[504]
That is certainly the right way of looking at it, he said.
But what do you understand by the greatest studies?
You remember, I presume, said I, that after distinguishing three kinds 1 in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally. If I did not remember, he said, I should not deserve to hear the rest. Do you also remember 504b what was said before this? What? We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way 2 was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say. Well, he said, it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently 504c to the rest of the company. Nay, my friend, said I, a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything, 3 though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough 4 and that there is no need of further inquiry. Yes, indeed, he said, many experience this because of their sloth. An experience, said I, that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws. That seems likely, he said. Then, said I, such a one must go around 5 504d the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him. Why, are not these things the greatest? said he; but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described? There is not only something greater, I said, but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline 6 as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve 7 to attain 504e to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest 8 matters? It would indeed, 9 he said; but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned? By no means, said I; but do you ask the question.
You remember, I presume, said I, that after distinguishing three kinds 1 in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally. If I did not remember, he said, I should not deserve to hear the rest. Do you also remember 504b what was said before this? What? We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way 2 was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say. Well, he said, it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently 504c to the rest of the company. Nay, my friend, said I, a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything, 3 though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough 4 and that there is no need of further inquiry. Yes, indeed, he said, many experience this because of their sloth. An experience, said I, that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws. That seems likely, he said. Then, said I, such a one must go around 5 504d the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him. Why, are not these things the greatest? said he; but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described? There is not only something greater, I said, but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline 6 as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve 7 to attain 504e to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest 8 matters? It would indeed, 9 he said; but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned? By no means, said I; but do you ask the question.
Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.
Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.
Funding provided by The Annenberg CPB/Project.