Plato Republic 6.508

Paul Shorey (Translator)

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Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The Annenberg CPB/Project.

Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)
Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 6.508 focus

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of ἰδέα. Cf. Laws 689 D
καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος
. Form over-translates ἰδέᾳ here, which is little more than a synonym for γένος above. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 250.
2. Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians did ( Cratyl. 397 D, Aristoph. Peace 406 ff., Herod. iv. 188). Cf. Laws 821 B, 899 B, 950 D, Apol. 26 D, Epinomis 985 B, 988 B.
3. Cf. my Idea of good in Plato’s Republic pp. 223-225, Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, pp. 374-384. Mediaeval writers have much to say of Platos mysterious Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses τἀγαθόν in much the same way. It is naive to take the language of Platonic unction too literally. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 394 ff.
4. Cf. 509 A, Plotinus, Enn. i. 6. 9
οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος
and vi. 7. 19, Cic. Tusc. i. 25. 73 in fine
quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare,
Manilius ii. 115:
quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse,
et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum?
Goethe's
Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Die Sonne könnt es nic erblicken,
and Goethe to Eckermann, Feb. 26, 1824:
Hätte ich nicht die Welt durch Anticipation bereits in mir getragen, ich wäre mit sehenden Augen blind geblieben.
5. i.e. creation was the work of benevolent design. This is one of the few passages in the Republic where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the Timaeus. It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of τἀγαθόν here either with god or with the ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p 512.
6. Cf. Gorg. 465 B-C, 510 A-B, 511 E, 530 D, 534 A, 576 C, Phaedo 111 A-B, Tim. 29 C, 32 A-B. For ἀνάλογον in this sense cf. 511 E, 534 A, Phaedo 110 D.
7. Plato’s rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being the good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato’s ethical and political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of good, i.e. the sanction, and not, as some commentators insist, the truth.
8. No absolute distinction can be drawn between εἶδος and ἰδέα in Plato. But ἰδέα may be used o carry the notion of apprehended aspect which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 379 A, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. Phil. xx. ( 1925) p. 347.
9. The meaning is clear. we really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. the position and case of γιγνωσκομένης are difficult. But no change proposed is any improvement.
10. Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 B
αἴσχιστον . . . αἴσχιον
, 578 B, Symp. 180 A-B and Bury ad loc. The same characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the Symposium where Agathon’s speech, which seems the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates: similarly in the Gorgias and the tenth book of the Republic, Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 174, Introd. p. lxi. This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and practical conclusions. Cf. e.g. Meno 81 D-E.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν : the heavenly constellations, which form the οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος ( Tim. 40 A ). Plato's description of the sun is instinct with religious feeling. The ‘clear god and patron of all light, From whom each lamp and shining star doth borrow The beauteous influence that makes him bright’ claims adoration from Plato not merely as an οὐράνιος θεός, like the other stars, but as the symbol and scion ( ἔκγονος) of the Supreme Idea or God. Cf. Bonitz Disp. Plat. duae, p. 6 note 3, and especially Paul Shorey in Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. Vol. I pp. 224 ff. The sunworship of some of the Neo-Platonists was inspired in no small measure by this passage of the Republic; see in particular Julian's ‘Address to the Sovereign Sun’ ( εἰς τὸν βασιλέα ἥλιον) Or. IV. Cf. 508 D note

ἡλιοειδεστάτην . The Eye is the Body's Sun: cf. Ar. Thesm. 16 , 17 ᾧ μὲν βλέπειν χρὴ πρῶτ’ ἐμηχανήσατο | ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντίμιμον ἡλίου τροχῷ. A similar idea appears in St Matth. 6. 22 ὁ λύχνος τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὁ ὀφθαλμός. Conversely, the Sun is often in Greek poetry called the Eye of the World or of Day, and Shakespeare invokes the Sun in the words ‘O eye of Eyes!’ ( Rape of Lucrece): cf. also Milton Par. Lost V 171 ‘Thou Sun! of this great world both eye and soul.’ Both comparisons rest ultimately on the favourite Greek idea of the Universe as the Macrocosm, and Man as the Microcosm. See on this subject Zeller^{3} II 2. p. 488, III 2. pp. 136, 397 notes, and Stein Psych. d. Stoa I pp. 205—214.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. Pindar Fr. 107 (Bergk) expresses the same idea in the language of poetry: Ἀκτὶς ἀελίου, τί πολύσκοπ’ ἐμήσαο, θοῶν μᾶτερ ὀμμάτων.

τὴν δύναμιν is of course τὴν δύναυιν τοῦ ὁρᾶν, ‘the power of seeing.’ The translation ‘faculty’ (D. and V.) for δύναμιν is incorrect; for the faculty of ὄψις is supposed to be present in the eyes even when there is no light (507 D). But the eye has no ‘power’ to see, i.e. cannot exercise the faculty of ὄψις unless such a power is constantly dispensed ( ταμιευομένην) to it from the Sun. Cf. Biehl die Id. d. Guten p. 52, where the same view is taken. The word ἐπίρρυτον (‘flowing over,’ ‘overflowing it,’ cf. Tim. 80 D ) as well as ταμιευομένην unmistakably points the allusion to Light. See also on ὅταν μὲν κτλ. and τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. in 508 D.

φάναι . Cf. 473 A note

ὅ τί περ ‐‐ ὁρώμενα explains ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, which should be understood in its strict sense of proportionate or ‘geometrical equality’: see Gorg. 508 A ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται.

τοῦτον after τοῦτο is needed to balance αὐτό (cf. 511 E): in construction, it depends, like ὅν, on ἐγέννησεν (Schneider). τοῦτο itself, like ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, is predicative (‘ut hoc esset’). Stallbaum erroneously supplies φάναι με λέγειν to govern τοῦτον.

ὧν ἂν ‐‐ ἐπέχῃ . ἐπέχῃ ‘occupat’ as in the Homeric ἑπτὰ δ’ ἐπέσχε πέλεθρα and the like. With ἐπί of light cf. Mimn. 2. 8 ἐπὶ γῆν κίδναται ἠέλιος. The Greek will not admit of D. and V.'s translation ‘upon which the light of day is shedding colour’; and Plato moreover, both here and in Tim. 67 C , looks on Colour as something inherent in the Object, not imparted by Light, although Light is of course necessary in order to see it. Cf. 507 D note

φῶς ‐‐ φέγγη : ‘lux — lumina.’ The words are constantly interchanged, but, when contrasted with φέγγος, φῶς denotes a natural or primary, φέγγος an artificial or derivative light. See Neil on Ar. Knights 1319 . Plato knew that the Moon's light is borrowed from the Sun (X 616 E).

ὧν ὁ ἥλιος κτλ. ‘The Sun’ is here said loosely for ‘the Sunlight’ or ‘light of Day’ ( τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς above); for, as appears from 508 E, 508 A, it is not the Sun, but Light, which is to be equated with Truth and Being ( οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν in D). See also on τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. in 508 D. Instead of καταλάμπει, καταλάμπῃ is read by a majority of editors, with several MSS, including Ξ: but ὅς for ὃς ἄν is, to say the least, extremely rare in prose, and the corruption καταλάμπῃ was easy after ὅταν. καταλάμπει was, if I mistake not, originally the reading of A (see cr. n.), and is at least as well supported by the other MSS as καταλάμπῃ. J. and C., reading καταλάμπῃ, strangely observe that ‘ ἄν would be felt as superfluous after ὅταν .’

ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται : sc. καθαρὰ ὄψις, supplied from καθαρᾶς ὄψεως above. ‘ <ὄψις> ἐνοῦσα <σαφὴς> lubens suppleverim’ says Herwerden, and ὄψις is found in a few MSS, including q. But the feminine inflexion prevents the possibility of mistake: cf. 503 E note The initial syllable of ἐνοῦσα should be emphasized to point the contrast with οὐκ ἐνούσης, where οὐκ is also emphatic.

ὅταν μὲν κτλ. ἀπερείσηται=‘is stayed upon’ (cf. IX 581 A), not ‘has fastened upon’ (D. and V.), which suggests an altogether different and much less appropriate idea. Cf. Phaed. 79 D πέπαυται τοῦ πλάνου, Plot. XX 4 Kirchhoff παύσασα δὲ τῆς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πλάνης ἐνιδρύει τῷ νοητῷ, and Dante Parad. 4. 124, 125 Io veggio ben che giammai non si sazia Nostro intelletto, se 'l ver non lo illustra. The soul can find no rest except in that ‘whereon Truth and Being shine’: elsewhere she is tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine ( ἄνω—μεταβάλλον. For ἄνω καὶ κάτω see Heindorf on Gorg. 495 A ). Instead of οὗ, van Heusde proposes ὅ, but οὗ is proved correct by ὧν above. With ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω cf. 490 B note Here, as there, the aorists denote instantaneous action. The faculty of νοῦς is suddenly actualized into νόησις by being turned upon its proper object. Then and not till then does the Soul ‘appear to have reason,’ for Reason has hitherto lain dormant within. Cf. (with Biehi l.c. p. 51) Tim. 37 C , Parm. 136 E and VII 518 C—519 A. See also on τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. below, and 508 E note

κεκραμένον . The suggestion κεκρυμμένον forgets that τὸ γιγνόμενον is not total darkness but only twilight. It is ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι (V 478 E: cf. also 479 C)—a halfway house between absolute Not-Being and absolute Being.

δοξάζει is explained by V 476 D ff.

τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. The following equations are involved:

τὴν δύναμιν sc. τοῦ γιγνώσκειν is not the faculty of Knowledge or Reason, but the power to exercise that faculty, hardly different, indeed, from the actual exercise of Reason (‘die thatkräftige Aeusserung’ Biehl l.c.). Hence γνώσεως (‘the exercise of knowledge,’ cf. ὅρασις, νόησις and the like) below. Plato's exposition suffers somewhat from the want of a strict philosophical nomenclature. Aristotle would have expressed the same meaning by saying that ὄψις and νοῦς are two δυνάμεις, which ἐνεργοῦσι through Light and Truth respectively, becoming in the one case ὅρασις, in the other νόησις. Plato's τὴν δύναμιν, in fact, is nearly equivalent to Aristotle's τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Cf. Biehl l.c. pp. 50—53.

αἰτίαν κτλ. ‘And being the cause of Knowledge and Truth, I would have you conceive of it as apprehended, no doubt, by Knowledge, but beautiful as is the act of Knowledge, and beautiful though Truth be, you will be right in thinking that it is something other and even more beautiful than these.’ The words αἰτίαν—ἀληθείας sum up and carry on τὸ—ἀποδιδόν. ὡς γιγνωσκομένην is in predicative agreement with αἰτίαν after διανοοῦ (cf. Pol. 258 C πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὡς οὔσας δύο εἴδη διανοηθῆναι): the words are the counterpart of ὁ ἥλιος— ὁρᾶται ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ταύτης (sc. τῆς ὄψεως) in the simile 508 B. μέν after γιγνωσκομένην balances δέ after οὕτω: though apprehended by Knowledge, and therefore in some sense subject thereto, the Idea of Good is (as being the cause of both) more beautiful than Knowledge and Truth. I have (with van Heusde) altered γιγνωσκομένης of the best MSS— see cr. n.—to γιγνωσκομένην. On other interpretations of this difficult passage see App. IX.