Plato Republic 7.527

Paul Shorey (Translator)

Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

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Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)
Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 7.527 focus

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. Geometry (and mathematics) is inevitably less abstract than dialectics. But the special purpose of the Platonic education values mathematics chiefly as a discipline in abstraction. Cf. on 523 A, p. 152, note b; and Titchener, A Beginner’s Psychology, pp. 265-266:
There are probably a good many of us whose abstract idea of triangle is simply a mental picture of the little equilateral triangle that stands for the word in text-books of geometry.
There have been some attempts to prove (that of Mr. F. M. Cornford in Mind, April 1932, is the most recent) that Plato, if he could not anticipate in detail the modern reduction of mathematics to logic, did postulate something like it as an ideal, the realization of which would abolish his own sharp distinction between mathematics and dialectic. The argument rests on a remote and strained interpretation of two or three texts of the Republic (cf. e.g. 511 and 533 B-D) which, naturally interpreted, merely affirm the general inferiority of the mathematical method and the intermediate position for education of mathematics as a propaedeutic to dialectics. Plato’s purpose throughout is not to exhort mathematicians as such to question their initiatory postulates, but to mark definitely the boundaries between the mathematical and other sciences and pure dialectics or philosophy. The distinction is a true and useful one today. Aristotle often refers to it with no hint that it could not be abolished by a new and different kind of mathematics. And it is uncritical to read that intention into Plato’s words. He may have contributed, and doubtless did contribute, in other ways to the improvement and precision of mathematical logic. But he had no idea of doing away with the fundamental difference that made dialectics and not mathematics the coping-stone of the higher education—science as such does not question its first principles and dialectic does. Cf. 533 B-534 E.
2. The very etymology of geometry implies the absurd practical conception of the science. Cf. Epin. 990 C
γελοῖον ὄνομα
.
3. Cf. Polit. 302 E, Laws 757 E, 818 B, Phileb. 62 B, Tim. 69 D, and also on 494 A. The word ἀναγκαίως has been variously misunderstood and mistranslated. It simply means that geometers are compelled to use the language of sense perception though they are thinking of abstractions (ideas) of which sense images are only approximations.
4. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1051 a 22
εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ· διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν
, geometrical constructions, too, are discovered by an actualization, because it is by dividing that we discover them. (Loeb tr.)
5. For φθεγγόμενοι cf. on 505 C, p. 89, note g.
6. Cf. Thompson on Meno 87 A.
7. E. Hoffmann, Der gegenwärtige Stand der Platonforschung, p. 1091 (Anhang, Zeller, Plato, 5th ed.), misunderstands the passage when he says:
Die Abneigung Platons, dem Ideellen irgendwie einen dynamischen Charakter zuzuschreiben, zeigt sich sogar in terminologischen Andeutungen; so verbietet er Republ. 527 A für die Mathematik jede Anwendung dynamischer Termini wie τετραγωνίζειν, παρατείνειν, προστιθέναι
Plato does not forbid the use of such terms but merely recognizes their inadequacy to express the true nature and purpose of geometry.
8. Cf. Meyerson, De l’explication dans les sciences, p. 33:
En effet, Platon déjà fait ressortir que la géométrie, en dépit de l’apparence, ne poursuit aucun but pratique et n’a tout entière d’autre objet que Ia connaissance.
9. i.e. mathematical ideas are (Platonic) ideas like other concepts. Cf. on 525 D, p. 164, note a.
10. καλλιπόλει: Plato smiles at his own Utopia. There were cities named Callipolis, e.g. in the Thracian Chersonese and in Calabria on the Gulf of Tarentum. Cf. also Herod. vii. 154. fanciful is the attempt of some scholars to distinguish the Callipolis as a separate section of the Republic, or to take it as the title of the Republic.
11. Plato briefly anticipates much modern literature on the value of the study of mathematics. Cf. on 526 B, p. 166, note a. Olympiodorus says that when geometry deigns to enter into matter she creates mechanics which is highly esteemed.
12. For ὅλῳ καὶ παντί cf. 469 C. Laws 779 B, 734 E, Phaedo 79 E, Crat. 434 A.
13. Xen. Mem. iv. 7. 3 ff. attributes to Socrates a similar utilitarian view of science.
14. For ἡδὺς εἶ cf. 337 D, Euthydem. 300 A, Gorg. 491 E
ἥδιστε
, Rep. 348 C
γλυκὺς εἶ
, Hipp. Maj. 288 B.
15. Cf. on 499 D-E, p. 66, note a.
16. Again Plato anticipates much modern controversy.
17. Cf. Xen. Symp. 1. 4
ἐκκεκαθαρμένοις τὰς ψυχάς
, and Phaedo 67 B-C.
18. Another instance of Plato’s unction. Cf. Tim. 47 A-B, Eurip. Orest. 806
μυρίων κρείσσων
, and Stallbaum ad loc. for imitations of this passage in antiquity.
19. For ἀμηχάνως ὡς Cf. Charm. 155 D
ἀμήχανόν τι οἷον
. Cf. 588 A, Phaedo 80 C, 95 C, Laws 782 A, also Rep. 331 A
θαυμάστος ὡς
, Hipp. Maj. 282 C, Epin. 982 C-E, Aristoph. Birds 427, Lysist. 198, 1148.
20. This is the thought more technically expressed in the earlier work, Crito 49 D. Despite his faith in dialectics Plato recognizes that the primary assumptions on which argument necessarily proceeds are irreducible choices of personality. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 478, Class. Phil. ix. ( 1914) p. 352.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη κτλ. : ‘the nature of this science is in precise contradiction to’ etc. πᾶν τοὐναντίον is adverbial, and ἔχει intransitive. In what follows Plato is not (as Stallbaum strangely supposes) censuring contemporary geometricians, “sed vitium quoddam ipsius scientiae” (Schneider, who refers to VI 510 B—511 A), for even those ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι agree with him. It is however probable on other grounds that Plato himself was afraid lest his pupils should depend too much on geometrical figures and instruments; and Plutarch tells us that he reproved Eudoxus and others for this very fault: ἀπόλλυσθαι γὰρ οὕτω καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι τὸ γεωμετρίας ἀγαθὸν αὖθις ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ παλινδρομούσης, καὶ μὴ φερομένης ἄνω μηδὲ ἀντιλαμβανομένης τῶν ἀϊδίων καὶ ἀσωμάτων εἰκόνων, πρὸς οἷσπερ ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ θεός ἐστι ( Conv. Disp. VIII 2. 718 F: cf. also Vit. Marc. 14. 5—7. The anecdote refers in particular to stereometrical instruments, but its moral applies equally to the study of plane geometry). See Rothlauf l.c. pp. 66 ff. and Gow Gk Math. p. 181.

ἀναγκαίως ‘in beggarly fashion’ (“nothgedrungenen Weise” Prantl). They are ‘hard up’ for words to express their meaning, and must consequently use language which does not: cf. VI 510 D. J. and C.'s explanation “with merely practical needs in view” is quite wrong; nor does the word appear to me to contain “a facetious allusion to geometrical necessity” (in the sense of V 458 D), as they assert. Madvig's ἀκάκως for ἀναγκαίως is a singularly unhappy suggestion.

παρατείνειν = ‘to apply,’ e.g. a parallelogram to a given line: cf. Men. 87 A ( παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν—γραμμὴν παρατείναντα κτλ.) with E. S. Thompson's note. Blass takes the same view ( de Pl. math. p. 19). Euclid's expression for this is παραβάλλειν (X 18 ff. and passim: cf. Cantor l.c. p. 145). The ordinary translation ‘produce’ (as e.g. a line) has no authority, and Euclid's word for ‘producing’ a line is ἐκβάλλειν or προσεκβάλλειν (I 5, 17 and passim. So also in Aristotle: see the Ind. Arist. s.v.).

προστιθέναι : ‘to add,’ sc. one μέγεθος to another in any geometrical construction: cf. Nicom. Introd. Ar. II 12. 2. Euclid uses συντιθέναι, σύγκειμαι (X 16 and passim) of such an operation.

φθεγγόμενοι is said “non sine eleganti quadam irrisione” (Stallbaum): cf. VI 505 C note

τὸ δέ : ‘whereas’: cf. I 340 D note

τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος . Plato held the objects of mathematical study to be ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα ‘eternal and unchangeable’ (Arist. Met. A 6. 987^{b} 16: cf. VI 510 C ff., VII 526 A note), but not Ideas. The Platonic meaning of τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος is certainly not exhausted by the observation that “the truths of every science are always true” (Bosanquet). ὄντος implies substantial existence, independently of our thoughts, and independently also of particulars. The existence of τὰ μαθηματικά as μιμήματα τῶν ὄντων or copies of the Ideas, ‘moving in and out of’ the material substance of the Universe, which they stamp with an infinite diversity of forms and shapes, is a cardinal doctrine of Plato's physics ( Tim. 50 C al.), and Bosanquet appears to me to rob the words of Plato of half their significance, in the fruitless attempt to find in his ontology nothing but what commends itself to certain schools of philosophy in the present day. See V 476 E and App. I.

τοῦ ποτέ κτλ. : ‘that which at some particular time is a particular instance of becoming and perishing.’ τι γιγνομένου= ὄντος (the copula) γιγνομένου τινός, but γιγνομένου itself involves the copula, the presence of which would here be intolerable. Cf. V 473 D note and Euthyph. 10 C εἴ τι γίγνεται ἤ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι, γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενόν ἐστι. Here τι is indeclinable like τι in Lach. 200 B , Menex. 247 B ( οἰομένῳ τι εἶναι), Euthyd. 303 C ( δοκούντων τι εἶναι), οὐδέν, μηδέν etc. tolerably often in tragedy, and the adverbial use of ἀμφότερα and τἀναντία (e.g. Lach. 185 A ὑέων γὰρ που ἢ χρηστῶν ἢ τἀναντία γενομένων κτλ.): cf. also (with Schneider Addit. p. 57) Procl. in Tim. 136 E τοῦ—ἀδιαιρέτως πάντα ὄντος et al. The indeclinable form adds to the emphasis, and indeed τινὸς (if placed after ποτέ) could hardly stand at all. Schneider translates “des etwas werdenden und vergehenden,” apparently taking τι predicatively with γιγνομένου. But the expression ‘that which becomes something’ suggests a substratum underlying γιγνόμενον, whereas the only correct antithesis to ὄν ( τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος) is γιγνόμενον itself. Stallbaum wrongly explains τι as “aliqua ratione.” A few inferior MSS omit the word. I believe the text is sound, though possibly τι should be accented, as in the exactly similar Aristotelian usage of τις “ad significandam τὴν ἀτομότητα” (Bonitz Ind. Ar. p. 763) e.g. ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος. The use of ποτέ also reminds us of the ποτέ of the Categories.

γεωμετρική is an adjective (Schneider).

σχεῖν . The tense is inchoative or ingressive, as usual: see 516 E note

καλλιπόλει . Socrates rallies Glauco on his ‘braif toun.’ The word, as J. and C. point out, is full of tenderness and affection. Callipolis was the name of several cities in Greece (PapeBenseler Gr. Eigennam. s.v.), a fact which sufficiently refutes Herwerden's doubts as to the formation of the word: see also (with Schneider) Lobeck's Phrynichus pp. 600—607. Herwerden ought not to have revived the tasteless and prosaic conjectures καλῇ πόλει ( Π^{2}) and καλλίστῃ πόλει ( Ξ).

αὐτοῦ : viz. τοῦ μαθήματος.

καὶ δὴ καὶ κτλ. See on 526 B.

ἡμμένος τε . Herwerden excises τε, comparing 526 D; but the MSS are a safer guide.

ἐμοὶ γοῦν . Schneider and others write ἔμοιγ’ οὖν (see cr. n.), but οὖν is too strongly illative for this passage. Cf. I 335 E note

τὸ γὰρ περὶ κτλ. Cf. 526 C note and Xenophon there quoted, esp. § 4 ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὥραν καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύνασθαι γιγνώσκειν κτλ. and infra τὰς ὥρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγιγνώσκοντες. The ana logy of this passage suggests that in Plato καὶ (‘both’) μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν depends on ὥρας, which is the accusative plural: cf. Laws 812 B εὐαισθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περί τε τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς κτλ. Practical astronomy will enable one to tell both the time of month and the time of year by looking at the moon and the sun. For ὥρας μηνῶν cf. also, besides the passage of Xenophon just quoted, Eur. Alc. 449 f. Σπάρτᾳ κυκλὰς ἁνίκα Καρνείου περινίσσεται ὥρα | μηνός κτλ. Schneider and the English translators take ὥρας as genitive and parallel with μηνῶν κτλ., but it is difficult to see what εὐαισθητοτέρως ἔχειν περὶ ἐνιαυτῶν can mean: for ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὡρῶν in VI 488 D is quite different. Schleiermacher translates the passage correctly.

εὐαισθητοτέρως . For this form of the comparative adverb see I 343 E note

ἡδὺς εἶ : ‘you amuse me.’ See I 337 D note

μὴ δοκῇς κτλ. The usefulness of ‘useless’ studies is a fundamental principle in Plato's theory; and (as Schneider points out) ὅτι ἐν τούτοις κτλ. is intended to shew that liberal studies are in the highest and truest sense useful.

τὸ δ’ ἔστιν . I 340 D note

χαλεπόν . Cobet's παγχάλεπον (after Nicom. Introd. Ar. III 7) is a wholly gratuitous change: see App. VII.

ἑκάστου . Every human being has an ὄργανον ψυχῆς viz. νοῦς: it is indeed the possession of νοῦς which makes him at once truly human and therewithal divine (VI 501 B note). The genitive is much more expressive than ἑκάστῳ, which Herwerden proposes: cf. 518 C note, and for the combination of genitives V 449 A note

ἐκκαθαίρεται κτλ. : ‘is purged and rekindled.’ In passages like this Plato hurls his metaphors about with Shakespearian vehemence and profusion. Cf. II 365 C note, and see the admirable remarks on metaphor by the author of the treatise περὶ ὕψους 32. 4 πλήθους καὶ τόλμης μεταφορῶν—τὰ εὔκαιρα καὶ σφοδρὰ πάθη καὶ τὸ γενναῖον ὕψος εἶναί φημι ἴδιά τινα ἀλεξιφάρμακα, ὅτι τῷ ῥοθίῳ τῆς φορᾶς ταυτὶ πέφυκεν ἅπαντα τἄλλα παρασύρειν καὶ προωθεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ὡς ἀναγκαῖα πάντως εἰσπράττεσθαι τὰ παράβολα, καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν σχολάζειν περὶ τὸν τοῦ πλήθους ἔλεγχον διὰ τὸ συνενθουσιᾶν τῷ λέγοντι. The eye of soul is purged of its blindness: its smouldering fires flame forth afresh. To translate “‘is polished’ like a soiled mirror” (J. and C.), besides being wrong, falls far below the level of Plato's ὕψος. The chiasmus in ἐκκαθαίρεται—τυφλούμενον adds to the literary effect. On other readings in this passage see App. VII.

οἷς μὲν οὖν κτλ. The logical sequence is somewhat difficult. Do not (says Socrates) be so anxious to persuade οἱ πολλοί of the usefulness of our curriculum. Its true utility is difficult to understand, and οἱ πολλοί will not easily be persuaded of it. Those who agree with us about its true utility will highly approve of your proposals; but οἱ πολλοί will not, for they can see no practical advantage (worthy of mention) accruing from them. δόξεις λέγειν attributes the proposals to Glauco as in D μὴ δοκῇς—προστάττειν, and ἄλλην is said with reference to τούτου. To the ὠφελία of intellectual salvation such persons are blind; and they cannot see any other, i.e. any practical ὠφελία worth mentioning in Plato's studies. ἄλλην cannot be understood as “beyond their practical applications” (D. and V.) unless we refer it to Glauco's remark τὸ γὰρ περὶ κτλ. in D, to the detriment both of grammar and of sense.

σκόπει οὖν κτλ. ‘Very well: make up your mind once for all with which of these parties you are discoursing: or are you not addressing your remarks to either, but’ etc.? Glauco's insistence on the practical uses of astronomy may be all very well with a popular audience, but are out of place in a philosophical discussion. For this peremptory αὐτόθεν cf. Symp. 213 A. οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους lit. ‘not to neither’: cf. the familiar μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ for μᾶλλον ἤ (Kühner Gr. Gr. II pp. 771—773). I understand ἢ—ὄνασθαι (with Ast) as an independent question: for it is difficult to supply ‘whether.’ Schneider's objections to this view are based on the idea that ἢ οὐ (if interrogative) must have an affirmative answer; but οὐ has nothing to do with ἤ, and only balances ἀλλά: cf. Ar. Plut. 372 μῶν οὐ κέκλοφας, ἀλλ’ ἥρπακας; Plato makes this clear by placing the two contrasting clauses in close juxtaposition. οὐ is omitted by Ξ and some inferior MSS. The text is, however, sound, and none of the proposed corrections— σὺ for οὐ (Schneider), εἰ πρὸς οὐδετέρους (Madvig), οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους (Cobet), εἰ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους (Baiter), ἦ που πρὸς οὐδετέρους (Liebhold)—will bear examination, though Cobet's deserves the praise of elegance.