τὸν κολακεύοντα
is explained by the Oxford editors as ‘the life that is flattering him,’ with reference to 538 D. It is rather, I think, ‘the flattering life’ i.e. the life of the
κόλαξ (cf.
ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος and the like in Arist.
Eth. Nic. I 2. 1095^{b} 17 ff.). In other words the epithet which properly belongs to the person who lives the life is transferred to the life which he lives. Aristotle reminds us that
ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον (
Pol.
Δ 4. 1292^{a} 20), and the demagogic life may be taken as one among many illustrations of Plato's meaning, especially as in
παράνομος κτλ. he seems to be thinking of Alcibiades: cf. Thuc. VI 15. 4 and 28. 2. See VI 494 C ff. notes and Bosanquet
Companion p. 306.
δόξει
. The appearance does not exclude the reality: cf. (with J. and C.)
Soph.
O. T. 402
and Thuc. III 10. 1.
εὐλαβουμένῳ
refers not to the pupils, but to Glauco as legislator, who ‘meddles with Dialectic’ by introducing the Guardians to it. This appears clearly both from
εὐλάβεια and from
ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἔργον in 537 D.
εὐλαβουμένους (Madvig) and
εὐλαβουμένοις (Baiter) are therefore wrong.
μὴ νέους κτλ.
Cf. Arist.
Eth. Nic. I 1. 1095^{a} 2
τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος. It is clear from the present passage that Dialectic is largely concerned with moral and religious questions, as Bosanquet (
Companion p. 302) and Nettleship (
Lect. and Rem. II p. 291) remark. See App. III. Grote (III pp. 237—239) has some interesting observations on Plato's exclusion of the young from dialectical debate; but it is scarcely right to say that the
Parmenides (135 C—136 E) contradicts Plato's precept in the
Republic, for the disputations in the
Parmenides are a preliminary exercise (
γυμνασία 135 D) to be undertaken before we attempt to define
καλόν τε τί καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν (135 C).
οἶμαι γάρ σε κτλ.
The same phenomenon is similarly described in
Phil. 15 D
—16 A: cf. also
Ap. 23 C
and Isocr.
Panath. 26.
ἀντιλογίαν
. See on V 454 A.
τούτου
: this provision, viz. that they shall not begin Dialectic in youth (539 B). The genitive depends on
προειρημένα (which refers to passages like VI 485 ff., 490, 503 C, VII 535 A ff.), and not, as J. and C. suggest, on
εὐλαβείᾳ .
ὡς ‐‐ ἔρχεται
. On the construction see III 410 B note
ἔτη ‐‐ τότε
. 537 B.
πέντε θές
. Krohn thinks five years very short, compared with the time allotted to the
προπαιδεία, and suspects that we have here ‘a silent confession that there is not so very much to say about the Ideas after all.’ (
Pl. St. p. 187). Five years devoted
ἐνδελεχῶς καὶ ξυντόνως to Dialectic exclusively is a good deal; and we may be sure that Plato does not intend his Guardians to neglect the subject between 35 and 50, although practical duties occupy most of their time. Moreover at 50, Dialectic is resumed, and it is not till then that the Idea of Good is fully apprehended, so that the five years from 30 to 35 were certainly not thought by Plato to exhaust the subject. We must also beware of supposing that there is any break of continuity in the education of the Guardians. The study of each propaedeutic ‘art’ by itself prepares us for seeing all the ‘arts’ in their mutual relations and interdependence, and the comparative survey of the ‘arts’ in turn prepares us for Dialectic (537 C), nor need the subjects of the
προπαιδεία be finally abandoned after we enter on Dialectic. See Appendices II and III.