ὀφλεῖν κτλ.
The infinitive depends on
φοβερόν, and is like the infinitive after
φοβοῦμαι. In the antithetical clause Plato substitutes the more usual construction with
μή. The future indicative (
κείσομαι) is rare after words of fearing (Goodwin
MT. p. 132), and represents the danger as imminent. To regard
οὔ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν as a reference to the
Ecclesiazusae is rash and unjustifiable: see App. I.
προσκυνῶ κτλ.
The apology looks forward, and not backward; whence
δέ rather than
δή (which Herwerden would read).
Ἀδράστειαν
. Adrasteia was originally, perhaps, a personification of
ἀνάγκη in its relation to humanity and the issues of human conduct. This meaning survived in the Orphic theology (Abel
Orph. Fr. 36, 109—111) and appears in
Phaedr. 248 C
. Specifically, she was viewed as a variety of Nemesis,
θεά τις τοὺς ὑπερηφάνους τιμωροῦσα (Schol. on
Aesch.
Prom. 936
), and in this sense Aeschylus (l.c.) writes
οἱ προσκυνοῦντες τὴν Ἀδράστειαν σοφοί (the first mention of Adrasteia in Greek literature). Adrasteia is in a still more special sense the punisher of proud words; so that
προσκυνῶ Ἀδράστειαν becomes, as here, a sort of apologetic preface to a bold assertion or rash utterance: cf.
Eur.
Rhes. 342
, 468 (
ξὺν δ’ Ἀδραστείᾳ λέγω). See Nägelsbach
Nachhom. Theol. p. 47 and Seymour in the
Proceedings of the Amer. Philol. Assoc. for July 1891 pp. XLVIII ff.
ἐλπίζω κτλ.
ἐλπίζω is ‘I fancy,’ not ‘I expect’: cf. II 383 B note The omission of
εἶναι is curious: Madvig would restore it after
ἁμάρτημα. I can find no parallel to its omission with
ἐλπίζω, but
οἴομαι, ἡγοῦμαι and other verbs of thinking often dispense with it. For examples see Schanz
Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 34.
καλῶν κτλ.
: “concerning noble and good and just institutions” (D. and V.), not “about the beautiful, the good, and the just, in the matter of laws” (J. and C.). The latter explanation gives a good sense, but it is harsh to separate
δικαίων from
νομίμων, and still harsher to take
καλῶν as equivalent to
περὶ καλῶν. Schneider was inclined to treat
δικαίων as a gloss on
νομίμων. But ‘about things beautiful and good and institutions’ is an anti-climax; and, besides, it is of institutions in conjunction with, not as distinct from, justice etc. that Plato is about to speak. In his translation Schneider takes the right view.
εὖ
.
q has
οὐκ εὖ, an obvious but audacious correction, suggested, no doubt, by
καλῶς εἶχεν ἡ παραμυθία in 450 D.
εὖ is ironical. Glauco had comforted Socrates by saying
inter alia that his hearers were friendly (
οὔτε δύσνοι οἱ ἀκουσόμενοι 450 D). Excellent comfort! says Socrates: I had rather, in the circumstances, that they were enemies! Stallbaum and others read
οὐκ εὖ, and Hermann
οὐ, for
εὖ, thinking the irony misplaced; but Glauco's smile (
γελάσας) favours the ironical interpretation, and so does the ‘Socratic irony’ with which the whole sentence is overflowing. I agree with J. and C. in rejecting the pointless alternative rendering ‘you do well to comfort me.’
ὥσπερ φόνου κτλ.
See cr. n.
καί before
καθαρόν is absent from the great majority of MSS and can scarcely, I think, be sound: for the difference in meaning between
καθαρόν and
μὴ ἀπατεῶνα is hardly enough to carry off the double
καί. ὥσπερ belongs to the whole expression
φόνου καθαρόν, which is virtually one word. Hartman would expunge
καὶ μὴ ἀπατεῶνα ἡμῶν, but it is quite in Plato's way to subjoin the interpretation of a metaphor or simile (cf. 470 C, VIII 553 D, 555 D, and my note on
Prot. 314 A
), nor have we any right to excise such expressions wholesale, as many Dutch critics would do (especially J. J. Hartman
de embl. in Pl. text. obviis 1898).
ἐκεῖ
: viz. in cases of
φόνος ἀκούσιος (so Schneider, Stallbaum, etc.), not (with D. and V.) ‘in the next world.’
κἀνθάδε is relevant only if it means ‘in this case too,’ i.e.
ἐν τῷ ἀπατεῶνα εἶναι καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν κτλ.: and this fixes the meaning of
ἐκεῖ.
ὡς ὁ νόμος λέγει
is explained by Dem.
πρὸς Πανταίνετον 58
καὶ γὰρ ἀκούσιοι φόνοι—καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα γίγνεται· ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἁπάντων τούτων ὅρος καὶ λύσις τοῖς παθοῦσι τέτακται τὸ πεισθέντας ἀφεῖναι, and ib. 59. See also
Laws 869 E.
ἀνδρεῖον δρᾶμα κτλ.
There is probably a playful allusion to the mimes of Sophron, as was first pointed out by R. Förster in
Rhein. Mus. XXX (1875) p. 316. According to Suidas (s.v.
Σώφρων) and others, Sophron's mimes were classified as
ἀνδρεῖοι μῖμοι and
γυναικεῖοι μῖμοι. In the former, as may be inferred from Choricius'
Defence of Mimes (first published by Graux in
Revue de Philologie 1 pp. 209 ff.) Sophron represented male characters, in the latter female (
μιμεῖται μὲν ἄνδρας, μιμεῖται δὲ γύναια ib. p. 215). This is corroborated by many of the titles of his plays, such as
ὁ ἀγροιώτας, ὁ θυνναθήρας, ὁ ἄγγελος contrasted with
ταὶ ἀκ<*>στρίαι, ἁ νυμφόπονος, ἁ πενθερά etc. Sophron's mimes are called
δράματα (cf.
ἀνδρεῖον δρᾶμα) by Demetrius
περὶ ἑρμηνείας § 156
σχεδόν τε πάσας ἐκ τῶν δραμάτων αὐτοῦ τὰς παροιμίας ἐκλέξαι ἐστίν. The point here is that just as custom required an
ἀνδρεῖος μῖμος to precede a
γυναικεῖος—this is not otherwise attested, so far as I can discover—, so it will be proper (
ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι) for Plato's women to come on the stage after his men have played their part. Plato's partiality for Sophron is frequently mentioned by ancient authors, as for example by D. L. III 18, Quintil. I 10. 17: see Schuster in
Rhein. Mus. XXIX (1874) pp. 605 ff., where these and other authorities are cited. Susemihl (Bursian's
Jahresbericht 1874—1875 III p. 343) doubted whether Plato has Sophron in view here; but the allusion, which was admitted by Graux (l.c. p. 215 note), and successfully reaffirmed by Förster (
Rhein. Mus. for 1880 p. 472), is highly probable. I can see no point in making
δρᾶμα γυναικεῖον an ironical reference to the
Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes (with Munk
die nat. Ordnung d. Pl. Schr. p. 296, and Chiappelli l.c. p. 196), nor is it likely that the words allude to a dramatic caricature of Plato's policy by some other comedian, as is supposed by Bergk
Gr. Literaturgesch. IV p. 462 note 134. On Sophron's prose-mimes as a preparation for the Socratic Dialogue see Hirzel
der Dialog I pp. 20—26.
κατ’ ἐκείνην κτλ.
: “in following out that original impulse which we communicated to them” (D. and V.).
ὡρμήσαμεν
(sc.
αὐτούς) is causative, and not intransitive, as Jowett supposes.
ἀγέλης
. Cf. II 375 D and infra 460 C, 466 D notes
πλὴν κτλ.
One MS inserts
ταῖς μέν after
πλήν; but, “
ταῖς θηλείαις utpote ex ipsa sententia et ex adjectivo
ἀσθενεστέραις facile intelligendum enuntiatum non est” (Schneider). Schneider's explanation is more accurate than to say (with Stallbaum) that
ταῖς μέν is idiomatically suppressed, like
τὸ μέν before
ἄλλο in
Prot. 330 A
(
ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο): cf. infra 455 E. This passage is thus criticised by Aristotle (
Pol. B. 5. 1264^{b} 4)
ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. But, from Plato's point of view, the analogy holds; for he regards
οἰκονομία as
παρὰ φύσιν even for human beings, and aims at abolishing it.
