Plato Republic 6.505

ἀντιλαμβανόμενος : ‘by holding on fast to me,’ ‘refusing to let me go,’ is the opposite of ἀφεῖναι: cf. VIII 544 B note ‘By raising objections’ (D. and V.) is incorrect: see on 497 D. Socrates means ‘you intend to bother me as before’— αὖ refers to V 449 B ff.—‘by not letting me off, but on this occasion you won't succeed, for I have the answer ready, so ask away!’ Cf. ἐρώτα in Gorg. 448 B .

ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα κτλ. It is clear from πολλάκις ἀκήκοας that the supremacy of the Idea of Good was already a recognised tenet of the Platonic school. No proof of the doctrine is here attempted by Plato (cf. V 475 E note): it is merely expounded and explained. τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν was in antiquity a proverb for any dark or obscure saying: see Amphis ap. D. L. III 27 ἧττον οἶδα τοῦτ’ ἐγώ, | ὦ δέσποτ’ , ἢ τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν. (Another allusion occurs in Alexis ap. Athen. VIII 354 D). Some account of the enormous literature of the subject will be found in Zeller^{4} II 1. pp. 709 ff., 718 note 1. In addition to Stumpf's treatise to be presently named, I have found the monograph by Biehl Die Idee des Guten bei Platon Graz 1870 particularly good and useful. Other special treatises are also referred to in the course of the notes. The majority of interpreters are now agreed in identifying Plato's Idea of the Good with his philosophical conception of the Deity. The best and fullest proof of the identity is still, I think, Stumpf's exhaustive dissertation Das Verhältniss des Platonischen Gottes zur Idee des Guten Halle 1869. There is only one passage in his works where Plato himself appears expressly to identify the two, viz. Phil. 22 C , but on the principle that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, the identification is complete, and I have therefore thought myself at liberty throughout the notes occasionally to illustrate Plato's metaphysics by his theology.

δίκαια καὶ τἄλλα . It is only by κοινωνία with the Idea of Good that δίκαια, καλά etc. become good i.e. useful and beneficial (synonyms of ‘good’: see V 457 B note). Otherwise they are altogether useless. δίκαια does not of course mean the Idea of Justice, but τὰ πολλὰ δίκαια in the widest sense of the term, including νόμιμα περὶ δικαίου: see on V 476 A, 476 C, 479 D. Baiter's δὴ καί for δίκαια καί occurs in one or two inferior MSS, but is certainly wrong: s<*>e on 506 A.

ὅτι ‐‐ ἴσμεν . Cf. 506 D ff., VII 517 B ff., 532 E ff. and Tim. 28 C , where much the same is said of the πατὴρ τοῦ παντός.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν κτλ. : ‘and if we know it not, and should know all else excepting it never so well’ etc. Cobet does ill to expunge εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν. The repetition of εἰ before ἐπισταίμεθα is necessary because, while ἴσμεν expresses a fact, ἐπισταίμεθα is only an improbable supposition: see next note. The sentiment is one of Plato's commonplaces: see for example Alc. II 144 D ff. (where it is expounded in detail), 147 B, Charm. 173 A ff., Euthyd. 280 E ff., 289 A ff., 291, and cf. also Lach. 199 C , Lys. 219 B ff., Phaed. 69 B . Stumpf das Verhältniss etc. p. 87 note compares also the language about the Gods in Laws 905 C. The Euthydemus and Charmides already forecast the city of the Philosopher-king, in which the Knowledge of Good shall ‘sit alone in the helm of the state’ ( Euthyd. 291 D ): see Nohle die Statslehre Pl. pp. 39—48.

κεκτήμεθα . To possess a thing ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is matter of common and daily occurrence; to know everything (except the Good) is not. Hence the indicative κεκτήμεθα is as appropriate now as the optative ἐπισταίμεθα was before. I formerly read κεκτῄμεθα with Π and the majority of editors, but now agree with Schneider that there is no reason to depart from the text of A.

φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ . The last three words were suspected by Morgenstern and bracketed by Stallbaum and others. If we take these words (like ἄνευ ταύτης above) with τἄλλα, they are not superfluous; ‘eo enim quod quis reliqua omnia excepto bono intelligit, efficitur ut nihil, quod pulchrum et bonum sit, intelligat’ (Schneider). That some writers might have omitted the phrase is no ground for interfering with Plato's characteristic fulness of expression.

τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς κτλ. We need not (with Tietzel Die Id. d. Guten u. d. Gottesbegriff p. 9) find in this an allusion to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. Plato means what he says and no more. Pleasure is always the summum bonum of the Many: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. I 3. 1095^{b} 16. In τοῖς κομψοτέροις Dümmler ( Antisth. p. 43) and others have recognised Antisthenes: cf. RP^{7} § 218 B note b. Hermann ( Gesch. u. System p. 329 note 323) interprets the words—more correctly, I think—of Socrates (cf. Xen. Mem. IV 5. 6 ) and his immediate followers, Antisthenes included. The Megarians sometimes held the same view (D. L. II 106). See also next note.

ἐπειδὰν κτλ. : “when they utter the mysterious word ‘good’.” For φθέγγεσθαι of a high-sounding, oracular, impressive utterance cf. VII 527 A, VIII 568 A, Prot. 342 E , Phaedr. 238 D , Ar. Clouds 315 . Plato's criticism applies to himself, in common with the other pupils of Socrates, and was doubtless intended to do so. He constantly declares that ‘knowledge of the good’ is the all-important possession for man: see on εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν 505 A. The present discussion removes the petitio principii by explaining what the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ really means.

ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι κτλ. This is exactly what happens to Callicles in Gorg. 495 A —499 C. If Plato is referring to any dialogue at all, the Gorgias l.c. illustrates his point much better than the Philebus (13 A—C), to which Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 548, Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 192, and others of the older generation of scholars suppose that Plato is alluding. But there is nothing to suggest any crossreference at all. On the question whether the Philebus is or is not prior to the Republic see Jackson in J. Ph. XXV pp. 65—82.

τόδε οὐ φανερὸν κτλ. The contrast is between δίκαια, καλά on the one hand, and ἀγαθά or ὠφέλιμα (V 457 B note) on the other. All men desire the reality of good (cf. IV 438 A note), but many are content with the semblance of honour. Cobet expunges τὰ δοκοῦντα, and καί before δοκεῖν, thereby leaving a very crabbed piece of Greek. Ast's καὶ διώκειν for καὶ δοκεῖν is on a higher plane of criticism. The text is nevertheless sound. δοκεῖν ‘to seem’ is used absolutely, as in II 361 B, and prepares the way for δόξαν ‘seeming’ (cf. 499 A) below. So also Schneider and Stallbaum understand the passage. For ἔτι and ἤδη see on III 412 B.

ὃ δὴ διώκει κτλ. With ὃ followed by τούτου cf. II 357 B note Cobet's ὅτου for τούτου is an unlucky venture. Stumpf justly observes that the Idea of Good is here regarded as the final cause: cf. Phaed. 98 B ff. and Phil. 20 D , 54 C. For a striking theological presentation of the same view see Laws 715 E ff. and 903 B—D. Plato's ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ laid “the foundations of the teleological view of the world” (Krohn Pl. St. p. 131).

ἀπομαντευομένη . Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. X 2. 1173^{a} 4 f. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν [ ἀγαθὸν ] κρεῖττον ἢ καθ’ αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. ἀπομαντευομένη implies the same instinctive, half-unconscious, divination of something beyond our grasp.

διὰ τοῦτο κτλ. See 505 A note

καὶ ἐκείνους : i.e. as well as οἱ πολλοί. For καί cf. VII 519 B.

οἶμαι γοῦν κτλ. No one who does not know the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ can possibly know in what respect or how far particular δίκαια (such as, for example, a particular νόμιμον περὶ δικαίου: see V 479 D note) are good, because it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ in them which makes them good (505 A note). And no one who is ignorant ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν can possibly defend δίκαια (such as for example the δίκαια ἐπιτηδεύματα of Plato's city), because he is at the mercy of anyone who attempts to shew that they are bad. Nor, until we know how far particular δίκαια are good ( πρότερον), can we adequately know these δίκαια themselves, i.e. know which of these really is δίκαιον and which not, for we do not know how they stand in relation to the ultimate source of all justice, viz. the Idea of the Good. It is this which, in the last resort, is the true ‘measure of all things’ ( Laws 716 C ff., where Plato employs the language of theology). Hence the supreme necessity for our Guardians to know the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Bekker first restored the true reading of this passage, which had been strangely mutilated in earlier editions. Stallbaum reads μηδ’ ἂν ἕνα with q, but instances of the future with ἄν—see on 492 C—should not be wilfully multiplied.

τούτων : i.e. τὰ δίκαιά τε καὶ καλά, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν.

πότερον ἐπιστήμην κτλ. Even if it could be shewn that the Philebus is earlier than the Republic— and recent critics take the opposite view —there would be no sufficient reason for holding (with Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 708 note) that Plato is referring to that dialogue, although he there denies that either Knowledge or Pleasure is the Chief Good (20 B ff., 60 E). See also on 505 C and 506 E.

οὗτος κτλ. καλῶς has in reality— see cr. n.—more and better MS support than καλός, which Schneider retained in the belief that A read καλός. Used in this way, καλῶς is colloquial (Jebb on Soph. O. T. 1008 καλῶς ε<*> δῆλος οὐκ εἰδὼς τί δρᾷς).

δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον κτλ. The sentence is ironical, as is clear from ἐξὸν παρ’ ἄλλων (the Sophists forsooth) ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά in D below. Plato frequently feigns ignorance and self-distrust before expounding some great principle of whose truth he is himself profoundly convinced: cf. V 450 D. The notion that he really lays claim only to δόξα or even ὀρθὴ δόξα of the Good is hardly to be entertained, although he does not claim to have perfect knowledge: to that we may, perchance, attain hereafter. See 505 A note

ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι κτλ. On ὀρθὴ δόξα see Men. 97 A —98 A, Theaet. 201 C , Tim. 51 D , E. Correct opinion believes, but does not know, and is therefore blind and insecure. Its ethical correlate is πολιτικὴ or δημοτικὴ ἀρετή: cf. 500 D and IV 430 C notes See in general Zeller^{4} II 1. pp. 588 ff.

σκολιά =‘crooked,’ ‘awry’ is objected to by Hermann on the ground that ὀρθαὶ δόξαι may be blind, but cannot be ‘crooked.’ This is true, but αἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξαι may be both blind and awry; and αἰσχρά, which looks back to αἰσχραί, shews that it is not correct opinions, but opinions without knowledge generally, which are described in τυφλά— σκολιά. Socrates' mock humility will not pretend to more than δόξα, let alone ὀρθὴ δόξα. If you wish for ‘science,’ go to your sophistical rhetoricians, forsooth, and ‘hear things bright and beautiful.’ φανά τε καὶ καλά may be an allusion to the ‘lumina orationis’ of Isocrates and his friends: see 498 E note σκότια, which Hermann conjectures, is apparently not used by Plato.

ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὤν : not ‘just as you are reaching the goal’ (Jowett), but ‘as if you were at the end.’ Jowett practically omits ὥσπερ in his translation.

ὁρμήν . The idea is as of a start or impulse which enables one to clear the obstacles in the way: cf. V 451 C.

τὰ νῦν should be taken with ἐφικέσθαι. If we take it with δοκοῦντος, we must suppose that Socrates intends to suggest that his view of the matter may change (so D. and V.). He is hardly likely to have made such a suggestion, even ironically. ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι is also in favour of connecting τὰ νῦν with ἐφικέσθαι. Cf. Tim. 48 C f. τὴν μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἁπάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε α<*>ρχὰς—τὸ νῦν οὐ ῥητέον, δἰ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, διὰ δὲ τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου δηλῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα κτλ. The emphasis on τὸ νῦν εἶναι and τὰ νῦν seems to hint that a description of the ἀγαθόν, as it is in itself, may be expected on some future occasion. But there is no dialogue in which the Idea of Good is so clearly described as in the Republic, and it is not without reason that every historian of Philosophy regards this passage as the locus classicus on the subject. O. Schneider ( Versuch einer genet. Entw. d. Pl. ἀγαθόν p. 15) thinks of the Philebus; Susemihl ( Gen. Entw. II p. 193) of the Φιλόσοφος, which was perhaps planned, but probably never executed (see on 484 A). The Philebus is unsuitable; and of the Φιλόσοφος we know nothing. I am inclined to think—in view especially of βουλοίμην ἂν κτλ. below—that, although Plato may have cherished the idea of describing the Good without the aid of a simile— εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δἰ αὐτῶν—, he never, at all events in any of his dialogues, did so. In a certain sense, perhaps, the Timaeus describes the Good (see Archer-Hind's edition p. 27), but even there, we study the ‘Father of all’ not in himself so much as in his works. I agree with Stumpf's conclusion (l.c. p. 75) that Plato could hardly have depicted the Idea of Good at all except by means of a comparison. Certainly nothing else could have made it equally clear; and, in point of fact, ‘es wird nirgends Mehr gegeben’ (Stumpf, l.c. p. 59 note). See also next note.

ὃς δὲ ἔκγονος κτλ. The ἔκγονος is the Sun, as presently appears. Socrates' procedure in Phaed. 99 C —E is in some respects like his procedure here. A nearer parallel is Phaedr. 246 A , where, before describing the soul, Socrates observes οἷον μέν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος. The Idea of Good, like the Soul, is best described by one man to another in a figure. On εἰσαῦθις see last note and IV 430 C note