely suggests ἔφη. Γενναῖα ταῦτά τε κτλ. ( Fleck. Jb. for 1893, p. 556).

ἄλλα ἀδελφά . It is remarkable that Plato says nothing of ψηφίσματα, which were regarded as an essential feature of advanced democracy: see Arist. Pol. Δ 4. 1292^{a} 19 and Gilbert Beitr. zur innern Gesch. Ath. etc. pp. 79 ff.

ἡδεῖα κτλ. True political equality, according to Plato, is γεωμετρικὴ ἰσότης, which τῷ μὲν—μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ’ ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει ( Laws 757 C and Gorg. 508 A ): ἀριθμητικὴ ἰσότης, which is the democratic principle, is a spurious kind of equality, not κατὰ φύσιν: τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίσοις τὰ ἴσα ἄνισα γίγνοιτ’ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου ( Laws 757 A). Cf. Isocr. Nicocles 14 and Arist. Pol. Γ 9. 1280^{a} 11 ff., with other passages cited by Henkel Gr. Lehre vom Staat p. 154 note 63.

βίᾳ δὴ κτλ. The description is interrupted by the digression on Desire: hence the anacoluthon.

οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι . See 554 A note

ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς κτλ. It becomes important at this stage to investigate the subject of the Desires, because τὸ <*>πιθυμητικόν in the widest sense is the psychological basis of the democratical as well as of the oligarchical character. Plato's complete classification distinguishes between (1) necessary desires, (2) not-necessary, (3) not-necessary and παράνομοι (IX 571 B). The ὀλιγαρχικός is the embodiment of (1): the δημοκρατικός of (1) and (2) equally (561 A ff.): the τυραννικός of (3). Cf. IX 571 A note If we translate παράνομοι by ‘unnatural’ (as in view of IX 571 C ff. we are justified in doing: cf. IX 571 B note), Plato's account becomes almost identical with that of Epicurus, who classified Desires as (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural and not-necessary, (3) neither natural nor necessary. For the authorities see Usener Epicurea pp. 78, 294. Cf. also Athen. XII 511 E.

ἄν . See cr. n., and for the loss of ἄν before ἀναγκαῖαι IV 437 B note

ὅσαι ‐‐ ἡμᾶς . As Aristotle would say, those also are ἀναγκαῖαι <*>ν ἄνευ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι ( Met. Δ 5. 1015^{a} 22).

τούτων ‐‐ ἀνάγκη justifies the appellation ἀναγκαῖαι. The pronoun τούτων is used somewhat vaguely, and denotes not the desires themselves, but their objects. Cf. 543 C note

τῆ φύσει . It follows that no desires which are necessary can be unnatural: see Epicurus referred to on 558 D.

καὶ πρός : ‘and which moreover’ (“idem est quod καὶ προσέτι, ac praeterea, atque insuper” Stallbaum). Two kinds of necessary desires were distinguished viz. (1) ἃς—ἀποτρέψαι, (2) ὅσαι—ἡμᾶς. Corresponding to this, which is not of course a mutually exclusive, division, Plato emphasises two distinct features of unnecessary desires: so that καὶ πρός (‘and which moreover,’ or according to the Greek idiom, ‘and these moreover’: see on II 357 B) is altogether appropriate. Cf. (with Stallbaum) Euthyd. 298 D and Blaydes on Ar. Knights 578 . Schneider takes πρὸς οὐδέν together (“nullius rei habita ratione”), but οὐδὲν cannot easily be separated from ἀγαθόν, unless we read <οὐδὲν> πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν, as I formerly suggested. I have no longer any doubt that Stallbaum's view is right. Ast's conjecture πρὸς οὐδέν) is refuted by Schneider.

αὐτοῦ σίτου : ‘merely of food,’ as opposed to e.g. pleasant food, sweet food ( τῶν τοιῶνδε σιτίων in Epicurus: Usener Epic. p. 295). See in particular IV 437 D —439 A notes

ἡ μέν γε κτλ. On γε see 556 A note and Neil's Appendix on γε in his edition of Ar. Knights p. 192. The words ᾗ τε—δυνατή should be explained as follows. Hunger, which is the desire of σῖτος, ‘is capable of putting an end to life’: i.e. it must be gratified ( οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ’ εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι 558 D), or else we die. On this ground, and also because it is ὠφέλιμος (i.e. ἀποτελουμένη ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς 558 E), we pronounce it an ἀναγκαία ἐπιθυμία. The Greek is terse but not obscure. With παῦσαι ζῶντα cf. Gorg. 523 C , D and Menex. 241 B . Jowett thinks the expression ‘very strange’ for ἀποκτιννύναι. It is strictly accurate: the sword kills, but hunger παύει ζῶντα: we merely ‘cease to live.’ Other views on this passage are discussed in App. III.

ἀλλοίων ‐‐ ἢ τοιούτων : “alius generis—quam quales modo diximus” (Stallbaum).

χρηματιστικὰς ‐‐ χρησίμους : ‘money-making or productive, because useful in production.’ Plato more suo σοφίζεται περὶ τὸ ὄνομα (VI 509 D note).

οὕτω δή : they also are ἀναλωτικαί. Epicurus l.c. describes ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμία as φυσικὴ μέν, οὐκ ἀναγκαία δέ.

νῦν δή . 552 C ff., 555 E ff.

πάλιν τοίνυν κτλ. Plato's description of the genesis of the democratical man is one of the most royal and magnificent pieces of writing in the whole range of literature, whether ancient or modern. Throughout most of this chapter, in the words of Longinus, the style πλουσιώτατα καθάπερ τι πέλαγος εἰς ἀναπεπταμένον κέχυται—μέγεθος ( περὶ ὕψους 12. 2), and no better example will ever be discovered of that full tide of lofty thoughts and images and words—a tide ‘too full for sound and foam’—in which the author of the treatise On the Sublime places the essence of <*>ψος. We owe to Longinus what is by far the best appreciation of Plato's hierophantic vein: see especially cc. 33—36, where we can hear more than a mere echo of that sublimity which is itself, according to Longinus, the ‘echo of high-mindedness’ ( ὕψος μεγαλοφροσύνης ἀπήχημα ib. 9. 2). For a very different estimate the student may be referred to Dionysius of Halicarnassus ( ad Cn. Pomp. Gem. 753—765 Reiske), whose pedantic criticisms make it tolerably plain that a study of the Attic orators does not qualify a man to sit in judgment upon Plato. The present episode is hardly less remarkable for psychological insight than for elevation of style, and the description of the democratic man as the chameleon of human society paints him for all time (561 C ff.). As a representation of actual fact, the picture is doubtless somewhat exaggerated, as usual; but it is extraordinarily vivid and powerful, and shews that the Platonic analogy between the individual and the State may prove in the hands of a master an admirable clue whereby to unravel the workings of the human soul in the individual as well as in the State.

νῦν δὴ κτλ. See 558 C, D. With ἀπαιδεύτως cf. 552 E note

κηφήνων κτλ. It is clear from the summary of this passage in IX 572 C συγγενόμενος δὲ κομψοτέροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ἄρτι διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμιῶν that κηφήνων and αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς refer to human drones, and not to the κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίαι in the young man's heart. αἴθωσι ‘furious,’ ‘wild’ (Jebb on Soph. Ajax 221 ) shews that the drones are of the ‘stinging’ order (552 C ff., 555 D ff.).

ὀλιγαρχίας ‐‐ δημοκρατίαν . See cr. n. Schneider defends the MSS by explaining μεταβολὴ ὀλιγαρχική as “ea quae ad ὀλιγαρχίαν pertinet eamque efficit,” and referring τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ “ad ipsam ὀλιγαρχίαν in adjectivo latentem.” δημοκρατικήν he thinks is written for δημοκρατίαν by a sort of attraction. This explanation is much too difficult and obscure. Nor can ὀλιγαρχικῆς by itself stand for ὀλιγαρχικῆς πολιτείας, at all events in this connexion. The MS reading can only mean ‘of the oligarchical change within himself into a democratical,’ an expression which bears no sense. I formerly wrote ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τοῦ—δημοκρατικόν, comparing 559 E, 560 A; but it may fairly be objected that the ‘oligarchical element’ within the man does not change into a democratical: it is the government that changes. For this reason I now prefer my old suggestion ( Cl. Rev. IV p. 357), although the corruption of ὀλιγαρχικοῦ — δημοκρατικόν is perhaps somewhat easier to explain. For the combination of genitives cf. V 449 A note An alternative solution would be to insert πολιτείας after ἑαυτῷ. This gives excellent sense, but it is difficult to assign a plausible reason for the loss of πολιτείας in all our MSS. I am unable to resist the conclusion that the text is corrupt, otherwise I should not venture to make any alteration. If Plato did not write the passage as it is printed above, there can be little doubt that πολιτείας has accidentally disappeared.

μετέβαλλε κτλ. See 556 E. τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν means of course τῷ ἑτέρῳ εἴδει τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.

τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ : ‘the oligarchical element within one.’ ἑαυτῷ is ‘oneself’: cf. III 407 C μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ἐν αὐτῷ, which Ast adopted (after Stephanus), would be easier; but I think Plato means to suggest that the oligarchical element present in this νεανίας is a universal feature of the human race. J. and C. think ἐκείνῳ and ἑαυτῷ may have changed places—a conjecture which is surely too bold. Schneider, taking ἑαυτῷ as ‘himself’ and not ‘oneself,’ compares ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν below and αὐτῷ—ἐν ἑαυτῷ in 559 D, E; but here there is nothing corresponding to the αὐτῷ in each of these passages, and ἑαυτῷ cannot therefore be translated in Schneider's way.